



FCH Annals  
Journal of the Florida Conference of Historians

Volume 21  
June 2014

Michael S. Cole, Editor

*FCH Annals: The Journal of the Florida Conference of Historians*

ISSN 2373-9525 (Print)

ISSN 2373-9541 (Online)

The *Annals* is published annually by the Florida Conference of Historians, and includes a selection of papers presented at the most recent annual meeting. Inquiries or requests to purchase copies should be directed to [mcole@fgcu.edu](mailto:mcole@fgcu.edu), or to Michael S. Cole, Florida Gulf Coast University, 10501 FGCU Boulevard South, Fort Myers, Florida 33965.

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## **Thomas M. Campbell Award**

*Beginning with Volumes 6/7, the Florida Conference of Historians has presented the Thomas M. Campbell Award for the best paper published in the Annual Proceedings (now Annals) of that year.*

Thomas M. (Tom) Campbell was the driving force behind the creation of the Florida Conference of Historians, at that time called The Florida College Teachers of History, over 40 years ago. It was his personality and hard work that kept the conference moving forward. Simply put, in those early years he was the conference.

Tom was a professor of US Diplomatic history at Florida State University. The Thomas M. Campbell Award is in his name so that we may recognize and remember his efforts on behalf of the Florida Conference of Historians

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## **J. Calvitt Clarke III Award**

*Beginning with volume 20, the Florida Conference of Historians will present the J. Calvitt Clarke III Award for the best undergraduate research paper published in the Annals.*

In 2012, Dr. Clarke, Professor Emeritus at Jacksonville University and a strong supporter of undergraduate research, graciously provided the seed funding for this important award. He is a frequent contributor and the founding editor of the predecessor to the *Annals*, the *Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians*.

### **Recipients**

- 2014: Michael Rodriguez, Florida Gulf Coast University
- 2013: Amy Denise Jackson, Wesleyan College

## A Note from the Editor

I am delighted to present the latest volume of the *FCH Annals: Journal of the Florida Conference of Historians*. The papers presented at the 2013 Annual Meeting in Sarasota featured an impressively wide range of historical topics and time-periods. The FCH enjoys growing notoriety, and the efforts of our webmaster, Jesse Hingson, to design, maintain, and refine the organization's website have greatly increased the visibility of both the Conference and this publication.

This year the journal has two new ISSNs, one for the print version and one for the online version (which is otherwise identical to the print version). The new numbers should have been assigned with volume 18 when the Executive Council decided on the new, current title (the journal began life as the *Selected Annual Proceedings*). An oversight of mine delayed the assignment new numbers, but this has now been corrected and the ISSN Center of the Library of Congress has also implemented a cross-listing of the old and new numbers to prevent confusion.

We have crossed a new milestone thanks to the efforts of Florida Gulf Coast University alumnus Michael Rodriguez, who contacted the American Historical Association and arranged to have the *Annals* listed in their online directory of history journals.

Congratulations to this year's winner of the Thomas M. Campbell Award, Michael Brooks, for his article entitled "Civilizing the Metropole: The Role of the 1906 Marseille Colonial Exposition in Creating Greater France." Congratulations are also in order to this year's winner of the J. Calvitt Clarke III Award, Michael Rodriguez, for his article entitled "The Ideologization of US-Guatemalan Relations, 1944-1954." Both of these articles appear in the present volume.

I have published an article of my own in this volume, my first with the FCH. It went through the same anonymous peer review as the others and was subject to the same scrutiny by the readers, to whom I owe a debt of gratitude for their hard work. Their comments and suggestions on all of the submissions were of great help in the tasks of selecting the articles that appear in this volume, and helping to smooth any rough edges. Of course any remaining editorial shortcomings in the volume are my own fault, and not theirs. Special recognition goes to Julian Chambliss for his initiative in creating the new logo for the FCH, which appears on the cover of this volume. He wanted the new logo to highlight the core principles of the FCH and capture the organization's expansive character. He certainly achieved these goals. Thanks also to the Executive Council for their continued support of the *Annals* in both print and online formats, and to the many longtime members of the Conference who have provided valuable guidance and input.

Michael S. Cole



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# Not All Brides Were Wealthy and White: Integration of the Women's Pages in 1960s Florida and Across the Country

Kimberly Voss

*University of Central Florida*

In her critique of newspaper society coverage, *New York Times* women's page editor Charlotte Curtis noted sarcastically that not all brides were beautiful – despite what was commonly written in wedding announcements.<sup>1</sup> While they may not have been attractive, the brides who were considered newsworthy for decades did typically have two things in common – they were white and wealthy. The photos showed the race of the women and their place in the city's society determined the size of the photo; the more important the woman was, the larger her photo was in the newspaper. Yet, change was coming by the 1960s as progressive women's page editors fought to change traditional practices. At metropolitan newspapers across the country, black brides and those from working class families began to appear in the wedding section for the first time. This was also true in Florida where several of the most progressive women's pages were published – most noticeably at the *St. Petersburg Times* and the *Fort Lauderdale News*. Other newspapers that were leaders in this area include the *Louisville Courier Journal*, the *Milwaukee Journal* and the *Dallas Times Herald*.

This is the story of the women's page journalists and their sections as the definition of society changed to be more inclusive in the 1950s and 1960s. It is a documentation of how these women opened the door to a previously ignored part of society. Using archival materials, oral histories and industry publications I will explore the integration of the bridal pages of the 1950s and 1960s, adding to the history of journalism and the social history of women.

Prior to the 1970s, most female journalists were restricted to the women's pages of newspapers. The content of the sections were largely based on women's roles as wives and mothers, along with large doses of high society news. At times, the sections were defined as the four Fs: family, fashion, food and furnishings. "Soft news" is often overlooked in place of front page news. The difference had big implications in the industry. As media historian Kay Mills wrote, "hard news and soft news were by no means gender-free terms. Instead, they evoked rich gender implications."<sup>2</sup> Recent research has shown that the soft news content of the women's page was more complex than previously thought.<sup>3</sup> At several metropolitan

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<sup>1</sup> Marilyn Greenwald, "All Brides Are Not Beautiful," *Journalism History* (Fall 1990), 100-109.

<sup>2</sup> Mei-ling Yang, "Women's Pages of the Washington Post and Gender Ideology in the Late 1940s and the 1950s," Master's Thesis, University of Maryland, 1992, 51.

<sup>3</sup> Jan Whitt, *Women in American Journalism: A New History* (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 37-61; Kimberly Wilmot Voss, "Vivian Castleberry: A Case Study of How a Women's Page Editor Lived and Translated the News of a Social Movement," *Southwest Historical Quarterly* (Spring 2007): 514-532; Kimberly Wilmot Voss and Lance Speere, "A Women's Page Pioneer: Marie Anderson and Her Influence at the *Miami Herald* and Beyond," *Florida Historical Quarterly* (Spring 2007): 398-421; Kimberly Wilmot Voss, "Forgotten

newspapers in the post-World War II years there was a change in content as more political and social issues were addressed.

Dorothy Journey, who was the women's page editor at the *Miami Herald* in the 1950s, said one of the advantages of heading women's sections during her tenure was that there were no expectations about what was newsworthy for women. She said, "we were free to explore areas where we thought the reader was very much involved – where we could interpret a trend, explain an event, show new dimensions that would give greater understanding to the life around us."<sup>4</sup> It meant that the traditional content could mix with more progressive material. These sections helped create a foundation for social change that would become more visible in the 1960s.

Forward-thinking women's page editors – often those working in Florida – were making improvements both shocking and subtle as they transformed their sections in ways that transformed their readership. In the 1960s, Florida newspapers dominated the top recognition for women's pages – the Penney-Missouri Awards. Overall, these women's page editors won one-third of all awards during the initial decade of the program.<sup>5</sup> They also helped to transform the newspaper industry through the new kind of content they created and mixed hard news and soft news.

Commonly included in the women's sections were stories of engagements and weddings – although not every bride was included. In many communities, members of the black community were ignored and even for white women, a lack of social clout meant lesser coverage in the women's pages. In some cases, newspapers included a special section that was devoted to "Negro News." This study looks specifically at the women's page content in terms of brides and society news at several progressive metropolitan newspapers.

## **Bridal Background**

As researcher Erika Engstrom noted in her book about the media and bridal coverage, "published gossip in the form of wedding announcements thus provides a record of social life."<sup>6</sup> And those announcements and accompanying stories have a long history. Engstrom noted: "the appeal of weddings as news finds its origins as far back as written news has existed. In addition to their newsworthiness, accounts of weddings of the politically important or of popular movie stars have included

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Feminist: Women's Page Editor Maggie Savoy and the Growth of Women's Liberation Awareness in Los Angeles," *California History* (Spring 2009): 48-64; Kimberly Wilmot Voss, "Dorothy Journey: The 'Godmother' of Women's Page Editors," *Journalism History* (Spring 2010): 13-22; Kimberly Wilmot Voss, "Anne Rowe Goldman: Refashioning Women's News in St. Petersburg, Florida," *FCH Annals: Journal of the Florida Conference of Historians* (March 2011): 104-111.

<sup>4</sup> Dorothy Journey, Autobiography, September 28, 1988, 2. Papers of Dorothy Journey, Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University of Missouri.

<sup>5</sup> George Beebe, "Women's Pages in 1973," *The Bulletin: American Society of Newspaper Editors*, February 1, 1962, 2.

<sup>6</sup> Erika Engstrom, *The Bride Factory: Mass Media Portrayals of Women and Weddings* (New York: Peter Lang, 2012), 65.

gossipy details of the most intricate and minute aspects.”<sup>7</sup> In the 1940s, scholars looked to the weddings announcements of the *New York Times* to evaluate the role of high society and noted the role of women in women’s clubs and their wealth. They found, for example, that 65 percent of brides were members of the elite women’s club the Junior League, and that the education level of the bride was less important than the groom’s educational status.<sup>8</sup>

According to internal memos at the *New York Times*, the editors questioned the decision to run the photos of black brides beginning in at least 1950. In that year the society editor wrote to the managing editor: “I am very confident that so long as we run society news we must do it on the selective basis, and that basis would certainly bar weddings in which Negroes were involved.”<sup>9</sup> During that decade the newspaper ran between forty and fifty stories about black brides without photos and no indication of race in the narrative.<sup>10</sup>

By the 1980s and 1990s, researchers used *New York Times* wedding announcements to determine the role of the women’s liberation movement and the commonality of women keeping their maiden names.<sup>11</sup> In 1997 the *New York Times* published a collection of its recent wedding columns. The *Times*’ wedding reporter noted: “it became clear that while writing about weddings, I could cover any subject from first kisses to family values in the 1990s. It could be a combination of anthropology, gossip, fashion, psychology, home economics and dreams.”<sup>12</sup>

What has not been examined is the more subtle change about society that wedding news contained, especially at newspapers beyond the *New York Times*. Using a social history approach, this is an examination of wedding announcement policies and practices at metropolitan newspapers – other than the *New York Times* – which demonstrated changing attitudes about race and social class. It includes several newspapers in South Florida that were leaders in women’s page journalism. The shift in coverage of weddings signaled a change in who was important enough to cover and who had value in the pages of a newspaper.

## Bridal News

Like many young women starting in journalism in the 1940s, Colleen “Koky” Dishon became the Society Editor of the *Zanesville Times Recorder*. In this job, Dishon, who went on to become the first woman to have her name on the masthead of the *Chicago Tribune*, covered the traditional fare of births and brides. The editor

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 78.

<sup>8</sup> David L Hatch and Mary A. Hatch, “Criteria of Social Status as Derived from the Marriage Announcements in the *New York Times*,” *American Sociological Review* (August 1947): 396-403.

<sup>9</sup> E.L.J. memo to Mr. Sulzberger, July 19, 1950. Society folder, Turner Catledge papers, *New York Times*, New York Public Library.

<sup>10</sup> Turner Catledge letter to Dean Chamberlin, July 29, 1957. Society folder, Turner Catledge papers, *New York Times*, New York Public Library.

<sup>11</sup> Michele Hofnung, “What’s In a Name? Marital Name Choice Revisited,” *Sex Roles* 55 (2006): 817-825.

<sup>12</sup> Lois Smith Brady, *Vow: Weddings of the Nineties from the New York Times* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1997), v.

Al Gonder showed her how to take a wedding at a local baseball diamond and write about it in a creative way (the groom was getting a “good catch”) so that it would be placed on the front page. She recalled that at the time “it wasn’t Hemingway, but that didn’t matter. The lesson was that there were stories in ordinary events and that readers care about the rituals of life.”<sup>13</sup> One of Dishon’s later scoops while at the *Chicago Daily News* newspaper was getting into the exclusive Jay Rockefeller-Sharon Percy wedding.<sup>14</sup> She got her reporter into the event by having an expert create a counterfeit invitation to the wedding.

Noting the “rituals of life” meant that throughout her career she recognized the need for coverage of those moments that were important in a person’s life, Dishon stated: “as we wrote about weddings and births and debutante balls, we learned about the importance of rites and rituals in people’s lives.”<sup>15</sup> *Fort Lauderdale News* women’s page editor Edee Greene pointed out that writing up engagement and wedding announcements provided “invaluable training in accuracy.”<sup>16</sup> For many young women, society writing was a foot in the door of a newspaper at a time when other sections were not hiring women.

### Society with a Small “s”

For much of women’s page history, society coverage was of the upper-class. Yet change was on the way. In a 1964 *Editor & Publisher* feature about *Miami Herald* women’s page editor Marie Anderson said that women’s sections were covering less society news and more hard news. She said, “we need to operate a little more like the city desk.”<sup>17</sup> In a 1967 industry presentation covered by the magazine *Editor & Publisher*, Anderson instructed women’s page journalists to “de-emphasize society activities and emphasize events and features of interest to the whole community.”<sup>18</sup> She said the trend in women’s pages was to play down high society news for a more inclusive approach as to who was covered.<sup>19</sup>

*Dallas Times Herald* women’s page editor Vivian Castleberry had been following that concept throughout the 1960s. She said, “I looked at society with a small “s” instead of a capital “S” which didn’t always please my bosses.”<sup>20</sup> She changed the definition of “society” to include “all humanity – the social structure of the community.”<sup>21</sup> Castleberry worked to include parts of the community and topics that had been ignored in the past. She said, “I always felt more comfortable

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<sup>13</sup> Colleen Dishon, “Newspapers Were a Lot More Exciting Than College,” *ASNE Bulletin* (November 1992): 26.

<sup>14</sup> “Pages for Women,” *Time* magazine, May 19, 1967.

<sup>15</sup> Koky Dishon, “We’ve Come a Long Way – Maybe,” *Media Studies Journal*, 95.

<sup>16</sup> Edee Greene, “How to Hurdle Your Girdle Or: Sex and the City Room,” Theta Sigma Phi Seminar, Cleveland, Ohio, August 24, 1963, 2. Penney-Missouri papers, Edee Greene folder.

<sup>17</sup> Dick Sherry, “Women’s Page Revolt: To the Classifieds!” *Editor & Publisher*, December 26, 1964.

<sup>18</sup> N.A. “Penney-Missouri Workshop is Another Classic Event,” *Southern Advertising and Publishing*, April 1967, 15-16.

<sup>19</sup> Pam Hanlon, “Women’s Rising Status Will Affect News Coverage,” *Columbia Missourian*, 17 March 1967.

<sup>20</sup> Vivian Castleberry, “Women in Journalism,” Washington Press Club Foundation, 60. <http://www.wpcf.org/vivian-castleberry/>

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, 160.

in the hovels of South Dallas and in West Dallas where there was only Spanish spoken . . . . I don't understand Spanish, but I often felt more comfortable in that setting than I did in the glitzy Four Hundred kind of country club, Petroleum Club milieu."<sup>22</sup> When she did occasionally attend society events her discomfort showed. At one party her society editor approached her and told her to "please wipe that expression off your face."<sup>23</sup>

At many newspapers, the publication of brides' photos had also meant taking the size of the image into consideration. The more wealthy the families the larger the photograph of the bride. Dishon, who fought to eliminate the social class-based practice at the *Milwaukee Journal* and later at the *Milwaukee Sentinel*, wrote of the old model, "this changed when the daughter of a company president and the daughter of a factory worker in the same company exchanged vows in the same week. Their stories were paired equally, side by side, under one headline. The old formula was broken."<sup>24</sup> Women's page editor Carol Sutton did the same at the *Courier-Journal* in the late 1960s when it came to becoming inclusive of all brides regardless of social class. She prepared her readers for weeks and eventually the bridal photos ran in alphabetical order and all the same size.<sup>25</sup>

### **Integrating Bridal News**

Marginalization based on race was blatant in the coverage of weddings. For example, black brides were simply not included in the women's pages. At times it was policy and at other newspapers it was practice. In another example, in the late 1950s, women's page editor Drue Lytle fought for Filipino brides to be featured in the pages of the *Honolulu Advertiser* for the first time.<sup>26</sup> It was in the 1950s that women's page editor Marjorie Paxson began publishing pictures of black brides in the *Houston Chronicle*. She attributed many of the changes that occurred in her section to changes in the community: "It was more a matter of let's keep up with the times and stay current. It was clear that our coverage would need to change."<sup>27</sup> She took that experience with her when she became a women's page journalist at the *Miami Herald* and the *St. Petersburg Times*.

From the day that Castleberry started working as the women's page editor in Dallas during the 1950s, she said she intended to publish pictures of African-American brides, although it was against policy. When she asked for permission to publish photos of African-American brides on a regular basis her editors

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 160.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, 162-3.

<sup>24</sup> Kimberly Wilmot Voss, "Carol Sutton and the Louisville Courier-Journal: The Problem of Being First," *American Journalism* (Spring 2010): 117-143.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Helen Geracimos Chapin, *Shaping History: The Role of Newspapers in Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996), 286.

<sup>27</sup> Kimberly Wilmot Voss and Lance Speere, "Marjorie Paxson: From Women's Page Editor to Publisher," *Media History Monograph*, 2008. <http://facstaff.elon.edu/dcopeland/mhm/mhm.htm>

continuously rejected her requests. “I don’t know why they didn’t fire me, because I probably asked at least once a month—at least,” she said.<sup>28</sup> She eventually was able to change the policy, according to a memo she sent her managing editor.

For women’s page editor Carol Sutton there was no such policy at the Louisville *Courier-Journal*, yet there were no African-American brides featured, based on the practice of the times. This changed in the mid-1960s when Sutton sought out leaders in the African-American community to encourage young women to send in their photos until it became a regular practice. In an oral history she said she did not recall any negative feedback from readers.<sup>29</sup>

The first African American bride to appear in the women’s pages of the *Milwaukee Journal* in the 1940s was Vel Phillips. Born to a middle-class family in Milwaukee, she was considered part of the black elite in that city. After earning a degree from Howard University she returned to her native state to attend law school at the University of Wisconsin. In 1956 she became the first woman and the first African American to become a Milwaukee alderman.<sup>30</sup>

It should be noted that some newspapers needed to be sued in order to integrate the weddings news. For example, in 1969 the *Montgomery Advertiser* (Alabama) had a policy that restricted photos of black brides to what was known as the “Negro News” page which ran only on Thursday. Famed civil rights attorney Morris Dees sued the newspaper over the policy. In the case *Cook v Advertiser*, the court ruled that this form of discrimination was not covered by civil rights statutes.<sup>31</sup> Yet the newspaper ultimately changed its policy of excluding black brides.

### Florida Women’s Pages

For decades at the Florida newspaper the *St. Petersburg Times*, black brides were given the option of having their photo running in the women’s page or the black pages – most brides chose the black page.<sup>32</sup> A turning point on the coverage of brides at the *St. Petersburg Times* occurred in the late 1960s when the mother of a young bride came in to drop off a photo. She requested the newspaper run a large version of the photo. The clerk responded, “in order to get one of the big pictures, you have to be somebody.” The woman walked away in tears and shared her concern with editor Don Baldwin when they shared an elevator ride. He later said he decided at that moment to run all photos the same size – one column. The

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<sup>28</sup> Voss, “Vivian Castleberry,” 43.

<sup>29</sup> University of Louisville. Oral History Project, July 21, 1982. Interview with Carol Sutton, CD #2, Part 2.

<sup>30</sup> Genevieve G. McBride, ed., *Women’s Wisconsin: From Native Matriarchies to the New Millennium* (Madison, Wisconsin: Wisconsin Historical Society Press, 2005), 430-1.

<sup>31</sup> *Cook v Advertiser*, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. March 21, 1972. <http://openjurist.org/458/f2d/1119/cook-v-advertiser-company>

<sup>32</sup> Robert N. Pierce, *A Sacred Trust: Nelson Poynter and the St. Petersburg Times* (University Press of Florida, 1993), 244.

big test occurred the following week when the publisher's daughter got married. The newspaper stuck by its policy and the photo ran in one column.<sup>33</sup>

In the 1960s, the previously mentioned women's page editor Edee Greene advocated for the publication of photos of black brides in her section at the *Fort Lauderdale News*. Her strategy was to pretend she did not know what policies were in place, thus making change. Her success in integrating her section is now noted in the Fort Lauderdale school system's curriculum.<sup>34</sup> Greene also pointed out that there were journalism lessons in reporting about those rituals in the lives of all women.<sup>35</sup>

## Conclusion

The changes in wedding announcement policies at American newspapers opened the door for a new kind of newspaper content.<sup>36</sup> By including wedding announcements of women who had been previously excluded, a new definition of "society news" was created. This opened the door for coverage in other sections. The method for change was a mix of management enlightenment, as well as negotiation and sneakiness by the women journalists. Male editors at the *St. Petersburg Times*, for example, were quick to see the inequality in policies and made changes. At the *Fort Lauderdale News*, Edee Greene would "forget" a policy to get black brides in the newspaper. And, for Vivian Castleberry, it was a negotiation. She wrote a letter to the managing editor asking for a raise and to print the photos of black brides. In response, her editor allowed the pictures to be published – but there was no raise.

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<sup>33</sup> Buddy Martin, "The St. Petersburg Times, Our Changing Women's Pages: Where Are We Now?" *APME Modern Living Committee Report*, October 1975, 17-18.

<sup>34</sup> "Women's Contributions to the United States: Honoring the Past and Challenging the Future Manual, Grades K-12." <http://www.broward.k12.fl.us/esol/Eng/Women's%20Contributions%20Manual.pdf>

<sup>35</sup> Edee Greene, "How to Hurdle Your Girdle Or: Sex and the City Room," Theta Sigma Phi Seminar, Cleveland, Ohio, August 24, 1963, 2. Papers of the Penney-Missouri Awards, Edee Greene folder.

<sup>36</sup> "The Bridal Desk," *Editor & Publisher*, June 30, 1973, 30. Tia Gindick, "How Times Have Changed in Society News," *Los Angeles Times*, November 27, 1977.





# Native Cultural Brokers and their Use of Linguistic Manipulation in Seventeenth-Century Mesoamerica

Michael S. Cole

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In the seventeenth century Spain referred to its colonies in America as *las indias* (the Indies), a misnomer that dates back to Columbus's first voyage when he mistook the islands of the Caribbean for islands off the coast of Asia. And just as that one error endured, so too did the error of referring to the people already living there at the time as *indios* (Indians). Through the course of the first few decades following the Spanish conquests on the mainlands, Crown policy gradually altered the various existing political structures into something more closely resembling Spanish forms of government. One such change took place at the level of the native village, so that by about 1560 it was becoming common in Mesoamerica<sup>1</sup> for Indian communities of substantial size to acquire the political classification of *pueblo de indios*, or Indian pueblo. Among the characteristics of the pueblo de indios was a certain degree of autonomy in running its daily affairs, such as collection of tribute owed to the royal exchequer, maintenance and upkeep of the local church and municipal buildings, and enforcement of laws, including any laws based on local tradition, so long as they were not in conflict with royal laws or Church doctrine.<sup>2</sup> This arrangement depended on people who may be referred to as cultural brokers, individuals who could operate effectively in both Spanish and native circles.<sup>3</sup> In the Indies, cultural brokers could be Spanish, native, or of mixed Spanish and native heritage, but most frequently they were native. By the seventeenth century many native cultural brokers in Mesoamerica had gained a deep and subtle understanding of Spanish values and customs, particularly the importance that Spaniards placed on written language, while still maintaining cultural ties to their own communities. They were sometimes successful in using their knowledge to affect small components of the colonial system in their favor, whether to the benefit of the villages they represented, the Spaniards they served, or themselves.

The use of cultural brokers was not limited to Spain's colonies. Indeed, it seems to have been a widespread phenomenon amongst native people colonized by outside powers. It probably tended to develop in a rather organic fashion, a result of an ongoing informal process in which people who possessed the skills

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<sup>1</sup> Paul Kirchoff, "Mesoamérica," *Acta Americana. Review of the Inter-American Society of Anthropology and Geography* (Washington, D.C.) 1, no. 1, (January-March 1943): 92-107. Mesoamerica is a loosely defined region in which the pre-Columbian populations shared a number of cultural characteristics. It spans the area roughly from the Central Valley of Mexico, south and southeast to the northern regions of modern-day Honduras.

<sup>2</sup> Charles Gibson, *The Aztecs Under Spanish Rule: A History of the Indians of the Valley of Mexico, 1519-1819* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 166-167, 178-183.

<sup>3</sup> Thank you to Murdo J. MacLeod for introducing me to the concept of a cultural broker.

enabling them to mediate an existing need were called upon by others to fulfill that function. For example, in Portuguese Brazil, Alida Metcalf places cultural brokers as a sub-group of a larger class of intermediaries she calls go-betweens.<sup>4</sup> Similar to the examples from Mesoamerica that will follow, Metcalf found that go-betweens in Portuguese Brazil sometimes used their skills and social status to serve their own personal interests.<sup>5</sup> In fact she points out that mameluco go-betweens “had no qualms about the economic exploitation of Indians.”<sup>6</sup>

The Spanish used the native elite in La Florida as cultural brokers, compensating them with gifts of European goods that reinforced their social status in their own communities.<sup>7</sup> The French and British in North America seem to have relied mostly on people of mixed European and native descent. The French referred to the children of Frenchmen and Indian women as *métis*, and they made a distinction between *métis legitimes* and *métis bâtards*; the former were born in wedlock, the latter out of wedlock. *Métis legitimes* tended to remain in French society, while *métis bâtards* remained Indian, but both served as cultural brokers and both served the additional purpose of helping to maintain ties of kinship between native and French allied groups.<sup>8</sup> Likewise, the children of British captives and native women served as both cultural brokers and social links between the two societies, although in fewer numbers than was the case with the French.<sup>9</sup>

Another example comes from the British East India Company, which in 1748 began to recruit its own permanent army in India “known as the sepoy (from *sipahi* or soldier) army,” composed of peasant soldiers commanded by British officers.<sup>10</sup> The Company became highly dependent on this army to uphold its political rule. The Company had its own recruiting centers, but “in the hills recruitment was made through local notables”<sup>11</sup> (i.e., cultural brokers). Additionally, as the sepoy army “came to incorporate a variety of social groups,” it had to employ “a careful balancing game and power had to be shared with the local elites.”<sup>12</sup>

In the Spanish American colonies, each *pueblo de indios* had a *cabildo*, a town council modeled after the Spanish town council. Its composition varied slightly from one time and region to another, but it generally consisted of six to eight *regidores*, or councilmen, who were usually elected to office on or around January

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<sup>4</sup> Alida C. Metcalf, *Go-Betweens and the Colonization of Brazil, 1500-1600* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 9-10.

<sup>5</sup> Metcalf, *Go-Betweens*, 3.

<sup>6</sup> Metcalf, *Go-Betweens*, 256. In sixteenth-century Brazil the term mameluco meant a person from southern Brazil of Portuguese and Indian heritage.

<sup>7</sup> Paul E. Hoffman, *Florida's Frontiers* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 100, 117-122. La Florida was the Spanish colonial name for present-day Florida and neighboring states

<sup>8</sup> Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 74, 189-192, 214-215. Thank you to Patrick Bottiger for bringing the work of White to my attention.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 323-324, 377-378.

<sup>10</sup> Sekha Bandyopadhyay, *From Plassey to Partition: A History of Modern India* (New Delhi: Orient Longman Private Limited, 2006), 105. Thank you to Eric Strahorn for bringing the sepoy army and this book to my attention.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 106.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 107.

first of each year for a one-year term. But native government was not a democracy; the councilmen were elected by a small group of electors known as *principales*, that is, the village elite of presumed noble heritage. The councilmen, in turn, elected the *alcaldes*, usually two of them, who also served a one-year term. This is the general outline of Spanish-imposed native government, but there were minor variations on these procedures according to time and place. The office of *alcalde* was a kind of hybrid executive and a judicial post, so that the *alcaldes* of *pueblos de indios* could and often did preside over the trials of local villagers accused of crimes. If the crime were of a serious enough nature, such as murder, then these trials functioned as a court of first instance that would eventually turn the case over to a Spanish provincial judge. The remainder of the government might include any of a variety of elected or appointed minor officials, such as constable or *escribano*, depending on local needs. Finally, many Indian *pueblos* had one more official that had no counterpart in Spanish town government, the *gobernador de indios*, or Indian governor.<sup>13</sup>

Any of these officials of the *pueblos de indios* might effectively serve the function of cultural broker, provided they spoke Castilian and could interact comfortably with Spanish officials. But the *alcaldes*, native *escribanos*, and *gobernadores* are the cultural brokers who tend to appear most frequently in colonial documents in such a capacity. The *gobernadores de indios* are interesting because they occupy the least well-defined of the municipal offices of the *pueblo de indios*. Depending on the time and region, *gobernadores* might be elected by their *cabildo*, or appointed by a provincial Spanish official, or even the president of the *audiencia*.<sup>14</sup> Because their function in native government was ill-defined, Spanish officials often used *gobernadores* as a remote set of eyes and ears to keep themselves informed about the goings-on in the *pueblo*. Sometimes *gobernadores* had the best interests of their own communities at heart, but they were also frequently accused of exploitation of members of their own communities, as will be seen in one of the later examples to follow.

My first example dates from the years 1688-1689, when a native *alcalde* named Juan Belásques from the *pueblo de indios* of Orica, in the center of the province of Honduras, used his familiarity with the subtle meanings Spaniards attached to specific language in order to obtain criminal convictions against three villagers

<sup>13</sup> Gibson, *Aztecs Under Spanish Rule*, 167-168, 172-173, 176, 178-173; James Lockhart, *The Nahuas After the Conquest: A Social and Cultural History of the Indians of Central Mexico, Sixteenth Through Eighteenth Centuries* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 429; Carlos Molina Argüello, "Gobernaciones, alcaldías mayores y corregimientos en el reino de Guatemala," *Anuario de estudios americanos* (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas), tomo XVII (1960): 118-119; Robert S. Haskett, "Indian Town Government in Colonial Cuernavaca: Persistence, Adaptation, and Change," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 67, no. 2 (1987): 228-229, 230-231. An *escribano* was similar to a notary, but this is not a suitable translation. In colonial Latin America he was an official who also performed handwriting, record keeping, and other clerical duties, and prepared contracts, wills, and other legal documents. It is usually left untranslated.

<sup>14</sup> Molina Argüello, "Gobernaciones, alcaldías mayores y corregimientos," 16-17, 119. An *audiencia* was a court and governing body of a jurisdiction.

living in his pueblo. All three of them, Marcos Hernández, Pedro López, and Ana María were widely disliked in Orica, and some people in the pueblo claimed the three had reputations for being *brujos* (witches).<sup>15</sup> Among the testimony provided by the accused, the accusers, and other witnesses, there are internal contradictions which strongly suggest that the charges against them were false, a convenient excuse used to rid Orica of three troublesome people. Most problematic is the physical evidence. For example, Marcos Hernández was accused of killing four people with witchcraft, Ana María was accused of killing five people with witchcraft, and Pedro López was accused of killing six people with witchcraft,<sup>16</sup> yet no description of either bodies or gravesites entered the testimony at any time. The use of torture against the accused to obtain confessions in the initial proceedings raises further doubts as to the accuracy of their own confessions of guilt.<sup>17</sup>

The proceedings began in the first week of December, 1688, in Orica, when Juan Belásques put the three accused witches on trial under his authority as *alcalde*. All legal proceedings in the Indies were conducted in writing, so Belásques created a written record of the trial in which he states that he “punished” the accused, or used “much rigor” in his questioning of the accused, both euphemisms for extracting confessions of guilt by means of torture.<sup>18</sup>

After having tortured the three defendants, Belásques recorded in writing some fantastic testimony in which the accused themselves described their witchcraft in detail, using terminology that could be expected to elicit great concern from the *alcalde*’s Spanish superiors. This is not surprising because Belásques was described by the Spanish district magistrate (*alcalde mayor*) to whom he later submitted the dossier he prepared as being “muy ladino” in the Castilian language, a term that means his Castilian was quite fluent, and suggests a general familiarity with Spanish culture.<sup>19</sup> Testimony in later proceedings suggests that following the torture of the accused, Belásques likely asked leading questions containing the very language he wished to record, and received affirmation of that language from the accused. For example Marcos Hernández claimed to own a toad from which he extracted saliva to put in the food or drink of people he wanted to kill. There are fifty-five species of poisonous frogs found in Central and South America, some of which are lethal to humans,<sup>20</sup> but the only species of toad that produce a toxin (bufotenin), which may be fatally toxic to human beings in large enough doses, are the *bufo marinus* (marine toad) and a similar species, *bufo valliceps* (Gulf Coast

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<sup>15</sup> Archivo Nacional de Honduras (hereafter ANH), caja 20, doc. 613, folios 20r-v, 26r.

<sup>16</sup> ANH, caja 20, doc. 613, 14r-15v.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 1r-v, 3r-v. The trial was long and drawn out, and fills 51 handwritten folios, often very repetitive. Therefore, in the interest of brevity I will limit my analysis to those elements of the trial that have relevance to my arguments.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 1r-v, 3r-v, 29v, 30v, 31r, 36r, petition of defensor (defense counselor) Andrés de Velasco, unnumbered folio.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 11v; Laura E. Matthew, *Memories of Conquest: Becoming Mexicano in Colonial Guatemala* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 231.

<sup>20</sup> Chris Mattison, *Frogs and Toads of the World* (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1987), 11-14, 52-53.

toad). There is an ongoing debate as to whether or not people in pre-Columbian Mesoamerica used this toxin as a hallucinogen, but there is no question that toads were venerated by some pre-Columbian Mesoamerican groups.<sup>21</sup> Yet toads were also widely associated with European ideas about the practice of witchcraft in the early modern period, and it is possible that Belásques knew this and put the reference to toads in the questions himself to make the testimony more alarming to Spanish officials.<sup>22</sup> Hernández also confessed to Belásques that he practiced vampirism, and claimed that people who did not cross themselves or pray were the easiest victims of this crime, testimony that later, in front of a Spanish judge, he said he never gave to Belásques.<sup>23</sup> There is also a certain amount of testimony that clearly reflects Mesoamerican rather than Spanish or European concepts. For example, in the dossier prepared by Belásques Marcos Hernades was said to have produced an idol made of clay named Tirire,<sup>24</sup> an accusation Hernández later denied in front of a Spanish judge, saying it was just a piece of clay he found and told his accusers it was an idol named Tirire in an attempt to avoid being whipped again.<sup>25</sup>

The next of the three tried by the alcalde, Ana María, is said to have confessed to killing five people with witchcraft, and of having a toad hidden in a pot, presumably for use in witchcraft.<sup>26</sup> The third accused witch, Pedro López, confessed to Belásques that the devil gave him the ability to practice witchcraft and that among other things he had placed a wooden stake in the doorway of the church, and “a toad behind the padre’s house.”<sup>27</sup>

The dossier prepared by Belásques was then delivered to a Spanish district judge, Joseph Fernández de Córdova, who began his investigation on 8 January 1889. One of the witnesses questioned by the judge was Domingo Garsía, a native escribano and resident of Orica whose signature appears on most of the folios in the dossier prepared by Belásques.<sup>28</sup> Garsía stands out clearly as a cultural broker, using his familiarity with Spanish society and the Castilian language to make the strongest

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<sup>21</sup> Victoria Schlesinger, *Animals and Plants of the Ancient Maya: A Guide* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001), 266-268, 273-275; Delia Goetz and Sylvanus G. Morley, translators, *Popol Vuh: The Sacred Book of the Ancient Quiché Maya, from the translation of Adrián Recinos*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), 137-138.

<sup>22</sup> Gustav Henningsen, *The Witches' Advocate: Basque Witchcraft and the Spanish Inquisition (1609-1614)* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1980), 78-79.

<sup>23</sup> ANH caja 20, doc. 613, testimony of Pedro Hernández to the alcalde mayor Joseph Fernández de Córdova, Jan. 10, 1689, unnumbered folio. It is important to note that he did confess to this judge that he had once sucked “a little blood with his mouth from the nose” of a corpse, but he denied ever having sucked blood from anyone else, and he made no mention of Christians or people who cross themselves. Also, he confessed to this judge that he had bewitched Marcos Martínez, but nobody else, perhaps attempting to influence the judge for leniency.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, dossier prepared by Juan Belásques, unnumbered folio dated 4 January 1689.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 31r.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 3r.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 3v.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 1v-2v, 6v. Although it is not stated in the document, the context of his signature on several folios makes it clear that he was Belásques’s scribe and the one who actually wrote the documents.

possible case before the Spanish judge against the three accused witches.<sup>29</sup> About a month had gone by since the original accusations, giving Garsía plenty of time to think through his story. In his testimony to the Spanish judge Garsía filled in many details left out of the original proceedings, and expanded the use of European-style rhetoric of witchcraft. For example, he describes how Marcos Hernández offered to cure one of the victims of his witchcraft, and according to Garsía, while administering the cure the accused witch called to the devil for help. He also re-affirmed Hernández's admission to owning a toad.<sup>30</sup>

Garsía went on to tell the Spanish judge about a type of gathering very similar to a witches' meeting, a detail that did not appear in the original dossier. In early modern Spanish belief the witches' meeting was a central component to witchcraft because witchcraft was not practiced alone, and new initiates were educated by more experienced witches.<sup>31</sup> Garsía said that Hernández "had companions in the pueblo of Sulaco with whom he gathered to practice witchcraft, who were three Indians named Andrea -- he said they were his teachers -- and another named Nicolasa who is her daughter, and another, María Ramos."<sup>32</sup>

That same day Juan Belásques, the native *alcalde* who presided over the initial proceedings in Orica, testified before the Spanish judge Fernández de Córdova, who described Belásques as "muy ladino."<sup>33</sup> Belásques also had time to think about and refine his testimony. He told the Spanish judge that when Hernández was trying to cure one of the alleged victims of his witchcraft "he sang some words in the Nagueate language" with which he believed the accused to be calling to the devil for help.<sup>34</sup> Belásques also testified that Hernández called to the devil for help in "Nagueate" when he was trying to retrieve some of the articles he used in the practice of witchcraft.<sup>35</sup> Belásques repeated some testimony that he said Hernández had originally given to him about the relative ease of practicing vampirism on "those who did not cross themselves or pray," and he claimed to have seen two toads come to Hernández out in the countryside after the accused had called them "in the Nagueate language."<sup>36</sup>

Belásques then testified about another of the three accused, Pedro López, telling the Spanish judge that López "declared, [after being] whipped, that the devil had given him these abilities" to practice witchcraft, and that he had, among other things, "a toad buried behind the padre's house."<sup>37</sup> In his testimony about the third accused witch, Ana María, Belásques said he went out in the countryside with

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<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 6v. Garsía was described by the Spanish judge as an "indio ladino en la lengua castellana."

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 8r.

<sup>31</sup> Henningsen, 69-84.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 8r.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 11v.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 12v-13r.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 13v-14r.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 14r-14v.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 15r.

her and some of the other Indians from Orica so she could show them a pot that she used for her witchcraft. According to Belásques, “even though they sang and danced, saying some words in their Lenca language, that he had been told by those who understand [it], that they called to the devil and to birds, and they said they could not produce the pot because the devil did not want to give it to them.”<sup>38</sup> Here Belásques clearly indicates that he does not understand the native language of the defendants, a circumstance that reinforces the likelihood that the testimony may have been, at least in part, his own invention.

Judge Fernández de Córdoba interviewed two more witnesses, and on 10 January 1689 he declared that there was enough evidence of guilt that the three accused should be jailed, and he appointed Andrés de Velasco as *defensor* (defense counselor) for the accused.<sup>39</sup> He then began to take *confesiones*<sup>40</sup> from the accused. Marcos Hernández did not deny all of the accusations against him, but he did deny having called to the devil while trying to cure one of the alleged victims of his witchcraft (who survived), and he did admit to having bewitched him. He also admitted to once having sucked some blood from the nose of a human corpse to use as food for his toads, but he denied the other accusations of vampirism. Likewise, during the course of this round of questioning he did not make any mention of Christianity or of people who did not pray. He also denied having gone to the meetings that Garsía had described. In fact there is very little in his testimony that resembles Christian rhetoric or Spanish beliefs about witchcraft.<sup>41</sup>

Ana María admitted to having put a pot with a toad in it into the river where the people of Orica got their drinking water, over one year earlier, to use for spells against them because “they had punished her and called her a witch, and that one week before they jailed her she had taken the toad out of the pot, alive, but very skinny.”<sup>42</sup> She said that an Indian woman taught her how to kill people by putting some of the toad’s saliva in their food, and that by this method she had killed five people. Finally, she repeatedly denied collaborating with the other two accused, or having any knowledge of their practice of witchcraft.<sup>43</sup>

The last of the defendants, Pedro López, who was accused in the original proceedings from Orica of having killed six people, admitted to killing only two people by putting toad saliva in their milk when he gave his *confesión* to the Spanish judge Fernández de Córdoba.<sup>44</sup> He admitted to making false confessions to three different accusations in the original proceedings, out of fear of torture, and

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<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 15v-16r. The Lenca are a native ethnic group in Honduras.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 21v.

<sup>40</sup> *Confesión* is a legal term for a declaration made by an accused criminal either denying or confessing the charges.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, *confesión* of Marcos Hernández, nine unnumbered folios.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 27r.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 27r-28r.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 30v-31r.

he denied ever invoking the devil.<sup>45</sup> Finally, throughout his confesión there is an almost complete lack of use of Christian rhetoric.<sup>46</sup>

So given the apparent hostility harbored by at least some of the villagers of Orica toward the three accused, the use of torture in the extraction of the original confessions, the extraordinary characteristics of some of the alleged crimes, and the lack of agreement on key points when comparing the testimony that Belásques originally received in Orica, to the testimony the defendants later gave to the Spanish judge, it is reasonable to assume that Belásques and Garsía embellished the original confessions of guilt as well as their own testimony to the Spanish judge. They used their knowledge of Spanish beliefs about witchcraft to produce language they expected to be effective with Spanish officials. Thus they possessed the skills and knowledge needed to function effectively as cultural brokers, in this case using those skills to extract a response from the colonial government that would rid their community of three disliked people. However clumsy the attempts of Belásques and Garsía may appear to modern observers, ultimately they succeeded, because on 8 February 1689 Judge Fernández de Córdoba found all three defendants guilty of witchcraft, and turned the case over to the audiencia of Guatemala for sentencing.<sup>47</sup> The audiencia then forwarded the case to the Bishop of Honduras because the nature of the crime (witchcraft) placed the sentencing under the jurisdiction of the church.<sup>48</sup> Ana María died in jail while awaiting sentencing, and Bishop Alonso de Vargas y Abarca sentenced Marcos Hernández and Pedro López to “ten years’ exile in the galleys of this province without pay.”<sup>49</sup>

Seventeenth-century Spaniards who believed in the reality of witches also had a fairly standard set of beliefs about what witches were like and how they acted and behaved. This was particularly true of the inquisitors of the Holy office of Inquisition who tried and questioned accused witches, although it should be noted that in the seventeenth century the Inquisition was growing increasingly skeptical about accusations of witchcraft.<sup>50</sup> But not all Spaniards shared the skepticism of the Holy Office, so such beliefs are worth considering in comparison with trials conducted against American Indians accused of witchcraft. It should also be noted that beginning 1571 Indians were legally exempt from the Inquisition because it was reasoned that as neophytes to the faith they should not be held to the same standards as other Christians. Therefore, Indians charged with crimes of the faith

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 29v, 30v-31r.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 29r-32r.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 42r.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 43r.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., sentence pronounced by Fray Alonso de Vargas y Abarca, Bishop of Honduras, three unnumbered folios, no date. The sentence is curious because there were no galleys in colonial Honduras. Indians convicted of crimes were sometimes sentenced to labor paddling canoes for Spaniards traveling in remote areas, perhaps this was what the Bishop meant by galley.

<sup>50</sup> Henningsen, 69-83; Solange Alberro, *Inquisición y sociedad en México, 1571-1700* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1988), 283-284, 287. It is beyond the scope of this essay to give a detailed summary of all such beliefs.



were usually tried by ecclesiastical courts of the secular clergy, and sometimes by civil authorities, both of which tended to be less familiar with the details of beliefs about witchcraft.<sup>51</sup>

Nevertheless, these ideas did find their way into the New World, and are sometimes evident in Inquisition trials against accused witches who were not Indians. A very clear example of this comes from the case of Diego López, a mulatto who was accused of witchcraft and incarcerated in the Inquisition jail of Cartagena in January of 1633.<sup>52</sup> After having been questioned by inquisitors on numerous occasions about the charges of witchcraft that had been brought against him, on 7 April 1634 López broke down and volunteered to confess his crimes.<sup>53</sup> This time he told the inquisitors, among other things, that in 1628 he went to a house where he knew of a witches' meeting taking place, and he told the inquisitor that he said to Elena de Vitoria, the woman who answered the door, that

he wanted to enter one of the gatherings that they held and that he came for that reason, and the woman responded that he should go toward the little apple trees in the swamp, which he did. . .and he arrived, taking the said Elena by the hand. She took him to a place where there was a black frog, very sumptuous, underneath which was Lucifer, very ugly and abominable, and. . .she said [to Lucifer] "I bring you here a disciple, furthermore he wants to be yours and [part of] your society," to which the said Lucifer responded in a husky voice, as if he had put his hand on his mouth, that it would be a good time, but to be his he would have to renounce God and his saints and Our Lady the Virgin Mary, and the baptism and chrism that he had received, and that he would have to recognize him [Lucifer] as his god and powerful lord to save him and give him glory and many benefits in this life. And [López], carried by greed for what the devil had promised him, he believed everything he [Lucifer] had said to him and made the renunciation.<sup>54</sup>

It is likely that the defendant never spoke these exact words in the order they were recorded by the Inquisition scribe. Because of the format in which these trials were conducted, the above passage was most likely a synthesis based on a series of affirmative responses to leading questions that had been posed to the defendant multiple times by inquisitors, and then repeated to him in this particular session. Regardless, the point of the above passage is to provide a partial example of concepts of witchcraft that were standard in sixteenth-century Spain and had found their way to the Indies. Inquisition proceedings were held in secret, so it is

<sup>51</sup> Richard E. Greenleaf, *Inquisición y sociedad en el México colonial* (Madrid: Ediciones José Porrúaturanzas, S.A., 1985), 71; Ernesto Chinchilla Aguilar, *La Inquisición en Guatemala* (Guatemala: Ministerio de Educación Pública, 1953), 221; Dolores Aramoni Calderón, *Los refugios de lo sagrado: Religiosidad, conflicto y resistencia entre los Zoques de Chiapas* (México: Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, 1992), passim.

<sup>52</sup> Archivo Histórico Nacional de España, ramo Inquisición, legajo 1620, expediente 7, fols. 1r-2r.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 3r-3v.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 4r-4v. The principal voice in the quotation is that of the inquisitor relaying the testimony of López.

not surprising that these ideas should lose some of the finer points of detail as they disseminated into colonial society. Belásques and Garsía, the cultural brokers who were central to the proceedings against the three accused witches from Orica, had enough of this knowledge to be able to make a convincing argument to Spanish officials in Honduras, officials who most likely did not have specialized training in prosecuting people accused of witchcraft.

Let us consider one more example of native cultural brokers appearing in the historical record from a pueblo de indios in Honduras. These proceedings are interesting because they involve at least two people (an escribano and a gobernador) who seem to have had the knowledge and rhetorical skills required of an effective cultural broker. Finally, I will conclude with a brief example from Mexico of two native people attempting to defend the interests of their own communities using the skills and tactics of cultural brokers.

A trial was conducted in 1672 against twenty eight people from the pueblo de indios of Texíguat, in the *alcaldía mayor* (district) of Tegucigalpa, for the execution of their former gobernador, don Pedro Fernádes. The pueblo was divided by a series of factional disputes over village finances and other related matters, and in the heat of these disagreements some of the members of the town council accused the gobernador of practicing witchcraft, and they decided to burn him.<sup>55</sup>

The accusations of witchcraft began after some of the village principales made a trip to Tegucigalpa to deliver the pueblo's tribute payment, during which they shared a drink from a gourd. After they returned to Texíguat one of them, Pedro de Oliva, became ill with a headache and fever. Oliva's illness prompted some of the principales to hold a meeting of the cabildo, during which Oliva accused Fernádes of bewitching him with the drink they had shared. The cabildo concluded they ought to burn the gobernador for having caused Oliva's illness. They sent for him, and when he arrived the alcalde Nicolás González ordered Fernádes to cure Pedro Oliva. After looking at the sick man the gobernador said Oliva was very ill, but he would not die from his illness.<sup>56</sup> González asked the gobernador "how do you know, señor Pedro Fernádes, are you God?" and ordered him to confess his crimes.<sup>57</sup>

Fernádes was then arrested and placed in jail in a stock. Later that night the principales took him out of the jail and told him to confess to being a witch, but he denied the accusation, so they tortured him until he appeared to be near death. Then they revived him with a drink of water mixed with dirt from a gravesite, and he confessed to being a witch.<sup>58</sup> According to the pueblo's escribano, Fernádes said "that he killed many Christians, that he spoke with the volcanoes and with

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<sup>55</sup> ANH, caja 9, doc. 210, passim.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 10r, 50r-51r.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 51r.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., one unnumbered folio; 25r, 51r-52r.

the winds, that they were yellow, purple, white, red, that he had seized the four corners of the world, and that is why he blew on the Christians, and he had [them] promised to the volcanoes.”<sup>59</sup>

The escribano had also recorded the gobernador’s final confession just before the execution, in a document addressed to the Spanish alcalde mayor. According to this document Fernández declared “that for more than thirty years he has used this craft of spell-casting witch, and that in this time he declares by his own account that he has killed more than one hundred Christians, men, women, and innocent children.”<sup>60</sup> When Fernández told his accusers he had nothing more to confess, they carried him off in a chair to the site where they strangled and burned him. According to the escribano “they placed two logs, one on one side, and the other on the other, and another on top, across like a cross, and they crucified him.” The escribano then recorded the declaration of the gobernador’s debts, after which they prayed, then they strangled him and burned the corpse, and the next day they threw the ashes in the river.<sup>61</sup> All of this took place in a very remote pueblo, at a time when there had been a severe shortage of clerics in Honduras since the beginnings of Spanish settlement.<sup>62</sup>

If we assume that Fernández was not a practicing witch (a conclusion eventually reached by the Spanish judge who took over the case after the execution of the gobernador) then the most likely reason for some of the principales wanting to be rid of him was personal animosity. There were signs of such animosity beginning in October of 1671, when the gobernador sent a petition to the bishop and president of the audiencia, Juan Baptista Matamoros, in Santiago de Guatemala. The petition denounced eight Indians from the pueblo as idolatrous drunken enemies of God, who lived in the hills and would not return to the pueblo unless they were forced to do so. Typical of the accusations were those made against Tomás Pérez, who was described as a “drunken Indian,” who knew neither God nor king. According to the gobernador, Pérez had been punished for living in sin with an Indian widow, and for “having forced” a married woman. Another person denounced in the petition, Lorenzo Martín, was described as a “drunken Indian who does not believe in God,” and who was punished for being married to his own sister. He had no house and spent most of his life living in the hills; he never came to the pueblo to pray or confess, nor did he come to perform required labor.<sup>63</sup> Similar accusations were made against the other persons named in the petition, and the petition said that all eight of them wished to “live adoring stones and hills,” as their parents, “who

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 52r.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 43v.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 53r.

<sup>62</sup> José Reina Valenzuela, *Historia eclesiástica de Honduras*, tomo I, 1502-1600, (Tegucigalpa: Tipografía Nacional, 1983) 81, 141; Reina Valenzuela, *Historia eclesiástica de Honduras*, tomo II (Choluteca, Honduras: Centro de Publicaciones, Obispado Choluteca, 1990), 128-130.

<sup>63</sup> ANH, caja 9, doc. 210, 132v.

were idolatrous Indians,” had lived.<sup>64</sup> The petition never reached Santiago, and was instead read to the village principales in Texíguat, who became angered over what it said about them. They arranged to have Fernánides removed from the office of gobernador and replaced by don Gregorio Vázquez.<sup>65</sup> At this point it is clear that a number of the village principales were divided into at least two factions: those who supported Pedro Fernánides and his friend, a former alcalde named Francisco Calis, and those who opposed them, the latter faction probably centered around the eight persons named in Fernánides’s petition.

In another petition sent to the Spanish colonial government, some of the anti-Fernánides faction said that he and Calis were hated by everyone in the pueblo because of the papers these two had prepared for the president of the audiencia. Fernánides was accused of making them pay the tribute twice and sending his constable from house to house collecting *petates* (sleeping mats) and other goods, which he sold to the alcalde mayor. He then cheated them out of their money by claiming he had not been paid for the petates. Fernánides and Calis were further accused of taking livestock from the community herd for their own use, and of keeping the earnings of the Indians who made houses for Spaniards, money that they argued belonged to everyone because the work was done by the entire pueblo.<sup>66</sup> Finally, the petition said that Fernánides and Calis “consider us as Xicaques in their opinion . . . who do not know the king,” and that these two were preparing papers full of lies stating that the Indians of the pueblo “do not know how to cross themselves, nor do they know how to pray,” characterizations that the petitioners denied.<sup>67</sup>

On 16 October 1672, A Spaniard named don Juan de Ugarte was commissioned as judge and ordered to go to Texíguat to investigate charges that the gobernador had been tortured and burned by some of the people of the pueblo.<sup>68</sup> From 21 to 28 October the judge received a number of related documents and petitions, took declarations from ten persons, and issued various orders. At the conclusion of this portion of the proceedings he found no reason to believe that Fernánides had been practicing witchcraft.<sup>69</sup> The defense counsel for the accused then presented a petition in which he admitted the guilt of his clients in having burned the gobernador without just cause, and presented arguments asking the judge for leniency.<sup>70</sup> On 7 November the judge called for a conclusion to the case within nine days, and on the following day the counselor for the accused renounced their nine days and asked for an immediate conclusion. The judge declared the case closed,

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 135r-135v.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 49r-49v.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 146v, 148r-149.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 149r. Strictly speaking, the term “Xicaque” refers to a specific ethnic group, but colonial officials in Central America generally used it as a synonym for “uncivilized.”

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 3 unnumbered folios.

<sup>69</sup> ANH, caja 10, doc. 211; ANH caja 9, doc 210, 5 unnumbered folios; 9r-41r.

<sup>70</sup> ANH, caja 9, doc. 210, 83r-83v.

and on 21 November he turned the dossier over to the *alcalde mayor*, who in turn submitted it to a royal attorney of the *audiencia* of Guatemala for sentencing.<sup>71</sup> Then on 17 March 1673 the sentence prepared by the royal attorney was presented to the *alcalde mayor*. The *alcalde mayor* went to the jail to read the sentence to the convicted prisoners, but he was told they had escaped.<sup>72</sup>

Both of the factions, the one that supported Fernandez and Calis, and the faction who opposed the *gobernador* and his friend, used the rhetorical skills, and knowledge of Spanish values, possessed by cultural brokers. In this case they were using these largely to promote their own personal interests. Both sides manipulated Spanish cultural meanings, symbolism, language, and religious and moral concepts in their written accusations against one another in ways that they hoped would ameliorate any potential actions taken against them by Spanish colonial officials. Fernandez and Calis may or may not have been exploiting the villagers in the ways they were accused of doing, but Fernandez was not practicing witchcraft. His confessions to witchcraft were made under severe duress in the hope of putting an end to the torture, and perhaps preserving his life. The defense attorney for the faction who killed Fernandez admitted that they had done so without just cause. So in a very remote colonial pueblo, in a parish which had not had an ecclesiastical inspection for eighty years,<sup>73</sup> their command of Spanish concepts demonstrates a relatively high degree of insight into the culture of Spanish colonial society. While the opponents of the *gobernador* were ultimately unsuccessful in their bid to convince the judge that their actions had been consistent with colonial law, they were successful to the extent that none of the final sentences appear to have been carried out.

My final example comes from the *alcalda mayor* of Veracruz Nueva, a province on the southern coast of the Gulf of Mexico just north of the Yucatan peninsula. The cultural broker in this instance is a native *escribano* from the pueblo de indios of Tlacotalpa, who used his linguistic skills and his knowledge of Spanish culture and values to help prevent the forced relocation of his community by the colonial government. An interesting contrast comes from the nearby *sujeto* of Puctla,<sup>74</sup> which made a similar but unsuccessful attempt.

Toward the end of the sixteenth century the viceregal government of New Spain (based in Mexico City) initiated a series of forced relocations of Indian communities. This was an effort to consolidate a number of communities that the colonial government considered to be too small and scattered to be viable with respect to

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<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 92v-93r, 114r-114v, 115v-116r, 117v-118v.

<sup>72</sup> ANH caja no. 10, doc. 232.

<sup>73</sup> Reina Valenzuela, *Historia eclesiastica de Honduras*, tomo II, 128-130.

<sup>74</sup> For a fuller treatment of this case see Michael S. Cole, "Tlacotalpa and Puctla: Native Strategies of Community Defense in Two Colonial Mexican Villages," *Secolas Annals: Journal of the Southeastern Council of Latin American Studies* 35 (Nov. 2003): 134-152. A *sujeto* is a separate community under the jurisdiction of the *cabildo* of another pueblo de indios. The pueblo exercising such jurisdiction is known as the *cabecera* of the *sujeto*.

colonial administration, access to labor, taxation, and religious administration.<sup>75</sup> Many of these small isolated communities existed as a result of the overall sharp demographic decline of the native population during the decades following the conquest. Population decline was the result of several factors, including overwork and slave-raiding at the hands of Spaniards, but the overwhelming cause was the unintentional introduction of Old World diseases to which the Indians had not built up any natural immunities.<sup>76</sup>

In 1598 a judge named Joseph de Solís was given the task of evaluating the communities in the vicinity of Tlacotalpa, and determining if and how they should be consolidated. By 1600 he concluded that Tlacotalpa and its five sujetos should be moved to a pueblo named Cozamaloapa, about ten leagues distant.<sup>77</sup> The villagers of Tlacotalpa, however, objected to the move and filed a petition with the viceroy explaining the many benefits they enjoyed living in their current location, as well as the many necessary services they were able to provide to Spanish society because of where they lived.<sup>78</sup> There was also a letter from five local Spaniards in support of allowing them to remain where they were.<sup>79</sup> The letter from the Spaniards probably carried a great deal of weight with the colonial officials who considered it, and it was most likely the skill of one or more cultural brokers from Tlacotalpa that convinced their local Spanish supporters to write and sign this letter.

Returning to the petition filed by the villagers of Tlacotalpa, it is evident that the letter was prepared by a very astute cultural broker, most likely the village escribano. In it they ask not to be moved to Cozamaloapa, suggesting instead that their five sujetos be moved to Tlacotalpa, in part to avoid damage

to all the Spanish passengers and merchants who descend from the provinces of Chontlalpan, Coatzacoalcos, Tabasco, Ucila, Tebtilla, where they come and go with merchandise and cacao. They embark in canoes at a river on whose banks the said pueblo of Tlacotalpa is settled, which river joins and connects with the Alvarado at one place, and with that from Tlaliscoya at another, and with that from Nychapa at another, and with that from Coyaltepec at another, and with that from Ocitlan at another, and with that from Guaspaltepec at another, and the most essential and unavoidable [of these], and [that] which is frequented the most is the one from Nychapa to Tlaliscoya, over thirty leagues

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<sup>75</sup> Howard F. Cline, "Civil Congregations of the Indians in New Spain, 1598-1606," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 29 (August, 1949): 349-350; Peter Gerhard, *A Guide to the Historical Geography of New Spain*, revised edition (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 27; Gerhard, "Congregaciones de indios en la Nueva España antes de 1570," *Historia Mexicana* 26 (Jan.-March 1977): 347.

<sup>76</sup> Sherburne F. Cook and Woodrow Borah, "The Rate of Population Change in Central Mexico, 1550-1570," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 37, no. 4: 467; Sherburne F. Cook and Woodrow Borah, "The Indian Population of Central Mexico, 1531-1610," *Ibero-Americana: 44* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960), 52.

<sup>77</sup> A Mexican league was just over 2.5 miles.

<sup>78</sup> Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico (hereafter AGN), ramo Tierras, vol. 70, expediente 1, fol. 14r.

<sup>79</sup> AGN Tierras, vol. 70, exp. 1, 13r-13v.

downriver. They make port in the said pueblo of Tlacotalpa, which is in the middle of the area and [all this] navigation . . . . If they move us from there it will be impossible to return because it is . . . [a] return trip of more than thirty leagues and against the current of the river . . . . Likewise our lord the king has an interest, and is well served, and through the help and service of this pueblo of Tlacotalpan [sic]. The port and fisheries of Alvarado sustain themselves because by means of these Indians more than eight thousand *arrobas* of fish are caught and collected. And when the fleets are lost they help the people who are lost, and go to the beaches and collect the lost merchandise, all of which will cease and be lost by moving them to Cucamaloapan [Cozamaloapa], being more than ten leagues distant from the ports and sea. Finally, this pueblo of Tlacotalpan is the most important of this region, which not only should not be depopulated, but rather should be made a very good pueblo, for which there is plenty of land and everything else where its five *estancias* [sujetos] can congregate, and there will be more than three hundred tributaries. And they can have their own ministry, with two hundred pesos which the Spanish vecinos of Alvarado have offered to help pay for it.<sup>80</sup>

After reviewing the original report prepared by judge Solís, along with the letter from the Spaniards, and the petition from the Indians, an aid to the viceroy recommended a new investigation, which the viceroy ordered to be conducted.<sup>81</sup> At the conclusion of the new investigation the viceroy was convinced that Tlacotalpa should not be moved, and he issued an order that its five sujetos be relocated to the pueblo of Tlacotalpa.<sup>82</sup>

Then in 1603 the nearby pueblo of Puctla tried to avoid its own relocation through a similar strategy, including the filing of a petition very similar to that filed by Tlacotalpa. But unlike Tlacotalpa, the principales of Puctla had no letter of support from local Spaniards, and the petition they submitted lacks the subtleties of tone and veracity that would be present in a document prepared by someone with the necessary qualities of a skilled cultural broker. The principales of Puctla asked not to be moved to Amatlan

because of the damage and loss that will result from it, being their said pueblo one of the richest of this area because of the wealth and volume of the fisheries that are in it, from which this city [Mexico] and that of Los Angeles [Puebla] are supplied, with which the natives are very rich and tranquil . . . . They have a lot of very good land where they sow and harvest great quantities of maize, chile, cotton, and many other products and fruits, all of which they will lose [if they are] taken to Amatlan, because it is more than ten leagues away . . . . Even

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 14r.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 15v.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., 20r-20v, 21v, 23r.

though it is true that there are also fisheries in Amatlan, they are not of such importance as Puctla's because Amatlan is very isolated and outside of the commerce and trade that Puctla has, where likewise the said pueblo of Puctla is of much importance because of the heavy traffic of small boats and canoes that come and go from many provinces on the river that goes to Tlaliscoya, and when there is some weather or northerly winds they take refuge and are relieved in the said pueblo of Puctla, [and] that if it should be absent from there, the said refuge would be lacking.<sup>83</sup>

The single greatest impediment to success for the principales of Puctla was the problem that their claims about the quality of their location were not true. In response to the petition the viceroy ordered a new investigation.<sup>84</sup> This inspection concluded that there was not sufficient land, and what little land they had was unhealthy, surrounded by marshes and swamps, and subject to frequent flooding, so that none of it was suitable for cultivation. The Indians of Puctla were in fact impoverished and many died of hunger.<sup>85</sup> With the new report in hand the viceroy rejected the petition from the principales of Puctla and ordered that they relocate to Amatlan.

In conclusion, both Spanish and Indian societies in colonial Mesoamerica relied on cultural brokers to facilitate commercial, administrative, and legal interactions between one other. A successful cultural broker was at minimum bilingual and had to maintain ties to his or her own culture, but also knowledgeable in that of the other. Here I have focused on Indian cultural brokers who lived in native communities yet were very fluent in Spanish and had a good degree of familiarity with Spanish culture and values. Such people could use these skills in defense of the interests of their own communities, as in the case of the escribano from Tlacotalpa, but they could also use them to attempt to manipulate colonial Spanish officials toward their own personal ends, sometimes to the detriment of their own communities. Pedro Fernández, the once gobernador of Texiguat, and his friend Francisco Calis, provide examples of cultural brokers who were accused of economic exploitation (in this case mostly embezzlement) of their own community. While Calis was cleared of the charges by a Spanish judge, the record of the proceedings is not very convincing.<sup>86</sup> Fernández never had his chance to clear his name before the judge, a missed opportunity which may have cost him his life. But despite the abuses sometimes perpetrated by cultural brokers, Spanish colonial government could not have functioned without them. The relative autonomy of the pueblos de indios in governing their own local affairs made cultural brokers indispensable to the colonial government.

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<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 25r.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 33r.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 26v-27r, 29r-29v.

<sup>86</sup> ANH, caja 9, doc. 210, 144r-159v.



# Rebels without a Cause: The *Blousons Noirs*, American Popular Culture, and the Dilemmas of French Modernity, 1959-1963

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On a cool evening in late February 1961, five thousand young adherents of rock and roll congregated at the Palais des Sports in Paris, France to watch their dearest teen idols perform. The event represented the first festival of its kind in France – a concert featuring the biggest names in French rock and roll. Stars like Johnny Hallyday, the Chaussettes Noires, and Frankie Jordan gathered to consecrate the emergent musical genre dedicated solely to a teenage audience. Michèle Manceaux, a journalist for the weekly newspaper *L'Express*, reported on the bizarre and colorful event as it unfolded. She described a conglomeration of ominous youngsters outfitted in leather jackets, caps, and blue jeans under the watchful eye of weary police poised to break up errant scuffles and brawls precipitated by the raucous music emanating from the stage. “This is Paris,” she concluded, “and *this* is French youth.”<sup>1</sup>

In the following weeks, dismayed readers proved quick to air their disagreement with Manceaux’s conclusions. As one reader wrote in the 16 March issue: “No, madam, this is not Paris and even less French youth . . . [as for] the true French youth – one doesn’t find them at the Palais des Sports shouting and swaying, dressed intentionally in an idiotic and extravagant way (without knowing why). No, . . . one finds the true French youth in schools, workshops, factories, colleges, and also in Algeria.”<sup>2</sup> The reader, in his effort to disassociate French young people from the image of the teenage rock and rollers, proved representative of larger cultural anxieties in early Fifth Republic France.

The late 1950s and early 1960s witnessed a proliferation of studies devoted to French youth and the apparent crisis of juvenile delinquency. Social commentators of all stripes – educators, journalists, social scientists, psychiatrists, and curious pollsters among them – weighed in on the topic. Often centered within these studies were the *blousons noirs*, an entity that was equal parts subculture and social construct. In one sense, the emergence of the *blousons noirs*, a youth gang culture mostly centered in France’s largest cities and heavily influenced by teenage trends emanating from across the Atlantic, represented genuine socio-economic changes in France. They were a byproduct of a society of increasingly available consumer goods, rapid postwar urbanization, and an evolving lifestyle that elevated the roles of leisure and teenage economic output. In another sense, however, the *blousons noirs* and their apparent affinities to American culture became a trope for the ills

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<sup>1</sup> Michèle Manceaux, “Le grand gala,” *L'Express*, 2 March 1961, 27. Emphasis added.

<sup>2</sup> J.-C. Burot, “La vraie jeunesse française,” *L'Express*, 16 March 1961, 2.

of modernity and the shortcomings of French modernization. As a social construct, they became a symbol, both implicitly and explicitly, of the dangers of adopting the supposed “American way of life.”<sup>3</sup>

While an underlying attention will be paid to the social conditions that gave rise to the *blousons noirs*, this paper will focus predominantly on the public perception of the youth subculture. I argue that social and intellectual responses to the burgeoning youth culture in the early years of the French Fifth Republic, from 1959 to 1962, illuminate the complexities and contradictions of France’s shift toward modernization. I contend that embedded in the fears over juvenile delinquency lay larger societal fears about Americanization, the development of mass consumer society, and, with them, the erosion of French cultural values. Through an examination of social responses and perceptions of youth subculture we can garner a better understanding about France’s postwar crisis of modernity.<sup>4</sup> In this effort the essay has two modest guiding questions. How and in what context is American youth culture defined and why is it defined this way? Though none of the studies used in this essay positioned themselves to represent a national consensus, they all endeavored to influence the public debate on the matter. These studies are therefore *emblematic* of the period and, insofar as they construct a youth identity, are representative of the dominant issues specific to the period.

The rise in popularity of American teen-oriented cinema and music in late 1950s France corresponded with a chorus of social commentators who sounded the alarm on juvenile delinquency. Fears about the unsavory links between youth crime and American popular culture, I contend, were representative of larger concerns over Americanization. Many of the supposed tenets of modernity – an overemphasis on workplace efficiency, streamlined production, and standardized mass consumerism, for instance – were associated with some of the worst aspects, real or imagined, of American society.<sup>5</sup> Not only, it seemed, did overt American influences destabilize French notions of culture and identity, they also exacerbated the apparent crisis of juvenile delinquency. As a result, the overwhelming associations of teenage-oriented American youth culture, materialized through film, fashion, and music, were negative.

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<sup>3</sup> In this respect, I am influenced by an idea posited by Rob Kroes. Kroes argues that, more often than not, “Americanization” and “American culture” become convenient metaphorical outlets for European societies to rationalize undesirable changes or traits in their own cultures. See the chapter “American Culture in European Metaphors” in Rob Kroes, *If You’ve Seen One You’ve Seen the Mall: Europeans and American Mass Culture* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996), 1-42.

<sup>4</sup> This work intends to build on a methodological approach, employed by Susan Weiner and Richard Ivan Jobs, among others, which uses the socially constructed concept of youth as an analytical tool to provide commentary on the larger society and era. See both Richard Ivan Jobs, *Riding the New Wave: Youth and the Rejuvenation of France After the Second World War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); and Susan Weiner, *Enfants Terribles: Youth and Femininity in the Mass Media in France, 1945-1968* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

<sup>5</sup> These themes are concisely discussed in Harm G. Schröter, *Americanization of the European Economy: A Compact Survey of American Economic Influence in Europe since the 1880s* (Dordrecht, NL: Springer, 2005); on the broader concerns over the social and political implications of Americanization, see Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

## American Cinema and France's Youth

The widespread ambivalence towards American teenage-oriented popular culture was emblematic of a larger anxiety over Americanization. Many within society resented (or, at least, remained skeptical) about the perceived rise of American cultural, political, and economic influence on French society in the aftermath of the Second World War.<sup>6</sup> And to be sure, the most visible instance of a pervasive American cultural influence in postwar France emanated from Hollywood. Stars like Marlon Brando and James Dean were the obvious points of reference for many French teenagers; among the most popular films from the period were *The Wild One* (released in France in mid-1954), featuring Brando as the rugged leader of a motorcycle gang, and *Rebel without a Cause* (released in France in 1956), featuring Dean cast as a rebellious teenager. There was little doubt that these American teen idols proved influential in the construction of an identity for the French working class youth gangs. The young men, deemed the *blousons noirs* (the black jackets) by a weary public, typically donned black leather jackets à la Marlon Brando, opted for blue jeans and white t-shirts instead of more respectable wares, and procured a greased and coiffed hairstyle modeled after Elvis Presley.<sup>7</sup> The advent of teenage-oriented cinema and teen idols – both products of American mass consumerism and thus conflated with the ills of modernity – appeared to exacerbate trends of juvenile delinquency.

Social commentators received these American teen idols and their questionable influence with great ambivalence. A 1961 study by journalist Jacques Duquesne and the Institut Français d'Opinion Publique (IFOP) underscores this point. The study, titled *Les 16-24 ans*, endeavored to illuminate the many aspects of the young generation: school and work, the family life, the youth's political and religious ideas, their feelings toward marriage, and their preferred leisure activities.<sup>8</sup> Duquesne began his introduction with a vivid description of the quintessential youth of the day. "Look at him," he writes:

Long hair falling on an open collar, a lost expression, a jacket slightly ruffled (because it was out the night before at a Rock performance or doing the Twist at the Palais des Sports), tight-fitting pants disappearing into a pair of cowboy boots. This is the portrait of the young of today that books, articles, and films have finally imposed on our imagination.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Even with the Marshall Plan and its benefits to French society, for example, many believed that the economic initiative was motivated more by commercial interests and an anticommunist political agenda than out of goodwill. The fact that the initiative was coupled with American propaganda and an assortment of strings attached only underscored this perception. See "The New American Hegemony" in Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French*, 15-36.

<sup>7</sup> Gerd-Rainer Horn, *The Spirit of '68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956-1976* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 26.

<sup>8</sup> Jacques Duquesne and the Institut Français d'Opinion Publique, *Les 16-24 ans. D'après une enquête de l'Institut Français d'Opinion Publique*, 2e edition (Paris: Le Centurion, 1963).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

Without explicitly condemning the newfound youth trends, Duquesne made it clear that their tastes defied French sensibilities.

Other studies were more forthcoming. In 1962, Émile Copfermann, an influential educator and writer, published *La génération des blousons noirs: Problèmes de la jeunesse française*, a study meant to comment on the mentalities of the young generation in France.<sup>10</sup> His introductory section, in a dual effort to entice the reader and underscore the problems of French youth, contained a chronology of supposedly representative and symptomatic events. The chronology balanced tales of stolen cars, violence and murder, and rising statistics of juvenile crime alongside debates among school principals throughout France seeking to “forbid their students from wearing blue jeans and leather jackets.” He even included a recount of two young girls who, in an effort to “join James Dean,” committed suicide by intentionally jumping from the rooftop of a fourteen-story building to the ground below, an act deemed as “two apprentices consecrating their leisure to the cult of the star.”<sup>11</sup> Throughout, Copfermann offered a conflation of criminal acts – theft, violence – with otherwise innocuous, but “American,” tastes and tendencies.

The dilemma of American teen idols was addressed elsewhere. Henri Joubrel, the commissioner of the French youth scouting movement, published a study in 1960 titled *Jeunesse en danger*.<sup>12</sup> He wasted little time in the foreword of his work highlighting the problematic influence of American film. Among young people, he noted, “violence seemed to be becoming the trend.”<sup>13</sup> “These adolescents,” he continued, “leaning against the walls like the cowboys in the westerns,” are capable of bursting with energy and “abruptly raising their switchblades.” The source of influence was clear: “an irresistible urge brings the youth to imitate Marlon Brando in *The Wild One* or James Dean from *Rebel without a Cause*.”<sup>14</sup> In his description of young people Joubrel constructed an image of an ominous, lurking teenage presence capable of sudden acts of violence. Only images drawn from American cinema, it seemed, proved able to provide the reader the appropriate comparison.

And finally, there was Philippe Parrot, a psychiatrist, and his partner Monique Gueneau, a psychologist, who, in 1959, published a study titled *Les Gangs d'Adolescents. Psycho-sociologie de la délinquance juvénile: de l'observation à la thérapeutique*.<sup>15</sup> Their work was part of the Nouvelle Recherche series under the direction of Georges Hahn, a respected and well-published psychologist from the

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<sup>10</sup> Émile Copfermann, *La génération des blousons noirs: Problèmes de la jeunesse française* (Paris: La Découverte, 2003), 32 [Originally published in 1962].

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>12</sup> Henri Joubrel, *Jeunesse en danger* (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1960).

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>15</sup> Monique Gueneau and Philippe Parrot, *Les Gangs d'Adolescents. Psycho-sociologie de la délinquance juvénile: de l'observation à la thérapeutique* (Toulouse: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959).

period. The authors, like elsewhere, linked American teen idols to juvenile crime. As they noted:

We have signaled that the delinquents find the source for their criminal techniques in comics and films. The press and the cinema supply nothing except recipes: they act in a very psychological way in giving to the young people the possibilities of identification that the young cannot find in the family: their heroes are going to be Eddie Constantine, James Dean, Marlon Brando, and Brigitte Bardot. The manner of dressing and the haircuts copy these stars.<sup>16</sup>

The passage suggests that the most visible aspects of American-styled youth culture – the idols of teen cinema – only detracted from French society. To be sure, Brando and Dean were not the only culprits. Constantine (born in America, he moved to Europe after failing to gain success in the US film industry) and Bardot were implicated. Though not American cultural exports, both Constantine and Bardot were part of a larger trend in postwar popular cinema, in both the US and Europe, influenced by the actions of Hollywood and viewed with apprehension from French social commentators.<sup>17</sup>

In each of these instances, the association of American popular culture, often personified through Marlon Brando and James Dean, with the apparent growth of juvenile delinquency served to cement, for the assorted readership, the dangerous relationship between low-brow American popular culture and impressionable youth. As the studies suggested, American popular culture, including Hollywood, had a suspect influence on French society. In this instance, the primary tenets of American culture and society, as perceived in the imagination of social commentators, influenced, even encouraged, juvenile crime and troublesome youth behavior in France. This was but one representative instance of a larger debate over America's cultural and socio-economic influence over the trajectory of France in the postwar period.

### **Rock and Roll and the Dilemma of Mass Consumer Culture**

Like the rise of American teen idols and teen cinema in France, the prevalence of rock and roll in the late 1950s was met with unease. To many, the burgeoning musical style was emblematic of a larger postwar trend toward a consumer society reliant on mass-produced culture. To its critics, the rise of mass culture, linked, of course, to Americanization, meant a lowering of cultural standards. It meant the replacement of sophisticated European tastes and sensibilities with an American-

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 213

<sup>17</sup> On the changes of film and the prevalence of European popular cinema in the postwar period, see James Chapman, *Cinemas of the World: Film and Society from 1895 to the Present* (London: Reaktion Books, 2003).

styled cultural output that appealed to the largest possible audience.<sup>18</sup> Most of all, mass culture represented the replacement of individuality and originality (with all the implications for French national identity) with a standardized and unoriginal culture produced for the lowest common denominator.<sup>19</sup> Within the context of this study, rock and roll represented, for the intellectuals and social commentators, the ills of a society shifting toward an American-style consumer society.

As others have argued, earlier forms of American culture – particularly jazz – were viewed by some in France (often left-leaning intellectuals) as both a respectable musical form and a vehicle to criticize American Cold War politics and consumer society.<sup>20</sup> American youth culture and rock and roll bore no such association. In barely two years the nascent musical style was linked to teen-related outbursts and disturbances in 500 cities throughout three continents. As a result of such incidents the musical genre was linked to moral degradation and depraved youth in the French popular imagination.<sup>21</sup>

A 1959 article in the weekly news magazine *L'Express* underscores this point. The article examined a study concerning the rise of a teenage consumer bloc in the United States and its economic influence.<sup>22</sup> It investigated the interests among teenagers and how these interests translated into marketable products in a world of increasing consumerism. Alongside films marketed toward them, the article considered how “the ‘teenagers’ have a music (or an anti-music): rock n’ roll.” Noting that rock and roll’s “blend of deafening blows and furious noises are incomprehensible, even intolerable, to adults,” the article made it clear that rock and roll was symbolic of low-brow American culture. Adding that “the record industry has met an enormous expansion since the appearance of rock n’ roll,” the article emphasized that the music form represented a harbinger of a society driven by consumer durables of little cultural value.<sup>23</sup>

Rock and roll not only stirred fears about its capacity to incite juvenile delinquency, it was also representative of an American-style consumer society regarded ambivalently by a French public. Emblematic of this convergence of consumer society and American culture was the rise of the transistor radio. In 1958, for instance, there were only 260,000 transistor radios in France. By 1961 the number had blossomed to two and a quarter million. The sheer accessibility

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<sup>18</sup> The European distaste for “mass” culture is discussed in an essay by Volker R. Berghahn. See Volker R. Berghahn, “European Elitism, American Money, and Popular Culture,” in *The American Century in Europe*, ed. R. Laurence Moore, and Maurizio Vaudagna (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 120-24.

<sup>19</sup> Rob Kroes, “American Mass Culture and European Youth Culture” in *Between Marx and Coca-Cola: Youth Cultures in Changing European Societies, 1960-1980*, ed. Axel Schildt and Detlef Siegfried (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006), 82-92.

<sup>20</sup> See, in particular, Elizabeth Vihlen’s essay “Jammin’ on the Champs-Élysées: Jazz, France, and the 1950s,” in *Here, There and Everywhere”: The Foreign Politics of American Popular Culture*, ed. Elaine Tyler May and Reinhold Wagnleitner (Hanover, NH: University of New England, 2000), 149-62.

<sup>21</sup> Jean-Charles Lagrée, *Les jeunes chantent leurs cultures* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1982), 15-16.

<sup>22</sup> “Dix-sept millions de clients. Une nouvelle classe de consommateurs est née: les jeunes. Les industriels américains étudient leurs mœurs,” *L’Express*, 19 February 1959, 16-17.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* 17.

of inexpensive (and portable) radios meant that the French youth were no longer bound by the tastes of their parents. Only a few years prior, teenagers had little choice beyond listening to the radio programs of their parents – news, radio dramas, or songs by the stars of *chanson* like Charles Trenet and Edith Piaf, all of which catered to older tastes. The rise of personal radios as well as commercial radio stations situated beyond French borders (and thus outside the reach of the French state) – including Radio Luxembourg, Radio Monte-Carlo, and Europe 1 – gave French youth access to unfiltered American rock and roll.<sup>24</sup> This convergence of American culture and American-style consumerism became metaphorical for a decline of societal values.

Characteristic of these concerns, Émile Copfermann, in his study *La génération des blousons noirs*, lamented the rise of what he deemed the “amusement industry,” one that, through effective advertising and marketed fashions, had “drawn a profile of youth” that encouraged conformity.<sup>25</sup> Not only did consumer culture encourage conformity, he feared, it also lowered cultural and social standards. Using rock and roll as an example, he noted that “the offered sentiments within the syrupy or rhythmic melody can be shared without effort by the listener.” “It’s enough,” he added, to “have an enjoyable feeling and a danceable rhythm.” The simplicity and lack of sophistication found in a culture of consumption, he concluded, explained the “standardizing through mediocrity” linked to France’s transition to consumer society.<sup>26</sup>

Copfermann’s sentiments were echoed in the aforementioned 1959 *L’Express* article. Expressing ambivalence about the tenets of consumer society, there was little doubt for the magazine journalist that the US represented an uncertain future: “Those Americans,” the article affirms, “have already put into practice what the French are only just beginning to have doubts about.” The article pointed to new trends in the US, ones that included teen cinema and rock and roll but also hours spent glued to the television and talking on the telephone. The article conveyed the sense that these were questionable new trends but, nonetheless, inevitable. “The readings of this survey are very instructive for us,” it noted, because “what’s happening in the United States, in economic and commercial matters, only precedes what is going to pop up here soon.” Transformation was a near certainty, the writer argued, adding that specialists consider French youth “the most Americanized in Europe.”<sup>27</sup>

Both works reflected anxieties about a changing society that turned increasingly to marketed consumer products of supposedly little cultural or educational value. If there was a productive consumerism, the type absorbed by juveniles certainly

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<sup>24</sup> Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 343-344.

<sup>25</sup> Copfermann, *La génération des blousons noirs*, 96.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 96.

<sup>27</sup> *L’Express*, 19 February 1959, 16.

was not it. Instead, the hallmarks of youth consumerism – music, clothing, and cinema – did little more than create a standardized and homogenous generation of mediocrity. Besides the negative connotations of rock and roll, these teenage leisure pursuits were troubling because, as Émile Copfermann wrote, “the quest for pleasure through entertainment . . . constituted an evasion of appreciable work.”<sup>28</sup>

Rock and roll thus represented the worst aspects of a standardized mass culture. Of course, rock and roll was also the musical choice of the *blousons noirs*. As a result, and with their identity tied to a maelstrom of unrespectable cultural products – blue jeans, leather jackets, banal teen-oriented cinema, cowboy boots, and rock and roll – the *blousons noirs* became a metaphor for the standardizing tendencies of consumerism. This standardization metaphor was employed in other domains. Indeed, not only did the *blousons noirs*, in their ostensible slackening of cultural standards, embody the worst aspects of American-styled consumer society, they were also representative of the erosion of national identity. For many, the *blousons noirs* represented the standardization of Western society, a result of the spread of an American-influenced consumer culture of mediocrity.

Jacques Duquesne, for instance, in his IFOP study, *Les 16-24 ans*, revealed anxiety about America’s pervasive influence on all of Europe. “We are told that this sickness is general,” he wrote. That, “if France has its *Blousons noirs* or *Dorés*, Italy has its *Vitelloni*, Germany its *Halbstarken*, Denmark its *Anderumper*, and Poland its *Hooligans*.” “As for the young American,” he concluded, “scarcely do we still dare talk about him.”<sup>29</sup> The text suggested, if subtly, that the rise of American-influenced youth culture not only undermined youth, but also challenged a distinct French identity by standardizing a consumer-based youth culture throughout Europe.

Similarly, the authors of *Les Gangs d’Adolescents*, Philippe Parrot and Monique Gueneau, highlighted in their introduction the commonality of troublesome youth groups linked to American culture. Citing the rise of the analogous subcultures – the “Vitteloni” in Italy, the “Demisels” in Germany, the “Nozun” in Holland, the “Anderumper” in Denmark, and the “Teddy Boys” in Britain, among others – the duo claimed, without the slightest sense of hyperbole, “in all of the countries it is the same contestation: that the young people present one of the gravest crises that humanity has ever known.”<sup>30</sup>

Émile Copfermann, in his 1962 study, emphasized a similar sentiment. “Here are the facts,” he wrote:

They are clear. Following other countries, France has, for two years, discovered the “Blousons Noirs.” They possess nothing very original, joining

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<sup>28</sup> Copfermann, *La génération des blousons noirs*, 97.

<sup>29</sup> Duquesne, *Les 16-24 ans*, 5.

<sup>30</sup> Gueneau and Parrot, *Les Gangs d’Adolescents*, 1-2.



the archetypes written elsewhere: revolt, nihilism, [both] amoral and immoral; [they are] the delinquents of the occasion.<sup>31</sup>

Copfermann too saw the *blousons noirs* as representative of a larger trend, emanating from a foreign source (the United States), and linked to a generic archetype of negative characteristics. The *blousons noirs* were, in the eyes of Copfermann and others, nothing more than a carbon-copy of some of the troublesome trends derivative of young Americans. The emphasis here is the supposed lack of originality attributed to the *blousons noirs*, a woeful characteristic that evoked, for many, the larger debates and fears of a standardized and mindless consumer society and also the decline of a distinct (and original) French culture.<sup>32</sup>

As the collection of works reveal, American culture in general and rock and roll music in particular bore negative connotations in the French public imagination. It was synonymous with the instances of juvenile crime and, even at its most innocuous, seemed to undermine French cultural sensibilities and produce an unimaginative and unproductive youth class. More broadly, the collected works reveal an uncertainty about the future and about concepts of modernity. Changing aspects underway in French society – a relative increase in youth autonomy resulting from access to disposable income and products marketed uniquely to teenagers – were viewed ambivalently and, insofar as they seemed troublesome to French society, were consistently linked to “American” symbols ranging from James Dean and blue jeans to rock and roll. In this instance, America, as embodied through symbolic products, was conflated with notions of modernity: mass consumption, standardized goods, and low-brow culture. The rising preoccupation with juvenile crime as well as the tastes and opinions of young people also suggest that French society placed great importance on the trajectory of the youth (and, as a consequence, the trajectory of France). Therein lay but one aspect of the complexity of France’s drift toward a modernized consumer society in the postwar period, as evidenced by the concerns over French youth culture.

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<sup>31</sup> Copfermann, *La génération des blousons noirs*, 33.

<sup>32</sup> The critiques of the standardizing qualities of rock and roll were emblematic of the larger anxieties about the rise of an ostensibly foreign consumerism in postwar France. Voices on both sides of the political spectrum proved ill at ease with the apparent wayward shift of French postwar society. The French left, for instance, were quick to denounce the consumerist changes in France, citing the inequities of economic progress and the perceived alienation caused by modern American-styled capitalism. The Catholic right, meanwhile, feared the ostensible loss of French tradition and even, perhaps, religiosity as a result of the uncertain tenet of modernity, especially a seemingly foreign-associated modernity. The rise of the Poujadist movement, devoted to protecting France’s small shopkeepers against higher taxes, as well as supermarkets and other symbols of mass-produced modernity, in the mid-1950s further underscored the cultural debate over consumerism and, with it, an evolving society. Couched within these debates, rock and roll, and the other constituent consumer objects of the *blousons noirs*, proved a representative and galvanizing symbol for those ambivalent about a changing French society. The larger issues of modernity are considered in Michael Kelly, Elizabeth Fallaize, and Anna Ridehalgh, “Crises of Modernization,” in *French Cultural Studies: An Introduction*, ed. Jill Forbes and Michael Kelly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 99-139; the Poujadist movement is covered in Judt, *Postwar*, 287, 487.



## Liquid Gold: The Rise and Fall of Florida's Family Citrus Farms

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In addition to a love of nature and a passionate interest in zoology, Marjorie Harris and Archie Carr had something else in common when they first met in the biology department at the University of Florida in 1936. They both became Floridians when their respective parents moved to the state to run a small orange grove. Like most small citrus farmers, however, the Harris and Carr families never reaped the profits that they had dreamed of making when they first launched their fruit businesses. Since the inception of Florida's commercial citrus industry in the late nineteenth century, citrus farmers have contended with freezes, diseases, pests, droughts, floods, and mounting pressure from real estate development, yet the state continues to be the nation's top citrus producer. Nonetheless, Florida's family citrus farms are a dying breed. Roadside citrus stands were once a common sight on most Florida highways, but nowadays they are few and far between. A triad of diseases could put an end to a piece of Florida's past that is as old as St. Augustine and as central to the Florida dream as beaches and sunsets.

In the early twentieth century, South Florida land speculators pitched the benefits of the state's tropical climate to all who would listen, claiming that an industrious individual could retire after running a family orange grove for ten years. Although oranges are actually native to Southeast Asia, Florida promoters had used images of citrus in subtropical Florida to lure tourists and permanent residents to the state since the late nineteenth century.<sup>1</sup> In 1918, when Marjorie Harris was three years old, her father, Charles Harris, relocated the family to a ten-acre orange grove in remote Southwest Florida. Charles built a modest house three miles south of Bonita Springs, near the Imperial River. The majority of the townsfolk worked on family citrus and vegetable farms. The Harrises were among a group of eight to ten families who moved from Boston to Fort Myers and regions further south to grow oranges.<sup>2</sup>

Charles and Clara Harris's decision to move to rural Bonita Springs would instill a love of natural Florida in their young daughter, who would later champion the cause of restoring and preserving the state's wild and scenic rivers.<sup>3</sup> About a decade later the parents of Marjorie Harris's future husband, Archie Carr, purchased a

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<sup>1</sup> For more information on the spread of citrus from Asia to the Mediterranean and eventually to the Americas, see Raymond E. Crist, "The Citrus Industry in Florida," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 15:1 (October, 1955): 1-12. Peggy Macdonald is now Assistant Professor of History at Florida Polytechnic University.

<sup>2</sup> Portions of this article were published in Peggy Macdonald, *Marjorie Harris Carr: Defender of Florida's Environment* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2014).

<sup>3</sup> Mimi Carr, interviews with author (November 11, 2005 and August 6, 2008); Marjorie Harris Carr, interview with Everett Caudle (April 24, 1989), courtesy of the Samuel Proctor Oral History Program.

small orange grove in the town of Umatilla, Florida (located between Ocala and Orlando), providing Harris and Carr with a shared connection to rural Florida. Yet very few small family citrus growers turned a profit in the early to mid-twentieth century. As the citrus industry consolidated, Florida and California farmers formed cooperatives, which left little room for family growers to compete.

Representing the clash between Florida's native plant life and the state's agricultural industry, the citrus industry was responsible both for improving Americans' health and permanently altering Florida's landscape and wildlife habitats. New World citrus was first planted in Hispaniola in 1493, during Columbus's second voyage to the Americas. It is believed that citrus was first introduced to Florida at St. Augustine in 1565. By 1774, when the naturalist William Bartram traveled up the St. Johns River, he reported finding wild orange groves scattered across the higher regions of land where he camped at night. Early promoters used images and narratives depicting Florida as a land of orange groves and Edenic gardens. The Harrises — originally a farming family — were drawn to the idea of escaping the big-city lifestyle and retreating to a small patch of Florida orange groves. In reality, orange groves do not reach maturity for three to six years, and they seldom produce enough fruit to enable a small farmer to turn a profit in less than ten years' time, but promoters offered exaggerated visions of instant success.<sup>4</sup>

At the time the Harris family and the other Bostonians who joined them settled in Lee County, Southwest Florida was a haven for small family citrus growers. Considered a luxury item since ancient times, oranges attracted such great thinkers as Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Thomas Edison, and Henry Ford to Florida. Rawlings, who won the 1939 Pulitzer Prize for fiction for *The Yearling*, lived on a 72-acre orange grove in North Central Florida. Stowe managed a profitable orange grove in Mandarin for almost two decades. John James Audubon sketched Florida birds on orange branches when he visited the state in 1831. Combining images of religion, art, and nature, Florida advertisements and literature tantalized Americans with the promise of paradise. Oranges were frequently at the heart of these images. By 1894 Florida's citrus industry produced five million boxes of fruit per year. At the turn of the century Florida postcards depicted families at work in their private orange groves, but larger citrus operations became the norm as the twentieth century wore on. Large packing houses and citrus cooperatives had spread across the state by the 1920s. After a series of hard freezes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the citrus industry relocated from North Florida to Central and South Florida. Fort Myers was situated far enough to the South to provide excellent growing

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<sup>4</sup> For a detailed analysis of William Bartram's journey through Florida, see Charlotte M. Porter, "An Eighteenth-Century Flower Child: William Bartram," in Jack E. Davis and Raymond Arsenault, eds., *Paradise Lost? The Environmental History of Florida* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005).

conditions for citrus. In 1895, Fort Myers was reported to be the southernmost point at which orange groves had been planted, but subsequent freezes later drove citrus growers farther south.<sup>5</sup>

The Harris family followed the same Florida dream that would lead millions of Americans to start a new life in the Sunshine State. However, they soon discovered that their ten-acre orange grove was not profitable enough to support the family. Out of economic necessity, Charles returned to Boston in the winters to teach. Unable to travel north for seasonal work like Charles, many of the other Boston families chose to return to New England or move to a bigger town where there were better job opportunities.<sup>6</sup>

Nonetheless, citrus remained a profitable crop even during the agricultural recession of the 1920s, when prices for citrus remained steady due to the lack of foreign competitors and citrus's special climate and temperature requirements. While many American farmers witnessed a dramatic fall in crop prices after World War I, citrus growers enjoyed a nearly twofold increase in orange prices between 1920 and 1929.<sup>7</sup> However, family orange growers were less likely to reap the record profits that citrus cooperatives experienced in the 1920s. Large packing houses proliferated in this period, making it possible for cooperatives to sell their crops across the country. Family growers' roadside citrus stands could not compete with the cooperatives' organized marketing and shipping apparatus. By 1930 the Depression contributed to a dramatic decrease in the price of oranges. By that time, most of Marjorie Harris's relatives had already left Bonita Springs. When Harris reached high school age her family finally left their citrus farm for good and moved to Fort Myers, because the Bonita Springs School did not go past the eighth grade. Most of the other Bostonians had abandoned their citrus farms long before. They were old when they moved to Florida, and the work was hard. They had been unable to fulfill their grand vision of enjoying a comfortable retirement with a profitable orange grove.

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, however, citrus farms provided many Florida families with an opportunity to live close to the land and turn a profit. One of the biggest selling points of Florida's once ubiquitous citrus stands was their fresh juice blends that taste nothing like the pasteurized orange

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<sup>5</sup> Helen L. Kohen, "Perfume, Postcards, and Promises: The Orange in Art and Industry," *The Journal of Decorative and Propaganda Arts* 23 (Florida Theme Issue, 1998): 33-47; Allen H. Andrews, *A Yank Pioneer in Florida: Recounting the Adventures of a City Chap Who Came to the Wilds of South Florida in the 1890s and Remained to Grow Up With the Country* (Jacksonville, Florida: Press of the Douglas Printing Company, 1950), 239; Gordon E. Bigelow, *Frontier Eden: The Literary Career of Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1980); Crist, "The Citrus Industry in Florida;" Charlotte M. Porter, *John James Audubon: Florida Travels, 1831-1832* (Gainesville: Florida State Museum, 1985); and Gary Mormino, *Land of Sunshine, State of Dreams: A Social History of Modern Florida* (Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 2005).

<sup>6</sup> Mimi Carr, interviews with author (November 11, 2005 and March 7, 2007); Marjorie Harris Carr, interview with Leslie Kemp Poole (October 18, 1990).

<sup>7</sup> For a statistical analysis of the Florida citrus industry in the 1920s, see Elizabeth Hoffman and Gary D. Libecap, "Institutional Choice and the Development of U.S. Agricultural Policies in the 1920s," *The Journal of Economic History* 51:2 (June 1991): 397-411.

and grapefruit juice available today in the supermarket. In 1951 Hale Groves on U.S. 1 in Wabasso offered all the orange juice you could drink for just ten cents. Yet even in their heyday roadside stands typically made most of their money by shipping citrus gift boxes up north, especially at the holidays.<sup>8</sup> The same holds true today, although prices have gone up dramatically. For example, a ten-pound gift box of oranges and grapefruit from Mixon Fruit Farm in Bradenton, Florida costs just under \$50 plus shipping.<sup>9</sup>

In the mid-twentieth century, before Walt Disney World changed the tourist industry, nature was the main attraction in Florida. For example, in 1956 a twenty-two-story tower was erected near U.S. 27 in Clermont, a highland region with a series of ridges that provide excellent drainage for citrus crops. The Citrus Tower offered tourists breathtaking views of miles of Florida citrus. Six years later a major freeze destroyed half of Florida's citrus crop, leading many growers to move further south. Because South Florida was known for its poor drainage, citrus tycoon Jack Berry devised a system of elevated beds surrounded by irrigation ditches. Berry planted 6,000 acres of citrus in Southwest Florida near the Caloosahatchee River.<sup>10</sup>

In the 1980s, after several hard freezes devastated Central Florida's citrus industry, more growers followed Berry's lead and headed to Southwest Florida. By the turn of the twenty-first century more than 100,000 acres in Southwest Florida had been converted to citrus groves. For Florida's surviving citrus growers, the upside of the freezes of the 1980s was that prices increased significantly. Berry did so well after the freezes that he purchased an additional 16,000 acres in Sarasota County, raising his total citrus holdings to 45 square miles and giving him a place on Forbes magazine's list of the top 400 wealthiest Americans in 1993.<sup>11</sup>

Citrus tycoons are far less common in Florida today. Since 1996, more than 200,000 acres of citrus land has been lost. Much of this land was sold to developers who replaced the groves with subdivisions. Along U.S. Highway 27, for instance, where the aroma of citrus blossoms used to fill the air for miles around in early spring, Clermont has become one of Orlando's sprawling bedroom communities. While the Citrus Tower once offered views of Clermont's seemingly endless citrus groves, today tourists who pay \$6.00 to ride the elevator to the observation deck are treated to a less satisfying view of rolling hills covered with strip malls and housing developments that are devoid of citrus yet bear names such as Citrus Highlands, Greater Groves, and Orange Tree. In the late 1940s, when the Florida Gift Fruit Shippers Association was founded, there were 152 members. As of 2010

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<sup>8</sup>"Deep Roots, Oranges and a Taste of Florida's Past," *New York Times*, December 31, 2009.

<sup>9</sup>America's Farmstand. "Navel oranges and pink grapefruit box." [https://www.americasfarmstand.com/product\\_details?category\\_id=produce&company\\_id=fresh-florida-citrus&product\\_id=orange-and-grapefruit-box](https://www.americasfarmstand.com/product_details?category_id=produce&company_id=fresh-florida-citrus&product_id=orange-and-grapefruit-box). Accessed February 24, 2013.

<sup>10</sup>"Jack Berry, Florida Citrus Baron, Dies at 81," *New York Times*, November 30, 1997.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

there were 37. Much like the Clermont region in Central Florida, the Indian River citrus region in South Florida is now home to lackluster strip malls, vacant lots, and closed packing houses where mature groves once stood.<sup>12</sup>

In addition to facing pressure from land developers and Florida's ever increasing population, Florida's citrus growers must wage war against the spread of diseases that have the potential to eradicate the state's orange and grapefruit crops. Due to the citrus disease known as greening or Huanglongbing (HLB), which was first detected in the United States in Homestead, Florida in 2005, the state's commercial citrus acreage has shrunk from 748,555 acres in 2004 to 531,493 acres in 2012 (a twenty-eight percent decline). This represents the lowest total acreage since the U.S. Department of Agriculture began surveying citrus acreage in 1966. Greening, which is also known as yellow dragon disease, was first noted in Southern China in the late 1800s. In the most recent citrus season, which runs from November to January, greening and drought have caused the greatest amount of premature fruit drop in more than forty years. As a result, the number of boxes of oranges expected to be produced this season dropped from an estimated 154 million ninety-pound boxes as of October 2012 to just 142 million boxes as of January 2013. The grapefruit forecast decreased from an estimated 20.3 million boxes to 18 million.<sup>13</sup>

Three years ago the National Academy of Sciences called for the removal of all trees infected with greening. Although some large commercial growers removed hundreds of thousands of infected trees, most growers did not remove infected trees quickly enough, so greening is here to stay. As a result, citrus growers have resorted to spraying trees for the Asian citrus psyllid, the insect that spreads the greening bacterium from plant to plant. By 2012 greening had also been found in citrus trees in Texas and California.<sup>14</sup>

Greening disrupts the flow of nutrients in citrus trees and kills them approximately five years after they are infected. The disease leaves citrus fruit green, lopsided, and bitter. According to some predictions, all of Florida's citrus trees could be infected within the next decade. To date greening has cost Florida's citrus industry more than \$1 billion and approximately one-tenth of its citrus acreage. Nonetheless, Florida remains the nation's largest producer of citrus, thanks in large part to the use of innovative growing techniques. Because young trees attract the insect that spreads greening, citrus growers are planting fewer new trees. To avoid infection, young trees are often cultivated in greenhouses for several years before being planted in groves. In addition, young trees and older, uninfected trees are sprayed with pesticides to prevent the spread of the citrus psyllid. Infected trees are given nutrient treatments to help them continue to yield fruit after they are infected. In

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<sup>12</sup> "Indian River Journal: Deep Roots, Oranges and a Taste of Florida's Past," *New York Times*, December 31, 2009; "Sweet, Sticky and Vanishing Fast: Interstates and Developers Have Been Rough on Florida's Citrus Stands," *New York Times*, January 1, 2010.

<sup>13</sup> "Green Disease Squeezes Florida's Citrus Industry," *Palm Beach Post*, January 20, 2013.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

order to save Florida's \$9 billion citrus industry, many companies have funneled monies that would have previously gone toward advertising into research. Greening primarily affects Florida's main citrus crops, oranges and grapefruits; the disease tends to have less of an impact upon lemons and limes. Attempts to hybridize new varieties of orange and grapefruit trees that are resistant to greening are ongoing, but this could take decades. Some University of Florida scientists are working with scientists in southern China to study citrus trees that are doing well in heavily infected groves. Most research focuses on developing genetically modified citrus trees, a controversial tactic that might prove to be the only successful option to save Florida's lucrative orange and grapefruit industry.<sup>15</sup>

As of 2008, Florida's citrus industry was dominated by fifteen large growers who owned approximately 40 percent of the state's citrus acreage. According to the Florida Department of Citrus, large growers have been faster to adopt spraying programs to combat greening than small growers. Even abandoned groves need to be sprayed or they can harbor the citrus psyllid. It is unlikely that enough disease resistant trees will be available to replace Florida's citrus acreage within the next ten years, but spraying programs have proven to be effective in controlling the spread of greening. Current estimates for HLB infection are as high as 18 percent of the state's total citrus crop. According to the *2010 Commercial Citrus Inventory* there were 554,000 acres of citrus in 2010, including a total of 72.1 million citrus trees. In recent years acreage- and tree-loss rates have actually declined compared to the heavy losses sustained in the early 2000s, which were due to the canker eradication program, the severe 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, and aggressive real estate development before the recession. Citrus canker is a leaf, fruit, and stem blemishing disease that affects most citrus and has become endemic in Florida. Positive projections based upon continued spraying programs for the control of citrus greening and canker indicate that Florida's citrus industry should remain viable for the next decade, after which time new HLB-resistant citrus trees are expected to be available.<sup>16</sup>

The entire state of Florida is under quarantine in an attempt to stop the spread of citrus canker, which is mostly a cosmetic disease but can lead to defoliation and premature fruit drop. Between 2000 and 2005, removal and on-site burning of infected trees contributed to significant losses in the citrus industry. Effective canker control programs have not been fully determined. Copper fungicide can be effective in preventing the spread of canker, but its use should be minimized

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<sup>15</sup> "Deadly Pathogen Harms Florida Citrus Groves," *New York Times*, August 25, 2008; "Threat to California Citrus May Finish Backyard Trees," *New York Times*, April 17, 2012. Huanglongbing is associated with a bacterium, *Candidatus Liberibacter asiaticus*, that is transmitted by the Asian citrus psyllid (*Diaphorina citri*), a tiny insect that thrives on young citrus leaves.

<sup>16</sup> Florida Department of Citrus. "Florida Citrus Production Trends 2012-13 Through 2020-21." [http://www.arapahocitrus.com/files/2012-2013\\_through\\_2020-2021.pdf](http://www.arapahocitrus.com/files/2012-2013_through_2020-2021.pdf). Accessed February 25, 2013.



since the metal accumulates in soil and can be toxic to citrus peels.<sup>17</sup> In addition to greening and canker, citrus farmers have to watch for citrus tristeza virus (CTV), which causes citrus trees to produce very small fruit and eventually kills infected trees. CTV is a serious viral pathogen that is spread by the brown citrus aphid.<sup>18</sup>

Despite the serious threat posed by greening, canker, and CTV, some small Florida growers continue to offer organic citrus that is free of synthetic fertilizers and pesticides. Many of these organic growers are located in Central Florida. Uncle Matt's Organic in Clermont offers USDA certified organic juices without the flavor packs that are typically added by larger citrus companies such as Tropicana. In contrast to Tropicana, which processes 41 million boxes of fruit each year and uses one of every three oranges produced in Florida, the family farmers who produce oranges for Uncle Matt's Organic typically own between two and 100 acres of citrus.<sup>19</sup>

One of the Uncle Matt's Organic growers, the Anderson family, has managed citrus in Florida for three generations. Siblings Jodi and Kerry Anderson currently oversee 15 acres in Lake County, south of Clermont. Their grandfather cleared the land and planted Hamlin oranges in the 1940s. The Andersons sell their oranges to the local growers co-op. Several years ago, before Florida's real estate bubble burst, root weevil spread like wildfire through the Andersons' grove. The family had to decide whether to sell to developers, plant pine trees, or save the grove. They decided to preserve the land for future generations and reinvent the grove by going organic. Uncle Matt's Organic helped the Andersons make the transition to organic citrus farming. Organic farmers have experimented with parasitic wasps to control the citrus psyllid and appear to have had some success when used in combination with prompt removal of infected trees and branches, and the use of healthy planting material. Another option to stave off the Asian citrus psyllid in organic groves is to use oil sprays (petroleum oil and botanical oils), kaolin clay, and pyrethrin based products, although these methods are not as effective as the application of pesticides.<sup>20</sup>

The Andersons are among a growing contingent of citrus growers who remain in Central Florida, despite its history of freezes.<sup>21</sup> As far north as Ocala and Citra, a few roadside citrus stands can still be found along U.S. 27, U.S. 441, and U.S. 301.

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<sup>17</sup> University of Florida IFAS Extension. "2012 Florida Citrus Pest Management Guide: Citrus Canker." <http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/cg040>. Accessed February 25, 2013.

<sup>18</sup> University of Florida IFAS Extension. "2012 Florida Citrus Pest Management Guide: Tristeza." <http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/cg039>. Accessed February 25, 2013.

<sup>19</sup> "Lawsuits Against Orange Juice Companies Target 'Flavor Packs,'" *Miami Herald*, June 8, 2012; Uncle Matt's Organic. "Meet Our Growers." <http://unclematts.com/ourstory.html>. Accessed February 25, 2013.

<sup>20</sup> Uncle Matt's Organic. "Meet Our Growers." <http://unclematts.com/anderson.html>. Accessed February 25, 2013; ResearchGate. "How Can We Control Greening Disease In Organic Citrus Production?" [http://www.researchgate.net/post/How\\_can\\_we\\_control\\_greening\\_disease\\_in\\_organic\\_citrus\\_production](http://www.researchgate.net/post/How_can_we_control_greening_disease_in_organic_citrus_production). Accessed February 25, 2013; The Texas Citrus Greening Task Force. "Texas Citrus Greening and Asian Citrus Psyllid Action Plan." [http://www.valleyag.org/texascitrusgreening/files/CG\\_Action\\_Plan.pdf](http://www.valleyag.org/texascitrusgreening/files/CG_Action_Plan.pdf). Accessed February 24, 2013.

<sup>21</sup> "I'm A Citrus Romantic," *Tampa Bay Times*, January 5, 2013.

Even Southwest Florida, which was once the grapefruit capital of the world, is not immune to cold snaps. Pasco County's citrus groves, which totaled 35,000 acres before the freezes of the 1980s, were reduced to approximately 8,500 by 2012.<sup>22</sup> Freezes are not the only culprit behind Florida's declining citrus acreage. Long ago, Florida farmers referred to the practice of selling land to real estate developers as "growing Yankees." The trend toward selling grove land for development was already flourishing in the late 1950s. Since the land itself became worth more than the citrus growing on it, many small citrus farmers took advantage of the opportunity to sell their groves to developers. In the 1940s, seven citrus packing houses could be found on what is now Seminole Boulevard. For many years, Citrus Country Groves, which was originally known as Orange Blossom Groves, was the sole survivor, although it was surrounded by subdivisions, laundromats, a Twistee Treat, consignment shops, pawn shops, and vacant stores. Al Repetto opened Orange Blossom Groves in 1946 in what is now Seminole. In 2005 citrus canker was detected in Citrus Country Groves, and approximately 27,500 trees were burned to prevent the disease from spreading. In 2011 Citrus Country Groves closed its stores in Seminole and Clearwater. The Clearwater location on U.S. 19 has been transformed into a car dealership, but the Seminole store reopened under new ownership and is now known as Florida Citrus Country, although its citrus is shipped in from other parts of Florida.<sup>23</sup>

The future of Florida citrus is not entirely bleak. Many acres of Central Florida citrus groves that had been slated for development remain intact, as plans for upscale housing developments and golf courses fell apart as a result of the recent recession. A long-term upward trend in prices has contributed to this modest revival, but it is based upon a decrease in the citrus supply, not an increase in demand. Greening has driven up the price of citrus, and as planters now have to replant more often to contend with disease, citrus nurseries have become a lucrative business venture as well. Moreover, a substantial number of dormant groves on land that owners had planned to sell to developers have returned to active status, further increasing the demand for new trees.<sup>24</sup> At many of today's family citrus farms workers still climb tall ladders to pick fruit by hand, place it in canvas bags, and sort it into cardboard boxes that are sold at fruit stands located near the groves.<sup>25</sup> Greening, canker, and CTV threaten to make Florida citrus go the way of the Space Shuttle. With a little help from science, however, Florida's most famous crop may survive into the next millennium.

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<sup>22</sup> "Fred Snell: Former Citrus Grower Saw West Pasco Transformed," *Tampa Bay Times*, July 10, 2012.

<sup>23</sup> "A Good Spot for Citrus...and the Rest is History," *Tampa Bay Times*, July 4, 2001; "Citrus Country Groves Stores in Clearwater, Seminole Closing Soon," *Tampa Bay Times*, April 12, 2011; "Back in Business: Citrus Store Reopens Under a New Name," *Seminole Beacon*, November 8, 2011.

<sup>24</sup> "Citrus Groves Fight for a Comeback," *Tampa Bay Times*, December 6, 2012.

<sup>25</sup> "Citrus Grove Grew with Owner's Passion," *Tampa Bay Times*, January 2, 2009.

# **Bourboning the Urban: Reform after the 1746 Earthquake of Lima**

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According to the Peruvian historiography the earthquake of 1746 was the most intense and destructive that hit the city of Lima under the Spanish domination. The material devastation of the capital of the Peruvian viceroyalty was widespread. It affected the properties of the entire population of the city without discrimination based on social condition. The viceroy Don José Antonio Manso de Velasco (1688 – 1767) believed that the destruction of most of Lima's building structures created an opportune occasion to implement an urban reform project that reflected the political program of the new Bourbon monarchy. Unfortunately his plans met strong resistance from the members of the elite who refused to abandon traditional patterns of construction that represented the status symbolism of their social power. The response of the colonial government, through the viceroy, and the City Council's representative Luis de Godin, was presented before the court, arguing that the urban project was for the *public good of the city*. This confrontation between the colonial administration and the elite was so grave that the viceroy decided to send documents related to the whole process to the king so he could give a final resolution to the conflict.<sup>1</sup>

The post-disaster context created by the 1746 Lima earthquake provides a case study that is helpful for evaluating how the royal government dealt with the strong opposition by the local elite in its attempt to extend the power of Bourbon rule over its colonial domains. Such power came through the introduction of reforms in the social practices of colonial subjects. The concept of public good used by the colonial government was firmly opposed by the elite's claim to maintain their rights or privileges to erect buildings that distanced them from the lower classes.

This study will analyze the concepts of public good and rights employed in the discourses of royal officials and the elite respectively. I plan to examine the use of these concepts to identify the meaning these antagonistic groups conferred to them. A first objective of this work is to understand the use of the concept of public good by colonial administrators who wanted to reinforce the authority of the Bourbon government. In their discourses the viceroy and other royal representatives seemed to place the public good of the Lima population above the rights claimed by the elite. I intend to explore the meaning of public good within the discursive language of the larger Enlightenment despotism of the period. The second objective is to

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<sup>1</sup> A special thanks is owed to Dr. Charles Walker who paved the way for the study of earthquakes in colonial Lima with his monograph *Shaky Colonialism: The 1746 earthquake-tsunami in Lima, Peru, and its Long Aftermath* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). Furthermore, Dr. Walker also provided me access to the microfilm of Archivo General de Indias (hereafter AGI), LIMA, 511.

evaluate the argument of the elite that based the defense of their privilege and social status on what they regarded as their rights. A close analysis of the elite's defensive discourse may help us to follow the values they used to justify social practices that secured them the highest place in the social hierarchy. I will examine how this corporative and exclusionary group adopted a concept of a right that has frequently been associated with northern European liberal connotations. My final objective is to explain how these antagonistic groups were able to appropriate terms that seem contradictory to their interests.

### Literature and Methodology

For the last three decades the study of natural disasters by scholars of different academic fields has increased.<sup>2</sup> This interest in disasters may be explained by the fact that many researchers have considered these events as laboratories to explore and evaluate changes in social, economic, and political patterns of human societies that emerge when traditional conditions of life and activities are disrupted.<sup>3</sup>

According to political scientist Richard Olson, disasters often become political crises because of the increased number of demands on the political system and the complexity of such demands.<sup>4</sup> This mounting pressure on the government is mainly created by the disruption of the traditional living conditions of the afflicted population. Therefore, the aftermath of a natural disaster may represent a test for the government's capacity to respond. In this case, the Lima 1746 earthquake became a trial for the colonial government.

Buchenau and Johnson also highlight the significance of this kind of natural phenomenon in Latin America and its effectiveness in providing the context to analyze the social, political and cultural constructions of the societies afflicted by emergency after natural disasters. They propose that seismic events challenged and probed customary arrangements held for a considerable time by institutions, authorities, social groups, and families within those societies.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> For more on the study of natural disaster see David Alexander, "The Study of Natural Disasters, 1977-97: Some Reflections on a Changing Field of Knowledge," *Disasters* 21, 4 (Dec 1997): 284. Andrew C. Isenberg, "Introduction. New Directions in Urban Environmental History," *The Nature of Cities*, Andrew C. Isenberg (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2006), xi.

<sup>3</sup> For instance, sociologists believe catastrophes serve to study individual and collective behavior under extreme stress. See Allen H. Barton, *Communities in Disaster. A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1969). Economists have also become interested in disasters since they tend to occur with greater frequency and produce greater losses than in the past. William Kern, "Introduction," *The Economics of Natural and Unnatural Disasters*, ed. William Kern (Kalamazoo: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 2010); Alan L. Sorkin, *Economic Aspects of Natural Hazards* (Lexington: Lexington, 1982); and Jack Hirshleifer, *Economic Behavior in Adversity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) provide analysis of disaster situations based on economic perspectives.

<sup>4</sup> Richard Olson, "Towards a Politics of Disasters: Losses, Values, Agendas, and Blame," *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters* 18 (August, 2000): 267.

<sup>5</sup> Jürgen Buchenau and Lyman L. Johnson, "Introduction. Earthquakes and Latin American Political Culture." *Aftershocks. Earthquakes and Popular Politics in Latin America*, Jürgen Buchenau and Lyman L. Johnson (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2009). Within this compilation, some of the authors such as Samuel J. Martland, "Social and Political Fault Lines. The Valparaiso Earthquake of 1906," 70-99; Paul J. Dosal, "Natural Disaster, Political Earthquake. The 1972 Destruction of Managua and the Somoza Dynasty," 129-155; and Louise E. Walker, "Economic Fault Lines and Middle-Class Fears. Tlatelolco,

The catastrophic situation of the city increased the demands of the population on colonial authorities. Lima residents required material relief such as food and shelter. The immediate chore of the royal officials was to tend to these needs of the population and safeguard the social order.<sup>6</sup> In the following days and weeks they also had to organize the cleaning of debris and the reconstruction of buildings. The viceroy Manso de Velasco and other royal officers assumed control of the situation and formulated a plan for the process of reconstruction. Several reconstruction projects were promoted during his administration. His effective participation during the aftermath of the disaster was recognized by many of his contemporaries, including the king, who awarded him the title Conde de Superunda (*sobre las olas*/over the waves).<sup>7</sup>

Nevertheless, the viceroy's reconstruction projects encountered major obstacles, such as the precarious situation of the Royal Treasury, and the resistance of powerful groups. Manso de Velasco saw that the necessity of rebuilding most of the city's buildings created an opportune occasion to make Lima an orderly city. The objective of improving the external condition of the viceregal capital was to expose the absolutism of the Spanish Crown.<sup>8</sup> These projects also reflected the increased importance of rulers' judiciousness when making critical decisions.

The analysis of the performance of the viceroy and other royal authorities in the aftermath of the earthquake is important for evaluating the capacity of the colonial government to deal with the resistance of corporate groups that wanted to preserve their customary privileges. Therefore, reconstruction allows us to see a transitional period when the Bourbon dynasty started to introduce reforms to the previously established Habsburg dominance, while encountering the opposition of those who defended customary local practices developed by the latter.

John Lynch and Stuart Voss agree that by the mid-eighteenth century the societies of the New World had acquired a *de facto* autonomy that the Crown and its ministers were unable to reverse. The Bourbons understood the need to

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Mexico City, 1985," 189-221, postulate that the legitimacy of political institutions and authorities was challenged during the period of reconstruction. The effectiveness to alleviate suffering and fulfill basic needs became essential for state authorities to overcome the questioning of their power.

<sup>6</sup> It is important to note that Alexandra Parma Cook and Noble David Cook, *The Plague Files: Crisis Management in Sixteenth-Century Seville* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2009); Charles Walker, "Shaking the Unstable empire: The Lima, Quito, and Arequipa Earthquakes, 1746, 1783, 1797" in *Dreadful Visitation: Confronting Natural Catastrophe in the Age of Enlightenment*, Alessa Johns (New York: Routledge, 1999), 113-144; Stephen Tobriner, "Safety and Reconstruction of Noto after the Sicilian Earthquake of 1693-the eighteenth Century Context" in *Dreadful Visitation*, 49-77; and Sherry Johnson, "The St. Augustine Hurricane of 1811: Disaster and the Question of Political Unrest on the Florida Frontier" *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 84, No. 1, special H-Florida Issue: *Florida History from Transnational Perspectives* (Summer, 2005): 28-56, offer diverse examples of royal officers that were able to implement similar measures of relief in the pre-modern period.

<sup>7</sup> Olson, "Towards a Politics of Disasters," 268, provides a division of five phases for quick onset disaster which includes earthquakes: pre-impact, impact, response, recovery and reconstruction. He explains that the recovery phase is the period when the fulfillment of basic needs is the prime objective; and reconstruction phase relates to the indefinite period (days, weeks, months, years) when a community rebuilds for the long-term. Allen H. Barton, *Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1969), and Jack Hirschleifer, *Economic Behavior in Adversity*, 9-11, also offer a similar division for disasters' phases.

<sup>8</sup> Charles Walker, *Shaky Colonialism*, 92.

develop a more centralized style of governance. According to Voss, the increased administrative control began to undermine the customary prerogatives of Spanish colonial societies. He explains that Bourbon legislation aimed to reconcile the interests of the varied groups of the colonial society. Nonetheless, the introduction of new policies often disrupted social relationships and challenged cultural patterns.<sup>9</sup> Lynch affirms that the Bourbons tried to alter and subject a society that had been allowed to develop compromise under the Habsburg model of consensus. One consequence of centralization was the resistance of the American subjects.<sup>10</sup>

Each of the social groups had maintained their own special privileges in defense of their interests. The protection of these prerogatives became essential to maintain the social order. According to Lynch, Spanish America was administered by a system of bureaucratic compromise that involved informal arrangements between the crown and its American subjects.<sup>11</sup> Thus at times, royal officials had to deal with a diversity of conflicting interests.

In the case of the Lima earthquake of 1746, conflict emerged when the viceroy issued urban reform measures that mainly menaced the elite's urban properties. A few months after the disastrous event, the new law issued on 7 January 1747 prohibited the reconstruction of tall buildings "in benefit of the public good," specifically those with second floors. It set the maximum height of private buildings at five *varas*.<sup>12</sup> With this measure, royal officials aimed to prevent, or at least diminish, massive death in future seismic events.<sup>13</sup>

Various members of the city's elite presented petitions for exemptions to this order before the City Council. Apparently the number of requests was excessive because the council requested the petitioners to name one representative to defend their common positions.<sup>14</sup> The judicial process involved long discourses from each party to defend their positions with respect to the project of urban modernization. As mentioned before, the viceroy pressed for the realization of his plan claiming it would provide "the benefit of the public good."<sup>15</sup> The elite protested against the destruction of their second floors arguing their rights to hold distinctive residences.

During the aftermath the Lima elite fought to maintain their corporate privileges instead of abiding by the new demands of the royal government, which promoted the interests of the regime over its subjects. In the following pages, I will illustrate

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<sup>9</sup> Stuart F. Voss, *Latin America in the Middle Period, 1750-1929* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2002), 16-22.

<sup>10</sup> John Lynch, "The Institutional Framework of Colonial Spanish America," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 24, Quincentenary Supplement: *The Colonial and the Post-colonial Experience. Five Centuries of Spanish and Portuguese America* (1992): 80, 81.

<sup>11</sup> John Lynch, "The Institutional Framework of Colonial Spanish America," 73. John Elliot, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 130-132, also supports the contractual nature of the colonial society until the mid-eighteenth century.

<sup>12</sup> Walker, *Shaky Colonialism*, 91, 92, explains that a vara is equivalent to 0.84 meters or a bit shorter than a yard. Godin advised that the wall may measure up to 4 varas, yet he later agreed to a maximum height of 5 varas.

<sup>13</sup> AGI, Lima 511, f. 16v, 90 v.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 55v.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 26v.

how both the colonial government and the elite appropriated these views, which had a malleable meaning, and adopted them to support their respective positions.

In order to understand the use of these terms by the elite and the royal government in their discourses, the meaning Thomas Hobbes and John Locke gave to public good must be discussed. These thinkers are considered key referents of the transition between old and new regimes. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note how ideas and concepts traditionally associated with the northern European tradition were present in the Hispanic world, including its colonies.

### Chaos and Destruction

On the night of 28 October 1746 a very intense earthquake struck the city of Lima, capital of the viceroyalty of Peru, around 10:30. After few minutes of intense tremors people realized devastation was tragic. The falling debris of structures caused deadly injury to those who were trying to escape. Even though most of the population escaped unscathed, some were buried alive under collapsed buildings.

As soon as the sun rose the population of Lima was able to recognize the magnitude of the catastrophe. The removal of the debris, the reconstruction of the city, and the provision of basic needs became a priority; these were enormous and indispensable tasks that needed to be addressed. The intensity of the earthquake almost destroyed the city in its entirety. Only 25 out of the approximately 3,000 houses that existed at the time remained after the devastation. Moreover, religious buildings suffered great damage. Not only the Cathedral, but also the churches of San Pablo, La Merced, and San Agustín collapsed. The arch with the statue of Felipe V, next to the bridge that crossed the Rimac River, fell down. The viceregal palace was also among the prominent structures that were destroyed. A cabin was prepared in which the viceroy could sleep until the palace was rebuilt.<sup>16</sup>

The port and town of Callao were completely devastated by the tsunami that hit and inundated the area a few minutes after the earthquake. The Jesuit Pedro Lozano states, in his account of the earthquake, that a twelfth of a total of 60,000 inhabitants perished in Lima and less than 200 survived in Callao, where the population was around 7,000 people.<sup>17</sup> The intensity of the seism was so enormous that it also caused havoc in many settled provinces of the viceroyalty.<sup>18</sup>

In the capital people abandoned their destroyed homes and turned to the plazas and open spaces outside city limits looking for refuge. Even the nuns had to abandon their cloisters and live in tents for many weeks.<sup>19</sup> The work of reconstruction took

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<sup>16</sup> Manuel Zanatelli, *Gobernantes del Siglo XVIII*, vol. 4 of *Compendio del Perú*, Carlos MillaBates (Lima: Editorial MillaBates, 1993): 116.

<sup>17</sup> Pedro Lozano, "Relacion del Terremotoquearruino a Lima e inundo al Callao el 28 de Octubre de 1746" in *Terremotos, coleccion de lasrelaciones mas notables que ha sufridoesta capital y que la hanarruinado: vaprocedida del plano de lo quefue el Puerto del callao antes que el mar lo inundase en 1746 y de un relojastronomico de temblores: colectadasarregladas*, edited by Manuel Odriozola (Lima: Tip. De Aurelio Alfaro, 1863), 36, 41.

<sup>18</sup> D. J. Eusebio Zapata, "Carta o diario," in *Terremotos*, ed. Odriozola, 95.

<sup>19</sup> Pedro Lozano, 'Relacion del Terremoto,' 56.

several months and even years to be completed. By the 1750s there were still some buildings that had not undergone reconstruction. The Cathedral's reparation was completed by 1758, more than ten years after the disaster.

The length of the period of reconstruction is corroborated by multiple accounts. In the ecclesiastical court records, I found several cases in which individuals and religious congregations describe the calamitous state of ruined properties. In 1753 the Treasurer of the Purísima Concepción confraternity, José de la Pena Montenegro, requested permission to sell a house owned by this institution in *censo perpetuo*.<sup>20</sup> He affirmed the property was totally demolished and had been looted. He wanted to impose a censo on it according to its new value, because the congregation lacked the means to rebuild the house.<sup>21</sup> In this case, we see a confraternity's official looking for someone who would probably pay a modest amount to his congregation in an effort to repair and rebuild the property, in order to make it habitable.

Similarly, as late as 1759 Manuel de Estrada, the steward of the Indian confraternity of Nuestra Señora de Loreto, claimed his congregation was unable to repair the chapel dedicated to their Virgin because of lack of resources. He requested permission to set tables to collect alms during holidays.<sup>22</sup> Don Miguel Yarrin and Don Melchor Caxahuaman, stewards of Nuestra Señora de Copacabana, also requested authorization from the Juez de Obras Pías (Judge of Pious Works) to withdraw 200 pesos from the congregation's deposit box to cover the repairs to a house owned by the institution and damaged by the earthquake.<sup>23</sup>

Several years after the event, we observe individuals and institutions trying to repair their properties that were damaged considerably by the earthquake. Doña Agueda Josefa Saez de Bustamante requested that the confraternity of the Purísima Concepción, which owned the two-story house she lived in, reduce the censo imposed on the property. She argued that the value of the structure had declined because the seism had completely destroyed it; therefore, she believed that the principal and the interest rate had to be reduced. She supported her petition by arguing that she had already invested a considerable amount of money in repairing the property.<sup>24</sup>

The level of the disruption produced by the earthquake was so severe that those institutions that were commonly in charge of providing public assistance became unable to do so. For instance, the social assistance traditionally provided by confraternities began to fail. These congregations became unable to pay benefits they promised to their members in case of death, in accordance with their affiliation

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<sup>20</sup> The censo was a contract that involved the cession of rights over a property in exchange for a periodical payment. It is similar to current property mortgages or leases.

<sup>21</sup> Archivo Arzobispal de Lima (AAL), Cofradías, Leg 9-A, exp. 31, f. 1 v.

<sup>22</sup> AAL, Cofradías, Leg 30, exp. 59, f. 1.

<sup>23</sup> AAL, Cofradías, Leg. 10-D, exp. 10, f. 1

<sup>24</sup> AAL, Cofradías, Leg 7, exp. 40, f. 1-3.



contracts. A few months after the disaster the steward of the Nuestra Señora de la Piedad refused to pay these stipends to the families of those who died in the seism.<sup>25</sup> These institutions were expected to fulfill obligations that had increased unexpectedly. They had to pay restitution to dead members' families and organize the repair of their including chapels, houses, farms, and other properties.

The Court of Wills, Donations, and Pious Works received several petitions that provide information regarding the magnitude of the material distress experienced by people during the years following the disaster. The contemporary accounts also vividly illustrate the material destruction to the city. A colossal task was tacitly trusted to the civil government; people were so dispossessed that it was essential to provide for their basic needs. The response of the royal authorities was immediate, despite of the chaotic state of the city.

### **The Response of the Royal Government**

The reaction of royal authorities was primarily associated with the actuation of the viceroy. He organized and mobilized other members of the colonial administration to provide the material relief Lima residents required during the months following the earthquake. He also promptly initiated a series of projects to repair the lamentable state of the city. Unfortunately, not all his initiatives were welcomed.

In the following weeks the viceroy began to plan the reconstruction of diverse structures of the city. Pérez Mallaina argues that the viceroy's reconstruction policy aimed to maintain social control by concentrating reconstruction efforts on the buildings that symbolized the power of the royal administration.<sup>26</sup> Among the top priorities were the rebuilding of the Royal Mint, the Viceregal Palace, and the construction of a new fortress in the port of Callao. On 16 January 1747, a few months after the terrible event, the construction of the fortress began. The viceroy himself removed part of the gravel to make a ditch for the new fortress that he later baptized as Felipe V. By October all excavation of the new town was completed and 3,000 varas of foundation were erected.<sup>27</sup> Alfredo Moreno argues that the viceroy used the complete destruction of Callao as a pretext to erect new and solid buildings according to new advances in military engineering.<sup>28</sup>

In Lima, the viceroy was mainly concerned with rehabilitating the Royal Mint and the Viceregal Palace. The Royal Treasury had to assume the entire cost of rebuilding these structures. The viceroy recalled in his memoir that he took prompt measures to prepare a new building for the Royal Mint because he wanted to

<sup>25</sup> AAL, Cofradías, Leg 26, exp. 17, f. 1v.

<sup>26</sup> Pérez Mallaina, *Retrato de una Ciudad en Crisis. La Sociedad Limeña Ante el Movimiento Sísmico de 1746* (Lima: Instituto Riva-Agüero, PUCP, 2001), 111-126.

<sup>27</sup> Dario Arrás, *El Callao en la época del coloniaje antes y después de la catástrofe de 1746* (Callao: imprenta de El Callao, 1904), 45, 47.

<sup>28</sup> Conde de Superunda, *Relación de Gobierno del Perú (1745-1761)* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1983), 76.

protect the precious metals from looting.<sup>29</sup> The rebuilding of the Viceregal Palace began almost a year after the seism; relatively fast when compared to the time it took to start the reconstruction of the Cathedral.<sup>30</sup>

The need for the colonial administration to repair public buildings was connected to the symbolic meaning these structures possessed. They were representative of the royal power of the king and his administration. Alejandra Osorio observes that urbanism was a crucial element used to provide power to the ruling elite. She contends that power was concentrated on the Plaza Mayor which represented the core of urban, social, political, and cultural life in Lima. For that reason it was important that the ruling groups build imposing structures because the structures were part of the symbolic set of power.<sup>31</sup>

The urban projects of viceroy Manso de Velasco had the evident objective of improving the infrastructural condition and symbolic meaning of the city. He prioritized the reconstruction of public buildings over that of religious or private ones because the former symbolized the power of the royal government in the city. His good performance in rebuilding these structures was recognized not only by the city population, but also by the king, who awarded him the title of Conde de Superunda in 1748.<sup>32</sup>

### The Lima Elite Protests

The earthquake's destruction of private buildings was recognized by the viceroy as an opportunity to reform the urban infrastructure of the city and make it orderly. He also realized that most of the victims of the seism who died were killed as the collapsing buildings impacted them. The colonial ruler appointed Louis Godin, a French mathematician and professor at the university of San Marcos, Lima, to evaluate the condition of the urban properties and make recommendations to improve the structures.<sup>33</sup>

In his memorial of 25 November 1746 Godin proposed a series of measures aimed at eradicating tall structures. He suggested that the walls of private buildings should have an elevation of 4 ½ or 5 varas maximum. He also recommended widening the streets to at least 12 varas; although he expressed a preference for streets 15 varas wide. If the walls were to collapse during an earthquake, there would be enough free space between crumbled debris for people's safety. He emphatically proposed that neither second floors nor balconies should be permitted.<sup>34</sup> He stated that even though 'it seems hard to destroy some tall building that the earthquake

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<sup>29</sup> Conde de Superunda, "Relación de Gobierno," 265.

<sup>30</sup> Charles Walker and Ricardo Ramírez, "Cuentas y cultural material: La reconstrucción del Real Palacio de Lima después del terremoto de 1746," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos*, LIX, 2 (2002): 670.

<sup>31</sup> Alejandra Osorio, *Inventing Lima: Baroque Modernity in Peru's South Sea Metropolis* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 152.

<sup>32</sup> Zanatelli, *Gobernantes del siglo XVIII*, 122.

<sup>33</sup> AGI, Lima 511, f. 6.

<sup>34</sup> AGI, Lima 511, f. 8.

left standing, it should seem harder to leave the imminent occasion for someone's death.<sup>35</sup>

The *Junta de Tribunales*, a provisional administrative and judicial body comprised of all the royal authorities of the city during critical situations, sent a transcript to the City Council requesting the opinion of its members regarding Godin's recommendations. The council members indicated the plan would be difficult to implement because of the bad condition of the buildings and the excessive costs of following his recommendation. Nonetheless, they finally supported Godin's recommendations, stating that private rights must yield to the public rights.<sup>36</sup> The City Council's report indicates that this institution was advocating for the "*bien común*" of the republic, without exception of persons.<sup>37</sup> Thus, this governmental institution, despite its local nature, supported the viceroy's urban reform program because it sought the wellbeing of the city population as a whole.

According to Hobbes, all men must obey the rule of the commonwealth or state because men's consent of their will comprises the greatest union of power. For him, the government in some instances has to enforce its power to direct men's action for common benefit or public good.<sup>38</sup> In the case of Locke, he states that the public good is the ultimate goal of government or civil society. He argues that supreme power is bound by the principle of governing for peace and the public good.<sup>39</sup> Thus they both seem to agree that government or the state must seek the general wellbeing of the people. The disagreement between them relates to the nature of such a government or state. Nonetheless, despite the different approaches about what constituted the ruling power, both thinkers believed the ultimate objective of the state was to provide for the common good of the people regardless of social distinctions.

In order to mitigate future menaces for the whole population of Lima the Junta de Tribunales decided to implement Godin's proposals after receiving the City Council's report. The government's decision to implement the urban reform project is clearly reflected in the content of the new law of 7 January 1747. The viceroy stipulated that all structures in the city should reduce their elevation within a period of five years. Nonetheless the reaction of the city's elite families was not delayed. Godin's recommendations primarily affected this privileged sector of society, which owned most of the two-story buildings in the city.

Following the order of the City Council, members of Lima's elite named Don Salvador Gerónimo de Portalanza, lawyer and *defensor de naturales* in the *audiencia*, as their representative.<sup>40</sup> Through this demand, the counselors and the

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<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 13v.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 18

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 25

<sup>38</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1889), 83.

<sup>39</sup> John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 299.

other royal officers tried to effectively deal with the elite's protests by grouping large numbers of similar requests to prevent the elimination of tall residences in one single and general request.

In the first petition presented before the Junta de Tribunales, Portalanza, attempted to undermine the instructions given by both Godin and the City Council. He stated that if the royal officials wanted to serve the people, it was important to differentiate between the vulgo or lower groups, who could not be considered the people, and the owners of tall buildings, who were the rational people.<sup>41</sup> He also protested the law of 7 January on the grounds that the costs of demolition of the remaining buildings allegedly had to be entirely covered by the owners. Portalanza stated it was unfair that only a group of individuals, the proprietors of such buildings, should bear the expenses of a project that was, in theory, implemented for the good of everyone in the neighborhood.<sup>42</sup>

The City Council's response emphasized that the provision against tall buildings was intended to benefit the common good. The counselors stated that "it was not the same to take from the neighbor his building, to convert it to useful works for the public, as to destroy it [the building] because it is offensive to the community."<sup>43</sup> They clarified that the new order was not intended to deprive the proprietors of their residences in order to construct public buildings in their place, but to eliminate the residences because they represented a menace to the wellbeing of the whole community. Because property rights remained with the owners, they had to afford the expenses of modifying their property and complying with the appropriate provisions for the public good.

The City Council's representative, Godin, pointed out that the new law did not dispossess the owners of rights over their properties, but restricted their "bad" use. He specified there was no transfer of rights because, even when part of the property is reduced, it remains in the owner's possession. Moreover, because such reduction was useful to all the neighbors, the proprietors do not have the "right" to either ignore the wellbeing of the neighborhood or receive any compensation.<sup>44</sup>

Against colonial authorities' arguments that emphasized the benefit to the people, Portalanza and a second representative, attorney Manuel Silva y de La Banda, elaborated an extensive counterargument. The defense of the elite's interests rested on notions of status, tradition, and common benefit. They argued that approximately three hundred families that were mainly affected by the new

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<sup>40</sup> Bianca Premo, *Children of the Father King: Youth, Authority, & Legal Minority in Colonial Lima* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 34. The defensor de naturales was an attorney in charge of representing natives and defending their properties before courts without collecting a fee. An audiencia was a court and governing body of a jurisdiction.

<sup>41</sup> AGI, Lima 511, f. 78.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 85 v.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 115.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 115, 115 v.

law belonged to the city's "first families" and not to the vulgar classes.<sup>45</sup>

They questioned the government's claim to be ruling in benefit of the public good. They affirmed that the colonial administration could not assert the new law of 1747 aimed to fulfill a common interest, because the most important part of the city's population was against it. Even though the illustrious families composed only a third of Lima's population, they pointed out that they were the most noble and distinguished segment. Therefore, they stated that the royal officers' claim that they were following the general wish of the people was incorrect.

To further undermine the idea of public good used by the colonial administration, Portalanza and Silva y de la Banda argued that "if the new law seeks the common good, the people would never resist it, and if it does not seek the common good, the law is not good." With this argument they tried to demonstrate that the mere opposition on the part of the people was sufficient proof that the viceroy's order was unacceptable.<sup>46</sup>

Portalanza defended the elite's right to erect tall buildings, arguing that the introduction of a new law required compliance with the customs of the country.<sup>47</sup> He affirmed that the members of the elite had always constructed tall buildings despite the constant earthquakes and tremors that afflicted the city. He strongly emphasized the higher value of custom over law. His argument relied primarily on the defense of customary use that had become rooted in the local practices.

He also affirmed that the members of the Lima elite were not only fighting to preserve a legitimate right rooted in tradition, but also fulfilling a duty. Portalanza stated that the two-story buildings benefited the whole society because their sumptuousness and magnificence embellished the city and stood in contrast to the modest dwellings of the lower class.<sup>48</sup> Therefore, the elite were rendering a service for the common good through the erection of beautiful buildings. According to the representatives of the elite, their request was rooted in the "unwritten right, which use and customs introduced in common benefit without any rule."<sup>49</sup> Therefore, the viceroy's new order or any other law should not oppose the elite's customary practices of construction.

The confrontation between the colonial authorities and the Lima elite demonstrates that both parties had a different understanding of the common good concept. From the analysis of their discourse, the viceroy and other royal officers issued the law of 7 January claiming to safeguard the wellbeing of the whole community against future seismic events. Their use of public good referred to the whole community, without exclusion of persons because of social status or economic condition. In this sense, their notion of public good was similar to

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<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 124.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 139.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 122 v.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 67.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 142.

those of Hobbes and Locke; these thinkers believed that the ultimate objective of the state was to provide for the common good without social distinctions. Hobbes maintained that the government had to regulate men's actions, by force if necessary, in order to serve to the common benefit or public good.

The defense argued by Portalanza and Silva y de la Banda presents a different idea of public good. It seems the elite understood that common good was synonymous with general or global will. They doubted the law of 7 January served to benefit the public good because they, as a part of the population, opposed it. Moreover, they believed that the authorities had to provide for the wellbeing of the people; yet this concept of people did not include the whole population of the city. The elite argued that, even though they were a numeric minority in opposition to this law, they comprised the most important part of the population because of their social position. They clearly stated that the *vulgo* could not be considered as part of the people (*pueblo*), but only the rational persons.<sup>50</sup> Therefore, the notion of public good was limited to only a portion of the population, that which was distinct by social position and rationality.<sup>51</sup>

Nonetheless, it is important to take into account that the ultimate objective of these government administrators was to convert Lima into a city that reflected the power of the Bourbon dynasty. Therefore, the discourse about the common good was apparently meant to justify a law that would undermine the traditional privileges and affect the corporate interests of a social group that constantly resisted royal orders. An analysis of the petition by the elite demonstrates how the colonial administration had to constantly deal with the opposition of interest groups that strongly defended their traditional privileges. Those speaking on behalf of the elite claimed rights that were rooted in custom and tradition. In the discourse of the elite's representatives, it is evident that the elite favored custom over law, and did not hesitate to oppose the latter when it was considered a menace to their interests.

The colonial officers tried to resist the opposition of the elite. The Junta de Tribunales rejected the petition presented by Portalanza and Silva y la Banda. On 26 October 1747, the viceroy reissued the order of 7 January. Nonetheless, the elite refused to give in and continued appealing the law. Unable to reach a definitive solution in the local courts, the viceroy sent copies of the court case to the king asking him to issue a final decision on the conflict.<sup>52</sup> Unfortunately, the king did not pronounce a definitive sentence on the request of the elite or approve the order of the authorities of Lima. Consequently, the project of urban reform was not implemented.

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid, f. 77 v. Portalanza also defined *barbaridad*

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, f. 77r. The representative of the elite also defined *barbaridad* as the lack of knowledge while *racionalidad* is the possession of virtue and philosophical morality.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, f. 4. Letter of the Viceroy to the King, dated 20 June 1748.

## **Conclusion**

The colonial government attempted to reorganize the city and initiated various projects of reconstruction aimed at symbolically reinforcing Bourbon absolutist power. The process of reconstruction was prolonged for several years because the viceroy's plans encountered various obstacles. For instance, the project of urban reform was obstructed by the Lima elite who wanted to preserve the customary patterns of social distinction that highlighted their social status.

When the government prohibited the building of two-story structures and ordered the demolition of the remaining two-story structures, the elite strongly opposed these measures. The long discussions between colonial officers and the elite were ventilated before the Junta de Tribunales. The discourse presented by both parties reflects their different views about the concept of common good.

The government claimed that the project of urban reform was aimed at benefiting the common good. Its use of this concept is comparable to Hobbes's and Locke's ideas of public good. Thus, we can see how these concepts, commonly related to the northern European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, were present in the Hispanic world by the mid-eighteenth century. This is important because it has been traditionally believed that enlightened ideas arrived in the Spanish colonies during the late part of that century.

In this study, we noticed how a privileged group with economic and social power openly opposed the measures implemented by the royal government. The elite limited the process of urban reform initiated by viceroy Manso de Velasco. They placed their private interests above those of other sectors of the colonial society. They claimed rights and custom in order to preserve their interests. The viceroy defended the new urban policy arguing that public welfare should prevail over the private. His actions reflected the new Bourbon agenda that favored the interest of the state over its subjects. Therefore, through this case, we see how the Spanish colonies witnessed the use of modern notions by royal officers and the elite to level all subjects regardless their social condition.





# Civilizing the Metropole: The Role of the 1906 Marseille Colonial Exposition in Creating Greater France

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Gary Wilder has argued that the Third Republic's management of the Franco-Prussian War, the Paris Commune, and industrialization during the interwar period changed "imperialism from a political inheritance into a state project."<sup>1</sup> Building on Wilder's analysis, this paper locates this shift in imperialism prior to the interwar era. One element of this state project was the dissemination of the concept of Greater France to the French populace, and one way the French state attempted to circulate this idea was by constructing colonial expositions. This paper argues that the organizers of the 1906 Colonial Exposition in Marseille, France, proposed, planned, managed, and constructed the exposition's colonial exhibits to implant the concept of Greater France into the French people's mindset in an effort to promote the French empire's perceived benefits to a metropolitan audience. The organizers used these colonial exhibits to teach visitors about the benefits of the French empire and to entertain visitors in order to attract a larger audience.

After having organized the colonial section of the 1900 Parisian Exposition, Jules Charles-Roux<sup>2</sup> proposed the creation of an exposition completely dedicated to the French colonies to the Municipal Council of Marseille in 1902.<sup>3</sup> On 1 March 1904 a presidential decree named Charles-Roux the General Commissioner of the Colonial Exposition and President of the Marseille Colonial Congress and appointed Dr. Édouard Heckel<sup>4</sup> as Deputy General Commissioner.<sup>5</sup> Charles-Roux, Heckel, and the other organizers of the 1906 Marseille Colonial Exposition hoped to instill the exposition's visitors with a sense of a Greater France through education and entertainment.

The 1906 Marseille exposition's organizers broadened the colonial discourse in two ways. First, through their efforts to educate the French public about the empire in general, and, more specifically, by showcasing the economic benefits of

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<sup>1</sup> Gary Wilder, "Framing Greater France Between the Wars," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 14, no. 2 (June 2001): 199.

<sup>2</sup> The son of a soap manufacturer, Charles-Roux modernized his father's soap factory upon his death. He championed economic liberalism and imperial expansion, especially in Tunisia, Dahomey, and Madagascar. He was the president of the Marseille Geographic Society and founded several colonial committees. See Isabelle Aillaud, ed., *Jules Charles-Roux: Le grand Marseillais de Paris* (Rennes: Éditions Marines, 2004).

<sup>3</sup> Laurent Morando, "Les expositions coloniales nationales de Marseille en 1906 et 1922: Manifestations locales ou nationales?" *Provence Historique* 54, no. 216 (April 2004): 230-231.

<sup>4</sup> Trained as a pharmacist, Heckel worked in the French Antilles and in New Caledonia. He became director of the Natural History Museum in Marseille and founded the Colonial Institute and Colonial Museum, as well as starting a publication entitled *Annales du Musée Colonial*. See Georges J. Aillaud, "Édouard Heckel, un savant organisateur: De la botanique appliquée à l'Exposition Coloniale de 1906," *Provence Historique* 43, no. 172 (1993): 153-155.

<sup>5</sup> *Guide officiel de l'Exposition Coloniale de Marseille* (Marseille: Barlatier, 1906), 12-13.

the empire, the organizers emphasized the empire's *mise en valeur*. By educating the French public about the potential economic benefits France could reap from its empire, the organizers essayed to alleviate some of the apathy residing within the visitors' mindset. Second, they set out to deepen the trade relations between metropolitan France and its colonies. Through a promotion of greater trade relations between the metropole and the colonies, the exposition's organizers attempted to highlight the unity needed to engender the exposition's visitors with a feeling of Greater France. The organizers entertained the visitors by offering them the opportunity to journey to the colonies and back again within one afternoon. The emphasis on education and entertainment parallels that of earlier expositions, but the prominence accorded to trade highlights the singular position of Marseille, not only within the metropolitan sphere, but also within the colonial one. An understanding of the role of Marseille, therefore, is a prerequisite to comprehending the main aspirations of the exposition's organizers and how they contributed to the construction of Greater France.

In 1903 the General Council of the Department of the Bouches-du-Rhône proclaimed that the era of colonial expositions had begun with the 1902 exposition in Hanoi and that the future sites should alternate between France's principal colonies and cities in the metropole. In order to showcase the city's imperial character, the departmental General Council deemed its headquarters, Marseille, to be the ideal location for the first metropolitan colonial exposition.<sup>6</sup> The choice of Marseille as the site of the first colonial exposition brought to light a potential challenge. The French Colonial Union, a private organization founded in 1893 which assembled representatives from more than four hundred domestic companies with economic interests in the empire,<sup>7</sup> inveighed against the organizers of the 1900 Paris exposition in its biweekly publication *La Quinzaine coloniale*, claiming they excessively concerned themselves with the entertainment element and did not provide the colonies with a sufficient amount of space to display their products effectively. Because of this disparity, these colonial exhibitors unanimously called for a "genuine colonial exposition," intent on demonstrating what the colonies were and what they were worth and on encapsulating the colonial effort of the Third Republic.<sup>8</sup>

The local Geographical Society, calling Marseille the "Colonial Metropole," claimed the Mediterranean port city was not only the premier maritime port in

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<sup>6</sup> "L'Exposition Coloniale et le Congrès Colonial de Marseille en 1906," *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie et d'Études Coloniales de Marseille, Tome Vingt-Huitième - 1903* (Marseille: Société de Géographie de Marseille, 1903), 439. Hereafter *BSG 1903*.

<sup>7</sup> Robert Aldrich, *Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 101; Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and in West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 42.

<sup>8</sup> "L'Exposition Coloniale de Marseille," *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie et d'Études Coloniales de Marseille, Tome Trentième - 1906* (Marseille: Société de Géographie de Marseille, 1907), 225. Hereafter *BSG 1906*.

France, but the archetypal colonial city.<sup>9</sup> A 1906 article in the newspaper *Journal des débats* echoed this sentiment by calling Marseille the “link between the metropole and the majority of the colonies.”<sup>10</sup> The idea that Marseille’s climate mirrored that of the tropical French colonies imbued the port city with the same exoticism perceived in the empire. Viewing colonial subjects, exotic things, and indigenous flora as like entities ranked nature and humans equally, thus rendering them mutually exploitable under the pretext of *mise en valeur*. The city would become “an exotic explosion of peoples and dwellings, a vehicle to transport the mind [of the visitor] from routine and hardship.”<sup>11</sup>

Convinced of Marseille’s place as the quintessential colonial city, the Municipal Council of Marseille, the Chamber of Commerce of Marseille, and the General Council of the department contributed some of the financial resources required to bring the exposition to fruition.<sup>12</sup> These local government organizations, fully cognizant of their role in promoting Marseille as the exemplary colonial city, joined forces under the leadership of Jules Charles-Roux to ensure the successful planning of a colonial exposition. They also wanted to demonstrate that a provincial city was capable of planning, producing, and hosting a large-scale event without the assistance of Paris. No Parisian official attended the inauguration of the exposition, claiming that the legislative elections followed too quickly after the opening. But the true reason apparently stemmed from a “certain disdain with the Marseille initiative” and the trepidation of associating with a major provincial event whose success was not guaranteed.<sup>13</sup> If the officials lent their support to it and the exposition failed, they feared not being re-elected.

Contrasting with the 1889 exposition in Paris, to which the French state contributed almost half of the budget, the majority of the requisite financial assistance needed to plan, to design, and to construct the 1906 Marseille exposition had to stem from other sources.<sup>14</sup> The 1.5 million Francs pledged by local metropolitan organizations, two state and one private, did not come close to covering the overall projected budget of approximately six million Francs.<sup>15</sup> The balance, according to the minutes of a 1903 meeting of the Municipal Council of Marseille, would have to be subsidized by the colonial exhibitors and by an issuance of bonds available to the general public from the Colonial Ministry and the Finance Ministry.<sup>16</sup> If the vast majority of the funds to construct the exposition

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<sup>9</sup> “L’Exposition Coloniale et le Congrès Colonial de Marseille en 1906,” *BSG 1903*, 439.

<sup>10</sup> Fernand Bourmon, “L’Exposition coloniale de Marseille,” *Journal des débats*, 18 February 1906, 3.

<sup>11</sup> Paul Greenhalgh, *Ephemeral Vistas: The Expositions Universelles, Great Exhibitions and World’s Fairs, 1851-1939* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1988), 84.

<sup>12</sup> Charles Depincé, “Une belle manifestation coloniale,” *La Quinzaine coloniale*, 25 April 1906, 225.

<sup>13</sup> Morando, 232-3.

<sup>14</sup> Morando, 232.

<sup>15</sup> The General Council of the Department of the Bouches-du-Rhône contributed 250,000 Francs. The Marseille Chamber of Commerce contributed 250,000 Francs. The City of Marseille contributed one million Francs.

<sup>16</sup> “L’Exposition Coloniale et le Congrès Colonial de Marseille en 1906,” *BSG 1903*, 440.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 439.

stemmed from the colonies, the French public would see that the work being done in the empire benefited the French state.

The exposition's organizers, under the aegis of Jules Charles-Roux, hoping to avoid a repeat of the Parisian embarrassment by directly addressing the exhibitors' concerns, dedicated an area that was five times larger than that of the 1900 Parisian exposition to the colonies, allowing them "to set up and to spread out at their leisure, far enough apart so that they do not disturb one another, but close enough, however, to allow visitors to see them all at a glance."<sup>17</sup> Despite the vast range of architectural styles displayed, the organizers hoped this "glance" would instill an impression of unity into the visitors' mindset. This unity underpinned the concept of Greater France, not only for the visiting public, but also for the colonial subjects who worked in the exhibits. The public could witness the organizers' ideal of cohesion between the metropole and the empire, while the colonial subjects could interact with their metropolitan analogues.

The exposition's organizers wanted to highlight the extraordinary economic development that France had fostered in its empire.<sup>18</sup> In contrast to the 1889 Parisian colonial exhibits, which employed the colonial displays to educate and to entertain the public, the Marseille pavilions manipulated the colonial displays to educate the French public about the economic benefits France could reap from maintaining an empire. The diseases affecting the wine and silk industries during the last decades of the nineteenth century caused a shift toward the French empire for economic growth.<sup>19</sup> Algerian winemakers, untouched by phylloxera, increased their production tenfold between 1870 and 1890 and came to represent ten percent of French production in 1890.<sup>20</sup> This *mise en valeur* of the empire, however, did not emerge without consequences. Winemakers in Algeria were, in reality, French colonists who had expropriated the Algerians' land, consigning the indigenous population to the perimeter of its own country.<sup>21</sup> The combination of disease and less expensive Asian-imported silk proved catastrophic for silkworm growers and weavers, resulting in the loss of many jobs, especially in southern France.<sup>22</sup> The lack of information regarding the land grab and the loss of metropolitan jobs maintained the sanitized and idyllic version of the empire that the exposition's organizers wished to display. Parallel to the sanitized North African pavilions, the organizers offered a pastoral and idyllic vision of sub-Saharan Africa as well. During the last decade of the nineteenth century, French West Africa suffered from war, famine, and a continued slave trade between tribes. The recent French

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<sup>17</sup> Charles-Roux, "Séance d'inauguration," *BSG 1906*, 226.

<sup>18</sup> "L'Exposition Coloniale de Marseille," *BSG 1906*, 206.

<sup>19</sup> Rondo Cameron, *The Evolution of International Business: France and the Economic Development of Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 70-1.

<sup>20</sup> Charles Sowerwine, *France since 1870* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 60.

<sup>21</sup> Aldrich, 28; Jeremy D. Popkin, *A History of Modern France*, 3rd ed., (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006), 132.

<sup>22</sup> Sowerwine, 60.

conquest of Western Soudan added to the region's destabilized nature, and the French military tolerated the inter-tribe slave trade for political reasons.<sup>23</sup> The exposition's organizers consciously chose to exclude these scenes of strife and war in order to display a sanitized version of Greater France.

Through their daily interaction with the local population, the indigenous peoples actively, and most likely unknowingly, participated in the French government's attempt to build a visual depiction of Greater France in which all races cohabitated peacefully. According to one newspaper article, all the "assembled races" come and go: "Arabs, Indochinese, blacks, Malagasies, etc. – a picturesque family."<sup>24</sup> The notion of a "picturesque family" underpinned the concept of a Greater France in which France was the father and the colonies were its many offspring in need of tutelage. In an era awash with rhetoric about degeneration and depopulation, the family unit emerged as a major subject of political, social, and medical discourse during the Third Republic.<sup>25</sup> Seeing the family as a stable and united entity not only countered the anxieties of the period, but extended the metaphor to the empire. A stable and united large Greater France had the potential to restore France to its former glory.

The organizers used the exposition's Grand Palace to showcase Marseille's progress in various industries. Domestic producers of flour, soap, oils, sugar, foodstuffs, and chemical products displayed their goods at the exposition. These companies did not solely manufacture goods for domestic consumption. Partnering with shipping companies based in Marseille, these producers exported their products to the French colonies.<sup>26</sup> In the five years prior to the exposition, colonial imports increased from 400 million Francs in 1901 to 453 million Francs in 1905. Exports to the colonies also increased over the same period from 510 million Francs to 585 million Francs.<sup>27</sup>

If the visiting public saw the colonies as financially beneficial to France, the indifferent nature of the French public might have shifted to one of acceptance at worst and enthusiastic support at best. The organizers included a few celebrations and nighttime festivities for entertainment purposes, but these aspects of previous expositions did not have the same weight during this exposition. No longer were the colonies solely "slices of a different humanity" to be viewed collectively. Instead, they emerged as centers of economic activity between the metropole and the colonies that could accommodate the *mise en valeur* that the French state valued

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<sup>23</sup> Conklin, 30.

<sup>24</sup> "Ouverture de l'Exposition Coloniale de Marseille," *Le Figaro*, 15 April 1906, 2.

<sup>25</sup> Elinor A. Accampo, "Gender, Social Policy, and the Formation of the Third Republic," *Gender and the Politics of Social Reform in France, 1870-1914*, ed. Elinor A. Accampo, Rachel G. Fuchs, and Mary Lynn Stewart (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 2.

<sup>26</sup> Aimé Bouis, *Le Livre d'Or de Marseille de son commerce et de ses industries* (Marseille: Typographie et Lithographie Ant. GED, 1907), 376-367.

<sup>27</sup> "Le commerce extérieur de la France et ses colonies françaises," *La Quinzaine coloniale*, 25 October 1906, 596.

so highly.<sup>28</sup> It was the organizers' responsibility to portray a "faithful expression of the current economic life" of the French empire.<sup>29</sup> The organizers impressed upon the exhibitors that the colonial pavilions had "better and more important things to do than just entertain the public." They were to be the most vivid, the most animated, and, more importantly, the most educative that visitors could have imagined.<sup>30</sup>

In his speech during the inaugural ceremony, Jules Charles-Roux proclaimed, "the new France had not shied away from any sacrifice in order to demonstrate to the metropole the ever-growing role that overseas France plays in our commercial trade."<sup>31</sup> A successful exposition should result in "an increase in trade transactions between the metropole and its colonial domain." Charles-Roux believed the exposition attained its double purpose in part because the colonial exhibits "were inhabited by natives living their daily lives and carrying out their various trades under the eyes of the public."<sup>32</sup> By displaying both the indigenous peoples and their goods, the French public could learn about colonial cultures and the potential fiscal benefits for France. The exposition emerged as the point of departure for more consistent and straightforward commercial relations between France and its colonies, as well as supplying a more precise notion of the resources available in the colonies to French industry and commerce.<sup>33</sup>

For all the pomp surrounding the newest additions to the French empire, the organizers did not afford equal status to the older colonies, including French India, Réunion, the Antilles, Guyana, and the Congo. Seeing that one of the main goals of the exposition was economic education, the organizers neglected those regions that they considered to be "in decline" or "behind" because they were no longer economically successful. The organizers situated these colonies' pavilions away from the majority of the colonial pavilions.<sup>34</sup> Their marginalization during the event can be attributed to the alleged lack of future economic gain or profit to the metropole and to the lack of geographic expansion possible in these areas. If these colonies did not contribute to the future fiscal growth of France, the organizers felt there was no need to showcase them in the same light as Algeria or Indochina. These actions suggest that, while they still considered these colonies part of the French empire, the organizers believed that these areas did not symbolize fiscal triumphs and should not be placed near the more economically thriving colonies.

The emphasis on education provided the opportunity to expand both the visiting public's familiarity with the empire and its perceived place within Greater France,

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<sup>29</sup> Maurice Zimmermann, "L'exposition coloniale et le congrès colonial de Marseille," *Annales de Géographie* 15, (1906): 464.

<sup>30</sup> Depincé, 227.

<sup>31</sup> Speech quoted in Depincé, 230.

<sup>32</sup> Jules Charles-Roux, "La clôture de l'Exposition coloniale de Marseille," *La Quinzaine coloniale*, 25 November 1906, 669.

<sup>33</sup> Bournon, 3.

<sup>34</sup> Zimmermann, 464.

and continued the momentum for universal education in the Third Republic. The Ferry laws of 1881 and 1882 decreed that “free, secular, and obligatory primary education be available to boys and girls.”<sup>35</sup> In order to modernize society and to regain France’s global stature, French citizens needed to possess the knowledge that permitted them to modernize along with the State. The organizers believed this to be the exposition’s “own originality,” distinguishing it from all previous expositions and empowering it with a sense of “marked superiority.”<sup>36</sup> Educating the French public about the empire allowed the exposition’s organizers to civilize the metropolitan citizens. Education was one way to acculturate people “to fit into societies and cultures broader than their own”<sup>37</sup> and to convince them that “these broader realms are their own.” A cultured and civilized population understood and appreciated the significance of possessing an empire and supported the nation’s imperial projects, reinforcing the notion of a united Greater France.

However, the exposition’s organizers did not just have education as a main goal. Solely focusing on the “scientific and methodological aspect...of the exposition would result in a harsh and uninviting visit.”<sup>38</sup> They understood that entertaining the visitors was paramount to having a successful event, and, if the exposition had an overly didactic tone, very few people would return. The organizers coordinated dragon parades, Cambodian dances, Annamite theatrical spectacles, and films depicting indigenous lifestyles. These *divertissements* piqued the visitors’ interest in the exotic and introduced them to the “mysteries of the Far East.”<sup>39</sup> The organizers used exoticism to lure in more visitors, thus rendering the exposition a financial success.

The exposition became the subject of many regional, national, and international press articles, which led to its popular success. The Parisian officials who initially snubbed the event eventually conceded that they had underestimated the efforts of the exposition’s organizers, leading to the visit of the President of the Republic and the Minister of the Colonies in September.<sup>40</sup> The presidential and ministerial visit testified to the abilities of Charles-Roux, Heckel, and the rest of the exposition’s organizers to plan and to administer effectively a colonial exposition without the assistance of Paris. The exposition’s success also suggests a decentralization of power between a perceived monolithic Paris and provincial cities. Since Parisian officials did not participate in the event’s planning and execution, Paris could no longer claim a monopoly on colonial affairs.

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<sup>35</sup> Judith F. Stone, “The Republican Brotherhood: Gender and Ideology,” *Gender and the Politics of Social Reform in France, 1870-1914*, ed. Elinor A. Accampo, Rachel G. Fuchs, and Mary Lynn Stewart (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 52.

<sup>36</sup> Depincé, 226.

<sup>37</sup> Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 330-1.

<sup>38</sup> Charles-Roux, *Rapport general*, 316.

<sup>39</sup> Isabelle Aillaud, “L’Exposition coloniale de 1906,” *Désirs d’ailleurs: Les expositions coloniales de Marseille 1906 et 1922* (Marseille: Éditions Alors Hord Du Temps, 2006), 100.

<sup>40</sup> Morando, 243.

Charles Depincé, in his account of the exposition, said “this is a heartwarming event for all of France, in which one can find the justification and, at the same time, the reward for the required sacrifices made in order to become a great colonial power again.”<sup>41</sup> His concept of justification stemmed from France’s recent industrialization. The extraction of colonial raw materials, which metropolitan industries transformed into salable products and exported to France’s overseas markets for profit, benefited France. His statement demonstrates that almost four decades after the Franco-Prussian War and the formation of the Third Republic, France still possessed anxieties, stemming from its 1870 defeat, depopulation, and degeneration, about its former place among the world powers. But he considered this exposition to constitute a key step in the establishment of economic stability and in the French public’s acceptance of colonial projects. This recognition could lead the French to a fuller acceptance of Greater France.

During the exposition’s closing ceremonies, Jules Charles-Roux announced certain representatives from neighboring countries had asked French officials for colonizing lessons. This request “fully proved not only that France knew how to colonize, but that she still knows how to instruct those who claim to know more about colonization than she does.”<sup>42</sup> This statement reaffirmed that France’s pride was still paramount to the organizers. Because other nations had inquired about the proper methods to colonize distant lands, these acts only bolstered French pride and gave the appearance that France had regained some of its former glory. According to the Geographical Society of Marseille’s annual report, the exposition “greatly contributed to the popularization of [France’s] colonies” and illuminated the “remarkable work accomplished in the definitive establishment of the French colonial empire.”<sup>43</sup>

The fusion of education and entertainment rendered the exposition a “vast, luminous, and useful activity” for the French public and, concomitantly, a practical way to teach the French about the utility of expanding “the movement of trade between the metropole and its colonial domain.”<sup>44</sup> The exposition also emerged as a practical way to teach the French about the utility of expanding “the movement of trade between the metropole and its colonial domain.” The exposition’s organizers planned the colonial exhibits as a way to offer the French people the opportunity to journey through a quixotic version of the French empire, learning about the goods produced in the colonies and observing the colonial subjects carrying out their daily routines, without having to leave France. The human and material displays educated visitors about the professed progress of France’s civilizing mission and about their colonial counterparts’ lifestyles in an idyllic and idealized manner, devoid of any notion of resistance, conflict, pacification, or violence.

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<sup>41</sup> Depincé, 228.

<sup>42</sup> Charles-Roux, “La clôture de l’Exposition coloniale de Marseille,” 669.

<sup>43</sup> “L’Exposition Coloniale de Marseille,” *BSG 1906*, 207.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 206.



# **“The Savages Are Only the Allies of Greater Savages”: The British-Indian Threat and the War of 1812**

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On 1 June 1812 the United States Congress passed a resolution declaring war on Great Britain for the second time in the short history of the young republic. The official list of grievances outlined in President James Madison’s address to congress that resulted in a vote for war, focused on the British naval restrictions on transatlantic shipping and the oppressive practice of impressing American sailors.<sup>1</sup> Despite this seemingly evident motivation for American involvement, there are major problems with accepting maritime restrictions and impressment as chief causes of the War of 1812. First, if maritime issues were the key factor behind the war, then what could explain such a lengthy time between the British infractions on American sovereignty and the vote for war by Congress? By the time the United States government voted to support armed conflict with England, the British Orders In Council, which authorized English ships to impress American seamen and blockade American shipping to France, had been in place for over five years.<sup>2</sup> Second, scholars looking back on the war’s origins question the lack of support for the war among the representatives from the states of the northeast, who experienced the most significant impact from the maritime factors largely credited with precipitating the war. In contrast, politicians seemingly removed from being directly affected by British naval restrictions adamantly supported the conflict, further questioning the direct influence of maritime factors. Addressing these inconsistencies, it becomes clear that the impact of the long accepted maritime issues may not have been as influential in leading to the War of 1812 as some historians previously concluded.

Looking beyond the long emphasized maritime issues in an effort to discover the true cause of the war, scholars must shift focus to the most influential faction behind America’s war movement; the western politicians more commonly known as the “War Hawks.” This collection of mostly southern and western Republicans were primarily motivated not by English blockades or impressment, but by a much more local and immediate threat. This factor was the perceived escalating threat of British-sponsored and supported Indian attacks along the western frontier. Surprisingly, the influence of the British-Indian threat has been largely overlooked and for the most part dismissed by generations of previous historians. By reexamining the congressional reports, personal correspondence, and newspaper accounts of the period, the extent to which citizens along the western border

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<sup>1</sup> James Madison to the United States Congress. June 1, 1811, in *The Papers of James Madison: Presidential Series*, vol. IV, ed. Robert Allen Rutland (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1984), 432.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 435.

legitimately feared British-provoked and supported Indian attacks above all else becomes apparent. The impact of this perceived British-Indian threat does much to explain why western citizens, who were seemingly unaffected by maritime factors, so adamantly supported war. Following the events surrounding Indian-settler warfare at Tippecanoe in November of 1811, the suspected British-Indian threat to national security seemed to become a frightening reality that needed to be rapidly addressed by the government in order to preserve the American nation.<sup>3</sup> This perceived Indian threat did more to lead western citizens and politicians alike to both push for and support armed conflict with Great Britain than perhaps any other single factor, and as a result may have been a key cause resulting in the War of 1812. It was not until the early twentieth century that historians began to question President Madison's long accepted catalogue of grievances resulting in the war and began to examine this highly influential but previously overlooked factor.<sup>4</sup>

By the mid nineteen-twenties President Madison's explanation for the war came under heavy criticism by a new wave of professional historians who believed the actual factors that sparked conflict in 1812 dealt more with the desire for western expansion and the preservation of national honor than the long-accepted maritime issues.<sup>5</sup> This revisionist trend ultimately concluded it was a western desire to annex Canada and Florida for the United States that was fundamentally responsible for provoking the west to lobby for war with England.<sup>6</sup> The studies produced by these early historians clearly understated the impact that the "Indian-menace" had on driving the west and subsequently the nation to war and failed to take into account the psychological impact this perceived attack may have had on westerners mind state.<sup>7</sup>

Overlooking fundamental flaws in early studies examining the factors that led western politicians to so avidly support the war, a key step was made to better understand the motivations of perhaps the most influential segment of the nation that led the United States to war in 1812. Hindsight affords modern scholars the luxury of understanding that numerically, the vastly outnumbered native tribes posed no real threat to eventual American expansion, but this fact was one not known to the western settlers of the early nineteenth century. Westerners believed they had much to fear from their Indian neighbors seemingly supported and encouraged by British agents. Hostility between American settlers and native tribes along the western borderlands was nothing new, as the conflict dated back to the earliest days of colonization in the new world. During in the early nineteenth

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<sup>3</sup> Henry Clay to the United States Senate, April 1, 1812, in *The Papers of Henry Clay: Supplement 1793-1852*, ed. Melba Porter Hay (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1992), 641.

<sup>4</sup> J.C.A. Stagg, *The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 5-7.

<sup>5</sup> Julius W. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812* (Gloucester: The Macmillan Company, 1925), 12.

<sup>6</sup> Louis M. Hacker, "Land Hunger and the War of 1812: A Conjecture," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 10, no. 4 (March 1924): 373.

<sup>7</sup> Julius W. Pratt. *Expansionists of 1812*, 273.

century there was steady increase in frequency, organization, and the ferocity of Indian attacks. This Increase coincided with the escalation of hostilities between the United States and Great Britain.<sup>8</sup>

This growing fear Americans had for the Indian tribes along the western frontier did not go unnoticed by England, as a British agent noted, “the Americans.... are constantly in alarm either by an Indian war or at least the shadow of bands of Indians. They imagine their heads in danger of being scalped.”<sup>9</sup> This seemingly ominous statement may have been merely an observation of the American state of mind, but as far as western citizens and politicians were concerned the renewed spark in recent native unrest along the frontier could have only been explained through direct British interference.

Beginning in late 1809 and early 1810 the fear of British-sponsored Indian attacks along the western frontier grew exponentially in the minds of western citizens and their representatives in Washington. The Senator from Kentucky and outspoken advocate for war, Henry Clay, addressed the growing belief that the only explanation for an increase in Indian attacks along the frontier must have been British instigation. During a speech to the Senate promoting an offensive move on Canada, Clay said, “is it nothing to us to extinguish the torch that lights up savage warfare?”<sup>10</sup> Clay’s statement not only explained the desire to invade Canada for defensive purposes rather than expansionist motives, it also clearly established the genuine widespread belief that the Indian threat along the western borders was clearly instigated by the British. Historians making the agrarian cupidity argument have long assumed that such statements made by War Hawk congressmen were insincere and were only used to gain popular support for a war of aggression, but further examination of the documents may disprove this claim. One such document was a letter written to President James Madison by a meeting of citizens of the Indiana Territory complaining of the activities of Great Britain and its sympathizers in corrupting “our aboriginal neighbors.”<sup>11</sup> With growing tensions between the United States and Great Britain, the fear of British-supported Indian attacks drastically intensified over the course of 1811 in both public and political dialogue.

The isolated incidents of Indian attacks along the western frontier intensified as a coalition of native tribes began to unify under the banner of the Shawnee leader Tecumseh and his brother the prophet.<sup>12</sup> American citizens as a whole were

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<sup>8</sup> Alan Taylor, *The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, and Indian Allies* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), 205.

<sup>9</sup> Alan Taylor, *The Civil War of 1812*, 203.

<sup>10</sup> Henry Clay to United States Senate, February 22, 1810, in *The Papers of Henry Clay: Supplement 1793-1852*, ed. Melba Porter Hay (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1992), 450.

<sup>11</sup> William Fleming and Willis Stucker to James Madison, November 4, 1810, in *The Papers of James Madison: Presidential Series*, vol. III, ed. Robert Allen Rutland (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1984), 1.

<sup>12</sup> Robert M. Owens, *Mr. Jefferson's Hammer: William Henry Harrison and The Origins of American Policy* (Norman: University of Oklahoma press, 2007), 194.

reluctant to credit native tribal leaders with creating such a grandiose undertaking on their own, and quickly attributed Tecumseh's action to British interference. A letter written to President Madison by the inhabitants of Knox County, located in what was then the Indiana Territory, clearly illustrated their feelings in believing that Tecumseh's threat was a "British scheme."<sup>13</sup> This letter illustrated the common belief that average citizens felt the recent spark in Indian hostility was directly linked to the escalating rift in Anglo-American relations. The widespread confidence in British instigation of the Indians was strengthened from reports written by agents of Indian affairs allegedly confirming such allegations to be factual.<sup>14</sup> In addition to letters of concern from town assemblies and government reports, both regional and national newspapers frequently published accounts of brutal attacks that apparently confirmed the common belief in English provocation of the frontier's Indian populations. The *National Intelligencer* published an article attesting to the direct supply of Indians menacing the frontier in 1811, claiming "British agents among the Indians excited them against us, furnished them with muskets, powder, ball, and provisions."<sup>15</sup> In addition to describing the supply of British arms to the Indians, frequently local papers terrified readers with much more threatening and graphic accounts of the result of this British supply and instigation.<sup>16</sup> The battle along the Wabash between the forces of Tenskwatawa, more commonly referred to as the prophet, and General William Henry Harrison did much to solidify the belief that Americans had much to fear from British instigation of the western tribes. The battle of Tippecanoe influenced American fear of Indian attacks on two accounts. First, by providing what seemed to be convincing evidence supporting previous claims warning people of the severity of the threat to their safety and second, by expanding the issue from a somewhat regional problem to one recognized by the entire nation. In a letter from Andrew Jackson to Harrison written after the battle, Jackson embodied the feelings shared by westerners when he wrote, "unrelenting barbarians . . . blood of our murdered countrymen must be avenged . . . This hostile band, which must be excited by the secret agents of Great Britain, must be destroyed."<sup>17</sup> Harrison himself, who experienced the concentration and organization of Indian warriors at Tippecanoe wrote, "the whole of the Indians

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<sup>13</sup> Inhabitants of Knox County to President James Madison, July 31, 1811, in *The Papers of James Madison: Presidential Series*, vol. III, 397. "Resolved that we are fully convinced that the formation of the combination headed by the Shawnee prophet, is a British scheme and that the agents of that power are constantly exciting the Indians to hostility against the United States."

<sup>14</sup> James Robertson to Willie Blount, Sept. 11, 1811, *The Papers of James Madison: Presidential Series*, vol. III, 456.

<sup>15</sup> *National Intelligencer*, August 31, 1811.

<sup>16</sup> *Lexington Reporter*, November 2, 1811. "The whole merit of stirring up Indians and their dreadful warfare on the wives and children – blood, murder, and the tomahawk, are monopolized solely by our friends at Malden [*the British trading station*] . . . We are persuaded that the Indian war will be found to be really British. The savages are only the allies of greater savages."

<sup>17</sup> Andrew Jackson to William Henry Harrison, November 28, 1811, in *The Papers of Andrew Jackson*, ed. Sam B. Smith, Harriet Fason Chappell Owsley, and Harold D. Moser (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1980), 270.

on the frontier have been completely armed and equipped from the British king's stores at Malden."<sup>18</sup> The somewhat regional but widespread fear of the "Indian menace" quickly grew into a national issue following Harrison's report and the national coverage the battle received in the newspapers. The influence of British-supported Indian insurrection on foreign policy following the events on the Wabash can be clearly indicated by congressional records that quickly brought this issue to the forefront of political debate throughout the nation.

Over the course of 1812 western political figures who supported conflict with Great Britain in the past made greater efforts to publicize the plight of the western people for the rest of the nation. The link between the British and the escalating Indian attacks along the frontier was clear to politicians like Henry Clay, who stated that "he had no doubt but the late Indian war on the Wabash, was excited by the British" in an address to the Senate urging the passage of the Embargo bill.<sup>19</sup> Clay's speech showed how pro-war political figures effectively used the Indian attack on American forces at Tippecanoe to nationalize a regional threat. A report on the causes and reasons for war by the committee on foreign relations further demonstrated this growing effort to make the western Indian attacks into a national threat. The report contended, "certain indications of general notoriety may supply the place of authentic documents."<sup>20</sup> This statement referred to the many reports of British instigation among the natives and the widely publicized skirmish between William Henry Harrison and the tribes under Tecumseh's confederation at Tippecanoe Creek. The congressional report also addressed the widespread accusations that the English government was providing hostile tribes with arms and supplies in order to harass and attack the American settlements along the frontier.<sup>21</sup>

Examples that indicate the growing influence the Indian threat had throughout the nation can be found in instances spanning from Georgia to Pennsylvania. In a letter from the citizens of Milledgeville Georgia written to President James Madison, the acceptance of British instigation as the primary factor driving the Indian attacks and concern for the safety of their western countrymen is clearly evident. The letter to President Madison produced no charges than had not previously been made by western citizens for several years, but it highlighted the influence the growing issue was having on a segment of the population not directly exposed to native

<sup>18</sup> William Henry Harrison to Governor Scott. 1811, quoted in Louis M. Hacker, "Land Hunger and the War of 1812: A Conjecture," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 10, no. 4 (Mar., 1924): 382.

<sup>19</sup> Henry Clay to the United States Senate, April 1, 1812, in *The Papers of Henry Clay: Supplement 1793-1852*, 641.

<sup>20</sup> Report on the Causes and Reasons for War by the Committee on Foreign Relations, in *The Papers of John C. Calhoun*, ed. Robert Lee Meriwether, William Edwin Hemphill, and Clyde Norman Wilson (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press for the South Carolinian Society, 1959), 109.

<sup>21</sup> Report on the Causes and Reasons for War by the Committee on Foreign Relations. *Ibid.* 109. "It is also well known that on all such occasions abundant supplies of ordinary munitions of war have been afforded by the agents of British commercial companies, and even from British garrisons, where with they were enabled to commence that system of savage warfare on our frontiers which has been at all times indiscriminate in its effect, on all ages, sexes, and conditions and so revolting to humanity."

attacks. The citizens of Milledgeville expressed their concern to the president by explaining, “she has excited the merciless Indian savages to make war upon the defenseless inhabitants of our frontier, placed in their hands, arms and other implements of war . . . every way giving them aid and comfort.”<sup>22</sup> Further example of the growing national awareness of a previously regional issue can be found in a similar letter written by citizens of Pennsylvania who wrote, “the horrid murders perpetrated upon our citizens by the aid of the savage tribes in alliance with that government are causes abundantly sufficient to justify a declaration of war.”<sup>23</sup> Letters like those from the citizens of Georgia and Pennsylvania to President Madison clearly illustrated how average citizens throughout the nation were alarmed by the growing Indian threat to American security following Tippecanoe, as well as, whom they believed was truly responsible for instigating unrest among the natives.

In addition to western politicians making their plight known to the nation through congressional addresses, state legislators directly appealed to President Madison informing him of the mounting threat and widespread fear expressed by their constituents surrounding the Indian attacks. In a letter from the Kentucky legislature, several of these concerns are expressed to the President:

Inciting the savages (as we have strong reasons to believe) to murder the inhabitants on our defenseless frontiers - furnishing them with arms and ammunition lately, to attack our forces; to the loss of a number of our brave men; and by every art of power and intrigue, seeking to dispose of our whole strength and resources, as may suit her unrestrained ambition or interest.<sup>24</sup>

The growing hostilities between the United States and Great Britain were recognized by many as an influential factor in intensifying the frequency and magnitude of the Indian attacks along the western border, adding further support to the perceived linkage between the British and the actions of the hostile natives. An example of this western understanding linking the deteriorating Anglo-American diplomatic relationship to the rise in Indian attacks can be seen in a letter from Andrew Jackson to the Governor of Tennessee in which he wrote, “the british agents no doubt are very busy. Why do the Indians in general seem to be in such commotion now that we are on the eve of a war with England? It is not long since when they were quite no way restless.”<sup>25</sup> Jackson’s observation provides revealing insight to the western state of mind, which had directly linked Indian hostility to British foreign policy in the years leading to the outbreak of war. He also wrote a

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<sup>22</sup> The Republican Citizens of Milledgeville Georgia to President James Madison. June 13, 1812, in *The Papers of James Madison: Presidential Series*, vol. IV, 479.

<sup>23</sup> The Citizens of Lancaster Pennsylvania to President James Madison. July 1, 1812, in *The Papers of James Madison: Presidential Series*, vol. IV, 537.

<sup>24</sup> The Kentucky Legislature to President James Madison. January 13, 1812, in *The Papers of James Madison: Presidential Series*, vol. IV, 129.

<sup>25</sup> Andrew Jackson to Willie Blount. June 12, 1812, in *The Papers of Andrew Jackson*, vol. II, 303.

graphic letter to the volunteers of his command on the outbreak of hostilities that clearly conveyed the fear western citizens felt for the Indians and in which none of the other factors commonly associated with the war are even mentioned:

He that can see the infant babe of nine days old torn from the arms of its mother and beat to pieces upon the walls of the house – he that can see children of six years of age stabbed with knives, their heads split open with Tomahawks, and others devoured alive by dogs – he that can view in the midst of this scene a distracted mother crying in vain for pity, and receiving from the hands of savage monsters stab after stab, and arrow after arrow, into her body.<sup>26</sup>

Despite the clearly widespread belief of the period, that Americans had much to fear from the British-supported attacks along the western frontier following Tippecanoe, some critics of the validity of the Indian threat existed in those segments of the nation far removed from their direct influence. These critics were predominantly Federalists in the northeast who may have been preoccupied with political survival, and who made accusations insisting the Indian threat along the frontier was no more than a fabrication used to justify westward expansion and the annexation of Canada.<sup>27</sup> Western politicians like Henry Clay quickly defended their interests and promoted ideas of national unity.<sup>28</sup>

Federalists like Representative Harmanus Bleecker of New York had alternate reasons for questioning the motives of their Republican political rivals, yet no clear evidence showing expansionist desires as the true factor that led western politicians to embellish the Indian threat can be produced. It is partially a result of the debate questioning motivations of western politicians, which has led historians to overlook the influence of the Indian threat on the War. Clearly western politicians used the events at Tippecanoe Creek to gain national recognition of a regional issue, but no substantial link to expansionist motivation can be established. Despite any question of western motives that may persist among historians, the influence of western attempts to nationalize what was previously seen as a regional concern became clear following the passing of H.R.184 on 17 June 1811. As concern among citizens in states close to those with seemingly large native populations intensified, the perceived danger of a British-provoked Indian threat, may have been enough to convince a majority of congressmen to declare war with England. The politically threatened northeastern Federalists from states long removed from

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<sup>26</sup> Andrew Jackson to the second division of the Tennessee militia. July 9, 1812, in *The Papers of Andrew Jackson*, vol. II, 313.

<sup>27</sup> *Annals of Congress*, 12th Congress, 1st session, 533-534.

<sup>28</sup> Address to the United States Senate by Henry Clay. January 8, 1813, in *The Papers of Henry Clay: Supplement 1793-1852*, 754. "Does not that gentleman feel for the unhappy victims of the tomahawk in the western country, although his quarter the union may be exempted from similar barbarities? . . . whenever the sacred rights of American freeman are assailed, all hearts ought to unite and every arm should be braced to vindicate his cause. . . . Is it not in Canada that the tomahawk of the savage has been molded into its death-like form? From Canadian magazines, Malden and others that those supplies have been issued which nourish and sustain the Indians hostilities?"

the impact of Indian attacks were not swayed by the nationalization of the Indian threat, but key states not detached from tribal influence, such as Pennsylvania, Vermont, and New York, supported unified western and southern politicians voting for war.<sup>29</sup> This successful political campaign combined with widespread notoriety of the increasing native attacks, shows the transition of the Indian threat from a regional issue to one identified by a majority of the nation and was perhaps the key issue resulting in the war in June of 1812.

What becomes clear from renewed examination of the newspapers, personal letters, public addresses, and Congressional votes, is that average citizens along the western frontier feared for their survival and that of the nation, in a land perceived to be full of hostile Indians supported by the British. Nearly every medium, both public and private, proclaimed that a savage and apparently British-supplied Indian threat was in fact an intensifying reality in the first decade of the nineteenth century. The significance of the Indian threat, which began as a regional issue known all too well by those western citizens who had experienced native attacks firsthand, quickly became a national issue following the events of Tippecanoe in November of 1811. The escalation of hostilities between the United States and Great Britain seemed to coincide with the intensification of Indian attacks along the western frontier, further solidifying the conclusion made by many Americans linking British instigation with Indian aggression. When surveying the historical literature one quickly becomes aware that the segment of the nation most influential in leading the United States to war in 1812 was the western War Hawk politicians. Understanding that the Indian threat was the most influential factor in gaining western support for the war, and that the west was the driving force behind the American declaration of war, it can be concluded that the perceived Indian threat along the western frontier may have been the most influential factor leading to the War of 1812.

While this study focuses on the impact of one major issue of the war, the influence of several other key factors such as impressment, British restrictions on American shipping, political competition, and the preservation of national honor must not be excluded from the discussion. The American nation was vastly different from the unified entity recognizable today and while the Indian threat was perhaps the key issue that led the west to war, it may not have affected the largely regionalized nation of 1812 to the same extent that it did in the more directly influenced west. Acknowledging the varying importance of several influential factors on different regions of the United States in 1812, the extent to which the Indian threat had become recognized on a national level following Tippecanoe and its relatively close proximity to the declaration of war, makes it arguably one of the single most influential factors bringing about the conflict.

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<sup>29</sup> Govtrack.us, Senate Vote Number 93, H.R. 184, 12th Congress, 1st session, [http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=s12\\_1-93](http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=s12_1-93).



# “The Best Covered War in History”: Intimate Perspectives from the Battlefields of Iraq

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This study explores the Iraq War through the cultural lens of the reporters who covered it, and considers how views of the “other” and the construction of the enemy impacted the experiences shared by soldiers and reporters.

In the embedding program during the Iraq War, over 600 journalists were attached to and reported on military units in the field and functioned as key observers of major combat operations. Many have since recounted their experiences in the form of memoirs and participant-observer histories of the war. Although their immediate eyewitness reports were limited by a set of ground rules<sup>1</sup> instituted due to concerns for the security of ongoing operations, these embedded reporters have since contributed invaluable oral histories and memoirs about their experiences while covering the Iraq War. Collectively, such in-depth accounts offer crucial insights into the culture of a modern army at war. Moreover, as first drafts of history, they require further analysis to achieve full academic impact.

Influenced by revolutionary military histories such as John Keegan’s *The Face of Battle*,<sup>2</sup> and utilizing methodological and theoretical frameworks pioneered by Jeremy Black in *Rethinking Military History*,<sup>3</sup> this study provides a unique, ground-up approach to battlefield history by analyzing the experiences of both combat reporters and soldiers through the intimate perspective that embedding provided. Black’s approach emphasizes the significance of innovative and original approaches to military history, an obvious reaction against the limited cultural and social analyses found in most battle piece<sup>4</sup> histories and “great man”<sup>5</sup> biographies. Although noteworthy studies have utilized such innovative approaches, very few works on post-World War II military history have focused on the unique accounts of combat reporters and their shared combat experiences with regular soldiers. What better war to put this narrative to the test than the Iraq War, which has been described as the “best covered war in history?”<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> United States Department of Defense, Document 101900Z FEB 03, “Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) on Embedding Media During Possible Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR),” (2003).

<sup>2</sup> Much like this study, although with a focus on wars of the more distant past, Keegan’s work focuses on battlefield conditions, soldiers’ emotions and behavior, and the motivation to fight in three famous battles (Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme). See John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976).

<sup>3</sup> Black “re-positions military history at the beginning of the twenty-first century” and “proposes a new manifesto for the subject to move forward.” See Jeremy Black, *Rethinking Military History* (New York: Routledge, 2004), i.

<sup>4</sup> Battle piece histories are defined by Keegan as descriptive, exaggerated accounts of combat, which substitute “romantic prose” for the realities of warfare. See Keegan, 30, 38.

<sup>5</sup> The Great Man Theory is a nineteenth-century idea according to which history can be largely explained by the impact of “great men,” or heroes. The theory was popularized in the 1840s by Scottish writer Thomas Carlyle. See Thomas Carlyle, *On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History* (New York: Fredrick A. Stokes & Brother, 1888).

<sup>6</sup> General Tommy R. Franks, *American Soldier* (New York: Regan Books, 2004), 412.

The broader study from which this paper originates illuminates the realities of the modern battlefield and the culture of combat through multiple perspectives. Over 100 personal accounts are available as of this writing, and a few will be explored here when addressing the perception and construction of the “other.” The first drafts of history must be scrutinized, organized, and presented as a complete package that provides agency to soldiers on both sides and also to the combat reporters who experienced the war so intimately.

### **War and Society, Influential Military Histories, and the Way Forward**

The embedding program has produced invaluable in-depth primary materials, especially first-hand accounts written by journalists during and after the war. The nature of these later accounts contrasts sharply with what had been written, broadcast and published when the journalists were on the ground in Iraq, due mainly to the restrictions placed on embedded media by the official ground rules dictated by the United States military during the conflict.<sup>7</sup> The fast pace of modern news outlets added to the challenges presented by the official ground rules and also influenced the limitations stemming from the daily coverage of the war. These two chief factors clearly restricted the depth of reportage, as combat reporting fell victim to restricted content and time limitations that prevented the type of nuanced and detailed accounts that have since emerged. This study will analyze the Iraq War through a multi-faceted approach which will highlight the value of the embedding program by offering cultural and social analyses of a modern army at war, while detailing the Iraqi battlefield from the ground up through the lens of the journalists who covered it.

The so-called bottom-up approach has been shaped by a variety of methodologies and studies, with different results. Although frequently limited by their approach and focus, traditional military histories focusing on battle analysis and/or leadership techniques cannot be cast aside, as the decision-making process, chain of command, and practice of the operational arts provide valuable – if descriptive – analyses of warfare. The new academic challenge is to forge a hybrid version of military history through innovative styles and methodologies that offer balanced and multilateral lines of investigation into particular conflicts. This study represents a response to Jeremy Black’s call for new approaches to military history and war and society studies, and builds upon the Face of Battle model. Furthermore, it incorporates social and cultural examination with the traditional methods of studying the actions of individuals and the ebb and flow of battle, by focusing on the unique perspective of embedded journalists and the unique primary source base they produced. This provides a new way forward that merges individual narratives, new accounts of battle, and insights into the culture of a modern army at war.

<sup>7</sup> United States Department of Defense, Document 101900Z FEB 03, “Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) on Embedding Media During Possible Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR),” (2003).

This concept is by no means unique. On the contrary, studies similar to this one, such as Joanna Rourke's *An Intimate History of Killing* and Gerald Linderman's *The World Within War*, have broken ground utilizing a socio-cultural approach to battlefield history, although they focus on earlier conflicts than the Iraq War, and utilize a more traditional source base.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, comparisons to these and other works are inevitable, especially considering the dearth of secondary historical sources on the Iraq War. The lack of accessible and reliable scholarly accounts on the conflict in Iraq makes an examination of the embedding program, and the journalists in it all the more necessary.

This study departs from previous academic inquiries into the embedding program; instead of evaluating the policy and its implementation and consequences, this account will raise questions about how embedded journalists and the soldiers with whom they experienced warfare viewed the enemy and some of the consequences of those views. This new approach will analyze the experiences of both combat reporters and soldiers through the intimate melding of the two that embedding provided. Moreover, it allows historians to chart a new course for understanding Iraq War battlefield history.

Two key topics frame the focus of this study. First, the training and indoctrination of embedded media will be examined. Of utmost interest are details concerning their experiences with joining their units and preparing to face the enemy. Second, views of the "other"—that is, how embedded media and soldiers perceived Iraqi forces through the formation of their constructions of the enemy—will be explored. By examining the experiences of reporters and the soldiers with whom they travelled in battle, a discussion based on the inner workings of the military-media relationship becomes apparent, as does the way in which views of the "other" shaped the course of the Iraq War.

Although one could select from a multitude of memoirs and oral histories produced by the embedding program, this study will examine three embedded reporters' personal accounts. These journalists have been chosen as representative examples that offer a multi-faceted "taste" of the plethora of perspectives on the Iraq War.

Pulitzer Prize-winner and bestselling author Rick Atkinson's *In the Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Combat*<sup>9</sup> details his experiences while embedded alongside a remarkably diverse group of soldiers over two months during the invasion of Iraq. He travelled with the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division, and his first-person account from the Iraqi battlefield represents an intimate view of officers

<sup>8</sup> Linderman offers an original social history, detailing the "full experience" of combat through the perspective of regular soldiers. Rourke delves into the nature of violence and the behavior of soldiers during the First and Second World Wars, and the Vietnam conflict. Gerald Linderman, *The World Within War: America's Combat Experience in World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Joanna Rourke, *An Intimate History of Killing: Face to Face Killing in 20th Century Warfare* (London: Basic Books, 1999).

<sup>9</sup> Rick Atkinson, *In the Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Combat* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004).

and soldiers in action. He details the lives and actions of regular infantrymen, but his central focus is on the senior officer ranks, especially the general in command of the division. Atkinson was attached to division commander Major General David Petraeus and his command staff for much of his assignment, and offers an intimate and detailed view of issues related to the chain of command, command authority, and the identity of the officer class. His narrative includes rich details of the planning and execution of operations; material that would clearly have violated the official ground rules during the war. The fact that these types of details are available in Atkinson's work highlights the value of the after-action accounts extensively utilized by this study.

Award-winning author and historian Patrick K. O'Donnell offers a first-hand account of the fierce battle for Fallujah and the Marines who fought there in *We Were One: Shoulder to Shoulder with the Marines Who Took Fallujah*.<sup>10</sup> His account is peppered with details of the brutal violence that he and the Marines witnessed while fighting in a deadly urban battle. O'Donnell travelled with the smallest combat units and witnessed intense house-to-house combat. He encountered brutality on a major scale, seeing suicide bombings, civilians used as human shields, and an enemy that in most cases fought to the death. The Marines he travelled with were among the first to fight in Fallujah, and their ilk bore the brunt of this major battle. O'Donnell captures not only the sights, sounds, and smells of the gritty street combat, but also the human drama of young men in a close-knit unit fighting for their lives and the lives of their friends. He follows these young men from the unit's formation at Camp Pendleton in California to its near destruction in the smoldering ruins of Fallujah.

Walter C. Rodgers, a CNN correspondent, was embedded for three weeks in March 2003 with the Seventh Cavalry, the Army unit that led the advance from the Kuwaiti border into Baghdad. In his book *Sleeping with Custer and the 7th Cavalry: An Embedded Reporter in Iraq*,<sup>11</sup> he details his experiences while travelling alongside tanks and reinforced vehicles in an old, refitted Humvee, struggling along with the armored cavalry. His account is one of excitement, fear and survival, and highlights the close ties he developed while experiencing ferocious combat with the soldiers he covered on live television. This is an example of the firsthand, immediate view of combat embedding offered, but Rodgers notes that the embedded journalist necessarily lacks a broader picture, and his wartime reports lacked what his final account provides. His close-up narrative "puts a human face on the bravery and determination" of regular soldiers in combat, and chronicles the lightning speed and sheer ferocity of a modern armored assault.

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<sup>10</sup> Patrick K. O'Donnell, *We Were One: Shoulder to Shoulder with the Marines Who Took Fallujah* (Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo Press, 2006).

<sup>11</sup> Walter C. Rodgers, *Sleeping with Custer and the 7th Cavalry: An Embedded Reporter in Iraq* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2006).

These three sources represent the proverbial tip of the iceberg with regard to the existing source base, yet they highlight the value of examining a variety of individual accounts and assignments in depth. Atkinson, a historian and award-winning author, offers a look at an air cavalry unit at war, mostly from the officers' perspective. O'Donnell takes us into the heart of urban, close-quarters combat with Marine infantry. Rogers furnishes the unique perspective of travelling with the lead units of the armored cavalry, operating deep behind enemy lines with only the enemy to his front. Taken together, the contributions of this diverse group highlight the unique, varied, and valuable insights emerging from the embedding program.

### **Joining the Band of Brothers: Preparation, Training and Indoctrination**

The embedding program was a revolutionary undertaking that would offer an unparalleled level of access to soldiers at war, and would require careful preparation for both the military and the press. Reporters' experiences with the introduction to their new lives as embedded journalists and first-hand observers of fighting units would take several forms. The military took several steps to acquaint participants in the embedding program with the ways of the military. First, the military set up orientation courses run by the same drill instructors and training establishment responsible for new recruit training, and introduced the reporters to the enemy they would face alongside the troops. Second, individual assignments were handed out, and experiences with this sometimes-unorganized process are explored. Finally, the act of actually joining a unit in the field represents an important experience that will be considered.

### **Orientation**

The vast majority of embedded reporters attended military training programs and were immersed in military culture in order to acquaint them with the environment and adversaries they would face in Iraq. Here the embedded reporters were trained in the use of gas masks and protective gear, and indoctrinated in the ways of the forces they would cover. The experience was a humbling one for many, and the cooperative nature of the embedding program quickly became apparent.

Each journalist was issued the "Initial-Entry Training Soldier's Handbook," a clear indication as to just what it was that they had agreed to participate in. Reporters were assigned individual tasks and responsibilities during mock combat drills, where they witnessed the horrors of combat for the first time. Even though these were only simulations and not the real thing, the lessons were not lost on the reporters; they would be exposed to the same dangers as the soldiers they would cover. The orientation days prepared the embedded media for the realities of the

undertaking they had agreed to; facing an enemy armed with deadly chemical and biological weapons.<sup>12</sup>

Walter C. Rodgers, the CNN correspondent made famous by his live coverage of the armored blitzkrieg into Iraq, recounts his experience with the frightening military preparation program for embedded journalists. He highlights, in vivid detail, the intense training and briefings that the Army provided, especially concerning the threat posed by chemical and biological weapons. Even a veteran war correspondent like Rodgers was clearly unsettled by the scare lectures graphically detailing the gruesome effects of poison gas and biological agents. His concerns for his safety were also influenced by the fact that “American news organizations spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on courses, training their employees on how to recognize and survive the dangers of chemical or biological attack.” Although Rodgers and the journalists he trained with felt that all of this preparation was presented in a rather dramatic fashion, he nonetheless understood that the “army course was taught by soldiers whose sole purpose was to keep themselves and us alive.”<sup>13</sup> Clearly, they believed Saddam Hussein would use these deadly unconventional weapons.

Historian Patrick K. O’Donnell explains just how important the military training of embedded reporters was to the men that he would follow into battle. He describes his experiences with Marine officers who would only allow him to deploy with their forces if he took part in a major combat exercise, hosted by the United States Army at Fort Polk, Louisiana:

I couldn’t accompany the 509th to the battlefield without the permission of the unit’s commanding officer. “Before you go to Iraq,” LTC Daniel Griffith told me, “you need to see what we do at Polk.” In order to cover the 509th, who consider themselves “the best terrorists in the world,” I would have to become a mock terrorist myself (my cover story was that I was an Al Jazeera [sic] reporter covering the insurgency), and do my best to keep up with the 350 509ers comprising the OPFOR in the current training exercise.<sup>14</sup>

The United States military had no illusions about the dangers of allowing civilian observers amongst their ranks in such a dangerous role, and on such a grand scale. It is clear that they only agreed to this program under the terms that embedded journalists would only be allowed to observe their operations after they had passed several tests, including their willingness to leave civilian life behind.

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<sup>12</sup> Katherine M. Skiba, *Sister In The Band Of Brothers: Embedded with the 101st Airborne in Iraq* (University Press of Kansas, 2005), 1-3.

<sup>13</sup> Rodgers, 8-11.

<sup>14</sup> O’Donnell, 219.

## Assignment

Reporters were assigned to specific commands and units by Public Affairs Officers, usually once they arrived in Kuwait. Certain journalists were allowed to be matched with units of their choice. Rick Atkinson, the influential historian and journalist, actually requested an assignment that would guarantee a front-row view of the United States Army's vital Air Mobile Division's operations:

I was assigned to division headquarters where I was the only reporter shadowing the commander, Dave Petraeus. I had known Petraeus casually since he was a major working for the Army chief of staff in the early 1990s. My premise in requesting this assignment was that a division command post in combat afforded a good vantage point for looking down, into the operations of its subordinate brigades and battalions, as well as for looking up, into corps operations. I also knew that Petraeus was a compelling figure: smart, articulate, and driven.<sup>15</sup>

The fact that Atkinson was allowed to choose his own assignment speaks volumes about the new level of cooperation that the embedding program afforded the media. It also highlights the value of Atkinson's account as a unique primary source. His experiences in Iraq were shaped by his interactions with the command staff of a division of nearly 20,000 soldiers in battle. In fact, Atkinson explains that he was privy to the highest levels of top-secret information during his time in Iraq.<sup>16</sup> He also was witness to the ways in which the construction of the enemy played a crucial role in the planning and execution of the battle. This fascinating assignment provides exceptional detail concerning the chain of command, battle planning, and execution of strategy.

In contrast to Atkinson's experiences, Walter C. Rodgers independently sought out the best assignment he could find. Indeed, some assignments were "sexier" than others, and riding alongside the fast-moving cavalry was clearly a better career move than being stuck reporting on a rear echelon supply unit or, worse, a military police outfit not slated to see any frontline action. Rodgers expresses his satisfaction with the results, as he was chosen to join the unit that would spearhead the assault on Iraq and lead the charge to Baghdad: Custer's famous Seventh Cavalry. He credits a good deal of luck to his fortunes, although his position as CNN's most experienced embedded reporter surely influenced his placement.<sup>17</sup> Although Rodgers found himself in an enviable assignment, his access to planning and command was much more limited than Atkinson's, highlighting his unique perspective of travelling within a critical formation that would see sustained and intense combat.

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<sup>15</sup> Atkinson, 19.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 94, 105-106, 163.

<sup>17</sup> Rodgers, 1-6.

Patrick K. O'Donnell's experiences with the assignment process highlight how individual reporters could parlay their way into a position that suited their goals. O'Donnell wanted to cover elite infantry operations, but had to lobby intensely for his inclusion before he obtained permission from U.S. Central Command and the Pentagon Public Affairs Office. He worked his way into a Marine special operations unit, and eventually a Marine infantry battalion. All of this positioning took him three months. He was looking to report on the intense infantry combat taking place in the al Anbar Province, west of Baghdad. He "interviewed the commander of the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division . . . [who] bluntly asserted that: 'Fallujah will be the Gettysburg of this war.' The battle was a potential turning point in history, and [he] wanted to be there." He convinced the Marines to allow him to follow them to Fallujah where he was initially assigned to the Marine 2nd Recon, which presented him with a front-row "view of the battle raging in the city."<sup>18</sup>

### **Joining the Unit**

Embedded journalists found themselves joining units with pre-established identities forged out of the complicated group dynamics and social composition of military formations. The close bonds and camaraderie that emerge over months and years amongst soldiers through intense training and the minutia of military life produce a hierarchy of authority that many journalists found quite intimidating. Joining a group of young soldiers would present enormous challenges that all embedded reporters would need to overcome by breaching the barriers that exist between soldiers and civilians. Therefore, they would be subjected to many of the same social and cultural experiences that any new recruit would be. This process was critical to the reporters' task, and to this study, as observing these social structures, and in effect becoming part of them, opened up the surreptitious world of military culture to our eyes.

Atkinson recalls his indoctrination into the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division. He and other embeds were paraded around the sprawling and impressive Fort Campbell, Kentucky, where the famed unit was based. There he was treated to a tour of the unit's monuments and shown a detailed indoctrination video. Handouts, including a divisional briefing document detailed the division's weaponry and capabilities, and introduced the unit's salutation, "air assault!"<sup>19</sup> Just to make clear that the reporters had become one with the unit and were no longer privy to the comforts of the civilian world, a veteran public-affairs officer quipped facetiously that "if you have a particular brand of cappuccino you prefer, if you'd rather have a room with a morning view rather than an evening view, just let us know and we'll see if we can accommodate you."<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> O'Donnell, 219-222.

<sup>19</sup> Atkinson, 13-14.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.



Atkinson makes it clear that these experiences assured the assembled reporters that they had indeed left the normality and comfort of the civilian world to join the ranks of the United States Army. In fact, he explains that reporters were given an honorary rank equivalent to major<sup>21</sup> and were briefed extensively on the laws of war.<sup>22</sup> His account is one that highlights the lengths to which the Army went to provide him with access to operations and planning, and he refers to conversations with officers from the 101st that welcomed him as one of their own, just like a new member of an elite sports team. Atkinson and General Petraeus, the commanding officer of the division, actually became close friends, which highlights just one of the intricate relationships that developed when reporters were embedded in military units in a war zone. Atkinson became a fixture in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and eventually shed his civilian clothes in favor of an army uniform.<sup>23</sup>

Historian Patrick K. O'Donnell found himself in a very different type of unit and assignment than Atkinson's. He requested to join the lower ranks of combat infantrymen. He explains that during his time in Iraq he had to prove himself to the Marines he wished to cover, as they were skeptical of allowing an outsider into their midst. His account of the delicate process of being accepted provides a clear contrast in group dynamics to the experiences of Atkinson and others.

O'Donnell explains how he also had to wear a uniform, not only to fit in, but to avoid being mistaken for the enemy as many fighters "were wearing civilian clothes." His wishes were granted and he was attached to a Marine rifle squad, which usually consisted of only six to ten men, "to be as close to the action as possible." He lived with the smallest units, "patrolled with them, and helped them do simple things when they were short of bodies." His goal was to observe and record the history of the war from the bottom up; that is, from the perspective of the grunt, the fighting soldier who risks his life on a daily basis and lives amongst the death and squalor. "The only way to do it was to be in their boots and record the events as they occurred." O'Donnell earned the respect of his subjects, not by fitting in with them in terms of class, education, or common ideals, but because he was willing to risk his life facing a fanatical enemy in order to tell the stories of the soldiers who fought for a living. One Marine summed these feelings up by telling the embedded reporter, "you have brass balls for being out here with us."<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 17-18.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 94, 105-106, 163, 108, 97, 96, 112, 163, 136.

<sup>24</sup> O'Donnell, 219-222, 189.

## Views of the “Other”

### 9/11 and the Influence of WMD

The Iraq War took place in an atmosphere shaped by fresh memories of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The political and social climate that existed in the weeks and months following the event was a major factor in the perception that the coming war in Iraq represented some form of a counter attack. Many believed that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had been stockpiling chemical and biological weapons, sought a nuclear weapon, and was a general threat to the United States via terrorism and these weapons of mass destruction, or WMD. The specter of another round of attacks loomed large at the time, and influenced the soldiers who would participate in the invasion and subsequent occupation. Their views of the enemy, the Iraqi people, and their mission were all shaped by this reality. Many soldiers used the idea that Hussein’s Iraq had some type of connection to the September 11 attacks to justify their mission and the actions that they would take on the battlefield.

Rick Atkinson expresses his motivation for joining the embedding program with “ambitions of observing the U.S. Army from the inside.” He explains how many soldiers had been swept up in the ideological aspirations of the invasion, pointing to the overarching justification for the war, the liberation of the Iraqi people from the tyrannical Saddam Hussein and his army. He states that, “liberation is an intoxicant for the liberator as much as the liberated.” Atkinson recounts his own thoughts on the matter, which allude to his questioning of the mission’s legitimacy: “I had been swept up in the adventure without ever quite shucking my unease at what we were doing.”<sup>25</sup> This account highlights the more well-informed and educated beliefs of the upper, officer class, that was less likely to be swept up in the propaganda efforts that linked Hussein to Osama bin Laden and WMD to a threat against America.

While the idea of liberating Iraqis from tyranny influenced many within the military, the September 11 attacks remained a focal point for motivating the troops. Atkinson describes a powerful speech delivered by Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, commander of all army forces in theatre, who told his troops that they needed to “remember September 11.” He linked Iraq to the September 11 terrorist attacks and their supposed stockpiles of WMD to a threat against America, and drove home his point by saying, “I want my family to be safe, I want your family to be safe.”<sup>26</sup>

The link between Saddam Hussein’s forces and *al Qaeda* was clearly being instilled in the minds of the soldiers tasked with invading Iraq, and this link, however flimsy in retrospect, was enough to strike a chord in the minds of the reporters covering the war as well. Immediately following the general’s motivational speech, the

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<sup>25</sup> Atkinson, 3.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 110-111.

alarm for incoming missiles, possibly armed with chemical or biological warheads, “sounded again. We yanked the M-40s from their canvas bags, fit the masks over our faces, and adjusted the straps” and ran for cover.<sup>27</sup> As if on cue, the point had been made: Iraq was a threat to the soldiers, their families, and their homeland. Atkinson was clearly influenced by the extensive training, and briefings he received on the threat that Saddam posed regarding WMD. Back at Fort Campbell, where he had received his pre-deployment indoctrination, a briefing by the base’s hospital commander had shown images of WMD victims, and the army offered immunizations and trained the reporters on the proper procedures for surviving a chemical weapons attack. This experience triggered a frank discussion amongst the rattled scribes concerning the “probability that Saddam Hussein would attack with sarin gas, botulinum toxin, or mustard gas.” A “narrow majority” agreed that it was likely that the forces engaged in battle would be exposed to WMD attack.<sup>28</sup>

Fears of gas attacks heightened anxieties and brought the issue of mortality to the fore. This caused journalists to probe the question of why soldiers were willing to fight, and in some cases, die for their cause. Atkinson cited a telling quote by Sergeant Marshall, who would later end up a fatality in a military operation: “I am not a politician or a policy maker, just an old soldier. Any doubt on my part could get someone killed.”<sup>29</sup> Perhaps the greatest motivation for a soldier to kill, and risk his life in combat, is the age old ideal that a soldier is only a tool in the grand scheme of international conflict, and can only affect his future by doing his job, without thinking too much as to why he has been ordered to do so. According to General Wallace, and considering the daily WMD alerts, his job was to respond to the September 11 attacks by eliminating the threat of weapons of mass destruction and their use against America and its friends by Saddam Hussein.<sup>30</sup>

### **Construction of the Enemy**

The enemy was somewhat a known commodity for most embedded reporters and the soldiers they covered. Hussein and his army had been the target of a prior successful information warfare campaign, one that painted the leader as a madman and tyrant, and his army as thugs and murderers. The link between Iraq and the September 11 attacks clearly built upon this construction and allowed for a branding of the soldier’s foes as legitimate enemies of America. These enemies were not considered respectable combat opponents, but terrorists. The way in which the enemy is viewed, and indeed constructed, is important to understanding the motivation to fight, and in turn the combat effectiveness and morale of fighting units. Embedded reporters witnessed this phenomenon, and their insights into

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<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 14-15.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 2, 95.

<sup>30</sup> Rodgers, 27.

soldiers' perception of the enemy, and even their own, helped define the essence of this conflict.

### **“Saddam’s Army”**

Dominant perceptions of the enemy were rooted in America’s lopsided victory in the 1991 Gulf War, when most of the Iraqi army had either surrendered or been destroyed. There was a clear belief amongst officers, soldiers and reporters alike that Hussein’s best forces were made up of unprofessional and inept regime loyalists, and that the remaining bulk were unwilling recruits. Other views included the belief that any hostile forces standing in the way of liberating the Iraqi people and wiping out the threat of WMD were simply religious fanatics or terrorists. These forces would be easily destroyed according to the conventional wisdom.<sup>31</sup>

Hussein’s army was viewed in three main ways: first, it was considered a rag-tag assortment of disheveled soldiers who had little loyalty to the regime and would be cast aside easily; second, the Iraqi army was thought to represent only an obstacle to the completion of the mission, one that blocked the soldiers from their families and homes; third, Iraqi soldiers were regarded as a visible enemy, one that could be found and destroyed in conventional terms in a conventional manner, unlike al Qaeda terrorists. This enemy represented an easy target, one whose war-fighting capabilities were constantly questioned.

Atkinson’s account highlights how the perception of the Iraqi army could be seen as misguided and ignorant to the realities of warfare. The old adage that *plans never survive first contact with an enemy* came to Atkinson’s mind. It was unclear to him “how the technological wizardry translated into battlefield advantages. What did an eight-digit grid coordinate tell you about an enemy’s willingness to die for his cause? What did it tell you about how 24 million Iraqis would react to an American invasion?”<sup>32</sup> The answers he received from the officers planning the assault seem like they would not have been very reassuring, even if quite objective in their tone. “From a systems perspective, I can tell you what the Iraqis have, what they’re doing, where they are, and, probably, where they’re going,” Lieutenant Colonel Reyes told me. “What I can’t tell you is what’s in their heads. Are they willing to fight?” One thing was guaranteed, according to the command staff, “we are going to do some serious psychological damage to them as well as physical damage.” One officer actually “pointed out that he had little personalized sense of the Iraqi enemy,” even though they believed that this enemy would likely not face the juggernaut of the American army in combat, due to the perceptions of weakness they had created. “You have to be comfortable sitting in the swamp with alligators. You have to have more ass than they’ve got teeth. The wild card is asymmetrical tactics. Out-of-the-box thinking. I can see Saddam poisoning the

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 25, 27.

<sup>32</sup> Atkinson, 106.

water and blaming it on us. I can see him torching the oil wells, or setting fire to oil trenches, which are everywhere, around mosques, *everywhere*.” Hussein’s reputation informs the construction further, as the officer expresses that he “can see tactical inundations, where he blows up dams. I can see Iraqis posing as American soldiers.” The officer continues with his construction of the enemy by referring once again to the deadliest perceived threat, chemical and biological weapons “I personally think he’ll use them when he sees that we’re definitely coming into Baghdad.”<sup>33</sup> An intelligence picture took shape by utilizing beliefs about Saddam Hussein’s past strategies – which should be noted, were mostly proven to be military blunders during the first Gulf War in 1991 – instead of objectively planning to face a capable, determined enemy defending its home territory. The influence of this construction would become apparent in the coming days, months, and indeed years.

The construction of the enemy in Hussein’s image was not limited to the high command that Atkinson covered. It was, in effect, a widespread perception that had trickled down from the highest levels. Walter Rodgers, travelling with the Seventh Cavalry, expresses the views of the Iraqi enemy held by the soldiers he covered through his narration of a discussion a young Captain had with his men:

“So it’s him versus us. This is a dictator, a tyrant who gasses his own people and oppresses them. We are ready to liberate the people of Iraq.” I kept my mouth shut, but having worked the Muslim world for years, I felt my first twinges of skepticism . . . . “That’s a conscription force up there;” Captain Lyle continued, the implication being the Iraqi soldiers would surrender en masse or welcome the liberating American army or at least not stand and fight. “We are the greatest army this earth has ever seen. All they want is to see an American tank to surrender to. It’s payback time. We are going to liberate those people and remove that tyrant.” I wanted to believe him. His men did.<sup>34</sup>

When the time came to test the theory that the Iraqi army would either surrender or run, the narrative concerning the perception of the enemy changed quickly. Instead of surrendering, the Iraqis fought spirited defenses of their territory. In fact, Rodgers and the troops with whom he was attached were faced with some of the most fanatical resistance they could have imagined. When describing one battle on the road to Baghdad, Rodgers explains that the Iraqis attacked “from all around us. The Iraqis were firing on us from the right and left side of the road while in front and behind us, the 7th Cavalry was shooting back at them.” The fear and anxiety of facing a determined adversary quickly replaced the earlier constructions of a cowardly enemy, as “four hundred to five hundred soldiers [were] shooting mortars, RPGs, machine guns, and rifles at us . . . . The soldiers in their tanks

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 105-108.

<sup>34</sup> Rodgers, 27.

and other vehicles were shooting at waves of Iraqis charging us from out in those fields. It was the first but not the last time that we encountered seemingly fearless Iraqi soldiers making suicidal charges.” The atmosphere amongst the troops, who had just days before been reassured by their officers that they would not face much resistance from the enemy that had been constructed in intelligence briefings and within their own fantasies, changed quickly as well. “‘It was unreal, . . . unimaginable,’ Sgt. Paul Wheatley, who commanded one of the Abrams tanks somewhere in the night ahead of us, later said of the ambush. ‘You’re constantly paranoid. You are paranoid about every turn, every person, every building, and it’s a little nerve-racking at times . . . we were trapped in the middle of it, helpless.’” The rationale explaining the enemy’s motivation had also changed, in the mind of Rodgers. “The Iraqis did not need daring. They were motivated, and they were brave. They didn’t give an inch. Iraqi soldiers were making these suicidal charges because many had been told their families would be executed if they did not.” So, in effect, one construction of the enemy morphs into another, as cowards became fanatics.<sup>35</sup>

### **“Terrorists” and Guerrilla Warfare**

Early in the invasion an unconventional enemy force appeared, to the shock of many military strategists. The *Fedayeen Saddam*, a group of foreign and loyal volunteers conducted guerrilla style attacks and suicide bombings, which – amongst many army officers – lent credence to the misguided perception that the Iraqi army and terrorism were linked, and a common enemy existed. The fanatical tactics of these groups, many of them foreign *Jihadist* elements, influenced a clear response by coalition forces exemplified by a change in the rules of engagement, allowing American forces to engage them more freely.<sup>36</sup> The guerrilla tactics had a major effect on morale and the embedded reporters convey the ways in which the soldiers coped and responded.

The perception of the enemy, and the constructions that followed, changed rapidly in the Iraq War, due mainly to unexpected resistance. Atkinson captures just how much the atmosphere had changed within the high command regarding the composition and capabilities of the enemy in his account of General Petraeus’ conversations with his subordinate commanders. “There are bad guys all over. This is really rugged terrain. What I want to emphasize is that this is a serious friggin’ enemy. They’ve been fighting big-time here. They don’t stop until they’re killed. If you see somebody with a weapon, kill them. They’re actually using white flags to feign surrender.” The idea that Saddam’s army would not resist had disappeared, and the reality that this could become a protracted engagement began to surface. “Petraeus said, ‘the plan has changed two or three times in the past twenty-four or

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<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 64-65.

<sup>36</sup> Atkinson, 161-165, 204.

thirty-six hours as corps has reassessed things.’ In addition to protecting Rams and Highway 28, the vital north-south road known as Alternate Supply Route (ASR) Boston, the 101st likely would be asked to subdue Najaf.” Although the United States Army was able to adapt, and confront the new challenges of asymmetrical warfare it faced, the fact remains that they had underestimated their adversary’s resolve and capabilities. This grew out of their problematic construction of the enemy, a fact that would haunt them for years to come. “The question is: Do we have business going farther if we’re challenged right now?” reflected Petraeus. “I tend to think not. We’re in a long war here, as I think you realize. I want to keep our guys from getting killed in large numbers. That’s the bottom line. I hope that this is the dying gasp of a regime on the ropes, as it’s being cast in some quarters. But I’m not so sure.” These words highlight the fact that the enemy was not the one the U.S. Army had expected, but was a determined foe that would fight a prolonged guerilla war for close to a decade. Even the term that had been used to describe the guerilla fighters that were becoming such a nuisance became problematic to the command:

An intelligence officer, Lieutenant Jeanne Hull, told me that orders had come down overnight banning the term “Fedayeen,” which means “men who sacrifice themselves for a cause,” because it ostensibly invested those fighters with too much dignity. They were to be referred to as paramilitaries. (Later the approved phrase would be “terrorist like death squads.”) Hull estimated that there were nine to twelve Fedayeen battalions in Iraq, each with roughly six hundred fighters, including a battalion in Najaf. In a small blow against Orwellian excess, most officers continued to call them Fedayeen.<sup>37</sup>

Atkinson was alarmed to see how troubled Petraeus was due to the asymmetrical nature of the enemy’s defense, and the general gave him good reason. “‘This thing is turning to shit,’ he said. ‘The 3 ID is in danger of running out of food and water. They lost two Abrams and a Bradley last night, although they got the crews out. The corps commander sounds tired.’” The enemy had indeed resisted the advance, and not only with suicidal futile attacks. The Iraqi enemy had stalled the American advance by attacking weakly defended supply columns, which had forced the generals to re-deploy assets to their rear areas. Classic insurgency tactics had emerged, and instead of being used to trap and destroy the conventional enemy to the front – that was initially expected to surrender – “the 82nd [Airborne Division] would be used to secure supply routes around Nasariyah, a move Petraeus considered sensible.”<sup>38</sup> The fact that the United States Army, a massive and powerful entity, relied on their own constructions of the enemy to plan and

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<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 164.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 163-166.

implement tactics and strategy on the battlefield is telling, especially in the context of the culture that pervaded this army in the Iraq War.

More than any event in the early stages of the Iraq War, the battle of Fallujah revealed the determination of America's enemies in resisting. The idea that the enemy in Iraq was a fanatical, suicidal one is pervasive in Patrick K. O'Donnell's account, and this new construction of the enemy rapidly developed. The terms "Fedayeen" and "Guerrilla" were conveniently replaced with "terrorist," "foreign fighter," and "Jihadist." Whatever term was used to describe the enemy, it always held negative connotations. This allowed the troops and some embedded media to justify the actions against Iraqi combatants, no matter how brutal. The city of Fallujah itself became synonymous with the fight against terrorism, as historian and embedded reporter O'Donnell explains:

The city had become a nest of vipers. Soon after Baghdad was liberated and Saddam driven out of power in April 2003, an unlikely alliance of Saddam loyalists and al Qaeda holy warriors began to concentrate in the city. They worked steadily to undermine the rule of the Coalition. In April 2004, the Marines were ready to reimpose Coalition control by assaulting the city, but the attack was aborted over coalition fears of a backlash in the Muslim world. The terrorist network declared victory and organized a ruling council called the Mujahideen Shura. The Shura consisted of gangs of "insurgents" made up of former Republican Guards, Baathists, criminals, and foreign fighters from all over the Muslim world. The leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, archterrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, soon set up shop in Fallujah. Dominated by Zarqawi, the city became a base of operations to export terrorism across Iraq.<sup>39</sup>

Once the resistance to the invasion became widespread, the terms used to describe it changed. Even though these descriptions were usually negative and derogatory, they were fitting in some cases. Suicide bombings became an effective tactic against the thinly-stretched American forces and the asymmetrical nature of the battle became even more apparent. Fear, anxiety, and anger arose within the ranks due to these surprise attacks, and embedded reporters witnessed the aftermaths and chronicled responses to them. These responses included the widespread employment of road blocks, with many nervous soldiers repeatedly misidentifying targets, resulting in extensive civilian casualties and numerous friendly fire incidents. The army even resorted to loosening its rules of engagement, which strictly governed the use of force by soldiers in Iraq, to allow the troops to face the enemy with the force necessary to avoid the mounting toll of casualties caused by these attacks.<sup>40</sup> Unfortunately, this new arrangement also led to mounting civilian

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<sup>39</sup> O'Donnell, 36.

<sup>40</sup> See Atkinson, 204.



casualties and further influenced widespread resistance by capable and determined adversaries; committed and organized insurgents who clearly had been omitted from previous constructions.

### **Conclusions**

Due to limitations concerning the depth of wartime reporting dictated by time constraints and official restrictions on content, the embedding program has been repeatedly criticized in academic studies. However, embedded reporters' personal accounts offer tangible value to historians, especially when we consider the wide variety of insights they offer into the esoteric culture of an army at war. This work, which considers three specific journalists' experiences, represents only a microcosm of available sources and fits into a larger study of the Iraq War and the embedding program. The inclusion of these emerging first-hand accounts is critical to the historical record and is of the utmost importance if we choose to pursue a more nuanced view of this conflict. Instead of evaluating the merits of the embedding program or the actions taken by soldiers and reporters, the objective here is to offer analysis of how the "other" was perceived, and how the process of constructing the enemy influenced events. Without considering these eyewitness accounts, there is a risk of leaving these crucial insights to obscurity.



**Special Section**  
Selected Undergraduate Articles



# The Ideologization of U.S.-Guatemalan Relations, 1944-1954

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On 1 July 1944, a massive general strike in Guatemala forced the resignation of the nation's superannuated dictator Jorge Ubico (1878-1946), whose ouster inaugurated a decade of social democracy and urgently needed economic reforms. However, Guatemalan reactionaries rolled back these reforms in 1954, when the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) facilitated the overthrow of reformist president Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán (1913-1971). For the United States, Arbenz's ouster eliminated a supposedly communistic regime, curbed the Soviet Union's influence in the Western Hemisphere, and foiled a painful blow to American economic interests inflicted by Arbenz's sweeping land and labor reforms.

Although the coup took place under Dwight D. Eisenhower, the administration of Harry S. Truman had laid the groundwork, as U.S. officials became increasingly hostile toward and suspicious of Guatemalan leftist politicians. The process of American rhetoric escalating toward intervention had begun by 1947, initially directed against the presidency of Juan José Arévalo Bermejo (1904-1990), whose center-left policies and nationalistic rhetoric had alarmed Washington. Initially forbearing, the U.S. State Department and the CIA came to see challenges to U.S. economic interests in Guatemala as symptomatic of a larger, ideological problem: communist influence on Guatemala's reformist governments.

Because of the 1954 coup's historical repercussions and tragic dimensions, American motivations for intervention have led to spirited historiographical debates. After all, the coup did mark a major shift in U.S. foreign policy—a shift from Franklin D. Roosevelt's hands-off Good Neighbor policy toward Latin America. Specifically, intervention toppled a sovereign nation's democratically elected government and paved the way for decades of civil war and mass murder in Guatemala. During the Guatemalan Civil War (1960-1996), right-wing death squads waged genocidal, scorched-earth campaigns not only against leftist guerillas but also against civilian populations, massacring fifty thousand to seventy-five thousand indigenous Mayan peasants in 1982-1983 alone and producing one million refugees. The notoriety surrounding these atrocities failed to dent U.S. economic or military aid to the conservative regimes that perpetrated them.<sup>1</sup> Intervention's ruinous consequences for Guatemala make U.S. intentions prior to 1954 critical to ascertain, the better to assess the extent of American administrations' complicity.

According to Stephen M. Streeter, historians debating the reasons for U.S. intervention in Guatemala tend to fall into three camps: traditionalists, revisionists,

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<sup>1</sup> John H. Coatsworth, "Introduction," *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, by Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), x.

and postrevisionists. Taking their cue from the U.S. government's official line, traditionalists (or self-described realists) viewed Arbenz's ouster as "the necessary rollback of communism in the Western Hemisphere."<sup>2</sup> Following the coup, these anticommunist academics hastened to denounce Arbenz for pro-Soviet sympathies and to overplay the influence of Guatemala's far-left elements. Ronald M. Schneider was among the researchers who argued that "a handful of relatively inexperienced Communists were able to seize the leadership of a national social revolution."<sup>3</sup> These historians echoed the testimony of Carlos Castillo Armas, a Guatemalan army colonel who seized power in the 1954 coup and later that year testified before the U.S. House of Representatives' Select Committee on Communist Aggression. Armas testified that Arbenz was none other than the Kremlin's "hand-picked candidate" for the presidency, and that by 1954 several hundred communist cadres had "almost completely" taken over the government.<sup>4</sup> Reasserting these allegations, self-proclaimed realist historians defended U.S. intervention in terms of U.S. national security and defense of the free world against Soviet encroachment.

In contrast to this overstated scenario of Guatemala's becoming a Soviet satellite state, revisionist historians from the 1960s onward denounced American intervention in Guatemala not only as destructive to Guatemala's young democracy but also as motivated by selfish economic interests, namely, those of the United Fruit Company (UFCO). Arbenz himself denied that his regime was communist, instead affirming that American reactionaries "have taken the pretext of Communism. The truth is elsewhere—in the financial interests of the United Fruit Company and other U.S. firms that have invested much in Guatemala."<sup>5</sup> Echoing this allegation, revisionists characterized Arbenz as a nationalist and "blamed his downfall on Yankee imperialism" intended to reverse Guatemala's expropriation of United Fruit's vast landholdings.<sup>6</sup> In 1982, journalists Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer published the influential *Bitter Fruit*, charging UFCO with engineering the 1954 coup via its powerful lobby in Washington.<sup>7</sup> Whereas traditionalists blamed Arbenz for his own downfall, revisionists blamed the United States.

Postrevisionism challenged this binary thinking. Without absolving the United States of moral responsibility for post-1954 atrocities, historians such as Piero

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<sup>2</sup> Stephen M. Streeter, "Interpreting the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: Realist, Revisionist, and Postrevisionist Perspectives," *History Teacher* 34, no. 1 (November 2000): 62.

<sup>3</sup> Ronald M. Schneider, *Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1954* (New York: Praeger, 1959), xi. Schneider's primary sources consisted of documents selected for distribution by Guatemala's National Committee for Defense against Communism—hardly an impartial selection agency. Schneider, *Communism in Guatemala*, 322.

<sup>4</sup> "How Guatemala Got Rid of the Communists," *American Mercury*, January 1955, 138-39.

<sup>5</sup> United States Central Intelligence Agency, "Arbenz' Speech Delivered at 0310-0320 EST," 27 June 1954, FOIA Declassified Documents, accessed 27 October 2012, [http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC\\_0000920952/DOC\\_0000920952.pdf](http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000920952/DOC_0000920952.pdf).

<sup>6</sup> Streeter, "Interpreting U.S. Intervention," 64-65.

<sup>7</sup> Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 77. See also Richard J. Barnett, *Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World* (New York: World Publishing, 1968) and Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

Glejeses and Richard H. Immerman argued that the United States overthrew Arbenz ultimately because U.S. officials mistook nationalist reformers for communist ideologues. Immerman characterizes Arbenz as a “middle-class reformer” who sought to rescue Guatemala’s economy from feudal stagnation.<sup>8</sup> Suggesting the accuracy of Immerman’s assessment, Arbenz in 1951 had defined his objectives as “the elevation of the people’s living standards,” “the economic emancipation of our homeland,” and “the transformation of our country into a capitalist nation.”<sup>9</sup> But the increasingly polarized Cold War environment erased such fine distinctions. As Glejeses concluded, the fact that a popularly elected Latin American leader expropriated American-owned property created “an intolerable challenge to America’s sense of self-respect.”<sup>10</sup> To quote the former general secretary of the Guatemalan Workers’ Party, “they [the Americans] would have overthrown us even if we had grown no bananas.”<sup>11</sup>

If anticommunist ideology, not economic interests, motivated U.S. intervention, then the need emerges to connect U.S.-Guatemalan relations to Cold War doctrine, especially to the U.S. government’s tendency to ideologize its enemies.<sup>12</sup> The dueling Long Telegrams of 1946 pose a study in contrasts. Nikolai Novikov, Soviet ambassador to the United States, described American foreign policy as a “striving for world supremacy” by power-hungry “American imperialists” who sought to force the “penetration of American capital into” smaller nations’ economies.<sup>13</sup> However, whereas Novikov branded the United States as an imperial power driven by capitalist greed, George F. Kennan, U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, essentialized Soviet leaders as ideologues and paranoiacs. Soviet elites embraced communism, Kennan wrote, because of their deep-seated fear of “foreign penetration,” prompted in turn by the “traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.”<sup>14</sup> Kennan’s tendency to attribute adversarial behavior to ideological rather than pragmatic motives foreshadowed the trajectory of U.S.-Guatemalan relations.

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<sup>8</sup> Piero Glejeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 185-86; Streeter, “Interpreting U.S. Intervention,” 67.

<sup>9</sup> Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, *Exposición del Presidente de la República, ciudadano Jacobo Arbenz, ante la opinión pública nacional y el Consejo Nacional de Economía sobre su programa de gobierno* (Guatemala City: Secretaría de Publicidad de la Presidencia de la República, 1951), 8, 3-4.

<sup>10</sup> Glejeses, *Shattered Hope*, 366.

<sup>11</sup> José Manuel Fortuny, interview by Piero Glejeses, Mexico City, 16 August 1981, quoted in Glejeses, *Shattered Hope*, 4.

<sup>12</sup> To ideologize means “to give an ideological character or interpretation to; especially: to change or interpret in relation to a sociopolitical ideology often seen as biased or limited.” *Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary*, 10th ed., v.t. “ideologize.”

<sup>13</sup> Nikolai Novikov to Viacheslav Molotov, telegram, 27 September 1946, in *Documents for America’s History since 1865*, vol. 2, ed. James A. Henretta and Kevin J. Fernlund (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2011), 288-91. Novikov downplays the reciprocity of ideologization. Moscow conflated geopolitical and ideological conflicts with alacrity similar to Washington’s. See John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin, 2005).

<sup>14</sup> George F. Kennan to James F. Byrnes, telegram, 22 February 1946, in *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, vol. 7: *The Ideological Foundation of the Cold War—the “Long Telegram,” the Clifford Report, and NSC 68*, edited by Dennis Merrill (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1996), 72.

In the immediate aftermath of Jorge Ubico's ouster in 1944, American State Department officials adopted a cautiously optimistic attitude toward Guatemala's military and revolutionary regimes. As indicated by the dispatches of Boaz Long, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala from 1943 to 1945, the United States did not regard any of the factions as particularly anti-American and cared little which faction held power as long as the government maintained public order. Popular American journalist John Gunther had described U.S.-Guatemalan relations as "in every way excellent" during the 1940s, but the United States by no means clung to Ubico. Long in fact energetically criticized that dictator's "intransigent attitude" and "ruthless policy measures."<sup>15</sup> Even after Ubico disbursed a two-million-dollar debt to the U.S.-owned International Railways of Central America (IRCA) in an eleventh-hour attempt to secure American support, the United States declined to send military aid. Ubico resigned barely one week into the general strike.<sup>16</sup>

This noninterventionist policy persisted throughout 1944, largely because U.S. diplomats fell short of gauging the magnitude of the pro-democracy movement. When Ubico relinquished power to a military junta dominated by General Juan Federico Ponce Vaidés (1889-1956), Ponce compelled the Guatemalan national assembly to appoint him the nation's provisional president. The United States straightaway recognized Ponce's regime, preferring to avert "internal strife" and economic disruption than to encourage democratization. Ambassador Long told Washington that "public support" for Ponce's "relatively liberal administration" had risen. He concluded with startling naivety that "the outward life of the country has apparently settled back to normal."<sup>17</sup>

In fact, Ubico's ouster had plunged Guatemalan politics into chaos. Ponce terrorized his opponents and rigged elections. Even the American chargé d'affaires acknowledged electoral fraud when noting, tongue in cheek, that Ponce's conservative Liberal Party swept October's legislative elections "by a handsome, not to say fantastic, margin, garnering 48,530 votes out of a total of 44,571."<sup>18</sup> On 1 October, assassins gunned down the editor of *El Imparcial*, the leading newspaper opposed to Ponce's conservatives. Yet so blasé felt Long regarding this unrest and repression that he went on vacation to Missouri mere days before the outbreak of the Revolution on 20 October 1944.<sup>19</sup> Spearheaded by young army officers, including Captain Jacobo Arbenz, the Guatemalan Revolution drove Ponce into exile within

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<sup>15</sup> Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 20-22; John Gunther, *Inside Latin America* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941), 126; Boaz Long to Cordell Hull, telegram, 25 June 1944, United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter *FRUS*), 1944, vol. 7: *The American Republics* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1944), 1133.

<sup>16</sup> Boaz Long to Cordell Hull, telegram, 28 June 1944, *FRUS*, vol. 7, 1134; Boaz Long to Cordell Hull, telegram, 4 July 1944, *ibid.*, 1135. Ubico fled into exile and died in New Orleans in 1946. Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 42.

<sup>17</sup> Boaz Long to Cordell Hull, telegram, 14 July 1944, *FRUS*, vol. 7, 1138-39.

<sup>18</sup> Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 28; William C. Affeld to Cordell Hull, telegram, 17 October 1944, *FRUS*, vol. 7, 1141.

<sup>19</sup> Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 28-29. Long's "lackadaisical and naïve behavior" reflected the State Department's failure to grasp the major implications of the revolutionary process. Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 85.



forty-eight hours. Costing fewer than one hundred lives, the speedy and successful uprising caught American diplomats by surprise. The new pro-democracy junta then held democratic elections in December, and reformist candidate Juan José Arévalo captured the presidency with 85 percent of the vote.<sup>20</sup>

Whereas Arévalo's successor would run into a wall of American opprobrium ten years later, the State Department's responses to the October Revolution and Arévalo's election proved not only measured but even positive. As early as 31 October—a mere eleven days after Ponce's ouster—Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. expressed Washington's willingness to recognize the revolutionary government pending consultations with U.S. allies in Latin America. Recognition did indeed follow on 7 November.<sup>21</sup> According to glowing reports from William C. Affeld, the U.S. chargé d'affaires for Guatemala, the revolutionary junta comprised "sound and responsible persons" who respected not only "democratic ideals and procedure" but also private property, signifying a noncommunist mentality.<sup>22</sup> U.S. diplomats showed less regard for private property, lobbying Guatemala's newly recognized government to expropriate German-owned coffee plantations (*fincas*) and compensate the owners at the value declared in tax returns. When applied to American-owned plantations in 1954, expropriation catalyzed U.S. intervention.<sup>23</sup>

The fact that Ambassador Long rushed to discuss expropriation with junta leaders on 10 November, only three days after recognition, suggested that during the Second World War, the United States prioritized fighting Nazi Germany over hindering communist influences. Ethnic Germans owned over half of Guatemala's lucrative coffee plantations and enjoyed cozy relations with Guatemalan elites, causing American diplomats to believe that Ubico and Ponce entertained fascist sympathies and might facilitate Nazi infiltration into the Western Hemisphere.<sup>24</sup> Granted, in June 1944, Ubico finally had capitulated to intense U.S. pressure and threats to halt purchase of Guatemalan coffee—then the nation's largest export—and had begun to nationalize German expatriates' coffee plantations; however, U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation agents oversaw the process because Ubico's reluctance had caused American officials to lose faith in him as a reliable ally.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 28-29; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 41-43; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 31; Boaz Long to Edward R. Stettinius, telegram, 9 December 1944, *FRUS*, vol. 7, 1152.

<sup>21</sup> Edward R. Stettinius to the Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics, telegram, 31 October 1944, *FRUS*, vol. 7, 1147; Edward R. Stettinius to Boaz Long, telegram, 4 November 1944, *ibid.*, 1151.

<sup>22</sup> William C. Affeld to Cordell Hull, telegram, 24 October 1944, *FRUS*, vol. 7, 1142-43; Affeld to Cordell Hull, telegram, 25 October 1944, *ibid.*, 1144.

<sup>23</sup> Boaz Long to Cordell Hull, telegram, 14 November 1944, *ibid.*, 1166.

<sup>24</sup> John Stephen Zunes, "Decisions on Intervention: United States Response to Third World Nationalist Governments, 1950-1957" (PhD diss., Cornell University, 1990), 40-43.

<sup>25</sup> Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 20-21; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 26-27; Cordell Hull to Boaz Long, telegram, 22 May 1944, *FRUS*, vol. 7, 1160-63; Boaz Long to Cordell Hull, telegram, 22 June 1944, *ibid.*, 1163-64.

The cautiously optimistic U.S. response to the October Revolution therefore owed in part to the Nazi menace and the consequent perception among U.S. officials that Germans and fascists, rather than Soviets or communists, constituted the graver threat to American interests.

Fundamental to this initial pragmatism was that the October Revolution took place during the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, whose Good Neighbor policy governed U.S. relations with Latin America during the 1930s and early 1940s.<sup>26</sup> In his 1933 inaugural address, Roosevelt promised to “dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor—the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others.”<sup>27</sup> Later that same year, Roosevelt formally rejected the principle of intervention in an address before the Woodrow Wilson Foundation: “The definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention.”<sup>28</sup> And on 26 December 1933, Secretary of State Cordell Hull reaffirmed Roosevelt’s policy of nonintervention when he formally endorsed Article 8 of the Inter-American Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. This plank stated flatly that “no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.”<sup>29</sup>

Most importantly, the Roosevelt administration followed through on this Good Neighbor rhetoric. In 1934, the United States withdrew an occupation force of Marines from Haiti as well as agreeing to abrogate the Platt Amendment, which had allowed the United States to dominate Cuba’s foreign relations since 1901. During the 1930s, the United States refrained from directly intervening in Latin American politics—a shift from the interventionist decades of the 1910s and 1920s. When Mexico nationalized its oil industry in 1938, Roosevelt resisted domestic pressure to intervene militarily, instead negotiating with Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas \$42 million in compensation for U.S. oil corporations. As this noninterventionism gratified Latin Americans, U.S. wartime relations with most Latin American nations set a new precedent for cordiality.<sup>30</sup>

In accordance with the Good Neighbor policy’s non-confrontational approach to international conflict resolution, the Roosevelt administration did not base its foreign policy on anticommunism. In November 1933, the United States finally recognized the Soviet Union, and while relations quickly cooled and mutual

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<sup>26</sup> Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, “Good Neighbor Policy,” n.d., accessed 1 December 2012, <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/GoodNeighbor>.

<sup>27</sup> Franklin D. Roosevelt, “First Inaugural Address,” 4 March 1933, Avalon Project, Yale University, accessed 19 November 2012, [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/froos1.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/froos1.asp).

<sup>28</sup> Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Address before the Woodrow Wilson Foundation,” 28 December 1933, American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara, accessed 19 November 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14593>.

<sup>29</sup> Reprinted in Edmund Jan Osmanczyk and Anthony Mango, eds., *Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 1017-18. See also Walter LaFeber, *The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, 1750 to Present*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1994), 376.

<sup>30</sup> Wesley M. Bagby, *America’s International Relations since World War I* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 75-77, 124. See also Irwin F. Gellman, *Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United States Policy in Latin America, 1933-1945* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).

suspicious persisted, Congress did pump \$11 billion into the Soviet war machine to fight the Nazi advance across Eastern Europe, and Roosevelt's wartime meetings with Soviet leader Josef Stalin, at Tehran in 1943 and at Yalta in 1945, proved unexpectedly cordial and fruitful.<sup>31</sup> Roosevelt advisor Harry Hopkins recalled that "the Russians had proved that they could be reasonable and farseeing"—and in particular, had proved that "we get along with them peacefully for as far into the future as any of us could imagine."<sup>32</sup>

Naïve in retrospect, the Roosevelt era's optimistic approach to Soviet relations spilled over into American diplomats' attitudes toward Guatemala's revolutionary leaders in 1944 and 1945. Under Roosevelt, Americans tended to see Guatemalans through a paternalistic rather than ideological lens. For instance, a 1942 *Harper's Magazine* article described Ubico as a benevolent paternal figure or *tata* who compelled obedience from his ingenuous, unruly Indian subjects.<sup>33</sup> Diplomats, too, commonly referred to Guatemalan revolutionaries in terms suggestive of unruly children. Ambassador Long expressed relief when "more sober judgment prevailed" at meetings of the revolutionary junta, while the chargé, Affeld, characterized junta members as "sound and responsible persons," as if surprised by their maturity.<sup>34</sup> However demeaning these connotations, American diplomats did not demonize the October revolutionaries as communists. In 1945, John F. Griffiths, the American chargé for Argentina, where Guatemala's newly elected reformist president, Juan José Arévalo, had lived eight years in exile, scorned suspicions of Arévalo being a communist as rumors "so utterly without foundation as to call for no response."<sup>35</sup>

Just as Griffiths maintained, President Arévalo and most of his fellow reformists were neither radicals nor ideologues. Standing six feet tall and exuding charisma, Arévalo had fled Ubico's dictatorship in 1936 to teach philosophy at the University of Tucumán in Argentina. He returned to Guatemala on 3 September 1944, met a hero's welcome as soon as he descended the gangway, and campaigned for president on the joint tickets of the National Renewal and Popular Liberation Front parties.<sup>36</sup> Condemning the militaristic and authoritarian conservatism and quasi-fascism he termed *ubiquismo*, Arévalo championed his political philosophy of *arevalismo* as "a movement genuinely of the people."<sup>37</sup> He further characterized the Revolution as fundamentally a progressive pro-democracy movement. "We

<sup>31</sup> Bagby, *America's International Relations*, 77-78, 95, 118-122.

<sup>32</sup> Harry Hopkins, interview with Robert E. Sherwood, n. d., quoted in Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1948), 870.

<sup>33</sup> Lawrence Martin and Sylvia Parsons Martin, "Four Strong Men and a President: A Central-American Group Portrait," *Harper's Magazine*, September 1942, 418-20.

<sup>34</sup> Boaz Long to Cordell Hull, telegram, 14 July 1944, *FRUS*, vol. 7, 1138; William C. Affeld to Cordell Hull, telegram, 24 October 1944, *ibid.*, 1143.

<sup>35</sup> John F. Griffiths to Edward R. Stettinius, memorandum, 8 January 1945, quoted in Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 86.

<sup>36</sup> Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 32-36. Both parties comprised mostly students and teachers.

<sup>37</sup> Juan José Arévalo Bermejo, radio address, 23 October 1944, in Juan José Arévalo, *Escritos políticos* (Guatemala City: Tipografía Nacional, 1945), 127.

live and shall live for democracy,” said Arévalo, adding that ubiquismo formed a system that “comes from and belongs *outside America*.”<sup>38</sup>

In keeping with this championship of democracy and denunciation of dictatorship as a system somehow foreign to Latin America, Arévalo condemned Ubico as tantamount to Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini. Albeit doctrinally distinct, Guatemalan conservatives and European fascists shared “empirical and temperamental” traits, by which Arévalo meant antidemocratic, authoritarian, and militaristic tendencies. Arévalo further insisted that Latin American democrats had been fighting quasi-fascists since the nineteenth century, citing Argentina’s right-wing secret police, La Mazorca, as “the first Gestapo.” By conflating ubiquismo with Nazism, Arévalo was able to designate Britain, the United States, and Guatemalan democrats as natural allies in the global fight against Nazism. He celebrated Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston Churchill—and by extension, Arévalo himself—as “paladins of democracy.”<sup>39</sup>

Rejecting both classical liberalism’s individualism and classical Marxism’s dogmatic materialism, Arévalo instead advocated “spiritual socialism”: a “doctrine of psychological and moral liberation” meant to rejuvenate the Guatemalan national spirit. Arévalo sought to imbue the masses with a sense of dignity and agency, but without necessarily wielding state power to redistribute the nation’s wealth—he sought a more organic egalitarianism.<sup>40</sup> In keeping with the president’s hazily defined philosophy, the newly elected government rewrote the constitution in 1945 to extend the franchise to all men and to literate women and guarantee freedom of speech, the press, and assembly. Arévalo also enacted a series of reforms modeled on Roosevelt’s New Deal, including a 1947 labor code favorable to unions, a 1948 social security program, a public health campaign that cut mortality rates by 15 percent over six years, a 155 percent rise in public spending on education, and the repeal of anti-vagrancy laws used to enforce debt peonage.<sup>41</sup>

Notwithstanding such unprecedented modernizations, these reforms primarily served Arévalo’s base of support: teachers, students, civil servants, factory workers, and other largely urban and middle-class sectors of society. Reformers comparatively neglected the 80 percent of Guatemalans, mostly impoverished and landless indigenous peasants, who lived in rural areas and whose labor the *latifundistas* (conservative landed elites) continued to exploit.<sup>42</sup> In fact, Arévalo’s government repeatedly used troops to crack down on striking farmworkers in 1946

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<sup>38</sup> Juan José Arévalo, “Nazismo europeo y nazismo criollo,” *El Libertador*, 9 September 1944, in Arévalo, *Escritos políticos*, 78.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 76-77.

<sup>40</sup> Juan José Arévalo, “Conservadores, liberales y socialistas,” pamphlet, 31 October 1944, in Arévalo, *Escritos políticos*, 146-47.

<sup>41</sup> Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 36-39; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 48-57; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 37-42.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

and 1947.<sup>43</sup> The dearth of agrarian reforms prompted Nick Cullather, the CIA's official historian for the 1954 coup, to go so far as to call Arévalo's government "essentially conservative."<sup>44</sup>

Arévalo hesitated to implement agrarian reforms because he was an adroit politician who knew how far he could push his reformist agenda without declaring war on the powerful planter class. Two percent of the population owned 72 percent of arable land, illiteracy rates topped 75 percent, income disparity was vast, and even the World Bank noted that the average Guatemalan worker's nutritional intake "often is not such as to permit him to do intensive work for long hours."<sup>45</sup> However, Guatemalan elites resisted taking steps intended to ameliorate this crushing poverty, malnutrition, and social injustice. Feeling their grip on the countryside slipping away, these latifundistas decried Arévalo's modest reforms as class warfare and communism. By the end of his six-year presidential term, Arévalo had survived twenty-nine coup attempts, including a 1949 conspiracy by military chief-of-staff and former revolutionary leader Colonel Francisco Javier Araña, whose plot culminated in pitched battles in Guatemala City and in Araña's own death when Arévalo loyalists ambushed his convoy near Lake Atitlán.<sup>46</sup>

Alongside these abortive counterrevolutions, State Department rhetoric against Arévalo's government escalated beginning in 1946 as U.S. economic interests increasingly conflicted with Guatemala's burgeoning labor movement. Relations remained largely cordial in 1945. Long's replacement as U.S. ambassador, Edwin Jackson Kyle, agreed that American military advisors would undertake to modernize, equip, and train the army of Guatemala.<sup>47</sup> In late 1946, however, a flurry of labor strikes on UFCO plantations and IRCA railroads incensed American diplomats, and the Arévalo administration, concerned lest the strikes anger the United States into imposing economic sanctions, intervened to halt the strikes pending the issuance of the (pro-union) Labor Code in 1947. Guatemalan Foreign Minister Eugenio Silva Peña also promised to "take a strong stand" against militant labor activists, reflecting Arévalo's keenness to allay U.S. concerns.<sup>48</sup>

Arévalo's accommodationist approach to U.S. interests proved more difficult to sustain in 1947 and 1948, as American corporations and diplomats alike increasingly

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<sup>43</sup> Jim Handy, *Revolution in the Countryside: Rural Conflict and Agrarian Reform in Guatemala, 1944-1954* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 63-67.

<sup>44</sup> Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 11. *Secret History* originated as a 1994 CIA-commissioned study.

<sup>45</sup> Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 36-37; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), *The Economic Development of Guatemala* (Washington, DC: IBRD, 1951), 95.

<sup>46</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Relations of the United States and Guatemala," policy statement, 2 May 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, vol 2: *The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1951), 1419; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 62-67.

<sup>47</sup> Edwin J. Kyle to Edward R. Stettinius, telegram, 22 May 1945, *FRUS*, 1945, vol. 9: *The American Republics* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1945), 1081-83.

<sup>48</sup> Andrew E. Donovan II to James F. Byrnes, telegram, 11 December 1946, *FRUS*, 1946, vol. 11: *The American Republics*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1946), 892-93.

vociferated against the government's economic reforms. The 1947 Labor Code in particular perturbed the United States, as the law legalized unionization and strikes only in firms with more than five hundred employees—a provision that United Fruit interpreted as a direct assault on itself. Pressured by UFCO lobbyist Thomas Corcoran, the State Department expressed “serious concern[s]” about “discrimination against American-owned enterprises.”<sup>49</sup> State Department division chief Robert Newbegin threatened to yank foreign investment from Guatemala were the UFCO not exempted from laws deemed “detrimental to the interests of the United Fruit Company and discriminatory to American interests in this country.”<sup>50</sup> This identification of the United States' national security with corporate interests notwithstanding, later developments undercut the revisionist case that the United States based its foreign policy on making the world safe for capitalism.<sup>51</sup>

Whereas in 1946 and 1947 American diplomats had sought merely to defend United Fruit's interests, by 1950 the State Department had come to see challenges to the UFCO as symptomatic of a deeper ideological problem: communist influence on Arévalo's government. Criticizing Arévalo for his relatively innocuous “inherent sympathy for the laboring classes” in 1947, U.S. diplomats denounced his regime as prey to “radical leftist influences” in 1949.<sup>52</sup> As early as May 1948, an embassy report had warned Washington that Arévalo's “radical” reforms, “accompanied by strong overtones of class warfare,” had facilitated the mass “infiltration of indoctrinated communists, fellow-travelers, and Marxist ideas” into Guatemala.<sup>53</sup> And in 1950, a State Department report conjured up a nonexistent “underground communist organization” that comprised two or three hundred cadres “strategically placed in effective control over” key labor unions and political parties. This report concluded that whether a Guatemalan Communist Party actually existed was irrelevant as long as undefined “crypto-communists” remained extant.<sup>54</sup> In American diplomatic circles, the perceived communist threat in Guatemala had already trumped purely economic concerns by 1950.

This sensationalistic fantasy of a grand communist conspiracy controlling Arévalo's government had little basis in Guatemalan politics but typified reductive

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<sup>49</sup> U.S. State Department to Guatemalan Embassy, memorandum, 28 May 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, vol. 8: *The American Republics* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1947), 705-06; George C. Marshall to Edwin J. Kyle, telegram, 24 July 1947, *ibid.*, 706.

<sup>50</sup> Robert Newbegin, memorandum, 30 July 1947, *FRUS*, vol. 11, 708-09; Edwin J. Kyle, memorandum, 8 August 1947, *ibid.*, 710.

<sup>51</sup> For revisionist diplomatic history's seminal text on the open-door policy as the main inspiration for U.S. foreign policy, see William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, rev. ed. (New York: Dell, 1962). For a piquant rebuttal of this argument, see Robert H. Ferrell, *Harry S. Truman and the Cold War Revisionists* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006).

<sup>52</sup> Milton Wells to George C. Marshall, telegram, 19 December 1947, *FRUS*, vol. 11, 718; Murray W. Wise, memorandum, 16 September 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, vol. 2: *The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1949), 665.

<sup>53</sup> Milton Wells to George C. Marshall, “Communism in Guatemala,” report, 6 May 1948, quoted in Immerman, *CLA in Guatemala*, 89.

<sup>54</sup> U.S. Department of State, “Some Aspects of Communist Penetration,” report, 23 March 1950, 10, Declassified Documents Reference System (CK3100351458).

American thinking about international communism. Unlike the United States, Guatemala cultivated no military or diplomatic ties to the Soviet Union. The two states had recognized each other, but Guatemala's 1945 constitution, which Arévalo had written, explicitly banned the Communist Party, and the State Department was aware of these realities. Nevertheless, U.S. diplomats spoke confidently of Soviet "inspiration and guidance" of Guatemalan reformists, particularly of the handful who, like Guatemalan Workers' Party leader José Manuel Fortuny, had traveled to Paris or Moscow. "No proof of direct control has yet been established," acknowledged one diplomat in 1950.<sup>55</sup>

This State Department report's use of the term "yet" signaled diplomats' confidence of confirming these Soviet-Guatemalan connections sooner or later. As the CIA reported in 1950, "Communist pressure probably will follow the customary pattern of infiltration and subversion rather than open military action."<sup>56</sup> Diplomats pointed to Arévalo's support for the Caribbean Legion, a motley handful of pro-democracy activists who opposed dictatorships in Nicaragua, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. Officials viewed the Legion as a vehicle for communist aggression against U.S. allies neighboring Guatemala—part of a Soviet strategy meant to "divide and subvert" the American republics and "leave the entire hemisphere open to attack."<sup>57</sup>

This exaggeration of the communist threat in Latin America reflects the Harry S. Truman administration's Cold War mentality. By 1950, Truman's administration had come to envision America as locked in a world-historical struggle for existence with international communism, spearheaded by the Soviet Union. Truman regarded communism as only marginally preferable to Nazism, manifesting deep-seated hostility toward Soviet leadership, which he deemed to be duplicitous, expansionistic, and totalitarian—opinions with which Truman's advisors concurred. The Maoist victory in China, the conflicts in Korea and Greece, and the establishment of Soviet satellite regimes across Eastern Europe appeared to corroborate Truman's concerns.<sup>58</sup> However, Latin America barely appeared on Moscow's radar during the 1940s or early 1950s.<sup>59</sup>

Domestic pressure on Truman to crack down on communism, both at home and abroad, facilitated the State Department's dire assumptions about the reach of Soviet expansion. In 1950, Senator Millard Tydings (D-MD), a Truman supporter, warned that attacks from anticommunist hardliners, most notably Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI), had weakened public support for the administration. For the

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<sup>55</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Some Aspects of Communist Penetration," 10, 13.

<sup>56</sup> U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Review of the World Situation," CIA 2-50, 15 February 1950, 3, Declassified Documents Reference System (CK3100376125).

<sup>57</sup> Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 95.

<sup>58</sup> Turner Catledge, "Our Policy Stated," *New York Times*, 24 June 1941, 7; Arnold A. Offner, *Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 16-17.

<sup>59</sup> Tobias Rupprecht, "Soviet Internationalism after Stalin: The USSR and Latin America in the Cultural Cold War" (PhD diss., European University Institute, 2012), 35-36.

sake of political popularity as well as of national self-defense, Tydings urged the president to reassure the American public that Truman stood as “the implacable foe of Communism,” unreservedly fighting to “eradicate it and hold it in check at home and abroad.”<sup>60</sup>

Tydings’ language of eradication and containment parallels the Truman administration’s intensification of anticommunist rhetoric and policy measures from 1947 through 1952—a trend that pressure from Republicans and conservative-leaning Democrats only exacerbated. By 1947, relative moderates on the communist question (Harry Hopkins, Henry A. Wallace, Edward R. Stettinius, and arguably James F. Byrnes) had died or resigned from Truman’s administration, giving way to anticommunist hardliners such as Dean Acheson, undersecretary (1945-1947) and later secretary of state (1949-1953).<sup>61</sup> This changing of the guard reflected the U.S.-Soviet move away from wartime cooperation toward Cold War rivalry. Alongside diplomat George F. Kennan and presidential advisor Clark Clifford, Acheson formulated the early doctrine of containment. In Kennan’s words, containment meant that the United States undertook to halt “Russian expansive tendencies” via “adroit and vigilant application of counterforce” at critical contact points.<sup>62</sup>

As U.S.-Soviet relations steadily deteriorated, Truman repudiated his predecessor’s Good Neighbor policy in March 1947, proclaiming that the United States would “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” According to this Truman Doctrine, U.S. officials would operate on the assumption that the American “way of life” was morally superior to all others, dichotomizing American “freedom” and communist “oppression.”<sup>63</sup> The Truman administration thus conceptualized the Cold War as an ideological conflict, not only a geopolitical power struggle. In April 1950, National Security Council report 68 (NSC 68) called for the “militarization of containment”: armed strength “intended to check and roll back the Kremlin’s drive for world domination.”<sup>64</sup> Rollback—that is, interventionism—had entered the Cold War lexicon, with dire future consequences for Guatemalan reformers.

This process of ideologization emerged also in the conduct of the U.S. ambassadors to Guatemala. Boaz Long, ambassador from 1943 to 1945, was an old-school pragmatist who had thirty years’ experience in “handling” Latin

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<sup>60</sup> Millard E. Tydings to Harry S. Truman, memorandum, 12 April 1950, in Merrill, ed., *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, vol. 25, 80-81.

<sup>61</sup> See Offner, *Another Such Victory*, 71-213.

<sup>62</sup> X [George F. Kennan], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 4 (1947): 566-582.

<sup>63</sup> Harry S. Truman, address [Truman Doctrine] to Joint Session of Senate and House of Representatives, 12 March 1947, in *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, vol. 8: *The Truman Doctrine and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1947-1949*, edited by Dennis Merrill (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1996), 102.

<sup>64</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 113; United States National Security Council, “A Report to the National Security Council-NSC 68,” 12 April 1950, 54-55, in Merrill, ed., *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, vol. 7, 380-81.



American dictators and who accepted the ouster of Jorge Ubico once assured that the reform movement would not lead to anarchy.<sup>65</sup> Although an anticommunist, Ambassador Edwin J. Kyle (1945-1948) adopted a non-confrontational approach toward Arévalo's cabinet. In one 1947 meeting, for example, he tried to soften his colleagues' threats to yank foreign investment from Guatemala by comparing UFCO stakes in the country to British investments in the United States "in the early days of American history." To discourage expropriation of UFCO assets, Kyle assured the Guatemalans that British stakes "had passed to American owners naturally and not as a result of pressure or legislation," suggesting that UFCO power in Guatemala was open to discussion.<sup>66</sup> Arévalo appreciated this civility enough to award Kyle the Order of Quetzal—Guatemala's highest honor—in 1949.<sup>67</sup> Kyle's successor, Richard C. Patterson, Jr. (1948-1950), was a pugnacious ultraconservative who popularized the term "duck test" for identifying communists. If a bird looked and quacked like a duck, Patterson said, then it probably was a duck, or in this case, a communist. Refusing to recognize the myriad distinctions among socialists and other leftists, Patterson openly supported anti-Arévalo plotters, forcing his recall in 1950 and his replacement by the more tactful Rudolf E. Schoenfeld (1951-1953).<sup>68</sup>

Intensifying anticommunist rhetoric from American diplomats coincided with the rise of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, a pragmatic but staunch nationalist, as political heir to Arévalo, who was constitutionally limited to one term. Elected president with 60 percent of the vote in November 1950, Arbenz enacted major agrarian reforms on 17 June 1952, when the National Assembly unanimously passed Decree 900. This law expropriated and redistributed more than 1.6 million acres of uncultivated land to one hundred thousand poor peasant families, most of them Mayan Indians who likely had not owned land since the Spanish Conquest. Only the richest landowners lost property, and Arbenz compensated them according to the value they had declared in taxes, recalling Jorge Ubico's nationalization of German-owned coffee plantations in 1944.<sup>69</sup> But the State Department saw redistribution as

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<sup>65</sup> Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, "Boaz Walton Long," n.d., accessed 24 November 2012, <http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/long-boaz-walton>; Boaz Long to Cordell Hull, telegram, 31 October 1944, *FRUS*, vol. 7, 1148.

<sup>66</sup> Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, "Edwin Jackson Kyle," n.d., accessed 24 November 2012, <http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/kyle-edwin-jackson>; Robert Newbegin, memorandum, 30 July 1947, *FRUS*, vol. 11, 709-10;

<sup>67</sup> Ann Miller Strom, "Kyle, Edwin Jackson," *Handbook of Texas Online*, Texas State Historical Association, accessed 24 November 2012, <http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fky04>.

<sup>68</sup> Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, "Richard Cunningham Patterson," n.d., accessed 24 November 2012, <http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/patterson-richard-cunningham>; Donald L. Nicholson to Thomas C. Mann, "Request for Replacement of United States Ambassador to Guatemala," telegram, 5 April 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, vol. 2: *The United Nations; the Western Hemisphere* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1950), 876; Immerman, 97, 102; Gleijeses, 173.

<sup>69</sup> Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 149-70; Handy, *Revolution in the Countryside*, 86-100; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 64-66. Redistribution cost UFCO 400,000 acres of fallow land. Zunes, *Decisions on Intervention*, 56-59.

an assault on United Fruit, declaring that “all American companies” were “fighting for their very existence” against “the Communists.”<sup>70</sup>

In contrast, Arbenz saw this massive land redistribution program as vital to his long-term goal of modernizing the Guatemalan economy. More economically oriented than Arévalo’s old manifestos, Arbenz’s 1951 platform called for reducing import dependency and diversifying the economy through industrialization, producing textiles and machinery in addition to the export monocrops of coffee and bananas. Arbenz promised to raise the “miserable” living standards and reduce malnutrition in the countryside not only by redistributing land but also by mechanizing agriculture to grow more food domestically.<sup>71</sup> For Arbenz, such measures would enable national “economic independence” and facilitate Guatemala’s “transformation” from a “predominantly feudal” agrarian society dominated by landowners into a “modern” and “capitalist” country—hardly the rhetoric of a blinkered apparatchik of international communism.<sup>72</sup>

Arbenz’s push for industrialization and economic self-sufficiency constituted the natural progression of Arévalo’s reforms. Far from duplicating Josef Stalin’s five-year plans, Arbenz’s program embraced import substitution industrialization (ISI), implemented across Latin America during the mid-twentieth century, particularly by Mexico, a U.S. ally. Mexico’s ruling socialist party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), oversaw an economic boom during the 1950s, with the nation’s annual growth rate averaging 6 percent between 1940 and 1980.<sup>73</sup>

The Truman administration, however, proved loath to allow Arbenz to jeopardize U.S. interests to better Guatemalans’ material conditions. American diplomats in 1950 and 1951 had greeted Arbenz’s election with guarded optimism, regarding him as a mere “opportunist” liable to “steer a more nearly middle course than Arévalo.”<sup>74</sup> But the State Department also warned of the government’s “excessive nationalism” and “strong sympathy for Communism,” complaining that Arbenz had appointed “agents of international Communism” to his cabinet (in fact, Arbenz had absorbed the far-left Guatemalan Workers’ Party into his coalition government).<sup>75</sup> Arbenz’s 1952 land reforms confirmed diplomats’ worst fears. “Unless action is taken,” warned one State Department memorandum, “the Soviet

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<sup>70</sup> Kenneth H. Redmond to Thomas C. Mann, memorandum, 20 February 1951, enclosure from W.L. Taillon, quoted in Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 82.

<sup>71</sup> Arbenz Guzmán, *Exposición del Presidente de la República*, 3-11.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>73</sup> Edwin Williamson, *The Penguin History of Latin America*, rev. ed. (New York: Penguin, 2009), 334, 399-400; John Charles Chasteen, *Born in Blood and Fire: A Concise History of Latin America* (New York: Norton, 2001), 226-28, 236-39.

<sup>74</sup> Willard Barber to Thomas C. Mann, “Evaluation of our policy toward Guatemala,” telegram, 14 July 1950, Declassified Documents Reference System (CK3100351497); U.S. Department of State, “Relations of the United States and Guatemala,” policy statement, 2 May 1951, *FRUS*, vol. 2, 1419.

<sup>75</sup> U.S. Department of State, “Relations of the United States and Guatemala,” 2 May 1951, *FRUS*, vol. 2, 1417-18; Rupprecht, “Soviet Internationalism,” 35.

international Communist movement” would establish “the first Soviet-controlled ‘People’s Democracy’ type of State in the Western Hemisphere.”<sup>76</sup>

With this scenario in mind, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency conspired to overthrow Arbenz. As early as January 1952, the CIA compiled lists of fifty-eight Guatemalans “to be disposed of through Executive action”—that is, assassination—and seventy-four other “persons to be disposed of through imprisonment or exile” in the event of a successful uprising against Arbenz.<sup>77</sup> In September 1952, the CIA obtained State Department approval to execute one of the agency’s first major covert actions, Operation PBFORTUNE, in which the CIA was to supply seven hundred firearms and \$225,000 to an anti-Arbenz band of exiles led by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas. Secretary of State Dean Acheson canceled the operation on 8 October because rumors had leaked to the press, leaving the task of ousting Arbenz to President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s CIA, which implemented Operation PBSUCCESS on 18 June 1954.<sup>78</sup> As U.S.-supplied bombers napalmed harbors and military bases, a CIA radio station broadcast propaganda, and a rebel force led by Castillo Armas neared the capital, Arbenz lost his army’s support and fled to Mexico, abandoning Guatemala to the forces of reaction.<sup>79</sup>

Arbenz’s flight had devastating repercussions for Guatemala and helped militarize U.S. foreign policy. The coup ushered in forty years of conservative military dictatorships, which rolled back most of Arévalo’s and Arbenz’s reforms, rigged elections, and brutally suppressed resistance. These actions culminated in the 1980s with the Guatemalan Genocide, in which the army and right-wing paramilitaries, motivated by anticommunist fervor, massacred an estimated one hundred thousand peasants.<sup>80</sup> The widespread perception among reformists that the United States had stamped out democracy in its neighbor radicalized Latin Americans such as Ernesto “Che” Guevara, whose experience of CIA bombing raids on Guatemala City during the 1954 coup influenced his conclusion that only revolution and Marxism could liberate Latin Americans from U.S. hegemony.<sup>81</sup> Aggressive U.S. actions to foil communist expansion in Latin America thus became a self-fulfilling prophecy as democrats and moderates were exiled or radicalized and the militant left became seemingly the only viable alternative to conservative dictatorship. But revolutionary efforts such as Guevara’s did little to

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<sup>76</sup> Henry Holland to John Foster Dulles, “Summary of Communist Influence in Guatemala,” memorandum, 11 May 1954, quoted in Zunes, *Decisions on Intervention*, 91.

<sup>77</sup> Cullather, *Secret History*, 141; [Author and recipient redacted], “Guatemalan Communist Personal to be disposed of during Military Operations of Calligeris,” n.d., National Security Archive, George Washington University, accessed 1 December 2012, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/index.html>.

<sup>78</sup> Cullather, *Secret History*, 27-31.

<sup>79</sup> Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 319-50.

<sup>80</sup> Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 3.

<sup>81</sup> Jon Lee Anderson, *Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life* (New York: Grove Press, 1997), 121-59, 498-99; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 195-96.

stem the rising tide of U.S. interventions, starting in earnest with the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. During the Cold War, U.S. soldiers or covert operatives toppled governments in Chile (1973), Grenada (1983), and Panama (1989), while U.S. economic and military aid bolstered conservative regimes across Latin America.<sup>82</sup>

The 1954 coup in Guatemala thus marked a major shift in U.S. foreign policy—a shift emergent since the mid-1940s as Harry S. Truman and his successors discarded Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy in favor of interventionism to roll back supposed Soviet-style communism throughout Latin America. Tending to see existential threats in places from which no such threats necessarily emanated, State Department and CIA officials came to see Arévalo’s and Arbenz’s challenges to U.S. economic interests in Guatemala not as actions of nationalists struggling to modernize their country but as symptoms of international communism’s growing control over Guatemala. Economic and ideological interests thus became intertwined, mutually reinforcing motivations for U.S. intervention. Mirroring the escalation of Cold War tensions between the superpowers, the ideologization of U.S.-Guatemalan relations from 1944 to 1954 established anticommunism as the driving force behind the foreign policy of the United States.

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<sup>82</sup> Chasteen, *Blood and Fire*, 275-301; Grandin, *Last Colonial Massacre*, 184-98.

## Two Generations of Bootlegging and Murder in Jacksonville, Florida: The Crimes of John B. and Clyde Hysler

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Scholarship on the Prohibition era within the United States normally focus attention on Al Capone and other organized crime leaders, who operated out of larger urban centers, such as Chicago, Detroit, and New York. This scholarship includes works such as Luciano J. Iorizzo's book on Al Capone,<sup>1</sup> a work focusing on New York City by Michael A. Lerner,<sup>2</sup> and an overall look at prohibition by Edward Behr.<sup>3</sup> However, there were several important, yet smaller scale's alcohol smuggling networks in existence throughout the country. Along with the Hyslers in Jacksonville, various other families involved in bootlegging were also in Florida. This can serve as representative to other small crime families throughout the country.<sup>4</sup> The small organizations that ran these illicit operations had connections outside of the United States and with other crime rings throughout the country. Much like their counterparts in larger metropolitan areas, they evaded the law, manipulated local law enforcement and the judicial system, and often engaged in violence to protect their interests.<sup>5</sup>

In Jacksonville, Florida, the Hysler family became known for committing crimes in northeast Florida during and after Prohibition. Studying the family allows one to understand the formation and operation of illicit alcohol local smuggling networks in the northeast Florida region during the early twentieth century. Their story also provides a glimpse into the problems of enforcing Prohibition laws at the local and regional levels and why Prohibition failed overall. The history of their criminal activities extends beyond Prohibition. The Hyslers both clashed and cooperated with law enforcement across generations and gained a degree of fame and notoriety unmatched by any other local crime organization.

Still, little evidence exists on the Hyslers and their activities. Because they were involved in criminal activity, the only information on them is found in accounts of their crimes such as newspaper, judicial, and police sources, which portray the family as being ruthless and unwilling to follow the law. This offers a largely one-sided perspective of the Hyslers tend to privilege the perspective of federal and local law enforcement. In addition, those engaged in illicit activities, like the

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<sup>1</sup> Luciano J. Iorizzo, *Al Capone: A Biography* (Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003).

<sup>2</sup> Michael A. Lerner, *Dry Manhattan* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008).

<sup>3</sup> Edward Behr, *Prohibition: Thirteen Years that Changed America* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1996).

<sup>4</sup> John J. Guthrie Jr., "Hard Times, Hard Liquor, and Hard Luck: Selective Enforcement of Prohibition in North Florida, 1928-1933," *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 72, no. 4 (April 1994): 435-452.

<sup>5</sup> Smaller networks of organized crime emerged during the 1920s because of the profits that could be gained from making alcohol illegal. He notes that larger gangs had already formed before Prohibition. For example, the Torrio gang in Chicago was able to gain a larger profit than those who appeared during Prohibition. See Andrew Sinclair, *Prohibition: The Era of Excess* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1962), 222.

Hyslers, did not want to leave any trace of their dealings. Thus, other evidence, including interviews with the descendants of the Hyslers, will provide a valuable personal perspective on the criminal activities of the family and fill in important gaps in our knowledge about them.

The rise of the Hyslers in bootlegging should be viewed within the context of larger efforts to restrict the distribution of alcohol. People throughout the country were more inclined to drink in public and drink in excess because they now had the means to do so. With consumption rising excessively in many cases, social groups believed that the government needed to take action. In the midst of the Progressive Movement, lasting from 1870 to 1920, a group of citizens emerged known as “prohibitionists.” According to Michael McGerr, although not widely supported, prohibitionists would continue to fight for their cause and not give up.<sup>6</sup> Various Progressive social groups, such as the Anti-Saloon League (ASL), linked alcohol consumption to a variety of social ills. Founded in 1865, it was instrumental in pressuring the federal government throughout World War I to pass laws restricting the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages. The Hobson Act banned liquor where food purchasing was also involved.<sup>7</sup>

A growing number of local and state governments decided to ban all alcoholic beverages. In localities all across the US, debates erupted between the “dries” in favor of the prohibition and the “wets” against the Prohibition.<sup>8</sup> These debates were not always civil. Edward Behr points out that street brawls, and fights ensued due to the disagreement between wets and dries.<sup>9</sup> Ultimately, pressure fell to Congress to decide whether Prohibition was necessary on a national level.

Florida was one of the twenty six states that had enacted a Prohibition law before it ever went to the federal government.<sup>10</sup> Some counties began a ban on alcohol as early as 1900 in Florida.<sup>11</sup> In Duval County, a Prohibition law went to a vote 8 November 1910 but was not passed; by 1918, however, Duval had become “Bone Dry.”<sup>12</sup> Reflecting on the events that occurred when Prohibition passed in Duval County, Bill Foley, a writer with the *Florida Times-Union* reported that: “Sixty-one liquor dealers folded their cork-screws . . . . The long, dark night of Prohibition had begun months before it became the Law of the Land.”<sup>13</sup> Duval

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<sup>6</sup> Michael McGerr, *A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870-1920* (New York: Free Press, 2003), 87-88.

<sup>7</sup> Margot Opdycke Lamme, “Tapping into War: Leveraging World War I in the Drive for a Dry Nation,” *American Journalism* 21, no. 4 (2004): 68.

<sup>8</sup> Charles Merz, *The Dry Decade* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1931) 17.

<sup>9</sup> Behr, *Prohibition*, 30.

<sup>10</sup> T. Frederick Davis, *History of Jacksonville Florida and Vicinity* (Jacksonville, FL: San Marco Bookstore, 1925), 239, 271.

<sup>11</sup> Lee Willis, *Southern Prohibition: Race, Reform, and public Life in Middle Florida* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2011), 135.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> Bill Foley, “The Soaking-Wet Campaign that Dried out Duval County,” *The Florida Times-Union*, May 14, 1999.

County was a dry county and actions were immediately taken to rid the area of liquor. The question then turned to when the nation would go dry as well.

The broader electorate favored the law, and the enactment of a constitutional amendment was bound to come after twenty-six individual states enacted their own Prohibition laws.<sup>14</sup> Ratified in the United States on 16 January 1919, the Eighteenth Amendment went into effect 17 January 1920.<sup>15</sup> Although most Prohibition efforts enacted before this time were to advance wartime production during World War I, this amendment was not an effort to advance wartime production. The Eighteenth Amendment passed after various efforts of organizations, such as the Anti-Saloon league, pressured Congress for action to be taken against the amount of alcohol being consumed.<sup>16</sup> The commercial production and sale of alcohol was halted, but illicit consumption continued.

One immediate consequence of Prohibition involved the rise of bootlegging in various parts of the country. According to historian Michael Gannon, Florida, although historically dry, became a major supplier of illegal liquor and one of the “wettest states.” In fact, as he notes, Duval County, where the Hyslers operated, had one of the greatest enforcement problems in Florida.<sup>17</sup>

With the biased view of news reporters and law enforcement officials, it is difficult to get the whole story of who the Hyslers were. However, Hysler descendants still reside in the Jacksonville area one of them was able to give the Hysler perspective on what had happened during the Prohibition era. J.D. Hysler III, great grandson of John B. Hysler stated that his relatives did not believe they were criminals; and that in conversation they mentioned that the bootleggers who emerged were “just good old boys trying to make a living.”<sup>18</sup> Mr. Hysler also mentioned that there were various members of the family who were involved in the bootlegging ring; the main participants were John B. Hysler, James Hysler, Thomas Hysler, Dan Hysler, and Leander Hysler.<sup>19</sup>

The Hyslers preferred to acquire their alcohol from Cuba, in particular, or from local stills in the northeast Florida area.<sup>20</sup> Politicians tried to prevent this. In 1924, Florida Senator Park Trammel asked for a treaty with Great Britain to prevent the sale of alcohol from the Bahamas to American merchants and for permission to search British vessels traveling to the United States.<sup>21</sup> However, a British observer noted that Florida “was the wettest country I have ever known . . . . There was

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<sup>14</sup> Merz, *The Dry Decade*, 17-20.

<sup>15</sup> Behr, *Prohibition*, 80.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>17</sup> Michael Gannon, *Florida: A Short History* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1993), 75-76. James A. Carter III, “Florida and Rumrunning during National Prohibition,” *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 48, no. 1 (July, 1969): 54.

<sup>18</sup> J.D. Hysler III, e-mail message to author, 4 December 2012.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> James A. Carter III, “Florida and Rumrunning during National Prohibition,” *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 48, no. 1 (July, 1969): 51.

not even an ‘attitude’ towards prohibition--people had simply forgotten about it altogether.”<sup>22</sup>

John B. Hysler and Clyde Hysler both gained local attention when their names appeared in the newspapers. Although seemingly well-known in the area as a source of liquor, their crimes became exaggerated by the press. John B. Hysler emerged as one of the most notorious bootleggers in Duval County. Commonly known as the “Liquor King,” “Liquor Czar,” or “Whiskey King” of Jacksonville, he was born in Duval County on 11 December 1894.<sup>23</sup> Growing up in the Jacksonville area, he came to know it very well. Like many males his age, he was drafted in 1917 to fight in World War I; on returning from military service, he came home to a changed America.<sup>24</sup> He also realized the continued importance of alcohol in his community and the potential profit that could be made from it, even as he downplayed the dangers that went along with it.

From the day Prohibition started in Jacksonville, Hysler was involved in bootlegging. Between 1921 and 1925, records show that he purchased property on two separate occasions in the Jacksonville area however the location and amount of land purchased was not specified.<sup>25</sup> Although not known for certain, this land may have been used to aid the bootlegging business. During this time, he was not charged with any crimes, although other members of the family were. John B. Hysler’s brother Tom Hysler was convicted of murder as well as manslaughter in 1921; A different John Hysler was also arrested for murder in April 1921; Dan Hysler, brother of John B. Hysler, was arrested for involvement in the same murder as John Hysler in 1921.<sup>26</sup>

Police corruption was an endemic problem and could explain how Hysler was able to avoid arrest. Editorial boards of Jacksonville’s newspapers during the 1920s complained that the enforcement of Prohibition laws was a constant problem. In a reflection on law enforcement during the Prohibition in Duval County, Bill Foley, a news writer for the *Florida Times-Union*, re-examined what was occurring in 1926 in the city when he wrote: “it is time that the citizenship of this community should put a stop to these conditions and enforcement officers be made to do their duty or be removed.”<sup>27</sup> Officers were not doing their jobs and they faced increased pressure to enforce the law.<sup>28</sup> Likely, the police were benefitting from the bootlegging that was occurring in the area, but now it seemed they were at risk of losing their jobs if they let it continue.

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 56.

<sup>23</sup> “Crowd Attends Hysler Funeral,” *Jacksonville Journal*, September 28, 1928. J.D. Hysler III; email message to author, December 4, 2012.

<sup>24</sup> Draft Registration Card. <http://search.ancestrylibrary.com/iexac?htx=View&r=5542&dbid=6482&iid=FL-1556866-3133&fn=John+B&ln=Hysler&st=r&ssrc=&pid=1010579>

<sup>25</sup> *Florida Times-Union Index: Personal Entries 1921-1925 H-J* (1940).

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Bill Foley, “Enforcement Officers Not Enforcing Enough,” *The Florida Times-Union*, November 19, 1999.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.



John B. Hysler had evaded the law for years, but his luck was about to run out. The appearance of federal Prohibition agents changed the dynamic. According to J.D. Hysler III, an anonymous source denounced John B. Hysler to dry agent (federal Prohibition agent) Hope King.<sup>29</sup> Hope King was a 26 year old prohibition agent in Jacksonville originally from Quitman, Georgia.<sup>30</sup> On 26 September 1928, Hysler was driving a car that was suspected by dry agents to contain illegal liquor, and was pursued by Hope King and other dry agents. The two faced each other atop the Acosta Bridge in downtown Jacksonville.<sup>31</sup> King confronted Hysler and accused him of having liquor in the vehicle. The details of the shooting are unknown. J.F. Starrett, a toll operator on the bridge and a key witness to the shooting, accused King of firing first.<sup>32</sup> The next day James Hysler, brother of John B. Hysler, stated that the allegations were false.<sup>33</sup> In a *Florida Times-Union* article published on the day following the shooting, James Hysler defended his brother John B. Hysler. "James Hysler, brother of the slain man, declared today that the automobile containing the liquor is not the automobile . . . turned over to John B. Hysler the following morning."<sup>34</sup> James Hysler claimed that false information prompted the stop by dry agents that led to his brother's death. If the dry agents had known about the vehicle exchange with the Hysler family, John B. Hysler might have lived. Regardless, John B. Hysler, only 34 years old, lost his life that day, and King was put in the hospital in critical condition but would eventually recover.

Funeral services for John B. Hysler were held two days after the shooting. Hundreds attended the viewing and funeral, among them lawyers, police officers, and the most respected preachers in the area.<sup>35</sup> He left behind a wife, two sons, five sisters, and two brothers.<sup>36</sup>

While King was still recovering the hospital, Hysler's wife, Bertha, had a warrant put out for his arrest on murder charges. To keep King out of prison, the government would either have to set bail for King or get the charges moved into a federal court.<sup>37</sup> It is not known what came of these charges, but the family left King alone after this incident.

After John B. Hysler had put the Hysler name in the headlines, another member of the family emerged. Clyde Hysler, nephew to John B. Hysler, became famous when he was incarcerated for involvement in a homicide.<sup>38</sup> Born around 1916, he grew up during Prohibition and continued to be involved in bootlegging even after

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<sup>29</sup> J.D. Hysler III, email message to author, 4 December 2012.

<sup>30</sup> "King Holding Own As Guards Watch Hospital," *Jacksonville Journal*, 28 September 1928.

<sup>31</sup> Debra Webb Rogers, *Jacksonville's Southside: Images of America Series* (FL: Arcadia Publishing, 2012) 17.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> "King Holding Own As Guards Watch Hospital," *Jacksonville Journal*, 28 September 1928.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> "Whisky King Met His End on Acosta," *Florida Times-Union*, 21 February 1999. [http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/022199/cel\\_hysler.html](http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/022199/cel_hysler.html) (accessed 4 December 2012).

<sup>36</sup> "Crowd Attends Hysler Funeral," *Jacksonville Journal*, 28 September 1928.

<sup>37</sup> "King is Facing Death Charge," *Jacksonville Journal*, October 9, 1928.

<sup>38</sup> J.D. Hysler III, email message to author, December 4, 2012.

the Eighteenth Amendment had been repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment in 1933. Eventually he and two other men, James Baker and Alvin Tyler, were arrested in 1937 for murdering Mr. and Mrs. John H. Surrency, a Jacksonville couple.<sup>39</sup> The murder was the result of an attempted robbery in Jacksonville. The robbery was rumored to be linked to bootlegging.

Clyde was sentenced to death by electrocution.<sup>40</sup> Trying to spare her son's life during a hearing, Clyde's mother, Sarah, testified that "her son had changed mentally during the past few weeks and 'at times doesn't seem to recognize me.'"<sup>41</sup> As a result of this testimony his execution was postponed in order to determine his state of mind. Although his mother's attempt to postpone the execution initially worked, he was diagnosed as sane and sentenced once again to the electric chair.

Clyde continued to appeal his case all the way to the US Supreme Court, but there was no change in the decision.<sup>42</sup> Before his execution, his mother passed away. The body of his mother Sarah was brought to the prison, so that he could say his final goodbyes to his mother, who had fought so diligently for his freedom and life.<sup>43</sup> Throughout the appeals process, doubts surfaced about whether or not he was guilty of the murders. According the Supreme Court Records, James Baker, one of the men hired by Hysler, charged that he had been coerced by law enforcement officers to confess Hysler had known about the murder from the time of hiring the two men.<sup>44</sup> Members of the Hysler family confirmed that he was not guilty of these particular crimes. JD Hysler stated that:

My grandmother told me on several occasions "He was innocent of the crime he was convicted of, but he was not an innocent man." Several different people in and out of the family told me during my research that the state couldn't get enough evidence to convict him of the crimes he allegedly committed so they framed him for another crime. One old retired police detective told me that if Clyde had wanted someone murdered, he would not have had someone else do it, he would have done it himself.<sup>45</sup>

Shortly after the appeals process, Clyde himself would die.<sup>46</sup> We may never know whether or not Clyde Hysler truly was guilty of hiring Tyler and Baker to commit murder on his behalf, but some believe that he was guilty of other crimes, including being involved in bootlegging after Prohibition had ended.

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<sup>39</sup> "Testimony Said Conflicting," *The Evening Independent*, February 11, 1937.

<sup>40</sup> "Youth Weeps as Governor Fails to Act," *St. Petersburg Times*, February 20, 1939.

<sup>41</sup> "Court Judges Hysler Sane," *St. Petersburg Times*, April 18, 1941.

<sup>42</sup> *Hysler v United States*. 86 F. 2d 918 (1936).

<sup>43</sup> "Hysler to View Mother's Body," *St. Petersburg Times*, May 11, 1941.

<sup>44</sup> *Hysler V. Florida*. 315 US 411 (1942).

<sup>45</sup> J.D. Hysler III, email message to author, December 4, 2012.

<sup>46</sup> Florida Death Index, 1877-1998. [http://search.ancestrylibrary.com/cgi-bin/sse.dll?db=floridadeath&h=155011&indiv=try&o\\_vc=Record:OtherRecord&rhSource=2120](http://search.ancestrylibrary.com/cgi-bin/sse.dll?db=floridadeath&h=155011&indiv=try&o_vc=Record:OtherRecord&rhSource=2120).

The John B. Hysler shooting served to escalate violence in Jacksonville during and after Prohibition. The number of federal agents deployed in Jacksonville increased, and they searched more aggressively for bootlegging rings. Law enforcement had begun to crack down on local bootlegging rings.<sup>47</sup> On 18 August 1929, a local brewery was raided and the illegal liquids found were dumped down a sewer in the city. This was a sign to other local bootleggers to beware.<sup>48</sup> By the late 1920s, the Bureau of Prohibition had picked up the tempo of their arrests throughout the country.<sup>49</sup> The Wickersham Commission, a federal commission appointed by Herbert Hoover to investigate the problem of enforcing Prohibition laws, concluded that poverty drove people to become involved in bootlegging.<sup>50</sup> With the increased arrests that had emerged, it is not a surprise that the Hyslers were going to continue to be closely scrutinized.

Prohibition in Jacksonville, Florida was not just for the local families trying to make some extra money. The Hyslers created a significant smuggling network. In March 1930, Al Capone paid them a visit. Capone is rumored to have vacationed a few times in the Jacksonville area and had stayed with Jim Hysler.<sup>51</sup> A debate erupted as to whether Jacksonville should allow Capone to freely walk the streets or whether he should be arrested to prevent him securing connections to bootlegging in the area.<sup>52</sup> As Prohibition was coming to a close, local law enforcement did not want Al Capone and the Hyslers to form larger smuggling networks.

On a local level in Jacksonville, FL, enforcement of liquor laws was never a success. John B. Hysler's death ushered in the expansion of federal powers at the local level. There was continued disagreement among federal prohibition agents and the local law enforcement. Federal agents strictly defended Prohibition law while local officers held close ties with bootlegging gangs. The story of Clyde Hysler shows how even after the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, the effects still lived on in the Jacksonville, Florida area. Clyde Hysler was convicted of facilitating a double homicide and sent to the electric chair while it was his other crime, involvement in the bootlegging business, that led to the murder. John B. and Clyde Hysler found themselves in the headlines while trying to run a successful bootlegging business. This case study of John B. and Clyde Hysler may be used as a small sample of a situation that may have been occurring throughout the country during the Prohibition Era. Families such as the Hyslers are an example of how Prohibition failed on a local level in the United States. These failures locally contributed to the failure of the Eighteenth Amendment nationwide.

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<sup>47</sup> "Dry Forces in City Increased," *Jacksonville Journal*, October 4, 1928.

<sup>48</sup> Bill Foley, "A River of Rye Gurgles Though City's Sewers," *The Florida Times-Union*, August 18, 1999.

<sup>49</sup> John J. Guthrie Jr., "Hard Times, Hard Liquor, and Hard Luck: Selective Enforcement of Prohibition in North Florida, 1928-1933," *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 72, no. 4 (April, 1994): 436.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.* 446; United States, *Wickersham Commission: Publications*, no. 1-14 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1930) 615.

<sup>51</sup> J.D. Hysler III, email message to author, December 4, 2012.

<sup>52</sup> "Now What Will State do with Mister Capone," *Jacksonville Journal*, March 24, 1930.



# **Mothers of Israel: Jewish Female Civil Leadership during the Refugee Crisis of the 1930s**

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## **Introduction**

During the 1930s relocation efforts of female Jewish civic leaders strengthened Jewish communities in Palestine. Many of these women came from across Europe and the United States. Through immigration, voluntary and forced, Jewish communities counteracted a series of barriers to their autonomy. Certain women of the Jewish community in Palestine in the 1930s represent prime examples of civilian actions that overcame adversities. Their creative efforts remain valuable as self-sovereignty and pragmatism succeeded in a time of destruction. In 1933 the emergence of the Third Reich almost immediately announced antisemitic policies. The April 1933 boycott of Jewish stores throughout Germany began the tragic processes of pressurizing Jews to emigrate from the Nazi state. The European refugee crisis thus commenced, while the effort to force Jews out of central Europe ultimately moved Germany closer to the Holocaust. Direct state-sanctioned violence did not occur until the November Pogrom of 1938. Hitler's Nazi administration developed the fulfilment of the predetermined annihilation strategy only after the outbreak of World War Two, but the motive for and enactment of a 'Jew-Free Germany' standard was already in effect before September of 1939. Where were Jews to go? How were they going to restore their lives?

Jewish female civil leaders began to build community institutions in Palestine before Hitler's empowerment as Führer. One example, Golda Meir, moved from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to Tel Aviv in 1921.<sup>1</sup> Teachers, nurses, public officials, wives, and mothers galvanized the seeds of a Jewish nation in Palestine, known as the *Yishuv*, by reaching out to international bodies, organizations, and governments. Humanitarian efforts aimed at easing passage for Jewish refugees to relocate. Restrictions were increasingly imposed from many international administrations, including from within the British Empire. Jewish women faced gender-discrimination, for example through the denial of more militant methods of activism such as enlisting in the Jewish Legion during and after World War One. Rachel Yanait, recruiter and intelligence coordinator, was a notable exception within the male-dominated arena of militant Zionism.<sup>2</sup> The influences and pioneering efforts of Jewish women affected not only their families, but also the wider community through successful, mostly peaceful, and at times self-justified illegal means to grow the *Yishuv*. Such proactive innovative efforts were especially

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<sup>1</sup> Golda Meir, *My Life*, 1st American ed. (New York: Putnam, 1975), 75.

<sup>2</sup> Meir, *My Life*, 57.

prescient as British territories largely failed to offer sanctuary for European Jewry emigrants and refugees.<sup>3</sup>

### Initial Emigration

Nazi Germany in the 1930s incrementally increased pressure upon Jewish communities to force European Jews to leave, preferably empty-handed. Ties between economic exploitation and emigration policies appear through a brief description of the 7 August 1933 pact between Berlin and the Jewish Agency. Essentially, negotiations permitted sanctions through licenses and authorized papers to move people and goods out of Nazi territories, of Germany and central Europe, into Palestine. Relocation occurred through payments to the Nazi state by Jewish leaders, fees that acquired the equivalency of business permits via *Haavara* transfer papers and subsequent journey visas to Palestine.<sup>4</sup> As *Haavara* took root, criticism and misgivings arose from sections of Nazi, British, Arab and also some Jewish quarters.

Major disputes began to open divides between the reemerging economic power of Germany and the transitioning, weakened British Empire in the wake of World War One.<sup>5</sup> Imperialism, rebranded as nationalism in the fallout from the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, still dominated internal European diplomacy even with attempts through the mandate system to develop independence movements. Britain wanted to know exactly where Germany expected European Jews to live, if not within the Reich.<sup>6</sup> British administrators reacted to anti-Zionist protests of Arabs in Palestine by offering to sell land and monitor immigration as documented in statistics published in a 1934 report to the League of Nations. Figures showed a sharp increase from 1932 to 1934 in financially stable Jewish migrants, termed “Jewish capitalist settlers.”<sup>7</sup> Economic motives for Nazis relied on stalling efforts of Jewish emigration in order to usurp properties, goods, and currencies. By the mid-1930s Britain had consolidated imperial armed forces to meet the demands of the post-World War One era of Dominions, Mandates, and the Great Depression. The Jewish Agency opened one avenue towards relocation through *Haavara*. Nazi Germany wanted to drain Jewish wealth, while Britain only wanted to accept economically viable Jewish migrants. Other options needed to come from beyond these traditional parties.

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<sup>3</sup> Paul R. Bartrop, “The British Colonial Empire and Jewish Refugees during the Holocaust Period: An Overview,” in *False Havens: the British Empire and the Holocaust*, ed. Paul R. Bartrop (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1995), 19–20.

<sup>4</sup> Edwin Black, *The Transfer Agreement: the Untold Story of the Secret Agreement between the Third Reich and Jewish Palestine* (New York: Scribner, 1984), 249.

<sup>5</sup> Francis R. Nicosia, *The Third Reich and the Palestine Question* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 138–140.

<sup>6</sup> Nicosia, *The Third Reich*, 114.

<sup>7</sup> Great Britain, and League of Nations, *Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the Year 1934* (London: H.M.S.O., 1934), § 30, see <<http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/A212CE7D6EDB27C6052565D4005AF973>>, accessed 20 June 2014.

## Women as Civil Leaders

Golda Meir's move to Tel Aviv followed the challenging patterns of many other immigrants. Relocation to the developing new communities of the Yishuv involved heightened challenges to basic needs, such as establishing the simplicities of a stable home life in a region with few infrastructural amenities. Once securely housed, Meir worked as a private English language teacher. Organized social networks appeared, built and promoted by traditional family homesteads and professional individuals. Meir had turned down a full-time high school teaching position as she was preparing to move to a kibbutz the following summer. Rather than settle immediately as an educator in her first locale, she opted instead for the more flexible employment of private tutoring.<sup>8</sup>

As the Yishuv slowly took shape through the 1920s and into the 1930s, Germany abandoned the Weimar Republic in favor of the Nazi Reich, and rapidly expanded beyond the limits of the Treaty of Versailles. Humanitarian appeals of non-Germanic peoples within the Reich received a late response at the Évian Conference of 1938. The International Conference on Refugees convened to resolve problems of refugee relocation from within, to beyond, the Reich. U.S. President Franklyn Delano Roosevelt issued invitations in March 1938, after the Berlin-orchestrated Anschluss of Austria. The unopposed military occupation and annexing of Austria by Hitler's troops and administrative bureaucrats led to severe repercussions for Austrian Jewry. The Nazis implemented five years of Nazi antisemitic policies in a matter of weeks, overwhelming and choking the lives of Austrian Jews. Severe psychological effects resounded throughout Jewish communities within Austria. Permutations of antisemitic policies spread throughout the entire continent as Hitler increasingly violated the Treaty of Versailles, an agreement he had no intention of upholding.

Roosevelt's initial, yet unattainable, location choice for the conference to address the urgent refugee crisis was Switzerland, but Swiss officials denied the President's request. In July at Évian-les-Bains, near the French-Swiss border, the Évian Conference was little more than an exercise in futile bureaucracy. Given no authority to decide upon the fate of refugees, the result was insipid appeasement. Direct confrontation of Hitler was avoided through diplomatically dodging the refugee crisis of European Jewry.<sup>9</sup> The lack of action devastated many, including Meir, entitled by the conference organizers to attend as the "Jewish observer from Palestine." Observer is a telling label. Officialdom demoted residents, such as Meir, from active engagement in the diplomatic negotiation process. Bureaucracy stalled action in favor of the economically stable and vested, self-interest supporting,

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<sup>8</sup> Meir, *My Life*, 79.

<sup>9</sup> Paul R. Bartrop, "The Dominions and the Evian Conference, 1938: A Lost Chance or a Golden Opportunity?," in *False Havens*, ed. Paul R. Bartrop, 70.

status quo. The staged injustice became a means to an entirely different end. Opposition to Hitler developed into opposition to Britain also as Jewish interests saw the failures first-hand of such highly stratified and self-centered hereditary classist administrations.<sup>10</sup> Classist representatives in the form of British imperial officials denied freedom of mobility in Europe to the chagrin of antisemitic Nazis as well as to the despair of European and American Jews.

Hospitals, agricultural centers, schools, and other institutional systemic networks of civic value built throughout the 1920s and 1930s in Palestine by Jewish women led to slender, but crucial, opportunities for later migrants and refugees. Briefly, several key figures include Bessie Gotsfeld, co-founder of the Mizrahi Women's Organization of America, and a less-heralded figure of constructive civic life in Palestine. Her step-mother, Adela Goldstein, developed a public profile for immigration methods within the U.S.A. when she became the "Palestinian Representative of MWOA" and moved to the Yishuv in 1931. Goldstein also set up a vocational secondary school, Bet Zeirot Mizrahi, in Jerusalem in 1933.<sup>11</sup> Henrietta Szold was one of the leading figures active in international promotion in the Yishuv. Szold founded the Hadassah, American women's Zionist group in 1912, eight years before she moved to Palestine. The achievements of Szold were remarkable and extensive. Among her many successful civic achievements, she was education and social officer of the Presidium and National Council, director of Youth Aliyah, as well as reformer of medical care and nursing education throughout the Yishuv. Many of her achievements were accomplished by adapting models based on modern standards practiced in the U.S.<sup>12</sup> With the work of these often overlooked public figures, more people received greater opportunities to relocate and ultimately thrive in Palestine.

Throughout the 1930s health and education institutions, the two core themes of any society, increased as the wider Jewish community in Palestine funded further civic responsibilities. Continued tenacity overcame major health problems, such as cholera and malaria. Female nurses added to the growing professional ranks, including migrant female Jewish teachers, throughout the 1930s. Such social structures showed a distinct divide between Arab and Jewish cultures within Palestine as Arab female nurse training dwindled at this time.<sup>13</sup> Cultural traditions acted as a barrier for Arab women, while Jewish women asserted their actions to fulfill emergent needs, often at odds with customary gendered etiquettes and procedures.

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<sup>10</sup> Meir, *My Life*, 158–160.

<sup>11</sup> Round Shargel, "American Jewish Women in Palestine: Bessie Gotsfeld, Henrietta Szold, and the Zionist Enterprise," *American Jewish History* 90, no. 2 (2002): 141.

<sup>12</sup> Shargel, "American Jewish Women," 142, 147.

<sup>13</sup> Marcella Simoni, "At the Roots of Division: A New Perspective on Arabs and Jews, 1930-39," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 3 (2000): 58–59, 64.



Notable influential character traits of American Jewish women in the Yishuv were those of exceptional confidence and self-belief, at times reaching levels of brazen self-empowerment. A heated exchange between Szold and several orthodox rabbis represented the militant liberal ideology of many of these pioneers. According to Szold's vehemently independent perspective, by suggesting so strongly the need for Jews to conservatively practice religious lifestyles once settled in Palestine, certain rabbis were displaying character traits akin to Hitler. For Szold, denying secularism and demanding orthodox Judaism were acts of totalitarianism. Szold even attempted to take up a role within an orthodox synagogue, but was unsuccessful at reforming religious gender differentials in the Yishuv.<sup>14</sup> Such civically-natured women took the lead in modernizing Palestine, while Arab females were left behind. Male-dominated Arab families and communities throughout the entire region during the 1930s deepened divides, especially with regards to education.<sup>15</sup> By breaking away from male-controlled hierarchical social expectations, Jewish women forged a unique staging ground for self-generated assertion and successes in immigration, refugee housing, healthcare, and education. Such public-works efforts led directly towards self-sufficiency. For female Jews in the Yishuv, Nazi exploitation and harassment in Europe as well as the inaction of the wider international community were viewed by such inspirational civic achievers as additional, but undeniably surmountable challenges.

### **Defying Britain**

The Arab riots of 1933 and the continual violence from 1936 to 1939 heavily influenced British Government legal conventions in Palestine in the 1930s.<sup>16</sup> The increased divisions between Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine caused the British Government to publish a series of commissions and reports. The 1937 Peel Report determined that a partition of Jews and Muslims was ultimately the only method towards "freedom and security" of the population of Palestine.<sup>17</sup> Britain abandoned the partition idea for being an overly-expensive solution, and concluded that the option would not be in the best interests of the mother country. World War One had imposed severe debts on the British Empire. Security and economic interests of profitable real estate regions surrounding the Suez Canal were among the main priorities for Britain in the interwar period. A crucial aspect of the Peel Report was the recommendation to immediately halt any further immigration into Palestine.<sup>18</sup> Following on from the report, the British 1939 Palestine Statement of Policy defined highly restrictive immigration quotas for Jews entering the Mandate territory over the next five years. The annual allotment for legal immigrants totaled

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<sup>14</sup> Shargel, "American Jewish Women in Palestine," 155–156.

<sup>15</sup> Simoni, "At the Roots of Division," 58, 62–64.

<sup>16</sup> Simoni, "At the Roots of Division," 81.

<sup>17</sup> United Kingdom, *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, Cmd. 5479, (London: H.M.S.O., 1937), 394.

<sup>18</sup> United Kingdom, *Palestine Report*, 403.

10,000 with a further 25,000 allocated refuge according to humanitarian needs throughout the entire timespan, equaling a combined figure of 75,000 Jewish people over the five-year period.<sup>19</sup> To illustrate the inadequacy of this figure, note that an official total of 61,900 Jews arrived in Palestine in 1935.<sup>20</sup>

The rise of illegal immigration, termed *Haapala*, through sea crossings from southern Europe, somewhat anticipated and partially negated British and German restrictions. Israel's Ministry of Defense printed Mordechai Naor's 1987 publication, *Haapala: Clandestine Immigration 1931–1948*. The official Israeli government publication offers several sets of statistics. Examples include three maiden ships that left in 1934 from Greece and Bulgaria. Two of the vessels were able to land, while border enforcement agents forced one back out to sea. The practice restarted in 1937 with a further two ships. Throughout 1938, a dozen more voyages made landfall. The following year, when British authorities blocked legal immigration, thirty-four ships made the journey. Each transported hundreds of passengers determined to deny both Nazi and British attempts of administrative subjugations disguised as apparent economic and bureaucratic necessities.<sup>21</sup>

Physically violent antisemitism became official doctrine in Nazi territories on 9 November 1938. *Kristallnacht*, Night of Broken Glass, added injury to the insult of September's Munich Conference. British and French officials had granted Hitler parts of Czechoslovakia through the appeasement policy. Soon after the sanctioned murder of Jews, and destruction of Jewish properties under Nazi rule during *Kristallnacht*, Hitler vowed to annihilate European Jewry if war was to come. The following quote, from his speech at the Reichstag of 31 January 1939, demonstrably indicated his developing strategy:

Today I will once more be a prophet: If the international Jewish financiers in and outside Europe should succeed in plunging the nations once more into a world war, then the result will not be the bolshevization of the earth, and thus the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe.<sup>22</sup>

At the very beginning of 1939, preparations for war were in motion by the greater powers of the world. The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations met in the summer of 1939. "Minutes of the Thirty-Sixth Session," dated 29 June 1939, gives insights into the attempts of communities in Palestine to initiate self-government. Due to severe financial constraints the Commission was unable to find resolutions to the riotous conflicts that occurred between Arabs and Jews. British officials gave special mention of the need to establish a "Jewish

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<sup>19</sup> United Kingdom, *Palestine Statement of Policy*, Cmd. 6019, (London: H.M.S.O., 1939), § 14, see <<http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/EB5B88C94ABA2AE585256D0B00555536>>, accessed 20 June 2014.

<sup>20</sup> Nicosia, *The Third Reich and the Palestine Question*, 212.

<sup>21</sup> Mordechai Naor, *Haapala: Clandestine Immigration 1931 - 1948* (Tel Aviv, Israel: Min. of Defense Pub. House, 1987), 108–110.

<sup>22</sup> *Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1949–1953), Vol XIII, 131.

National Home,” while also maintaining obligations with certain Arab interests.<sup>23</sup> This was, without doubt, a position of diplomatic strategy as British authorities kept in close contact with both Jewish and Arab communities. The British Government stalled decisions to either leave Palestine or assist in the resolution of violent disputes. One option, a sustained military presence would incur heavy financial losses. The option to stay remained feasible only whilst the potential for future profits existed through viable private buyers and parties that held initial rights to sell Mandate territorial land, namely British aristocratic entities.

### Growth and Defense

Jewish communities in Palestine grew throughout the 1930s thanks to a myriad of tactics. The methods of migration available for review successfully outmaneuvered British bureaucratic barriers. Falsified marriages, with full documentation, doubled the passage rate. Tourists by the thousands arrived in *Eretz Yisrael*, the Land of Israel, only to decide that permanent vacations offered a better future when compared to a return to Europe. *Aliyah Bet*, informal illegal immigration, formalized into *Haapala*, the organized illegal transfers of emigrants and refugees from mainland Europe to Palestine.<sup>24</sup>

Many textbooks state that the outbreak of World War Two began on 1 September 1939; however, a state of war and militancy had replaced civic relations in Jewish communities several years before Britain declared war against Germany. Berthold Storfer emerged within the Reich as a Viennese entrepreneurial middle-man, and a dominant operator of emigration business from 1939. A distinct lack of trust by European Jews wary of officials within the Reich was a serious problem that convoluted earnest emigration efforts. Berthold was even thought of as a potential Nazi agent due to multiple emigration cancellations.<sup>25</sup> The *Haganah*, underground defense network, acted well on behalf of immigrants and refugees that were able to reach Palestine in stark contrast to efforts within Europe that attempted to protect Jewish residents. The *Haganah* was especially effective during the height of Jewish-Arab violence in British Mandate Palestine between 1936 and 1939.<sup>26</sup> Once official emigration ceased and war began the *Haganah* became the trusted form of security within the *Yishuv*.

Male leaders of this emerging society occasionally acknowledged by name the importance of a group known as the Pioneer Women. A formal lecture presentation to female civil leaders and activists was made after World War Two by Dr. Ben Halpern, Ph.D. in sociology from Harvard, and managing editor of labor Zionist journal *Jewish Frontier*. The lecture addressed a variety of errors made during the

<sup>23</sup> League of Nations, “Minutes of the Thirty-Sixth Session,” *Permanent Mandates Commission*, (Held at Geneva from June 8th to 29th, 1939), *passim*.

<sup>24</sup> Naor, *Haapala*, 3.

<sup>25</sup> Dalia Ofer, “The Rescue of European Jewry and Illegal Immigration to Palestine in 1940 – Prospects and Reality; Berthold Storfer and the Mossad Le’Aliyah Bet,” *Modern Judaism* 4, no. 2 (1984): 164–165.

<sup>26</sup> Meir, *My Life*, 148–149.

founding period, such as the common use of violence in the efforts of establishing a Jewish nation.<sup>27</sup> With potential negativity of aggressive military actions deflected through communal self-defense, the Women's Labor Council and the Pioneer Women were among the most successful, creative, and productive bodies within Palestine and later Israel. Civic engagement enacted by Jewish women throughout the 1930s played a central role in incentivizing increased emigration. The training of younger immigrant women and girls by their senior female compatriots, including agricultural skills in addition to other professions previously mentioned, gave those that were able to relocate another chance to live and work on the earth.<sup>28</sup>

### **Breaking the Mold**

The 1930s in Palestine was a stage of accelerated and divergent actions. Arab, British, and Jewish interests had many various groups advocating for self-advancement. In relation to Jewish female civil leaders, what does the record show with regards to immigration within the British Mandate of Palestine during the Nazi era? The British shifted position as Jewish immigration grew dramatically throughout the 1930s. The quota system of 75,000 total refugees was eventually endorsed as according to the recommendation of the 1939 White Paper. The refugee definition shows a discrepancy, as immigration is clearly different to refugee status with illegal immigration as yet another separate differentiation. Evidently, further research is necessary to comprehensively discern these multifaceted and tangential, yet relevant issues. To address specific stances of Jewish female civil leadership with regards to British Mandate immigration policies, here follows a short review of some example groups and individuals active at the time.

The Women's International Zionist Organization and the Pioneer Women's Organization followed the line of general agreement that promoted and engaged immigration fully while overt antisemitism increased across Europe. The two groups expanded in the 1930s, especially as Palestine began to provide self-autonomous lives for Yishuv member communities. By the time legal immigration was annulled and the refugee quota system was enacted agricultural, health, education, and social welfare priorities of these groups had already established productive networks. The potentially overwhelming workloads of these groups appear to have limited announcements of separate policy statements on immigration, although betrayals of trust such as at Évian may well have prompted a reduction of public declarations to indirectly assist illegal relocation from the Reich to the Yishuv. Throughout the 1930s the creation of communities within the traditional Promised Land region, at that time administrated by the British Mandate, began to reverse the Jewish

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<sup>27</sup> Mark A. Raider, "Irresponsible, Undisciplined Opposition: Ben Halpern on the Bergson Group and Jewish Terrorism in Pre-State Palestine (1)," *American Jewish History* 92, no. 3 (2004): 313, 360.

<sup>28</sup> Meir, *My Life*, 113.

diaspora. Decentralized male-dominated groups in Europe known individually as Jewish Agency organizations were often bureaucratic conservative entities, unskilled at transitioning effectively to cope with such accelerated realities. Failures to adapt occurred throughout the increasingly violent and oppressive rule of Nazi territories. Resistance was certainly another successful method of survival within Europe once emigration options diminished. Prior to the forceful expansion of the Reich during World War Two, one aspect that united all Jewish groups was the universal condemnation of the 1939 White Paper with regards to the refugee quota.<sup>29</sup>

As the Yishuv grew, so too did the confidence of one particular Jewish female civil leader. It is important to note Golda Meir explicitly denied her leadership as feminist, declaring herself instead as a resident Zionist ready to defend her home and allow others to find refuge through immigration according to their needs. Such efforts are noted in *A Land of Our Own*, a collection of oral histories published in 1973 while Meir was Prime Minister of the State of Israel. The oral testimonies were gathered over several years as Meir travelled to various public events, through private interviews and public records. This revealing text gives historians insight into the unprecedented course of events of, arguably, the premier Jewish female civil leader of the twentieth century. The editor rejected the idea that Meir was a feminist, citing the leader's talent for governing as a more noteworthy characteristic.<sup>30</sup> One chapter displays a unique aspect of Meir as she began to solidify her own political position, not only as a practical Zionist, but also in terms of ideological rhetoric. She often defended and promoted further immigration, illegal if necessary, to breathe life into the Jewish home nation. A chapter entitled "A Nice, Law-Abiding Lady" documents sections of court records from the 1943 Sirkin-Richin arms trial. The British administration adjudicated the case between suspects accused of stealing weapons and the British Army. A speech cited and acknowledged as being Meir's own words from 2 May 1940, given during the trial, related to Jewish immigration after the announcement of the restrictive refugee quota policy. Meir identified Malcolm MacDonald, the chief author of the 1939 White Paper, as having no justification to judge Jewish property rights. The need to support illegal immigration through all available means was also attributed to Meir's statement as she clearly identified Britain as working to preclude the further growth of the Jewish community in Palestine.<sup>31</sup> Meir, as with the other examples of Jewish female civil leaders, exemplified the need for strength in labor on the land in conjunction with courageous public political positions.

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<sup>29</sup> D. R. Elston, *Israel: the Making of a Nation*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 30.

<sup>30</sup> Golda Meir, *A Land of Our Own: an Oral Autobiography*, ed. Marie Syrkin (New York: Putnam, 1973), 14.

<sup>31</sup> Meir, *A Land of Our Own*, 49–51.

## **Conclusion**

In the 1930s, Jewish female civil leaders came to the forefront in Palestine. The Third Reich, the British Empire, and Arab efforts to restrict Jewish refugee and immigrant relocation were not entirely effective due in many ways to Jewish female civil leadership. The diverse opinions within the relevant societies were not able to assist and assert each of their own goals in contrast to female Jewry within the Yishuv, the U.S.A., and Nazi territories. Jewish women established and maintained civic institutions in Palestine well before, during, and after Hitler's regime. These Pioneer Women, official and unofficial, moved their communities into action to add viable and successful solutions to the refugee crisis of the 1930s. The example of Meir demonstrates the efforts of Jewish female civil leadership, from self-immigration to self-sufficiency and later to further enabling other activities to defy Arab violence, Nazi antisemitism, and British restriction. Documented cases of civic virtue emerged as the Jewish community in Palestine formed and began to consolidate the multifaceted, disjointed groups of the Jewish diaspora. This study is an attempt to display the values of diversity and creativity within a self-autonomous community pursuing sovereignty and equality. The need for greater research is apparent as the formation of the Jewish community in Palestine was originally an effort to live in peace, a concept that has since unfortunately been absent throughout the Middle East. This brief investigation into the historical research of the interwar period leads on to questions that investigate the causes and continuation of violence throughout the region that have accompanied the State of Israel, from before inception until today. Observers cannot deny the rapid, fundamental impact of Jewish female civil leaders as being mostly positive with regards to immigration and post-immigration into the British Mandate of Palestine during the Nazi era. Forced and chosen immigration into the Yishuv occurred during the refugee crisis of the 1930s simultaneously with civic efforts of female community leaders that saved lives and built a future for those that strove to live. The histories of the survivors are often more valuable than the stories of the victors.

**Florida Conference of Historians**  
**53rd Annual Meeting**  
**March 1-2, 2013**  
**Sudakoff Conference Center, New College of Florida**  
**Sarasota, Florida**

**Registration:**

8:30 AM-5:00 PM Friday and 8:30 AM-12:00 PM Saturday in Sudakoff Lobby

***Session One: Friday, March 1, 9:00-10:30 AM***

**Session 1A, Friday, 9:00 AM-10:30 AM**

**“Gender and its Representations in Twentieth-Century America”**

“Not All Brides Are Wealthy and White: Integration of the Women’s Pages in 1960s Florida and Across the Country”

Kim Voss, University of Central Florida

“Weighing in on Obesity: The Science, Business and Politics of Weight Loss in America, 1850-1960”

Heather Parker, Saint Leo University

“A Word from Our Sponsors: Challenging Patriarchal Cultural Hegemony through Women’s Consumerist Representation”

Kyle Bridge, University of North Florida

Chair/Discussant: Marcy Murray, State College of Florida

**Session 1B, Friday, 9:00 AM-10:30 AM**

**“Topics in Latin American History”**

“Native Cultural Brokers and their Use of Linguistic Manipulation in Seventeenth-Century Mesoamerica”

Michael Cole, Florida Gulf Coast University

“Climate Change and Transatlantic Migration: Local Adaptation by European Immigrants to the Southern Arid Pampas, Argentina (1898-1940)”

Yovanna Pineda, University of Central Florida

“Counter-Spinning the Cuban Insurgency: “Facts and Fakes in Cuba” (1897)”

Andy Huse, University of South Florida

Chair/Discussant: Alicia Mercado-Harvey, University of Florida

**Session 1C, Friday, 9:00 AM-10:30 AM**

**“Colonialism, Power, and Violence in the Twentieth Century”**

“The Struggle against Bandits in Cuba, 1959-1963”

Anthony Rossodivito, University of North Florida

“The Ideologization of US-Guatemalan Relations, 1944-54”  
Michael Rodriguez, Florida Gulf Coast University

“The Belgian Congo: A Country Ruled by Belgian Brutality”  
Hannah Rawcliffe, Wesleyan College

Chair/Discussant: Christopher Williams, University College of the Cayman Islands

**Session 1D, Friday, 9:00-10:30 AM**

**“Between the Dark and the Light: Paternalism, Power, and Superhero Comics”**

“The Saga of the Dark Phoenix: Gender, Power, and Identity in the X-Men”  
Gregory Cavanaugh and Julian Chambliss, Rollins College

“The Dark Knight as Daddy: The Fatherhood Roles of Batman through Time”  
Tim Craig, Warner University

“An Alternate History of the Shogun’s Palace in Postmodern, Transnational Cultural Media Form”  
Kimiko Akita, University of Central Florida

Chair/Discussant: Julian Chambliss, Rollins College

***Session Two: Friday, March 1, 10:45 AM-12:15 PM***

**Session 2A, Friday, 10:45 AM-12:15 PM**

**“I-Investigate: The Intersectionality of Music and African-American Experience”**

“The Legacy of John Henry”  
Alex Fang, Rollins College

“Let My People Go: The Exodus and the Underground Railroad”  
Kim Mascarenhas, Rollins College

“Didn’t My Lord Deliver Daniel: An Analysis of Christianity within the African Experience in the 19th Century”  
Jacqueline Schultz, Rollins College

Chair/Discussant: Julian Chambliss, Rollins College

**Session 2B, Friday, 10:45 AM-12:15 PM**

**“Media and the Representation of Violence”**

“Conveying Racialized Terror on Screen: Depictions of Southern Lynching Culture from Early Race Films to Hollywood Blockbusters”  
Erin Tobin, Ohio State University

“Representations of Torture in Post-Modern Detective Fiction in the Iberian Atlantic”  
Alicia Mercado-Harvey, University of Florida

“The Television and the Fight against Dictatorship in Brazil”  
Paulo Azevedo Maia, Universidade Fluminense

Chair/Discussant: Jesse Hingson, Jacksonville University



**Session 2C, Friday, 10:45-12:15**

**“Selling the Future, Serving the Public, Marketing the Body, and Branding the Stars: Everyday Forms of Consumerism in America”**

“Tomorrowland Today: Disney’s Commodification of Time”  
Thayer Warne, New College of Florida

“Commercial Expansion and the Service Ideal: Profit in Private and Public Enterprise”  
Max Imberman, New College of Florida

“The Illusion of Intimacy: Women, Visibility, and Marketing Beauty Culture”  
Kiri Cutts, New College of Florida

“The Institutionalization of the Celebrity Image”  
Alan Sachnowski, New College of Florida

Chair/Discussant: Brendan Goff, New College of Florida

**Session 2D, Friday, 10:45 AM-12:15 PM**

**“Ploughshares into Swords: Southern Men in War and Peace”**

“Tenting Tonight: Manhood and Community in Confederate Camps”  
Jim Broomall, University of North Florida

“The Boys of Lexington: Masculinity at Washington College and the Virginia Military Institute, 1820-1865”  
Clay Cooper, University of Florida

“Edmund Ruffin: Agriculturalist Turned Agitator”  
Peter Thomas, University of North Florida

Chair/Discussant: Tim Williams, Appalachian State University

***Lunch Break: 12:15-1:00 PM***

FCH Executive Committee Meeting, Sudakoff East Wing.

***Session Three, Friday, March 1, 1:00-2:00 PM***

**Session 3A, Friday, 1:00-2:00 PM**

**“Heritage and Local History in Florida”**

“Cracker Country and the Preservation of Florida History”  
Melissa Badcock, University of South Florida

“The End of the Old Regime”: Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings’s Crackers in Modern Florida”  
Monica Berra, University of Florida

Chair/Discussant: Peggy Macdonald, Stetson University

**Session 3B, Friday, 1:00-2:00 PM**

**“Bohemian Paris Revisited: French Culture and its Discontents”**

“Autour d’elle, le silence de midi’: Negotiating Bohemian Femininity in the Works of Marie Kryzinska”

Andrew Kotick, New College of Florida

“Rebels without a Cause: The Blousons Noirs, American Popular Culture, and the Dilemmas of French Modernity, 1959-1963”

Drew Fedorka, University of Central Florida

Chair/Discussant: David Allen Harvey, New College of Florida

**Session 3C, Friday, 1:00-2:00 PM**

**“Childhood, Education, and Public Policy in the Contemporary USA”**

“The Resegregation of Public Schools and Magnets as a Solution”

Chris Duryea, University of Florida

“The Importance of the Local: Reforming Children’s Radio and Television”

Amanda Bruce, University of Tampa

Chair/Discussant: Mike Epple, Florida Gulf Coast University

**Session 3D, Friday, 1:00-2:00 PM**

**“Publishing De-Mystified: Roundtable Panel and Discussion”**

Annabel Tudor, Rollins College

Amy Gorelick, University Press of Florida

Glenn McNair, Kenyon College

Daniel Murphree, University of Central Florida

***Session Four, Friday, March 1, 2:15-3:45 PM***

**Session 4A, Friday, 2:15-3:45 PM**

**“Producing and Promoting the Sunshine State”**

“Imagined Greatness: Urban Boosters and the Tampa Bay Hotel”

Alena Pirok, University of South Florida

“From Seminoles to Pollution to Farmworkers: Women and Environmental Justice in Florida”

Leslie Kemp Poole, Rollins College

“Liquid Gold: The Rise and Fall of Florida’s Family Citrus Farms”

Peggy Macdonald, Stetson College

Chair/Discussant: Seth Weitz, Dalton State College

**Session 4B, Friday, 2:15-3:45 PM**

“State Innovations and Popular Reactions in Latin American Capitals: Case Studies from Lima, Bogota, and Caracas”

“Bourboning the Urban: Reform after the 1746 Earthquake of Lima”  
Judith Mansilla, Florida International University

“Anarchic Arbitration: Urban Development in the Wake of the Bogotazo”  
Micah Oelze, Florida International University

“Grain or Flour: The History of Venezuelans’ Love Affair with Maize”  
Andreina Fernandez Fuenmayor, Florida International University

Chair/Discussant: Michael Cole, Florida Gulf Coast University

**Session 4C, Friday, 2:15-3:45 PM**  
**“American and French Representations of the Other”**

“God’s Country”: Religion and American Soldiers in the American-Philippine War”  
Daniel Bradfield, University of Central Florida

“Civilizing the Metropole: The Role of the 1906 Marseille Colonial Exposition in Creating Greater France”  
Michael Brooks, University of Central Florida

“Race and Gender in Reading the News: Coverage of the Exposition coloniale internationale in L’Humanité and Le Figaro”  
Zachary Morgan, University of Central Florida

Chair/Discussant: Amelia Lyons, University of Central Florida

**Section 4D, Friday, 2:15-3:45 PM**  
**“Topics in Early American History”**

“Germs, Gender, and Grog: A Social Perspective of Frontier Taverns in the Early Republic”  
Andrew Cain, Florida Gulf Coast University

“‘The Savages Are Only the Allies of Greater Savages’: The British-Indian Threat and the War of 1812”  
Adam Rock, University of Central Florida

“Archbishop John Hughes and the Two Great Crises of the Civil War”  
Matthew Jones, University of North Florida

Chair/Discussant: Blaine Browne, Broward College

***Session Five, Friday, March 1, 4:00-5:00 PM***

**Session 5A, Friday, 4:00-5:00 PM**  
**“Popular Culture: Carnival and Circus”**

“Bringing the Legitimacy of Carnival and the Carnavalesque to Bear on Modern Rhetorical Caymanian Culture”  
Christopher Williams, University College Cayman Islands

“Noble Savages, African Natives, and Harem Girls: Representations of Race in the Golden Age of the American Circus and Wild West Shows”  
Marcy Murray, State College of Florida

Chair/Discussant: Sean McMahon, Florida Gateway College

**Session 5B, Friday, 4:00-5:00 PM**  
**“Florida’s Rebels”**

“Two Generations of Bootlegging and Murder in Jacksonville, Florida: The Crimes of John B. and Clyde Hysler”  
Andrea Laursen, Jacksonville University

“We Can’t Help It If We’re from Florida: A History of the Florida Hardcore Punk Movement”  
Michael Garcia, Florida Southern College

Chair/Discussant: Andy Huse, University of South Florida

**Session 5C, Friday, 4:00-5:00 PM**  
**“Transporting the American Dream: Aviation, Naval Policy, and the Projection of American Power in the Early Twentieth Century”**

“The Chosen Instrument: Pam American Airways and U.S. International Aviation Policy, 1927-1938”  
Erik Carlson, Florida Gulf Coast University

“Teddy Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet in the Construction of Racial Hegemony, Gender Roles, and Nationalism, in the Early Twentieth Century”  
Gary DeSantis, Florida State University

Chair/Discussant: Sarah Mergel, Dalton State College

***Keynote Address, Friday, 5:30-6:45 PM***

“You’re History: How We Know the Past”  
Paul Kramer, Vanderbilt University

Welcoming Remarks: Dr. Sean McMahon, Florida Gateway College  
President, Florida Conference of Historians, 2012-2013

FCH Journal Remarks: Dr. Michael Cole, Florida Gulf Coast University

Presentation of Aards, Dr. David Allen Harvey, New College of Florida  
President, Florida Conference of Historians, 2013-2014  
J. Calvitt Clarke III Award for best undergraduate paper  
Thomas M. Campbell Award for best paper published in the *FCH Annals*

***Session Six, Saturday, March 2, 8:30-10:00 AM***

**Session 6A, Saturday, 8:30-10:00 AM**

**“Race and Power in the Twentieth Century”**

“Hollywood v. Fred Grey: Miss Evers’ Boys and the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment Apology”

Samuel Faith, Jacksonville University

“The Internal Politics of the Klan: The Struggle for Power and the Role of Women”

Marah Ernest, Florida Southern College

“Marcus Garvey and the Class Struggle before Sojourning to the United States”

Geoffrey Cravero, University of Central Florida

Chair/Discussant: Erin Tobin, Ohio State University

**Session 6B, Saturday, 8:30-10:00 AM**

**“Power, Identity, and Social Change in the Modern World”**

“Creating European Identities in Nineteenth-Century Travel-Writing”

Catherine Freeman, University of North Florida”

“The Karmic Retribution of Pei Huaigu: The Reign of China’s Only Female Emperor from the View of an Unofficial History

Kelly Carlton, University of North Florida

“Before King Came: The Local Civil Rights Movement in St. Augustine, Florida, 1915-1960”

James Smith, University of North Florida

Chair/Discussant: Chau Johnsen Kelly, University of North Florida

**Session 6C, Saturday, 8:30-10:00 AM**

**“A Lawyer’s Memories of and Reflections about Gideon v. Wainwright.”**

Tom Adamich, Visiting Library Services, Chair and Facilitator

Bruce Jacob, Stetson Law School, Featured Speaker

Jim Schnur, University of South Florida, Discussant

**Session 6D, Saturday, 9:00-10:00 AM**

**“The Iraq War in Historical Perspective”**

“‘The Best Covered War in History’: Intimate Perspectives from the Battlefields of Iraq”

Andrew McLaughlin, University of Waterloo

“The Gulf War, The Untold Story: Secrecy and/or Censorship?”

Belgacem Mehdaoui, Sohar University, Oman

Chair/Discussant: Marco Rimanelli, Saint Leo University

***Session Seven, Saturday, March 2, 10:15-11:45 AM***

**Session 7A, Saturday, 10:15-11:45 AM**

**“Sarasota’s Congressman James A. Haley (D-Florida) Confronts the Issues of the Day (1952-1976)”**

“Congressman James A. Haley and the Equal Rights Amendment”  
Chelsia Stone, Florida Southern College

“Congressman James A. Haley and the Southern Manifesto”  
Tamala Restall, Florida Southern College

“Congressman James A. Haley and the Arts”  
Marina Ortiz, Florida Southern College

“Congressman James A. Haley and the Manatee School Crisis”  
Destiny Swygard, Florida Southern College

Chair/Discussant: James Denham, Florida Southern College

**Session 7B, Saturday, 10:15-11:45 AM**

**“Identities across Borders: Migration in Latin American History”**

“Mutualista Organizing by U.S. Mexicans and Its Enduring Legacy”  
Julie Leininger Pycior, Manhattan College

“The Boricua Triangle: Tampa, Miami and Orlando-A Historical Overview of the Development of a Transnational Puerto Rican Diaspora in Florida”  
Victor Vazquez-Hernandez, Miami Dade College

“The Ley de Residencia and the Impact of Darwinism on Immigration Policy in 19th Century Argentina”  
Stephen Naylor, University of South Florida

Chair/Discussant: Yovanna Pineda, University of Central Florida

**Session 7C, Saturday, 10:15-11:45 AM**

**“Florida in the 1960s”**

“Inquisition: The Johns Committee and the War Waged on Deviants”  
Seth Weitz, Dalton State College

“The Other ‘68 Convention: The Republicans in Miami”  
Sarah Mergel, Dalton State College

“Reporting from the Brink: How Newspapers in Florida Covered the Cuban Missile Crisis”  
Mike Epple, Florida Gulf Coast University

Chair/Discussant: David Proctor, Tallahassee Community College

**Session 7D, Saturday, 10:15-11:45 AM**

“Democracies at War in the Age of Global Terror: Israel, Italy, and the United States”

“Hard-Power vs. Soft-Power in U.S. Diplomacy from 1979 to Today”  
Nick Lanier, Saint Leo University

“Italy’s Government Responses to Italian and Arab Terrorism from the “Leaden Years” to the Achille Lauro Cruise-liner Hijacking”  
Marco Rimanelli, Saint Leo University

“The January 22 Israeli Elections”  
Jack McTague, Saint Leo University

Chair/Discussant: Nicholas Steneck, Florida Southern College

### ***Session Eight, Saturday, March 2, 12:00-1:30 PM***

#### **Session 8A, Saturday, 12:00-1:30 PM**

#### **“Windows into East Florida: Contact, Conflict, and Rebellion from the Sixteenth through the Eighteenth Centuries”**

“Ais Indians’ Alliances, Diplomacy, and Networks in the Southeastern Borderlands, 1549-1743”

Peter Fernandino, Florida International University

“Imperial Crisis in British East Florida, 1763-75”

Susan Schwartz, Florida International University

“Race in the Spanish East Florida Rebellion of 1793-1795”

Rene Silva, Florida International University

Chair: Jenna Gibbs, Florida International University

Discussant: Daniel Murphree, University of Central Florida

#### **Session 8B, Saturday, 12:00-1:30 PM**

#### **“Topics in Medieval and Renaissance History”**

“Restoring Empress Matilda’s Rightful Heritage: Monarch, not Marginal Figure”

Niki Incorvia, Nova Southeastern University

“The Albigensian Crusade: The Role of Civilians in Medieval Warfare”

Lydia Epple, Florida Gulf Coast University

“Reactionary Republicanism: The Stability of Venetian Institutional Government, 1300-1600”

Michael McGurl, New College of Florida

Chair/Discussant: Thomas McCarthy, New College of Florida

#### **Session 8C, Saturday, 12:00-1:30 PM**

#### **“Popular Press in the Twentieth Century”**

“The Rwandan Genocide and French Media: A Discourse Analysis of L’Express and Le Monde”

Candice Tyrrell, University of Central Florida

“A Discourse Analysis of the Visual and Textual Construction of Women in Sports Illustrated From 1954 to 1964”  
Ella Gibson, University of Central Florida

“Baseball and Gambling: A Discourse Analysis of the Cobb-Speaker Incident and Pete Rose Gambling Scandals through the Popular Press”  
Patrick Rotton, University of Central Florida

Chair/Discussant: Ezekiel Walker, University of Central Florida

**Session 8D, Saturday, 12:00-1:30**

**“Jewish History in Times of Crisis: From the Diaspora to the Holocaust”**

“Destruction of the Jewish Life in the Early Years of the Soviet State: 1917-1933”  
Michael Gesin, Worcester State University

“Mothers of Israel: Jewish Female Civil Leadership during the Refugee Crisis of the 1930s”  
Christopher Harrison, Florida Gulf Coast University

“‘The Greatest Crime in Auschwitz Was To Be Pregnant.’ Understanding Jewish Women’s Responses to Pregnancy and Abortion During the Holocaust.”  
Elizabeth Burger, New College of Florida

Chair/Discussant: Karen Huber, Wesleyan College

*Thanks for coming to the 2013 Florida Conference of Historians!*

*We hope to see you in St. Augustine in 2014!*