Selected Annual Proceedings of the

Florida Conference of Historians
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Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians

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Letter From the Editors

It is with great pleasure and a measure of relief that the Florida Conference of Historians (FCH) offers the combined third and fourth volumes of our *Selected Annual Proceedings*.

The decision to combine volumes and change editors was necessary and deserves explanation. At the end of the 1995 FCH meeting it became apparent that, for various reasons, there were not enough contributions to merit publishing an annual proceedings. It was decided to wait until after the 1996 FCH and then publish a combined 1995-1996 *Proceedings*. In the interim, Jay Clarke our eminent editor asked for a replacement so he could concentrate on arrangements for hosting the 1997 conference in Jacksonville. It was here, after Jay had started editing the 1995 papers and before the 1996 conference, that we volunteered.

Editing is an educational experience that is sometimes painful, and our learning curve was steep. However, we followed Jay’s dictums and limited ourselves to issues of clarity, consistency of format and style. We hope the authors and our readers are satisfied with the results. We are already looking forward to applying our “painfully” earned experiences to the editing of volume five.

In closing, we would like to extend our thanks to Tallahassee Community College for its generosity in supporting the FCH and the printing of this volume.

Will Benedicks
Kyle Eidahl
Tallahassee, Florida
December 1996
Florida Conference of Historians
1995 Annual Program

HOSTED BY
JOE FINLEY
ST. PETERSBURG COMMUNITY COLLEGE
CLEARWATER, FLORIDA

THURSDAY—January 26

7:00-8:30 pm
Reception

FRIDAY—January 27

8:00-9:00 am
Registration
Conference Center Lobby, Dolphin Resort Hotel, St. Petersburg, FL

SESSION I

9:00-9:50 am
Faule of the Persone and Note of the Sex: The Sixteenth Century Debate About Political Obedience
David B. Mock, Tallahassee Community College
Analysis of the French Student May Day Riots of 1968
Edward P. Smith, Broward Community College

SESSION II

10:00-10:50 am
The Failure of British Policy in Southeastern Europe, 1939-1941
Lynn H. Curtwright, Tallahassee Community College
Italy and the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939
J. Calvitt Clarke III, Jacksonville University
SESSION III

11:00-11:50 am
Peter Demens: Between Two Worlds
William Parsons, Eckerd College

Warning Signs: Public Attitudes on the FEA and Its Use of Sanctions
Prior to the Teachers' Strike of 1968
Frank M. Baglione, Tallahassee Community College

SESSION IV

1:00-1:50 pm
Florida Humanities Council Goals and Grants
Joan Bragginton, Program Director, Florida Humanities Council

SESSION V

2:00-2:50 pm
Fort DeSoto Park's History
Alicia Addeo, Historian, Fort DeSoto Park, Pinellas County

The Significance of Charlotte Harbor, Florida in the Civil War
Irvin D. Solomon, University of South Florida at Fort Myers

SESSION VI

3:00-3:50 pm
Italian Naval Strategy From Unification to NATO, 1861-1995
Marco Rimanelli, Saint Leo College

The Courthouse As Primary Source
James E. Jones, St. Petersburg Junior College, Adjunct

BANQUET

6:00-7:00 pm

BUSINESS MEETING

7:00-7:30 pm
Virginia York, Gulf Coast Community College, President of the FCH, presiding
Florida Conference of Historians

SATURDAY—January 28

SESSION VII

9:00-9:30 am
Yitzhak Shamir and Terrorism: The Assassination of Lord Moyne, 1944
Jack McTague, Saint Leo College

SESSION VIII

9:30-10:15 am
Eisenhower's New Look Foreign Policy
Nicole Bond, Saint Leo College, undergraduate
Willy Brandt, Eric Honecker and the Reemergence of German Self-Determination
Kip Kelly, Saint Leo College, undergraduate

SESSION IX

10:30-11:15 am
Charlie Cuellar: Marco Polo of the Minors
Wes Singletary, Florida State University
Florida Conference of Historians
1996 Annual Program

HOSTED BY
BLAINE T. BROWNE—NORTH CAMPUS
BROWARD COMMUNITY COLLEGE
FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA

THURSDAY—March 28

7:00-9:00 pm
Reception

FRIDAY—March 29

7:45-8:15 am
Registration
Conference Center Lobby, Riverside Hotel, Ft. Lauderdale

Session I: Florida History

8:30-9:45 am
William Temple Hornaday’s Wildlife Collecting Expedition to Cuba and Florida in 1774
James A. Dolph, Weber State University
Defeated in War and Peace: The Life and Times of Major E.C. Weeks
Thomas Dye, Florida State University
The Creek Mounted Volunteer Regiment, 1836-37
David T. Childress, Jacksonville State University

Plenary Session

10:00-11:15 am
The Enola Gay / Smithsonian Controversy
Florida Conference of Historians

Barton Berstein, Stanford University

Session II: India

11:30-12:30 pm
The Vernacular Press Act of 1878 and the Role of Indian Language Newspapers in the Formation of the Indian Nationalist Movement
Phillip M. Guerty, Florida Atlantic University
The Dynamic Leadership of Indire Gandhi and Eleanor Roosevelt
Genet Pally, Saint Leo College

Lunch

12:30-1:30 pm

Session III: Middle East

1:30-3:00 pm
Bucknam Pasha: Ransford D. Bucknam and the Ottoman Navy, 1904-1909
R. Boyd Murphree, Florida State University
Africa Invades the New World: Egypt’s Mexican Adventure, 1863-1867
John Dunn, Valdosta State University
David Crist Florida State University
Arabs and Muslims in America: The Media Image
Jack McTague, Saint Leo College

Session IV: Art In Early Modern Europe

3:15-4:45 pm
The Ottoman Empire as the ‘The Cruel Enemy of God’: An Analysis of the Religious Imagery Used by the Court of Rudolph II in its Portrayal of the Turkish Wars, 1593-1606
Paul Henneman, Florida International University
The Golden Age of Masters: A Prosopography of the Spanish Baroque
Ileana Carmen Ramirez, Florida International University
The Art of Reform: Trent’s 25th Session and El Greco’s Virgin
Gretel Guerra, Florida International University

Banquet

7:00-8:30 pm
Presidential remarks and Business Meeting

SATURDAY, March 30

7:30-8:00 am
Refreshments

Session V: Preparing Future Faculty

8:00-9:15 am
Coping with Crisis
Catherine Edgemon, Florida State University
Multiple Mentoring
Robert Cassanello, Florida State University
Teaching at Diverse Colleges
Glen Harris, Florida State University

Session VI: World War II

9:30-11:00 am
Joseph C. Grew, the Emperor and Unconditional Surrender
Edward C. Osborne, Florida Atlantic University
The Soviet Union, Japan and the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-1936
J. Calvitt Clarke III, Jacksonville University
Nuremberg and the Naval Trial
Frederick Ramlow, Saint Leo College
The Court-Martial of Black WAC Privates Morrison, Murphy, Green and Goss: Discrimination or Mutiny?
Patricia Spaniol Mathews, Florida State University

Session VII: Issues and Methods in U.S. History

11:15-12:45 pm
The Kennedy Assassination as a Model for Teaching Historical Methods
William Marina, Florida Atlantic University
By No Means the Only Sinner: John Fiske and the Science of History
Frank M. Baglione, Tallahassee Community College
Jackson State: A Reappraisal
Patrick Smith, Broward Community College, Central Campus
The U.S. Constitution and Some Neglected British Legislative Antecedents
Dennis Rubini, Temple University
Public Attitudes on the FEA and its Use of Sanctions Before the Florida Teachers’ Strike of 1968

Frank M. Baglione
Tallahassee Community College

In February 1968, more than 30,000 of Florida’s 56,684 teachers went out on strike. Bound together in the Florida Teachers Association (FEA), a professional organization of administrators and teachers, their walkout took the form of mass resignations to sidestep state law prohibiting teacher strikes.¹ Teachers struck over low salaries, but in the dialogue before the strike the FEA with the help of its parent group, the National Education Association (NEA), built the case that education needed more funds to correct systemic deficiencies: overcrowded classrooms, substandard facilities, and inadequate supplies. This strategy overcame the public’s distaste for the increased taxes necessary to build and maintain a sound educational system. The FEA, however, was unable to build public support for the actions needed to force change—sanctions and, if necessary, closing the schools.

The imposition of sanctions by the FEA and NEA in the early months of 1967 amounted to an ultimatum, the final statement in their dialogue with state officials and the last chance to assess strategy and measure public opinion. Public support of the cause began to falter when teachers suggested strategies that might wound the state’s economy or close the schools.

The FEA and NEA were not sure themselves of how militant a pose they should take. The NEA, a federally chartered professional organization, and its state-chartered affiliates had long rejected collective bargaining and strikes as unprofessional. But in the 1960s, increased competition with the American Federation of Teachers, a labor union affiliate, to represent teachers was forcing the NEA to alter its position and embrace union tactics. This identity crisis within the NEA and FEA, plus Floridians’ ambivalence about unions in general and teachers’ unions in particular, hampered the NEA/FEA effort in the 1968 strike. Florida’s strike, nonetheless, pushed the NEA toward unionism.²

A year before the strike, the FEA had evidence of the public’s reservations about sanctions in contrast to the militancy of the teachers’ organization. First


came interviews of public officials and business leaders in Duval and Marion counties in late 1966 as part of an NEA investigation into the problems plaguing Florida’s public school system. Next was a scientific, NEA-commissioned survey conducted in July 1967 of public opinion on Florida’s educational crisis. Finally came press reaction and correspondence to the FEA, particularly after the announcements in May and June 1967 of national sanctions against the state for its inadequate response to the education crisis.

Education in Florida in the 1960s, like education in the South generally, was still feeling the effects of generations of poverty and indifference. While Florida’s growth offered the prospect of change, the rapid increase in the numbers of children flooding the school system and Florida’s obsession with frugal government also suggested that change could only come out of crisis. Florida’s schools compared favorably in terms of facilities and teachers’ salaries with other public school systems in the South, but in national comparisons, Florida’s system languished in mediocrity. Without a state income tax, the burden in funding schools fell on local property owners. Only the state sales tax could be used to relieve this burden and provide additional educational funds.

The FEA and its county affiliates had to make the public aware of the state’s education crisis, gain its approval for additional school funding, and muster support for increased property or sales taxes for education. The 1967 survey results show that the teacher’s organization did quite well in all three areas. The FEA, however, ran into problems because of its tactics to pressure the state government to embrace the association’s education budget proposals.

On March 19, 1966, the FEA Board of Directors meeting in Orlando declared a statewide “Sanctions Alert” to teachers, because the state had failed to address Florida’s educational problems. The alert escalated the battle the FEA had been fighting with Florida’s local and state officials over funding salary increases for teachers and improvements in the state’s school system. The FEA delegation on July 1 notified the NEA Convention meeting in Miami Beach of the alert and its intention to impose sanctions if next year’s legislative session did not pass an education bill substantially improving education. The proposed sanctions included censure of the governor, notice to teachers not to accept employment in Florida, and notice to business and industry of the poor conditions existing in Florida’s school system.

In November and December 1966, the NEA sent a team to several Florida

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3Federal education statistics from 1965 showed that Florida ranked 18th nationally in average teacher salaries, the highest for any southern state. Florida ranked 21st in the percentage of personal income spent on education and 26th in expenditures per pupil. But Florida did not have to be so average; the money was there for a better system. Florida ranked 35th in per capita income and 36th in per capita income spent on education. Kallina, Claude Kirk, 82–83. Thomas R. Dye, McKenzie Professor of Government at Florida State University, has noted that there remains the perception that Florida is not meeting its responsibilities in education. He writes that Florida is often criticized “for tolerating mediocrity or worse,” in the public schools. Thomas R. Dye, “Public Policy in Florida: Education and Welfare,” in Robert J. Huckshorn, ed., Government and Politics in Florida (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1991), 284.
counties to investigate local schools and interview community leaders on the FEA program and related issues. FEA records in the Florida Archives contain summaries of 24 interviews in Duval County and 40 interviews in Marion County. The questions asked covered a range of topics from local property tax assessments to school board politics. The relevant responses concern: the need for additional funds for school facilities and teacher salaries; support for increasing taxes to provide additional funds for education; the source of the school system's problems; support for a Professional Negotiations Statute; support for the FEA; and, finally, support for sanctions and similar tactics.

Duval County is an urban area in north Florida that includes the city of Jacksonville. Marion County is a rural area in central Florida dominated in the 1960s by horse, cattle, timber, and farming interests. Despite this contrast, interviews in both counties revealed substantial support for increased spending on schools and teacher salaries. In Duval, 17 respondents expressed support for these items and 7 did not. In Marion the split was 26 to 13. Support for taxes, however, to fund this increased spending was tepid. In Marion a slight plurality favored more taxes for education. In Duval only 6 respondents favored increased taxation, and 10 were opposed. In Marion, 13 supported additional taxes, while 11 opposed them.

The taxation figures require further analysis. First, those who recognized the need for additional educational funding did not always believe that more taxes were required. A number felt that a better use of existing funds or the elimination of waste would supply the needed dollars. Second, of those favoring some sort of tax increase, the largest number favored increased sales taxes: 5 of the 6 favoring taxes in Duval and 9 of the 13 in Marion.

Douglas Cole of Florida First National Bank typified those Marion County respondents who supported the FEA program. He agreed that more money was needed for education, but he felt that the funding should come from the state, not from a property tax. Businessman Zandy Collins, Jr. supported higher pay for teachers, recognizing that Florida could not compete with states paying higher salaries. He, too, felt that an increase in the sales tax was the answer. He let slip, however, his opinion that the poor who have the most children pay no taxes and burden the system. His interviewer disapprovingly commented,
“So let’s tax them, and the elderly too, with more sales taxes.”9

Not everyone supported a higher sales tax. James Cunningham, a funeral home director in Marion, thought the county could support the schools. He said he looked forward to a time when people would say, “The taxes of Marion County are high, but look at the great education system we have.”10 Dr. Edward Anderson, a school board member, favored a cigarette tax to raise funds for education.11

One respondent, J. E. Davis of Duval County, felt that the schools had made great progress in the past few years, and that, in fact, the budget had increased too rapidly. He suggested that cutting $3 million from the Duval County school budget would be possible.12 Davis did not impress his interviewers. One of them, June Pittenger, commented, I was furious when I left this man’s office. J. E. Davis is part of the real power structure in this community, but he does not care about the schools. He is concerned about taxes and nothing else.... He is probably representative of the power structure’s attitude here, and I see him as an insidious evil. Another interviewer, Lynn Gilmore, was even more pointed: “J. E. Davis is a self-made man who worships his creator.”13

In identifying the causes for the educational crisis, 8 in Duval County blamed the school board or superintendent while 3 endorsed them; 5 blamed public apathy; and 2 asserted incompetent teachers were the problem while 3 said they were not. In Marion County, 15 blamed the school board or superintendent; 12 indicted the teachers while 4 absolved them; and 11 cited public apathy while 6 claimed the public was interested and involved.14

Most of those interviewed did not pull their punches in laying blame. David Cook, editor of the Star Banner in Marion County, blamed the county’s poor educational atmosphere on: a senile assessor working in concert with local power groups; poorly administered schools by a superintendent bumped upstairs because of poor performance at lower levels; a conservative area fighting liberal views; and politics in the school administration.15

Dr. Kissling, an unsuccessful candidate for the school board in Duval County, laid the cause of the problem on the apathy of indifferent citizens. “The problem is really one of moral indifference and greed,” he said. “Duval County

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9Ibid. Mr. Collins did not leave a favorable impression on the interviewer: He’s young, married without children, a member of City Council, director of a bank, on the Downtown Development Council, owns much downtown property, as well as citrus, timber and land holdings outside of Marion. He appears to be a flashy, urbane type with little in the way of brains...."

10Ibid.
11Ibid.
12Ibid., Box 36.
13Ibid. The interviewers also noted that some respondents opposed across-the-board raises for teachers. Ben Daniels, an attorney on the Ocala City Council, thought that such raises rewarded poor teachers as much as good ones. Trusten Drake, Sr., a Marion County banker, cattleman, and landowner thought that such raises amounted to “unionism.” Ibid., Box 37.
14Ibid., Boxes 36, 37.
15Ibid., Box 37.
suffers from touch of Midas—the concentration of wealth in a few hands, such as Ed Ball's, and all the little sycophants who lick his boots for cash.” Dr. Kissling believed that the politicians were taking bribes from the business leaders.16

Jacob Bryan, also in Duval County, laid all problems on the teachers, who, he said, “are no good, can’t teach, and push socialistic ideas.”17 Leonard Monroe, a Marion County contractor, held similar opinions. His interviewer reported that he

blames the Negro for all school ills...[t]hinks the schools are good enough and taxes high enough...[and] feels teachers indoctrinate the children to radical thinking.18

Tom Slade, a Duval County State Senator, spread the blame around. He found the entire FEA program too strong. “He feels we are as crazy as hell,” the interviewer wrote, “but he also feels that the superintendent and the school board members are a bunch of horses’ asses.”19 In less colorful language, Cecil Pemberton of Duval County and Florida Tax Information Associates said that no amount of money poured into the schools as they were would improve anything. The schools had been bad a long time and were getting worse, he said, because of politics in the system.20

In Marion County, Harold Goforth of Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan echoed this sense of futility. Although concerned about the schools and the teachers, Mr. Goforth felt the situation had deteriorated to the point that no amount of money could save the system. He did not think that teacher militancy would help matters. He felt that the Marion Education Association (MEA) had fallen into the hands of “far out” leaders whose talk of strikes and worse had alienated those who might help them. “When there’s nothing that can be done,” he said, “they should keep quiet...and not threaten the public.”21

The political and business leaders interviewed were noticeably hostile to FEA militancy. In Duval County, only 5 respondents approved of the FEA, while 9 disapproved. In Marion County where an assertive FEA had argued over sanctions with a more conciliatory MEA, 7 expressed a favorable view of

16 Ibid., Box 36. Some in Marion County also questioned the abilities of school officials. Kirk Driver of the Marion County Education Improvement Committee and Paul Ferguson, editor of the Orlando Sentinel, believed that school board members were indifferent and inept and served only for the money. Al Lee of the Tampa Tribune called most members of the school board incompetent. Ibid., Box 37.

17 Ibid., Box 36. The comment of the interviewer on Mr. Bryan was, “God help us.”

18 Ibid., Box 37.

19 Ibid., Box 36.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., Box 37. June Pittenger’s comment was, “Mr. Goforth is touchy about the subject of teachers’ militancy and keeps returning to the subject.”
the FEA, while 16 saw the state group unfavorably. The FEA’s proposal for a Professional Negotiations Statute that would force management to bargain collectively with a teachers’ representative organization upset the interviewees. In Duval the split was 5 favorable and 8 opposed; in Marion only 1 respondent favored such an idea while 8 opposed. Two Duval County School Board members, Harry G. Kincaid and Franklin Reinstein, opposed the FEA’s proposal for a Professional Negotiations Statute. Mr. Reinstein, an attorney, said that the Professional Negotiations Statute “smacks of unionism.” In Marion County, school board member Dr. Edward Anderson opposed the Professional Negotiations idea, preferring that school issues be handled on the local level. “He thinks it can be worked out in the family,” the interviewer wrote. The community leaders condemned sanctions and, even more, the possibility of a strike. Fourteen respondents in Duval said they opposed sanctions. Four admitted they supported imposing sanctions, but 2 of these qualified their support by suggesting that they should be used only when all else had failed. In Marion County only 1 respondent favored sanctions, while 19, some of whom expressed general support for the teachers, opposed sanctions, often in strong terms.

In Duval County, C. W. Buford, said that he approved wholeheartedly of the FEA goals, but cautioned that the teachers had work to do in changing public attitudes. “Any overt action by the teachers, such as censure, strikes or sanctions,” he warned, “would only serve to make the public more antagonistic towards the teachers and create further doubt and suspicion in the public’s mind.” J. E. Davis said that opposition to the Duval Teachers Association was forming, and he added that “any power play now would cause a real backlash. Sanctions would ruin them—lose them support they now have and serve no real purpose.”

Mayor Ritter of Jacksonville said that sanctions would be ineffective and do nothing for the teachers. Mr. Lumpkins of the State National Bank said that he

22Ibid., Boxes 36, 37.
23Ibid.
24Ibid., Box 36. The interviewer’s poor opinion of the school board was evident in the comment, “Mr. Kincaid talked a lot but said little.”
25Mr. Reinstein was no friend of the teachers. At a June 1, 1966 meeting of the Duval Committee of Elected Officials, an ad hoc committee formed to study the education crisis in Duval, he proposed the revision or repeal of tenure. He said that the state’s Tenure Law was “a millstone” around the neck of the school board. His call to counter the FEA’s sanctions threat with a threat to repeal tenure would later be taken up in the state legislature. Ibid.
26Ibid., Box 37. People who talk about working things out in the family usually see themselves as the pater familias possessing the pater potestas.
27Ibid., Boxes 36, 37.
28Ibid., Box 36.
29Ibid.
30Ibid.
supported schools, but felt the teachers should maintain their professionalism and “shouldn’t ruin their image with talk of strikes and sanctions.”

31 Cecil Pemberton said that he deplored sanctions. They would be a terrible thing, a back breaker, and would correct nothing.

32 W. W. Griffen, a member of the Marion Board of Public Instruction, believed that teacher militancy had alienated the public and lost them the friends they had.

33 John McKeever, Chairman of the Marion Junior Chamber of Commerce Education Committee, urged the MEA to drop talk about sanctions and “back off.”

34 William B. Ray, a Marion County businessman, said that he did not like being threatened by the teachers, and Gordon Skipper of Munroe & Chambliss Bank said he disliked the teachers’ use of force, strikes, and unions.

35 J. L. Collum of the Florida Power Corporation said the teachers had the wrong attitude and that public opinion was against them. He advised the teachers to “get rid of the power politics.”

36 A few of those interviewed supported strong action. John Crider, a legislator from Duval County, said he did not oppose sanctions provided they were a last resort. J. J. Daniels was more certain that sanctions were the only way to cause change. “The people need to be awakened,” he said.

37 These results are significant. There was political support for what the teachers were trying to accomplish, and the business community in particular was encouraging strong financial support for education. The Ocala-Marion Chamber of Commerce had conducted its own study of the county schools and concluded that the schools needed more support and that the state had the wealth to provide adequate funding without overburdening the tax structure.

38 Many, otherwise friendly toward education, were unwilling to support teacher militancy, unions, or sanctions that would damage the state’s image and economy; nor were they ready for a scorched earth policy of closing the schools during a strike.

39 The FEA had been warned by what it called, the “power structure,” the tip of the iceberg; six months later, the NEA’s survey of July 1967 exposed what lay below the water line in the depths of public opposition to sanctions and strikes.

40 The FEA Board of Directors had declared a “Sanctions Alert” on March 19, 1966, and on July 1 it notified the NEA of its intention to impose sanctions if

31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., Box 37.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., Box 36.
the 1967 session of the Florida Legislature did not pass the FEA budget program to improve education. Nearly a year later, on May 13, 1967, when the legislature failed to come up with an acceptable education package, the FEA leadership received teacher endorsement for the proposed sanctions.

The first sanctions were imposed on May 25. These included: the censure of Governor Claude Kirk for lack of leadership; the national circulation of notices that conditions in Florida were unsatisfactory for teaching; and a request that the NEA impose sanctions on Florida. On June 3, the FEA’s Board of Directors unanimously voted to impose three additional sanctions: a nationwide notice to business and industry of the conditions in the state that had brought sanctions; warnings to teachers outside Florida that they would be charged with violation of the Code of Ethics of the Education Profession if they accepted employment in Florida; and a similar warning to teachers in Florida not then under contract. Two days later, the NEA’s Executive Committee invoked national sanctions against the state, censuring Governor Kirk and his legislative allies and requesting that teachers not under contract refrain from accepting employment in the state.

In support of the FEA, the NEA commissioned a study by First Research Corporation of Miami which surveyed 1400 registered voters between July 14 and July 24, 1967 through telephone interviews. The survey examined public attitudes on Florida’s educational system, increased taxation for education, teachers’ salaries, school overcrowding, quality of education, and the general crisis in Florida education. It also examined the level of public support for sanctions, a possible teacher walkout, and a special legislative session to resolve the dispute.

The FEA could take heart in the results of the survey regarding the public’s perception of education in Florida. More than 62 percent of the respondents said that education was the most important issue facing the state. About half that number, 32 percent, cited taxes as the most important issue. In a head to head battle between education and taxes, the FEA could conclude that education was of greater concern to Florida’s citizens than were taxes.

The FEA had reason to feel that they were winning the battle for public opinion. Two years earlier, a survey conducted for the NEA had shown that a plurality of the respondents was satisfied with Florida’s education, 46.4 percent

39First Research Group, Attitudes and Opinions of Florida Voters on Selected Educational Issues, (July, 1967) 1–2, FSA, RG M86–011, Series A.4, Box 49 [hereafter cited as FRG]. The survey was conducted in eight areas and included: Duval (Area 1), Brevard, Orange, Seminole, and Volusia (Area 2), Hillsborough and Polk (Area 3), Pinellas, Manatee, and Sarasota (Area 4), Dade (Area 5), Broward and Palm Beach (Area 6), Bay, Escambia, Leon, and Marion (Area 7), and Jackson, Columbia, Putnam, Hardee, Highlands, and Lee (Area 8).

40Ibid., 3 T–1. Civil rights, employment, and crime were other areas of concern, each cited by 10% or less of the sample as the most important problem. The total of percentages was 123% because of multiple answers.
to 43.5 percent. After two years of the education crisis, public satisfaction with the state's educational system had dropped to 46.4 percent, while 52.2 percent was not satisfied.

The reasons given for dissatisfaction encouraged teachers. Most cited was teachers' salaries, which at 16.5 percent represented a dramatic change from the 1965 survey in which only 3.1 percent had cited teachers' salaries as the reason for their unhappiness with the system. The next most cited reason, school standards and quality, also showed significant movement, up to 13.8 percent in the 1967 survey from only 2.5 percent in 1965. The only dark cloud was the stable number of respondents viewing the poor quality of teachers as the reason for their dissatisfaction, 11.2 percent in 1967 compared to 12.9 percent in 1965.

The survey went into detail in three areas to refine the responses. More than 55 percent of the respondents felt that teachers' salaries were too low; 35 percent thought salaries were about right; and only 2 percent thought they were too high. Over 60 percent felt that the schools were overcrowded, and more than 64 percent felt that Florida needed more teachers. In all three areas—salary, overcrowding, staffing—support for the teachers was greater among younger age groups and fell off significantly with those 65 and over. The FEA could conclude that the public had adopted its views on these issues.

Most respondents (51 percent) said that they believed teachers' salaries were lower in Florida than in other states; 38 percent said that Florida spent about the same, while 27 percent answered less. Thirty-five percent thought that Florida residents paid about the same in taxes, while 31.5 percent responded less. There was also a sense of urgency on taking action to upgrade Florida's schools, 75.7 percent feeling that it was urgent, and a solid majority, 55 percent to 41 percent, favoring increasing taxes to provide these improvements. Most supported raising the state's sales tax (28 percent) or instituting a state lottery (27 percent) as the means of raising the funds needed. Once again, those 65 and over felt less urgency (66 percent) and were less willing (47 percent) to embrace increased taxes.

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41Ibid., 4–5, T–5. The survey indicated that the greatest dissatisfaction with the schools was in Duval County (84%). At the other end of the state, 54% of respondents in Dade County were satisfied with their schools.
42Ibid., 7, T–7.
43Ibid., 9–10, T–11. Only in one area, Broward and Palm Beach, did a slight plurality feel that salaries were about right. The highest percentage of respondents (60%) who felt that teacher salaries were too low was recorded in Dade County where, ironically, teachers enjoyed the highest pay in the state. Ibid., T–9.
46Ibid., 15–16, T–22. The greatest opposition to any increase in taxes came from Broward and Palm Beach counties (23.6%) and Bay, Escambia, Leon, and Marion counties (20.8%). Ibid., T–22, T–23.
While the FEA could point to the survey as proof that public opinion backed their analysis of both the problem and appropriate remedies, clearly the public was wary of the teachers' organization and critical of its tactics. The FEA's disapproval rating was 37.5 percent; its approval rating was only 32.3 percent. Only the 21–29 age group gave it a greater approval than disapproval rating, 39.4 percent to 31.7 percent. Those 65 and over disapproved by a 2 to 1 margin, 40.9 percent to 21.1 percent. The Tampa-central Florida region and Dade County did give the FEA a higher approval rating, but Duval County, the site of a good deal of FEA activity, returned a disapproval rating of 60.5 percent with a meager 21.1 percent approving.

Worse was to come. The survey showed that while more people were identifying with the issues raised by the FEA, their opinion of the FEA was deteriorating. In the 1965 survey, 36 percent had approved of the FEA and its activities, and only 8 percent had disapproved. More than 28 percent, however, had not heard of the FEA, and 23.9 percent held no opinion. Two years later, 7.1 percent had not heard of the FEA, and 21.8 percent had no opinion. Thus about 21 percent of the previously uninformed had learned of the FEA and its activities in the two years and another 2 percent of those previously without an opinion had formed one. Because the FEA's approval rating had dropped only 3 percent in the two years while its disapproval rating increased by 20 percent, the survey showed that most of those becoming aware of the FEA and its activities did not like what they were learning.

The survey's inquiries on specific actions to resolve the educational crisis reflected this dichotomy between educational issues and educational organizations. An overwhelming majority, more than 81 percent, agreed that the teachers should take action on educational issues, a figure that held steady in both the 1965 and 1967 surveys. And nearly the same number, 79.1 percent, were aware of the crisis regarding school funding, and 70 percent thought it was serious. However, only a plurality, 48.5 percent versus 33.9 percent, favored the teachers over the governor in their disagreement over the scope and remedy for the funding crisis. All age groups, except those 65 and over, and all counties, again except Broward and Palm Beach and the Bay, Escambia, Leon, and Marion counties supported the teachers.

The real problem was the sanctions imposed by the FEA. Three-quarters of the respondents (73.7 percent) were aware that the FEA and NEA had imposed sanctions on the state. Respondents were told what the three sanctions were and then were asked if they approved of them. Nearly 70 percent disapproved of the first sanction that discouraged teachers from accepting positions in Florida.

48Ibid., 17–18, T–24.
49Ibid., T–24. Broward and Palm Beach counties gave the NEA its second highest disapproval rating at 48.6%, and only in these counties was the approval rating at 20.1% lower than in Duval.
50Ibid., 17–18.
51Ibid., 18–19, T–26, T–27.
Only 22 percent approved. All age groups, even the 21–29 group which had given the teachers the greatest support, disapproved of this sanction, 60 percent to 30 percent. For the group 65 and over, the split was 73.3 percent disapproval against 14.3 percent. All areas of the state opposed this sanction, led by Duval County (84.2 percent), followed by Broward and Palm Beach counties (79.7 percent), which also had the lowest approval number (11.8 percent).52

Respondents also disapproved of the second FEA/NEA sanction which censured Governor Kirk. Nearly 81 percent were aware of the censure, and 53.4 percent disapproved while only 35.3 percent approved. The patterns regarding age groups and counties were similar to those for the first sanction.53

The third sanction, the national notice to business and industry that educational conditions in Florida were unsatisfactory, was almost as unpopular as was the first. A total of 67.4 percent of respondents disapproved and 25.9 percent approved. Again, the 65 and over age group was the most opposed (75.4 percent), as were the counties of Broward and Palm Beach (79.6 percent).54

Finally, on the issue of the teachers possibly refusing to return to work, in essence striking, if the crisis were not solved before the new school term, 74.6 percent said they did not favor the teachers refusing to return, while only 19.8 percent favored that action. All age groups registered between 73 percent and 76 percent in opposing a walkout. Broward, Palm Beach, and Duval counties disapproved in the range of 82 percent to 85 percent. Only in the Tampa-central Florida counties, did the disapproval rating drop slightly below 70 percent. The highest approval rating came from Brevard, Orange, Seminole and Volusia counties (25.2 percent), and Pinellas, Manatee, and Sarasota counties (26.3 percent).55

The survey gave the FEA reason for hope. The public seemed aware of the problems, understood that the major problem was teacher salaries, and was willing to sustain a tax increase to resolve the crisis. But there was also a clear warning. The public rejected FEA tactics. Discouraging teachers from entering the state at a time of teacher shortages and classroom overcrowding, publicly censuring the governor, and attempting to dissuade business and industry from investing in the state were unpopular. Closing the schools, perhaps the FEA’s best weapon for winning its fight, also seriously lacked public support. The rejection of sanctions and opposition to a walkout were overwhelming.

With the results of the July survey in hand, the FEA understood the nature of the problem it faced. Rank and file teachers, however, were becoming desperate for strong action, including a strike. A brief sample of the correspondence received by the FEA at this time showed the strength of these feelings and

53Ibid., 20, T–31, T–32.
54Ibid., 20, T–33, T–34.
55Ibid., 21, T–35.
the choice that lay before the organization.

The NEA and its affiliate stood at the crossroads between academic organizations and unions, and they had to accommodate themselves to the difference in the types of dialogue appropriate to each. Balanced argument had to give way to single-minded advocacy; polite colloquies had to transform into blunt talk; individual opinion had to accommodate to united action. A letter to the editor of the Ocala Star-Banner in December 1966, while the NEA team was conducting its interviews in Marion County, articulated the difference in approach. Jeanne Gray wrote,

> Whether the action of the FEA and the MEA [Marion Education Association] is fair, unfair, polite, stupid, arrogant, etc., it should certainly be a kick in the pants that might impel the citizens into long delayed action, and it is certainly less drastic than the facetious suggestion after the Wyomina [School] fire, that perhaps the only way to improve the Marion County school system is to burn down the rest of the schools.\textsuperscript{56}

That voices would be strident and actions strong was expected. Paul Ferguson, the editor of the Marion Sentinel, noted in a column early in 1967, that the battle over sanctions centered on the issue of who was going to run the school system—the school board or the FEA.\textsuperscript{57} Ferguson’s bias may have caused him to overstate the problem—certainly the FEA wanted to participate in school governance, not control it—but to school boards accustomed to unquestioned authority, this may have been a distinction without a difference.

As the FEA chose its weapons, it also had to contend with its own character. Some were not convinced that a professional organization representing the interests of principals and administrators as well as teachers could put its whole heart into the struggle. As Cesar Rivera in a Letter to the Editor of the Ocala Star-Banner wrote,

> Classroom teachers are trained in conformity and little else by the colleges of education. They get booster shots from their principals and administrators, and they develop the conditioned docility of the little old maid schoolmarm who taught in the little Old Red School House.... Classroom teachers and administrators have conflicting interests much too often.... I’ve heard teachers deplore the spinelessness of the NEA.... It is time that we had an organization for classroom teachers, by classroom teachers, and of classroom teachers.\textsuperscript{58}

Correspondence to the FEA showed that many teachers wanted strong action. “Don’t give an inch,” wrote John R. Lane, a teacher from Tallahassee. “For the first time the world knows we are not weak,” wrote a group of guidance

\textsuperscript{56}Ocala Star-Banner, Dec. 6, 1966.
\textsuperscript{57}Marion Sentinel, Feb. 7, 1967.
\textsuperscript{58}Ocala Star-Banner, Jan. 6, 1967.
counselors from the Plant High School in Tampa. "We have fought too long and too hard to quit now," said Clara Belle Wright, a first grade teacher at the Kirby Smith School in Gainesville. "I have only four more years to retirement, but I feel these steps are necessary," wrote Mary Foley, a teacher from the Poinciana Elementary School in Key West.\textsuperscript{59}

Many educators expressed similar sentiments to the press. In rebutting a \textit{Fort Myers News-Press} editorial supporting Governor Kirk's refusal to meet with the FEA, Edward Sym, a teacher at the Tommie Barfield School in Marco, wrote,

> Most people are inclined to treat teachers as scared rabbits (and unfortunately too many are) and having a female mentality. Therefore, if they get a little restless just put them on the butt and they will become docile again. When educators give a sigh of resignation regarding quality education it immediately is construed as yelling and a manifestation of arrogance.\textsuperscript{60}

In support of teachers who were no longer acting like scared rabbits, Larry P. Elliott wrote to the \textit{Gainesville Sun} that people who say they are for the teachers but "don't like their methods," were responsible for Florida education being on "a four lane highway to mediocrity." "Regardless of the ethical or moral aspects of sanctions," he wrote, "[w]e all know that politicians only respond to political pressure or 'pain.'" The teachers had been pushed to the wall by indifference and petty politics, said Mr. Elliott, and now "we must recognize that they mean business."\textsuperscript{61} The same newspaper heard from Arthur W. Combs who, in defending the FEA's call for mass resignations, quoted FEA Executive Director Dr. Phil Constans' remark at the Orlando rally that, "It is better to die standing, than to live on your knees."\textsuperscript{62}

By October 1967 teachers wanting strong action began pushing the FEA to do more. "If you've got 25,000 resignations," wrote Alan Mencher of Riviera Junior High school in St. Petersburg, "the teachers here do not want to wait—GO NOW!" From across the bay in Fort Myers, James J. Doyle of the Colin English School wrote that teachers who had submitted resignations were getting impatient and desired to get to the next step.\textsuperscript{63}

Having brought the teachers to the brink, the FEA was now being encouraged to take the leap. "We need the crisis to be resolved," wrote Sherman A. Drawdy, a math teacher at Hardee Junior High School in Wachula. "Do it in

\textsuperscript{59}FEA Correspondence, John R. Lane, Tallahassee, June 6, 1967; Marguerite Smith, Edna Kilby, Ernest Zeman, and William J. Hojnacki, Tampa, June 8, 1967; Clara Belle Wright, Gainesville, Aug. 1, 1967; and Mary Foley, Key West, Aug. 26, 1967. FSA, Box 39.
\textsuperscript{60}Fort Myers News-Press, May 25, 31, 1967.
\textsuperscript{61}The Gainesville Sun, Aug. 31, 1967.
\textsuperscript{62}Ibid., Aug. 31, 1967.
\textsuperscript{63}Alan Mencher, St. Petersburg, Oct. 5, 1967; James J. Doyle, Punta Gorda, Oct. 5, 1967. Mr. Doyle also noted a growing animosity toward those who had not resigned or who had violated the sanctions. FEA Correspondence, FSA, RG M86–011, Series A.4, Box 39.
November.” This reflected the sentiment of Mrs. M. Coraggio of Venice, who wrote, “The school board is putting the pressure on. If we don’t do something by November 1, we might as well give up. We are with you, but ACT!”

Even many administrators felt the time had come for the FEA to show the power of its convictions. George R. C. Fox, the Principal of the Shore Acres School in St. Petersburg wrote,

Please let there soon be a great silence spread across this beautiful state of Florida. Let us cease our teaching and our preaching. For 18 years I have talked and talked and talked. I am tired. Let us now turn in our resignations and become silent.

Because of these sentiments, the FEA was probably aware that it risked losing some of its membership if it did not act. Paul E. Peters, who operated the Educators Placement Service in Gainesville, cautioned that if the NEA did not win this battle, its members would go to labor unions. It also heard from a university professor, Raymond D. Cheydleur of Sarasota, that “there is a point of no return in these sort of things,” and if the FEA waits too long to act “that will encourage unions to move in against you....”

That is not to say that the FEA had the solid support of its members for militant action. If it dragged its feet, it was because it also heard from teachers who did not want to cross the line. “I strongly oppose a strike of any kind,” Lucille Maxwell wrote the FEA from her vacation home in North Carolina. “Please weigh this matter carefully before some silly thing is done and then we regret it afterwards.” H. F. Walterhouse of Cocoa Beach wrote that he opposed both the sanctions, which he felt harmed the state, its people, and its education. Any walk out was a breach of the teachers’ contractual agreement.

An even bigger worry to the FEA was the nearly unanimous condemnation of teacher militancy expressed in the press. In Marion County, the Ocala Star-Banner pummeled the FEA for its sanctions talk. In November 1966, the paper reported that the FEA, in its “understandable zeal to improve Marion County’s inexcusable school situation,” was proposing boycotts, sanctions, and en masse resignations by teachers. “To our ears,” the paper editorialized, “this seems like strange talk. Such impractical and destructive threats sound like fighting words.”

That editorial set the tone for the paper’s coverage of the education crisis.

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70Ocala Star-Banner, Nov. 11, 1966.
It recognized that a problem existed, but it rejected the FEA’s militant tactics in seeking a remedy. When sanctions were later imposed on the county, the paper reported it as a “stunning blow” against the county school system which dismayed school officials.71 In an editorial, the paper accused the FEA of resorting to blackmail to improve the schools, challenged its good intentions, and said its arrogance was more suited to “Teamster Boss Jimmy Hoffa’s most notorious labor negotiations.” Teachers, the editorial advised, should resign from the organization in protest.72

The paper’s campaign against the FEA included a series of articles quoting county officials who condemned sanctions. Ocala City Councilman Jack Clark was quoted as saying that the FEA was trying to blackmail local officials and was serving its own selfish ends. Councilman Ben Daniel called the sanctions unduly harsh, and Councilman E. C. Vandagriff called “the whole thing asinine and unfair.” Dr. Ed Anderson of the Marion School Board said the FEA was using extortion, and board member Carl Freimuth called it “unionism at its worst.”73

Early in 1967, the paper reported that local officials were trying to improve education and that the local MEA was showing an attitude of compromise. But it continued to criticize the FEA for “inflammatory statements,” characterizing these as “an affront to the people of Marion County and the officials who have been acting in good faith.” It concluded that the people of Marion County were not going to be “bullied or blackmailed into following the political whims” of the FEA leadership.74

In Duval County, the Florida Times-Union and the Jacksonville Journal also played the theme of FEA overreaching. In a Times-Union column, Education Editor Al Erxleben called the threat of sanctions in 1966 “dangerous and precipitous,” and encouraged the NEA and FEA to accept the slow but steady progress the county was making. His successor in that post the following year, quoting the president of the Jacksonville Area Chamber of Commerce, wrote that improvement in the schools would not come from sanctions, which he felt would only further damage the image of the city and its schools.75 “It makes no sense to me to take action to damage economically a county that despite previous economic damage is putting forth a real effort,” W. Ashley Verlander was

72 Ibid., Dec. 15, 1966.
75 Florida Times-Union, May 3, 1966. A local television station, WFGA-TV, also editorialized that Dr. Phil Constand’s threat to recommend sanctions until “either the community is brought to its senses or we close the school system” was immoderate in light of the community’s efforts to improve the schools. Noting that much progress was yet to be made, the station said it could best be accomplished in a spirit of cooperation and understanding “without a club over the community’s head.” Letter to Phil Constand from Harold Baker, Vice President, News and Public Affairs, WFGA-TV, Dec. 5, 1966. FSA, RG M86-011, Series A.4, Box 39.
quoted as saying.76

The Jacksonville Journal's coverage contained the same message. In May 1967 it ran an article on the reaction of Duval County legislators to the sanctions threat. Representative Dan Scarborough asserted the FEA was leading the teachers to the brink of disaster. Senator John J. Fisher said that the teachers were going to alienate the people working hard for them. Representative George Stallings body punched, "Government by blackmail or threats has always been offensive to me," and Tom Slade called the FEA action "immature, premature and irresponsible." Only Representative Don Nichols showed some understanding saying, "Our teachers have waited and waited and waited and very little has been accomplished for them."77 When the sanctions came down, the paper called them "school-crippling" and a "colossal snub" to the state.78

Press coverage reflected the attitudes and opinions expressed in the NEA interviews and the FRG survey. No one disputed that Florida had to address the serious shortcomings of its educational system, but there was considerable disagreement over the proper methods for improving Florida's schools. The FEA could enlist political and business leaders and the press in gaining public sympathy for its diagnosis on the health of the school system, but it was having problems enlisting their support for the treatment program the NEA was prescribing. Part of the difficulty stemmed from the NEA's own identity crisis as it struggled to maintain its image as a professional organization while trying to hold the allegiance of a restless membership being wooed by more militant labor organizations.

Ready or not, the FEA did lead the teachers out of the classrooms in February 1968. The success and failure of that effort has been debated.79 Perhaps, however, it is wrong to look at the struggle as an event with a definite conclusion and winners and losers. It was rather one event in a continuing struggle.

A photograph from the strike in the Florida State Archives shows a teacher holding a sign which reads, "The gov. says let's fight crime now! Education can wait another 20 years." With little editing, that message could apply today. A recent public opinion poll reported that 34 percent of Floridians consider crime the single most important issue facing the government. Only 10 percent selected education and schools as the most important issue. At the same time, 66 percent of the respondents said they would favor paying more taxes for

79Kallina, Claude Kirk, 100 called the strike "nothing less than a disaster for the FEA." Lyons, "Walkout," 84 concluded that the strike failed because of "poor leadership, lack of public support, the political environment, and lack of solidarity among teachers when it counted most." Colburn and Scher, Florida's Gubernatorial Politics, 202 say the strike effectively forced the governor to negotiate with the teachers and to accept the legislature's education bill. Makowsky, "The 1968 Florida Teachers' Strike," 179-80 argues that the strike gave teachers a victory on the salary issue, got more funds for education, and, most important, allowed union proponents in both the FEA and NEA to achieve their goal of turning these organizations toward unionism.
education. Only 46 percent would favor paying more taxes for prison construction.\textsuperscript{80}

What has not changed is that strikes by teachers are still illegal and that therefore public attitudes can seldom be expected to favor such action. If teachers in a labor dispute can close the schools, public pressure on government officials to reopen them will work to the teachers’ benefit. But if public support is so weak as to allow officials to keep the schools open by bringing in strike breakers—no matter how unqualified and no matter how clearly just to babysit students—then the strike will weaken and falter. The FEA in 1968 read the polls, the press, and its membership and decided to gamble on the result. It is hard to call a strike supported by 30,000 teachers a failure, although it is clear the FEA was unable to protect all of its members from the “white terror” of some malicious school boards when the strike ended. The FEA broke even, and it survived. It might have found a clear victory, however, if it had heeded the warning signs of public uncertainty about the employment of sanctions and strike actions. If the strike failed, it failed because of a lack of public support, because the FEA had not convinced the public of the necessity of strong measures.

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\textsuperscript{80}Schroth & Associates poll of 1,000 Florida voters, \textit{Tallahassee Democrat}, Sept. 25, 1994.
The Eisenhower Administration and the New Look

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The beginning Eisenhower’s presidency was challenged to improve Truman’s foreign policy. Following a series of meetings involving special committees, task groups, and the National Security Council, the administration in 1954 forged its “New Look” defense policy. This New Look further moved the United States from an isolationist trend toward the risk of total war by drastically reducing military expenditures in all areas except for the Air Force and strategic weapons while emphasizing its discretion to use those means. Although the policy proved to be successful at times, it was not without criticism.

Upon taking office, Eisenhower was appalled at the organization and structure of defense plans within the Truman administration. Following World War II, Truman began cutting the defense budget until it had dropped to $13.5 billion in 1950. Eisenhower objected to the cuts and to the uncertainty as budgets jumped up and down. In 1952, Truman projected defense appropriations to reach $50 billion by 1954. His budget tried to cover every contingency from short limited wars to total nuclear devastation. He was allocating vast amounts of money for the build-up of massive ground forces sufficient to fight a global, two-front war. Nuclear weapons would not be necessary unless the Soviets used them first. But if they should, nuclear arsenals were being stockpiled as well.¹

This strategy required so much money that Eisenhower considered it impractical as well as harmful to the US economy.² He believed that economic stability at home was just as vital as was military strength, writing that “the Armed Services are to defend ‘a way of life’ not merely land, property or lives.”³ Eisenhower could not justify Truman’s spending plan. In his own words, he had “always fought the idea of X units by Y date.” He believed that once Truman’s target was reached, massive production of military supplies would cease and the economy would suffer severely.

He advocated instead “a steady build-up based on what the country could afford. In response to his mounting concern for a balance between the domestic budget and military capability in the face of a Soviet threat, he created the New Look Policy.”⁴

Before World War I, the United States followed an isolationist foreign policy. After the war, the US drastically reduced forces to a minimal. Most Americans thought that the war had been a mistake and should not be repeated. This feeling was strongest among conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats who opposed intervention in anything beyond the Americas. Congress refused to ratify the League of Nations charter in 1922. Toward the end of the 1930's, however, isolationists began to see a turn toward intervention supporting the European democracies threatened by Hitler. In December 1941, Germany declared war on the United States, killing isolationism.

The traditional faith in isolationism threatened to revive after World War II. Truman, however, was able to bring the United States to a position of semi-isolationism in dealing with the Cold War through the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and United Nations. The Truman Doctrine was a declaration to "support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures." The Marshall Plan, in conjunction, was a pledge to provide aid for the rebuilding of democracies within Europe so that they may again be able to defend themselves without undue US involvement. Despite these attempts, there was still a major reduction in American military forces; so much so that US troops were forced to withdraw from their occupation of South Korea.

In general, these were both considered policies of containment that did not unnecessarily involve the US in foreign conflicts. They served to keep Communism within preset boundaries, but did not provide for the reduction of existing Communist holdings. The policy for supporting the United Nations was primarily for security reasons. The advancement of technological warfare was too great a threat to remain completely reclusive. As long as the Soviets operated only at home, there would be no need for US intervention.

Eisenhower reacted to the isolationist impulse within the Republican party as embodied by Senator Taft's previous leadership. As a more middle-of-the-road Republican, Eisenhower viewed any attempt at isolationism as an exercise in futility. He found it impossible to comprehend that there were still those that did not understand that in order for America to remain a free and democratic nation, it must be willing to involve itself in the international arena. In response to those who believed that Americans should stay home and concentrate on resolving existing internal domestic problems, Eisenhower called upon his

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6Ambrose, Globalism, 2-3, 14; Adams, Firsthand, 92.
7Eisenhower, Mandate, 8; Ambrose, Globalism, 5.
9Ambrose, Globalism, 78; Smoke, National Security, 48; Adams, Firsthand, 391.
10Eisenhower, Mandate, 8, 33.
view that domestic and foreign problems are "inextricably intertwined" and cannot be dealt with on a separate basis, but must be handled coordinately as "two sides of the same coin." Indeed, according to General Scowcroft as espoused Eisenhower's philosophy on foreign policy, in order to protect and promote world peace, the United States must be willing to take an active world leadership role.  

In an effort to further remove the United States from an isolationist position, Eisenhower ordered a complete reexamination of the administrations foreign policy. He and the Republican party proposed to develop a strategy that was far from isolationist in that it would take Truman's internationalist position and carry it all the way. Simple containment would be transformed into a rollback of Communism in Eastern Europe and Asia in an effort to free those bound to "Communist enslavement." However, Eisenhower's policy in practice fell short of its intended goals and came, if nothing more, to strongly resemble Truman's containment.

By 1953, the United States defense strategy had come to rest largely on the two major premises of NSC 68. The first premise stated that the foremost international conflict that existed was between the United States and Soviet Russia while the second concluded that this conflict would ultimately be "a fight to the finish." By now the US had come to realize that developing any positive relations with the Soviet Union would be an impossible feat.

Out of the four possible directives established by NSC 68 for dealing with the Communists, the US opted for the last which concluded that American forces would undergo a substantial build-up. They should, in size, be comparable to W.W.II magnitude. The Council argued against the first three directives which included a continued presentation of policies, a retreat to isolationism and defense of only the Western Hemisphere, or a launch of a "preventive war." Neither of these three actions would be enough to either deter Soviet expansion or allow the US to become engaged in any type of limited or total war if necessary. A build-up of forces was the only directive that fully supported both NSC 68 premises.

Although the National Security Council report failed to give an estimate in dollars of what this would cost should it be fully recognized, it did provide a guess that the budget would be about three times more than what it had previously been. The prevailing attitude among the Council group was that cost was unimportant when faced with such hostile Soviet aggressions against the United States. This language was explicit within NSC 68 as it stated, "Budgetary

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12Adams, Firsthand, 391; Ambrose, Globalism, 128-29.
14Smoke, National Security, 57.
considerations will need to be subordinated to the stark fact that our very independence as a nation may be at stake.”

This was the basic situation Eisenhower was confronted with in 1953. Although he agreed with the philosophy that the USSR was a major threat to US security and one that should be contained, he did not believe that the budget should suffer in accomplishing this. In effect, he was unwilling to spend the recommended 20% of the US GNP to contain the Communists and to protect America and its interests. It was clear to him that “chronically high defense spending would annihilate this country just as surely as would Soviet bombing raids.” In this aspect, NSC 68 failed to impress him: Eisenhower rejected NSC 68 and called for new Committee meetings to reevaluate the situation and come up with alternative suggestions.

Three task groups were appointed within Project Solarium by Robert Cutler, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, to investigate courses of action for a national defense policy. The final report was to include not only a strategic plan, but if possible, an estimated cost to achieve an economically sound and effective program.

Soviet expert, George F. Kennan, headed group A. Kennan served as a staff member in the American Embassy in Moscow periodically for several years until he was declared persona non grata in 1952. During this time, in 1946, he sent a 16-page report to the US entitled “The Sources of Soviet Conflict.” Within this document Kennan laid the basis for his belief in containment which was the option put forth by his task group.

This group advocated the need to continue the existing policy of containment. In view of the fact that the Soviet threat had yet to diminish, it was important to US security that the government not let its guard down. As for financing this move, group A stated that it would be necessary to allot approximately $40 billion dollars despite the domestic ramifications of increased taxes and an unbalanced budget. Again it was viewed that there was no comparison between dollars and national security. The upside that this group offered was that in time the Soviet threat would be nonexistent and with that there would be no need for such large expenditures.

Group B was led by Air Force Major General James McCormack who possessed extensive knowledge of atomic weapons and had served in the Pentagon. The members of this task group set forth the option of designating a boundary around all Communist countries or areas of involvement and stating


\[16\] Ambrose, *Globalism*, 130.

\[17\] Brands, *Age of Vulnerability*, 966.


that if their officials penetrate these lines, the US would respond with a full nuclear attack. This eliminated the need for conventional forces because nuclear weapons would be the soul retaliatory force should Soviets threaten American interests.\textsuperscript{21}

This second policy of containment presented two problems: designating a boundary that would be acceptable and establishing credibility of this policy among the Soviets. A boundary could not be found that would exclude large unimportant areas and, at the same time, include vital points of American interest. In establishing credibility, the question was how the government would be able to explain a war with the USSR should the Soviets call America’s bluff. Being among the armed forces, this group failed to specify any military budget cuts. They did advocate, however, that this plan was the most economically sound in that the US would only have to fully prepare for one kind of conflict—full nuclear war.\textsuperscript{22}

The last of the task groups was headed by Vice Admiral Richard Conolly. In contrast to the first two groups, Group C promoted a policy of rolling back Communism rather than simply containing it. Their comprehensive plan involved the use of all measures including those within the military and economic spheres and the use of propaganda and covert and diplomatic actions. The basis for this proposal was their view that, instead of declining in power, the Kremlin continued to increase in strength. Unless the US took aggressive action to turn back their expansionist tendencies, America would lose the Cold War. This would require more than the military action proposed by group A and B. It would especially require the use of covert and diplomatic actions in trying to create civil unrest within the Soviet bloc. This group, while addressing a strategic plan, did not hint as to what full recognition of this would cost.\textsuperscript{23}

The proposals offered by the three task groups were transformed into NSC 162\textsuperscript{2} and ultimately provided the basis for the New Look policy. Aspects were taken from within each proposal and combined to form a national defense policy. From groups A and C, NSC 162\textsuperscript{2} coupled the continuing philosophy of containment with covert actions. In this latter area, the US would need to create a “national program of deception and concealment from public disclosure” and be prepared to take such action as outlawing the American Communist party.\textsuperscript{24}

In adopting this policy, Eisenhower abandoned his promise that “We shall never rest” in destroying the threat of Communism.\textsuperscript{25} Without taking the step and actually rolling back Communism, the threat would still exist. It has often been the opinion that this was the essence of the New Look. However, a more

\textsuperscript{21}Brands, \textit{Age of Vulnerability}, 967; Bobbitt, \textit{Democracy}, 35.
\textsuperscript{22}Brands, \textit{Age of Vulnerability}, 967.
\textsuperscript{23}\textit{Ibid.}, 967–68.
\textsuperscript{24}\textit{Ibid.}, 968.
\textsuperscript{25}Ambrose, \textit{Globalism}, 129.
accurate assessment would be that Eisenhower’s policy was more closely aligned with group B’s proposal which “nuclear deterrence based on total response.”26 After a measure of debate, it was concluded that this proposal of nuclear deterrence would be adopted as official US policy. Also, this was the only one that offered itself within the President’s acceptable cost parameters.27

In marked contrast to the ease in which the first part of the policy was passed, the area of budgeting brought on heated debate. On the side of reduced military expenditures was George Humphrey and Joseph Dodge of the Department of Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget, respectively. They argued that, more than the Communist threat, an unstable American economy, or the loss of power within, could possibly bring about an even greater threat. Dodge and Humphrey were looking at this situation with respect to the long term and the consequences of excessive spending over that time. They both agreed that although America could sustain a large output for a few years if necessary, it would mean eventual ruin should it last over a period of several years.28

Presenting an equally strong opposition to budget cuts were Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles; Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson; and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Arthur W. Radford. Dulles repeatedly professed the importance of national security over a balanced budget in saying that the government “would be irresponsible to throw its defense system out the window because we had to balance the budget.” Wilson and Radford strongly supported Dulles’ position and seconded the view that a balanced budget would just have to wait for a more opportune time.29

Despite these economic disagreements, the National Security Council succeeded in formulating a policy that Eisenhower found acceptable. His stance during the proceedings had remained unspoken, but it seemed evident by his comments that he was in favor of the position of both Dodge and Humphrey. Thus, he must have been pleased when the final paper came down on his side.30

Within the area of strategic planning and nuclear response, it was decided that in combination with massive retaliation the US would be prepared to “consider nuclear weapons...as available as other munitions” for use in war. Although Dodge and Humphrey won the economic round, Dulles and his supporters were the victors here. The President, however, made it very clear that regardless of what the National Security Council decided, the final say would be his and he would not hesitate to launch a nuclear attack if it was found to be necessary.31

The New Look originated not only from NSC 162\2, but also as the second

26Bobbitt, Democracy, 35.
27Brands, Age of Vulnerability, 969, 972.
28Ibid., 968–69.
29Ibid., 969–70.
30Ibid., 970, 972.
31Ibid., 971–72.
half of a two-part plan to deter the Soviets. Eisenhower took office with five guidelines in mind from which a national defense policy would be shaped and to which it would strictly adhere. The first of these was that the US would never initiate a major war. Thus, the armed forces would have to be of greater strength so as to withstand a first strike and still hold the power to destroy the enemy. Second, the goal of the US should be in creating a policy of deterrence rather than preparing to fight, although that ability should exist en masse fighting occurred for the simple fact that a “modern global war” would be entirely destructive. Third, the strength of the US cannot be measured purely in military terms, but must also be measured equally in terms “moral, intellectual and economic.” The fourth guideline was that American forces should be of such a modern state that they could effectively deter or respond to a modern twentieth century war. Lastly, the US should fully realize and accept the necessity for a number of alliances. This was due to the fact that America could never conceivably provide enough military strength to defend the free world without the help of allies.32

Eisenhower’s stated guidelines went on to form the two-part deterrence plan. While the first part was purely diplomatic in forging new alliances against the Communist bloc, the New Look was just as purely a military strategy. Originally this term represented something completely to the other side of the spectrum. It was coined as a 1950’s term to describe a radical change in the way women were dressing. Incidentally, Admiral Arthur W. Radford used the same term when referring to the “epochal developments” taking place in the technology of nuclear weapons. Thereafter, the term became the title of the administrations defense policy. According to Eisenhower, this may very well have led many to believe that he was making changes more radical than what they actually were. The fact was that this policy stressed technology of nuclear weapons over conventional troops at a proposed cost of three times the 1950 budget of $13 billion. This was still considerably less than the NSC estimate.33

To actually define the New Look, a breakdown of how Eisenhower Viewed American forces must first be given. In the first group he categorized “Nuclear retaliatory or strike forces” as the means to massive destruction aided primarily by the Strategic Air Command within the Air Force and the attack carriers of the Navy. The second group contained “Forces deployed overseas.” All armed forces were represented here and charged with protecting the free world borders. Next were Naval and Marine forces stationed in the Pacific and Atlantic to keep the lanes of communication open in the event of an emergency. Following this was “Forces to protect the United States from Air Attack.” These units were from both the Army and Air Force and were stationed to strategic points within the US. Eisenhower’s final designation was “Reserve Forces” which combined

32Smoke, National Security, 64; Eisenhower, Mandate, 446.
33Eisenhower, Mandate, 446, 452, 449; Smoke, National Security, 64, 66–67.
forces from all military branches.  

In understanding that these were divisions based on the tasks that were to be performed rather than simply on the different military branches, Eisenhower laid down the first part of the definition. It is, essentially, replacing emphasis on each group based on priorities or, "a reallocation of resources among the five" groups. The conclusion states that there will be a greater emphasis placed on the "deterrent and destructive power of improved nuclear weapons, better means of delivery, and effective air-defense units."  

The New Look of the Eisenhower administration conformed to NSC 162/2 by combining massive retaliation and the imminent use of nuclear weapons with a corresponding reduction in the majority of all other facets of the military. John Foster Dulles coined the term "massive retaliation" while explaining the US position in a speech shortly after the end of the Korean war. In essence, it was a threat that, should the Communist bloc attempt to invade the free world, the US would respond with a full nuclear attack against the USSR. 

The viability of this policy, for a time, was unmistakable. Initially, it was because the United States was enjoying a superior stance in weapons technology. This was primarily because the majority of other nations were repairing and rebuilding after the mass destruction encountered during W.W.II. Also lending to its viability was that it was never specified exactly what type of war or conflict would constitute a large enough threat to the free world to incur the wrath of the United States. American officials purposely left the Kremlin in a state of uncertainty; not knowing for sure what to expect from the US.  

With a nuclear response as a definite course of action, there was little use for more conventional tools of war. The branch of the armed forces to suffer the most was the army. The only area in which the Soviets were superior was in ground troops. No amount of American soldiers, with or without NATO support, could begin to compare to the Soviet Red Army. Additionally, Eisenhower contended that in the event of a nuclear war, it would be at least three months before more troops could be deployed to foreign soil. Therefore, only a small number were needed to participate in maybe one or two minor skirmishes. A final reason for demilitarizing US armed forces, and thus reducing superiority, was the reality that although Russia had the means to retaliate, they would never be able to successfully defend themselves. Hence, it wasn't necessary to rank superior in all areas of military preparedness. 

The present policy only necessitated the need for advancement in areas associated with nuclear weapons and their deployment. By the 1950's, the

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37 Ibid., 68–69, 71.
nuclear stockpile had reached massive proportions; so much so that the US would have been capable of going to war strictly with this weapon as their only source. The Army's air division was used to a certain extent and received substantially more funding than the rest of the divisions within that branch. The Navy was used on a limited basis as well; solely in their capacity to deploy aircraft carriers. However, the branch that ranked above all in its reliability and success in delivering a nuclear assault was the Air Force. More specifically, it was the Strategic Air Command and Air Defense Command within.40

John Foster Dulles entitled as brinksmanship the threat of massive retaliation; the ability to go to the brink of war without actually becoming engaged in it. In his view, the art of success was in being able to accomplish this. In both war and peace, chances had to be taken and a strong front had to be presented. This was only effective as long as the US had superior nuclear capabilities. Accordingly, after the Soviets became equally equipped, brinksmanship was used on a much lesser scale. Dulles has cited three instances in Eisenhower's first term when this strategy was called upon.41

In July of 1953, Eisenhower kept his promise to the American public to go to Korea and end the war. By 1953, the Chinese had yet to agree on an armistice. While Eisenhower threatened to expand the war, Dulles planted the thought among the Communist Chinese that America may resort to a nuclear attack if the peace talks did not resume. The dispute had come about over prisoner repatriation and the desire of the Chinese to get back all of their prisoners of war. The problem was that not all of them wanted to go back and the United States was not going to force them.42

The reputation Eisenhower had earned in W.W.II of using all available munitions against the enemy coupled with the American nuclear stockpile convinced the Chinese that they were facing a serious threat. Within two weeks, the Chinese agreed not only to resume the peace talks, but to allow international authorities to deal with the issue of repatriation. Finally, on July 26, 1953, the armistice was signed and the war was officially over. In this instance, the New Look succeeded in theory as it had yet to be fully developed on paper.43

The Vietnam war of 1952 brought about a second chance for the intervention of the New Look and, with it, brinksmanship. Eisenhower had three major concerns about the Indochinese war in the event of a continued stalemate or a French loss. First of all, if the war were to continue indefinitely, an already depleted France would be unable to meet its NATO obligations which, for the President, was top priority. Also, France was threatening to reject the European Defense Community should the US refuse to send in supporting forces. Eisen-

40 Ibid., 66-67; 451.
41 Ambrose, Globalism, 133.
42 Ibid., 134; Ambrose, Eisenhower, 34, 106.
43 Ibid., 52, 106, 134.
hower was in strong favor of the EDC and did not want to see it fail. Finally, America did not want to assume such a close threat as that which would exist should the Communists gain control of Indochina.  

By 1954, French forces at Dien Bien Phu were failing miserably and the North Vietnamese were in clear view of a victory. In an effort to contain Communist expansion, the US wanted to send in joint air strikes with Great Britain. Additionally, he proposed that Europe and Asia would send in more manpower to assist the French troops. Churchill was unmoved by this and all future attempts Eisenhower made. Other suggestions made by top officials included Nixon’s idea of sending in troops and, Air Force Chief of Staff, Nathan Twining’s suggestion of sending in three “small” atomic bombs. In Twining’s words, his solution would “clean those Commies out of there and the band could play ‘the Marseillaise’ and the French would come marching out...in fine shape.” Eisenhower adamantly opposed both avenues and in the end did not act at all. In this instance, brinksmanship had failed.

In the final conflict, the Chinese Communist’s (ChiCom’s) attack against the Tachen Islands in 1955 led Eisenhower to believe that an attack on Formosa and the Pescadores would be imminent, thereby compromising the Western Pacific border around Communism. Also, and more importantly, Quemoy and Matsu were under threat of a Communist takeover. Eisenhower reasoned that if these were to fall, then it would only be a matter of time before Formosa was hit. After some consideration, he decided to evacuate the Chinese Nationalists (ChiNats) and let the Tachen Islands go while giving full protection to Quemoy, Matsu, Formosa, and the Pescadores. Although defense of Formosa did not rely on keeping Quemoy and Matsu, it was important to the ChiNat’s morale that these islands remain nationalist.

In order to move forward with his resolution, Eisenhower needed Congressional approval. What he asked for, and subsequently received on January 28, was blanket approval to make any decisions and take any actions he deemed necessary to handle the crisis. As a result, he could bring in anything from ground troops to nuclear weapons. Although he adamantly objected to troops, he did eventually consider a tactical weapons assault. However, his official position on the subject was so ambiguous that the ChiComs were never sure what he would do. Fortunately, because of this confusion, they decided not to launch an invasion. The administration’s policy prevailed once again.

Despite its successes, there were many who criticized the administrations New Look. The views of most critics can be separated into two categories. The

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44Ibid., 134–35; 173.
46Ambrose, Globalism, 137.
47Ibid., 142.
48Ambrose, Eisenhower, 232, 236.
49Ibid., 232, 239, 245; Ambrose, Globalism, 143.
first is the concept of credibility. The belief was that because of growing Soviet capabilities, the US would not risk a nuclear war over a minor conflict someplace in the world. At one time this would have been an accepted course of action because the Soviets had an extremely limited nuclear arsenal. But as they began to reach a parity with America, the reality was that despite all of our technology, we would never be able to prevent the destruction of our own cities. This would always be the case because despite any leaps and bounds America made in the advancement of nuclear weapons or their delivery, there could not be any doubt that the Soviets were not far behind.\footnote{Smoke, \textit{National Security}, 83–84, 86.}

The critics noted that this was not simply their belief, but it would be the belief of all nations. Neither the USSR nor China would ever accept that, should they engage in another conflict such as Korea, the Americans would risk W.W.III. In addition, none of our allies or any of the nations of Western Europe would believe this. In fact, a European circle of critics made this same argument. As a result, Western Europe insisted that the US station a large number of troops in their area so that if a sizable conflict broke out, the US would be bound to fight. In this way, there could be no last minute policy changes and any doubts would be of no consequence.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 84–85.} In effect, the major drawback to Eisenhower’s policy was that it required the US to “risk national suicide for interests not inherently vital to American security.”\footnote{Brands, \textit{Age of Vulnerability}, 73.}

The second criticism of massive retaliation involved the vulnerability of overseas SAC bases. By the 1950's, the combined number of foreign and domestic SAC bases was well below 50. As time progressed and analysts found that Soviet military strength was far beyond the original estimation, these bases became more vulnerable. The fear was that, with long-range bombers, the Soviets would be able to launch a successful first strike against these bases, thereby crippling the US effort. To the critics, it seemed that the massive retaliation policy would initiate this action because clearly it would give the USSR a substantial advantage. They would be fully aware that, if war broke out, the US would rely on the B–47’s and B–52’s housed at these bases. Obviously it would be easier to destroy the aircraft while it was still on the ground which led many to the conclusion that the USSR might be inclined to start a nuclear war.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 974–75; Smoke, \textit{National Security}, 89–90.}

A final criticism of massive retaliation was that it locked the US into an “all or nothing” response. In doing so it did not allow for limited intervention. Army Chief of Staff Matthew Ridgway was the major advocate of this position. He thought that the US should be capable of meeting any conflict, anywhere in the world, and with the ability to engage at any level. However, this would have
required more than Eisenhower was willing to spend. In any case, there were enough troops to intervene on a small scale as was the situation with the 1958 Lebanese crisis.54

In forging the New Look, Eisenhower was able to prevent the United States from falling into a traditional stance of isolationism while moving towards a more international activist position. Through a combination of special task groups and committees, the policy was given life, and finally formalized in National Security Council meeting 162/2. Resting on the premises that the US and Soviet Union were intertwined in a long-standing conflict that would bring about the demise of one or the other, the US launched a new and improved containment policy that would provide for increased national security.

The New Look had two basic philosophies. National security would be accomplished through the promise of nuclear intervention in any conflict of an unspecified degree at any time. It was this ambiguity that brought success to the New Look. The response of massive retaliation would allow the administration to keep with its intended goals of balancing the budget without having to increase taxes. As well as national security, this was Eisenhower’s most important objective.

Despite numerous criticisms, the New Look prevailed throughout Eisenhower’s two terms in office. The deterrent effect of the New Look, it can be said, usually accomplished its intended goals of containing Communism without the use or loss of large numbers of American troops. Examples of success and failure can be seen in the conflicts of China, Korea, and Vietnam. He never strayed far from this policy and in doing so he was able to leave office knowing that he had not been responsible for the loss of American lives on foreign soil.

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54Ambrose, Eisenhower, 172, 464; Ambrose, Globalism, 132.
Italy and the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939

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An insufferably cocky Joachim von Ribbentrop informed Galeazzo Ciano at 10:30 pm on August 21, 1939 of his impending departure for Moscow to sign a political accord with the Soviet Union, an accord directed against Poland. Ciano, Italy’s foreign minister, later complained, “And naturally, he spoke as if this were a fact! All that remained for me was to wish him a good flight...”

The diplomatic coup so astonished and impressed Benito Mussolini and Ciano that for twenty-four hours they believed that the Germans could localize their war against Poland, an idea heretofore they had vigorously rejected. For the moment neither criticized Berlin or asked for clarification. Ciano confided to his later-famous diary:

Last night...a new act opened.... I suspended all decisions.... A long telephone conversation with the Duce...the Germans have struck a masterstroke. The European situation is upset.... Nevertheless, we must make no hasty decisions. We must wait, and, if possible, be ready ourselves to gain something in Croatia or Dalmatia. The Duce has set up an ad hoc army commanded by Graziani...  

Italy’s embassy in Berlin had not been particularly helpful in preparing Rome for the new situation. Embassy counselor Massimo Magistrati, a confidant of both Hermann Göring and Ciano, reflected this confusion. To his surprise, at the last moment before leaving for Moscow, Ribbentrop had canceled a planned visit with Ciano, who had decided to confront the Germans about their plans. Magistrati complained that Berlin had deceived him by

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1Dino Alfieri, Due dittatori di fronte, 2nd ed. (Milan: Rizzoli, 1948), 204. Alfieri concluded that Ciano, accustomed to the limelight, was annoyed that the German coup would occupy world attention. For the pact’s impact on Rome, see 203–06. Ciano represented the younger generation of fascists. Married to Mussolini’s daughter, he became foreign minister in June 1936 at the age of 34. Good-natured and intelligent, he was also corrupt, self-indulgent, frivolous, and often decided policy by vanity and pique. He was executed in 1944 for treason by his father-in-law.

2Ibid., 203.

masking its political negotiations with Moscow behind an economic façade.4

On the morning of August 22, the high-ranking fascist diplomat, Dino Alfieri, went to Mussolini to present him with the daily report. He found the Duce pensive, waiting to see how news of the pact was being received abroad. Mussolini reflected,

Despite my firm and convinced anti-Bolshevism, I was the first to recognize the USSR. From that to signing a pact, however, is a long way. Obviously the world is evolving, the bolshevism of 1917 is very different from the communism of today. Any nation, while maintaining its own ideological principles and positions, can establish relations of convenience and make economic agreements. We will see. Keep me informed of reactions.5

The Nazi-Soviet agreement violated the Pact of Steel of May 22, 1939 which had allied Rome and Berlin, and it made nonsense of the common Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936—an alliance sanctified by martyrs in the Spanish Civil War and grist from propaganda mills. Nonetheless, on August 25 the Duce wrote Hitler about that agreement:

I approve of it completely. His Excellency Göring will tell you that in the colloquy I had with him last April, I affirmed that—to avoid encirclement by the democracies—a German-Soviet rapprochement was necessary.6

This strange ambivalence, confusion, and indecision went deeper. The Germans, for example, told Rome that their pact with the Soviets included several secret protocols. Oddly, the Italians never even asked for, much less demanded, their full disclosure. No small matter, given that Mussolini and Ciano had returned to their conviction that Germany could not localize the war with Poland. They knew that an expanded war threatened to make mincemeat of their ill-prepared military machine. This sanguine attitude was doubly strange given that for years, with only a brief respite during the Spanish Civil War, Mussolini had encouraged Hitler to settle his differences with the Bolshevist regime.

How can this Italian reaction be explained? According to the late Mario Toscano, the respected diplomatic historian, the Pact of Steel had been born in an understanding regarding the propriety and limits of an accord with the USSR. The purpose of the agreement was to block the successful conclusion of Anglo-

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5Alfieri, Due dittatori, 204. Although a reluctant fusionist with the fascists, Alfieri, 1886–1966, served them in many capacities. He was Italy’s ambassador to Berlin from May 1940 until his dismissal in July 1943, when he participated in removing the Duce from power.

Soviet negotiations. Up to then the fascist government had been aware of virtually all of the essential elements of the Moscow-Berlin negotiations. It had encouraged them to the Soviet foreign commissariat. It had transmitted to the Kremlin the first concrete Axis proposals for a political accord. And it had cultivated the possibility of a parallel Italo-Soviet understanding.

But Bernardo Attolico, Italy’s ambassador in Berlin, was skeptical about the chances for successfully concluding the Axis negotiations in Moscow, and Mussolini and Ciano fully shared that skepticism. These doubts paralyzed fascist diplomacy and encouraged Rome to believe that an Anglo-Soviet accord was probable, despite the absolute rejection of that idea by Augusto Rosso, Italy’s ambassador to the Kremlin. Not withstanding its alliance agreement with Rome, the Wilhelmstrasse therefore refused to be open with the negative Attolico.

In fact, during the summer of 1939, the outward appearance of agreement between Rome and Berlin concealed underlying Italian resentments and a fundamental lack of harmony and mutual confidence. While anxiously presenting a united front with Italy to the outside world, Germany was less interested in keeping Rome fully informed as to its intentions. The Nazi government, for example, did not directly inform Italy of the critical soundings made in Berlin by the counselor of the Soviet embassy on May 5, 9, and 17. These approaches would have interested Rome, because, to substantiate his belief in the possibility of ameliorating Soviet-German relations, the Soviet counselor had:

> repeatedly referred to Italy and stressed that the Duce even after the creation of the Axis had let it be known that there were no obstacles to a normal development of the political and economic relations between Italy and the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, only the confidences to Rosso by the German ambassador in Moscow allowed Rome to know the essentials of German activity in the Soviet

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7For Italy’s relations with the Soviet Union from 1939 to 1941, see Mario Toscano, *Designs in Diplomacy: Pages from European Diplomatic History in the Twentieth Century*, trans. and ed. George A. Carbone (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 48–252.

8Attolico, 1880–1942, served as ambassador to Moscow from 1930 to 1935 and to Berlin from 1935 to 1940. In this latter post he sought to prevent his country’s total subservience to Nazi Germany and contributed significantly to Italy’s decision for “nonbelligeranza” in 1939. Overworked, he died during the war while serving as ambassador to the Vatican.

9Rosso, who had been ambassador to Washington, DC before his posting in Moscow, worked hard to encourage good relations between his country and the USSR. Charles Bohlen of America’s embassy to the Kremlin had a source in the German embassy in Moscow and knew beforehand of the Soviet-German negotiations and the pact to which they led in August 1939. Presumably unaware of the depth of the German ambassador’s personal relationship with the Italian ambassador, this source incorrectly assured Bohlen that Rosso knew nothing of the secret negotiations. Bohlen characterized Rosso, who had married an American, as strongly anti-fascist and pro-American, and he regretted that after the war he was mislabeled as pro-Nazi and was never given another responsible government job. Rosso entertained frequently and invited the Bohlens to many of his functions. Charles Eustis Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929–1969* (New York: Norton, 1973), 99.

10DGFP, D, 6: nos. 332, 351, 406.
capital and to measure the degree of German reticence toward Italy. But
threatened by this confidential information, Rosso, not Attolico, more accurately
appraised the chances of the Soviets reaching an agreement with either Britain
or Germany.

Many of Rosso’s reports, however, carry a plaintive tone, and some scarcely
veil their criticism. For example, in the late fall of 1939 while responding to a
series of questions put to him by Filippo Anfuso, the chief of cabinet and
Ciano’s confidant, Rosso privately wrote him complaining that those questions
marked “the first indication of interest” from the foreign ministry in three
years. He begged for directives, information, and orientation, and he requested
authorization to return home briefly to complete his presentation and to divine
his government’s intentions. The Soviet Union was a major power around
which had swirled critical events over the last several years, and Italy’s foreign
minister had turned his ambassador to that post into a poor beggar. Ciano,
arguing that a visit might lead to rumors and erroneous interpretations, rejected
Rosso’s plea.

For all intents and purposes, the Duce and his son-in-law ignored the reports
of this experienced diplomat, as much out of personal dislike as anything else.
Reflecting this idiosyncratic blindness, Ciano hardly mentions the USSR in his
diary before mid-August 1939. Because information on the Nazi-Soviet negoti-
atations came largely from their Moscow embassy, both Mussolini and Ciano
were seduced into underestimating the development of Nazi-Soviet relations. In
fact, the entire correspondence from Moscow was not routed to Ciano’s kitchen
 cabinet within the foreign ministry, the Gabinetto, but to area desks along with
all other dispatches of ordinary interest. That the entire Soviet matter seemed
neither secret nor important explains Italian surprise on August 21 at the im-
iminent conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. This indifference to its Moscow
embassy greatly hampered Rome in developing a useful policy toward Germany,
the USSR, and the developing war.

Was the Kremlin aware of this confusing Italian nonchalance? And, if so,
did the Soviets try to take advantage of it? It would be helpful to say something

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12*DDI*, 9th, 1: no. 796. Anfuso, 1901–63, entered the foreign ministry in 1925. He proved loyal to
the Salo Republic during World War II.
15Ciano had deprived the functionaries at Palazzo Chigi of their traditional policy-making role by
moving all important work to the Gabinetto, which became Ciano’s chief instrument for directing foreign
policy. As many Italian diplomats have testified, this mechanism led to confusion and error. Gordon
517–19.
16On these points, it is difficult to add much of significance to Toscano’s work. Perhaps, however,
Mussolini and Ciano were not quite as foolish in this regard as they might seem at first blush. In 1938,
Attolico’s advice that a Nazi-Soviet Pact had not then been in the offing had proved sounder than
Rosso’s. Perhaps Mussolini and his son-in-law were relying too much on a proven track record.
first about the larger skein of Italo-Soviet relations after Hitler’s rise to power. In both Rome and Moscow, the reactions to the Führer were remarkably similar in their ambivalence. Both tended to underestimate him and the significance of Nazi ideology for practical politics, and both hoped to continue their tripartite cooperation with Germany directed against France and its allies.

Yet both also suspected the possible revolutionary potential of Hitler’s regime and took precautions. As part of these precautions, in May 1933 Rome and Moscow signed a commercial accord, followed in September by a Pact of Friendship, Neutrality, and Nonaggression. Exchanges of military observers and commissions, and Italian technical help with, and construction of, Soviet warships and dirigibles marked this budding friendship.\(^{17}\)

The Soviets had an abiding interest in Italy. Despite the lack of Soviet documents revealing the deepest thoughts of the Kremlin’s leaders, it is reasonable to suppose that Moscow valued its Italian contacts, especially for the triple pressure they put on Berlin. Most important, they honed to a sharp edge Rome’s opposition to Nazi designs on Austria by implicitly opening the possibility of Soviet support—even military support—for Italy’s defense of that country. Second, such cooperation reminded the German military establishment and industrialists of the value of their own lost, Rapallo-era cooperation with the USSR.\(^{18}\) By drawing closer to Italy, Moscow also was showing Berlin that ideology need not get in the way of friendly relations. Frequently criticizing Berlin for causing the breakdown in Soviet-German relations, Mussolini himself many times tried to drive this last point home to Hitler.\(^{19}\) And, finally, third, Moscow presumably thought its cooperation with Rome paralleled by Franco-Soviet political, economic, and military exchanges, to be useful in greasing the ways for Italo-French cooperation. Collaboration among the three capitals would put Germany into a vise to squeeze Hitler to impotence or—even better—to force him to return to loyal, Rapallo-like cooperation.\(^{20}\)

From the Kremlin’s vantage, in other words, Rome had a most important role to play in forging the incipient collective security coalition designed to keep Germany in its place. Until 1936 or so, Italy was the one power with both the will and the means to stop German expansionism in its tracks through direct

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18On January 13, 1934, e.g., at a farewell dinner given by the Red Army for the departing Italian military attaché, Aldo de Ferrari, the Red Army’s chief of staff told the German military attaché that he desired renewed military cooperation. To put an edge on his wish, he also intimated that Moscow was considering equipping Soviet submarines with Italian torpedoes. *DGPP*, C, 2: 191.

19For one example in 1933 of Soviet appreciation for Rome’s intercession in Berlin, see Attolico to Rome, 4/10/33; Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Direzione Generale degli Affari Politici, URSS (Rome). [Hereafter cited as MAE (Rome) AP URSS] b(usta) 10 f(oglio) 1.

20As for Rome, Italy needed military contracts to pay for its imports of Soviet oil and timber, and in trying to balance its trade deficit, Rome had little else that Moscow wanted. Politically, Italy had to find support against Nazi encroachments on Austria. And further, Rome needed Paris, and the French desire for Soviet support forced Rome to subliminate its rivalry with the USSR in Slavic Southeast Europe.
Italy and the Nazi-Soviet Pact

political and military intervention in Austria against Anschluss. And it was only through Rome that its protégées, Austria and Hungary, could be brought to cooperate with the French allies in East and Southeast Europe—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Italy’s critical place in the anti-German coalition is easily demonstrated. Witness only that the ramshackle structure did collapse in 1935 and 1936 following the strains of the Italo-Ethiopian War, when Rome withdrew itself from anti-German cooperation.

In retrospect, Italy’s slide down the slippery path into a suffocating German alliance might seem to have been inevitable. During the mid- and late-1930s, however, the matter was not quite so clear. Despite its constant fears of the worst, all the way to June 22, 1941 when Italy followed Germany into war against Soviet Russia, Moscow consistently tried to wean Rome from its German alliance. Following the Italo-Ethiopian War, for example, the Kremlin in May 1936 offered Rome a tripartite Italo-Franco-Soviet accord in exchange for the removal of Soviet sanctions. During July, rumors abounded that Mussolini had been seriously studying the possibility. In the end, however, Italy broke off trade negotiations with the Soviet Union, although Ciano claimed for economic rather than political reasons.

The Kremlin’s efforts at reconciliation after Italy’s Ethiopian adventure were dashed on the rocks of the Spanish Civil War, begun in July 1936, with Italy and Germany supporting Francisco Franco’s rebel Nationalists, and the USSR supplying the Republicans. For the next three years, relations between the two states degenerated into little more than vicious public attacks on one another and covert Italian submarine and air attacks on Soviet merchantmen plying the Mediterranean. In 1937 and 1938, commercial relations between the two plummeted to almost nothing.

Undeterred, once Spain’s fate had been decided, the Soviets in early 1939 used Italy to try to prove once again to Hitler that different ideologies need not hinder cooperation between two governments. First, a series of prisoner exchanges—Soviet merchant crews held by Franco exchanged for Italians arrested in the USSR—cleaned up the wreckage left over from the Spanish Civil

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21For one Soviet propagandist/intelligence agent’s appreciative description of the role Rome played in putting down the Nazi putsch of July 25, 1934 in Austria, see Ernst Henri (Henri Rostovskii), Hitler Over Russia? The Coming Fight Between the Fascist and Socialist Armies, Michael Davidson, trans. (London: J. M. Dent, 1936), 38–53, 82–120.


23Vitetti to Rome, 7/18/36: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b21 f5.


25Italy’s exports to the Soviet Union dropped from 9 million lire in 1937 to 1 million lire in 1938, and its imports from 105 million lire to 7 million. Ibid., 2: 107.
War.\textsuperscript{26}

Most important, the two managed to restore commercial relations. That process began on January 23, 1939 when deputy foreign commissar V. P. Potemkin called Rosso's attention to Ciano's recent statement expressing "the hope for ameliorating relations between the two countries, at least in the economic field."\textsuperscript{27} The vice commissar also suggested the "generic" possibility that his government would enter into commercial negotiations with Germany, a prospect which Germany's embassy in Moscow confirmed. Rosso, as well as foreign ministry officials in Rome, recognized the inherent potential for Soviet-German political and military cooperation flowing out of such economic negotiations. By linking the notion of economic cooperation with both Italy and Germany, perhaps Soviet leaders were floating a trial balloon to Germany; perhaps they were attempting to split the Axis by bolstering Italy.\textsuperscript{28}

In any case, the Italo-Soviet commercial rapprochement sent a strong political message.\textsuperscript{29} On February 7, Rome and Moscow concluded a series of economic protocols exchanging the funds mutually impounded the year before, detailing the methods of commercial exchanges, and giving the Soviets possession of a cruiser previously ordered from Ansaldo of Genoa.\textsuperscript{30}

This agreement, however, erected an artificial and unstable economic structure. For example, as one of its direct results, Charles Bohlen of America's Moscow embassy was able to purchase a ticket from Moscow to New York for $15.00. His embassy had obtained rubles on the black market at a rate of 60 and 70 to the dollar, while the ticket was written in lire at the official rate of 1.15 rubles per dollar. This ticket provided not only first-class rail accommodations from Moscow to Genoa, but also first class passage on the luxury liner, \textit{Conti di Savoia}, to New York.\textsuperscript{31} This economic irrationality, however, was unimportant, because the true significance of the commercial accord lay in the political rather than in the economic field.

\textsuperscript{26}For this, plus Italian mediation in attempts to secure the return of 3,000 Spanish children sent to the USSR early in the war, see the numerous documents in MAE (Rome) AP URSS b34 f4 and f6. The Spanish Nationalists also asked for Italian intervention in Moscow to secure the exchange of nine Spanish merchant ships detained in the USSR for the six Soviet ships held by the Nationalists. See the documents in MAE (Rome) AP URSS b34 f10.

\textsuperscript{27}Rosso to Rome, 1/18/38, 1/24/39; Del Balzo circular, 1/31/39: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b35 f3. Vladimir Petrovich Potemkin, 1878–1946, was the Soviet plenipotentiary representative to Italy from 1932 to 1934, when he signed the Italo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, and Nonaggression.

\textsuperscript{28}Rosso and Attolico attempted to keep Rome abreast of the commercial negotiations between Moscow and Berlin, begun on December 19, and their implications. See, e.g., the reports on the delays. Rosso to Rome, 1/26/39, 1/21/39, 1/31/39, 2/4/39; Attolico to Rome, 2/4/39; see also Grandi to Rome, 1/31/39: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b35 f3.

\textsuperscript{29}See Dmitrii Dmitriyevich Mishustin, ed., \textit{Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR: Kratkoe uchebnoe posobie}, 3rd ed., rev. (Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnaia kniga," 1941), 28. See \textit{Pravda}, Feb. 8, 1940 for Molotov's later comments that this trade agreement symbolized the possibility of coming to a full political understanding with Italy.

\textsuperscript{30}Printed copies of the agreements can be found in MAE (Rome) AP URSS b34 f15. See Bayer, "Soviet Foreign Trade Policies," \textit{Soviet Russia Today} 8 (Apr. 1939): 26, 39.

\textsuperscript{31}Bohlen, \textit{Witness}, 99.
Especially after Germany’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in March, Moscow worked hard to convince Rome that they had common interests directed against Germany. For example, Rosso summarized for Rome a conversation in which Potemkin observed,

I am convinced that before long your great leader will recognize that between Italy [and] the USSR exists a community of political interests...and I do not see that a difference of regimes ought to preclude repeating that collaboration that I myself had the good fortune of initiating when I had the honor of representing my government in Rome [in 1933].

Rosso posited that the Soviets would take advantage of the tense international situation surrounding Poland to force Britain and France to champion collective security openly. He stressed, as he had many times before, that the Soviets wished to take advantage of any conflict to further the proletarian revolution and that the Kremlin would maneuver to maintain its freedom of action. He doubted that Moscow wished to assume precise obligations toward the two western democracies.

On April 6, Ambassador Rosso described for Rome a conversation with Potemkin, and he again volunteered his views on Soviet foreign policy. He strongly argued that a tripartite Anglo-Soviet-French agreement was impossible:

...it is my impression that in the depths of their souls these gentlemen continue to believe that England is continually working to channel the German torrent toward the east.

Rosso described Potemkin as emphasizing

‘common [Italo-Soviet] interests’ in the political as well as in the economic fields. This time he made no further mention of raising a barrier against German expansionism but only of ‘taking a common equilibrating action,’ particularly in southeastern Europe.

Rosso thought that Potemkin was speaking sincerely. After all, it was to the Soviets’ advantage to have a friendly Italy that would not hamper the movement of Soviet merchant and naval ships.

It is even more obvious that Moscow would like to have a friendly Italy disposed to cooperate with the U.S.S.R. in applying the brakes to German penetrations of the Balkans.

Despite their press attacks, which Rosso stressed were no more violent than those in the Italian press on the USSR, the Soviets had avoided a complete

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33Toscano, Designs, 55.
break and were leaving the door open to a tactical amelioration of relations.

The fundamental and ultimate goal of the Kremlin, the one which determines the general directives of the Politbureau, remains the proletarian revolution which will destroy the ‘capitalist encirclement’ often referred to by Stalin. From these fundamentals stems my view that the Soviet leaders desire and indirectly encourage a world war that will force the antagonistic elements in the capitalist world to clash and to destroy themselves. The U.S.S.R. will make every effort to remain out of the conflict until the moment arrives which will permit her to facilitate the creation of the largest possible number of ‘novus ordo’ Communist states.\textsuperscript{34}

We may debate whether a satellite Eastern Europe was Stalin’s original purpose,\textsuperscript{35} but certainly Rosso was remarkably prescient in describing the actual course of future events.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1939, a disappointed Soviet press closely followed Italy’s decline from a vigorous, fully independent military, diplomatic, and economic power capable of standing up to Germany, to one increasingly tied to Hitler’s whims.\textsuperscript{36} Could fascist Italy be used to control to any degree Nazi gluttony? Or would Mussolini feast on scraps tossed his way by Hitler? Seemingly inconsistent public statements and actions toward Italy are easily explained: they at all times represented Moscow’s desperate hopes for the best and profound fears of the worst.\textsuperscript{37}

We could carry this discussion on to August 1939 and even beyond to June 1941, but the heart of the story would remain the same. All in all, Italian documents clearly show that the Kremlin followed a consistent policy toward Italy, a policy which also reveals its larger perspective toward its international situation.

Although fearing Nazi ambitions, the Kremlin was determined to cooperate, if possible, with Hitler. Fascist Italy had a two-pronged role to play vis-à-vis

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., 55–57, 60–61; Rosso to Ciano, 4/6/39, elucidating Rosso to Rome, 4/5/39; MAE (Rome) AP URSS b34 f6.

\textsuperscript{35}Vojtech Mastny in Russia’s Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941–1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), e.g., has convincingly described the evolution of Stalin’s aims.

\textsuperscript{36}See, e.g., Izvestia, Apr. 27, May 5, 6, 9–11, 17, 21–24, 1939; Pravda, May 4, 5, 8–10, 24–26, June 4, 6, 25, 30, Aug. 8, 1939; Rosso to Ciano, 5/11/39, 7/20/39: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b36 (1939) f1.

\textsuperscript{37}For example, repeating its contention that the Italo-German collaboration could not be split, on May 11 Izvestia noted that the two fascist states merely were conducting parallel policies, which frequently, but not necessarily, had to draw together. Although some, Izvestia continued, hoped to detach Italy from Germany and thereby isolate Berlin, their alliance had put an end to such hopes and had worsened the international situation. The paper also emphasized that the Anti-Comintern Pact was but a mask hiding a bloc directed against Britain and France. This situation had forced the democratic states to negotiate with the USSR. Frederick Lewis Schuman, Night Over Europe: The Diplomacy of Nemesis, 1939–1940 (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1941), 236–37; Izvestia, May 11, 1939; New York Times, May 12, 1939; Rosso to Rome, 5/18/39, 5/25/39: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b36 (1939) f1; Andrei Andreevich Gromyko, et al., SSSR v bor’be za mir nakonune vtoroi mirovoi voiny (sentiabr’ 1938 g.–avgust 1939 g.) Dokumenty i materialy (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoj literatury, 1971), 390–93.
Germany. The Kremlin tried to use Mussolini as a vehicle to approach Hitler and did its utmost to exploit any friction between Italy and Germany in order to hinder the Nazi advance into Southeast Europe. Fascists, Moscow thought, might join collective security arrangements, because Italy had as much to lose from a self-aggrandizing Nazi Germany as did Soviet Russia. Without Italy, Nazi Germany would be isolated in Europe and could turn only to the USSR for support. If Germany, against all reason, chose to continue its anti-Soviet policies, without allies it posed less of a threat to the world’s first socialist state.

Soviet policy seemed vindicated with Italy’s declaration of “nonbelligeranza” at the onset of World War II, and, rationally, that policy followed so assiduously since 1933 should not have come to naught. Mussolini had represented Italy’s interests quite well in the first half of the 1930s and at times had appeared willing to entertain the Kremlin’s entreaties to work toward their common interests. Seduced, however, by his own vainglory and fatally mesmerized by Hitler’s successes, he ultimately joined the Führer in the fateful attack on Soviet Russia on June 22, 1941.

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The Failure of British Strategy in the Balkans, 1939–1941

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Historians concerned with British strategy in the Balkans have viewed the period 1939 through 1940 as mere prelude to the real war in that theater. They have not seen the lost opportunities, largely because no action in the Balkans was possible without Turkey's active support, and Turkey's later behavior has led to the assumption that Ankara's active intervention could never have been obtained.1 Turkey was only interested in war with Italy, and the value to the Allies of Mussolini's nonbelligerency has been accepted.2

Yet it is the last decade's reevaluation of the benefit of Italian nonbelligerency that warrants a reexamination of British policy in the Balkans.3 Not only did Italian nonbelligerency leave a hole in the blockade, the basis of British war strategy, and free Hitler of the need to divert short supplies to his ally, it removed all desire by Turkey to enter the war. The Turks gravely re- sented Italy's claim to leadership in the Balkans, and its conquest of Muslim Albania and occupation of the Dodecanese Islands off Turkey's south-west coast. Without Italy in the war, there would be no Turkish intervention. With-

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2Characteristic of secondary works: Eleanor M. Gates, _End of the Affair: The Collapse of the Anglo-French Alliance, 1939–40_ (Berkeley, CA, 1981), 35–38, dismisses the proposals for action in the Balkans in less than 4 pages; Elisabeth Barker, _British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War_ (London, 1976), 5–19, summarizes the entire period up to the fall of France in just over 16 pages; Frank G. Weber, _The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War_ (Columbia, MO, 1979), is primarily concerned with the Near East and the conflicting interests of the Turks, Arabs, Germans, Italians, French, and British in that region, rather than the Balkans. Regarding British policy, using only Foreign Office records and neglecting relevant Cabinet records, he overlooks economic strategy. None of these authors question the value of Italian nonbelligerency to the British.

3For comparison with British policy in the Balkans in the early months of the First World War, see Lynn H. Curtwright, _Muddle, Indecision and Setback: British Policy and the Balkan States, August 1914 to the Inception of the Dardanelles Campaign_ (Thessaloniki, 1986).


5That the Allies committed a grave mistake, when they allowed Mussolini to remain out of the war in September 1939, was put forth in Williamson Murray's _Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938–1939: The Path to Ruin_ (Princeton, 1984), 314–321. MacGregor Knox, _Mussolini Unleashed, 1939–1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascists Italy's Last War_ (Cambridge, 1982), 44–45, agrees with Murray's assessment, noting an earlier article by that author. Both historians acknowledge each other's assistance in the preparation of their books. More recently, Paul Kennedy, _The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000_ (New York, 1987), 298, 340–41, agrees with Murray and Knox, citing the two above works. These authors do not mention the effect of Italian nonbelligerency on Turkey and the Balkans.
out Turkish intervention, the other Balkan states had little hope of resisting German demands.

Concerning the importance on having Italy in the war, Britain’s Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of War had concluded in the summer of 1938 that, from the standpoint of economic warfare, Rome’s entry into war on the side of Germany would be to the advantage of the Allies. 4 Similarly, the Chiefs of Staff’s European Appreciation of February 1939, calling for the Allies to build up their defenses while using the blockade to strangle the German economy, paid considerable attention to Italy as the Axis partner against whom the Allies were capable of taking military action.5

Attention did not turn to the Balkans, however, until after the German occupation of Czechoslovakia on March 15, when rumors abounded that Germany had presented Romania with an ultimatum. Regarding this apparent threat to Romania, the Cabinet agreed that Britain should make approaches to Russia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece, inviting them to join in resisting “any act of German aggression aimed at obtaining domination in South-East Europe.”6 Though a March 28 report by the Chiefs of Staff, was extremely pessimistic about Romania’s abilities, it concluded that Romania, like far better-prepared Poland, would, if occupied, contain a considerable number of German divisions. The paper went on again to stress Italian economic vulnerability and the role Turkey could play against the Italians:

the vital factor in her economic position is her dependence on seaborne imports, particularly oil. If seaborne imports were to be completely cut off, as they certainly would be if Turkey were our ally, Italy would have to depend on Germany for supplies, and in this sense her entry into the war would prove an embarrassment to her ally. Whereas if Italy remained neutral, she would prove a valuable channel for seaborne supply to Germany.7

The fear of an invasion of Romania soon subsided, as attention turned to the German threat to Poland. The Balkans received less attention until Italy invaded Albania on Good Friday, April 7. Britain decided on Easter Monday to guarantee Greece, as it and France had done Poland on March 31, and to work toward an alliance with Turkey. But the French, who feared that leaving Romania out would invite German aggression, pressed for a guarantee of Romania as well. The British relented, and the guarantees were announced on April 13. Britain would now base its future strategy in southeastern Europe on an alliance with Turkey, where the Italian invasion of Albania had swung the Ankara into the

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5Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, European Appreciation 1939–1940, 2/20/39, CAB 16/183/44, D.P.(P)44.
7Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, Military Implications of an Anglo-French Guarantee to Poland and Rumania, 3/28/39, CAB 53/47, C.O.S.872.
western camp. The resulting Anglo-Turkish Declaration of May 12 promised mutual assistance in the event of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean. Having achieved the first step in an alliance with Turkey, London then set to extend Turkish obligations to cover all of the Balkans.\(^8\)

Britain, however, was losing sight of the greater picture and would forfeit all when its leaders became convinced that summer that Italian neutrality, if possible, would be preferable. The shift in British policy toward Italy came out of a Chiefs of Staff’s report of July 18. It proclaimed:

> although a neutral Italy would to some extent handicap the application of economic pressure to Germany, it would reduce our military commitments, and our military risks. We would therefore conclude that Italian neutrality… would be…preferable to her active hostility.\(^9\)

Britain’s military planners had overlooked that Turkey, upon which the British were counting, had no desire to enter a war in which Italy remained neutral.

While Britain was coming to prefer an Italian neutrality that would cause the Allies to lose Turkey’s active intervention, Paris was proposing the establishment of a front in the Balkans, dependent on Turkish intervention. At the Anglo-French Staff Conversations on July 13, the French had proposed the sending of an expeditionary force to Salonika in Greece. At the same time, Turkish troops would land in the Italian-held Dodecanese Islands.\(^10\) On August 28, the question of an expedition to Salonika was again discussed. Paris announced that General Weygand would command French forces in the Near East.\(^11\) Weygand’s words and deeds there would cause the British endless anxieties throughout the following months.

When war broke out, the treaty with Turkey had not yet been signed. The War Cabinet on September 4 resolved that the treaty should be concluded as soon as possible, but discussion then turned to the importance of Italian neutrality.\(^12\) The government overlooked this inherent contradiction in Britain’s strategy in the difficult circumstances of the first days of the war. Turkey would not join the Allies unless Italy came into the war, and the War Cabinet was increasingly determined to keep Italy out.

The arrival in Turkey of General Weygand caused grave apprehension in London during the following weeks. The British military attaché at Ankara reported that the general had told him that stronger allied action was needed in the Balkans; that the Greeks must be reinforced; and that if this brought Italy


\(^12\)Minutes of the War Cabinet, 9/4/39, CAB 65/1, W.M.2(39).
into the war it was merely precipitating what in his opinion was a foregone conclusion.¹³

Regarding Italy, the Balkans, Turkey, and British strategy in general, the War Cabinet meeting of September 14 was one of the most important in the early period of the war. Circular logic prevailed. Each point approved was contradicted by the next. The War Cabinet considered two long-awaited papers on the Balkans. The first was a report by the Chiefs of Staff who had been asked to consider a telegram received on September 6. In it Sir Percy Loraine, the British Ambassador, had reported a conversation with the frightened Yugoslav minister in Rome, recounting:

He said there was no shadow of doubt that if the allies tried to attack Germany through the Balkans both Italy and the U.S.S.R. would intervene.... [It] would be the end of everything.¹⁴

This view is completely opposite to that presented by Prince Paul, the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia, to the British and French ministers at Belgrade. In Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934–1941, J. P. Hopnter states that, in the first week of the war, the prince had urged that the French land a force at Salonika as quickly as possible, even without Italy’s consent.¹⁵ Hopnter notes the British Minister’s telegrams from Belgrade, printed in Documents on British Foreign Policy, which stated that Prince Paul had said that, if Britain allowed Italy to adopt neutrality with the prospect of entering the war when it suited Rome and Berlin, the Balkan states, and perhaps Turkey as well, would be driven to accept whatever terms they could get from Hitler.¹⁶ The government, however, paid more attention to Loraine’s endorsement of the panicky statements of the Yugoslav minister and forwarded them to the Chiefs of Staff, who were asked, in view of this telegram, whether it would be preferable:

a) to have the Balkan Entente neutral so long as Italy also remains neutral, or
b) to have Turkey, Greece and Roumania belligerent on our side, even though this would inevitably involve the accession of Italy to Germany.

The Chiefs of Staff began their report by favoring keeping the Balkans and Italy neutral. But they concluded,

Whereas the intervention of Greece or Roumania on our side could only add to our immediate commitments, the addition of Turkey to the ranks of the Allies would materially improve the allied position if Germany attempts a

¹⁶Documents on British Foreign Policy, 3rd series, 7: nos. 554–56.
drive into the Balkans.\textsuperscript{17}

The Chiefs of Staff, however, had overlooked the overwhelming likelihood that Turkey would never actively intervene on the side of the Allies if Italy remained out of the war.

The report was taken into consideration by the Foreign Office when they compiled the second paper relating to the Balkans discussed by the War Cabinet of September 14. The paper repeated the Chiefs of Staff's earlier reports favoring Italian neutrality. The memorandum also noted, however, that this was precisely the course that Germany wanted:

With Italy neutral it seems possible that Germany may be anxious to restrict the area of conflict, and leave the Balkan countries untouched with a view to drawing from them the supplies she needs. She may, indeed, have given a pledge to this effect to the Soviet Government and may be offering a similar bribe to the Turks.\textsuperscript{18}

But after admitting that allowing the Germans to carry out this plan might be foolish, the Foreign Office memorandum returned to advocating inaction.

The counter-productivity of British policy can be seen again in Halifax's statements somewhat later in the meeting. He said that it was clear that Italy's economic difficulties were great; in the case of coal in particular, stocks were low, and there was great difficulty in arranging the transport of further supplies from Germany. This is precisely why aggressive action against Italy would have been so productive. The War Cabinet nonetheless had determined to appease Italy, and the papers by the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office convinced the War Cabinet to keep the Balkans neutral.\textsuperscript{19}

On September 28, Warsaw fell to the Germans. That same day representatives of the three powers initialed an Anglo-French-Turkish treaty. Final signature and publication were postponed until the Turkish foreign minister had returned from Moscow, where he was meeting with Stalin, a meeting, incidentally, which caused considerable apprehension in Britain and France. The treaty was signed on October 19.

Meanwhile, the second meeting of the Supreme War Council, headed by (first) Chamberlain and (first) Daladier, took place on September 22. Daladier again brought up the French proposal for an Allied expedition to the Balkans. The minutes state:

DALADIER thought that, if the Balkan States were left to themselves in their present state of terror, they would either collapse and accept whatever conditions the Germans chose to demand for delivery of their raw materials, food,
&c.; or alternatively, that if they resisted, they would soon be broken by the force which Germany might bring against them. If, however, the allies... concentrated important military forces at Salonika or Constantinople, this might act as a cement for the Balkan nations which would otherwise be discouraged and disunited.20

Chamberlain agreed to examine the French proposal. The result was a report which stated that only in the case of a German attack on southeast Europe with Italy neutral was it proposed that a limited Allied defensive force should be landed at Salonika, and then only if Italy agreed.21 The unlikelihood of these preconditions was clear, and they would have been quite unwelcomed by the Turks, who wanted war with Italy, not Germany.

It was only the German invasion of France in May 1940 that led British policy makers to reappraise their position on spreading the war to the Balkans.22 On June 2, the Joint Planners recommended encouraging the Balkan Entente to intervene the moment Italy declared war and proposed that Yugoslavia should be told that the Allies would declare war on Italy if Italy attacked Yugoslavia.23 The Foreign Office still opposed this bolder course.24

When the Chiefs of Staff met on 11 June, Italy had declared war. There was no longer a question of Mussolini attacking Yugoslavia first; the issue was now what the Balkans could do for the Allies. The Chiefs’ revised paper stated:

now that Italy has entered the war against us we feel that there is little doubt that any military relief, however small, which we could obtain from a diversion in the Balkans would be to our immediate advantage.25

It was far too late, however. Even with Turkey’s active encouragement, it would have been impossible to rally the Balkan Entente. And Turkey herself was unwilling to honor its treaty with a defeated France. Most of the arguments put forth by the Chiefs of Staff had been valid since the war began, but Britain had waited too long and would now pay for its earlier appeasement of Italy. Turkey was still neutral, and the Dodecanese were still in Italian hands, to hinder British communications in the Aegean and Mediterranean and to serve as a German air base.

Limited air and naval bombardment of Italian bases in the Dodecanese

21Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, Military Strategy to Be Adopted in the Near East Including the Balkans, 9/28/39, CAB 66/2, W.P.(39)70.
22For greater detail see Lynn H. Curtright, “Too Late: Britain’s Missed Opportunities and the Italian Invasion of Greece,” Greece and the War in the Balkans (Thessaloniki, 1992), 51–66.
began on September 4, with little result. A Chiefs of Staff report that same day presented a pessimistic picture of Britain’s position. Regarding German intentions in the Balkans and Middle East, the Chiefs found little likelihood that they would move southeastward, considering that they already had economic control of the Balkan resources and that the Soviets would oppose any such advance. Regarding Italy, however, the report added that Britain would have to:

anticipate the possibility of an Italian advance through Greece towards the Aegean, with the object of establishing bases to facilitate control of the sea communications from the Black Sea and, at the same time, protecting Italian communications to the Dodecanese.

The report continued, “The immediate threat to the Middle East is from Italian land and air attack from Libya and Italian East Africa, and by air attack from the Dodecanese.” Under “Offensive Strategy,” the Chiefs stated:

In the Mediterranean we should undermine Italian resistance by continued offensive operations with our naval forces. This in time may provide the opportunity for amphibious operations within the Mediterranean and the securing of bases, such as the Dodecanese, from which we could operate against Italian communications in the Aegean and remove the threat to our own....

From Athens, Sir Michael Palaiaret, the British Minister, telegraphed on September 10 that the British Naval Attaché saw the Dodecanese as Italy’s Achilles heel. He also reported Metaxas’ question to him that day as to why Britain did not attack the Dodecanese and destroy Italian power in the eastern Mediterranean. Palairet reported on the 17th that Metaxas had again pressed for British action against the Dodecanese.

At the Foreign Office, growing concern was expressed over the more distant future of the Dodecanese. The islands now threatened to become a bone of contention between Greece and Turkey, rather than an inducement to bring Turkey into the war. But as a Foreign Office minute of October 18 stated:

Whatever is to happen to the Dodecanese after the war, their capture now will contribute towards winning the war, and this is surely a much more important consideration than any squabbles over the postwar settlement.

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27Palairet to FO, 9/10/40, FO 371/24963, R6937/4786/22.
28Palairet to FO, 9/17/40, FO 371/24919, R7600/764/19.
29Minute by Nichols, 9/17/40, FO 371/24963, R6937/4786/22; FO to Knatchbull-Hugessen and FO to Palairet, 10/3/40, FO 371/24963, R6937/4786/22; FO to Knatchbull-Hugessen, 10/4/40, FO 371/24963, R6937/4786/22; Palairet to FO, 10/5/40, FO 371/24963, R6937/4786/22; and Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 10/8/40, FO 371/24963, R6937/4786/22.
30Minute by Warner, 10/18/40, FO 371/24963, R7944/4786/22.
The value of the Dodecanese to the enemy was demonstrated when the Secretary of State for Air told the War Cabinet on October 21 that four Italian aircraft from the Dodecanese had bombed the oil refinery at Bahrain in the Persian Gulf.\textsuperscript{31} It was the Italian invasion of Greece on October 28, however, that finally led Winston Churchill to tell the Joint Planners to prepare a plan for British occupation of the Dodecanese.\textsuperscript{32} The importance of doing so was reiterated in a telegram of November 1 from Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State for War, who was then in the Middle East. Referring to plans to send aircraft to Crete, Eden cautioned, "Crete is very vulnerable to air attack, not only from Italian bombers in Libya but also from fighters operating from the Dodecanese."\textsuperscript{33}

The planned operation against the Dodecanese was code-named "Mandibles." Any expectation of early action was set right, however, when the Defence Committee (Operations), of which Churchill was a member, agreed on December 5 that Mandibles should be held in abeyance for the time being.\textsuperscript{34} In Cairo, General Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, disagreed with London's decision. On December 16, he strongly argued:

Now that War appears to be moving towards Balkans and may break out in spring 1941, relative importance and need for early capture of Dodecanese is greatly increased.
Presence of forces in the Dodecanese has continued to be thorn in our side.... Moreover, were German aircraft and possibly submarines to use the islands they would be more aggressive. Torpedo bombers operating from Rhodes and Libya are serious menace and elimination of one alternative base is in itself almost sufficient reason for capturing Dodecanese.\textsuperscript{35}

The strength of Wavell's arguments led the Chiefs of Staff on December 20 to recommend the proposed operation against the islands.\textsuperscript{36} Still, delay continued. Finally in mid-March the British scheduled an attack on Rhodes for April 12.\textsuperscript{37} By that date it was too late; the German invasion of Greece commenced on April 6. German forces would, by the end of April, overrun Greece. And, with the Dodecanese as an Axis air base, the Germans would follow with a devastating victory over the British in Crete at the end of May.

The ultimate disaster in the Balkans capped a long list of strategic mistakes. From the outbreak of war, and the months immediately before, Britain had based its policy on the desire to avoid committing forces to the Mediterranean

\textsuperscript{31}Minutes of the War Cabinet, 10/21/40, CAB 65/9, W.M.274(40).
\textsuperscript{32}Minutes of the Joint-Planning Sub-Committee, 10/29/40, CAB 80/21, C.O.S.(40)882.
\textsuperscript{33}Eden to Churchill, 11/1/40, PREM 3/309/1.
\textsuperscript{34}Minutes of the Defence Sub-Committee (Operations), 12/5/40, CAB 69/1, D.O.(40)48th Mtg.
\textsuperscript{35}Wavell to Chiefs of Staff, 12/16/40, FO 371/24963, 9003/4786/22.
\textsuperscript{36}Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, The Dodecanese, 12/20/40, C.O.S.(40)1051, FO 371/24963, R9003/4786/22.
\textsuperscript{37}Eden to Churchill, 3/15/41, PREM 3/124/2.
or being called upon to fulfill commitments to the states of southeastern Europe. Had Italy entered the war in September 1939, Turkey would have joined the war on the side of Britain and France. Beyond all other advantages provided by Turkish intervention, the Dodecanese, which provided an advance base to the Germans, would have been captured by the Allies early in the war. Yet even after Italy’s entry in 1940, Britain still failed to take action or even necessary precautions in the region. British leaders continued the attempt to avoid war in the Balkans, while hoping for Turkish support if required.

When the British were forced to come to the aid of Greece, after the Italian invasion of October 1940, Turkey again declined to intervene. Britain’s failure to carry out an invasion of the Dodecanese left Greece and Crete without secure communications and provided Germany an air base from which to threaten Suez and the Levant. Inadequate British forces were sent to the Greek mainland, while Crete was left inadequately defended. The resulting loss of Crete to the Germans only capped the long list of consequences for mistakes in British strategy in the region.

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Willy Brandt, Erich Honecker, and the Reemergence of German Self-Determination

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It has been five years since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Since that milestone, many significant events have occurred, including the breakup of the Soviet Union. Perhaps of even greater importance was the reunification of Eastern and Western Germany. This landmark symbolizes the beginning of a new era for Germany. Finally, after nearly half a century of forced separation, it has regained recognition as a single state. Impossible to predict the ramifications of reunification, some fear a united Germany's industrial and economic might. The country is dramatically transforming as it attempts to fuse two distinct cultures formed during fifty years of life under two radically different political, economic, and social systems. Did a spark set off a sudden surge toward reunification, or was there instead a gradual shift unnoticed until done? Whatever, there are two men who, by choice and by chance, directly impacted the direction that East-West German relations took. Without Willy Brandt and Erich Honecker, the reunification of the two Germanies might have taken much longer.

After its loss in World War II, the Allies divided Germany into five parts, one annexed by Poland and the Soviet Union, another occupied by the USSR, and three administered by France, Great Britain, and the United States. By 1954, the Soviet section had become East Germany and the portion administered by the other three powers had become West Germany. The Allies simply but brutally solved the border conflicts Germany had experienced with Poland and Czechoslovakia, expelling about ten million Germans from lands now governed by these two Slavic states. Most of the refugees eventually drifted into West Germany.¹

Late in July of 1945, the "Big Three," Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and Harry S Truman, met in Potsdam, Germany to discuss the future political composition of Europe. They had already divided Germany into four sectors occupied respectively by Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Unfortunately, by the end of the Potsdam Conference, it had become clear that the USSR and the US increasingly distrusted one another. Nevertheless, they had agreed at the end of the war that, while it would be necessary to constrain Germany, it should remain one state.² Both also agreed that any settlement should ensure that Germany would never again disturb the

²Ibid.
world peace.\textsuperscript{3}

Unfortunately, these two nations were unable to agree upon the disposition of the eastern European nations. Contrary to American wishes and apparently violating the Yalta agreements, the Soviets refused to allow the governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania to represent all internal democratic elements or to hold elections to form governments sympathetic to the will of the people. By 1947 it seemed that the US and the Soviet Union were headed toward confrontation.\textsuperscript{4}

In Germany, the Soviets were determined to maintain their position in the East and, if possible, to expand their influence throughout the whole of Germany.\textsuperscript{5} They abandoned their preference for a strong, central German government, when it became apparent that this government would not be communist. They switched to a two-Germany policy. In response, the Americans sought to prevent the Soviets from farther their politico-military gains by economically reviving Germany and using its resources as an obstacle to communist advances westward.\textsuperscript{6} In April of 1948, as part of this effort, Washington put the Marshall Plan into effect.

Because of the Cold War, Germany became an integral part of the strategies of the US and USSR. Politically, East and West Germany became dependent on their respective mentors. Ultimately, both took dramatic steps in the 1970s to break their dependence and change the system that bound them. In West Germany, Willy Brandt brought a new style of leadership to the forefront and changed the German political landscape forever. In the East, Erich Honecker likewise helped to end the Cold War in Europe.\textsuperscript{7}

Willy Brandt was born Herbert Ernst Karl Frahm, the illegitimate son of Martha Frahm, a salesgirl in Luebeck. Apparently, he never knew or desired to know who his father was. The people of northern Germany are often described as reserved in manner, but independent and adventurous in character. As many similarly described Brandt, it seems likely that his environment helped form his character.\textsuperscript{8}

Frahm was greatly influenced by his grandfather, who, upon returning from the war in 1918, became a socialist and studied Karl Marx, August Bebel, and Ferdinand Lassalle. The grandfather's most bitter memory was of his father being whipped for his socialist leanings.\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{3}Felix Gilbert and David Clay Large, The End of the European Era, 1890 to the Present (New York: Norton, 1991), 358.
\textsuperscript{4}Ibid., 367.
\textsuperscript{5}Calvocoretti, World Politics, 11.
\textsuperscript{6}Gilbert and Large, End of the European Era, 366.
\textsuperscript{8}Terence Prittie, Willy Brandt (New York: Schocken Books, 1974), 1.
\textsuperscript{9}Ibid., 3.
By age seventeen, in 1930, Frahm became active in the Social Democratic movement and a published journalist. Imitating the adult habits of older journalists, he was a heavy smoker and beer hall enthusiast. He wrote mainly on the plight of the youth and his fear that many of them might succumb to the attraction of Hitler’s virulent nationalism.\(^\text{10}\) He was greatly influenced by Julius Leber, a zealous and creative socialist, who had moved to Luebeck to become the editor of *Volksbote* (Peoples’ Messenger), a socialist newspaper. Leber encouraged him in his writing and steered him into his political career. Leber gave Frahm a semi-honorary position on the *Volksbote* and sponsored his admission into the Social Democratic Party (SPD).\(^\text{11}\)

The Nazis burst into German politics in 1930, electing 107 to the Reichstag, a gain of 95 seats. The five years from 1928 to 1933 had formed a critical period for the Nazis, as their popularity rose from 3 to 33 percent. Their gains had come from the lower middle class that had formerly supported the liberal parties. Other rightist parties had fallen apart and their members had gone over to the Nazi Party. In 1933, President Paul von Hindenburg reluctantly named Adolph Hitler to the position of chancellor.\(^\text{12}\)

Frahm adamantly opposed the Nazis. In 1930, he discussed Nazism with a friend who belonged to the Nazi party:

> The Nazis were talking of ending the republic, abolishing the free vote, using force. Their so-called socialism meant nothing to us—it was an obvious fraud.... I came to the conclusion that they represented an unbridled nationalism, devoid of spiritual content. Nazism was brutal and scorned humanity; it was steering in the direction of war.\(^\text{13}\)

This impassioned hatred of Nazism compelled Frahm to break politically with his mentor, Leber, then a member of the Reichstag. He abhorred what he perceived as SPD collaboration and “abject abdication of political responsibility” during the formation of authoritarian rule in Germany. Frahm joined the more radical Socialists Workers Party.\(^\text{14}\)

Although courage marked his career, in 1933 even Frahm could not brave the political climate that had given Hitler the dictatorial power to outlaw all other political parties. At the age of nineteen, he fled Germany. Most likely, he would have been arrested and thrown into a concentration camp had he stayed. While on his way to exile in Norway, in Berlin Frahm adopted his “party name,” Willy Brandt.\(^\text{15}\)

For the next seven years in Norway, Brandt continued his journalist and

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\(^{11}\)Prittie, *Willy Brandt*, 7.


\(^{13}\)Prittie, *Willy Brandt*, 7.

\(^{14}\)Ibid., 10.

\(^{15}\)Ibid., 17.
anti-Nazi activities. After war broke out in 1939, Norway sought security in neutrality. After an ultimatum on April 9, 1940 from Hitler, in a surprise move Germany attacked Norway on April 11. In early May, Brandt, wearing a friend’s Norwegian army uniform, was captured but was released in June. Later, he would be hounded by reports that he had fired on his own countrymen.

The end of the war found Brandt in Sweden, whose political system he felt could provide a role model for Germany’s socialist parties. He traveled first to Norway, his second home, and then to Nuremberg in February 1946 to witness “the final abasement of the Nazi regime.”16 On November 7, 1947, reestablished his German citizenship and became the SPD’s special representative in Berlin. As Berlin’s representative, Brandt made a name for himself by helping to organize the Berlin Airlift in 1949. In 1950, he resigned to become Berlin’s representative to West Germany’s parliament. Two years later, Brandt made an ill-advised attempt to gain the Chairmanship of the Berlin SPD.17 Lacking proper backing, Brandt was defeated.

In 1957, his party overwhelmingly chose Brandt to the post of Mayor of Berlin. In large part, he owed his ascent to events the year before. West Berliners rioted in response to the deaths of 8,000 Hungarians slaughtered by invading Soviet forces. With Soviet tanks poised at the East-West Berlin border, Brandt led the rioting West Berliners in a stirring rendition of the German national anthem and thereby restored order.18

Brandt, leading a group within the SPD desiring modernization and new blood, at last able won the chairmanship of the Berlin SPD in 1958. At this time, West Germany’s Social Democrats were foundering and took on the appearance of a third party in a nation seemingly headed toward a true two-party system.

The years leading up to 1962 were busy ones for Willy Brandt. Despite increasing Cold War tensions over Berlin, he made his bid for the Chancellorship in the 1961 elections. On August 13, 1961, while Brandt was campaigning in Nuremberg, the People’s Police of East Germany began unrolling barbed wire along the whole of the East-West Berlin border. Eventually, the Berlin Wall would stretch 100 miles to surround all of West Berlin.19 Caught unaware, the West was left, not with a Berlin problem, but a West Berlin problem.

While Brandt himself lost the 1961 elections, they marked a dramatic improvement for his party. He returned to Berlin to counter the effects of The Wall. Roughly 7 percent of West Berlin’s work force was lost, cut off by The Wall, and economic growth began to fall by 1 percent per year. Even more tragically, West Berlin’s police with truncheons and water cannons at times had

16Ibid., 61.
17Viola, Willy Brandt, 73.
18Ibid., 73.
19Prittie, Willy Brandt, 148.
to stop West Berliners from storming The Wall.\textsuperscript{20}

In 1962, after reelection as Mayor of West Berlin, Brandt invited the American president, John F. Kennedy, to Berlin. Kennedy would not back armed confrontation with the Soviets over The Wall, but he did reassure the West Berliners with his “Ich bin ein Berliner” (“I am a Berliner”) statement.

Mayor Brandt was elected chairman of the SPD in 1964. The next year, he was defeated in another bid for chancellor of Germany, although his party did gain more than one million votes from the previous national elections. A year-and-a-half later, Ludwig Erhard’s government collapsed. Facing a huge deficit of about 1.5 billion dollars, Erhard had proposed tax increases that many of his Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party members would not accept.\textsuperscript{21}

Known as the “Grand Coalition,” Brandt joined Kiesinger, a former Nazi, in a coalition government which replaced the fallen government. This coalition, with Kiesinger as chancellor and Brandt as vice-chancellor and foreign minister, lasted three years. Although tumultuous, neither Kiesinger nor Brandt felt that Germany could stand another government collapse.\textsuperscript{22} Brandt overshadowed Kiesinger with his adroitness in foreign affairs, and by distancing himself from Kiesinger, Brandt finally won the position of chancellor in 1969. The SPD took 48.5 percent of the vote.

Brandt felt his election had finally liberated Germany and defeated Hitler.\textsuperscript{23} He firmly believed that it was time for a German reawakening and political redirection. Taking what he termed “small steps” to realize his aims, as chancellor Brandt continued to exhibit the political courage that had become his custom. The new chancellor sincerely felt that it was time to move beyond the Germany of the past. In genuine remorse for the sins of the Nazi regime, Brandt fell to his knees in front of a memorial celebrating Jewish resistance in Warsaw. With this one symbolic gesture, he asked forgiveness for his nation.\textsuperscript{24} After only one year in office, Brandt had done what no other West German leader had done before to restore Germany to the family of nations.

Brandt’s greatest achievements were linked to his program of “Ostpolitik” (“Eastern Policies”). One of its basic tenets was to accept the current situation of “two German states within one German nation.”\textsuperscript{25} To Brandt, Germans had to be pragmatic about Germany’s division, “The Germans must be at peace with themselves, so that the world can be at peace with Germany.”\textsuperscript{26} With the implementation of Ostpolitik, West Germany could no longer be considered a satellite of the West, although the nation still depended on Western troops to protect its

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., 162.
\textsuperscript{21}Viola, Willy Brandt, 86.
\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., 89.
\textsuperscript{23}Willy Brandt, Willy Brandt: My Life in Politics (New York: Penguin, 1992), 171.
\textsuperscript{24}Viola, Willy Brandt, 91.
\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., 91.
\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., 92.
border. The Brandt government made bold moves without consulting its Western allies. With unbelievable quickness, this young government began to settle the dilemmas that past governments had been afraid to touch.

In 1970 with the Treaty of Moscow, the Soviet Union and Germany renounced the use of force against each other. The treaty went beyond a mere nonaggression pact: the parties also accepted the “Map of Europe” as it stood, and they agreed to respect the territorial integrity of all European states without forcing West Germany to recognize East Germany’s sovereignty under international law. In addition, the Soviet Union agreed to waive its right as a victor nation of the Second World War to intervene in West Germany.

The treaty, however, did have its critics. Some detractors in the West felt that Germany had accepted boundaries in eastern Europe that the Soviet Union had no legal right to hold. Also, some believed that the treaty could be exploited to reduce America’s military commitment to Europe by encouraging Soviet hopes for a European security conference. This treaty was also not without critics in the Soviet Union. Some suggested that it might create a less favorable climate for East Germany. Some objected to losing a convenient pressure point that could be manipulated at will by the Soviet Union. For those who believed that the United States would eventually pull out of Europe regardless, it seemed more advantageous simply to wait than to make concessions over Berlin.

Later, in that same year, Brandt signed the Treaty of Warsaw, a pact which Brandt regarded as marking reconciliation with Poland. While this treaty did recognize the highly controversial Oder-Neisse Line as Poland’s western frontier, the Treaty of Moscow had already done so. The Poles were somewhat disappointed that their negotiations had not achieved this concession from Brandt. Importantly, the word “recognize” was never used in the treaty, because West Germany was constitutionally unable to “recognize” formally boundaries not its own.

Brandt’s government took another important step with the Basic Treaty of 1972. This treaty allowed for agreements on trade and transport communications. Brandt felt that the treaty was more beneficial to East Germany but decided that the “Federal Republic is ready to pay something for the settlement of a number of affairs.” Regardless, the Basic Treaty in Article Two skirted the issue of recognition:

The FRG [West Germany] and the GDR [East Germany] will be guided by the aims and principles laid down in the United Nations Charter, especially those of the sovereign equality of all States, respect for their independence, auton-

27 Macridis, Modern Political Systems, 162.
28 Prittie, Willy Brandt, 250.
29 Ibid., 253.
30 Brandt, Willy Brandt, 458.
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Although East and West Germany were to undertake the responsibilities of states, there was no direct acknowledgment of the sovereign equality of the two states. Here was an obvious example of the "small steps" that Brandt was willing to take in the pursuit of long-term goals.

As chancellor, Brandt also attempted to improve West Germany's relations with the West, "Westpolitik" ("Western Policies"). Westpolitik attempted to expand the European Economic Community (EEC) to end the economic stagnation hanging over Europe. Brandt believed that a greater EEC would benefit member countries and spur European youth. He pressed France to accept Great Britain, Ireland, Norway, and Denmark into the EEC, and with much wit and tact, Brandt won their acceptance. He also investigated the possibility of establishing closer ties to such states as Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden. Brandt believed that a reemergent Germany would be less threatening to the other European nations if it were bound by membership in such political and economic organizations.

These are only some of the breakthroughs that Brandt made, and it is hard to imagine what Europe would look like today without his vision. With Ostpolitik and Westpolitik, he made great strides in promoting West Germany throughout the world. Realigning West Germany with both the East and the West, he normalized relations, as much as they could be, with Russia and Poland, and through his belief in a linked European economy, he helped create the forefather of the European Union. For these efforts which took great strides toward ending the Cold War, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1971.

A terrible scandal forced Willy Brandt from power. One of his personal aides, Guenter Guillaume, was discovered to be an East German spy. On May 7, 1974, Brandt resigned as chancellor. Meanwhile, in East Germany, change was also in the air. In the early 1970s, a new leader arrived who also achieved a place in history, but for very different reasons. Nor would he receive a Nobel Peace Prize.

Erich Honecker was born just before the outbreak of the First World War in the town of Neunkirchen, in the Saar region of Germany. His father was a mine worker when mines were run like little kingdoms. Because of the extremely low wages, many miners continued to live in rural areas and work the land in their spare time. Honecker's birthplace was already known as a "red village" for supporting socialist candidates in elections.

Honecker's father, Wilhelm, was no exception. A member of the KPD (German Communist Party), he served on its local executive committee. He

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31Plock, Basic Treaty, 71.
32Prittie, Willy Brandt, 235.
33Viola, Willy Brandt, 104.
also acted as a local union representative at his mine, a position that required a great amount of courage. Suspected socialist workers and members of unions were regularly dismissed, often never to be rehired.

After World War I, the Saar mines were ceded to France. When Honecker was six years old, the Saar mine workers called their first postwar strike demanding higher wages and an eight-hour day. The French military ordered the strikers back to work and began arresting those who did not comply. While over four hundred miners were arrested, including fifty from the Honecker’s region, the French military did introduce the eight-hour day. Young Honecker distributed leaflets and often brought extra sandwiches to school to share with the children whose fathers the French had arrested and deported.34 When he was ten, Honecker joined the Young Pioneers, a communist youth organization which promoted awareness of the class struggle and organized events to aid women and children to demonstrate proletarian solidarity. Members also attended lectures given by participants of the October Revolution in Russia.

Influenced by statements from Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks at the Second Congress of the Communist International, a KPD spokesman in the 1922 Saar legislature denounced the Treaty of Versailles and the League as “coercive and the League of Nations as a representation of capitalist states.” The KPD announced a list of eight demands that included the withdrawal of French troops. The Communists were now the only party in the Saar legislature that opposed the Treaty of Versailles, and essentially had declared war on the French Governing Commission in the Saar.35

On February 5, 1923, the hundred-day strike began. Up to 99 percent, or 72,000, of the blue and white collar workers of the Saarland went on strike over declining real wages and for an eight-hour working day. Through great personal sacrifice, the workers won their demands.36 This triumph influenced the eleven-year-old Honecker, cementing his loyalty to the Communist Party and convincing him of the power of the worker.

After finishing school, Honecker had trouble finding work. He eventually became the chairman of the Communist League of German Youths (KJVD). In response to the Communist Party’s desire to infiltrate organized labor, Honecker joined the wood workers union. He visited Moscow in 1930 with a group of KJVD members to attend a Comintern youth school. Much influenced and exhilarated to be in the vanguard of socialism, he later wrote:

Where Magnitogorsk stands today there was nothing but bare, barren steppe forty years ago. . . . In summer, 1931, I was privileged to be one of a group of young German Communists that helped build Magnitogorsk. I shall never

35Ibid., 12.
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forget that time of heroic struggle with the pioneers of socialism.\(^{37}\)

Hitler’s rise found Honecker, like Brandt, opposed to the Nazis. In 1933, Honecker went to Paris to head a Ruhr delegation of an international youth congress against fascism. After appointment to the Central Committee of the KJVD, he returned to Berlin via Sweden and Prague with forged documents as Marten Tjaden of Amsterdam. He worked in the underground as Secretary of the KJVD for Greater Berlin. Honecker was arrested, along with seven other KJVD officials, on December 4, 1935. After a year-and-a-half in prison, they were tried and sentenced to ten years for “conspiracy for high treason, with aggravating factors and gross forgery of documents.”\(^{38}\) Erich Honecker was released in 1945 after spending the entire war in Brandenburg-Goerden prison.

In 1955, Honecker traveled to Moscow again to study at a party college for a year. Although earlier that year, he had been relieved as chairman of the Free German Youth (FDJ), a job that had grown dear to him, he was excited at the opportunity to examine the effect socialism was having on international events.\(^{39}\)

While in Moscow, Honecker learned that Stalin had misused his power and had operated illegally as leader of the Party pursuing his own goals. A grave blow, Honecker had truly believed that Stalin had been a “wise leader and standard-bearer of peace and progress all over the world.”\(^{40}\) He came to realize that de-Stalinization was necessary for the Soviet Union to cope with the realities of the modern world. His view of the Soviet Union was not destroyed but merely modified, unlike the views of other leaders in East Germany.\(^{41}\)

When Honecker returned from Moscow, he was quietly accepted back into the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), the ruling party which included Walter Ulbricht, the leader of East Germany. Put in charge of national security, Honecker was responsibility for the armed services, the frontier police, and the secret police. One of Ulbricht’s trusted allies, Honecker believed his own success was, for the time being, tied to Ulbricht’s. In 1957, he was identified with the purging of seventy-three dissidents, “subversive agents,” in East Germany given heart by the revolts in Hungary and Poland.

That same year, however, severely tested Honecker’s loyalty to Ulbricht. A rival faction in the Central Committee had appeared and opposed Ulbricht’s economic philosophy. This group proposed seeking a détente between the two Germanies and continuing the de-Stalinization process. Ulbricht disparaged this “Third Way” policy but made some concessions because Khrushchev backed this route. Afraid to commit political suicide, Honecker attacked the opposition

\(^{37}\) Lippmann, Honecker, 25.
\(^{38}\) Ibid., 30.
\(^{39}\) Honecker, From My Life, 195–96.
\(^{40}\) Ibid
\(^{41}\) Lippmann, Honecker, 175.
at the Thirtieth Session of the Central Committee and called for the “maintenance of party unity.” Honecker skillfully maneuvered with help from the Soviet Union, where Khrushchev was under attack for his de-Stalinization policy. Some believed that Khrushchev’s program had sparked the revolt in Hungary. Eventually, Honecker’s gambit would ensure his elevation to the position of First Secretary of the SED Central Committee. In 1958, though, he was rewarded by being named as head of security and leading party organizations. He was now the second most powerful man in East Germany.  

Erich Honecker experienced a sense of pride with the building of the Berlin Wall. The logistics had been his responsibility, and he firmly believed that The Wall directly reduced Cold War tensions. Honecker later wrote:

No doubt, the 13th of August 1961 made leading circles in the West realise what they had rejected for more than a decade. The sovereign socialist German state could neither be blackmailed nor overrun. Thus the 13th of August 1961 contributed to the preconditions for the later departure from the cold war, the change from confrontation to negotiations, and the first step toward detente. As I see it, this road led to the Helsinki agreement, in particular to the recognition of the existing borders in Europe and of their inviability.

Ultimately, Honecker succeeded Ulbricht as First Secretary. Since 1958, it had been apparent that Ulbricht was grooming him for this position. Also, Honecker had shown great loyalty and actively cultivated Ulbricht’s trust. The reasons behind the selection of Honecker as successor, however, may be more important than the act itself.

The Russian Communist Party was certain of Honecker’s loyalty. Ulbricht had aggravated relations with the Soviet Union by assuming a role as a world leader of the Communist Party. Ulbricht used the perceived strength of the East German economy as his right “to school” the Russian Communist Party. In November 1970, Ulbricht criticized the lack of cooperation between various communist parties, a seeming direct criticism of Leonid Brezhnev, the leader of Soviet Russia. According to the “Ulbricht Doctrine,” East Germany should be consulted and have a right to maneuver in the new phase of East-West negotiations. Ulbricht thought the communist bloc should direct its policies westward. Unlike Honecker, however, Ulbricht did not understand that the Treaty of Moscow had annulled the “Ulbricht Doctrine.” Reacting, Soviet Union sought a change in leadership in East Germany and a settlement of the Berlin problem. Honecker was their answer.

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42Ibid., 178.
43Ibid., 177.
44Honecker, From My Life, 213. Willy Brandt added that “nothing will be the same again.” The Wall did have an inestimable effect. Jerry Bornstein, The Wall Came Tumbling Down: The Berlin Wall and the Fall of Communism (New York: Arch Cape Press, 1990), 26.
45Lippmann, Honecker, 219.
46Ibid., 227.
With Honecker’s ascent to leadership, it was no longer possible to deny the new scope of the East-West German political relationship; unadulterated hostility from East Germany directed at West Germany was no longer acceptable. The Kremlin’s desire for relaxing relations with the Federal Republic of Germany would now be translated into a new East German-West German relationship.47

In addition, the new leader of the GDR would face other problems not encountered by past leaders. In 1973, Honecker nonchalantly acknowledged that West German television transmissions would no longer be disrupted. This amazing decision illustrated the technological nightmare that East Germany faced. The result—most East German citizens now had access to an unadulterated source of Western ideas.48 This created a paradoxical situation for Honecker. As the head of one of the most authoritarian and orthodox systems in the socialist bloc, he, at the same time, encountered an unprecedented inflow of Western information.49 More than any other East German leader he had to compete with capitalism and defend the legitimacy of his regime as representing the German people.

Honecker attempted to regenerate the economy. One Central Committee member defined his pragmatic economic outlook this way: “The Central Committee’s report did not call for food supply models but set up plans for supplying the people with food.”50 Honecker believed that complex problems could be simplified and solved with simple answers.

Ironically, Honecker was forced to resign when The Wall he built fell. In May of 1989, the Hungarian border with Austria was opened. This infuriated the GDR, because it allowed its citizens a route to freedom. Perhaps as many as one-eighth of the East German population would flee if given the chance.51

In October, Gorbachev visited East Germany to celebrate its fortieth anniversary. The Soviet leader could not convince Honecker to loosen the reins. Honecker, after all, believed in The Wall he had built. When thousands of East Germans rioted, seeking reform similar to those in Gorbachev’s Russia, Honecker ordered a crackdown in Leipzig. A young subordinate, Egon Krenz, flew to Leipzig and countermanded the order. The next day Honecker left office due to “poor health.” In reality he had been ousted.52

The lives of Erich Honecker and Willy Brandt decided Germany’s fate. Though they were different, their policies created change so great that the fallout is still felt today. Together, they created one nation where there once were two.

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48Ibid., 22.
49Ibid, 36.
52Ibid., 19–20.
Clearly, their early years had an immense impact on both Honecker and Brandt. As socialists, the Nazi movement in Germany profoundly disappointed both. Their paths differed in that Honecker was an early communist and visited the Soviet Union that greatly influenced his views. Honecker proved to be a loyal Communist. It was this loyalty that created the opportunity for change in East Germany. Without Erich Honecker, the Soviet Union might have been forced to back Walter Ulbricht for a few years longer. Honecker allowed the Soviets to seize the window of opportunity when it arose in East Germany. Willy Brandt, on the other hand, did not end up a loyal party man. He innovated policy courageously, and he willingly compromised as he took small steps to achieve larger aims. He did not allow his policies to be weighted with outdated premises or mired in outdated strategies.

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Yitzhak Shamir and Terrorism: The Assassination of Lord Moyne, 1944

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Yitzhak Shamir, Prime Minister of Israel from 1983 through 1984 and again in 1986 through 1992, has been one of the most virulent critics of the Palestine Liberation Organization, calling it a terrorist organization bent on the destruction of Israel. During his years in power, he refused to have any official dealings with the PLO and had a law passed in the Knesset making it illegal for any Israeli citizen to do so. Shamir, however, is a former terrorist leader himself, and fifty years ago he helped mastermind an assassination which, although not the worst atrocity of World War II, should not be forgotten in light of Shamir’s subsequent career. This act was the murder of British government official, Lord Moyne, in Cairo on November 6, 1944 by Shamir’s group, the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel (in Hebrew, “Lohamei Herut Israel” or “LEHI”), commonly known as the Stern Gang.

Shamir was born Yitzhak Yzertinsky in 1915 in Poland and immigrated to Palestine in 1935. A supporter of the Revisionist branch of Zionism led by Vladimir Jabotinsky, he joined its underground army, the Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL), soon after his arrival.1 In 1940 the Irgun split, primarily over the issue of whether to attack British “occupiers” in Palestine while Britain was fighting the Nazis. Yzertinsky/Shamir supported the idea and joined the splinter group led by Avraham Stern. LEHI preached that diplomacy and negotiation would never convince the British to leave Palestine and, as a consequence, they would have to be driven out. The Sternists found role models in the Serbian Black Hand, Russia’s People’s Will, and the Irish Republican Army, all groups that had used assassination as their major weapon.2

LEHI, whose ranks during the war never numbered more than a few hundred, was desperately short of money and made bank robbery its major activity in 1940 and 1941. These robberies led to gun battles with the police, and Stern soon became a marked man. In February 1942, he was arrested and “shot while trying to escape” in a Tel Aviv apartment. In the next few months, most of the group’s leaders were caught and imprisoned.3

One of those caught was Yzertinsky/Shamir, but in early 1943 he managed

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1Yitzhak Shamir, Summing Up: An Autobiography (Boston, 1994)
3Bell, Terror, 69–73; Shamir, Summing Up, 41, 47–8.
to escape and, with Stern dead, he assumed the task of rebuilding the organization. He gradually became part of a leadership triumvirate with Nathan Friedman-Yellin and Dr. Israel Scheib. Shamir was the pragmatic director of operations, "a man of no doubts and few words."4 Friedman-Yellin was the politician of the three, shaping LEHI strategy and setting its political positions. Scheib, with a doctorate in philosophy, was the intellectual force of the organization, "possessed of a revolutionary vision." When twenty LEHI members escaped from Latrun prison camp in November 1943, the group began its comeback.5

In early 1944, LEHI became active once again. The group carried out a series of attacks against British policemen, either on patrol or in their stations, leading to some bloody shootouts. These actions, however, had little effect, so the group in mid-1944 reverted to its original purpose of carrying out assassinations of major political figures. Their first choice was the High Commissioner of Palestine, Sir Harold MacMichael. Four attempts to murder him had ended in failure by August 1944, and soon after he finished his term of office and left Palestine. The LEHI triumvirate sought out another potential target.6

The man they settled on was Lord Moyne. A friend of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, he had been Colonial Secretary responsible for Palestine in 1941 and 1942, and he was currently Minister-Resident for the Middle East, a post which placed him in Cairo. Regarded as a pro-Arab Colonial Secretary, he had refused permission for a Jewish refugee ship, the Struma, to come to Palestine. The ship subsequently sank off Istanbul. Also, he was widely reported to have asked, when discussing Jewish immigration to the Holy Land, "What would I do with a million Jews?" But Friedman-Yellin later remarked:

Really these acts by Lord Moyne were without meaning for us.... What was important to us was that he symbolized the British Empire in Cairo. We weren't yet in a position to try to hit Churchill in London, so the logical second best was to hit Lord Moyne in Cairo.7

The group's high command was convinced that Moyne's death would show the British that their continued rule in Palestine was not worth the price and would force them to withdraw and pave the way for Jewish independence. "A man who goes forth to take the life of another whom he does not know must believe only one thing—that by his act he will change the course of history."8 On this rationalization they justified the assassination.

Carrying out such an action in Cairo, where LEHI had only a tiny member-

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4Shamir, Summing Up, 41, 47–8.
5Bell, Terror, 84; Bauer, From Diplomacy, 319; Shamir, Summing Up, 46–7.
6Bell, Terror, 87–91.
8Gerold Frank, in The Deed (New York, 1963), 35 attributes the quote directly to Shamir; also see Bell, Terror, 90; and Shamir, Summing Up, 51.
ship, was more difficult than it would have been in Palestine. The assassins would have to be smuggled into Egypt and then somehow back out again, a risky proposition. Two young volunteers, nonetheless, quickly emerged. One was Eliahu Bet-Zouri, twenty-three, a government surveyor active in the underground for several years. The other was eighteen-year-old Eliahu Hakim, who had also been in LEHI for a few years and was a British Army deserter formerly stationed in Cairo.9

The two men slipped into the Egyptian capital in October 1944, and Hakim began tracking Moyne’s movements and patterns. They made two decisions. First, they would attack when the British official returned to his residence for lunch. This would avoid harming any Arabs who might inadvertently get involved in the action, because LEHI considered Arabs as potential allies at this time. They decided to make their escape by bicycle, an automobile having proven impossible to obtain. Neither young man appeared to have any doubts about the morality of the deed they were about to undertake.10

On November 6, 1944, Moyne left his office about 1:00 pm and with two aides and a driver motored to his residence to have lunch. When they arrived ten minutes later, Hakim and Bet-Zouri were waiting. After one aide got out of the car and the driver prepared to open the door for Moyne, the two young assassins struck. Bet-Zouri ordered the driver not to move, then shot him where he stood. Hearing the shots, Moyne began to open his door but Hakim did so for him. He fired three shots at point-blank range, hitting Moyne in the neck, abdomen, and chest.

The two young men then ran to their bicycles to make their escape. But one of the surviving aides quickly telephoned the police, and an Egyptian officer on a motorcycle caught up with them on a nearby bridge. They fired at him but missed, deliberately, they later claimed. He then shot and wounded Bet-Zouri and pinned Hakim against a wall with his motorbike. The two then surrendered.

Back at Moyne’s residence, the driver was dead and Moyne barely alive. He was rushed to the hospital and emergency surgery, but he died that evening.11 The news sent shock waves throughout Britain and the Middle East and replaced Franklin Roosevelt’s reelection to a fourth presidential term as the leading news story on the BBC.12

Hakim and Bet-Zouri went on trial in an Egyptian court the following January. Despite their young age, they were remarkably composed. They openly admitted their guilt and showed no remorse. In a joint statement they claimed that “our deed stemmed from our motives, and our motives stemmed from our ideals, and if we prove our ideals were right and just, then our deed

9Frank, Deed, 35–7; Bell, Terror, 93; Shamir, Summing Up, 52–3.
10Inquiry into Moyne Assassination, 11/22/44, Foreign Office Documents FO 371/41516/2436; Frank, Deed, 223–6; Bell, Terror, 93–8; Bethell, Palestine Triangle, 181–2; Shamir, Summing Up, 53.
11Ibid.
12Bethell, Palestine Triangle, 186.
was right and just.” They argued that Britain was an occupying power that had
to be driven out by force. Gerold Frank, who covered the trial for an American
newspaper, noted that the calm demeanor of the defendants, who faced almost
certain execution, impressed many observers. With their own confessions and
eyewitness testimony, the verdict was a foregone conclusion and the death
sentence was pronounced on January 22, 1945.

There was a two-month delay in carrying out the executions, due to various
procedural problems. First, the Mufti of Cairo, the highest Muslim official
there, had to approve the sentence, then the Egyptian prime minister. But the
latter was himself assassinated in late February, and it then fell to his successor
to sign the order. The two murderers were executed on March 22, calm after
they had spent the previous night with the Chief Rabbi of Egypt. Hakim
supposedly remarked, eyeing the baggy burlap suit he had been issued, “this is the
finest suit of clothes I have ever worn in my life.” Their bodies were buried in
a cemetery outside Cairo.13

Did LEHI achieve its objective from the Moyne assassination? Britain did
give up the Palestine mandate in May 1948—just three and a half years later.
To credit this one terrorist act with driving the British out of Palestine would be
unrealistic, although the combined anti-British campaigns of LEHI and the
Irgun from 1944 to 1948 definitely played a role in Whitehall’s decision. There
were, however, two immediate effects of the assassination, and both were
disastrous for the Jewish community in Palestine, known as the Yishuv.

The first concerned the response of the British government. Only two days
before the murder, Churchill met privately with Dr. Chaim Weizmann, who had
been the leading spokesman for the Zionist movement since the Balfour Decla-
ration in 1917. The two discussed the creation of a Jewish state in part of
Palestine, which matched the minimal Zionist goal, though the prime minister
warned that he could take no action until after Germany’s surrender.14 In fact,
a committee report recommending the partition of Palestine into Jewish and
Arab states was on the Cabinet’s future agenda at the time of Moyne’s death,
but Churchill postponed the discussion. He never took it up for the rest of his
term of office, which ended the following July. Consequently, the opportunity
to gain a Jewish state was delayed.15

The consequences, however, could have been much worse. British officials,
from Churchill on down, reacted to the murder with outrage. The Prime Minis-

13Frank, Deed, 237–308; Bell, Terror, 99–100; Bethell, Palestine Triangle, 186–7; Michael J.

14Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. 7: Road to Victory 1941–45 (Boston, 1986), 1048–50;

was shocked and shaken by the murder of one of his oldest friends. Churchill telephoned Moyne’s daughter to say that her father ‘had died like a soldier.’

He instructed Colonial Secretary Oliver Stanley to tell Weizmann “that it was incumbent on the Jewish Agency [the officially recognized representative of the Yishuv] to do all in their power to suppress these terrorist activities.” Apparently, Stanley delivered the message with gusto. The stunned Zionist leader later commented that Stanley had behaved “like a brute.” Still, he sent Churchill a conciliatory letter the very next day.

Twenty years earlier, when an Egyptian had assassinated the British Governor of the Sudan, Sir Lee Stack, Egypt had been punished by having its condominium over that country taken away. Churchill now faced demands for an equally harsh punishment for the Zionists. The leading advocates of a hard line were the British Ambassador to Cairo, Lord Killearn, and the three commanders-in-chief in the Middle East. Their major recommendations were the suspension of Jewish immigration and a vigorous campaign to eliminate terrorist groups.

On the other hand, the new High Commissioner of Palestine, Lord Gort, opposed both measures, at least for the time being. He believed that a campaign against the Irgun and LEHI would require more troops than were available and that a suspension of immigration would punish the entire Yishuv for the actions of a tiny minority. He suggested postponing any specific action until the extent of the promised cooperation from the Jewish Agency could be evaluated.

Churchill came down on the side of Gort. In a message to Stanley he argued,

[W]ill not suspension of immigration or a threat of suspension simply play into the hands of the extremists? At present the Jews generally seem to have been shocked by Lord Moyne’s death into a mood in which they are more likely to listen to Dr. Weizmann’s counsels of moderation.... [Punitive measures] may well unite the whole forces of Zionism and even Jewry throughout the world against us instead of against the terrorist bands.

Stanley, who had originally sided with Killearn, presented the Churchill-Gort arguments in the Cabinet, which decided to postpone any direct countermeasures.

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19Shone to Foreign Office, 11/19/44, FO 371/41515/J4149.
20Gort to Colonial Office, Nov. 10, 1944, Colonial Office Documents C.O. 733/466/75998.
22Cabinet Meeting, Nov. 24, 1944, Cabinet Papers, CAB 65/48.
Consequently, when the Prime Minister spoke in Commons on the assassination on November 17 he recommended no specific actions but issued this chilling warning:

If our dreams for Zionism are to end in the smoke of assassins’ pistols and our labors for its future to produce only a new set of gangsters worthy of Nazi Germany, many like myself will have to reconsider the position we have maintained so consistently and so long in the past.\(^\text{23}\)

Churchill followed the trial of the two LEHI assassins closely, and the two-month delay between sentencing and execution angered him. At one point he telegraphed Killearn:

I hope you will realize that unless the sentences duly passed upon the assassins of Lord Moyne are executed, it will cause a marked breach between Great Britain and the Egyptian Government.\(^\text{24}\)

Killearn was so diligent in passing on the warning that he spoke to the new Egyptian Prime Minister about it at his predecessor’s funeral.\(^\text{25}\)

The commitment of the Jewish Agency to cooperate with them against the terrorists served to moderate the response of the British government to the assassination. This marked the second important consequence of the LEHI action and one which was more serious than the British response. The Jewish Agency’s agreement to stamp out the terrorists led to one of the most controversial chapters in the history of modern Zionism, the “Saison” which pitted Jew against Jew and Zionist against Zionist in a struggle for control of the Yishuv. It lasted for seven months, until the following June.

The year 1944 had seen a dramatic increase in incidents of Jewish terrorist attacks against British rule. Not only had LEHI resumed its activities, but the Irgun, which previously had refrained from making targets of the British, reversed its policy after Menahem Begin took over as commander in December 1943. One month later he declared a “revolt” against Britain, although with the stipulation that only property, not people, should be attacked, one point which distinguished the Irgun from LEHI at this time.\(^\text{26}\)

His Majesty’s Government began to pressure the Jewish Agency to assist in wiping out these terrorists. After some half-hearted efforts in spring and summer 1944 produced few results, the Agency’s leadership met in October to consider stronger measures. But the idea of cooperating with the British authorities against their fellow Jews—albeit Jewish terrorists—was so disturbing that

\(^{23}\)Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill*, 7: 1052; *The Times*, Nov. 18, 1944.


\(^{25}\)Killearn to Foreign Office, 2/26/45, FO 371/46111/J787.

no consensus could be reached. They could only agree to begin gathering
information about the groups without passing it to the British, and to meet
personally with their leaders to try to dissuade them from further provocations.27

The Moyne assassination occurred a mere two weeks after this meeting. It
caused profound shock and anger throughout the Yishuv, not only due to the
brutality of the deed itself but because Jewish leaders such as Weizmann and
David Ben-Gurion believed that their dream of a Jewish State was within
reach.28 Even Begin, who heard the news on the radio while he was waiting to
meet with Shamir, was stunned and angry.29 The Jewish Agency leadership
held an emergency meeting on the night of Moyne’s death to reconsider their
erlier decision. Ben-Gurion, who had failed to persuade his colleagues to take
a tough antiterrorist stand at the previous meeting, now carried the day in light
of the LEHI assassination.30

As a result of the November 6 session, the Agency issued a statement
deploiring the murder and all terrorism in Palestine. It called on members of the
Yishuv to take the following measures:

(1) to cast out the members of this destructive band; (2) to deprive them of all
refuge and shelter; (3) to resist their threats and; (4) to render all necessary
assistance to the authorities in the prevention of terrorist acts and in the eradi-
cation of the terrorist organization.

The statement concluded that “our very existence is at stake.”31

By far the most controversial aspect of this new policy was cooperation with
the British authorities against fellow Jews, an idea rejected just two weeks
before. In reality, such cooperation would include rounding up members of the
Irgun and LEHI and handing them over to the British, a distasteful measure to
say the least.

Ironically LEHI, whose assassination plot had triggered the action, was left
alone while the full force of the “hunting season” was employed against the
Irgun. Friedman-Yellin, in a conversation with historian Nicholas Bethell,
claimed that he threatened to retaliate—“we shall kill you one by one”—if any
LEHI members were rounded up, but most other sources believe that he made
a deal with the Jewish Agency: in return for their freedom, the group would
cease operations for the next six months. Perhaps it was only a coincidence, but
LEHI was spared from the “Saison” and undertook no actions until the follow-

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ing summer.32

The Irgun had no such luck. Although less violent than Stern’s organization, they were disliked much more intensely by members of the Jewish Agency because of their origins in the Revisionist Movement, a breakaway group from mainstream Zionism. Conversely, LEHI was not regarded as ideological, and some Zionist leaders sympathized with them.33 According to various estimates, the Jewish Agency turned over information on between 700 and 1,000 suspects to the British, resulting in at least 300 internments. Most of these were low level operatives, with the only “big fish” being Begin’s right-hand-man, Yaakov Meridor.34

The “Saison” created horrible bitterness and division within the Yishuv, which has carried over fifty years later to the political rivalry between the Labor Party and the Likud. The consequences might well have been worse had it not been for Begin’s decision not to retaliate. Despite intense pressure from his colleagues, the Irgun leader insisted “no, not civil war, not that at any price,” and his men obeyed. Avoiding an internecine bloodbath, Begin’s stature inside the Yishuv was enhanced to some degree.35 He and Ben-Gurion, however, became bitter enemies due to this and later incidents, and it was not until Israel’s founding father had retired that the Irgun leader was granted respectability. In 1967, he was invited to join the coalition cabinet formed due to the threat from Nasser that led to the Six-Day War. Complete acceptance came even later, when he was elected Prime Minister in 1977.

The “Saison” lost its momentum in March 1945 and was called off four months later. Many of those who participated lost their enthusiasm, and the Yishuv appeared to have ambivalent feelings about the entire operation. Moreover, this cooperation with the British brought no rewards; on the contrary, officials of His Majesty’s Government voiced numerous complaints over the less-than-full support the Jews were giving them.36 The operation failed to crush the terrorists or to satisfy the British, and it opened major wounds inside the Yishuv. It may, however, have been necessary to ward off even harsher measures from London and to establish the Zionists’ moral credentials at a time when the moral issue was one of the strongest weapons in their arsenal. The “Saison” would never have occurred had it not been for the outrage and indignation aroused by Moyne’s assassination. Because that and the indefinite postponement of partition were the two major results of the terrorist action, it would have to be considered a serious mistake.

32Bethell, Palestine Triangle, 188; Begin, Revolt, 150–1; Bauer, From Diplomacy, 330; Bell, Terror, 128; Shamir, Summing Up, 55–6.
33Perlmutter, Life and Times, 161–2; Begin, Revolt, 145–53; Shamir, Summing Up, 55.
34Begin, Revolt, 147–8; Bell, Terror, 127–36; Perlmutter, Life and Times, 155–62; Cohen, “Moyne Assassination,” 369; Bethell, Palestine Triangle, 188–93.
35Begin, Revolt, 152; Perlmutter, Life and Times, 156–7; Bell, Terror, 134–5.
36Bethell, Palestine Triangle, 190; Shaw to Colonial Office, Dec. 22, 1944, C.O. 733/457/75156.
And then, of course, there is the ethical issue of assassinating a civilian government official because of the nation he represents. The Yishuv was outraged at the murder but that attitude changed over time. In June 1975, thirty years after the executions, the Egyptian government turned over the bodies of Bet-Zouri and Hakim to Israel in return for some Arab prisoners. The two were then reburied in Israel’s national cemetery with all the honors awarded to the country’s national heroes. Among those attending was Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and other government officials. Shamir, who only recently had become a member of the Knesset, delivered the eulogy.\textsuperscript{37} It seems a strange way to commemorate cold-blooded murderers.

Yet the LEHI leader appears to have no regrets, even now. In his new autobiography, he freely discusses the assassination and his days in the “underground,” something he was reluctant to talk about when he was active in Israeli politics. When the Likud came to power in the 1977 “earthquake” election, Shamir was chosen Speaker of the Knesset. Then, in 1980, Begin picked him to succeed Moshe Dayan as Foreign Minister, and, three years later upon Begin’s retirement, Shamir became Prime Minister. He served in that position until 1992, except from 1984 to 1986 during the National Unity Government.

Now retired from the political arena, he openly admits his role in Lord Moyne’s murder. Referring to the assassination plan, he writes, “but I knew about that plan and, together with my colleagues, eventually decided to carry it out” and “we were in touch constantly and I followed every detail.” He claims that the two Eliahu “died the death of heroes.”\textsuperscript{38} In fact, his autobiography portrays him as completely comfortable with his behavior in the 1940s. He seems to echo the words that Begin uttered to Mike Wallace in a “60 Minutes” interview some years ago: “Arafat is a terrorist—I was a freedom fighter.”\textsuperscript{39}

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\textsuperscript{37}Personal recollection of the author, who was in Israel at the time; also Bell, \textit{Terror}, 349; Bethell, \textit{Palestine Triangle}, 187; Shamir, \textit{Summing Up}, 55.


Italy’s Strategy and Naval Doctrines from Unification to NATO, 1861–1995

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Italy’s maritime history is rooted in her geostrategic position at the center of the Mediterranean basin, bridging three continents and tying the Atlantic Ocean to the Black Sea, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf. An elongated peninsula, Italy has a 5,000 km-long coastline and economically depends on an unimpeded sea trade. This traditional sea-dependency is enhanced by the country’s mountainous terrain, which constrains road and rail trade with Continental Europe and restricts arable lands to 32 percent. Thus, sea trade, which constitute 80 percent of imports and exports in the 1880s, has risen since the 1970s to 95 percent of imports and 65 percent of exports.¹

Italy’s legacy of political fragmentation and foreign domination prevented it from exploiting its geostrategic position to build a sizeable regional influence until the late 1800s. Italy’s importance revived after 1859 with national unification, the iron shipbuilding and steam propulsion revolutions, and the opening in 1869 of the Suez Canal. Until the 1940s, Italy’s new importance allowed it to revamp Roman and Mediterranean myths in the quest for regional preeminence and introduced a new competitor among the Great Powers to control the Mediterranean. The difficulty, however, of protecting Italy’s porous Alpine border and unfortified coasts, and its vulnerability to blockade and amphibious invasion left Italy vulnerable in wartime.²

Scarce national resources for both nation-building and international aspirations overwhelmed Italy’s foreign policy and strategic, naval thinking. Italy was poor and been had united by a fourth-rate power—Piedmont. Yet influential Risorgimental figures stressed in the 1840s through the 1870s the close relation between national security and a strong navy, and they forecast Italy’s role as a maritime power capable of balancing Britain and France in the Mediterranean.³

Count Camillo Cavour’s untimely death in 1861, robbed Italy of an advo-

²Pietro Silva, Il Mediterraneo dall’unità di Roma all’Impero (Varese, 1940); A.A.V.V., L’alleanza atlantica e la difesa dell’Europa (Rome, 1978); Jesse W. Lewis, Jr., The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean (Washington, DC, 1976).
cate of a balanced, nation-building and naval expansion policy. Italy’s collective ethos was land-oriented and quickly forfeited Cavour’s seapower vision. A large, national navy of ninety-seven warships remained beset until 1880 by sharp regional and personal rivalries, as well as stifling medieval traditions favoring routine, “hands-on” experience at sea, while disregarding discipline, scientific-intellectual education and training, qualified superior command, and strategic and tactical naval doctrines.4

During the early Liberal Era national security had to rely on a dual maritime and land strategy of alliances or good relations with Europe’s dominant land power (Germany) and the Mediterranean’s dominant maritime power (Britain). Italy’s army settled on static land defense, split between the Alps and the Po River Valley.5

Favoring cheaper traditional, domestic, wooden sailing ships, Italy rejected untested armor and propulsion technologies, and Italy’s industrial backwardness made it dependent on American, British, and French shipyards for new warship technology. More disturbing was Italy’s carelessness about naval doctrines and combat readiness. Steam propulsion and iron-plated warships had radically altered naval strategy and tactics, and Italy’s thinkers were slow to devise comprehensive strategic plans to exploit the revolutionary freedom of steam-propulsion and shorter distances and firepower.6

Italy’s sea-exposure pressed Rome to secure footholds in Tunisia and Egypt where many Italians had emigrated since the 1850s; but any expansion in North Africa or in the explosive Adriatic-Aegean region was repeatedly dashed by the other powers’ hostility and by Italy’s own inability to reconcile power pretenses with chronic, structural shortcomings. Thus, instead of preparing the navy for either clear Mediterranean missions or a future Adriatic war against Austria, Rome built its national prestige upon a façade of a superficial naval force.

Italy’s lack of policy coordination between military and political leaderships also aggravated naval-military problems. The government was always indifferent to military preparedness. Yet Rome pretended that at a moment’s notice the armed forces were ready to secure any foreign policy goal in the face of any war

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6For discussions of these issues, see Vico Mantegazza, Il Mediterraneo e il suo equilibrio (Milan, 1914); Angelo Gnocchi, Nozioni d’arte militare e marittima (Rome, 1928); Angelo Gnocchi and Franco Garofalo, Nozioni di storia navale, 3 vols. (Bologna, 1935); Giorgio Molli, La guerra antica e moderna (Genoa, 1906); Gioacchino Russo, Manuale d’architettura navale (Turin, 1905); Edward J. Reed, Shipbuilding in Iron and Steel (London, 1869); Edward J. Reed, Our Iron-Clad Ships (London, 1870); and Louis Bouët-Willaumez, Tactique provisoire sur le combat des bateaux cuirassés (Paris, 1866).
scare. Surviving Italy’s 1915 reversal of alliances, this tragic tendency continued into the fascist era: Mussolini’s last-minute 1940 “short war” against France and Britain and his 1941 declarations of war against the Soviet Union and United States.7

Italy feared that the French navy might stage amphibious landings and devastate Italy’s undefended coasts and sea-trade, while Italy’s sandy, Adriatic coast was undefensible against Vienna’s smaller navy, sheltered in scores of fortified bases along the jagged rocky Dalmatian coast. Italy’s deepwater harbors were Genoa, Livorno, and Naples and faced France. Thus any Italian strike in the Adriatic would be hampered by lines of communication and risked flank and rear attacks from the Austrian bases.8

In 1866, Prussia and Italy attacked Austria to demote its hold over Central Europe and the Adriatic. Italy’s navy was woefully inadequate, while the Italian shipyards’ long construction times and backwardness meant that all new warships were foreign-built, technically different, and often unfinished. The 1866 war was fought under an incompetent, bickering command which produced land and sea defeats against inferior Austrian forces. Although Prussia’s victory secured the Veneto for Italy, the wounded national pride scapegoated the navy. The isolationist, postwar army and navy were savaged by skeletal budgets, lack of training, warship obsolescence, and popular contempt.9

Until the 1880s, Italy focused its coastal defense on a makeshift policy of extensive coastal fortifications and garrisons backed at sea by a minefields and defensive strikes by a small, fast, coastal fleet armed with rams. Both land and maritime strategies reflected the predominance of the “Brick and Mortar School” of static territorial defense over the “Blue Water School” of interdiction and sea-control. Italy’s vulnerability in the basin against France and Austria forced Rome in 1882 to join the Triple Alliance with the Germany and Austria. This alliance secured Italy’s national security and status against the French threat, and, with the Army focused on Alpine defense against France, Italy could rely on its traditional naval friendship with Britain. This respite allowed the


9Raffaele Romanelli, L’Italia liberale, 1861–1900 (Bologna, 1979); Mariano Gabriele, “La politica navale italiana dal 1861 ad oggi,” Rivista Marittima, (Mar. 1961); Pieri, Storia, 367–80; Augusto-Vittorio Vecchi, Memorie d’un luogotenente di vascello (Rome, 1897); Luigi Borghi, Sul presente e sull’avvenire dell’armata navale (Turin, 1863); Alberto Lumbroso, La battaglia di Lissa nella storia e nella seggenda (Rome, 1910); Ippolito Spinola, Ricordi d’un vecchio marinaio (Rome, 1884); Mariano Gabriele and Giuliano Friz, La politica navale italiana, 1885–1915 (Rome, 1982).
radical naval reforms which revamped Italy’s navy in the 1870s through the 1890s.10

Italy’s naval maneuvers in 1883 and 1885 confirmed the danger of a sudden, French, naval invasion. Both Britain and Germany criticized Italy’s lack of a strike-fleet and told Rome to seek help from Austria’s navy. But Vienna hoped that Italy’s defeat would eliminate Italian irredentism in the Adriatic and Balkans. In response, a long, theoretical debate broke out in Italy between the supporters of the Brick and Mortar doctrines and the Blue Water doctrine.

The “Continentalists,” criticized the navalists and limited naval strategy to coastal defense of littoral railroads and cities to protect the Army’s mobilization and Alpine defense from encircling rear sea-invasions. All “Navalists” countered that Italy’s defeat would be certain against superior regional maritime powers: France, Britain, and, one day, Russia too. This concern dominated for over ninety years among people as different as Premier Cavour after 1854, the authoritative naval analyst Augusto-Vittorio Vecchio,11 foreign minister of San Giuliano in 1912 through 1914, and Mussolini between 1936 and 1941. No amount of fortifications along all coasts could provide effective security. “Navalists” believed that Italy had to develop a national maritime ethos, naval reforms, “high-tech” warships, and efficient strategic planning.12

Between 1868 and 1873, naval ministers Augusto Riboty and Simone de Saint-Bon challenged parliament’s demotion of the navy and stressed that only a powerful combat navy based on long-term naval construction and cutting-edge technologies could secure the national defense, independence, and Mediterranean expansion through.13 The latter finally forced a hostile parliament to their
The debate then shifted to the question of which naval instruments were best: a few, expensive, big ships, armored and armed to the hilt, or many, cheap, small ships, fast, maneuverable, and less armed and armored? Italy was violently split between the grand fleet" league which included de Saint-Bon, Brin, Premier Crispi, navalists like Vecchj, parliamentarian navy-hawks, the banking sector, and the growing steel-shipbuilding industries on the one hand, and the small-ship lobby which included the press, budget-minded parliamentarians, and navy minister Rear Admiral Ferdinando Acton (1879–83). Both de Saint-Bon and his Chief of Engineers Corps, Benedetto Brin, pressed for a Grand Fleet concept of a state-of-the-art, big ship navy with superior firepower, great speed, and maximum shielding. The symbols of this choice were the revolutionary battleships of the Duilio- and Italia-classes.15

As naval minister (1876–78, 1884–92, 1896–98), Brin modernized Italy’s naval industry and introduced new offensive-defensive technologies, including submarines. The big ship victory propelled Italy’s navy back into third place by 1885, with the adoption of the Blue Water school of Nelson and Mahan which favored sea-control and resolute naval clashes. Italy’s naval reorganization between 1875 and 1877 created a seventy-two-unit fleet which included sixteen battleships. Given the arbitrary fleet composition and size, and the dearth of clear naval strategies, it was uncertain if Italy’s expensive, high-tech, strike fleet could destroy the bulk of either the French or Austrian navies. Uneven military procurements and generalized cuts following international setbacks in 1866 and 1896, delayed naval construction. The revolutionary ships were too few and were soon outdated by larger and faster Anglo-French shipbuilding. Governmental near-sightedness saw the navy only as a static symbol of power rather than as the flexible and technically superior military tool extolled by de Saint-

naval blockade of Austria’s bases, thereby foretelling Italy’s plans in World War I. See as well his La difesa dello stato: Considerazioni sull’opera del T-C. Perrucchetti (Rome, 1884). Also see Ezio Ferrante, “Romanzi navali e guerre ipotetiche nel secolo XIX,” in Informazioni parlamentari difesa, n. 14 (1982); Gaetano Limo (“Argus”), L’armata d’Italia nella guerra futura (Rome, 1894); Gaetano Limo (“A**”), La guerra del 19… in Terra ed in mare (La Spezia, 1899); A. Cangemi, L’Italia e le lotte a venire sul mare (La Spezia, 1899); Cosimo Muraglia, La guerra italo-francese del 190 (Perugia, 1901); E. Massa, La prima guerra in Italia nel secolo xx: Un colpo di mano sulla Sicilia nell’anno 19… (Trani, 1901); Mario Misori, Governi, alte cariche dello stato e prefetti del regno d’Italia (Rome, 1978), 32–37; Carlo Rossi, Racconto d’un guardiano di spiaggia: Traduzione Libera della Battaglia di Dorking (Rome, 1872); Anonymous, “La Battaglia di Pinerolo: Episodio della difesa d’Italia nel 1872,” in Risposta al “Racconto d’un Guardiano di Spiaggia” (Turin, 1872).

14Simone P. de Saint-Bon, Thoughts on the Military Navy (1863).
15Piero Pieri, Le forze armate nell’età della destra (Milan, 1962); Simone P. de Saint-Bon, Pensieri sulla marineria militare (Naples, 1863); Mariano Gabriele, Lo strumento della legge navale nello sviluppo della politica marittima dell’Unità in poi (Rome, 1975); Simone de Saint Bon, La questione delle navi (Turin, 1881); E. De Gaetani, L’ammiraglio de Saint-Bon (Florence, 1907); Galeazzo-Maria Maldini, Le navi corazzate e la marina italiana (Turin, 1863); Galeazzo-Maria Maldini, Le nuove costruzioni navali per la marina italiana: Navi piccole e navi giganti (Rome, 1881); Hyacinthe Th. Aube, La guerre maritime et coloniale: Opinion d’un marin (Paris, 1885); Francesco and Ferdinando Acton, Genealogia degli Acton (Naples, 1969).
Bon and Brin.16

Furthermore while Italy’s membership in the Triple Alliance promoted continental security against France and Russia, it did not improve maritime security. During the 1882 Egyptian Crisis, the Austrians and Germans ignored Italy’s interests and rhetoric, and they forced Rome to reject Britain’s offer of a joint local military occupation once France had bailed out. Britain’s quick strategic conquest of Suez and the Nile forced Italy into a parallel expansion in the Red Sea campaigns, “the back-door to the Mediterranean and Libya,” while unsuccessfully seeking a British alliance against France between 1882 and 1904. Given Britain’s indifference, Italy’s only regional naval help was Austria-Hungary, but Vienna often contemplated preemptive attacks against Rome if it sought to alter the Adriatic balance by intervening in the Balkans. Thus, their belief in Italy’s haplessness led Austria and Germany to oppose any military involvement in the basin on Italy’s behalf. The Italian Navy reacted by drawing up contingency war plans for blockading the Adriatic and Otranto with bases at Brindisi and Taranto while occupying the strategic Albanian coast at Valona and the Greek island of Corfú. These war plans lay dormant for thirty years and were revamped during World War I.17

Notwithstanding, the Triple Alliance between 1882 and 1914 did shore-up Italy’s national defenses, while forcing Rome to renounce revenge wars against France or Austria. But Berlin and Vienna refused to join a naval convention, stressing that Britain was Italy’s best guarantee. Britain avoided any such agreement and secretly sabotaged any Italian drive in Libya, Greece, or Turkey which threatened the status quo.

Between 1892 and 1899 with international tensions growing between the Triple Alliance and the developing Franco-Russian alliance which liberated France from international isolation while destroying the Austro-Russian-German Dreikaiserbunds and the Russo-German Reinsurance Treaty, any future general war in Europe would be a massive two-front clash with Italy caught in the middle. Thus, Rome altered again its strategy by abandoning Adriatic defense to Austria while refocusing on the Tyrrhenian against the French naval-amphibian threat and colonial expansion. Rome rapidly expanded both the army and navy, but neither this nor colonial expansion in the Horn between 1885 and 1896 could match Paris’ buildup. Brin responded in 1887 with a nine-year Naval Act to match France in overall tonnage. However, Italy’s earlier techno-


logical edge evaporated in the 1890s by the fast tempo of naval design innovations and long construction schedules.\(^8\)

The deaths of de Saint-Bon and Brin in 1894 and 1898 closed a major development period by the fathers of the modern Italian Navy, but did not stop the growing application of new technologies to Italian shipbuilding, including liquid combustion, new armors and engines, and the first domestic destroyers and submarines. Italian warships, even when technically superior, were often disconnected experimentations sacrificing the economies of scale of a more regular expansion plan. Procurements declined in 1898–1903, reflecting confusion in naval doctrine, the economic crisis after 1893, and the colonial setbacks in Ethiopiain 1895 and 1896. Commentators agreed that the impressive technical grace and design boldness of Italy’s warships could not fully replace its appalling financial and structural shortcomings.

Italy’s defense strategy throughout the period of 1861 to 1899 had focused on Italo-French antagonisms, which only an alliance with Britain or a Triple Alliance naval convention could contain. But in the 1880s and 1890s, neither of Italy’s “friends” would help. Although the Franco-Russian alliance and 1898 naval convention threatened the Triple Alliance in both the entire Mediterranean and Baltic Seas, Berlin and Vienna still focused only on national coastal defense and opposed sending their fleets to help their weaker Italian ally. Meanwhile, as Britain reoriented its foreign policy toward France to reduce Mediterranean tensions, protecting Italy’s coasts in wartime would be prohibitive.\(^9\)

In these conditions and following the fall of Crispi in 1896, Italy could not muster the financial, industrial and military resources necessary to maintain its great power pretensions. The Italian Navy’s international ranking fell to fifth place.

Only with total sea-control could Italy fight a prolonged war, because any restriction of its sea trade and would lead to economic collapse of the homefront and accelerate military defeat on the field as happened in 1915 through 1918; 1935 and 1936; and 1940 through 1943. Italy’s options were limited. The country could drift into a dubious neutrality, but this meant renouncing great power pretensions as in 1866 through 1882, 1914 and 1915, and in 1939 through 1940. Or Italy could rely on the equally dubious maritime support of Britain and concentrate its resources on land defense against Germany. In any case, victory would be tied to the decision to focus on either land or sea offen-


sive, but not on both. Italy ended up pursuing a highly visible peacetime, prestige policy based on a strong army and a powerful navy, but without the resources, goals, or strategy needed to sustain the effort in wartime too. Meanwhile, the superior shipbuilding capacity of Britain and France allowed them to keep the quantitative lead over Italy’s technological marvels.\(^{20}\)

Although the French naval threat was quite real in 1861–1880s, it also had been partially exaggerated in 1880–1904: Italy’s politico-military élite used it to stimulate naval growth (trebling the Navy in real terms in 1880–1900), but they also sincerely overestimated France’s capacity to invade Sicily from the naval base of Biserte in Tunisia (unrealistic given the local superiority of Italian troops), or stage prolonged strikes against Italy’s coastal roads, railways and Tyrrhenian harbors (the French Navy would have been dangerously over-extended against the Italian Navy). Even the redeployment of a Russian Black Sea squadron to the Mediterranean, never went beyond Franco-Russian war-plans, although it deeply anguished London, Rome and Vienna. Italy’s military problems were seriously jeopardized by 1898–1914, when Germany’s global expansionism (“ Weltpolitik”) and naval race (Admiral von Tirpitz’s “ Risk Theory” stressed that Germany must build a battlefleet strong enough to mortally wound and demote Britain’s supremacy), challenged Britain’s traditional global commercial and maritime supremacy. Anglo-German cooperation waned, to be replaced by a dramatic alliance reversal: the Anglo-French and Anglo-Franco-Russian “Ententes” (1904–1907) against the Triple Alliance isolated also Italy by destroying her twin defense strategy posture (parallel Mediterranean and Continental support from her Anglo-German protectors). On the Continent, the Austro-Germans were now surrounded, while Germany’s subsequent diplomatic humiliation of France in the 1905–1906 First Moroccan Crisis and Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and 1905 only heightened tensions by cementing the Entente, once Britain pledged to send her Army in France against Germany’s hegemonic threat. In the Mediterranean too, any new naval expansion by Italy and Austria-Hungary, even in response to the renewed Italo-Austrian rivalry in the Adriatic, was now considered by the Entente merely as another asset to Germany. The Anglo-German rivalry provoked also a growing rift within the Triple Alliance: Germany rejected in 1896 the 1882 Mancini Corollary, a keystone of Italy’s national security (“ the Triple Alliance would never become anti-British”), while Irredentist tensions resurfaced between Italy and Austria-Hungary since the 1908 Bosnian Crisis (with Vienna’s refusal to cede Italian-speaking lands or Albania), at the same time that Russia’s potential naval reemergence in the Mediterranean and actual political penetration in the Balkans weakened the security of both Vienna and Rome (Serbia switched alignment from Austria to Russia, who secretly influ-

enced also Romania, Bulgaria and Greece).  

Consequently, in 1896–1914 Italy sought to improve her collapsing security by skillfully exploiting the international tensions to strengthen her balancing position with ties to both the Triple Alliance, and the Entente: separate colonial deals were worked out with France in 1900–1902 (the Two Italo-French Exchange of Notes swapping Morocco to France and Libya to Italy), with Britain in 1902 (Italian support of Britain in Egypt and British support of Italy in Libya), and Austria-Hungary in 1902 (Libya), while Italy abandoned the 1888 Triple Alliance Military Convention. But Italy’s success after 15 years of attempts in forcing a First Triple Alliance Naval Convention (December 1900) was hollow: no serious joint naval action was planned and only cursory cooperation was discussed to prevent the rendezvous of the Franco-Russian fleets, while each ally would secure sea-control of neighboring seas (Vienna in the Adriatic, Rome in the Western and Central Mediterranean against France, and a smaller Italo-Austrian task-force would operate in the Eastern Mediterranean). Thus, Italy’s successful role in the international patrols during the 1897–1898 Cretan Crisis proved for the first time Italy’s role as a full fledged Mediterranean Power, and her independence from the Triple Alliance on vital security issues in the basin. Italy’s Navy in 1892–1900 had 319 vessels (382,000–tons): 17 battleships; 21 cruisers; 19 destroyers; 143 torpedo-boats; a submarine; and 126 sail-ship auxiliaries. The 1904 naval reorganization redeployed all best units to the Mediterranean Naval Force strike-squadron (La Spezia, Naples and Messina), with minor warships in the Reserve Division, and other units in the Torpedo Boats Command and Oceanic Naval Division (with the Naval Stations of the Red Sea and the Americas).

Italy’s naval thought responded to the growing international tensions by critically reexamining its strategic posture under the influence of Julian S. Corbett’s 1911 Some Principles of Strategy, U.S. Captain Alfred Mahan’s 1912 Naval Strategy, and Britain’s Charles Callwell, who criticized Italy’s geostrategic deficiencies. Mahan revolutionized international geo-politics, and naval strategic and tactical studies by using historical models of seapower to identify the politico-economic forces connected to seapower and how to achieve sea-control and naval supremacy. Concerning Italy, Mahan deemed imperative to attain total sea-control in wartime to protect from any sea-strike the strategic coastal railways (vital for quick transport of armies to the Alps). Italy’s “Naval-

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ists" readily adopted Mahan's original concept of "naval strategy" bent on securing national seapower in war and peace, as well as Corbett's more appealing vision of "strategic defense" based on the central role of a "fleet in-being" and sea trade interdiction and destruction. But rarely they truly embraced Mahan's broad strategic outlook, and even references to Malta and Corsica remained merely tactical, rather than explore their geostrategic impact as springboards into the Mediterranean. Lieutenant Giovanni Sechi's (later Admiral and Navy Minister) 1897 article Notes on Naval Strategy and 1903 book Elements of Maritime Military Art, stressed that strategy must correlate land and sea forces, with alternative priorities based on available force-ratios. Strategic offensive based on squadron combat was always the best defense for Italy's exposed coasts if she had superior naval forces (avoiding Pyrrhic tactical victories which would surely lead to strategic defeat in the longer run). Yet superiority was unlikely, thus forcing Italy to concentrate instead on strategic defense ("to deny sea-control to the enemy") as a "fleet in-being" operating at sea (not sitting idly in port), with infrequent open tactical clashes when advantageous, and parallel "guerrilla-strikes" (torpedo-boats and submarines) and privateering to destroy enemy sea-trade. Lieutenant Romeo Bernotti's (later Admiral) 1902–1903 articles Analysis of Naval Tactics, Reflections on Naval Strategy and 1911 book Principles of Naval Strategy, focused on the differences between strategy (broader comprehensive sweeps) and tactics (immediate combat), stressing the need to paralyze and destroy enemy fleets through either "tactical blockades" (near-coastal blockade of enemy ports), or "strategic blockade" if the enemy relies on torpedo boat defense (far-distance coastal blockade with near-coastal destroyer screen against torpedo attacks). The resolutive squadron clash between opposing fleets ("fleet war") should be eschewed by the Italian Navy in favor of an active, mobile "fleet in-being" to offset naval blockades, while being ready at a moment's notice to shift from defensive to offensive. Destruction of enemy sea trade was important, but could never break the enemy unless pursued relentlessly and extensively.23

By 1911 the Italian Navy had 30,052 men and 180 ships (358,748-tons): 16 battleships; 10 heavy-cruisers; 21 light-cruisers; 23 destroyers; 62 torpedo boats; 7 submarines; and 47 auxiliaries. Overall naval preparedness, efficiency and accuracy in target shooting increased by 1909 from 40 percent to 75 percent. The "Navalist" doctrinaire contribution (strategic offensive, mobile "fleet in-being"), and the threat to Italy's security from a war between the Entente and Triple Alliance, forced the Italian Navy to develop secret naval war-plans for both the Tyrrenian (aggressive, mobile naval defense against France) and

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Adriatic ("fleet in-being" defensive posture against Austria-Hungary), deciding to annex Libya in 1911, while resuming the buildup of fortifications and warships to overcome unfavorable naval-ratios with her enemies (1:2 in the Tyrrenian, 2:3 in the Adriatic given the Austro-Italian naval race). To respond to these foreign threats and sharp politico-journalistic contrasts in Italy between supporters and opposers (Socialists) of accrued naval defenses, Italy sought to attain after 1908 a 2-to-1 naval ratio against Vienna, but such ratio hovered only at 1.24-to-1 in 1904 and 1.3/1.2-to-1 in 1913–1914 given the Austrian dreadnought expansion, which qualitatively placed her Navy at par with the marginally larger Italian fleet. Even by expanding the Italian Navy and launching super-dreadnoughts, by 1918–1919 the ratio would have still been 1.45-to-1, while the French advantage on Italy would be 2.9-to-1. Thus, in 1913 Chief of Naval Staff Rear-Admiral Thaon di Revel pressed both for an effective Triple Alliance Naval Convention (to destroy in the Tyrrenian the French transport-fleet carrying the IV Army from Algeria to France), and for expanding the Italian Navy by 1918 to 60 percent of the French Navy and four-thirds of Austria’s by supporting a vast “insidious war” in the Adriatic (guerrilla-type attrition by torpedo-boats, MAS, lesser units, submarines, airplanes and minefields to corner the Austrian battlefleet in their bases). Both naval strategies were alternatively implemented during World War I (the “resolutive squadron-battle” in 1915–1917, and the “insidious war” in 1915 and 1917–1918). However in 1911 the Young Turks’ modernizing revolution (1907–1911) and France’s annexation of Morocco precipitated the Italian decision to conquer Libya from Turkey. Italy’s 145 warships (of which 34 battleships and cruisers), faced 39 Turkish warships (4 battleships; 2 light-cruisers; 12 destroyers; 21 lesser units) and scores of obsolete vessels, but the logistic and tactical aspects of this sudden naval campaign were both taxing and dangerous, while Navy and Army were not informed and fully mobilized until the last moment due to extreme political concern for secrecy. The nearly obsolescent “Grand Fleet” (Britain’s introduction of dreadnought battleships revolutionized seapower, while Italy’s strike-force was twenty to thirty years old and technologically unchanged since the glorious 1870s–1890s build-up), had its only field day in the 1911–1912 Italo-Turkish War: securing total sea-control of the Central Mediterranean and Aegean, and striking Turkey even in the Straits. But Italy’s expansion in the basin as its third maritime Power, destabilized the Euro-Mediterranean balance of power, alienated all Powers, demoted Turkey, and provoked the pro-Russian Balkan States to also defeat Turkey and precipitate World War I.  

Italy’s maritime position deteriorated once her 1911 military emergence in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean worried the Entente, which prepared naval war-plans against both Italy and Austria (the Entente’s 1912–1913 Naval

Conventions). Although the 1909 British Admiralty’s memorandum *Mediterranean*, had stressed the unlikeability that Rome or Vienna would sacrifice their fleets to defend each other (given the reciprocal hostility), still the combined Italo-Austrian Navies and a naval Triple Alliance threatened in wartime the Entente’s naval forces and commercial shipping in the basin, as well as Malta and Egypt. France could have secured SLOC defense more easily by focusing on the Western Mediterranean, while Britain would control the basin east of Malta but opposed any cooperation with the weaker Russian fleet in the Straits. Following this, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill decided to partially withdraw the Royal Navy from the basin to the North Sea against the German threat of invasion and maritime supremacy, while transferring a skeletal Mediterranean Fleet from Malta to Gibraltar because she could no longer assure sea-control in the Eastern Mediterranean against Italy. The British decision (March 1912), as well as Russia’s unsuccessful pressures for an Anglo-Russian naval convention in the Baltic and Mediterranean to shore-up weak Russian forces (September 1912), led France to single-handedly strengthen the Entente’s Mediterranean posture by suddenly transferring most of her fleet to the basin to back the weakened British forces, while entrusting the common security in the North Sea-Atlantic to Britain (September 1912). The Anglo-French Naval Convention (February 1913), agreed to protect the vulnerable transport of French troops from North Africa with all French units and 50 percent of heavy British warships, while the rest would provide local defense, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and send an autonomous combat-squadron in the eastern basin to prevent the Austro-Hungarian Navy from exiting the Adriatic to join the Italians concentrated against France. If the Italo-Austrian Navies successfully rendezvoused, British warships would abandon SLOC protection and operate under French unified command to destroy in battle the adversary and then invade Southern Italy.25

Italy reacted by pushing through the 1913 Second Triple Alliance Naval Convention: a German Mediterranean Naval division (4 cruisers) operated in Italy, the Adriatic and Middle-East (November 1912), and an integrated Triple Alliance Mediterranean strategy under Italian command focused on the rendezvous of the Austro-Italian Navies to secure naval superiority and destroy the French fleet (without the full Austrian Navy in support of Italy victory would be questionable). But the Triple Alliance still lacked clear plans to offset British naval strikes from Malta to the Otranto Channel against the exit of the Italo-Austrian fleets. In late-1913, 8 Italo-Austrian dreadnoughts faced 8 French ones; 13 lesser battleships faced 12 French ones; 10 cruisers against 8 French ones; 44 destroyers against 35 French ones; 20 submarines against 18 French. Five new Italo-Austrian battleships under construction would face 9 French

ones on slips and immediate British support, but France feared the fast progress of the Italian Navy which would add in 1919 4 new super-dreadnoughts and 6 dreadnoughts. More problematic however was the deep schizophrenic Italo-Austrian rivalry in the Adriatic: neither could accept the other’s sub-regional predominance in the Adriatic (Vienna wanted to control the Otranto Channel by annexing Albania and the Salonika outlet to the Aegean, while Italy would not stop opposing Vienna in the Balkans unless she obtained territorial compensations in the “Irredenta” and Albania), although they cooperated against the Greek-Serbian annexation of anarchical Albania and Serbia’s pan-Slavist nationalism (which threatened Vienna’s influence and national integrity by promoting the secession of her Slavic provinces).^{26}

Following the Three Balkan Wars (1912–13), Italy strongly opposed any Austrian attack on Serbia both in 1913 and during the 1914 Sarajevo Crisis, fearing this would precipitate a European conflict if the Franco-Russians also intervened. In any protracted war the Entente’s superior naval power and resources (and Rome’s own Irredentist and expansionist aims) implied that Italy should join it, abandoning the Triple Alliance (Italy’s 34 divisions would tip the strategic balance in favor of the Entente by providing a 2-to-1 force ratio of 245 divisions against the hopelessly encircled Austro-German 126 divisions, but excluding their Turco-Bulgarian allies). But in a shorter conflict the Triple Alliance’s land superiority could easily win the war with Italy on their side (the Triple Alliance’s 160 divisions could defeat the superior but weaker Franco-Russian land forces, even if supported by Britain, Serbia-Montenegro, Greece and Romania). However, Rome could never have accepted subordination to the Triple Alliance in a war aimed at establishing Berlin’s hegemony in Europe and Vienna’s in the Balkans (contesting Rome’s influence in the Adriatic), without serious compensations. Nor could Italy hope to win a prolonged naval engagement with the Entente, or guarantee the communication and security of her exposed colonies: while a naval war against France and Russia was possible and sought for, a clash with Britain (once she sided with the Entente) would have overwhelmed Italy’s Navy, forcing her to seek a dangerous resolute battle on the high seas against superior forces. Thus, Italy remained neutral at the onset of World War I (Rome had been kept in the dark of Austria’s aggression against Serbia to prevent her requests for territorial compensations), thus securing her vulnerable sea-trade and coasts, while her land and naval defenses were hastily strengthened, because her neutrality was despised by both the Entente and the Austro-Germans (but neither bloc challenged her for fear of pushing Rome into the opposite group). Yet the country was bitterly divided over the “intervento”: neutrality was backed by a heterogeneous front of Catholics, Socialists and ex-Premier Giovanni Giolitti’s supporters, while nationalists of all stripes, the

^{26}Halpern, Mediterranean Naval Situation, 10–171; Gabriele and Friz, Politica navale italiana, 291–344; Marder, Dreadnought, vols. 1–2.
government and monarchy felt that Italy’s Risorgimental and “Third Rome” myths (on which her regional Power status and self-image were officially based), required her to join the war or risk turning into another fallen ex-Power like Spain. The Italian Army’s traditional pro-Triplicism quickly abated by May 1914, turning to a pro-Entente posture once the Anglo-French Navies completed the French troop-transport from North Africa, blockading the German Navy in port and stopping the German Army at the Marne (August): many feared that although the Entente’s victory at sea was not in doubt, Germany could still have prevailed on land, subsequently merging with Austria-Hungary into a more powerful Mitteleuropean Power (spanning from the North and Baltic Seas to the Adriatic, Aegean and Turkey), and demoting Italy to a mere “satellite”. Nonetheless Italy’s incomplete fortifications in the east, the military urged a rapid intervention in the Fall 1914 on the Allied side, compensating existing deficiencies with the surprise factor against the exposed Austro-Hungarian defenses. Parallel to this intense negotiations were underway between Italy and the Entente (August-September), which offered her Valona and all of the “Irredenta” (Trentino, Istria, Dalmatia). But not withstanding the Entente’s courting of Italy, France and Russia still secretly opposed Rome’s desire to replace Vienna as a more powerful rival force in the Adriatic, Western Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean: as soon as Allied victories seemed to reduce the urgency of Italy’s intervention, they reneged on Dalmatia, supporting pro-Russian Serbia’s claims there and in Albania, while Russia hoped to secure a naval base at Cattaro in the Adriatic.\footnote{F. C. von Hötendorff, *Aus meiner dienstzeit, 1908–1918*, 4–5 vols.; Paul Nikitisch-Boulles, *Vor dem Sturm: Erinnerungen an Erzherzog Thronfolger Franz-Ferdinand* (Berlin, 1925); Saldonà, *L’irredentismo*, 231–302; Francesco Cataluccio, *Antonio di San Giuliano e la politica estera italiana, 1900–14* (Florence, 1937); Halpern, *Mediterranean*, 100–271.}

Italy entered in World War I in Spring 1915 against her Parliament’s will, once the hope for a “quick war” outweighed her natural caution: Italy would maintain maritime security in cooperation with the Anglo-French, while switching her Continental land-security from the Austro-Germans to the Entente, obtaining in the process the entire “Irredenta” and other territories in the Adriatic from Austria, Adriatic supremacy and political influence in the Balkans, and consolidating her role as a leading Mediterranean Power (1915 Treaty of London). With the Italian Navy concentrated in the Adriatic to gain sea control against Vienna’s fortified bases, jagged coastline, mines and Austro-German submarines, the Otranto Channel was blocked. Only after defeating the Austrian Navy, larger Allied operations and landings could be finally staged in the Balkans to support Serbia and turn local Slavs against Austrian rule. But the Austrian Navy was not an easy prey: in seven months the French fleet sunk only an old Austrian cruiser, while losing instead its flag ship battleship, a cruiser, a destroyer, a submarine, and failing to conquer Austria’s base of Cattaro. Thereafter the French fleet retreated to Otranto leaving to Austria the virtual control
of the whole Adriatic. Italy occupied in 1914 the Albania’s strategic Valona harbor and by 1915 most of the country, while the Allied Naval Convention (May 1915) transferred under Italian command in the Adriatic 4 British heavy battleships and 4 light-cruisers, plus 12 French destroyers, 6 submarines and lesser ships. Another Allied fleet under French command would operate there whenever needed, while the combined Allied Mediterranean fleet based at Malta and Biserte would provide ASW defense in the basin. Concerning overall force-structures, in 1914–1915 Italy lined 143–179 warships against 126 Austrian, with: 13–16 battleships against 15 Austrians; 25–26 armored-cruisers and scout-cruisers against 10 ones; 25–33 destroyers against 25; 59–88 torpedo boats against 69; 16–21 submarines against 7, and 125 auxiliaries, while overall Italian naval tonnage increased to 512,000 in 1915 and personnel to 41,140. During World War I Italy added 127 new units against 38 Austrians: 2 battleships against one Austrian; 26 destroyers against 2; 35 torpedo boats against 18; and 64 submarines against 17. Italy’s combat-efficient units totalled 270 (excluding the 300 MAS) against 164 Austrians, but during the war Rome lost 32 warships (12 percent) against 29 Austrians (18 percent), plus 26 auxiliaries and 17 MAS against 19 Austrian auxiliaries (by 1918 Italy had 15 battleships, 21 cruisers, 63 destroyers, 108 torpedo boats, 81 submarines, 350 MAS, 309 auxiliaries). 28

Meanwhile in 1915, the war suddenly turned in favor of the Central Powers who recouped in the Balkans and at Gallipoli, so that Italy’s intervention instead of finishing the war in the Balkans against Vienna turned into a hopeless, long and bloody standstill until 1918 (the 11 attrition trench battles of the Isonzo and the 6 Piave Battles), while the Italo-Austrian battle fleets remained in port as opposite “fleets in-being”. This did not help neither vital SLOC protection, nor ASW operations, and Italy’s sea-trade and resources were decimated sinking 955,291 tons of merchant ships (or 53 percent of Allied losses compared to Britain’s 49 percent and France’s 42 percent) and Navy (263,450 tons in warships). Finally, Anglo-French warships in the Mediterranean operated independently from Italian command, even those assigned to guard the strategic Otranto mine-barriers, and few Allied infantry forces were sent to help Italy recover from her 1917 disastrous Caporetto defeat which was finally stopped at the Piave. Throughout World War I Italy concentrated exclusively on the narrow Adriatic war-front, viewing the conflict as her completion of the Risorgimental epic of national unification against Austria, instead of taking full charge of Allied security within the broader Mediterranean theater. Rome opposed Allied military coordination and limited her ASW naval patrol only to the Central Mediterranean, while refusing to join the 1915 Gallipoli campaign in the Straits and at Salonika (1915–18), or help Britain’s land front in the

28 Capo di Stato Maggiore della Marina, “Scontro tra la flotta italiana a dell’Austria-Ungheria,” (Jan. 1904) in (Rome, 1904); Gabriele and Friz, Politica navale italiana, 291–344; Marder, Dreadnought, vols. 2–3.
Middle-East, and even the common main warfront in France (only in 1916 Italy declared war to both Germany and Turkey). Thus, after forty years of heated strategic debates Italy demonstrated her politico-strategic immaturity by eschewing any major naval commitment in the Mediterranean, which she could have exploited instead to wedge herself between the weakened Anglo-French regional presence. Italy’s self-imposed military marginalization within the West helped the Allies’ secret aim to undermine Italy’s rival influence in both the Mediterranean and Europe: the Anglo-Franco-Russian Entente excluded her in 1915–1916 from the secret partitioning of Turkey’s and Germany’s colonies; in early–1918 America, Britain, and France reneged on the 1915 Treaty of London, supporting instead Yugo-Slav and Greek nationalism in the Adriatic-Aegean to weaken Italy; while at Versailles in 1919 again the “Big Three” who shared the Western Front experience, monopolized all postwar settlements.29

At the Versailles Peace Treaty, Italy secured the strategic Eastern-Alpine land-borders and clear naval predominance in the Adriatic (but not full supremacy), while the Anglo-French supremacy over the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean encircled Italy (weakened also by her loss of Libya during World War I and domestic opposition to annexing Albania). Upon Austria’s surrender (November 3, 1918), the Italian Navy seized all enemy bases in the Adriatic (from Trieste to Cattaro), all warships (which had already been devolved to the new Yugoslav authorities), and the outer Dalmatian islands (important strategic outposts in the central Adriatic). But not withstanding Italy’s significant naval war losses, she was prevented at Versailles from absorbing the captured Austrian Navy and had to scrap it entirely, leaving her even weaker in 1920 in relation to the old French threat and her collapsing peacetime naval expenditures. Ethnic tensions between Italians and Croats exploded around Italy’s occupation of Fiume and her contradictory diplomatic quest at Versailles to reclaim the 1915 London Pact clauses and Fiume (not part of it), exacerbated Italy’s international isolation (all other Powers supported Yugoslavia’s claims on Fiume, especially America whose staunch opposition to Rome’s security aims was enhanced by Italy’s economic dependence on vital U.S. aid and loans for postwar recovery), while domestically accelerating the political collapse of internal order and governmental authority. Finally, the Italian Army opposed annexing Dalmatia, because although important for sea control of the Adriatic, only a 100,000 army corps could defend it against Balkan threats. Thus, at the Rapallo Treaty (November 1920) Italy lost both Dalmatia (given to Yugoslavia) and Fiume (made an independent free city-state until Mussolini annexed it in 1924). For all of Italy’s brilliant diplomacy in 1896–1917, her lack of maritime vision and diplomatic flexibility, and depleted economy, left her isolated in the Great Powers’ game, while her military-economic exhaustion and domestic

political weakness prevented Italy from pursuing either a bolder independentist Mediterranean policy, or conciliatory diplomacy with America, the Slav neighbors and Britain, to isolate France in the postwar. Unfortunately for the European balance of power in the 1920s through the 1930s, much of Fascism’s brash Mediterranean imperialism and anti-Western bitterness would be the inescapably product of these lessons in humiliation and broken Power-dreams, as well as Mussolini’s own attempt to assert a more favorable politico-naval influence in the basin.³⁰

The Fascist Era (1922–45) was the apex of Italy’s military power and aspirations in a world devoid of great tensions or power competitions after the international bloodletting of World War I. In the old balance of power, Italy as the “junior” Power, always resented the West’s cavalier attitude towards her own regional Mediterranean aspirations, but cyclical domestic crises and structural-economic shortcomings prevented more forceful independent actions. Mussolini’s seizure of power (“March on Rome”) in October 1922, produced radical changes in foreign and naval policies to revitalize national prestige and reorganize the Armed Forces, while Fascism’s imperialist thirst for glory and international power symbolized that Italy was now willing to change all rules and abandon the restraints of her Liberal past. After World War I, the realignment of power following the collapse of four Great Powers and the isolation of both Soviet Russia and America, allowed Italy to play now a decisive role in Euro-Mediterranean politics in the 1920s–1930s: Fascist Italy had the power, influence and determination to act both as a natural balancer between the sharply divided Powers (Britain, France, Germany), or as a perturbar of the 1919 Versailles status quo whenever her quest for equality with France and Britain were frustrated (1925, 1935–1940). Thus, just when the revolutionary techno-strategic advent of aero-naval combat foretold the demise of traditional battleship squadron clashes, Fascism rediscovered the Navy as a major foreign policy tool for power-projection. In his ambitious but still predominantly rhetorical quest to buildup Italy’s military power to plunge in a belated drive for regional expansion, Mussolini’s ideologized security and foreign policy constantly wavered between rigid support of the status quo through cooperation with Britain and France, to revisionist pressures and clashes with the West in the basin (diplomatic posturing, open rivalry, secret destabilizations) and war plans against weak neighbors (Libya, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, Ethiopia, Spain).³¹

While Mussolini really continued the old geostrategic path for regional pre-eminence of Liberal Italy (self-curtailed by excessive reliance on diplomacy and fear of uncontrollable military escalations), he brought a new, fresh ambition for

³⁰Rochat, L’esercito, 196–270; Romeo Bernotti, Cinquant’anni nella Marina (Rome, 9); Ferrante and Gay, Marina italiana, 68–84, 207–269.

unscrupulous use of violence and subversion to achieve his goals: Fascist Italy would be second to none, as her limited colonial wars would prove (Libya 1923–29, Ethiopia 1935–36, Spain 1936–1939); and if she could not achieve diplomatically her equal status, then another world war would settle scores with France and even Britain to achieve control of the basin in the name of Fascist Italy’s Neo-Roman myth. However, Europe’s twin “civil war” (the World Wars), undermined Italy’s carefully cultivated image as a Mediterranean Power, exposing unsolved weaknesses and hesitations. Both in 1914–1915 and 1939–1940 Rome faced the hard choice between either accepting, or openly renouncing to her claims to Power during international wars: renouncing her Power status was impossible, because Italy was always the weakest of Powers, whose claims were routinely discounted and international status was propped up by Rome’s well orchestrated façade of military strength and diplomatic bluff; yet accepting the ultimate responsibilities of wartime Powership in wars “too big” for Italy, entailed immense economic sacrifices and domestic socio-political instability. A little “finesse” therefore was more than required, but Rome’s diplomatic cynicism and military capabilities could not always bend reality to suit glorious war plans built on the cheap (that is, minimum military commitment on the side of the apparent winners): in 1915 Italy successfully sided with the winning Allies, while in 1940 the apparently winning Axis proved a disastrous choice. In reality she emerged as a loser in both occasions, when pent up socio-economic-political tensions exploded under the stress of World Wars: the price paid was a loss of power (temporary in 1919–1921, definitive in 1943), and domestic political revolutions (Fascism in 1922–1925; Western democratic republic in 1943–1949).32

World War I brought major changes in naval strategy and operations, most importantly demoting the battleships and squadron combat as centerpieces of naval policy. While all industrial resources had been fully committed to such total war, minefields, torpedo boats, submarines, and MAS had proved cheaper and more effective weapons against the expensive strike-fleets (reduced to either passive “fleets in-being,” or convoy escorts), while air power was rapidly expanding from the land battlefields into maritime theaters too. Thus the 1920s were heavily influenced by the international doctrinaire clash between capital ships vs. “insidious combatants” (submarines and torpedo boats), and especially between sea power vs. air power. Both were new revolutionary warfare concepts aimed at winning control of the world’s SLOCs to severe enemy sea-trade, yet both also split to the core military establishments worldwide, in an unrelenting doctrinaire clash between exclusivist strategic visions, favoring either traditional naval warfare (capital ships; squadron combat), or new strategies (submarines; airplanes; mine fields; sea traffic interdiction). Unfortunately, both

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visions forcefully negated any space for strategic integration or cooperation between rival armed services. Concerning Italy, the “insidious warfare” had vindicated Admiral Thaon di Revel’s unpopular wartime policy of transforming the expensive “Great Fleet’s” offensive-defense strategy into a silent restless “Fleet in-being,” which kept capital ships in port while privileging medium- and lesser-unit combat roles (reconnaissance, land support, blockade, interdiction, convoy-escort). This was the official posture of the Italian Naval authorities to justify their deep frustration (Commander Romeo Bernotti’s 1917 Forecasts and Reality in Naval Warfare). More important was the major strategico-doctrinaire clash between sea power and air power, dominated in Italy by the towering figure of Air Force General Giulio Douhet’s revolutionary theories of air supremacy as a new war-winning tactical and strategic policy. Since the 1911–1912 Italo-Turkish War, Italy pioneered in field aerial reconnaissance, strategic bombing, on-board cameras and radios (using 22 planes, 3 blimps and 10 balloons). This stimulated the international air race during World War I (Italy had in 1914 80 planes and 3 blimps; by 1918 she reached 1,100 Army and 638 Navy planes, although only 700 were always in flight-condition). The concept of air supremacy over seapower lay in the capability of freely seeking, striking and sinking from any altitude even the strongest enemy warship (proven dramatically by the U.S. air-bombing exercises at Cape Hatteras, North Carolina in 1921). Thereafter the heated international air-naval controversy raged between “air-supremacists” pressing for an independent land-based AirForce to gain air supremacy and exclusive sea and land defense from the air, versus seapower advocates split in two rival groups: the “surface warships traditionalists” defending the central role of battleships (regardless of the increasingly hostile combat environment with torpedoes, submarines, aircrafts, mines) against the visionary “aero-navalists” who expanded the land-based air striking range against enemy fleets through the use of auxiliary naval aviation based on sea-going air carriers (introduced by Britain and the United States in World War I).33

Douhet’s Critical War Diary (1921), Supremacy in the Air (1921–1927), and Probable Aspects of Future Wars (1928), relentlessly advocated air supremacy over traditional land- and seapower: to concentrate all air-power (by combining the separate land- and sea-based air services into an autonomous Air Force) in air combat and strategic bombing to annihilate the enemy by securing total air supremacy and bomb cities, railways, industries, communications, bases, and least protected centers. Given the amount of destruction any plane can cause, the only real deterrence against air attacks is air control and “supremacy of the air,” while the less decisive Army and Navy should remain on the

33C. Castex, Synthèse de la guerre submarine (Paris, 1920); Otto Groos, La dottrina della guerra marittima nel conflitto mondiale (Rome, 1929); Ferrante, Potere marittimo, 54–55; Alfredo Baistrocchi, Per l’efficienza d’Italia (Livorno, 1924); Arturo Riccardi, La difesa marittima dell’Italia: Corsi, 1922–24 (Turin, 1924).
defensive, supported by the land-based aviation. Douhet’s theories foretold the advent of strategic bombing and air power in World War II and especially in the early nuclear Age (with America’s Strategic Air Command-SAC). But Douhet’s opposition to auxiliary airforces, air-carriers and torpedo seaplanes operating in the basin’s close environment (Concerning the Whole and the Proportioning of its Parts, 1929), was sharply criticized by the more progressivist Army and Navy circles. The “Aero-Navalists” insisted that mere land-based air-cover would be insufficient, and not as rapid as needed to protect the Italian Navy in distant aero-naval combats with enemy fleets endowed with carriers: the lack of naval air cover would leave the Italian Navy a hopeless sitting duck. Bernotti’s 1929 article On behalf of Naval Aviation and book Fifty Years in the Military Navy, supported by Fioravanzo’s 1929 Resisting on the Surface to Amass in the Air and History of Tactical Naval Thought, advocated air-carriers for sea-combat in the Mediterranean and “seek-and-destroy” tactics against enemy SLOCs, sea-trade and warships in both the Mediterranean and Atlantic Ocean to compensate for his seizing Italian sea-supplies. The “Navalists” pressed for “Integral Warfare”: 1) the operational combat coordination of Army, Navy and Air Force (Fioravanzo); or 2) at a binary tactical aero-naval level at sea (with autonomous carrier-based aviation and long-range reconnaissance and strikes), and aero-land one on the field (Bernotti); 3) while SLOC interdiction forced the Navy to concentrate on ASW convoy-escort. But Douhet’s importance increased once Fascism embraced air-power concepts as a perfect military symbolism of Fascist values and Roman myth (1928 Probable Aspects of the Future War). Mussolini together with the powerful Fascist “Ras” Cesare Balbo Air Force Minister, and Navy Minister Rear Admiral Sechi remained faithful to Douhet’s theories of Air Force supremacism over auxiliary forces and opposed using extremely expensive and vulnerable air-carriers in the Mediterranean enclosed basin, where Italy could rely on cheaper land-based airfields. But Mussolini always failed to go beneath rhetoric and build air power effectively, thus Italy’s naval strategy between the wars remained virtually paralyzed by this extenuating air versus naval doctrinaire clash, while her fateful decision not to build carriers was the first time she renounced her traditional policy of spearheading, or closely following the latest technical innovations to maximize scarce resources. The Army and Air Force were reorganized, while the Navy (dubbed Supermarina) opted for a balanced force combination to maximize offensive and defensive strategies in the Mediterranean, but Fascist political priorities called instead for creating a prestigious strike-fleet capable of clashing with France (the old Liberal naval concept) and balance limited national resources with an internationally prestigious foreign policy and Power status.34

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34Pietro Maravigna, Un secolo di progresso italiano nelle scienze militari (Rome, 1940); Ferrante, Potere marittimo, 55–67; Giulio Rocco, Riflessioni sul potere marittimo (Naples, 1814); Oscar di Giambardin, Politica navale (Bologna, 1932); O. di Giambardino, L’arte della guerra in mare (Rome, 1938); Romeo Bernotti, “La marina come potere marittimo,” Enciclopedia Italiana, 22: 322–24;
Economically exhausted, Italy was hopelessly left behind by the larger "Oceanic" maritime Powers, and with great relief it supported the 1921–1922 Washington Naval Disarmament Conference imposing a ten-year construction holiday and fixed tonnage ceilings for battleships (35,000 tons with 406mm. guns), carriers (27,000 tons with 203mm. guns) and light cruisers (10,000 tons with 203mm. guns), but no agreement was reached on destroyers, submarines and lesser vessels. The treaty assigned to Britain & Dominions 22 units (tonnage 580,450), to the United States 18 units (tonnage 500,610), and 10 units each to Japan (tonnage 301,320), France (tonnage 221,175) and Italy (tonnage 182,800). In 1927–31 overall battleship fleet tonnage were further reduced to 15 units (525,000-tons) for United States and Britain each, and 9 units each for Japan (315,000 tons), France and Italy (175,000 tons each). For carriers overall tonnage limits were: 135,000 tons for the United States and Britain each; 81,000 tons for Japan; 60,000 tons for France and Italy each. Since the 1923 Corfù Crisis, Mussolini understood the impossibility of pursuing an active and forceful international policy without an efficient and prestigious Navy. Italy’s naval programs in 1920 and 1928 expanded the Navy (dubbed “Supermarina”) to 45,221 men and 662 units: 5 aging battleships, 2 coastal battleships, 6 heavy cruisers, 9 light cruisers, 75 destroyers, 91 torpedo boats, 55 submarines, 241 MAS, 33 gunboats, 16 mine-laying ships, 58 minesweepers, 43 auxiliaries, and 8 transport ships. The Italian Navy now reversed herself and in 1922–40 pressed for naval air-cover and air carriers, but was stonewalled by Mussolini, who dubbed carriers useless in the enclosed Mediterranean basin (“Italy is our unsinkable Air-Carrier”). Italy’s strategic thought slowly evolved from the rigid focus on Adriatic supremacy (1860s–1920), to broader regional concepts of sea-control in the Central Mediterranean and colonies (1898–1920s), to the whole basin (1930s), and finally to the permanent access to oceans and global sea-trade (1938–1940). The truly “Oceanic” maritime Powers (Britain, France, Japan, United States) already pursued a broader international strategic power game in which control of the whole Mediterranean was just one element in the global rush to influence the Middle East/Persian Gulf, Balkans and Africa (Britain and France), East Asia (Japan and United States), and secure global naval parity (United States, Britain, Japan, France). Mussolini was obscurely aware of Italy’s strategic and naval limitations, stressing the need to defend her SLOCs, but Mussolini’s grandiose Mediterranean vision remained always too confused and superficial in its rhetorical shallowness, a mere emotional bandwagon without the necessary technico-strategic guidelines for effective action. Instead of strengthening his maritime policy and naval modernization (which proceeded slowly regardless of the increasingly aggressive Fascist foreign policy in the 1930s showing once again the traditional Italian communication cleavage between political goals and military preparedness), Mussolini mediated his

modern quest for maritime preeminence with constant politico-cultural references to Ancient Rome’s Mediterranean supremacy (as Liberal Italy did in 1860–1914) to enhance Fascist Italy’s maritime prestige.35

Commander (later Admiral) Edoardo Squadrilli’s theory of seapower in his 1938 *Maritime Power and the Fascist Empire*, brutally adapted Mahan (without mentioning him) to the Fascist régime’s most cherished maritime tenets: international dynamism, centrality of the military Navy (Mussolini’s emphasis on prestigious capital ships), colonial expansion as a symbol of national virility and Power status (the 1935–1936 Ethiopian campaign), as well as using totalitarianism’s indoctrination of public opinion to forge a national maritime ethos. A more influential and correct vision of seapower came from Commander Guido Po’s (later Admiral) 1929 *Sea-Power and Italy’s Wartime Supplies*, focused on the Navy’s wartime mission to protect the free flow of national sea-trade. Similar views were stressed by Baistrocchi in 1924, who also examined potential war-scenarios against a hostile Balkan bloc (Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece) as heir of Austria’s rival Adriatic projection, or France in the Western Mediterranean (Italy’s perennial rival), or even Britain throughout the basin and Red Sea (should Italy displease her by developing too great a regional appetite). Yet everybody dreaded such hopeless clash with the Royal Navy, given Italy’s naval inferiority (during the 1923 Corfú Crisis with Britain, Navy Minister Thaon di Revel curtly replied to Mussolini that the Italian Navy could resist only 48 hours). Captain Arturo Riccardi’s (Admiral and Navy Under-Secretary during World War II) 1924 *Italy’s Maritime Defense*, focused on a two-front naval war (Western Mediterranean against France and Adriatic against pro-French Yugoslavia): no degree of defensive strategy (“Fleet-in-being”) would protect Italy’s exposed coasts from enemy attack and sea-trade, thus Italy needed an offensive posture to severe enemy SLOCs, secure sea-control and absolute air-supremacy to protect Italian sea trade and SLOCs especially in the Eastern Mediterranean. Equally so Po’s seapower vision called for both military defense and coordination with the national merchant navy to promote adequate supplies in wartime given Italy’s dependency on sea imports (80 percent of total trade). Yet the Mediterranean’s elongated geography and limited trade routes to the outer Oceans (Atlantic through Gibraltar; Indian through Suez and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait) jeopardized Italy’s national security, economy and colonial defense (only Britain had a balanced network of bases along the basin’s routes). Fioravanzo’s 1929 *Notes on Naval Military Art* and 1930–31 *War at Sea and Integrated Warfare*, advocated integrated strategic action by coordinating politics and strategy on one hand, and all armed services on the other to achieve the maximum operational aero-naval concentration of power to defeat the enemy.

"Navalists" agreed on aggressive and integrated aero-naval strategies to secure unhindered communications and sea-control, while denying it to the enemy (Bernotti, Fioravanzo, Po, Commander and later Admiral, Oscar di Giambardino). Essential was the politico-military will to pursue massive strategic offensives and well-planned operations (convoy-escort, squadron attack, amphibious invasion), even with inferior forces, rather than relying on a passive "Fleet in-being" defense of confining the Navy to port under the threat of submarine and enemy air strikes (Taranto 1941; Pearl Harbor 1941), while national sea-trade would be ravaged (Bernotti's 1930s articles The Navy as Maritime Power and Supremacy at Sea, and Commander Vittorio Mocagatta's 1939 Sea-Power and Fast-Paced Warfare). Mocagatta (killed in a suicide MAS attack on Malta) urged an initial rapid strategic actions to seize quick tactical victories against even superior enemy forces by exploiting strategic surprise to achieve victory (a strategic surprise which the Italian Navy failed to pursue at the onset of both World Wars).36

Unfortunately these intellectual doctrines failed to influence Fascist Italy's schizophrenic national security and foreign policy, dominated by constant changes in rhetoric and objectives, and lacking in sound strategic planning or long-term procurements, given Mussolini's quest for easy prestige and wavering politico-military opposition to Britain, France or Germany. Naval parity and naval-diplomatic contrasts with France dominated Italy's naval thought in 1921 through 1935, and torpedoed all international naval disarmament conferences in the 1920s. Mussolini's need to counter both France in the basin and Nazi Germany in Europe forced him to launch a rapid naval overhaul in 1933-37 of the obsolete Cavour, Giulio Cesare, Duilio and Dandolo battleships, notwithstanding high costs and criticism (all remodeled units remained qualitatively inferior to similar modernized Anglo-French units). Parallel to this in 1934-1938 the first four truly modern 35,000-tons battleships were put on keels (Vittorio-Veneto, Littorio, Roma, Impero) and by 1932 Supermarina's battlefleet had 412 units: 4 battleships, 3 battlecruisers, 7 heavy cruisers, 14 light cruisers, 60 destroyers, 71 torpedo boats, 43 MAS, 65 submarines, 24 gunboats, 17 minelayers, 39 minesweepers, 59 major auxiliaries, and countless lesser-units. But Mussolini's prestigious naval buildup in the Mediterranean in the 1930s was offset by tensions with Britain and France, who surrounded Italy from their bases at Toulon, Biserte, Malta, Alexandria and Corsica, with help also from Yugoslavia and Greece in the Adriatic and Aegean. But Mussolini was impassable to the deteriorating naval and air-power ratios (Italy could muster in 1931 only 1,507 planes against 2,375 French and 2,041 British), cutting off Italy's colonial interests and sea-trade. Thus, when in 1935 he embarked on the Italo-Ethiopian War, it sounded the death knell of the Anglo-Italian friendship: to

36Giuseppe Fioravanzo, La guerra sul mare e guerra integrale, 2 vols. (Turin, 1930–31); Giuseppe Fioravanzo, Appunti d'arte militare marittima (Turin, 1929); Vittorio Mocagatta, "Il potere marittimo e la guerra di rapido corso," Rivista Maritima, (Jan. 1938).
stop the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, in October 1935 the French fleet mobilized at Bizerte and Mers el-Kébir, while Britain’s Mediterranean Fleet concentrated off Alexandria, Port Said, Haifa, Malta, Aquaba, Aden, with the Home Fleet moving to Gibraltar. The Royal Navy lined 5 battleships, 2 air-carriers, 16 cruisers, 63 destroyers, 11 submarines, and 1,000 planes against Italy’s 400-odd warships (but Italy’s combat-ready battlefleet had only 2 old battleships, 19 cruisers, 60 destroyers, 36 torpedo boats, 61 submarines and 600–700 planes, while the other units were either in the Horn or obsolete). Although lacking in sufficient capital ships and naval aviation, Supermarina hoped to deter a British attack with her superiority in submarines and torpedo boats. The Italian Navy played a key logistical role in transporting troops and supplies (560,000 men, 66,000 animals, 30,000 vehicles, 2 million tons), while defending Italy’s coasts and long SLOCs from the superior British Navy. Mussolini moreover, knew from his secret service that the Admiralty was bluffing given its low ammunition and as long as he could resist the sanctions imposed by the League of Nations, the deeply divided Anglo-French refrained from going to war over peripheral crises.37

Italy’s Ethiopian victory in 1936 enhanced her Power status and access to the Mediterranean-Indian SLOCs, but further increased Italy’s geo-strategic vulnerability: Britain still controlled Suez and the seas and could always cut Italy off from the Red Sea in any real confrontation (as happened in 1940–1941). London now modernized all her battleships, built two more and an air-carrier, increased her cruisers to 70 and her frontline aviation to 1,750 planes, while replacing most destroyers and submarines. Supermarina in 1936 had more than 600 units (416,562 tons) with 112,565 tons of new constructions being readied. International tensions spiralled further when Italy intervened in the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War on the side of Franco’s Fascist insurgents (shipping there 80,000 “volunteers,” 500 guns, 4,000 trucks), while the Italian Navy seized the strategic Minorca Island and harassed anti-Franco merchant ships even through pirate attacks. Both campaigns enhanced Fascist Italy’s international prestige as a regional Mediterranean maritime Power, although the high matériel attrition harmed combat-readiness of the Armed Forces. Moreover, if Mussolini’s “fluid” foreign policy had constantly shifted in the past according to circumstances and dreams of glory, the 1935–37 expansion confirmed his determination to make of Italy a decisive Euro-Mediterranean Power allied with Nazi Germany (1936 Axis; 1937 Anti-Comintern Pact; 1939 Steel Pact; 1940 Tripartite Pact). Thus, the prospect of another World War forced Italy as a maritime Power, to either dominate the seas, or find herself forever a

prisoner in the Mediterranean. But in any total war against the West 47 percent of Italy’s annual imports could not be substituted by any domestic production (“autarky”), especially 7.3 million tons of oil (out of a yearly consumption of 8.7 millions); one million tons of steal products (1.2 million yearly consumption); 513,000-tons of foodstuff (out of 620,000-tons imported); all 22,000-tons of imported rubber, and other equally vital raw materials. Already during the Ethiopian War and League of Nations’ embargo, Mussolini had admitted that had foreign shipments of coal and oil been stopped, Italy’s offensive would have died, but still in 1939 Italy imported 22.5 million tons of foreign goods (78 percent fuel, 22 percent industrial and agricultural goods). 38

Under Mussolini’s imperialistic expansionism, in 1940 Supermarina’s overall force structure reached 700-odd warships and auxiliaries (951,100-tons), plus 82 local units: 6 remodeled battleships; 22 cruisers; 61 destroyers; 71 torpedo boats; 114 submarines; 20 MAS; and 322 auxiliaries. Especially important had been Italy’s naval growth compared to her French rival: in nine years (1931–1940) the battlefleet ratio which favored France fell from 1.59-to-1 to 1.25-to-1, with 280 Italian warships against 240 French in 1940, although Paris still held the lead in battleships, destroyers, overall tonnage and auxiliaries. Navy personnel grew to 83,900 men in 1939–1940 and 139,000 men in June 1940, but Supermarina’s modernization program was still only half-way through, with 2 battleships, 12 cruisers and 4 large submarines unfinished, fuel stocks only for one year of combat, Army stocks depleted by foreign interventions and military aid to Franco’s Spain, while only one-third of the Air Force was operational and plagued by inefficiency and corruption in the aeronautical industry, as well as rivalry with the Navy over procurements of modern interceptors and torpedo bombers. Although Mussolini’s diplomacy had stopped Hitler’s preparations for war at the 1938 Munich Treaty (ceding Czechoslovakia’s German-speaking Sudetenland to Germany), he could not restrain Hitler any more from attacking Poland (over Danzig and the Corridor) and precipitating World War II in 1939. As an official German ally (1939 Steel Pact), Fascist Italy could neither join Germany in a joint war purported by Hitler to take place only in 1943, nor side with the Allies who despised her politically and ideologically. Notwithstanding Hitler’s pressures for an Italian surprise expansion of World War II to the Mediterranean, neutrality however humiliating it sounded for the sabre-rattling Fascist régime, was still preferable to such a blind uneven war, given Mussolini’s alarm over Italy’s military unreadiness, Anglo-French naval blockades, and a possible Russian expansion in the Balkans under the 1939 Molotov-von Ribbentrop Pact (partitioning Eastern Europe between

Italy’s Strategy and Naval Doctrines from Unification to NATO

Germany and the USSR in exchange for a Soviet pro-German neutrality.39

The military situation changed anew by Spring 1940, when Germany’s “Blitzkrieg” in the West quickly conquered Scandinavia, Netherlands, Belgium and destroyed France, forecasting an inevitable armistice with a besieged Britain. Mussolini felt he had to jump immediately into the military cauldron on Germany’s side if he hoped for territorial gains in the Mediterranean and post-war influence. More than in 1915, war this time promised to be a truly quick one, undertaken under the best of auspices notwithstanding military unreadiness. Yet while the real war went on in France between the Germans and Anglo-French, Italy’s hasty diversionary Alpine offensive was bloodily halted by France. At sea, Supermarina had a slight superiority over the weakened Anglo-French Navies: 151 Italian warships plus 115 submarines in the Central Mediterranean faced 128 Allied and 54 submarines (118 French controlling the Western Mediterranean and 64 British in the Eastern basin); 4–6 Italian battleships (2 more on slips) against 12 British and 4–5 French; no Italian carrier (only in 1941 two will be put on slips) against 2 British with 60 fighters; 7 heavy cruisers against 7 French; 12 light cruisers against 10 British and 7 French; 57 destroyers against 39 British and 35–41 French; 71 Torpedo-boats against 16 French; 20 MAS against none; 2,492 Italian planes against 2,367 Anglo-French (but no torpedo bombers against British carriers). But Supermarina remained plagued by indecision over strategy and soon fell on the defensive under the umbrella of land-based air cover. Italy’s regional expansion was conditioned by her vital north-south SLOCs to Libya, which intersect Britain’s East-West “Imperial lifeline” near Malta, as well as France’s own SLOCs to Algeria and Tunisia. Italy could cut the British SLOCs in the Sicilian Channel surrounding Malta, while Massaua in the Red Sea and Italy’s Rhodes base in the Aegean could provide sufficient diversionary threats to Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean. But poor leadership, excessive caution, lack of war-plans and resources left Italy idle in the Mediterranean, rather than exploit surprise to conquer an undefended Malta, Corsica, Nice, Tunisia, Egypt-Sudan, the British and French Somalilands, or disrupt Anglo-French SLOCs and bases (Alexandria, Malta, Toulon, Gibraltar, Bisate), while blockading with mines the Suez Canal.40 But Mussolini and Supermarina never excelled in bold imagination, planning, or strategic risk taking, while the Duce’s war decision came


suddenly at the last minute, leaving no time for serious planning and squandering the initial surprise advantage according to Admiral Giorgio Da Zara’s *Admiral’s Skin*: “[Why] was the war not started with a triple attack of special naval forces against Alexandria, Malta and Gibraltar, fully exploiting the surprise?”

Under-Secretary Cavagnari respond to the lack of clear strategic war aims by shelving bold, surprise offensive plans, given the unfavorable aero-naval ratio against the Allies, extensive coastal defense duties, and exhausting troop-convoy escort missions. To avoid risky combats for fear of defeats which would worsen the naval power balance, Supermarina and its Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Angelo Jachino, adopted Admiral Fioravanzo’s “active strategic defense” (or active “Fleet-in-being”) doctrine against Britain in June 1940-May 1943 (while Admirals di Giamberardino and Bernotti, proponents of an “aggressive strategic offense” were relegated to marginal roles). Jachino justified his wartime decisions in *Twilight of a Great Navy*, stressing that an active “Fleet-in-being” doctrine was: “the most useful strategy for an inferior Navy, bent on challenging sea-control from the enemy without staying idle in port, yet without accepting a decisive battle in desperate conditions.... [However] by remaining constantly on the defensive, it is possible to resist enemy pressures even for a long time, but never to win the war.”

Italy’s position eroded fast. Mussolini’s army in Libya (167,000 men, 339 tanks and 151 planes) was battered by 419,000 Anglo-French troops with 300 tanks and 900 planes, while the whole Horn of Africa was deemed virtually lost after the closure of Suez (Rome had there 280,000 men, 323 planes and 53 tanks) and even the Italian conquest of British Somalia did not help because Rome had no plans to rescue the Horn unless Britain could be driven away from both Egypt and Suez. Instead, London continued the war all alone under Premier Churchill’s tough leadership, and in a surprise strike sunk the French warships at Mers-el-Kébir (3 July 1940) to preempt their feared cession to the Axis, while receiving large scale assistance from “neutral” United States (“Destroyers Deal,” 1940; “Cash ‘n’ Carry, 1940; “Lend-Lease,” 1941). In the basin France’s fall gave numerical superiority to Supermarina, but Rome dissipated it (still without conquering Malta) in bloody, ill-conceived naval combats without radar support, air reconnaissance and night action techniques, against the better equipped Mediterranean Fleet (Punta Stilo and Cape Matapan Battles). To relieve Libya, Mussolini finally dispatched in August sufficient amour and supplies with a heavily escorted convoy (2 battleships, 16 cruisers, 32 destroyers, 5 supply-ships), which met two other British convoys converging on the Gibraltar-Malta-Alexandria route (escorted by 3 battleships, 5 cruisers, 16 destroyers and a carrier). The naval battle that ensued was inconclusive given the generalized improvisation of modern aero-naval

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warfare tactics: the smaller Italian fleet (following the policy of avoiding battle when victory was not assured) sought in vain to draw the British towards the coast and her superior land-based airforce (from Sicily); the Royal Navy failed to corner the Italians through air strikes; all air strikes missed their targets and both convoys reached their destinations.43

Mussolini further dispersed his forces by planning spectacular offensives against Egypt, Yugoslavia and Greece in his “parallel Mediterranean war” to boost his prestige and stem Germany’s mastery in the Balkans (Two Vienna Arbitrations, October 1938 and August 1940, which rearranged along closer ethnic-lines Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, making them all into German satellites). In Egypt, Italy’s September 1940 offensive in Libya (40,000 men and insufficient aircover and matériel because supplies were rerouted to the impending offensive against Greece), was soon routed by inferior Anglo-Indian forces (31,000 men) with a 5-to-1 armor and air superiority: Italy lost 38,000 prisoners at the battle of Sidi el-Barrani (December 1940), Tobruk and half of Libya were lost with 65,000 prisoners (January 1941), and the remaining Italian army corps in Libya was defeated at Beda-Fomm (February 1941). Also Mussolini’s bold bid to conquer Greece from Albania and geostrategically outflank both Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean and Germany in the Balkans, unfolded badly when her forces (21 divisions) were defeated by the tough winter weather and well-entrenched Greek resistance (Winter 1940–1941). Rome lost 65,000 men against 43,000 Greeks and was thrown back into Albania. In the basin moreover, Italy suddenly lost her brief naval superiority (June-November 1940), when the Royal Navy staged a bold surprise aero-naval night torpedo bomber attack on Rome’s main naval base, sinking 3 Italian battleships out of 5 at Taranto (Italy’s “Pearl Harbor”). The Taranto débâcle curtailed Italy’s naval operations against the Royal Navy’s raids on Italian coasts (January-February 1941), because any high seas combat against the 2 British carrier Task Forces could have meant total defeat for the remaining Italian fleet. Nevertheless, the Italian fleet was defeated twice off Cape Matapán in the Aegean (March 1941: 3 cruisers and 2 destroyers sunk) and Cape Kerkenah in Tunisia (April 1941: 3 destroyers and a 5 merchant-ship-convoy lost, against one British destroyer sunk). Since December 1940 German Luftwaffe air wings were dispatched to Sicily to reinforce Italy’s air-force, and an autonomous German armored Afrika Korps sent to Libya under General Rommel relieved the hard pressed Italians, but the Horn was lost with 260,000 prisoners (May 1941), and only Italy’s Dodecanese repulsed British attacks (February 1941). Italy’s Power pretensions and bid for Mediterranean supremacy had

been dramatically wiped out by May 1941, highlighting insufficient preparation and politico-military incompetence, which no amount of courage by badly-led and ill-equipped troops alone could redress. Worse, by December 1940 Fascist Italy saw herself subtly demoted from equal Axis partner to the status of Germany’s “first satellite,” while Germany, an essential land Power, had now to improvise a new Mediterranean vision with her Afrika Korps through a mostly land-oriented armored encirclement strategy, which repulsed the British back into Egypt but ignored the large aero-naval combat haunting Supermarina.\(^{44}\)

The military balance changed again: since November 1940 Hitler planned “Operation Barbarossa,” the invasion of the Soviet Union in May 1941, once bilateral relations faltered over their Balkan rivalry and the USSR’s refusal to join the Axis and expand into British-controlled Persia, Middle-East and India, while leaving the Balkans and Straits to the Italo-Germans (Hitler-Molotov Talks, Berlin, October 1940). But a pro-British military coup took Yugoslavia away from the Axis fold, forcing Hitler to postpone the attack against the USSR and in April-June 1941 Axis forces dismembered Yugoslavia and Greece, routing Britain also out of the Aegean. With Yugoslavia dismembered, Rome annexed Dalmatia, Slovenia, Kossovo and Albania, created a pro-Italian Croatia, and with Germany garrisoned Serbia and Greece. The delayed German Blitzkrieg against Russia (June 22, 1941) scored impressive victories, but was finally stalled at Moscow by German force dispersion and the devastating early Russian winter. The impossibility of destroying the Communist colossus in one single blow, meant that the Axis faced a long uncertain two-front war against London and Moscow, both actively supplied by the United States. But Hitler’s and Mussolini’s blind ideologico-racist hatred undervalued their dormant Russo-American opponents and led them to plunge into seemingly easy prestigious wars against “weak” enemies (June 22, 1941 against Russia; December 11, 1941 against America). These fateful decisions decided World War II; they destroyed Germany’s last bid for European hegemony and SuperPowership; wiped out Germany, Italy, France and Europe’s balance of power; ushered post-war Bipolarism under the rival Soviet-American global SuperPowers. In this historical context, only Japan was justified in her Pacific war against America, but she had no choice anyway if she wanted to preserve her dominant Asian Power and offset the crippling U.S. sanctions in 1940–1941. In the Mediterranean, Rommel’s invasion of Egypt was stalled once the Luftwaffe and 60,000 Italian troops were sent to fight the great anti-Communist crusade in Russia (by Winter 1941–1942 Italy’s ARMIR Corps in the USSR had 227,000-men with 1300 tanks, or 10 divisions alongside 170 German, 15 Romanian, 14 Finnish,

13 Hungarian and a Spanish division). At sea, Italy’s belated but skillful torpedo bomber attacks deeply influenced the Convoy war, although the reduction of German fuel supplies (due to the Russian campaign) further eroded Supermarina’s presence. The Axis failed to add to the war-effort her neutral friends, Franco’s Spain and Turkey, although by 1942 the Japanese offensive in Asia and the Pacific wiped out the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941) and Anglo-American forces in Indochina, the Philippines and Indonesia (December 1941-June 1942). The British Mediterranean Fleet was reduced to counter the Japanese, while Italian human-torpedoes (“Maiali”) sank in Alexandria the 2 remaining British battleships and a tanker, altering again the basin’s naval balance in Rome’s favor. A new Italian convoy escorted by the Italian Navy succeeded in passing the British aero-naval barrage and allowing Rommel to reconquer Tobruk (January 1942) and invade Egypt (May 1942). The Royal Navy suffered a major aero-naval defeat in the Mediterranean against Rome (1942 “Mid-June Battle”): 192 Italian and 40 German planes from Sicily joined two Italian naval squadrons (2 battleships, 8 cruisers, 17 destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines) attacking two British convoys crossing off Malta (2 air-carriers, a battleship, 11 cruisers, 45 destroyers, 17 supply ships and 75 planes). Italy sank 2 British destroyers, 3 supply ships and lost a cruiser, while the Luftwaffe sank a cruiser, 3 destroyers and 2 supply ships. Rome scored another major naval victory with the 1942 “Mid-August Battle,” when it attacked a huge British convoy relieving the collapsing Malta garrison (3 air-carriers, 2 battleships, 7 cruisers, 24 destroyers, and 14 supply ships). Axis’ aero-naval strikes sank 2 cruisers, a destroyer and 8 vital supply ships, crippling the British. A final naval victory and the fall of Malta were both at hand if the Axis had attacked relentlessly the remaining British naval force to sink the last precious supply ships. But Supermarina withdrew, not daring to challenge further the British without sufficient air-cover, given the Italo-German air-forces’ unwillingness to help Supermarina.

Malta was relieved and Anglo-Indian reinforcements in Egypt defeated the Italo-Germans at El Alamein (July-October 1942), because the Russian campaign absorbed all Axis supplies for Africa. Then the Axis defeat at Stalingrad (October 1942-January 1943) and the Anglo-American landings in French North Africa (November-December 1942) symbolized the beginning of the end: in Russia the whole front collapsed, while in Africa the victorious Allied

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pincher offensive from Egypt and Algeria conquered Libya and Tunisia (May 1943). The Axis never recovered from the twin African and Russian disaster, and Mussolini contemplated the possibility of a separate peace, spurred by Germany’s satellites who turned to his purported “Latin Community” (Italy, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, Finland, Bulgaria), hoping that he could negotiate peace and protect them against both Germany and the USSR (January-May 1943). But to no avail: Mussolini shied away from such radical policy, too subjugated to Hitler to even press for a defensive strategy in Russia and an offensive one in the Mediterranean to save Fascist Italy from sea-invasion (Hitler instead launched a last massive offensive in Ukraine in Summer 1943). Given Italy’s abdication from leadership and the mounting Soviet progress, the other Balkan states tried separate negotiations with the Allies, while Spain and Portugal refused to mediate for Italy. Throughout the war Supermarina kept open her SLOCs with North Africa until the collapse of Tunisia (May 1943), always repelling British attempts to severe Axis SLOCs in the Mediterranean. But Supermarina also failed to destroy Malta or cut Allied east-west SLOCs. Although the loss of Tunisia meant also the end to the Italian Navy’s draining and dangerous convoy-escort duties, Allied submarines cut Italy’s merchant fleet from 3 million to 300,000-tons, while her industrial production fell to 43 percent of her 1939 levels. By September 1943 Supermarina had fuel only for one major sortie of her 24-vessel strike-fleet (5 battleships, 8 cruisers, 11 destroyers), while scores of unfinished Italian vessels lay unfinished on slips (including 2 air-carriers and a battleship). instead, the Anglo-American Navies soared to 180 warships (8 air-carriers, 8 battleships, 26 cruisers, 138 destroyers) with massive naval air-cover. Supermarina’s defeat was clearly imminent, and her desperate retreat to a “fleet in-being” posture to prevent a massive Allied invasion of Italy could not hide the fact that without fuel, naval air cover, radars, or rapid unit replacements, Supermarina became a hapless naval Power (May-September 1943).47

Since 1942 British influence had re-routed American forces from the planned invasion of France (“Overlord”) to the 1943 conquest of North Africa and the Mediterranean (“Torch”), followed by the rapid conquest of Sicily in July 1943 (“Anvil”). With the invasion of Italy’s mainland imminent, General Pietro Badoglio staged a monarchist-military coup deposing Mussolini and starting secret surrender negotiations, while still officially fighting the war on Germany’s side. Germany however, secretly doubled her divisions in Italy to 15 and seized all Alpine passes and strategic areas (“Operation Axis Command”). Badoglio wasted precious time by insisting on negotiating terms for Italy’s switch against Germany (full Allied status, return of the colonies, immediate Allied amphibious and paratrooper landings near Rome before the official

47Romeo Bernotti, Storia della guerra nel Mediterraneo (Rome, 1960); Romeo Bernotti, La guerra sui mari nel conflitto mondiale (Livorno, 1974); Ireland, War, 45–111; Angelo Jachino, “La teoria della Fleet in-Being,” Rivista Marittima, (Sept. 1959).
surrender to protect the government from Hitler’s wrath). But under British prodding, the Allies never deflected from total unconditional surrender (1943 Casablanca Declaration). Thus, the secret “Short Armistice” (Cassibile, September 3, 1943), was announced on September 8, but the planned Allied amphibious liberation of Rome was bogged-down at Anzio by German counterattacks, while Rome fell to the Germans after the monarchical Badoglio government fled to Allied-controlled lines rather than fight or coordinate a joint Italo-Allied resistance to Germany. Left without instructions the entire Italian Armed Forces collapsed overnight: Germany seized two-thirds of Italy and destroyed 32 Italian divisions from Southern France to the Balkans, while most of the Italian Army self-disbanded after the surrender returning home (450,000 POWs). Only the Air-Force’s surviving 315 planes and the entire Navy kept their cohesion and surrendered to the Allies at Malta (losing only the flag-battleship Roma to German air attacks), while all unfinished units were destroyed.48

Italy’s regional Powsphere in the Mediterranean was finished: although in 1943–1945 the Monarchist “government of the South” re-assembled 4 divisions, plus air and naval support for the Allies in the Mediterranean, her role remained marginal given the Allies’ decision to make Italy’s demise as a Power permanent. The complete liberation of Italy took other two years of fighting against well-entrenched German forces, but the 350,000 Italian POWs in Allied hands were never retrained for combat duty, even after the front bogged down once most Allied forces were shifted to the Normandy Invasion. In Northern Italy, German troops and Mussolini’s rejuvenated Fascist Republic of Salò (1944–1945) were tied down by a spontaneous partisan war (1943–1945), which operated as a grass-roots democratic military-insurrectional movement of national self-regeneration, independent from both the semi-hostile Allies or Monarchist government of the South. From late-1943 to the end of World War II in Europe (May 1945), only Supermarina earned much credit from the Allies for her naval support and ASW convoy-escort roles against Germany. But as the last and most important symbol of Italy’s past Mediterranean Powsphere (and a potential rival to Britain in the future), Britain pushed the Allies to unceremoniously disband and partition the Italian Navy (1947 Paris Peace Treaty). In World War II Fascist Italy suffered dearly: 775,000 Army casualties (of which 170,000 against Germany in 1943–1945), one million POWs (45 percent with the Allies; 55 percent in Germany), and 6,483 airplanes lost against 1,920 enemy ones. Supermarina lost in the Mediterranean 2 unfinished air-carrers, 3 battleships, 14 cruisers, 63 destroyers and escorts, 84 submarines and 50 MAS (3 battleships, 14 cruisers, 26 destroyers were lost to air-strikes; 3 cruisers and

12 destroyers to submarine attacks; 19 destroyers and escorts hit by mines; and only 5 cruisers and 16 destroyers sunk in direct surface naval combat with Britain). The Royal Navy instead lost to Italo-German strikes: the aircraft carrier *Ark Royal*, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, 11 destroyers and 41 submarines (a cruiser and 2 destroyers to Italian air raids; a carrier, 4 cruisers and 2 destroyers to submarines; a cruiser and 4 destroyers by mines; 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, a destroyer by MAS and human-torpedo raids; and only 2 destroyers in direct naval combat). In the end the Italian armed forces suffered the most from their own unreadiness (made more severe by unsolved equipment shortages and depletition during the 1935–1936 Ethiopian War and 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War), and her lack of modern amour, airplanes, radar, leadership, night-combat training, fuel shortages, poor strategic planning, and the naval policy of avoiding offensive surface actions against superior enemy forces given the uncertainty of victory.49

The Italian Navy faced with courage but little clairvoyance her supreme naval clash for sea control against Britain, which for 80 years she had instinctively equated to suicide. But after decades of strategic debates over offensives, active defense, or "Fleet-in-being" postures, Supermarina failed repeatedly to prepare contingency surprise strike-plans, or seize the offensive against the collapsing French and depleted British fleets. In real combat, the lack of aircarriers, coordinated aero-naval operations, radar and fuel proved major liabilities, although by themselves they did not lead to defeat. Supermarina instead, regardless of high costs, always kept open her main strategic SLOCs to North Africa, with 75 percent of war matériel reaching destination. What doomed her, even when superior to British forces (1940 and 1942), was her confused strategy and unwillingness to aggressively strike British forces. After 80 years of naval buildups, Italy still remained fundamentally a land Power with too little maritime ethos and no serious naval combat experience against superior enemies, fearing to lose in combat her expensive new warships (as Germany in both World Wars, and Soviet Russia in 1960 through 1991). The gap in the Armed Forces between effective combat-readiness and role as prestigious foreign policy tools was never really filled, even when imperialist aims should have required it as a prerequisite. Instead, Italy's Army and Navy were nurtured mostly as outward prestige symbols, seeing limited combat only against inferior forces, while diplomacy and guile slowly secured regional positioning. To many Italy had never been a real maritime Power, or a Power at all, notwithstanding her sizeable Navy and Armed Forces, which by themselves could never secure regional preeminence in the Mediterranean, given the government's traditional

indifference to the massive financial needs required to defeat the Anglo-French giants.50

Was Mussolini to blame for Italy's final collapse as a Power and the demise of her old Mediterranean dreams? Since 1861 Italy had always attempted to shore up her international Power status as a major Euro-Mediterranean force. As in 1915, also in 1940 Italy's eventual entry in World War II was considered inevitable to attain regional supremacy in the basin alongside or against Paris and London. More than in 1915, the 1940 war decision seemed an almost fail-safe policy: with Germany on the verge of total victory, even an unprepared Italy could hope to easily gain several French colonies and maritime supremacy in the basin in a Nazi-dominated postwar. The very logic of Fascist imperialism and ideology prevented either close relations with London and Paris (after the Ethiopian and Spanish wars), or a permanent neutrality in World War II as Franco's Spain and Portugal. Fascist Italy was not Spain, but a Power with vast regional ambitions, and an ideology which praised conquest and military power as symbols of success. Unfortunately Mussolini's imperialist designs of Mediterranean supremacy always failed to produce the necessary industrial base and modern military readiness for such goals, seeking instead ever bolder diplomatico-military adventures to seize the "fleeting opportunity of glory" and maximize national influence. In the end, Mussolini too was blinded by his own propaganda and led Fascist Italy to a humiliating destruction in World War II. Thereafter, the demise of the old 450-years-old Eurocentric order, left Italy, Europe and the world as pawns in a new Cold War global bipolarism between the politico-ideological rival Soviet-American nuclear SuperPowers.51

The military lessons perceived during the Risorgimento wars (1849–70), Liberal Era (1860–1922), Fascism (1922–45) and two World Wars, were fundamental in determining the limits and objectives of Italy's national security from Unification to the Cold War (1945–91). After a century of identity crises and troublesome confrontations with overpowering foreign realities, Italy in the most recent post-war finally found an acceptable new balance between national security concerns and domestic deficiencies (which plagued her ever since the Risorgimento): limited resources, the drain of imperialism, budget constraints, popular passivity and strategic confusion (Adriatic supremacy vs. Mediterranean influence; land defense vs. high-seas strike-Navy). National collapse in World War II produced the total rejection of old imperialist and military symbols of Power (whose financial-military onus were never understood), leaving Italy with the inward-looking mentality of a medium-Power. Paradoxically the loss of her national power in a last ill-planned drive for regional supremacy during World War II, allowed Italy to quickly re-emerge on the winning side not during the


51 Bosworth, Italy, 20–279; Barclay, Rise and Fall, 9–293; Ferrante and Gay, Marina, 68–112; Jachino, Tramonto, 19–359; Weinberg, World at Arms, 6–667; Bernotti, Guerra, 5–360.
war but once the Cold War’s international nuclear balance of terror between the USSR and the U.S.-led West gave to “Atlantic Italy” a virtual risk-free, complete, national defense at relatively low cost for herself within NATO. The Atlantic Alliance and “Pax Americana” insured to “Atlantic Italy”: full land, sea, air and nuclear security from foreign threats; industrial and trade growth with emigration relief through cross-national integration within the European Community (E.C.) and the U.S.-led Western capitalist system; international and Mediterranean prestige as a democratic Western member of NATO and the E.C. In this context the promise never fulfilled—Mediterranean hegemony in the name of to her Roman heritage—was finally achieved once it was officially folded in the aftermath of military defeat, which paradoxically forced her to realistically appraise her national security within the context of a wider, peace-time alliance assuring national defense at a fraction of the cost it would otherwise taken her as an independent Power. The price-tag? To renounce any independentist dream of regional Powership and imperialism, which had always been the real source of all her security problems. Thus the stability of “Atlantic” Italy’s three vital foreign policy pillars (United States, NATO, E.C.) during the Cold War (1945–1991), allowed Rome to both support European integration (1950–1995), while pursuing some form of autonomous Mediterranean role (oil, pro-Arabism, naval build-up), even at times against U.S. interests (1960s–1991). Following the end of the Cold War in 1988–92 with the tumultuous inner collapse of the Eastern European communist régimes and Warsaw Pact threat to NATO’s security, the reunification of Germany, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the long “Atlantic” cooperation between Europe and America still remains the centerpiece of Western security and economic progress. Consequently, Italy too will hold to her triple American, Atlantic and European pillars, due to economic-military needs, Euro-Atlantic identity and domestic consensus, rather than seek impossible new Mediterranean dreams.52

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Charlie Cuellar: Marco Polo of the Minors

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When discussing Florida's exceptional baseball heritage, Al Lopez, Lou Piniella, Steve Garvey, Andre Dawson, Hal McRae and Tony LaRussa, all native born sons, are names which leap to mind. Yet others, less etched in the national consciousness but nonetheless remembered as local icons, have made the arduous trek from Florida's sandy lots to big league yards. Such players hailed from the communities of Deland, Lake Worth, Arcadia, Apalachicola, Kissimmee, Yulee, Bartow, De Funiak Springs, Jasper, and the better known cities of Tampa, Fort Lauderdale, Pensacola, and Jacksonville. Local high schools and amateur leagues fashioned their skills, and old-timers trade their stories with pride and reverence.

These men helped establish a rich legacy of baseball in a land known more for "diamondbacks" than baseball diamonds. Jimmy Bloodworth, Manuel Onis, "Bitsy" Mott, Russ Scarritt, Frank "Red" Barrett, and Andy Hansen are among those Florida ballplayers whose names may not strike a familiar tone but once graced big league rosters. As former major leaguers, all have claimed their piece of "America's Game," while becoming part of the national baseball fabric, and each has his unique set of memories to share.

A Ybor City native and former Chicago White Sox pitcher, Charlie Cuellar tells one of the better of such baseball tales. Cuellar, a crafty hurler who once tutored under the volatile "Pride of Havana," Adolpho Luque, while playing winter baseball for Almendares in Cuba, strung together an outstanding minor league career, posting 253 victories. In 1947, while playing for the Tampa Smokers in the strong Florida International League, Cuellar pitched the most exciting game of his life, bringing Tampa's baseball fans to a state of euphoria by no-hitting the powerful Havana Cubans. Yet these performances remain shrouded by a big league career that failed to develop. Despite his statistics, a chronic sore arm that required more attention than major league clubs could afford and demanded more understanding than major league coaches could give, kept Cuellar trapped in the bush-leagues after an all-too-brief stay in the majors. Cuellar's extensive travels throughout the towns and cities comprising minor league baseball, however, earned him the classic moniker, "Marco Polo of the Minors."

In The Glory of Their Times, Lawrence Ritter illustrates that, when properly authenticated, the best source of information on a particular baseball life is from the mouth of the person who lived it. In his Prologue, Ritter asks that the reader
"listen" to the stories of his interviewees. Only by listening to these shared memories can the reader hope to grasp the gist of experience that was being passed on.

Ritter's ground breaking effort has inspired other works of similar scope and direction. Donald Honig, with Ritter acting in an advisory capacity, presented a sequel to The Glory of Their Times, with Baseball When The Grass Was Real.2 Published in 1975, this book proceeded with Ritter's ideas through the subsequent generation of major league performers. Other works have also borrowed from Ritter by chronicling the lives of former big leaguers. John B. Holway's Black Diamonds: Life in the Negro Leagues from the Men Who Lived It, and We Played the Game: 65 Players Remember Baseball's Greatest Era 1947–1964, edited by Danny Peary, are two excellent examples.3 Larry Gerlach notes that such anthologies attract academics who desire to preserve eyewitness accounts, particularly in social history.4

"Charlie Cuellar: Marco Polo of the Minors" is an oral history shared as part of another such collection. I have taken the original transcript of my March 30, 1994-interview with Cuellar, conducted at his home in Tampa, and removed all questions to put the text into a first-person narrative. This best conveys the true flavor of Charlie Cuellar's personal history. So now I, like Ritter, ask you to sit back and listen to one man's memories, "that can't be taken away."5

I was born here in Tampa, Ybor City, and this is where I lived up. My parents, John and Regla Cuellar, were from Cuba. During the 1890s, my daddy came over, like so many others, to work in the cigar factories, and when he found a job my mother came too. I'm not positive, but I think that my grandparents immigrated to Cuba from Spain; most of them had. Both of my parents went to work in the cigar factories. My daddy was a cigar maker, and my mother was what they called a stripper. They worked there all their lives, but they didn't make any money, maybe five or six dollars a week.

I went to Ybor City Elementary School and George Washington Junior High. I began playing ball when I was ten years old. I loved to pitch, and I did so every chance I could. I had a good curve ball, and I got better and better. We used to play at the city park in West Tampa and for the American Legion team there, Post 248. When I played on that Legion team, we missed winning the national American Legion tournament by one game. We got all the way to the finals, and we lost to Gastonia, North Carolina. That was in 1934. After that, I graduated from junior high, and by the next year I was

2Donald Honig, Baseball When The Grass Was Real: Baseball from the 20's to the 40's Told by the Men Who Played It (New York: McCann & Geoghegan, Co., 1975).
playing professional baseball. There weren’t too many from around here then playing ball and earning money at it.

The way I was signed was that Cincinnati used to train here in Tampa, and in 1935 I was invited to come and train with them. Charlie Dressen was the manager of the team, and he kind of liked me, so he sent me to the Minneapolis Millers in Deland, Florida, a farm club. The Minneapolis team liked me so they sent me to Decatur, Illinois, in the Class D Three-I League, and that’s how I began my professional baseball career. My parents didn’t mind my leaving home to play ball. My daddy was a great baseball fan. He died in 1943, so I hadn’t played too much before he died.

There were a lot of good ballplayers there in Decatur that I got to play with. Frank McCormick, who later played with Cincinnati, was a hell of a good first-baseman. Birdie Tebbets, a future manager in the big leagues, was the catcher. We had a good team. The next two years I played in Marshall, Texas, and won thirteen ball games as a pitcher. After that, 1938, I was sold to Pensacola of the Southeastern League and won two games before being sold again to Palestine in the East Texas League. In Palestine I won another fourteen games or so.

The next season, 1939, I was sold to Reidsville in the Bi-State League, and I won seventeen games. At Reidsville, I began to feel like I was really taking off. That off season I played my first winter baseball in Cuba. I played for a club by the name of Almendares. Cuba had a hell of a league. It was just as strong as any double or triple A league that I ever played in. There were many players there that went on to the majors. Adolfo Luque was my manager there in Almendares. They used to call Luque the “Havana Perfecto.” They named him that after the best cigars in Cuba, since he was the best to have come out of there. He had always been a hell of a pitcher, but what a temper. He was a son-of-a-bitch to play with. Luque would fight anybody, but he could pitch. He was a good manager, but that temper kept him from getting along too well with the players. Sal Maglie played in Cuba too. Luque had a lot to do with his success, working with him both in Cuba and later in Mexico. Luque taught him to take control while he was on the mound and not to give in to the hitter. That became something Maglie was known for.

I split the next season between Reidsville and Leaksville in the same league. In 1940 I won seventeen games and I won sixteen in 1941. During one stretch in this period, I pitched forty games without any relief. Do you think that anyone could do that today? Pitchers today are just not strong enough. There is no reason why a pitcher can’t throw nine innings if he is in shape. How many times do you see a really good starter go seven or eight innings, look sharp, and then the big strong reliever comes in and ruins the game? It happens all the time. The starter should go the distance, and then he wouldn’t have to worry about it. I prefer to see a pitcher stay in there.

Yeah, I had a lot of good records in the minor leagues. There was a year there, one of my best, 1942, when I won twenty-two games and lost six for Leaksville. I struck out over two hundred and had an earned run average of 1.56, I think. I did so well that season, that Leaksville sold me to Portsmouth, Virginia, in the Piedmont League. After I had won four games for Portsmouth, I was sold to Tyler, Texas, but then Tyler went to hell; they disbanded. So I came back to Tampa for the rest of the year and worked in the shipyards. While I was here in Tampa, I kept busy playing for a shipyard team and for the Cuban club in the Inter-Social league. Benny Fernandez, a future teammate of mine on the Tampa Smokers, was on that Cuban Club team. His brother Manuel, who also played for the Smokers, caught that year for Centro Asturiano, a rival club. Manuel joined the Navy before the end of the season.
and went into the war.

I returned to organized baseball the next season with Nashville of the Southern Association. Larry Gilbert was the manager there, a really nice man. I think that I won seventeen and lost six with the Vols. I was unable to pitch the last month of the season though on account of an arm injury. My arm would tighten up and cause a great deal of pain. From then on, every time I pitched, I'd have to spend a lot of time warming up. This is what hurt me later on in the big leagues. If I hadn't hurt my arm in Nashville, I would have won a lot more games. I tried to have it worked on. I used to go to this doctor in Miami, and he would pull on it and stretch it, and he could make it feel good. But once I pitched again, it would get tight on me.

From Nashville I went to Los Angeles of the Pacific Coast League, 1945, and won thirteen games, and I think I lost seventeen. It was a bad year; the team lost one hundred ball games. I decided the next season that I'd had enough of Los Angeles and their losing, so I refused to report. They said that if I could make a deal for myself to go ahead. Well, I had always wanted to play at home, so I arranged a deal between Los Angeles and Tampa, in the Florida International League, and I joined the Smokers in May 1946; I won fifteen games for them that season.

That was a big mistake of mine, staying here with the Smokers: I should have gone back. The Pacific Coast League was a higher classification league, and I would have been better off staying there. But baseball was like a chain gang then. Once you signed a contract, you were obligated to that team for as long as you played ball and for whatever pay they gave you, unless they released you. The players didn't have the upper hand then like they do now. So when I had the chance to go home and play, I took it; otherwise, I might have been stuck out there.

In 1947 I won another fifteen games for the Smokers. Tony Cuccinello, Al Lopez's old teammate, was the manager. Benny and Manuel Fernandez, Bitsy Mott, Citayo Gonzalez, Lamar Murphy, Gene Elliott, Dick Dendinger, Joe Benedito, Marcelo Masaeda, were all on that team. It was a good team.

On July 23rd of that season, I pitched against the Havana Cubans in the most exciting game I can remember. Most of the guys on my team, except for maybe Mott, Murphy, Elliott and Dendinger, were local Cubans like me, so you can imagine that it was a big deal playing against Havana. That day, as always when Havana came to play in Tampa, the stands at Plant Field were packed. Earlier in the season Havana had no-hit us and won, but this time we turned it around. I pitched eight strike-outs and walked only one. Two others reached base on errors, but I still got the no-hit shutout and we won five-zero. With the big crowds that we drew playing Havana, the no-hitter meant a lot to everybody. The tension in that game was so great. Any time Havana came to Tampa, the town would be in an uproar because so many Cuban people here rooted for Havana. When I pitched the no-hitter, the place went wild. There were seat cushions all over the field. The people were going bananas. It really was such a big rivalry. The Tampa fans later rewarded me with a special day, and the team gave me an engraved watch for the victory. It was quite a feeling. In 1948 I won another seventeen games for the Smokers.

I saw Bitsy Mott not all that long ago. Bitsy is living up in Georgia now, and a couple of the guys I played with on the Smokers, Benny Fernandez and Lamar Murphy, went with me to see him. Benny has a place in North Carolina where we had gone, and on the way back we stopped off in Georgia to visit Bitsy. Lamar Murphy was a hell of a hitter. I don't think he made it to the big leagues, because they didn't like his arm, but he was a hell of a hitter. The Smokers had a lot of local Tampa guys playing for them. Benny Fernandez was another guy who could hit the hell out of the ball. He was a
great first baseman too. Manuel Fernandez couldn't hit as well as his brother, but he was a damn good catcher. Manuel is the one who caught me, when I pitched the no-hitter against Havana. I think that the only thing that kept Benny Fernandez out of the big leagues is that he didn't care to go anywhere. He loved it here. Benny ended up working thirty-something years for the State Hotel and Restaurant Commission and still lives here in Tampa.

The following season, 1949, in a surprise deal, I was sold to the Lakeland Pilots as a manager. When I came to Lakeland from Tampa, I pitched four games against the Tampa ball club and beat them all four times. It was with Lakeland that I won my 200th minor league game. It took me three tries after I had won the 199th to get the next one. On the first try, I pitched a two-hitter against Miami and lost; then next I pitched a five-hitter against the same club at Miami Beach and lost; then I threw another five-hitter against Miami and lost again. Finally on the fourth try I made it; we beat St. Petersburg.

When I was managing at Lakeland, 1950, I was sold to the Chicago White Sox. I could have gone to the Washington Senators or the White Sox, and I picked the White Sox and made a big mistake. Back then most of the Cuban players that went to the big leagues went to the Senators and did real good. I should have gone there too, but I didn't.

Do you know what it is in this business for a guy like me to win 200 games before ever getting to the big leagues? That was unbelievable! Believe me, I still don’t know what took them so long, because I was a winner wherever I went. There was a scout down here, I can’t remember his name, that kind of liked me, and he thought that I could pitch in the big leagues.

I would have too, if they hadn't put me as a relief pitcher. I had always been a starter, and they put me in there as a reliever, and I just wasn't a relief pitcher. I could never pitch in relief. Plus, remember when I was in Nashville I hurt my arm, and I couldn't pitch every other day or always be getting up to throw in the bullpen. If I could pitch every third or fourth day, I would give you a good game. I don't think I relieved five times in my life and I had a 253-130 lifetime record. But once I warmed up, I had to go ahead and pitch. I couldn't sit back down and wait, just because the pitcher that was in there had settled down. My arm couldn't take the ups and downs of the bullpen. It was hard for me to go through that and frustrating too. I couldn't do it. I appeared in two games for Chicago and had about a thirty ERA in a little over an inning. I guess it was my tough luck not to make it in the big leagues, because everywhere else I went I was a winner.

To show you what I am talking about, I left Chicago and went to Memphis in the Southern Association and won nine games just like that, all as a starter. While I was in Memphis, I had a tussle with Luke Appling, the manager, over this same arm thing. One game I pitched for Memphis was a shutout, and after that we went to New Orleans. While in New Orleans, Appling wanted me to pitch some batting practice, and I told him that I couldn't do it because my arm was too sore. Well, he says that if you're going to pitch for me, you're going to have to pitch batting practice, and I told him that I couldn't do it. Well, I went up there and tried because he made me, but I couldn't hardly throw the ball. Finally, I told him that if he wanted me to stay with Memphis, then he would have to let me get my rest. I told him that if he pitched me every three or four days, I would give him a hell of a ball game, but otherwise I couldn't do it. Appling, I guess he didn't care, stuck to it and told me that anybody who pitches for him had to pitch batting practice. So I said fine, I wasn't pitching for him. I came back here to the Florida International League and pitched for the St. Petersburg Saints. At St. Petersburg I won some more games and never had another losing season after that.

Not too many people stay in the minor leagues as long as I did. I was the
Marco Polo of the minor leagues. I played everywhere; won 253 games against 130 losses. That is not counting all the ball that I played during the winter in Cuba. At every level I won a lot more than I lost. Nobody could ever do what I did again. Today, who stays in the minors long enough to put up numbers like that? And I pitched complete games 97 percent of the time. But the arm trouble eventually ran me out after 1955.

You know, a lot of the fans used to think that I won so many games because I threw spit-balls. That was a lot of shit. I just had a habit of wetting my pitching hand when I was out on the mound. But then I would dry it by wiping it on my uniform, and you can see from the old pictures the smudge spot where I wiped it. The reason I used to do this was because when you use the rosin bag sometimes your hands would get kind of smooth. So I would lick my fingers to give me a better grip on the ball. But every time I went to my mouth, I wiped off my hand. That is why my jerseys have that dark spot in those pictures. I never threw a spit-ball. But you know, if I was going to throw a spitter, I could have learned it from Burleigh Grimes, the great spit-ball pitcher. I played with him for a while in Minneapolis in 1935, after he left the big leagues. Grimes was only a reliever for us, but he was still something else. I imagine that Burleigh could have taught me to throw a good one, if I had wanted to learn.

My last game was in Tallahassee; I went there to manage the club. Earlier, I had finished as a full-time player in Keokuk, Iowa. Although I was sent to Tallahassee to manage, I thought that I might help out by pitching a little if the team needed me to. I was only there two days when the league went under. Oh well, that was enough for me.

After I retired from playing ball, I started doing a little house painting. It was all that I knew how to do. I only had a junior high education, and, since I was only thirty-five, I had to work at something. I had learned on my own to do some woodwork, and I started building bars or whatever people wanted, and as time went on word spread, and I got more woodworking jobs than painting. After that I started to do nothing but woodwork. My reputation for good work got around, and I began remodeling penthouses, beach condominiums and offices as well as houses. I can go into a house and right away know what I'm going to do and how it's going to look. I've been lucky and very busy doing a lot of nice homes. Some of the work that I've done had been featured in Tampa Bay Southern Homes and Tampa Bay Homes magazines.

Tampa has really gotten big over the years, but I like it here. We are in a nice neighborhood, close to Dale Mabry Avenue, that has everything on it. There is no professional baseball here though; they messed it all up. They ruined Al Lopez field; tore it down. At least they renamed Horizon Park after him. Of course, in the last five years more people have gone to the majors from here than at any other time. When I went to the majors in 1950, no one had gone from here except Al Lopez, Manuel Onis, and Bitsy Mott. But I don't think Bitsy was born here in Tampa. I once played somewhere with Max Macon; he was another guy from Florida. There just wasn't many of us back then.

I met my wife Dahlia at a tea dance at the Centro Español Club here in Tampa. We corresponded while I was playing baseball around the country and were eventually married. We have been married thirty-two years. Dahlia was always a good fan; she enjoyed my playing. She worked at Tampa Electric for thirty-eight years until she retired in 1990. We are usually here around the house. Until recently you would probably find me out back doing something in the workshop. Not so much anymore. We've both been very lucky.
An adjunct history instructor at Tallahassee Community College, Wes Singletary received his Ph.D. from Florida State University. Interested in the oral history of Florida’s first major league baseball players, his dissertation was on the life of Tampa native and Baseball Hall of Famer, Al Lopez. He has written a number of articles, the most recent of which is “The Early Baseball Career of Al Lopez” in *Tampa Bay History* (Spr. 1994).
Grading the Preparing Future Faculty Program:
The History Fellows Speak Out

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The graduate history student today has many adversities that a graduate student did not have twenty or even ten years ago. The new history Ph.D. on the job market twenty years ago did not need to stack his/her vitae with several publications and years of teaching experience just to make the penultimate list of possible candidates for a single teaching position. With that secret out most graduate students make an effort now not to enter the job market without substantial teaching experience and at least a publication under their belt. What can a graduate student do today to distinguish themselves from the pack? The Association of American Colleges and Universities and the Council of Graduate Schools believe they have answered such a question. They have initiated a program called Preparing Future Faculty (PFF). The PFF program has a general goal of providing the graduate student with exposure to institutional life, so that student will know how to balance teaching, research, and service to the community before he/she enters the job market.

For the PFF program to be an asset on any person’s vitae, the program itself must conform to two goals. First it must be nationally recognized, and secondly it must be a success. PFF has achieved the first goal. It is a nationally recognized program, which organized a session at the American Historical Association Conference at Atlanta in January of 1996. Concerning the second stipulation, whether, the PFF program has achieved its goals successfully will be the focus of this paper.

The criteria for measuring the success of a program is subjective. No one can give any program a value and then plug that value into an equation and produce an actual figure to measure the success or failure of that program. Instead one must go to the consumers and let the consumers evaluate whether the program succeeded or failed. This paper will draw on the interviews of both the history PFF mentors at Tallahassee Community College and the history PFF fellows at Florida State University, one of 17 schools participating in the PFF program in the United States, to evaluate the success of the program.

Collectively the PFF mentors tried to achieve four major goals when meeting with their assigned fellows. (1) The mentors tried to accurately expose the PFF fellow to the professional life at a non-research institution. (2) The mentors tried to provide additional insight for the fellow about classroom preparation. (3) The mentors tried to prepare the fellows for the issues facing a history professor in the classroom of the twenty-first century. (4) The mentors tried to help the fellows find their niche within the history discipline. Now, one must
ask the fellows if these goals were achieved.

The first goal, exposure to a non-research institution, was for the most part met with success for the fellows. Every fellow interviewed believed they generally received an accurate depiction of institutional life at a community college. This depiction was so accurate that it broke many fellows previously held stereotypes of community colleges and their professors. Fellows realized that community college professors were part of the history mainsteam and in touch with the rest of the discipline. Community college professors did go to conferences and were encouraged and supported by their institution to remain current in their fields of specialization. Other fellows realized that a community college professor has the opportunity to publish and teach. The fellows also encountered the diverse student body at a community college. For the most part they realized that the admittance policy at a community college was much different from that of a research institution. Fellows realized that a community college professor’s classroom will be more populated by students from many different socioeconomic, ethnic, and generational backgrounds than a research institution. Because of the program, the PFF fellows can make an accurate assessment of life at a community college.

The second goal, classroom preparation, was also met to a high degree of success. Fellows got an understanding of exactly how to approach a lecture. In that respect, fellows understood first hand how to cut a lecture down to make it appropriate for a survey class. In fact one fellow replied that “I understood through the program to make a lecture simple and systematic.” Other fellows got an understanding through guest lecturing in a mentors’ course exactly how to control the pace of a lecture, and an evaluation of the effectiveness of the fellows lecture, by comments from the students and the mentor. Another fellow understood first hand how professors handle office hours with their students. The PFF program was successful in exposing the fellows to the teaching pitfalls any new teacher experiences their first time teaching, so they can be better prepared to face their first time in a classroom with more confidence.

The third goal of the mentors, preparing fellows for the classrooms of the twenty-first century, also reached the fellows. Mentors showed fellows the significance of multi-culturalism, which is very relative in an ever growing global society. The mentors also exposed the fellows to different ways to approach the history survey course. Mentors reenforced the notion that the history survey of the future with be modeled after the interdisciplinary survey studies approach now popular at many institutions. Most fellows will have little time to spend as a professor in the twentieth century and at some point must approach the new century, and the new methods and issues which every fellow one day must confront as a newly hired professor.

The final goal of the mentors, helping fellows find their individual niche within the discipline, was also successful. Many fellows walked away from the program with a sense of where they fit on the teaching/research spectrum. Some were so impressed with the experience that upon finishing graduate school they
would be interested in actively pursuing full time employment with a community college. One fellow found the community college experience so accurate that it helped the fellow decide that maybe a community college was not the right choice for the future. All in all, the PFF program did help the fellows become aware of where they will fit in the history discipline.

With every rose there are a few thorns. In no way did every PFF fellow believe that the program was a virtual utopia. Each fellow addressed ways the PFF program could improve achieving its goals. In one regard the program was not fully accurate in depicting institutional life. The fellows addressed a concern about the issues of institutional life that everyone is cognizant of, but few people discuss openly without looking over their shoulder. This issue is personal politics. Upon becoming a newly hired professor how does one approach the politics of a department, a college, or an institution? While most departments or institutions may not be as polarized as the United States and the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, no department is apolitical. The fellows are concerned with how does one identify the politics present and avoid them upon entering an institution? Another way the fellows felt that the experience could also improve was through creating a systematic program. Each mentor and fellow should have a planned schedule at the beginning of the semester. For example the first meeting could be reserved for experiencing the first day of class, the second meeting could be set aside for experiencing office hours on through possibly the last meeting being reserved for a lecture the fellow gives to the mentors’ class. This could assure that every fellow is exposed to similar experiences. Incorporating these issues into future programs could only strengthen future fellows’ experiences.

According to every fellow interviewed the program was for the most part a success. The average grade the fellows gave the program was an A-. All believed it was a worthwhile program in which they believed opened their eyes to institutional life for a history professor. It is no doubt that the PFF program, with the experience of the past two years, will provide future fellows, willing to commit their time to the program, a valuable experience their peers at other institutions may not have access to and in the end create an impressive line on their vitae.

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Soviet Appeasement, Collective Security, and the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935 and 1936

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Apologists for the USSR have long-trumpeted Soviet Russia’s altruistic and principled position defending Ethiopia’s sovereign rights against Italy’s colonial predations during the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935 and 1936.1 The truth is more complex as state interests, communist ideology, and earlier Italo-Russian confrontation in Northeast Africa whipsawed Soviet policy. Japan’s intrusion, real and perceived, into African affairs made Moscow’s choices all-the-more critical.

Before the turn of the century, both the Russian Empire and the Italian Kingdom had struggled to increase their influence in Northeast Africa, a crucial area astride Europe’s vital route to India and East Asia. Often acting with France, the tsars guided their activities in the region primarily with an eye toward Russia’s larger struggle against the British Empire. On the other hand, Italy supported Britain’s interests in Northeast Africa to gain London’s support for its own ambition to make Libya a colony. Thus Italy’s penetration of the area was primarily at London’s sufferance, the British using Rome for their own, generally anti-French, purposes. Given Anglo-French competition and Franco-Russian cooperation in Africa, Russia and Italy frequently butted heads.2

Their most dramatic clash occurred in 1896, when the Ethiopians beat the Italians at Adwa, the first defeat of a major European army on African soil.3 French and Russian arms aided Ethiopia’s victory.4

Competition with John Bull had stimulated tsarist conflict with Italy in Northeast Africa, and after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and 1905, improved relations with London removed Russia’s major rationale for any further African adventures. With the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement, Great Britain and Russia redressed the balance of power upset by Japan’s decisive victory in the Pacific during that war.5

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1See, e.g., Emile Bums, Ethiopia and Italy (New York, c. 1935), 135–37. Research for this paper was, in part, made possible by a Residential Fellowship provided by the Kennan Institute of the Wilson Center for Advanced Scholarly Research and by a research grant provided by Jacksonville University.


3For the battle and the events leading up to it, see Carlo Conti Rossini, La battaglia di Adwa (Rome, 1939); Italia e Etiopia del trattato di Ucciali alla battaglia di Adua (Rome, 1935); and William Leonard Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890–1902, 2nd ed. (New York, 1951), 259–84.


5Wilson, Russia, 84.
In 1922, after the First World War, Benito Mussolini and his Fascists came to power in Italy. Beyond the ranking memories of Adwa and the Duce’s personal and political needs for imperial prestige, a myriad of other motivations went into creating and sustaining Italy’s aggressive policy in Northeast Africa. Economics played a role, including Italy’s need for raw materials and a place to dump its surplus population. Another purpose also loomed large.

Frequently forgotten today, but often cited in the 1930s, was Italy’s supposed need to blunt Japan’s commercial and military advances into Northeast Africa, advances abetted by a sense of racial solidarity between the two “colored” (yellow and black) peoples. Further, throughout the summer and into the fall of 1935, and contrary to what might be expected from its history and anticolonial rhetoric, Soviet Russia used the threat of Japanese expansion to justify fascism’s military preparations as legitimately defending Italy and Africa. The Moscow Daily News, for example, in early 1935 editorialized that Italy had merely desired peaceful economic penetration of Ethiopia, but,

The reversion of Italian policy...to the old methods of direct seizure is bound up to a considerable degree with the intensification of Japanese economic and political influence in Abyssinia.

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7For example, in August 1930 the Congress of the Profintern then sitting in Moscow formed a new “International Negro Committee” for intensifying the Profintern’s work among the black masses of Africa and America. Praising communist work “even in the most remote districts,” the Congress attached great importance to rousing blacks for class warfare against “the chauvinism of Whites.” The Times (London), Aug. 20, 27, 1930.


Clearly, after 1933 the USSR was casting about for allies and was willing to use any bait, no matter how scurrilous or ideologically embarrassing, to hook them. Other than Great Britain, Italy was the sole power, a much weaker one to be sure, which could be brought directly to serve against the USSR’s two enemies, Germany and Japan; and Britain, unlike Italy, could not be counted on for long to risk the diplomatic quicksands of East and Southeast Europe. Although the Kremlin could not suppose that Italy’s navy could threaten the Japanese in the Pacific, if Rome and London could be brought to cooperate, Italy could patrol the Mediterranean, and Britain, freed from that chore, could more effectively oppose Japan in the Indian and Pacific oceans.

This diplomatic need explains the hiccups raised among Comintern officials when a Japanese trade delegation visited Ethiopia in 1932 and signed a commercial treaty. An American communist and editor of the *Negro Worker*, George Padmore, drew wide implications:

"[T]he eyes of the white world...are once more focussed on this black empire, [because of] an alliance which might have tremendous and far-reaching importance, not only for Ethiopia, but for all Black Africa. That is why European powers with African colonies are all anxiously watching the new developments between Japan, the most aggressive imperialist state in the world today, and her new African ally."  

Padmore saw, on the surface, a natural racial unity between the two peoples, both “independent” and “jealous of their national freedom.” Based on this psychology, Japan’s press had touted the new alliance and claimed that it was “in the interest of both of these colored nations to establish the closest ties against white imperialism.” Padmore warned, however,

It is to be hoped that the Ethiopians have no illusions about the Japanese imperialists, who in their internal and external policies are quite as ruthless as the white imperialist nations. The Japanese ruling class, like all other capitalists, are no respecters of race, color or creed, although it might suit their present needs to pose as the “defenders” and “champions” of the darker races.

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12 Ibid.
Their record, however, has been too dramatically written in the blood of millions of Koreans and Chinese for us to have any doubts about their true character.\textsuperscript{13}

Padmore had described the sort of penetration into its African sphere of influence that upset Rome.\textsuperscript{14} Giving added force to Rome’s distress, rumors arose that the Ethiopian emperor’s nephew planned to marry a Japanese woman, perhaps even a princess.\textsuperscript{15}

How accurate were these fears? Some “logical thinking” Ethiopians, as one self-styled patriot put it, did want the Japanese to reduce Europe’s influence in their country by introducing capital and workers.\textsuperscript{16} For its part, Japan did have some limited economic ambitions. For example, in September 1933 Tokyo asked Ethiopia to authorize the firm of Nikkei-Sha to dispatch an investigation party to search out 500,000 hectares of waste land for reclamation.\textsuperscript{17}

Although the Japanese consistently denied that their penetration of Ethiopia was cause for alarm, and despite their protests over Italy’s antagonistic stance,\textsuperscript{18} Rome was unmoved.\textsuperscript{19} For example, Alessandro Lessona, Under-Secretary of Colonies, commented on the worsening political situation in East Asia and charged,

The birth rate, energy and spirit of sacrifice of the Japanese, the imperious necessity for always seeking new markets—all these combine to make Japan a very great danger for Europe.... The more one restrains the Japanese expansion in the East, the more she will try to expand in other sectors and in other continents, as is proved already by Japan’s activity in Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{20}


\textsuperscript{14}Italy and Russia were not alone in worrying about Japan’s penetration of Ethiopia. The Anti-Opiyum Information Bureau of Geneva asserted that the Japanese had learned how to use opium supplied by their drug monopolies as a political tool in Formosa, Chosen, and Manchukuo. The Bureau worried that with the 1,600,000 acres of fertile land granted by a 1932 agreement for cotton growing, Ethiopia also had granted Japan the sole right to cultivate opium poppies. “Africa Beware!” Record Office (Tokyo) E424 1–3–1.

\textsuperscript{15}Mario dei Gaslini, “Il Giappone nell’economia Etiopica,” in Federazione Provinciale Fascista Milanese, Corso di Preparazione politica per i giovani, Riassunti dello lezioni tenute nel secondo trimestre (Milan: Tipografia del “Popolo d’Italia,” 1935), 99–107 explained Italy’s upset at Japan’s attempt to dominate the Ethiopian market.


\textsuperscript{17}Adol Mar to Hanew, 3/4/34: Record Office (Tokyo) M130 1–1–2.

\textsuperscript{18}Tokyo to Blatin Geta Helou, 9/4/33; Note to Kitagawa, 9/28/33: ibid., E424 1–3–1.


\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., Sept. 9, 10, Dec. 27, 1934.
Lessona ominously added, "To draw the Dark Continent into...[Japan's] orbit would...[deprive] Europe of the possibility of using Africa for the defense of her civilization." 21

Meanwhile, 1933 was an important year for Moscow's relations with Rome and for its newly declared policy of collective security designed to contain both Adolf Hitler and the Japanese. In May, Italy and the USSR signed an economic accord, and in September they signed a Treaty of Neutrality, Friendship, and Nonaggression. A series of military exchanges and favorable press comment punctuated their good relations. 22 On October 27, Ambassador Vladimir Potemkin told Deputy Foreign Minister Fulvio Suvich that Germany was trying to conclude an agreement with Japan at Soviet expense. Distrusting Britain in East Asia, the Soviets wished to forge a pact among themselves, the French, Italians, and Americans to defend China against Japan. 23

Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov consummated rapprochement in December with a visit to Rome while on his way home from his triumphant trip to the United States. There he had signed accords of mutual recognition designed, Moscow hoped, to keep an aggressive Japan in check. 24 In his talks with Litvinov, Mussolini acknowledged that Japan threatened Italy's interests by competing in the Mediterranean basin and in Ethiopia, where Tokyo had received economic, territorial, and immigration concessions. He promised to oppose Japanese aggression; East Asia, however, was not a vital interest for him. 25 Some Italians argued that Litvinov's trip to Rome signified a vast European solidarity facing Japan. 26

The descriptions in Soviet newspapers of Italy's antagonism toward Japan

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21 Ibid.


23 Suvich memorandum, 10/27/33; Suvich circular, 11/2/33: ibid., b8 f4.


25 Memorandum, 12/2/33; MAE circular, 12/3/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b8 f4; Mussolini memorandum, 12/3/33: ibid., b10 f1; DVP, 16: nos. 405, 419; Izvestia, Dec. 8, 1933; The Times (London), Jan. 29, 1934; "Business Abroad," Business Week (Dec. 16, 1933) 25. Italy's representatives in the USSR closely followed the increasing incidents threatening relations between Soviet Russia and Japan throughout 1933. See the many documents in MAE (Rome) AP URSS b10 f9.

suggested Italy’s union of interests with the USSR. Although acrimonious articles also sparked tensions, mutual recriminations in truth lay on the periphery of Italo-Soviet relations. For example, in mid-May 1935, when Mussolini complained about the hostility expressed in the Soviet press regarding Italo-Ethiopian incidents, Ambassador Boris Shtejn denied any official antagonism: “It is something which does not regard Russia,” he said.

In 1934 and 1935, Moscow had every reason to suppose that Italy was prepared to work in harness with the USSR not only against Japan in East Asia and Northeast Africa, but also against Germany in the Austrian and Danubian region.

For Moscow, collective security in Europe was to ensnare Germany by stitching together a net that would include France and Italy and their respective allies in Eastern Europe—Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia on the one hand and Austria and Hungary on the other. Toward this end, for example, in mid-1934 Ambassador Shtejn assured Rome that the USSR wanted to see Paris and Rome solve their problems as part of the Soviet rapprochement with France and the Little Entente. If Moscow could bring Italy and France together, then

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28 Suvich memorandum, 6/6/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b12 f2; Tamaro to Rome, 7/6/34; Rome to Attolico, 7/19/34: ibid., b12 f3; Attolico to Rome, 6/7/34: ibid., b13 f1; Attolico to Rome, 6/29/34, 7/12/34; Bastianini to Rome, 7/4/34: ibid., b14 f1; Suvich memorandum, 5/16/35: ibid., b16 f1; Attolico to Rome, 1/31/35, 2/17/35: ibid., b16 f3; Buti to Suvich, 8/27/35; Attolico to Rome, 1/2/35, 1/9/35, 2/28/35, 5/11/35; Berardis to Rome, 6/18/35; Suvich to Undersecretary of Press and Propaganda, 5/26/35: ibid., b17 f2; Attolico to Mussolini, 8/8/35: ibid., b18 f4; Undersecretary of Press and Propaganda to MAE, 6/22/35: ibid., b18 f12; Italy, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, I documenti diplomatici italiani [hereafter cited as DD], (Rome, 1953- ), 8th (series), (vol.) 1: no. 710; DVP, 17: nos. 221, 417; 18: no. 3, n.3; Izvestia, May 12, 1934; New York Times, Mar. 10, 1935; Pravda, May 8, June 17, July 21, 1935.

29 Suvich memorandum, 5/16/35: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b16 f1. John Haslam, in The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933–39 (London, 1984), 61–62, in viewing this document argues that when faced with Suvich’s criticisms of a press campaign on Ethiopia’s behalf, Shtejn, “being one of those Soviet diplomats confident to act independently,” took it upon himself, “evidently without explicit authorisation,” to deny that his government intended to get involved in the dispute. Haslam continues that the Soviet Union had a vested interest in forestalling any Italian adventure in East Africa, because it could only weaken Rome’s capacity to act effectively against Germany. Shtejn, therefore, had “unwittingly conveyed the illusion” that Moscow was indifferent. See Suvich memorandum, 5/16/35: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b16 f1.

This independence, during the purges, seems quite unlikely; therefore, to suggest that Moscow was not, in reality, “indifferent,” seems equally unlikely. Surely, the Soviets just wanted the matter resolved quickly—whatever the solution—that it could return its gaze to the Brenner. Also see Donald Inrich Buzinkai, “Soviet-League Relations, 1919–1939: A Survey and Analysis” (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1964), 166–73; Salvezini, Prelude to World War II, 183; and James Dugan and Laurence Lafore, Days of Emperor and Clown: The Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935–1936 (Garden City, NY, 1973), 161.

30 Other, even minor, Italian gestures into 1935 continued to encourage Moscow to be hopeful. See, e.g., DVP, 17: no. 29; Moscow Daily News, Feb. 26, Mar. 12, 1935; and Journal de Moscou, Oct. 27, 1934.

the countries of the Little Entente would have to cooperate with Austria and Hungary. This grouping would stop Germany in its aggressive tracks by preventing Anschluss against Austria. France and Italy worked toward these goals in the Rome Accords of January 1935, and they were joined by Britain in the Stresa Agreements of April. Together with the Italo-Soviet agreement of 1933, Soviet entry into the League of Nations in 1934, and the Franco-Soviet and Czecho-Soviet pacts of May 1935, the Rome and Stresa agreements formed more bricks in the wall being raised against German expansion. And the Krem-
lin appreciated these pacts for that very reason. In exchange for his participation in collective security, however, Mussolini demanded and received concessions in Africa.\(^{32}\)

The Soviets understood the strategic necessities driving France to buy off Italy “with Ethiopian coin,” as one scholar has put it.\(^{33}\) Italy was, after all, the one power which felt not only its own sense of necessity but also could act quickly and significantly against any German move on Austria. Beyond pandering to a Paris increasingly bound to Italy after Stresa, the Soviets had their own anti-German stake in Southeast Europe which, they admitted, was more import-
tant than were any revolutionary interests in Northeast Africa.

Ambassador Bernardo Attolico’s reports from Moscow sympathetically explained the contradictions the Rome Accords had imposed on the Kremlin’s policy. Despite Moscow’s claims that only it could be impartial in conflicts between the white race and others, in February 1935 he noted that for some time the Kremlin had maintained reserve toward the brewing Italo-Ethiopian conflict. According to their verbiage, ideology, and intense interest in the conflict,

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\(^{33}\)Gaetano Carlo Salvemini, *Prelude to World War II* (Garden City, NY, 1954), 183. See also Lisovskii, *Voina v Afrike*, 41 and *DDI*, 8th, 1: nos. 12, 159.
Attolico continued, the Soviets should have been enjoying the struggle of a colonial people against a great power. But they were not.  

In truth, Moscow’s inaction toward the Italo-Ethiopian imbroglio had become terribly obvious. Litvinov, as president of the Eighty-Sixth Session of the League’s Council and Assembly sessions, on May 21 carefully avoided any statement condemning aggression committed by League members. He made it clear that the USSR preferred to retain Italy in the front against Germany rather than to protect the rights of small nations.  

Litvinov’s silence outraged officials of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples (NAACP). Walter White on May 22 cabled him demanding:

Why has soviet Russia through you as foreign minister and president league council remained silent Italian Ethiopian situation? Has Russia abandoned its alleged opposition imperialism and its much publicized defense weaker peoples? Does your anti-imperialism stop at black nations? Await your reply.

That same day, he asked Charles H. Houston of Howard University’s School of Law to picket the Soviet embassy in Washington. The NAACP then sent messages to Earl Browder, secretary general of the American Communist Party, and on May 23 to the New York branch of TASS. White urged Browder to demand that Litvinov “break his silence.” To do otherwise would reveal all communist protestations against imperialism as pure hypocrisy. The NAACP told TASS that the

Negro people of America, being keenly interested in the imperialistic aggression of Italy upon the independent African kingdom of Ethiopia, naturally expected that the Soviet Union spokesman in the League of Nations would speak out against this aggression.

Roy Wilkins, the NAACP’s assistant secretary and editor of The Crisis, explained to TASS that Litvinov’s reserve at Geneva destroyed any black faith in the USSR. Walter White put it more bluntly to William N. Jones, editor of the Baltimore Afro-American at its Philadelphia office. On July 8, he wrote Jones, who was planning to meet directly with Joseph Stalin on the Ethiopian question, that the Kremlin had sold out Ethiopia.

As a preliminary observation it appears to me that Russia is showing

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34Attolico to Rome, 2/16/35: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b17 f2; Attolico to Rome, 3/21/35, 4/11/35: ibid., b18 f4; Suvich memorandum, 1/24/35; Suvich circular, 1/28/35: ibid., b16 f1.
35Scott, Sons, 124.
37Scott, Sons, 125.
increasingly a tendency to dump the Negro overboard whenever Russia’s interest in the Negro conflicts with Russia’s interests.\textsuperscript{38}

Blacks had much to be mad at. The communists had expelled George Padmore, the head of the International Trade Committee of Negro Workers, from the Comintern, and they had ousted him as editor of *The Black Worker*, because he had protested communist failure to aid African workers. They had abandoned their anticolonial work in Africa, and they had soft-pedaled the Scottsboro case outside the United States after Moscow had gained American recognition. Above all, Litvinov remained silent at Geneva. *The Christian Century* explained that “communist theory has not been able to prevail in the face of the immediate political interests of the communists’ state.”\textsuperscript{39} Although the *Moscow Daily News* sympathetically described the anti-Italian attitudes of America’s blacks, the paper did not inform its readers of their disappointment in the USSR.\textsuperscript{40}

In May 1935, Padmore analyzed the increasingly serious diplomatic situation. In tones different from several years before, he now thought that the Italo-Ethiopian conflict merely reflected world politics and new groupings among European powers preparing for a new world war. Germany, he wrote, was trying to break its diplomatic isolation forged by France, Britain, Soviet Russia, and the Little Entente.\textsuperscript{41}

Padmore charged that the League Council preferred that Mussolini wage war in Africa rather than disturb the European status quo. Noting the Italo-German conflict over Austria, he charged that the League was bribing Mussolini with African territory to stand in Europe. Given a “free hand to grab as much of Ethiopia” as he could, the Pact of Rome was “the most glaring example of the united front of white Europe against black Africa.”\textsuperscript{42} Dating Mussolini’s aggressive attitude toward Ethiopia to the failure of Rome and the USSR to get Polish support for the Eastern Locarno Pact, the Duce had correctly calculated that France would have to come to terms with him. Because of the Franco-Soviet Pact and fearing to offend Pierre Laval or antagonize Mussolini, “Litvinov dares not raise his voice in protest.... The League is no more than a farce.”\textsuperscript{43}

Padmore then turned to the Japanese connection. “[T]he Ethiopians and the Japanese are the only two colored nations which have ever defeated white powers at arms.”\textsuperscript{44} Charging that Italy was defending not only its rights, but also the prestige of the white race, he quoted *Affari Esteri*:

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., 126.
\textsuperscript{39}American Negroes,” 781; Scott, *Sons*, 126.
\textsuperscript{40}Moscow Daily News*, July 11, 1935.
\textsuperscript{42}Ibid., 139.
\textsuperscript{43}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44}Ibid., 157.
It is time that the white nations of Europe should abandon their long suffering toleration towards the only African state which is still autonomous, and proceed to settle all questions connected with the Abyssinian problem. Abyssinia is a gander to the white race. The young Abyssinians are inspired with the idea of ‘Africa for the Africans,’ and are already combining with Japanese immigrants in the country to combat the white man’s influences in Africa.45

Padmore blamed much of Ethiopia’s difficulties on its friendly relations with Japan. The Emperor realized that his country was surrounded by colonies owned by Britain, France, and Italy and these powers wished to see Ethiopia backward or even reduced to colonial status. The emperor, who had been trying to modernize his realm, was unable to get capital from white nations, because they did not want to see destroyed the myth that blacks could not govern themselves. To carry out his reforms, the Emperor gave certain preferential privileges to Japanese who not only needed markets for their textiles and other commodities, but lands where they could cultivate raw cotton—the Japanese too were seeking independence from the white powers, Britain and America, from which Japan was buying most of its cotton lint. Britain and France, too occupied by their own problems to antagonize the Japanese, had “assigned” Mussolini the task of intervening in Ethiopia and breaking its ties with Japan.46

The core of Padmore’s charge, that Moscow would willingly sacrifice Ethiopia if this served Soviet interests, was accurate, at least according to information from Italy’s representative in Moscow. In late June, Ambassador Shtein reassured him that the USSR did not intend to interfere in Italy’s plans for East Africa; Moscow only wanted that war be avoided.47

Giving force to Italy’s new role as a defender of the status quo against Germany, Mussolini promised a “million bayonets.”48 By the end of June, Rome and Paris had signed a pact of general military cooperation over Austria, and these good relations permitted the French army to plan for withdrawing seventeen divisions from southeast France and North Africa to reposition them above the Maginot Line.49 All this drew favorable comment from Moscow, and the Kremlin had good reason in the first half of 1935 to hope that collective security could continue to work as in the summer of 1934, when Italy had moved its troops to the Brenner Pass and forced Germany to back down over Austria.50

46Ibid., 157. See Asante, Pan-African Protest, 44–45.
47Suvich memorandum, 6/26/35: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b16 f1; DDI, 8th, 1: nos. 435, 440.
Behind the closed doors of the League Council, Litvinov pressed hard for a peaceful settlement in Italy’s favor of the brewing conflict. For example, when told that London was insisting on a Council meeting for July 29 to discuss the dispute, the commissar instructed Shtein to warn Palazzo Chigi and to suggest that Italy formally request a delay, which he would officially support. The Italians thanked Shtein for the friendly gesture.\(^5\)

In midsummer, the Japanese ambassador in Rome, Youtarou Sugimura, reported to Tokyo that Litvinov at first had intended to use the League of Nations to restrain Italy as well as Japan and Germany, but now he was hesitating to discuss the Italo-Ethiopian conflict in the League Council. The reason: the deterioration in Italo-Japanese relations.\(^5\)

Another strong indication of the Kremlin’s desire not to let increasing tensions over Ethiopia interfere with good relations with Rome was the series of economic negotiations begun in 1934 and concluded in June 1935 after hard bargaining, mutual recrimination, and expired deadlines.\(^5\) And as Italy aggressively mobilized for war in the fall, some forty Greek freighters hauled Soviet wheat, oats, barley, coal, timber, coal tar, and petroleum for Mussolini’s war machine building up in Mas’uwa and Mogadishu.\(^5\) In consequence, a grateful Italy only informally protested the activities of the Seventh Comintern Congress of August, which itself clearly played down the onrushing war. Only Palmiro Togliatti raised the Ethiopian issue at any length, and even he carefully gave his less than ringing call to battle solely in the name of the Italian Communist Party and not the Comintern.\(^5\)

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\(^{54}\) Drawing upon this press report, in October, the NAACP charged that the USSR was aiding the fascist war effort. The Crisis denounced Soviet hypocrisy. See “Soviet Russia Aids Italy,” Crisis 42 (Oct. 1935): 305. American Communist Party leaders denied any duplicity, pointing to worldwide communist demonstrations against Italian aggression. In response to the bitter attacks, Browder reminded African-Americans that Russia and the communists were exerting “all energies to build a mass movement in defense of Ethiopia against a bestial fascist assault.” See “Earl Browder Replies,” Crisis 42 (Dec. 1935): 372. All this caused estrangement among the Party’s black rank and file. See Mark Naison, Communists in Harlem During the Depression (Urbana, IL 1983): 173–84; Daily Worker, Sept. 6, 9, 1935; and Scott, Sons, 125–27.

During the summer of 1935, increasing tensions between Japan and Italy over Tokyo’s support for Ethiopia further justified the Soviet Union’s tilt toward Italy. For example, General Kazushige Ugaki, Governor General of Korea, spoke about the possibility of Japanese aid to Ethiopia in case of an Italo-Ethiopian war. Tokyo unctuously blamed false rumors of excessive Japanese interference in Ethiopia on Soviet sources.

According to Japan’s representatives in Rome, in early July many Italian papers were arguing that, although Japanese interests in Ethiopia included imperialism and protection of economic interests, Japan was now interested in the conflict primarily as one between white and colored peoples. Japan, the papers continued, was the only country which could lead the colored peoples. The basis of an inhumane and tragic racial war was ripening, one which, Italy’s papers warned, European countries had to prevent.

The depth of the dispute between Italy and Japan occurred in mid-July 1935 with the “Sugimura Affair,” which began when Foreign Minister Kouki Hirota undermined Ambassador Sugimura’s private and public efforts to mollify Italy’s attitudes toward Japan over the Ethiopian and other questions. Italy’s inflamed press continued to charge that Japan was trying to start a race war and was using Africa as a bridge over which the yellow race would attack Europe. A wonderful example of the temperamentality of public diplomacy, the ultimate significance of the Sugimura Affair was that, in smoothing over this contretemps, Rome and Tokyo built the foundation for their later alliance.

For the moment, however, Italo-Japanese tensions continued well into August and September. For example, Japan’s acting minister to the League of Nations insisted that an Italo-Ethiopian war would mean a conflict between the white and black races, although, he added, war could be prevented. With great hopes for assistance and to grand public fanfare, an Ethiopian representative visited Japan. Many Japanese nationalists asserted that a racial unity bonded Japan with Ethiopia. Although these were mostly private citizens who bargained the government, their blandishments lent credence to Italy’s racial


So did Japan’s newspapers. The *Kokumin* of July 25, 1935 editorialized that Italy, guided by racial prejudices toward Ethiopia, had even criticized Japan from that warped racial viewpoint. The paper added that even if they settled the immediate issue, the racial problem would remain and Italy was responsible. The *Nichi Nichi* added that Italy’s attempt to wrap the Ethiopian issue in racial cloth would fail. The *Houchi* on August 7 wrote that Italy intended to make Ethiopia its protectorate—the imperialism and sense of racial superiority common among whites had led Italy to take such an ambitious policy. The paper concluded that Japanese had to make the white race see its injustice and errors. That same day, the *Osaka Asahi* wrote that the Italo-Ethiopian dispute had aroused the colored peoples against Italy and whites. If racial reconciliation proved difficult, Mussolini, Italian papers, and their use of the “yellow peril” would have to bear the consequences.

Increasing the stakes involved from the Kremlin’s vantage, Austria’s Nazis strongly supported Ethiopia. They believed that the moment Italy began hostilities, Germany would reopen its campaign against the government in Vienna. In response, on August 24, Mussolini took personal charge of military maneuvers along Italy’s Alpine frontier to reemphasize that he was prepared to do his duty in preserving Europe’s peace. Paris continued to conclude that some latitude in Africa was a small price to pay for keeping Italy on the Brenner, ready to move against the Nazis in Austria.

So did the Kremlin. For example, Ambassador Shtein again begged that Rome would take into account “the most difficult position of Litvinov, who wants to do all possible to help Italy.” The greatest problem was Italy’s declaration to take Ethiopia at any cost. If Italy could have carried off its aggression without calling it “aggression,” Moscow would have been content, and a cooperative rather than a defiant Mussolini could have won from the League all concessions of practical importance he wanted. Shtein made clear the Kremlin’s belief that the League’s position depended on a self-serving Britain determined to make problems for Italy.

Britain did fear Italy’s pressure on its own imperial holdings, and London

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66 *DDI*, 8th, 1: no. 710.
dismissed Italy’s ability to counter the Hitlerite threat in any case. The Stresa Front, with its implicit Soviet connection, thus collapsed within a few months, partly because Britain concluded the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in June behind the backs of its Stresa partners and ultimately because London insisted on League-imposed economic sanctions to punish Italy for invading Ethiopia.68

Was Italy or Britain in the end more useful to Moscow in opposing Germany and Japan? The Soviets had to ask the question, especially after the breakdown on August 14 of the Anglo-Franco-Italian talks on Ethiopia.69 The answer was obvious, and London sucked not only Paris, but Moscow as well, into the vortex of anti-Italian League action.

Moscow’s attitude toward Italy hardened while its attitude toward Britain softened at the beginning of September. Whereas Soviet newspapers into August had stressed the “interested motives” of British opposition to war in East Africa, the Journal de Moscou also emphasized the need to assert League principles even toward a conflict “on a secondary front in world politics,” because “warmongers in Europe” were counting on “the certainty that no collective action whatever” could foil their plans.70 A couple of weeks later, Pravda added:

Whatever may be the reasons behind the British action it is clear that England is following the line of reinforcement of the interests of peace and of strengthening the authority of the League of Nations.71

Playing for higher stakes than it wished, Moscow had its hand called at Geneva: the Soviets condemned Italian aggression—with reservations. In a speech to the League Council’s September 5 meeting, Litvinov clearly enunciated Soviet concerns: Moscow valued Italy’s friendship and wished to keep it if possible; the Italo-Ethiopian dispute in itself did not threaten or even concern the USSR except that it portended future threats to peace. Italy was a vital component in collective security; nonetheless, it was that very system which was now at stake.72

Displeased, the Italians called Litvinov’s speech “a grave blow” to mutual friendship.73 Yet some recognized the ambivalence in the Kremlin’s position.

68 Lisovskii, Voina v Afrike, 34; Lowe and Marzari, Italian Policy, 275; Shorrock, From Ally to Enemy, 123, 127; DDI, 8th, 1: nos. 134, 135, 392, 401, 429, 431, 432, 449, 465, 539, 566; 2: nos. 17, 31, 33, 44.
69 DDI, 8th, 1: nos. 541, 547, 548, 553, 597, 629, 684; B DFA, II, A, 14: no. 413.
70 Journal de Moscou, Aug. 23, 1935.
72 Most have misinterpreted this speech. On the surface, violently anti-Italian, in context it was in truth a plea for continued cooperation with Rome. See Arthur Upham Pope, Maxim Litvinoff (New York, 1943), 361–62; DVP, 18: no. 357; Moscow Daily News, Sept. 6, 1935; Sipols, Sovetskii Soiuz, bor’ba za mir, 100; “Litvinov at Geneva,” New World Review 4 (Jan. 1936); 7; Izvestia, June 9, 1935; Journal de Moscou, Sept. 6, 1935; New York Times, Sept. 6, 1935; and DDI, 8th, 2: nos. 55, 59, 80.
73 Mussolini to Aloisi, 9/6/35; Suvich to Arone, 9/12/35: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b17 f2.
Pietro Arone, the newly-arrived ambassador to Moscow, on September 9 spoke with the deputy foreign commissar, who played down the League’s ability to do anything effective and emphasized that suspicions of Britain united Russia and Italy. In his September 12 telegram to the foreign commissariat, Litvinov reiterated the core of his speech: “the resolute application of sanctions by the League against Italy will be a stern warning to Germany as well.” On September 14, Litvinov again spoke to the League with “all the restraint” the situation demanded. He complained:

If we had before us from Italy, instead of a declaration on liberty of action, a formal and well-founded complaint against acts of aggression committed by a neighboring Ethiopia...I venture to assure the representative of Italy that not only would he have obtained from the League full justice, but also convinced himself of the amount of the sympathy to which the noble Italian nation is entitled.

In other words, if Italy had but presented its case differently, then both the League and Moscow would have accepted Rome’s claims.

Litvinov stressed not only an abstract Soviet admiration for the League as an instrument to stalemate aggressive states, but also the Kremlin’s efforts to make it a workable and effective device. But, again, most impressive about his statement was its mildness, its desire to put off the day when the Soviets would have to condemn directly, and on its own terms, Italian aggression in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian conflict merely threatened the League’s ability to deal with aggression elsewhere, and for that reason alone was it worth the energies of the League’s representatives. Arone understood and reported on September 19 that the USSR wanted to maintain the status quo in Europe and that the Kremlin feared Italy might support Germany against the USSR. Thus, he explained, Moscow’s moderate tone on the Ethiopian situation—even at this late date.

Italy attacked Ethiopia on October 2. Once the League Council applied sanctions against Italy, the Soviet Union joined the other powers. The Council of People’s Commissars on October 17 banned the export of war material to Italy. Interestingly, even as the League of Nations with Soviet support worked to thwart Italy’s ambitions in Ethiopia, Moscow applied to Ansaldo of Genoa to purchase 75/17 mm cannon. Mussolini’s government granted permission for

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74 Buti to Suvich, 7/1/35; Arone to Rome, 8/31/35; Arone to Rome, 9/8/35: ibid., b17 f2.
75 MAE circular, 9/12/35: ibid., b17 f2.
76 Sipols, On the Eve, 82.
77 Izvestia, Sept. 15, 1935; see also Pravda’s editorial, Sept. 15, 1935.
79 Arone to Rome, 9/19/35: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b17 f5.
the transaction. A mere half-a-year later, in April 1936, the League Council met under the dark shadow of Ethiopia’s impending collapse. On the 24th, it was reported that the Soviets were disposed to drop sanctions against Italy, if given absolute assurance that effective measures would be applied against any future aggressor.

In May 1936 the Soviets offered to remove their sanctions, if Italy would join a tripartite accord with themselves and Paris. During July rumors abounded that Mussolini had seriously studied the idea but had rejected it in the end. Meanwhile, the League abandoned sanctions. The onset of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936 dashed efforts at reconciliation. Soviet appeasement had failed.

Certainly, the Kremlin’s policy gyrations won few friends among the world’s blacks. For example, the American journal, *The Black Man*, in the early summer of 1936 commented,

Primarily, there is no difference between capitalistic white men and communistic white men in the determination of racial interest. It is true that the communist whites pretend a kind of sympathy for and fellowship with the Negro, but that is only a means to an end.... The Negro will always suffer from the prejudice of the dominant whites, whether they are capitalistic or communistic. (...) Russia treats the few Negroes there to-day with consideration only because there is no danger from black domination.

Castigating the League and communism, James S. McIntyre wrote in the next issue of *The Black Man*:

Geneva has now drawn the curtain heavily and ruthlessly on the black country of Abyssinia, and white civilization with all its past astuteness and cunning diplomacy, has now shamelessly demonstrated in the open that its only con-

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82 Ansaldo to MAE, 9/13/35; Suvich to Ministero della Guerra, 9/24/35; Suvich to Ansaldo, 9/26/35; Ansaldo to MAE, 10/4/35; MAE to Ansaldo, 10/10/35: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b18 f1. For an evaluation of Soviet trade with Italy during sanctions, see Lowell Ray Tillett, “The Soviet Role in League Sanctions Against Italy, 1935–36,” *The American Slavic and East European Review* 15 (Feb. 1956): 11–16.

83 Beloff, *Foreign Policy*, 1: 203.

84 Cerruti to Rome, 5/22/36: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b19 f1.

85 Vitetti to Rome, 7/18/36: *ibid.*, b21 f5.


87 Beloff, *Foreign Policy*, 2: 106.

cern for the coloured peoples of the world is their exploitation and domina-
tion. (...) Communism, as a matter of political convenience, makes a gesture,
and embraces the Negro in its doctrine of equality for all peoples, but the
attitude of Soviet Russia at Geneva, of simply falling in line with the dictates
of Imperialism and M. Litvinoff’s apologetic speech at the outcome of events,
afford the Negro another outstanding lesson in white tomfoolery."

He added that there was hope: “Let him [the Negro] pick a page from the book
of Japan with its united and phenomenally progressive people—an answer to an
impudent and degenerate western civilization.”

An ill-founded hope. Seeing an Italy determined to attack and a Britain
determined to stand firm, Tokyo insisted that it wished to continue commercial
relations with Ethiopia even after an Italian victory. The Japanese resisted
imposing League sanctions and worked hard to reassure Rome that their inter-
ests in Ethiopia were strictly commercial. In return, the Italians promised to
protect those interests. Without second thoughts, in 1936 Japan recognized
Italy’s empire created by the conquest of Ethiopia. The rapprochement, begun
after the Sugimura affair, quickly culminated in the Anti-Comintern Pact which
by 1937 had united Italy and Japan with Germany and helped pave the way to
World War II.

During that war, the famous Italian philosopher and fascist supporter,
Giovanni Gentile, called for racial solidarity among Italians, Germans, and
Japanese “to save Europe from the double threat of stateless communists and
false democrats, Hebrew or not.” His plea graphically reveals the cynical
banality of the racial politics played during the Italo-Ethiopian War and so
flippantly reversed with the Anti-Comintern Pact.

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89McIntyre, James S. “Abyssinia and After,” The Blackman (July-Aug. 1936), 6–7, in ibid.
90DDI, 8th, 1: no. 820. When the Japanese foreign ministry denied that Japan had sent arms to
Ethiopia, Messagero praised the Japanese attitude. Sugimura to Hirota, 9/16/35, 8/31/35: Record Office
(Tokyo) A461 ET/II vol. 2. Sugimura reported that Italy’s press was saying that Japan’s press was
covering the Italian position objectively. The Giornale d’Italia on Aug. 27, 1935 argued that Italy and
Japan were not going to come into conflict with one another but would cooperate, because the two
countries shared the same policy and fate. Italy, reassured the paper, wanted only to secure the safety of
its workers and to trade there; Italy did not seek to monopolize profits in Ethiopia by closing the
economic door or by using the racial issue. See the many documents in Record Office (Tokyo) A461
ET/II–4; A461 ET/II vol. 5; and M130 1–1–2, including Giornale d’Italia, Dec. 3, 1936; Il Piccolo,
(Tokyo) A461 ET/II vol. 2; Invoices of Mishima & Co., Ltd.: ibid., 461 ET/II–3; DDI, 8th, 1: no. 113.
leading naval officers, Admiral Gino Ducci, similarly urged Japan to enter the war against USSR, and
Roberto Farinacci prodded Spain to do likewise: “All of Europe is on its feet against Anglo-Saxon and
Soviet Judaism. It would be absurd for the Spain of Franco to remain absent in the hour when her
enemies are being crushed in the grip of inexorable justice.” New York Times, June 27, 1941. Praising
the morality of the war against bolshevism, Spain already had promised to send volunteers to fight, but
was still unprepared to fully join the war. DDI, 9th, 7: no. 301.
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The Father of Wildlife Preservation begins his career:
William Temple Hornaday’s wildlife collecting expedition to
Cuba and Florida, 1874–1875

James A. Dolph
Weber State University

William Temple Hornaday traveled to more exotic places and experienced
more adventure than most boys ever dream and raised himself up from poverty
and obscurity as if his life’s script had been written by Horatio Alger. He was
born on a small farm near Indianapolis, Indiana in 1854. When he was two, he
and his family joined the stream of wagons and cattle moving west to Iowa.¹

Hornaday’s early youth was happy and carefree. He enjoyed roaming the
Iowa prairies on the edge of settlement, but soon the Civil War brought tragedy
to his family. Two brothers went off to war, one never to return. Working the
land without their labor, his father’s health failed, forcing him to sell their large
farm and move to a small one near Knoxville, Iowa. Then his mother died when
he was eleven and he was orphaned at age of fourteen with the death of his
father in 1869. Hornaday was alone without the benefit of any immediate
family.

After living with relatives on farms in Indiana and Illinois for two years,
Hornaday decided that he must do something in life other than being a farmer.
He enrolled at Oskaloosa College in the neighboring county. Barely able to
make ends meet, Hornaday was relieved when he qualified for a county scholar-
ship the next year at Iowa State Agricultural College.

Enrolling in the spring of 1872, he did well academically at Iowa State, but
it was his part time job that molded Hornaday’s future. He won a job as a
taxidermist and custodian at six cents an hour at the college’s new natural
history museum by crudely mounting a great white pelican that someone had
shot and given to the president. After a year at Iowa State Hornaday made a
decision to leave school. He was too restless to study animals in the classroom
and laboratory. He decided he would become a professional taxidermist, which
would be, as he later wrote, “a good stepping-stone to travel, field observation
and finally to work in a museum.”²

Taxidermy was then considered to be a handmaiden of science, but the only
place for training was Ward’s Natural Science Establishment in Rochester, New
York. At that time, Ward’s was the principal supplier of scientific specimens to

¹For a detailed account of the first half of Hornaday’s life see James A. Dolph, “Bringing Wildlife
Massachusetts, 1975.
Library of Congress.
the many public and university natural history museums which were being founded across the country in the late nineteenth century. The owner of this intriguing business enterprise was an irascible professor of geology at the University of Rochester, Henry A. Ward, who hired Hornaday as a workman at $6.00 per week with only the promise that he could learn taxidermy on the job. When Hornaday arrived in Rochester in November of 1873, Ward’s Natural Science Establishment consisted of six wooden building surrounded by a white wooden fence with a gateway made of the immense jawbones of a whale. Hornaday later wrote of the thrill he experienced when he entered through this strange looking gate:

To me the romance and glamor [sic] of Ward’s...was as fascinating and compelling as the stage and foot-lights are to the confirmed actor. Up to that time nothing else of the kind had entered into my life. At that one spot, the jungles of the tropics, the game-haunted mountains and plains, and the mysterious depth of the seas seemed to contest for the privilege of pouring in day by day their richest zoological treasures.\(^3\)

In May of 1874, after working at Ward’s for only half a year, Hornaday became so enamored by the “call of the wild,” as he put it later, that he decided he was ready to go off to foreign lands as a collecting naturalist on behalf of his employer. Ward refused to sponsor Hornaday until the day his young employee brazenly walked into the professor’s study and announced: “Professor Ward, I am going to Du Chaillu’s country in West Africa on a collecting expedition for gorillas. Is there anything in particular that I can do for you over there?”\(^4\) Paul B. Du Chaillu was author of Equatorial Africa, a book which had thrilled young Hornaday with stories of tropical beasts and birds.” One of Hornaday’s uncles soon showed up in Rochester with fire in his eye and put a stop to his Hornaday’s foolhardy plan. Fearing his nephew’s bleached bones would end up in some far off jungle, the uncle gained a pledge from Professor Ward that he would break in the young man gradually by sending him to a less dangerous place than Africa.

Professor Ward was in need of maritime specimens, especially manatee, and he decided that the shorelines of Cuba and Florida would be ideal for Hornaday to begin his apprenticeship as a collecting naturalist. Hornaday considered Ward’s alternate proposal a comedown from his original plan, but still welcomed the opportunity to begin collecting. After waiting for the heat of the summer to pass, Hornaday sailed for Cuba in October of 1874. He arrived in Havana in the midst of the first Cuban insurrection (The Ten Years War), with very inadequate clothing and equipment, and with little knowledge of Spanish. His destination was the Isle of Pines where he hoped to obtain manatee.

\(^4\)Hornaday, Ibid. Chap. 4, 52.
The Consul General in Havana warned this “innocent abroad” about the dangers about traveling in Cuba, particularly on the Isle of Pines since it was a penal colony for criminals and suspected rebels. But Hornaday took little heed of the warnings, and blithely set off for the island. The Isle of Pines yielded few valuable specimens, with the exception of a manatee skull Hornaday was able to purchase from fishermen. This was his first major specimen and it soon found its way to the shelves of Harvard’s Museum of Comparative Zoology. But Hornaday did collect some goods stories for his future writings on the Isle of Pines. On the large plantation where he stayed slaves came to his quarters late at night to ask him about the possibility of American intervention in the revolution. A Spanish naval officer invited him for dinner on board his gunboat in return for Hornaday’s stuffing a tortoise-shell turtle for him and Hornaday was almost shot by an overzealous rural guard who suspected him of being a spy.5

After having been on the Isle of Pines for approximately a month Hornaday returned to Havana. He then sailed to Key West, arriving in America’s southernmost city early in December of 1874. For Hornaday, Key West was not only a steppingstone to the mainland of Florida, but it was also a significant collecting stop on his expedition. A thriving city approaching 10,000 people, Key West was one of Florida’s largest towns because of the shipwreck salvaging business and because it had one of the busiest fish and sea turtle markets in the state.

Hornaday took a room in a boarding house and kept himself so busy during the three weeks he spent in Key West that his twentieth birthday passed unnoticed. But he was enjoying himself completely. He wrote Professor Ward that he was “happy as any clam or sunflower,” and that the weather suited him exactly, “neither cold nor hot, kinder [sic] lukewarm.”6

He spent much of his time down on the docks purchasing fish, sponges and sea turtles, or out along the beach collecting shells and corals. Once the collecting was done, Hornaday’s work began—skinning the specimens, brushing on arsenic soap, and hanging them up to dry or placing the smaller specimens in large barrels of alcohol. Nearby fishermen must have enjoyed the sight of this energetic boy from the North as he dissected and preserved two large loggerhead turtles which weigh up to five hundred pounds, several sharks, three dolphins and a barracuda, the largest specimens of Hornaday’s Key West collection.

It was while Hornaday was working on one of these specimens that he met Chester E. Jackson, a jolly and adventuresome twenty-nine year-old farmer from Racine, Wisconsin who was spending the winter traveling through the South.

6William T. Hornaday to Henry A. Ward, 1 January 1875, Henry Ward Papers, University of Rochester Library.
Wintering in Florida by midwestern farmers has been a longtime custom, apparently. In a journal which he wrote three years later, Jackson vividly described his first impression of Hornaday, offering keen insights into Hornaday’s personality and character:

It was on a sunny morning when I wandered down to the fish market to see the great fish come in.... In the shade of the market near the wharf a large Loggerhead laid on his back with an energetic young man taking off his carapace or breast plate. I thought him a fisherman at first, his working clothes (blue flannel shirt and light pants—straw hat, I believe) and occupation making me think so.... (I never thought him a naturalist at the time).... In age he was about 20—short in stature—roundly built—short arms—fine shaped hands—small yet firmly made—a good shape foot—short quick step—upright—head strongly set on a short neck—square shoulders—very dark hair—darkest brown eyes, bright, deep, and quick—prominent nose, short upper lip that can easily turn with a sneer—firm mouth—with an expression overall of untiring energy—quickness, probity, determination and strong nerves—backed by a strong confidence in self and the desire to make the most of everything—he looked fully five years older than his age. A man’s face with a boy’s body as it were.3

Jackson had stopped to enquire about the boat which sailed to Biscayne Bay and discovered that Hornaday would be taking passage on that vessel in several days. Jackson was so interested in Hornaday’s activities, he decided to join him for the remainder of his expedition.

Having gathered a fine collection of sea specimens, Hornaday departed Key West with Chester Jackson on January 2, 1875. They sailed on a small, sixteen-ton mail schooner, the Liberty, proceeding up the southeast coast of Florida to Biscayne Bay in pursuit of alligators, scarlet ibises, flamingoes, spoonbills, manatee, shells and corals, which they hoped to find in the Bay and in the Everglades. After a pleasant voyage of three days along the Florida Keys, the Liberty arrived at the north end of Biscayne Bay at the present site of Miami.

Southern Florida was largely an unpopulated wilderness at this time, and it remained so until well into the twentieth century. It was not until 1896 that Miami became incorporated as a town, and then it had a population of only 1,500. When Hornaday and Jackson arrived on Biscayne Bay in 1875, Miami was scarcely in existence. Beginning in 1870, a few homes had been built along the Miami River where it flows into the Bay, and thus the village became a regular stop for the mail schooner. In a letter dated January 8, 1875, Miami, Florida, Hornaday described this wilderness outpost: There is no town here at all [sic], three houses at the mouth of the river, and others at intervals of one and two miles, scattered along the shore of the Bay.” Nonetheless, he felt it was a

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“lovely place, and no mistake, beats Cuba all hollow.”

Hornaday and his new companion pitched their tent on the shore of Biscayne Bay and took their meals at a farmhouse located on the banks of the Miami River. Hornaday was enjoying himself as he never had before and he wrote Professor Ward that he and Jackson were as “snug and independent as can be” in their tent on the beach. Only a few sandy trails cut through the palmettoes led out of Miami, so wagons and carriages were utterly useless, and anyone who owned a house also owned a boat. Hence, for transportation this tiny community was almost completely dependent on Biscayne Bay, which Hornaday described as a “beautiful sheet of water” in an article he sent to the Western Farm Journal in Des Moines that year. This short piece, “Notes from Southern Florida Taken in Winter” was the first of many articles and books that Hornaday would write about his travels and experiences with wildlife.

The people of Miami were friendly to their northern visitors. On their second day there, Hornaday and Jackson met some workmen who had noosed a big diamond-backed rattlesnake. They gave the rattler to Hornaday and Jackson to keep as a specimen, but asked them to cut off the meat and insisted that the two young collectors join them in a rattlesnake luncheon. So against their better judgment, Hornaday and Jackson soon found themselves eating rattlesnake steak with all the men and women of Miami.

Hornaday was disappointed to learn from the residents of Miami that the flamingoes, scarlet ibises or spoonbills that he expected to find in that could only found in the depths of the Everglades. He was even more disillusioned to hear from three Seminoles who came to Miami to trade that they were unable to guide him to their camp in the Everglades because their chief, Old Tiger Tail, had ordered them not to do so while he and the rest of the tribe were on a grand hunt. This dignified Seminole was a favored visitor to the community. Just two years before Hornaday had arrived in Miami, Old Tiger Tail had stopped the last serious Indian threat to the settlers.

With little chance of collecting plumed birds, Hornaday and Jackson concentrated on collecting aquatic animals. Renting a dingy for one dollar per week, the two collectors crossed Biscayne Bay to the sand bar which separates the Bay from the Atlantic Ocean. There on that mangrove-covered spit of sand which is now the location of Miami Beach’s resort hotels, Hornaday combed

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8William T. Hornaday to Henry A. Ward, 8 January 1875, University of Rochester Library.
9William T. Hornaday to Henry Ward, 14 January 1865, University of Rochester Library.
12Hornaday to Ward, 8 January 1875, University of Rochester Library.
the Atlantic shoreline for shells and other maritime specimens. Having that beautiful sun-soaked beach all to themselves, they collected “a splendid lot of sea-eggs, sponges and shells,” Hornaday reported to Ward in a letter. 14

Another day they rowed down the bay six miles to where a manatee was said to have washed ashore. They found the manatee, but its skin had decomposed so badly that Hornaday took only its bones. Rounding out the week’s collection was a big leather-backed turtle Hornaday bought from an Indian, and ten scorpions that he and Jackson found in a clearing near their tent.

After a week collecting around Miami, Hornaday and Jackson started off in their dingy for the north end of Biscayne Bay in quest alligators. They went up Arch Creek, so named because of the natural bridge which spanned its waters. Hornaday and Jackson proceeded up this deep and crooked topical stream, one of the many which flowed out of the Everglades, and they pitched their tent on top of the arch and set up camp. From a family which lived nearby, they learned that there were alligators in the creek. In fact, they were told that a mile below the arch lived a very big alligator that was so cunning it had evaded all pursuers for years. The next morning Hornaday and Jackson made their way down the stream. As they rounded a bend in the creek, they spotted the large reptile on the bank sunning itself. As Hornaday trained his binoculars on what he assumed was an enormous alligator, he saw that it was grey, not black, and that it had a sharp tapered snout rather than a broad square one. It was a crocodile, not an alligator!

By the time Hornaday and Jackson had gotten over their amazement at finding a crocodile in Florida, (most naturalist at that time supported the theory that crocodiles did not inhabit the United States), the big saurian had slipped into the water and disappeared. Two days later, on January 22, 1875, Hornaday wounded the old crocodile in mid-stream, frantically rowed down the creek in their dingy in a wild chase and killed it as their exhausted prey finally crawled up a bank. 15

When Hornaday examined his quarry, he found that it was fourteen feet two inches in length, in spite of the fact that part of its tail had been bitten off, and it was over five feet in girth. He and Jackson called this huge reptile “Ole boss” and it was the first crocodile collected in Florida, and one of the largest ever found in that state. Upon his return to Rochester, Hornaday proclaimed to the scientific community that the crocodile did in fact exist in Florida in his first scientific article, “The Florida Crocodile” which was published in The American Naturalist. 16 Old Boss and his mate, which was shot the next day, were soon purchased by the Smithsonian Institution and were on display for many years.

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14 Hornaday to Ward, 14 January 1875, University of Rochester Library.
After returning to Miami and placing the crocodile skins in brine to soak, Hornaday and Jackson once more rowed up to the head of Biscayne Bay. This time they hunted a few miles north of Arch Creek, journeying along Snake Creek as far as the edge of the Everglades. Hornaday shot two alligators there, but saw very few birds, "except 10,000 mud hens," he wrote to Ward. He and Jackson hunted in this swampy wilderness for five days and were forced to sleep in their small open boat for lack of dry land. By the time they got back to Miami on February 5, Hornaday had scarcely enough strength left to write Professor Ward that he had come down with a "fever and general breakdown, brought on, as all agree, by overwork on crocodiles and alligators." 17 Perhaps because of this experience, Hornaday was never enthusiastic about the creation of Everglades National Park.

That night, Jackson left on the mail schooner for Key West his way home to Wisconsin. But Hornaday stayed on in Florida for another month. After recuperating from his fever, Hornaday hired a Miami homesteader, William J. Smith, to take him up the coast approximately twenty-five miles north to the New River. 18 On February 14 they set off in Smith's small sailboat. When they reached their destination, Smith made such marvelous claims about the wildlife along the Hillsborough River they continued on another eighteen miles and went ashore. But it took Hornaday just one day to determine that there was nothing in the way of wildlife for him to collect the Hillsborough. So they moved back down the coast to the New River. While Smith sailed the boat, Hornaday walked ten miles along the beach looking for specimens. As a southeast wind came up, Hornaday returned to the boat. The wind turned into a gale, almost capsizing them, but they finally made their way through the breakers and landed safely on the shore that evening.

Hornaday and Smith made camp near the uninhabited mouth of the New River. Hornaday had intended to spend six days hunting alligators and collecting other specimens along that beautiful, clear stream lined with tropical foliage which is now bordered with exclusive homes complete with yacht slips in the heart of the city of Ft. Lauderdale. But the southeast gale kept up and it was so strong that he "could not hunt alligators, birds, catch fish nor anything else," he complained to Ward. Nevertheless, Hornaday insisted on staying until the wind died down, for he was bound to collect more alligators and other specimens, despite the fact that their provisions gave out after six days and they were forced to live on nothing but sweet potatoes and an occasional fish. Future wayfarers would not have to survive storms on their own in that area as did Hornaday. A year later, because of the high winds and frequent shipwrecks, the U.S. government built a House of Refuge for stranded sailors near where Hornaday had

17 Hornaday to Ward, 5 February 1875, University of Rochester Library.
been marooned.  

While waiting for the wind to calm down, Smith’s coffee and tobacco gave out and he grumbled and complained all the while, but Hornaday, a life-long abstainer from coffee, tobacco, and alcohol wrote self-righteously to Ward “Since I never used either, I was not troubled in the least that way.” Finally after eight days the sun came out and the wind subsided. Hornaday and his boatman were able to make their way up the river where Hornaday killed several alligators, the largest being eight feet in length. He also killed a wildcat, two water moccasins, and collected more shells and sponges during his second week on the New River.

After being twice as long in the Ft. Lauderdale area as he had planned, Hornaday was happy to leave his “detestable quarters,” commenting to Professor Ward in a letter that “if I had been leaving the Tombs, I could not have been more rejoiced.” He and Smith broke camp on February 26th at 3:00 a.m. in a thick fog, having no wind except, in Hornaday’s words, “a yellow pine breeze.” Now instead of having too much wind, they had too little and Hornaday wrote that they got back to Miami twelve hours later, “by main strength and awkwardness, Smith poling and I pulling.” He added that their first care in getting back was to “surround a square meal, the first in thirteen days.”

By now Hornaday had spent two months in southeastern Florida, and he wrote Professor Ward that he “walked no less than 40 miles of the beach north of Cape Florida, the southern tip of Biscayne Key and got all from it that is worth getting.” Besides specimens, he had gained a lifelong friend, the keeper of the red brick lighthouse at Cape Florida who welcomed all visitors to his beautiful but solitary outpost.

On March 5, 1875, he boarded the mail schooner and sailed for Key West. Finally on March 16, he boarded the steamer The City of Austin which was bound for New York City. Taking passage with him was a strange assortment of traveling companions—hermit crabs, crocodiles, sharks, dolphins, loggerhead turtles, water moccasins and many others—contained in six large boxes and one barrel of alcohol. He had been gone for five months, and by the time he returned to Rochester he was deeply tanned and his clothes were in tatters, but he arrived with a sense of fulfillment and confidence.

By the age of twenty, Hornaday had made an important zoological discovery. He had also published his first scientific article and his first account of his travels. But just as important, his wrote long letters which are full of humorous anecdotes, striking descriptions of wildlife and rare glimpses of wild places which have survived and serve as a valuable and delightful record of his adventures.

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20 Hornaday to Ward, 28 February 1875, University of Rochester Library.
21 Hornaday to Ward, 15 March 1875, University of Rochester Library.
But the expedition to Cuba and Florida was only the beginning of a most remarkable career, for William Temple Hornaday would bring wildlife to millions through his various callings. Collecting naturalist, museum taxidermist and curator, zoological park founder, nature writer, and wildlife preservationist, all are described in detail in my biography of the first half of his life, "Bringing Wildlife to Millions," which is now being considered for publication.

The same year he returned from Florida, he and Chester Jackson floated down the delta of the Orinoco River in Venezuela collecting South America species. In 1876 when he was twenty-one, he journeyed through Europe, India and the East Indies returning in 1879 when he was twenty-four with the largest zoological collection ever collected by one individual, including a record-breaking tiger. In 1882, at the age of twenty-seven, he had become recognized as the most skilled taxidermist in the world by his appointment to the position of Chief Taxidermist of the Smithsonian Institution. In 1885, at the age thirty, Two Years in the Jungle was published, his account of his expedition through India and the East Indies, the best-selling travel and adventure book of its day. In 1887, when he was thirty-two he mounted his celebrated American bison group that he had collected on the plains of Montana for the Smithsonian, which included the largest bison on record.

Because of Hornaday, habitat groups were accepted by natural history museums, changing them from austere scientific storehouses to institutions of public education. In 1889, at the age of thirty-four, he sounded the alarm that other species would go the way of the buffalo if something was not done in The Extermination of the American Bison, the seminal work in wildlife preservation. In 1890, when he was thirty-five, he single-handedly lobbied Congress to create the National Zoological Park, the first zoo in the world created to protect endangered species. By 1894, when he was thirty-nine Hornaday was well on the way to becoming known as the authority on wild animals in America because of his many popular articles on wildlife, which appeared in the best magazines of the day. One of them he gave an authentic Horatio Alger title, The Pluckiest Boy In Florida. Considered the most knowledgeable person in America on wild animals, he was called to become the founding director of the New York Zoological Park in 1896, when he was just forty-one.

While there he conducted a relentless war for wildlife which resulted in the preservation of the American bison, the fur seal, and the protection of plumed and migratory birds, among other achievements. Truly the “father of wildlife preservation,” Hornaday died in 1937 at the age of eighty-three after bringing wildlife to millions and creating the sentiment which would eventually create the Endangered Species Act of 1973. The placement of the crocodile, alligator,

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manatee, and giant sea turtles on the Endangered Species List would have pleased William Temple Hornaday, "the pluckiest boy in Florida," who collected them for science over a hundred years ago when he began his incredible career.

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The Vernacular Press Act of 1878

and the Role of Indian Language Papers in the Formation of the Nationalist Movement

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On 14 March 1878 Lord Lytton’s Legislative Council passed the Vernacular Press Act, also known as “An Act For The Better Control Of Publications In Oriental Languages.” In essence, the Act gave the British government in India the power to censor and control the vernacular press, even at the expense of the judicial process. The Act and its repercussions were to have a significant influence on the direction and unification of the Indian nationalist movement. Even before the founding of the Indian National Congress in 1885, the seeds of the nationalist movement were already planted in the hearts and minds of many Indians. Lytton’s policies, especially the Vernacular Press Act, caused these seeds to flourish as nascent unification efforts were begun by middle-class intellectuals. Many of these intellectuals were involved in the Indian press as proprietors, editors, and journalists. Undoubtedly, the press was an integral and necessary component of the movement. Events protesting the Act, such as the meeting of the Indian Association in March 1878, stand as a watershed in the formation of the nationalist movement.¹

The significance of the Vernacular Press Act, despite its influence, has often been ignored or brushed over by historians. Anil Seal’s *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism*, though a very thorough study, fails to attribute a more unified middle-class effort in the nationalist movement to the ramifications and results of the Act. Even the monumental study *The Indian Press: A History of the Growth of Public Opinion in India* by Margarita Barns fails to address the more profound effects of the Act. For example, Barnes notes that the Act caused an increase in Indian bitterness towards the British as well as the concurrent rise in opposition in various geographic sections in India. This opposition, though, is not described by Barns as a unified effort. Specifically, she discusses the founding of the newspaper, the *Hindu*, and the rise of political awakening in Madras in 1878, but neglects to discuss the communication that was established between Madras and Bengal as a result of efforts against the Act. Perhaps the best example of scholarly oversight of the Vernacular Press Act is Leonard Gordon’s *Bengal: The Nationalist movement 1876–1940*. Gordon

neglects to mention not only the Act of 1878, but fails to even make a cursory survey of the policies of Lord Lytton and the effects of those policies on the nationalist movement. In summary, few of the major works in the historiography of the early years of the nationalist movement appreciate the results of the Vernacular Press Act. In order to truly understand the overall impact of the Vernacular Press Act on the nationalist movement, the history of the Indian press must be considered as well as the attitudes and commentary of the vernacular press in the years leading up to the passing of the Act.  

The vernacular press in the 1870s possessed immense variety. Vernacular papers were often unilingual, bilingual, and in some cases trilingual. The more popular journals frequently included vernacular and English sections. As historian Uma Das Gupta notes, “A knowledge of English was a passport to the urbane, educated community in India at the time.”

Circulation frequency also displayed variety. In 1877, the majority of publications were weeklies, followed in popularity by bi-weeklies, then tri-weeklies, monthlies, bi-monthlies, and finally quarterlys. Daily vernacular publications were rare. At the time of the Act, there were four dailies in Bombay, four in Bengal, one in Upper India, and none in the South.

Although most papers were urban-based, as time progressed, district and village papers increased in number. Gupta notes, for example that, “village-centered newspapers had come into vogue mainly in Bengal. By the seventies there were quite a few powerful ones.” Bengali village publications such as the Grambarta Prokashika and Barisal Bartaba gained relatively large readerships.

In general, the editor of a native paper also served as proprietor and publisher. In some cases, as with the Amrita Bazar Patrika in Bengal, two or three partners were involved with the paper. These partners, though, were usually family or close relations. The Amrita, for example, was founded and operated by the three Ghosh brothers. Even so, Gupta notes that “Sisir kumar Ghosh was known to have written all of the articles of the paper.” In Bengal in the 1870s, seventeen papers were owned by a single individual and four papers were owned jointly. This four-to-one ratio was also the case, roughly speaking, in Bombay and Madras. In the North-West Provinces, the ratio was nearly ten to

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3Gupta, 214; Ibid., 213–215.

4Ibid., 214.

5Ibid.

6Ibid.

7Ibid., 217; the brothers were Hemnata Kumar, Motilal, and Sisir kumar Ghosh; Sisir kumar Ghosh was born in 1840 in West Bengal to a middle-class family. Throughout his life he was active in journalism and politics. He founded the Indian League in 1875 and the Indian Union in 1884. He was also an active member of the Indian Association.
one in favor of sole proprietorship. The only exception was in the Punjab and Oudh where single and joint ownership were about equal. 8

Owners and editors tended to share similar backgrounds. By the 1870s most newspaper editors belonged to the well educated middle-class. Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar of the Som Prakash of Bengal, for example, studied at Sanskrit College in Calcutta. Similarly, Sisir kumar Ghosh of the Amrita Bazar Pratrika was educated at Presidents College in Calcutta. Exceptions did exist, though. Harinath Majumdar of the Grambarta Prakashika, had little education and limited money. 9

Between 1870 and 1880 Bengal had forty-one newspapers. Of these papers, thirty were produced in Calcutta, a concentration figure higher than in any other major city in India. The Bombay Presidency produced thirty-eight different papers. Of this number, Bombay city produced sixteen vernacular newspapers. The North-West Provinces accounted for twenty-five papers and Madras produced twenty-seven. In the Punjab and Oudh, twenty-nine papers existed. In comparison, the vernacular press in 1875 had a circulation that was twice as large as the English press. The vernacular press had a readership of about 150,000 in 1875 with the maximum circulation of any one journal not exceeding more that three thousand subscribers. 10

In the four years leading up to the passing of the Act, several issues dominated the native press. Most important of these issues, judging from the British Raj’s point of view, was criticism of the government and governmental policy. By sampling the years from 1874–1878, a general idea of the complaints can be understood. Criticisms of the government included protests about policy brutality, the judicial system, prejudice and obstacles in the Indian Civil Service, problems with cotton and indigo production, famine relief, new taxes and the Indian Arms Act. 11

Many native papers objected to the brutality of the police. On 3 March 1875, for example, the Grambarta Prakahika of Bengal protested actions of the police, expressing that “the majority of subordinate police officials is composed of low, ignorant and unprincipled men who do not hesitate to commit outrages

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8Ibid., 216.
9Ibid., 223–231; Vidyasagar was born in 1820 to a middle-class Brahmin family in West Bengal. He was well educated and was active in several universities in Bengal. Specifically, Vidyasagar promoted the study of vernacular languages. Also, he was a strong advocate of social reform, being awarded the title C.I.E. by Queen Victoria in 1880. He fought to allow widow remarriage and to eliminate polygamy.
alike on males and females." The article also notes that injustices against females, in particular, often go unpunished because "it is felt extremely humiliating to go to the courts." The article concludes by requesting reform.

Another example of this type of condemnation is found in an article in the Sahachar of Bengal published on 6 March 1876. The article criticizes the inefficiency of "higher authorities" in checking the police. Also, the writer notes that the police are "inefficient to prevent and detect crimes, but are remarkably proficient in tyrannizing over innocent people." The author concludes by requesting a commission to investigate police actions.

Native papers also complained about the racism and inequality of the judicial system. Also, much disapproval was expressed about the high cost of court fees and stamp duties as well as the "nature of justice awarded." In some cases, editors complained about the existence and use of lawyers. In comparison to the panchayat system, argued some editors, British justice was slow and impersonal. Commenting on the judicial system in general, the Amrita Bazar Patrika noted on 11 May 1876, that too "often the extreme penalty of law is unjustly inflicted" upon the innocent.

The voice of the press was equally ambitious in criticizing the other abuses. For example, several papers censured the Durbar of Delhi in 1876, claiming that celebration was inappropriate while people in Bombay and Madras died of famine. The Sona Prakash noted on 6 November 1876, that "while thousands are spent on fireworks in the chief cities and towns...thousands of men will perhaps be dying from starvation." Many papers noted that racial inequality was rampant in the Indian Civil Service, and, when the government suggested lowering the examination age to nineteen, criticism exploded.

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12India Office Library and Records, Report on Native Papers in Bengal for the Week Ending 6 March 1875.
13Ibid.
14Ibid.
15Ibid., Report on Native Papers in Bengal for the Week Ending 11 March 1876.
16Ibid.
17Ibid., January 1876
19India Office Library and Records, Report on Native Papers in Bengal for the Week Ending 13 May 1876; Chaturvedi, 203–204.
20The Delhi Durbar was an official celebration of the proclamation of Queen Victoria as Empress of India. The celebration included, among other festivities, military parades and cannon salutes.
21India Office Library and Records, Report on Native Papers in Bengal for the Week Ending 11 November 1876.
Several papers commented on the overall results and conditions of British rule. For example, the *Swadesh Mangal* of Broach in Bombay explained on 13 January 1878 that the government finds money to pay an enormous salary to the Governor-General; to employ highly-paid foreigners; to give full pensions to some retired officers; to spend a large amount, one-third of the revenue of the empire, on the army; to maintain ecclesiastical establishments for Christians; to maintain the Cooper’s Hill College in England; to build splendid barracks for soldiers...but cannot get money to lessen the death-rate in our jails; to build railways and canals; to spread high and popular education; to give little relief to the ryots suffering from a heavy land assessment.23

Native papers, in their critical commentary, rarely called for the overthrow of the Raj. At most, the papers reminisced about Mughal rule in an attempt to highlight problems with the British.24

Lord Lytton, the new Conservative Viceroy, came into this volatile situation in 1876, making an already antagonistic environment much worse.25 Press regulation was not new to India; a pendulum-like policy had existed since the founding of the first paper in 1790. This pendulum swung from complete liberty under Governor-General William Bentinck, for example, to extreme control, immediately following the Mutiny.26 In the 1870s, freedom existed despite the extension of Act XXVII of the Indian Penal Code in 1870. In essence, this extension made sedition published in newspapers a criminal offense. Lord Lytton wished to extend this control by creating legislation dealing solely with the press. Initial proposals were circulated to members of Lytton’s Council, Chief Commissioners, and local governments through a circular in 1877. This circular met with almost unanimous approval from every level of government except in Madras where the governor disagreed with its use. Arthur Hobhouse offered the dissenting opinion that “people who have newly acquired freedom of speech are likely at times to use their tongues without discretion. All that we must take as the drawback necessarily attendant on the benefit of having a more intelligent and less reticent people in India.”27

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25 Educated at Harrow and Bonn, Edward Robert Bulwer (1831–1891) had an extensive diplomatic career, serving in Florence, Copenhagen, Vienna, Belgrade, and Madrid, before assuming the title of Lord Lytton in 1873. He served as the Viceroy of India from 1876–1880. Interestingly, Lytton was an accomplished poet. His poem “King Poppy”, for example, received much acclaim when published in 1890.
26 Bentinck was Governor-General from 1828 to 1835.
27 Barns, 276.
Lytton disagreed.28

On 1 January 1877, Queen Victoria was made Empress of India. In her speech commemorating the occasion, she explained that

We trust that the present occasion may tend to unite in bonds of yet closer affection ourselves and our subjects; that from the highest to the humblest all may feel that under our rule the great principles of liberty, equity, and justice are secured to them; and to promote their happiness, to add to their prosperity, and advance their welfare, are the ever present aims and objects of our Empire.29

Two months and thirteen days later, the Vernacular Press Act was passed by the Viceroy’s Council. This enactment was unusually hasty. Generally, when a bill was introduced into the Council, it was referred to a Select Committee of the Council and published in the Government Gazette, “so that the public might get an opportunity of discussing the merits of the proposed measure.”30 The Act, on the contrary, was rushed through the Council in one day. The same day, 13 March, it was telegraphed to the Secretary of State for India, Lord Salisbury, in England, who returned his approval the next day. On March 14, the Act became law. Naturally, the Indian public was outraged. Lytton attempted to justify his actions by stating that,

I am unwilling to hamper the diffusion of honest thought; but I recognize in the present circumstances of this country, and in the present condition of the populations committed to our charge the clear and obvious duty of checking the propagation of sedition, and preventing ignorant, foolish, and irresponsible persons from recklessly destroying the noble edifice which still generously shelters even its vile detractors.31

He also noted that “I cannot but regret the necessity which, by some irony of fate, has imposed on me the duty of undertaking legislation for the purpose of putting restrictions on a portion of the press of this country.”32

Members of the Viceroy’s Council voiced their support for the action. Sir A.J. Arbuthnot, for example, noted that seditious publications, as found in the native papers, perverted “the mind of the young” and jeopardized the educational foundations provided by the British.33 E.C. Morgan stated that statements within the native papers were “so monstrous that, in the mind of an educated

29Barns, 279.
30Roy, 737.
31The Times (London), 15 March 1878.
32Barns, 280.
reader, they would only raise a smile or provoke disgust." G.C. Paul recommended the strongest measures possible in the suppression of the native press, noting that the editors of vernacular papers had evil purposes which would only poison the minds of the "lower orders." According to Paul, the native press saturated the minds of those "orders" with "evil thoughts" and aroused "evil passions." With this amount of support, the Act was, not surprisingly, unanimously passed in one day by the Council.

The governor of Bengal, Sir Ashley Eden, agreed with Lytton, noting that the "evil" of sedition "had long been felt by the Government of Bengal" and that he had "long recognized, as a fact, that the licentiousness of the Press [had] under false ideas of freedom and independence been allowed to reach a stage which promptly calls, in the interests of the public at large, for the interference of legislation." In discussing the reason for legislation against the vernacular press, while the English press remained free, Eden explained that the character of the English press was "naturally intolerant of sedition" something that did not exist "in the case of the ordinary Indian newspaper." Similar beliefs were expressed by other governors, especially those of the North-West Provinces and Bombay.

In essence, Lytton called for the stifling of the vernacular press because he felt that the attacks on the government were dangerous, certainly at a time when, as Lytton thought, Russophobia was heightened because of the Afghan War. Lytton and the Council based their judgments on a government collection of 150 samples of seditious writings in vernacular papers. The Advocate-General, Sir A.J. Arbuthnot, organized the writings into six categories. These categories included writings that were "seditious libel, libel on government officers, contemptuous observations on the administration of justice, libels on the character of Europeans, libel on Christians and mischievous to excite race and religious antipathies" and the wonderfully vague, "suggestions and insinuations which their authors contrived should fall short of seditious libels by reason of the absence of positive declarations." The popular journals Sadharani, Somprakash, Amrita Bazar Patrika, Sahachar, Dacca Prakash, Hindu

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34Ibid., 159.
35Ibid., 161.
36Ibid.
37Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3d ser., vol. 242 (1878), col. 57.
38Buckland, 715–716.
39Ibid.
40Seal, 144–145; Support in Bombay came from Sir Richard Temple. In the North-West Provinces, Sir George Couper was an enthusiastic supporter of the measure. Eden (1831–1887) was educated at Rugby and Winchester. During the Indian Mutiny he served as a magistrate in Moorshedabad. Also, he served as Governor of Bengal from 1877–1882.
41The Times (London), 18 March 1878.
Hitaihini, Bharat Mihir were cited, among others, in the report.\textsuperscript{42}

On 18 March 1878 the Times published some of the extracts from the governments collection. One article, for example, claimed that the British "thought it worthwhile to conquer the country, though with enormous bloodshed. Even if thousands of our countrymen are starved to death, any attempt on our part to write on their behalf will be imputed with partiality. The rule of our country has passed into the hands of foreigners and we have lost our independence."\textsuperscript{43} A more colorful article likened Europeans to snakes, claiming that "Europeans are more mischievous to natives" than serpents. A few of the 150 excerpts, presented to the British public in the Pall Mall Gazette on 15 March, expressed a desire for the defeat of the British at the hands of the Russians, but these discussions were rare.\textsuperscript{44}

The text of the Vernacular Press Act included twenty sections. A brief review highlighting some of the Act's more important restrictions will help explain reactions to the Act both in India and Britain. The preamble to the Act stated that native newspapers were

read by and disseminated amongst large numbers of ignorant and unintelligent persons, and [were] thus likely to have an influence which they other wise would not possess; and whereas it [was] accordingly necessary for the maintenance of the public tranquility and for the security of Her Majesty's subjects and others to confer on the Executive Government power to control the printing and circulation of such publications.\textsuperscript{45}

Considering that, as has already been discussed, the newspapers' readership was mostly middle-class and urban with a maximum circulation reaching 150,000, the reasoning specified in the preamble is suspect. Sections one and two of the Act defined the legal meaning of newspaper and discussed the other publications covered under the Act. Section three of the law gave any District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police the ability to force the a printer or publisher to submit a bond if the government official thought that the editor or publisher was printing any "words, signs or visible representations likely to excite disaffection to the Government established by law in British India, or antipathy between any persons of different races, castes, religions or sects."\textsuperscript{46}

Section four required that the bond be made in the form of money or property. This bond could be returned after fifteen days if the editor promised not to

\textsuperscript{43}The Times (London), 18 March 1878.
\textsuperscript{44}Pall Mall Gazette, 15 March 1878.
\textsuperscript{45}Barns, 282.
\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., 282.
publish information as outlined in section three. The editor or publisher had the option not to pay the bond if a copy of the newspaper was given to an officer of the local government for censorship prior to publication.\(^{47}\)

Section eight specified that all property belonging to the paper could be seized by the government if a printer or publisher ignored the warning given at the time a bond was required by the government. According to the Act,

all printing presses, engines, machinery, types, lithographic stones, paper and other implements, utensils, plant and materials, used or employed, or intended to be used or employed, in or for the purpose of printing or publishing such newspapers, or found in or about any premises where such newspaper is printed or published, and all copies of such newspapers wherever found, and any money or securities which the printer or publisher of such newspaper deposited shall be liable to be forfeited to Her Majesty.\(^{48}\)

The section also specifies that a record of all money and property seized by the government would be published in the government Gazette.

Section nine allowed the local government officials to search the premises of any property that was suspected of printing material outlined in section three. Section seventeen explained that, as well as being liable for bond, violators could also be punished “by imprisonment for a term which [could] extend to six months.”\(^{49}\) The Act also stipulated that any appeal had to be made directly to the Viceroy and his Council.\(^{50}\)

Reactions to the Act in Britain, where a conservative ministry under Benjamin Disraeli was in power, were evenly mixed. In the British press, the more liberal papers condemned the Act. The Spectator, for example, commented that “we cannot believe that such a law, more Draconian than the worst ever sanctioned by Napoleon III, will be tolerated by Parliament.”\(^{51}\) The editorial asserted that however discreetly the Act might be used, no discretion could “make confiscation without trial and without hearing a defense, just” despite the intentions of the individual.\(^{52}\) The Daily News argued that the Act was a mistake because, as the editor noted, “the step is all the more grave and culpable because we have already carried the policy of distrust in our dealings with the natives to great lengths. We cannot accomplish our true work in India without the confidence and co-operation of the people.”\(^{53}\) Anticipating events, the writer concluded by warning that the Act would force opposition underground and thus make it far more dangerous. As well as The Spectator and Daily News, the

\(^{47}\)Ibid., 283.
\(^{48}\)Ibid., 284.
\(^{49}\)Ibid., 287.
\(^{50}\)Ibid., 284–287.
\(^{51}\)The Spectator, 16 March 1878.
\(^{52}\)Ibid.
\(^{53}\)As quoted in the Pall Mall Gazette, 20 March 1878.
Home News and the Echo also condemned the Act. The Saturday Review withheld judgment, suggesting that more time was needed to determine whether or not the Act was necessary.54

The more conservative newspapers in Britain supported the Act. The Pall Mall Gazette, for example, provided excerpts from the Indian Government’s list of 150 samples. The paper then concluded that there existed in India the “necessity of checking the writings appealing so openly to the passions of an ignorant and excitabile population,” a statement that almost directly matched the preamble to the Act.55 Along with the Pall Mall, the Standard, Globe, and Daily Telegraph supported the measure. The Times withheld comment, neither condemning nor supporting the action. Politically, William E. Gladstone and most liberals disagreed with the measure.

The most profound reactions to the passing of the Act occurred in India. This reaction, especially under the direction of the Indian Association, paved the way for the foundations of a unified effort on behalf of middle-class India. This unification led to the nascent formation of the Indian nationalist movement.56

The strongest reactions to the Vernacular Press Act were voiced by the Indian press. The English language press generally disagreed with the measure. This disagreement, though, was not in support of the native press but rather a condemnation of the extension of governmental power. For example, the Bombay Gazette noted that the Act “exaggerates the importance of the vernacular press.”57 The Pioneer contended that “the British Government in India rests on a foundation which is too broad for seditious newspapers to shake.”58 The Times of India agreed with the Government of India contentions about the vernacular press, but argued that an openly seditious press was less dangerous than a stifled press that could “affect the most vital organs of body politic.”59 The Bengal and Hindoo Patriot also agreed. The Bengal argued that “the British Lion should not have been thrown into excitement by the buzzing of a few gnats.”60 The Hindoo Patriot likened the Act to “moving the cannon to crush the mosquito.”61 The attitude of the vernacular papers, however, was much more severe.

The vernacular press overwhelmingly condemned the action. Of the twenty-nine major papers published in the Bombay Presidency and Berar in

54 Roy, 739; as quoted in the Pall Mall Gazette, 23 March 1878.
55 Pall Mall Gazette, 15 March 1878.
56 Roy, 739, 741; The Times (London), 15 March 1878; For an excellent discussion of the political affiliations of British newspapers throughout the nineteenth century see Stephan Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain: The Nineteenth Century (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981).
57 As reported in the Pall Mall Gazette, 4 April 1878.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Both The Bengal and the Hindu Patriot were quoted in Roy, 739.
61 Ibid.
March and April of 1878, for example, only four supported Lytton’s action.\textsuperscript{62} Specifically, the condemnations fell into three categories: (1) the deprivation of liberty caused by the Act; (2) the 150 extracts that were used by the government; and (3) the vagueness of the Act’s wording.\textsuperscript{63}

An overwhelming number of the native papers criticized the Act’s deprivation of liberty. Most editors saw liberty of the press as one of the enlightened foundations of British rule and were shocked at its removal. The Rast Gafar, for example, noted on 17 March that “the good name of the British rule is founded upon the liberty of its subjects; and when that liberty is taken away, the British rule loses its excellence.”\textsuperscript{64} Liberty, argued the writer, was what set British rule above the rule of France and Germany. The Bombay Samachar likened the Act to “shackles on liberty,” noting that “once the key of the manacle goes into the hands of the European officers of Government” the safety of liberty is in jeopardy.\textsuperscript{65} On 25 March, the editor of the Indu Prakash stated that the “14 March of 1878 will remain strongly impressed on the hearts of the Natives” and would never be forgotten.\textsuperscript{66} The Berar Samachar proclaimed on 28 April, that all readers of the native press were well aware of the deprivation of liberty caused by the government.\textsuperscript{67}

The vernacular press strongly objected to the way the 150 extracts were used by the Council. For example, the Poona Herald contended that the extracts contained nothing objectionable. Even if some articles did contain seditious or libelous information, argued the editor, the government was wrong to “gag the whole press for the faults of a few.”\textsuperscript{68} Also, the writer explained that the government was at a loss for good translations of the articles, failing to understand “the genius and idioms of the different vernaculars.”\textsuperscript{69} The Rast Gafar added that the Native press never got to view copies of the translations used in the government’s 150 extracts before the law was passed. Similar objections to the 150 extracts were also voiced by the Surya Prakash, Bombay Samachai, Kaside Mumbai, Nyana Prakash, the Swadesh Mangal, and the Janue Jamsid among other papers.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{62}Indian Office Library and Records, Report on Native Papers for the Week Ending...Bombay, March-April 1878.
\textsuperscript{63}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{64}India Office Library and Records, Report on Native Papers for the Week Ending 23 March 1878 for Bombay, India.
\textsuperscript{65}India Office Library and Records, Report on Native Papers for the Week Ending 16 March 1878 for Bombay, India.
\textsuperscript{66}India Office Library and Records, Report on Native Papers for the Week Ending 30 March 1878.
\textsuperscript{67}India Office Library and Records, Report on Native Papers for the Week Ending 4 May 1878 for Bombay, India.
\textsuperscript{68}India Office Library and Records, Report on Native Papers for the Week Ending 23 March 1878 for Bombay, India.
\textsuperscript{69}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{70}India Office Library and Records, Report on Native Papers for the Week Ending 23 March 1878 for Bombay, India.
As well as criticizing the restrictions of liberty and the 150 extracts, the native press also attacked the vague wording of the Vernacular Press Act. Most native editors felt intimidated by the unclear text in section three and were also afraid of the power given to local magistrates and police commissioners. The Bombay Samachar argued, for example, that “the prohibitions against certain kinds of writing are so worded that it would be difficult for a public writer to strike out for himself a safe course.”\textsuperscript{71} The editor commented that a bond was required, but the amount of the bond was not specified, leaving the decision to the local government official. The Anglo-Indian publication Native Opinion agreed with the Samachar’s assessment, saying that section three of the Act was “extremely vague.”\textsuperscript{72} The editor further argued that the act did not describe “what matter should be published and what should not.”\textsuperscript{73} The Indu Prakash specifically attacked the vagueness of the phrase in section three that described material “likely to incite disaffection against the established Government.”\textsuperscript{74} The editor noted that the vagueness intimidated all editors, both loyal and disloyal.\textsuperscript{75}

Several of the papers also called for the public to unify and protest the action. For example, the Native Opinion appealed to the people to “hold public meetings and to send petitions to the Government” to get the law appealed.\textsuperscript{76} The Kiran called for a popular appeal to Parliament, noting that “on such an occasion, we cannot afford to be silent.”\textsuperscript{77} The Guzerat Mitra urged the populace to take the issue to England, explaining that the people should “approach the highest national tribunal in due humility and submissiveness, with a prayer for the just right, and with a hope that some members of that tribunal might take up our cause.”\textsuperscript{78} Several public meetings resulted from these appeals, especially the meeting of the Indian Association in April of 1878.\textsuperscript{79}

The key event leading to the unification of the Indian nationalist movement in opposition to the Vernacular Press Act was a meeting of the Indian Association in Calcutta on 17 April 1878. The Association and the press were inseparably intertwined. In fact, journalists and editors constituted the second largest professional group in the Association.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72}India Office Library and Records, Report on Native Papers for the Week Ending 30 March 1878 for Bombay, India; most Anglo-Indian papers condemned the Act. The Native Opinion was especially vocal in its criticism.
\textsuperscript{73}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74}India Office Library and Records, Report on Native Papers for the Week Ending 1 April 1878 for Bombay, India.
\textsuperscript{75}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76}India Office Library and Record, Report on Native Papers for the Week Ending 30 March 1878 for Bombay, India.
\textsuperscript{77}India Office Library and Record, Report on Native Papers for the Week Ending 6 April 1878.
\textsuperscript{78}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79}Roy, 742–743; Banerjea, 57; Bagal, 34; The Times (London), 13 May 1878.
\textsuperscript{80}Roy 742–743; Banerjea, 57; Bagal, 34; Seal, 20.
The Indian Association was founded in Bengal in 1876 by prominent members of Bengal’s educated middle-class including Surendranath Banerjea and Monomohan Ghose. The Association grew out of casual meetings between several intellectuals in Calcutta. Over time these meetings grew in number and on 26 July 1876 the Association was officially established at a meeting of over two hundred men at Albert Hall in Calcutta. The Association’s goals, as outlined at the meeting by Chandra Noth Bose, were

the creation of a strong public opinion in the country, the unification of the Indian races and peoples upon the bases of common political interests and aspirations, the promotion of friendly feeling between Hindus and Muhammadans, and the inclusion of the masses in the great public movements of the day.

Although the Aims and Objects Resolution specified the importance of unity, this goal had yet to be realized. Over time, the Association began to spread to other areas of India, conducting subcontinent tours. It was not until the passage of the Vernacular Press Act, though, that the Association was able to unite various geographic areas of India through a strong, unified message.

Prior to 1878 the Association conducted campaigns protesting the treatment of railway passengers, the Dramatic Performances Bill, the Rent Law change, and the change of the Indian Civil Service maximum examination age from twenty-one to nineteen. On 24 March 1877, for example, a public meeting of the Association was held at Albert Hall in Calcutta. At the meeting, a resolution was drafted concerning the Civil Service problem and was sent to Parliament. At the time, only the Association in Bengal was involved at the meeting. A promise was made, though, to launch a strong all-India effort. By the end of 1877, the Association had substantially grown. Membership, for example, went from seventy in 1876 to two hundred in 1877. Also, the Association began branches in Lahore, Agra, Cawnpore, Allahabad, Bogra, Mymensingh, Meherpore, Bhazanghata, Contai, and Senhattty. By March 1878, the Association was ripe for a cause that would bring middle-class India together. The Vernacular Press Act provided the incentive and the response was massive and

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81Banerjea was born on November 10, 1848. He was a very prominent member of the Indian Nationalist Movement. Banerjea was able to receive the proper education and credentials to go to England and pass the Indian Civil Service examination in 1871. British racism, though, kept him from fulfilling his goal of a career in the I.C.S. After this disillusionment, Banerjea led an active public life, especially as the co-founder of the Indian Association in 1876 and as editor of the Bengalee. It is strongly suggested that the reader consult Banerjea’s A Nation In the Making for more information. Monomohan Ghosh was born in 1844 to a well known upper-middle class family in Kayastha. Throughout his life he was active in public affairs and advocated reform. As well as being a journalist, even starting the Indian Mirror in 1861, he was an active barrister. Ghosh was a member of both the Indian Association and the Indian National Congress. He died in 1896.

82Bagal, 13; Banerjea, 39.

83Bagal, 12–15; Banerjea, 37–39; Seal, 214–221;

84For a discussion of both the Dramatic Performances Bill and the Rent Law change see Bagal, 17.
unified, as is evident by the size and composition of the Association’s meeting at the Calcutta Town Hall on 17 March 1878.\textsuperscript{85}

Four days after the passage of the Act, members of the Association drew up a petition to be approved at a public meeting in Calcutta on 17 April, and then forwarded to Parliament. The April gathering in Calcutta was a watershed in the history of the Indian nationalist movement because, as historian Jogesh Chandra Bagal explains it “solicited support from the leading political associations and persons all over the country, which most of them gave readily.”\textsuperscript{86} Bagal also remarks that “the success of the meeting shows that the leadership of the people was rapidly passing...to the educated middle-class.”\textsuperscript{87} Over five thousand people attended the rally, prompting S.N. Banerjea to comment that “it was one of the first great demonstrations of the Indian Association and the middle-class.”\textsuperscript{88} Banerjea also noted that the meeting “marked a definite and progressive stage in national evolution.”\textsuperscript{89} The Association successfully sought to draw all of middle-class India into the movement, even the middle-class in Madras which, as discussed, did not feel the effects of the Vernacular Press Act.\textsuperscript{90}

The Association’s petition included five resolutions. Resolution one charged that the Act restrained the freedom of the press and thus hindered the “free expression of popular opinion and feeling.”\textsuperscript{91} These restrictions, warned the resolution, would produce the very “evils” that the Act sought to eliminate.\textsuperscript{92} Also, the Act would retard the evolution of “oriental literature and deal a serious blow to the cause of native progress” and good government in India.\textsuperscript{93}

The second resolution complained that the Act was retrograde and unnecessary because of the peace in India at the time. Furthermore, the resolution outlined that the Association opposed the elimination of regular components of the judicial process, substituting instead the “discretionary autonomy of executive officers.”\textsuperscript{94} The third resolution criticized the speed at which the Act was passed. No opportunity, complained the Association, was given for discussion.\textsuperscript{95}

The last two resolutions dealt with Parliament. The fourth resolution established a committee to organize a memorial to be sent to Parliament. The

\textsuperscript{85}Bagal, 16–30; Seal, 218; Roy, 743.
\textsuperscript{86}Bagal, 34.
\textsuperscript{87}Ibid.; on 13 May 1878 the Times referred to the meeting as “monster” in size.
\textsuperscript{88}Banerjea, 57.
\textsuperscript{89}Ibid., 58.
\textsuperscript{90}R. Sumtharalingam, “The ‘Hindu’ And The Genesis Of Nationalist Politics In South India, 1878–1885,” South Asia 2 (1972), 65.
\textsuperscript{91}Bagal, 34–35.
\textsuperscript{92}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{94}Ibid.; O’Donnell
\textsuperscript{95}Ibid.; Roy, 743.
committee consisted of sixteen members including A.M. Bose, Jogesh Chunder Dutt, and Rashbihair Ghosh. The fifth resolution thanked Gladstone, and other Liberal MPs for their understanding and support.

The memorial was presented to the House of Commons early in July, and a subsequent motion on the Act was debated in the House on the 23 July. The motion, presented by Gladstone, specified that any implementation of the Act should be reported to the Secretary of State for India and the Parliament. Gladstone did not seek to condemn Lytton and the government of India in the motion for fear of discrediting the Government of India. In his speech introducing the proposal, however, he did argue against the hasty manner in which the Act had been passed as well as condemning the absence of the judicial sanctioned by the Act. Also, Gladstone declared, in response to Lytton's assertions, that he found nothing objectionable in the 150 extracts used by the Government of India. An amendment to the motion was presented by the Liberal MP F.H. O'Donnell. In the amendment, O'Donnell did criticize Lytton for, among other actions, the manner he thought in which Lytton "improperly obtained the sanction of the Home Government." Furthermore, O'Donnell contended that Lytton with using in the Act an "unjust and insulting tone...towards the people and languages of India." Furthermore, O'Donnell noted that the "extracts alleged by Lord Lytton as a justification for the recent Press Act...extend to complete falsification." Unfortunately, the motion was defeated by 52 votes; 152 out of 360 members of Parliament, though, voted in favor of the motion.

Although technically a defeat, the motion can be seen as a victory for Indian nationalism. The Native Opinion noted on 4 August that "the fact that the Press Act was discussed before a full house of Parliament is the first of its kind, and is a happy indication that Englishmen have commenced to pay more attention

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96 A small committee was given the task of compiling all the resolutions into the memorial that was sent to the House of Commons. The members of the committee were Rev. K.M. Banerjea, T. Palit, Chunder Madhab Ghosh, Rev. K.S. MacDonald, Dwijendra Nath Tagore, Jogesh Chunder Dutt, Rash Behary Ghose, Bhairab Chunder Banerjea, Probodh Chunder Mullick, Nitya Lal Mullick, Jagannath Khanna, Dr. Guruda Banerjea, Nobogopal Mitra, Ganesh Chunder Chunda, and A.M. Bose.

97 Bagal, 36; Ananda Mohan Bose (1841–1906) was the leader of the Brahmo Samaj, a pioneer of the freedom movement, and an advocate of education and social reform in Bengal. Jogesh Chunder Dutt (1848–1909) attended Presidency College and University College, London. As well as serving in the Indian Civil Service, he was a successful barrister, lecturer and writer. Rashbihair Ghosh was the step-brother of Surendra Chandra Ghosh. He was educated in Bengal, graduating with a degree of Doctor of Laws in 1884. A moderate in politics, he worked throughout his life for both political and social reform.

98 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3d ser., vol. 242 (1878), col. 67; O'Donnell felt that the sanction was obtained improperly because Lytton misrepresented the urgency of the measure.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid.

than they hitherto given to Indian questions."\textsuperscript{102} Commenting on the attainment of 152 votes, the *Rast Gaftar* explained that the reason for the support was that Indian issues were becoming party issues and this fact boded well for India. Commenting on Lytton and the Act in general, Banerjea noted that

bad rulers are a blessing in disguise. They help to stir a community into life, a result that years of agitation would perhaps have failed to achieve. They call into being organized efforts which not only sweep away their bad measures, but create that public life and spirit which survives for all time to come.\textsuperscript{103}

Banerjea's observations were certainly true. The Vernacular Press Act was the catalyst of great change in India. Besides politically uniting middle class, urbanized India, the Act caused several changes within some aspects of the vernacular press. Some papers were created because of the Act, other papers changed their format so as to increase their chance of survival under the strict conditions, and some papers ceased to exist.

As a result of the creation of new papers, Madras was drawn into the political sphere of India. Prior to the arrival of Lytton, southern India "made no attempt to consolidate opinion in the Presidency nor did they devise steps to carry their agitation to England."\textsuperscript{104} After the Press Act, and in response to other harsh measures of Lytton, six young Brahmans in Madras created the *Hindu*.\textsuperscript{105} According to the founders, the paper was an attempt to fill the void caused by the lack of political associations in Madras. The men thought that "public feeling, not only politically and morally, but socially" was influenced by newspapers because "the community [was] bound however unconsciously to imbibe the spirit" of the journals that were read.\textsuperscript{106} The *Hindu* became, in the years following 1878, a fundamental component in drawing Madras into the nationalist movement.\textsuperscript{107}

As well as stimulating the founding of new papers, such as the *Hindu*, the Act caused other changes. The *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, for example, changed to an all English publication, freeing it from the restrictions and strict requirements of the native press. The *Sahachar* and *Shom Prakash* both ceased to exist because of the Act; the *Sahachar*’s editor refusing to pay the five hundred rupee bond demanded by the Police Commissioner of Calcutta. Fortunately for

\textsuperscript{102}India Office Library and Record, *Report on Native Papers for the Week Ending 10 August 1878 for Bombay, India*.
\textsuperscript{103}Banerjea, 59.
\textsuperscript{104}Sunthraralingam, 66.
\textsuperscript{105}Lytton's other policies that were considered harsh included the Indian Arms Act, which put restrictions on the ownership of weapons by Indians, the lowering of the age limit for the Indian Civil Service, the repeal of duties on British cotton goods and the subsequent License Tax that was passed in order to replace the revenue lost by the abolition of the duties. For an excellent discussion of the License tax, see Seal, 255.
\textsuperscript{106}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107}Ibid., 88.
the vernacular press, the Act had a short life.\textsuperscript{108}

In 1880, Gladstone returned for his second term as Prime Minister and appointed a new liberal Viceroy, Lord Ripon, to replace Lord Lytton. Almost immediately Ripon repealed the Vernacular Press Act, an action warmly welcomed by the native press.\textsuperscript{109}

The Vernacular Press Act played an important role in the unification of the Indian nationalist movement. In response to the Act, the press and the Indian Association made efforts to unify various parts of India, something that had up to that time never materialized. Seven years after the Indian Association's Calcutta meeting and subsequent debate in Parliament, the Indian National Congress was formed. Although it is proper to avoid "what if" questions in history, it must at least be considered that perhaps the founding of the Congress would have taken longer without the foundations laid in 1878.

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\textsuperscript{109}Barns, 293; Bagal, 48; Seal, 147; Roy, 748; Wolpert, 256; Prem Narain, "The Ethos Of," 77; T.O. Lloyd, \textit{The British Empire 1558–1983} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 231; the Act was officially repealed on 7 December 1881. The government claimed that in 1881 conditions no longer warranted restrictions on the press.
Arabs and Muslims in America: the Media Image

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As a nation of immigrants and a world power, the United States has had, in the twentieth century, a unique problem that few other countries in history have had to deal with. That problem is the issue of how to deal with one of our own ethnic groups when the U.S. is in conflict—either military or diplomatic—with their nation of origin. The classic example was the internment of Japanese-Americans on the West Coast during World War II due to the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Anger toward Japan was transferred to people of Japanese ancestry living in this country, about two-thirds of whom were citizens, and as a consequence, they were subjected to one of the most blatant violations of civil rights in American history.

For the past twenty to twenty-five years, another ethnic group and a religious group have also been subjected to prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination—Arab-Americans and Muslim-Americans. They have received predominantly negative coverage in the American news media, and have been portrayed stereotypically in political cartoons, movies, television programs and popular fiction. That stereotype generally describes Arabs or Muslims in the following ways: as rich oil sheiks, terrorists, people who are barbarous and uncultured, and men who lust for western women, especially blondes.¹

Why are Arabs and Muslims viewed in such negative terms? Edward Said has demonstrated that western culture has regarded the Islamic world as dangerous and threatening since the Early Middle Ages² but in the U.S. this negative image was dormant before World War II. Prior to the 1940s there were few Arabs or Muslims in this country, and American foreign policy gave scant attention to the Middle East, most of which was under British or French hegemony. But after the war the birth of Israel caught the attention of many Americans while the increasing significance of oil made the region vital to U.S. interests. As a consequence, the Middle East has received an enormous amount of coverage by the American news media in the last fifty years.

And unfortunately for Arab and Muslim-Americans, much of this coverage has put their compatriots in a bad light. Particularly since 1970, news from the Middle East has consistently shown Arabs and Muslims to be fanatics, terrorists, and filthy rich oil sheiks who enjoy watching Americans suffer in long gas lines. A list of major news stories from the region demonstrates the problem:

1970—PLO hijacks and destroys western airplanes in Jordan;
1972—PLO kidnaps and kills Israeli athletes at Munich Olympics;
1973-1981—OPEC oil boycott and price increases cause hardship for Americans;
1979-1981—Ayatollah Khomeini overthrows Shah and holds 52 Americans hostage at U.S. embassy;
1983—Shiite suicide bomber kills 240 Marines sleeping in barracks in Lebanon;
1985—PLO splinter group hijacks Achille Lauro cruise ship and kills American Leon Klinghoffer;
1986—U.S.-Libyan showdown results in bombing of Tripoli;
1980s—American hostages held by Hizbollah in Lebanon;
1990-1991—Iraqi invasion of Kuwait leads to Gulf War;
1996—Hamas suicide bombers endanger peace process.

All of these incidents portray Arabs and/or Muslims in an extremely negative light, and have been characterized that way by the American news media. In tandem with that fact, few world leaders over the past twenty-five years have been demonized in the media the way Ayatollah Khomeini (early 1980s), Muammar Qaddafi (mid-1980s) and Saddam Hussein (early 1990s) have been. Perhaps only Fidel Castro can equal or exceed their bad press. In contrast, the only Arab or Muslim leader to be lionized in America was Anwar Sadat, and that positive press only began after 1977, when he made his historic trip to Jerusalem.

Studies that have been done of coverage of major Middle Eastern news events by the U.S. media reveal an evolving perspective that is gradually becoming more balanced. Michael Suleiman examined and compared the reportage of the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1967 (Six-Day) War and the 1973 (Yom Kippur) War in six American magazines: Time, Newsweek, Life, The Nation, The New Republic and U.S. News and World Report plus the Sunday New York Times "Week in Review". He found that in 1956 coverage was heavily biased toward Israel, a tendency which became even more pronounced in 1967. But six years later the reporting was much more balanced, with a far greater effort made to explain the Arab side of the story.3

Studies of the media during more recent Middle East crises reveal a much more critical attitude toward Israel than had been previously demonstrated. The two best examples of this trend are media coverage of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and of the Intifada, the Palestinian rebellion in the West Bank and Gaza that began in late 1987. In both cases the print and electronic media devoted a considerable amount of space (or airtime) to Israeli misdeeds, indiscriminate bombing in Lebanon and human rights violations during the Intifada.

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These two events partially overturned the earlier image of Israel as a heroic David battling the Arab Goliath; if anything, it was Israel which now appeared to be the giant picking on a weaker opponent.4

Yet this more sympathetic view of Arabs and Muslims emerging in the 1980s did nothing to help Saddam Hussein when he invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Like Khomeini and Qaddafi before him, both of whom had directly challenged the United States, Saddam was subjected to a media blitz that demonized him and classified him as a new Hitler. One study claimed:

First the media reduced a complex geopolitical situation to the motives of Saddam Hussein. The media then relied on two caricatures to explain and interpret the conflict: Saddam Hussein was irrational and uncivilized, and Saddam Hussein was dangerous...To demonize Saddam the media simply retrieved standard anti-Arab stereotypes from popular culture.5

One interesting aspect of news media reportage on Middle Eastern issues is the changing image of PLO leader Yasir Arafat. In the 1970s and 1980s he was subjected to demonization as much as any other world figure, but so far in this decade he has received much more sympathetic treatment. While there seems to be considerable ambivalence in the media as to whether Arafat has really changed from terrorist to peacemaker, his recognition by both the American and Israeli governments has encouraged a more positive image. Whether this situation continues will be determined by events.

But if the news media have become less biased against Arabs and Muslims, the same cannot be said for the entertainment media. Studies of popular movies, television programs and literature have found that the images presented are almost always negative stereotypes. Films, which today reach much wider audiences than before due to video cassettes, are egregious examples.

Since the beginning of American cinema early in this century, Arabs have usually been presented as exotic and mysterious. One of the most popular and still famous silent movies was Rudolph Valentino’s “The Sheik,” while other well-known pre-World War II films with Middle Eastern themes were “The Thief of Baghdad” and “The Mummy.” But since the war, and particularly since the late 1960s, Arabs and/or Muslims have been commonly portrayed in


sinister guises, most often as terrorists.6

Some examples of popular movies with Arab or Muslim villains are “Black Sunday,” where Arab terrorists try to launch an attack during the Super Bowl; “Death Before Dishonor,” in which Marines battle terrorists; “Iron Eagle,” involving a rescue of an American kidnapped and held in an Islamic fundamentalist state; and “Not Without My Daughter,” the story of an American woman trying to get herself and her daughter away from her husband in Iran. In these films, Arab and Muslim characters are uniformly portrayed as evil, with no offsetting sympathetic portrayals offered.7

One of the most blatant examples of the “Arab/Muslim as terrorist” stereotype is the 1994 Arnold Schwarzenegger hit “True Lies.” The plot pits Arnie against a presumably Iranian terrorist group called Crimson Jihad, led by the thoroughly evil Aziz, who sets off a nuclear bomb, kidnaps the hero’s daughter and slaps women around at will. It was one of the biggest box office hits of that year.8

Even films that are perceived as presenting a positive image of Middle Eastern culture have reinforced stereotypes. Probably the two best-known movies about the region are “Lawrence of Arabia” and Disney’s “Aladdin.” Yet the former focused on the popular western image of the Arabs as desert nomads (less than 10% fall into that category) and presented them as helpless without their British advisor, historically inaccurate as it applies to the scenes in Damascus at the end of the movie.9

“Aladdin,” probably the most popular film ever made with a Middle Eastern theme, has been strongly criticized by Arab and Muslim organizations in this country. The strongest complaint was lodged over the lyrics in the opening song “Arabian Nights” which read: “Where they cut off your ear if they don’t like your face, it’s barbaric but hey, it’s home”.10 As a result of the criticisms, particularly from the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, before the movie’s video release those lyrics were revised to: “Where it’s flat and immense and the heat is intense”.11 But other complaints have not been addressed. The “good guys” — Aladdin, Princess Jasmine and the Genie, speak with American accents, while the “bad guys” have foreign accents and faces that match Arab

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stereotypes. Arab characters several times threaten to cut off people’s hands.\textsuperscript{12} While some of these complaints might appear trivial, for groups that are battling to change a harmful stereotype, they can be very damaging.

The most recent movie to draw the ire of Arab-Americans is “Father of the Bride II,” in which a character named Mr. Habib is the “bad guy”. He “speaks with a thick accent and uses mock Arabic language, is unscrupulous, cruel and shrewd”.\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Tampa Tribune} film critic Bob Ross described “Father...” as “inoffensive unless you are Arab-American”.\textsuperscript{14} As the ADC press release noted:

The main problem is not the depiction of an obnoxious Arab, but the absence of a balancing positive Arab character. To be fair, films that contain “bad” Arabs should make an effort to show balance by including positive Arab characters as well, as they do with most other ethnic and racial groups.\textsuperscript{15}

The television image of Arabs and Muslims appears to be similarly based on stereotypes. Jack Shaheen examined TV programs of all types from 1975 to 1983 and found approximately 200 that dealt with Arabs in some way or other. He found that four basic myths about Arabs were repeated time and again: “they are all fabulously wealthy; they are barbaric and uncultured; they are sex maniacs with a penchant for white slavery; and they revel in acts of terrorism”.\textsuperscript{16} He found action series such as cop or private detective dramas to be the worst perpetrators, while documentaries were generally the least biased.\textsuperscript{17} One producer admitted to Shaheen that it was “safe to stereotype Arabs because they lack a strong lobby—people who will speak up for them—in the television industry”.\textsuperscript{18} Whether this situation has changed is difficult to ascertain, for no follow up study to \textit{The TV Arab}, which was published in 1984, has thus far appeared.

In a similar vein, the view of Arabs and Muslims in popular literature has been studied by Janice Terry in a 1985 book. Her conclusions were not much different from Shaheen’s:

The preceding chapters demonstrate the pervasive negative character of the portrayal of Islam and Arabs throughout a wide variety of popular writing. These distorted images have been reiterated so frequently that they seem to reflect reality for many Westerners. The impact of these negative stereotypes has been particularly extensive because there are so few works in which the


\textsuperscript{14}Bob Ross, \textit{Tampa Tribune Friday Extra}, Mar. 15, 1995, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{15}ADC Action Alert.”

\textsuperscript{16}Shaheen, \textit{The TV Arab}, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{17}Shaheen, pp. 40-54; 83-112.

\textsuperscript{18}Shaheen, p. 64.
Arab world is depicted objectively, let alone favorably. Because there is almost no counterweight to this rendition of the Arab world and Islam, the average reader's perceptions of Arabs and Muslims are likely to be racially and religiously biased.\textsuperscript{19}

Terry focused on best-selling novels such as Leon Uris' *Exodus* and *The Haj* along with James A. Michener's *The Source*, all of which paint a very negative portrait of Arabs, particularly in contrast to Israelis who are viewed as heroic. The one well-known novel she found to present a balanced view of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was John le Carre's *Little Drummer Girl*, in which both characters on both sides were presented as human beings with strengths and flaws.\textsuperscript{20} As with television, follow up studies are needed to see if the situation has changed since the mid-1980s.

Still another field worthy of examination is the political cartoon, which straddles the borderline between news and entertainment. Those who have studied this aspect of the image of Arabs in the American media have come to the same conclusion: the cartoons are overwhelmingly negative, frequently vicious, and sometimes racist.\textsuperscript{21} One scholar noted that there are many similarities between the cartoon images of Arabs in the past twenty-five years and those of Jews in the period before World War II.\textsuperscript{22} These include scraggly beards and hooked noses, lust for both money and white women, and comparison to rats. Some examples are included with the text.

When one combines the image of Arabs and Muslims as presented in the news media, movies, television, popular literature and political cartoons, the impact is devastating. Lawrence Michalak has written:

\textit{...stereotyping of Arabs is pervasive in American popular culture and daily life, the Arab stereotype is overwhelmingly negative, and for some reason the norms of ethnic respect in America are not extended to Arabs. The result is that probably more than any other ethnic group, Arabs are maligned in American popular culture.}\textsuperscript{23}

Janice Terry commented:

The stereotyping of Arabs in popular literature has an effect on that portion of the public that reads such material. The same treatment in textbooks, television, newspapers, magazines, and films each has its own particular impact on


\textsuperscript{20}Terry, Ch. 2, 5, 6.


\textsuperscript{23}Michalak, p. 9 (first quote), 21 (second quote).
the public; in addition, however, each medium enhances the effect of the others. The constant repetition of these negative stereotypes of the Arabs and their culture reaches virtually every segment of the population.²⁴

And Jack Shaheen argued:

America’s bogeyman is the Arab. Until the nightly news brought us TV pictures of Palestinian boys being punched and beaten, almost all portraits of Arabs seen in America were dangerously threatening. Arabs were either billionaires or bombers—rarely victims. They were hardly ever seen as ordinary people practicing law, driving taxis, singing lullabies or healing the sick.²⁵

What impact do these stereotypes have? When the World Trade Center in New York was bombed by a small group of Muslim extremists in 1993, the only instance of Islamic terrorism on American soil, a preexisting image was reinforced. Yet David Koresh and the Branch Davidians in Waco, whose showdown with the FBI took place only a few months later, were not regarded as typical Christians, because most Americans are quite familiar with Christianity. While the Waco tragedy may have refurbished the negative image of extremist Christian sects, the World Trade Center attack, for many Americans, came to symbolize Islam in general.

And these stereotypes translate into anti-Arab and anti-Muslim violence, particularly in times of crisis. From March 1985 to June 1986, a period which witnessed hijackings of several airplanes and the Achille Lauro plus the confrontation with Qaddafi, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee recorded 48 anti-Arab incidents including four bombings and four cases of arson. Three people were killed and seventeen others injured in these attacks.²⁶ Then in 1991, the year of the Gulf War, the ADC noted 119 incidents of hate violence, which was then an all-time high.²⁷

Then came the April 1995 bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Immediately, “experts” in the news media suggested that Middle Eastern terrorists were responsible, despite the lack of any supporting evidence. Even though Timothy McVeigh, a white American militia member, was soon arrested and charged with the atrocity, the ADC reported 222 anti-Arab or -Muslim

²⁴Terry, p. 109.
²⁵Shaheen, Newsweek, Feb. 29, 1988, p. 10.
²⁷“Excerpts from the 1991 Report on Anti-Arab Hate Crimes,” American-Arab ADC. They stated that they used the Dept. of Justice definition of hate crimes: “aggravated assault, simple assault, intimidation, arson, vandalism, or destruction of property that are ‘motivated in whole or in part by bias and manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity”.”
incidents in the first four months after the attack.\textsuperscript{28} Fortunately, none resulted in death.

Since both the Arab and Muslim communities in this country are steadily growing in size, the danger for them will increase unless the prejudice and acts of discrimination against them are curtailed. And the two communities are by no means identical, although they do overlap to some degree. There are an estimated two to three million Arab-Americans today, but roughly half of them are Christian. Prior to the Second World War, the vast majority of Arab immigrants were Christians but since then, and particularly since the Immigration Act of 1965, Muslim Arabs have comprised the largest group entering the country.\textsuperscript{29}

The American Muslim Council, an organization formed in 1990, estimates that there are between four and six million American Muslims, a number that is growing rapidly due to both immigration and conversion. But only 12\% of them are Arab-Americans, who are just the third largest Muslim group here. Surprisingly, the biggest Muslim group (42\%) are African-Americans, the vast majority of whom are not recent immigrants. In second place come South Asians (Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis), who comprise 24\%.\textsuperscript{30} Consequently, the common perception that the words Arab and Muslim identify the same group is a false one.

Numerous racial and ethnic groups in this country have had to fight prejudice and discrimination against them. Blacks and Jews, to name two, have waged vigorous campaigns, with great success, to reduce the stereotyped images with which they were saddled. Today it is Arab and Muslim-Americans who must fight this battle. Until recently, their small numbers, lack of visibility, and poor organization have held back their efforts. Those problems are now being corrected and the battle is being joined.

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\textsuperscript{29}El-Badry.

\textsuperscript{30}"Muslims in America," \textit{CQ Researcher}, April 1993, pp. 362-383.
Bucknam Pasha:  
Ransford D. Bucknam and the Ottoman Navy, 1904–1909  

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On 30 May 1915, the Sunday edition of the New York Times reported the death of “Bucknam Pasha, an American citizen, who was formerly Rear Admiral in the Turkish Navy.”1 Bucknam Pasha, whose full name was Ransford D. Bucknam, had a short but extraordinary life. This one time cabin boy rose through the anonymous ranks of American merchant seamen to captain some of the most powerful steamships of his day, served as naval advisor to Sultan Abdul Hamid II, and owned extensive economic concessions throughout the Ottoman Empire.2

How did Bucknam, a man with no military training, become naval advisor to the Sultan? What influence did he have on the development of the Ottoman navy? Did his service in the Ottoman Empire have an impact on Ottoman-American relations?

Bucknam was born at Hantsport, Nova Scotia, in 1869 to Ezra and Isabella Bucknam. Soon after his birth, the family moved to Mount Desert, Maine, where Ezra, a seaman, found work. Ezra perished at sea when Bucknam was only four years old. The boy next lived for a short time with an uncle in Worcester, Massachusetts, and then spent several years with his grandfather in Winnipeg, Canada. Determined to become a sailor like his father, Bucknam left Canada at age fourteen. Traveling across the Midwest, he stopped in Duluth, Minnesota, where he found work as a cabin boy aboard one of the many steamers plying the waters of the Great Lakes. Captain Lewis Eliot, the commander of the steamer, befriended Bucknam and eventually adopted him.3

The security of Captain Eliot’s guidance did not last long, however. Bucknam left the Eliot’s home in Clayton, New York, for New York City and the sea. Once arrived in New York City, he found a position as the quartermaster of a schooner bound for the Philippines. When the schooner’s captain and mate died of cholera in Manila, Bucknam, who had studied navigation under Captain Eliot, took over command of the ship at age seventeen.4

Bucknam’s nautical skills and ambition accounted for his rapid advancement as a merchant sailor. Known as the “Boy Captain,” Bucknam, after his Pacific service, returned to the United States to captain steamships on the Great

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2Ibid.; I have used the English spelling for all Turkish names and terms.
Lakes. He eventually entered the employ of the American Steel Barge Company, whose owner, Alexander McDougall, invented the unique series of whaleback steamships. McDougall entrusted Bucknam with the supervision of the company’s fleet.5

Bucknam left McDougall’s company in 1895 to command the trials of newly constructed warships built by the William Cramp and Son’s Ship and Engine Building Company of Philadelphia. One of the most distinguished shipbuilding firms in the United States, “Cramps” built many of the warships for America’s new steel navy of the 1890s, including the ill-fated U.S.S. *Maine*, which Bucknam commanded during some of its initial trial runs.6

Although he would eventually return to Cramps, Bucknam left the company in 1901 to again command civilian steamships. He joined the Pacific Mail Steamship Company of Panama as captain of the *City of Peking*, which journeyed regularly to Japan and China. In 1902, Bucknam became superintendent for the above company in Panama City, Columbia, where he managed the company’s transshipment of goods across the Isthmus. A year later, he accepted a new offer from Cramps to resume his position as a trial commander. It was during his second employment at Cramps that Bucknam began his relationship with the Ottoman Empire.7

Cramps assigned Bucknam to command the trials of one of the company’s newest and most controversial warships, the cruiser *Medjidia*, a vessel Cramps was building for Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II. Before relating Bucknam’s association with the *Medjidia*, it is first important to understand the condition of Abdul Hamid’s navy at the turn of the century.8

The Ottoman navy of the 1890s was a pathetic shadow of the once mighty Turkish war fleets that had dominated Mediterranean waters during the sixteenth century. Abdul Hamid’s uncle, Sultan Abdul Aziz, had spent lavishly but indiscriminately on the navy, procuring a number of unneeded and impractical warships.9 Realizing that the survival of the empire depended primarily on a successful land defense, and attempting to economize in the wake of his spendthrift predecessor, Abdul Hamid gave precedence to the reform of the

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army at the expense of the navy during the first twenty years of his thirty-three year reign.\textsuperscript{10}

The neglect of the navy was so great that the fleet did not leave the confines of the Golden Horn until the Greco-Ottoman War of 1897, some nineteen years after its last engagement in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878. Given its long dereliction, the fleet’s dismal performance in the Greco-Ottoman War was hardly surprising. Those ships that could make it out of harbor, five ironclads and three torpedo boats, did so on 20 March 1897, passing in a fine revue before the cheering crowds of Constantinople. This display, however, proved to be more for public consumption rather than a demonstration of Ottoman naval prowess. The fleet barely managed to complete the short voyage across the Sea of Marmara to its new anchorage under the protective guns of the Dardanelles fortresses, where it remained for the duration of the conflict.\textsuperscript{11}

With his fleet an international embarrassment, Abdul Hamid decided to endorse a naval modernization program. In May 1897, four months before the end of the war with Greece, a naval commission recommended the modernization of the existing ironclads and the construction of six new warships in foreign ports. The frugal Sultan undertook a complex series of negotiations with foreign governments and shipbuilders with the intention of obtaining the warships at the lowest possible cost. Abdul Hamid parcelled out the modernization of his fleet to British, Italian, French, German, and American shipbuilding companies. His contract with the American company, Cramps, for the construction of a cruiser was intertwined with a long outstanding diplomatic dispute between the Ottoman Empire and the United States. The background to this dispute and its resolution are important elements in the story of the Medjidia.\textsuperscript{12}

The Ottoman Empire’s relationship with the United States was strained by 1900. While it is true that the two nations had never had close ties, they had enjoyed a mostly amicable commercial association since the signing of the first Ottoman-American treaty in 1830. In addition, individual Americans had long been involved in Ottoman naval affairs. Sultan Mahmud II purchased the corvette, the United States, and employed its builder, Henry Eckford, in a new naval construction program following the destruction of the Ottoman fleet at Navarino in 1827.\textsuperscript{13}

This mutually beneficial relationship continued during the American Civil War when Sultan Abdul Aziz told the United States that he would prevent the outfitting of Confederate privateers in the Ottoman empire. In 1895, however,


\textsuperscript{11}Langensiepen and Guleryuz, The Ottoman Steam Navy, pp. 8–9.

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., pp. 9–10; Oscar S. Straus, Under Four Administrations: From Cleveland to Taft (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1922), pp. 141–142.

relations suffered when the United States demanded that the Ottoman government pay an indemnity of $84,519 for losses of property suffered by American missionaries during the Armenian massacres of that year. Since "most Americans knew the Sultan and his subjects only through the letters, lectures, and reports of Protestant missionaries," popular outrage against "the Turk" for the destruction of missionary property, and genuine sympathy for the plight of the Armenians poured forth from the United States. 14 Although the cost of the property damage was relatively small, the political influence of the missionary lobby in Washington was great. Successive American administrations called on the Ottoman empire to make restitution and ordered the American Minister in Constantinople to "get that Armenian indemnity." 15

Abdul Hamid refused to recognize the American claims for several years. The Sultan, always suspicious of the missionaries, believed they provided aid and comfort to their fellow Christians, the Armenians. Furthermore, he knew that if he acquiesced to the American claims he would have to pay the British, French, Germans, and Italians, who had all made similar indemnity demands. Abdul Hamid had still not acknowledged the American claims as late as October 1898, when Oscar S. Straus, the newly appointed American Minister to Turkey, assumed his post in Constantinople. 16

Straus reopened the indemnity question and surprisingly, he soon met with some success. On 9 December 1898 he learned that the Sultan had agreed to settle the American claims. Why had Abdul Hamid finally changed his mind? He most likely recognized the changed strategic relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the United States resulting from the later's recent victory over Spain. The United States was now a world power whose navy could strike its enemies at most points around the globe. The Sultan, "a skilled master of diplomacy," decided that a more accommodating approach to the United States on the indemnity issue was warranted in order to avoid a more serious crisis with the Americans in the future. 17

However, if he was going to pay the United States for the sake of better Ottoman-American relations, Abdul Hamid was also determined that his empire would profit from the indemnity issue. He decided to tie the American indemnity to his own plans for naval reform. The Sultan informed Minister Straus that the indemnity would be paid upon the signing of a contract between the Otto-

17Enclosure of letter from Straus to Tewfik Pasha, 16 December 1899, Despatches; John David Hymes, Jr., "The Contribution of Dr. George Washburn to World Opinion and Relations Towards the Ottoman Empire, 1859–1903" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973), p. 240.
man Empire and an American shipbuilding firm for the construction of a cruiser for the Ottoman navy. Abdul Hamid hoped to hide the indemnity payment in the price of the cruiser. By placing the indemnity "behind a screen," the Sultan hoped to avoid official admission of his government's responsibility for the losses of American property, thereby avoiding a loss of face and the renewal of European indemnity claims that would surely follow any public indemnity payment to the Americans. 18

What followed the Sultan's initial acceptance of the American claims was an excruciatingly slow negotiating process. Almost a year after his initial proposal, Abdul Hamid, on 22 December 1899, informed Minister Straus that he had decided, after consultations with his Minister of Marine, Hassan Pasha, to contract with Cramps for the construction of a cruiser. Given the interminable delays they had already suffered, the Americans were suspicious that the Sultan had no intention of actually buying a cruiser. Was he using the cruiser proposal as a way to merely put off paying the indemnity? The McKinley administration, in the person of Secretary of State John Hay, did not instruct its legation in Constantinople to accept the Sultan's cruiser scheme until 24 April 1900. 19

This reluctance was well founded as it took eight more months of delays, negotiations, and finally the visit of an American battleship, the U.S.S. Kentucky, in December 1900 before the Ottoman government and Cramps signed the cruiser contract on Christmas Day of the same year. The contract stipulated that the Ottoman government would pay Cramps 333,962 pounds for the construction of a cruiser. Cramps would give 19,000 pounds of the first 100,000 pound installment of the contract to the United States for payment of the missionary indemnity. Unfortunately, Ottoman financial difficulties created several more months of delay before the Sultan finally paid the first installment of the contract to Cramps in May 1901. The United States officially recognized Ottoman payment of the indemnity on 10 July. 20

Cramps began construction of the cruiser, Medjidia, on 7 November 1901. The company launched the Medjidia with great fanfare before an assembly of American and Ottoman officials, diplomats, and naval officers at Philadelphia on 25 July 1903.

With a displacement of 3485 tons and a length of 331.25 feet, the steam powered, steel hulled Medjidia carried a complement of 22 officers and 280 men. The cruiser's armament, which would be installed later, consisted of two 6-inch,

18 Straus to Hay, 16 October 1899, Despatches; Straus, Under Four Administrations, p. 141.
19 Enclosure of letter from Straus to Tewfik Pasha, 16 December 1899, Despatches; Griscom, Diplomatically Speaking, p. 162; Griscom to Hay, 26 April 1900, Despatches.
eight 4.7 inch, six 3 pound, and six 7 pound rapid firing guns. Additional weapons included one 3-inch field gun, and two torpedo tubes equipped with 14-inch Whitehead torpedoes.²¹

The Medjidia was commissioned into Ottoman service on 19 December 1903. On the following day, Bucknam commanded the cruiser during its first trial. The trial, carried out in Chesapeake Bay over a one mile course, “proved to be a success in every way.”²² A swift vessel, the Medjidia sustained a speed of 22.28 knots during a one hour trial and later cruised at 20 knots during a six hour trial. Although the ship performed well during its early trial runs, once in Ottoman service, the Medjidia was a disappointment.²³

The cruiser suffered frequent instability problems up to the First World War, when German naval advisors directed the repair of the ship after discovering that the boilers had been incorrectly situated during construction. While Cramps built the vessel, it seems that the Ottoman naval supervisors, who were appointed to watch over the construction, proved “totally inadequate.”²⁴ Despite these problems, the Medjidia performed extended service in both the Ottoman and Turkish navies. The cruiser saw duty in the Italo-Ottoman War (1911–1912), the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), the First World War (1914–1918), and served as a cadet training vessel from 1918 to 1947. Decommissioned in the later year, the Medjidia was finally scrapped in 1952.²⁵

Bucknam’s trial experience led to the Ottomans’ appointment of him to be the cruiser’s captain during its voyage from the United States to Constantinople in April 1904. As Bucknam was the most experienced commander of the Medjidia, his continued service was important for the cruiser’s early operational period. Therefore, upon the ship’s arrival in Turkey, the Ottoman government asked Bucknam, now age thirty-five, to remain in the Sultan’s employ as captain of the Medjidia on a salary of 150 pounds a month. Bucknam agreed to the offer.²⁶

The Sultan met Bucknam soon after the latter’s arrival in Constantinople. On 4 July 1904, Bucknam held an American Independence Day celebration on board the Medjidia. Despite an imperial edict outlawing unauthorized firings of cannons and loud celebrations in Constantinople, Bucknam proceeded to announce the Fourth by shooting fireworks off the deck of the cruiser and firing a cannonade from the ship’s guns that shook the windows of the Sultan’s residence at Yildiz Palace! Curious to see this insolent American for himself, Abdul Hamid summoned Bucknam to his presence. The Sultan was so im-

²³Ibid.
²⁴Langensiepen and Guleryuz, The Ottoman Steam Navy, p. 11; p. 15.
²⁵Ibid., pp. 18–25; p. 149.
²⁶Leishman to Hay, 2 May 1904, Despatches, Roll 74, vol. 76.
pressed with Bucknam that he asked the sailor to become his personal naval advisor, a position that Bucknam immediately accepted.27

Abdul Hamid’s respect for Bucknam increased after Bucknam’s actions during an attempted assassination of the Sultan. Although he rarely left Yildiz Palace because he feared assassination, the Sultan attended prayers near the palace every Friday at the Hamidieh Mosque as part of the weekly Selamlik (grand review) ceremony. On Friday, 21 July 1905, just as he was walking down the stairs of Hamidieh Mosque for his return journey to the palace, a bomb exploded only thirty yards from Abdul Hamid.28

Bucknam, who was attending the ceremony as part of the Sultan’s entourage, stood near the spot where the bomb went off. While he was not hurt, the explosion split open the head of the man standing to his right, and flying debris sliced off the hands of the man on his left. In the resulting confusion, Bucknam saw an uninjured Abdul Hamid descend the mosque stairs to his awaiting carriage. Concerned that the assassins might attempt to rush the Sultan, Bucknam drew his sword and “cried out that he would behead any unauthorized person who dared approach the imperial carriage.”29 Impressed by the American’s courage, Abdul Hamid called Bucknam to his side and instructed him to investigate the attack and report his findings to the police.30

The Sultan never forgot this act of loyalty. Bucknam, in addition to his position as naval advisor, became a personal friend of Abdul Hamid, who often invited Bucknam to dine with him at Yildiz, decorated him with the Order of Osmanieh, made him a Rear Admiral, and awarded him valuable economic concessions in the empire. As his stature with the Sultan rose, Bucknam became a much sought after guest among Ottoman and foreign dignitaries in Constantinople. He repaid the Sultan’s generosity with liberal words of praise. When asked about the character of Abdul Hamid, who was known abroad as the “Red Sultan” or “Abdul the Damned” for his slaughter of the Armenians, Bucknam protested that the Sultan was “not responsible for all the wrong that had been done in his name.”31 On the contrary, Bucknam found Abdul Hamid “gentle, extremely courteous, considerate, intelligent, and kind-hearted.”32

What were the personal characteristics of Bucknam as he began his service with the Sultan? Standing approximately 5’8" and weighing around 170 pounds, Bucknam was broad shouldered and solidly built. His face was moon

30Ibid.
shaped and set with a thick nose, dark eyes, thick black eyebrows, and topped by a head of close cropped dark hair. Contemporaries of Bucknam invariably described him as a determined, honest, and bluff personality. A man, who, at the same time, was outgoing, jovial, and always willing to provide an amusing story. An inveterate socializer, Bucknam could usually be found at noon on most days of the week, sitting at a table in the Constantinople Club, enjoying one of his famous “Bucknam cocktails.”

Bucknam, however, did not let his fun interfere with his obligations to the Sultan. Confident in the abilities of “Bucknam Pasha,” Abdul Hamid sought his help in the completion of the Ottoman naval modernization program. Although the program began in 1897, the reconstruction of several of the old ironclads was still unfinished in 1906. Bucknam looked into the matter. He discovered that the reconstruction of one of the ironclads, the Assari Tewfik, was costing, after six years of repairs, much more than the vessel was worth. The reconstruction was the responsibility of Germania Werft, a German firm in Kiel. Bucknam asked the Sultan’s permission to travel to Kiel himself in order to sort out the matter and bring the ship back to Constantinople.

Upon his arrival in Kiel, Bucknam discovered that the reconstruction of the Assari Tewfik was far from complete. The ship was in no condition to leave the dock as the Germans had stolen all her movable parts. An outraged Bucknam hunted down most of the missing components and supervised the finishing repairs. After making the vessel seaworthy, Bucknam, who was preparing to leave Germany, was savagely assaulted at the docks one night by a group of angry German shipworkers, who were now unemployed due to Bucknam’s interference with their “work” on the Assari Tewfik. The knife bearing assailants stabbed him dozens of times. Left for dead, Bucknam survived the attack, but he could not leave the hospital for six weeks. After he had recovered sufficiently, he steamed the reconstructed Assari Tewfik back to Constantinople on 19 November 1906.

Bucknam continued to advise the Sultan on naval matters until the Young Turks deposed Abdul Hamid on 26 April 1909. His unyielding loyalty to the Sultan brought Bucknam disfavor with the new regime. The Young Turks insisted that he renounce his American citizenship and become a Turkish subject. Bucknam refused, and in 1909 the Young Turks released him from Otto-

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35Ibid.
man service; however, he was allowed to retain his rank of Rear Admiral.36

Briefly despondent over this setback, Bucknam returned to the United States in 1910. He soon regained his usual optimism, however, and determined to return to Constantinople to settle his differences with the Young Turks. While he never returned to his former position of authority in the Ottoman navy, Bucknam must have repaired his relations with the Young Turks as he did return to Constantinople by 1912. He resided there for the remaining years of his life with his wife Rose, formerly Rose Thayer, an American whom he had married while in Philadelphia in 1904. Bucknam may have even returned to active naval duty for the Turks during the Italo-Ottoman War in 1912 as there was a report that he conducted gun running to the Ottoman troops fighting in Tripoli.37

Unfortunately, the Ottoman Empire’s continuing financial crisis prevented any significant reformation of its navy. The navy could do little more in the war against the Italians than defend the Dardanelles from a possible attack by the Italian fleet. This unaggressive trend continued during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913; with the exception, however, of the Medjidia’s sistership, the Hamidieh, which conducted an eight month raiding cruise in the Aegean, Mediterranean and Red Sea from 14 January 1913 to 7 September 1913.38

The commander of the Hamidieh, Hussein Rauf, was something of a protege of Bucknam’s. As a young officer in Abdul Hamid’s navy, Rauf, who spoke excellent English, served as Bucknam’s aide for several years and received training in naval tactics during several trips to the United States. Bucknam accompanied him on one of those trips during which President Theodore Roosevelt received them at the White House. The president was so impressed by Rauf that he told Bucknam: “If they are all like this fellow you will soon have a navy over there.”39

During Rauf’s exploits with the Hamidieh, Bucknam, who was once again associated with the Ottoman government through his business ventures in Turkey, accompanied the Ottoman delegation to the London Peace Conference in 1913, a conference held in order to resolve the latest Balkan war. While in London, Bucknam recounted for reporters his impressions of the Hamidieh’s cruise, which he enthusiastically proclaimed was “the greatest feat in modern

36 For the fall of Abdul Hamid see Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 2, pp. 279–282; “Where Is Bucknam Turkish Admiral?,” New York Times, 14 October 1911, sec. 1, p. 3.
38 Langensiepen and Guleryuz, The Ottoman Steam Navy, pp. 15–16; pp. 25–27.
Ransford D. Bucknam and the Ottoman Navy, 1904–1909

naval warfare." He was also optimistic about the future of the Ottoman Empire which he believed would be brighter once the Turks turned their attentions to investing in their Asian territories; they no longer had to concentrate on the Balkans having lost most of their remaining territory there during the present conflict.41

Bucknam’s vision of the Ottoman future was undoubtedly tinged with a great deal of self-interest. Known in Constantinople as a man “ready for anything which would bring in money,” he was essentially a businessman by 1913 seeking backers for investments in rail, mining, and oil concessions throughout the empire.42 Four years earlier, in January 1909, several months after the Young Turk takeover but before the ouster of Abdul Hamid, Bucknam extolled the Ottoman Empire’s huge potential for economic growth in an interview for the New York Times:

There are unworked coal mines on the Sea of Marmora and petroleum properties in European Turkey as well as in Asia Minor. The Government has already drafted projects for more than 3,000 miles of railways which it wants to put through the richest section of the empire. But everywhere throughout the country railways, telegraphs, irrigation systems, and harbor and river improvements are awaiting the engineer and financier. Turkey herself being for the moment unable to make the improvements she desires.43

He was also excited about business opportunities for Americans in Turkey: “The Turks want to break away from the tutelage of European countries; and America, because she has no territorial ambition, is in an excellent position to get in there.”44

Especially interested in obtaining oil concessions in Turkey, Bucknam eventually acquired a total of some 165,000 acres of “oil land” along the Sea of Marmara, on the shore of Lake Van, and on the Black Sea coast near Trebizond. But the insecure political environment in the Ottoman Empire, and the country’s large foreign debt discouraged the foreign investment that was essential for long range economic development such as oil wells. Turkey did not develop its oil potential until after the First World War.45

The Ottoman Empire’s entry into that conflict on 5 November 1914 must have been extremely distressing to Bucknam. He had invested the last ten years of his life working to improve the Ottoman navy and economy. While there is


44Ibid.

no doubt that Bucknam sought to profit from his association with Turkey, he had made a life in that country and called Constantinople home. All of these achievements were now threatened by a war which the Ottoman Empire was unlikely to win given the vast alliance of Britain, France, and Russia arrayed against it. Furthermore, as an American, Bucknam must have worried about the potential for his native land’s entry into the war.

These anxieties most likely contributed to Bucknam’s untimely death “after several weeks of illness” on 27 May 1915.\textsuperscript{46} The next day, as the world’s attention focused on the battle raging along the shores of Gallipoli, members of the American colony buried Bucknam under the soil of Constantinople.\textsuperscript{47}

What was Bucknam’s historical contribution? His non-military background and the paltry naval resources of the Ottoman Empire, despite Abdul Hamid’s naval construction program, prevented his having a major impact on Ottoman naval history. His rise from obscurity to a prominent, although briefly held, position of influence in the Ottoman Empire could be written off as a combination of luck, opportunism, and self-promotion, all characteristics which he possessed in abundance.

Bucknam’s real success, however, lies in his tireless promotion of Turkish-American relations. Following the Armenian massacres of the 1890s, many Americans viewed the Ottoman Empire as a repulsive, backward, and despotic land. Bucknam, through his naval and business contacts, tried to change this negative American perception. Although initially out of favor in the empire after the Young Turk’s ouster of Abdul Hamid in 1909, Bucknam’s persistence, charisma, and undoubted nautical expertise allowed him to maintain important contacts in the new Turkish government. His endorsement and support for pro-American Turks like Hussein Rauf, who later played a significant role in the politics of the Turkish republic, contributed to the generally favorable Turkish attitude towards the United States after the First World War. While remaining steadfastly American, Bucknam nevertheless strove to improve the international position of his adopted country.

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\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.