Published in memory of Dr. Thomas (Tom) M. Campbell, the driving force behind the creation of the Florida Conference of Historians.
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Thomas M. Campbell Award

Beginning with Volumes 6/7, the Florida Conference of Historians has presented the Thomas M. Campbell Award for the best paper published in the Annual Proceedings (now Annals) of that year.

Thomas M. (Tom) Campbell was the driving force behind the creation of the Florida Conference of Historians, at that time called The Florida College Teachers of History, over 40 years ago. It was his personality and hard work that kept the conference moving forward. Simply put, in those early years he was the conference.

Tom was a professor of U.S. Diplomatic history at Florida State University. The Thomas M. Campbell Award is in his name so that we may recognize and remember his efforts on behalf of the Florida Conference of Historians

Recipients

2020: Charles Closmann, University of North Florida (co-recipient)
2020: Rowena J-M. H. Múzquiz, St. Vincent de Paul Regional Seminary (co-recipient)
2019: Steven Nicklas and Jonas Kauffeldt, University of North Georgia
2018: Javiera N. Reyes-Navarro, Independent Scholar
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2005: David Michel, Ph.D., Chicago Theological Seminary
2004: Robert L. Shearer, Ph.D., Florida Institute of Technology
2002-3: J. Calvitt Clarke III, Ph.D., Jacksonville University
2000-1: J. Calvitt Clarke III, Ph.D., Jacksonville University
Blaine T. Browne Award

Beginning with the current volume, the Florida Conference of Historians will present the Blaine T. Browne Award, given to the best paper written by a graduate student who presents at the annual meeting and publishes in the Annals.

Dr. Browne earned a doctorate in American history at the University of Oklahoma in 1985. He subsequently taught at several universities and colleges before joining the faculty at Broward College in 1988. An active participant in the Florida Conference of Historians since 1994, Dr. Browne has presented at annual meetings and published in the Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians, the predecessor of the Annals. Now retired from Broward College, in 2014 Dr. Browne generously provided the seed money for this award.

Recipients

2020: Douglas Benner, University of South Florida
2019: Colin Cook, University of Central Florida
2018: Colin Cook, University of Central Florida
2017: Brad Massey, Polk State College and University of Florida
2016: Khali I. Navarro, University of Central Florida
2015: Jenny Smith, Valdosta State University

J. Calvitt Clarke III Award

Beginning with volume 20, the Florida Conference of Historians has presented the J. Calvitt Clarke III Award for the best undergraduate research paper published in the Annals.

In 2012, Dr. Clarke, Professor Emeritus at Jacksonville University and a strong supporter of undergraduate research, graciously provided the seed funding for this important award. He is a frequent contributor and the founding editor of the predecessor to the Annals, the Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians.

Recipients

2020: Marianna Kellis, University of Central Florida
2019: Jeffrey Coltman-Cormier, Florida Atlantic University
2018: John Lancaster, University of Central Florida
2017: Frankie Bauer, Middle Georgia State University
2016: Nicole Kana Hummel, New College of Florida
2015: Tyler Campbell, University of Central Florida
2014: Michael Rodriguez, Florida Gulf Coast University
2013: Amy Denise Jackson, Wesleyan College
A Note from the Editor

The present volume (27) includes articles presented at the 59th Annual Meeting of the Florida Conference of Historians, hosted by New College of Sarasota, February 22-23, 2019. With this volume we also welcome Patricia L. Farless as Associate Editor. Ms. Farless is Senior Instructor at the University of Central Florida, and is a longtime contributor to the editorial process of the journal. She has taken the new position with the *Annals* as part of our effort to expand publication of the best papers presented by undergraduate students at the Annual Meeting. This year the selected undergraduate papers will be published in an online *Supplement to Volume 27*, and we are endeavoring to make it a stand-alone publication for future volumes. It is hoped that these changes will encourage even greater participation in the Conference by talented undergraduates, and raise the quality of the publication. Congratulations to this year’s recipient of the J. Calvitt Clarke III Award for the best undergraduate paper presented at the Annual Meeting and published in the *Annals*, Marianna Kellis, University of Central Florida, for “The Influence of the Boston *Pilot* on Irish-Catholic Immigrants During the Civil War.”

Contributions from professional scholars, graduate students, and independent scholars in the present volume include the co-recipients of the Thomas M. Campbell Award for the best paper presented at the Annual Meeting and published in the *Annals*: Rowena J-M. H. Múzquiz, St. Vincent de Paul Regional Seminary, for “Perceptions and Interpretations: Intersections of Crises and Fears in Fifteenth-Century Spain,” and Charles Closmann, University of North Florida, for “‘Feeling the Burn’: Camp Blanding, Florida and the U.S. Military’s Role in Forest Ecology, 1980s to 2010.” Congratulations to Douglas Benner, University of South Florida, the recipient of the Blaine T. Browne Award for the best paper presented by a graduate student at the Annual Meeting and published in the *Annals*, “Slave Resistance and the Secession Crisis in the Deep South.” The remaining contributions, as always, cover a wide variety of historical topics and geographical regions, including the United States, the ancient Near East, and Great Britain. I will let the topics speak for themselves.

Michael S. Cole
19 January 2021
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Perceptions and Interpretations:
Intersections of Crises and Fears in Fifteenth-Century Spain

Rowena J-M. H. Múzquiz
St. Vincent de Paul Regional Seminary

Introduction

As scholars of history, we have one foot in the past and one foot in the present. Each of us is essentially an intellectual Colossus of Rhodes. We stand across the gap of time. And we attempt to cross that gap, in both directions, on a somewhat precarious bridge made of documents and artifacts. Sometimes we succeed; sometimes we fall short. But generally, we seek to learn lessons. The most important lesson we can learn is how to understand people who dwelt in the past, people very much like ourselves and very different from us. The past may be an alien land. Yet if we peek into the past and meet the people who have left their mark in some way, big or small, we individually and collectively benefit from the experience; the well-worn adage that travel is the best way to learn is substantiated. When our journey takes us to fifteenth-century Spain, we find a complex society in a multi-cultural context that challenges us to understand how they perceive crises, what fears result from those crises, and how they resolve the challenges of crises. And when the crises are focused on subsistence, the wide range of emotions reflected in our material become palpable.

When responsible scholars study the medieval past, we must become aware of our modern filters and attempt to understand the people of that time and place on their own terms, through their own words, and appreciate their own monuments which reflect what was important to them. But we also have the advantage of identifying with them as people, and we may reach reasoned conclusions drawn from that common ground as well; these may lead in turn to further research, or to contemporary application of examined concepts. Thus, we may develop empathy for others, regardless of the time in which they lived. Real empathy is sorely lacking in our contemporary culture. This article was inspired in part by my efforts to make my students aware of those who preceded them, and to encourage in them deeper understanding and a certain degree of empathy toward others.

In this study, crises are defined and differentiated from the perspectives of contemporaries, rather than from a theoretical model or artificial construct of crisis. Thus, the terminology which frames appeals for help, and responsive aid, contextualizes the analysis. The severity of individual crises, or compound crisis situations, may be corroborated by assessment of available statistics. But urgency is gauged through the voices of Seville’s residents and their governing bodies, both municipal and royal.
The framework for this paper is chiefly qualitative, and the emphasis is on lived experiences and how we may access those experiences. I accent the affective: relating to, arising from, or influencing feelings or emotions, analyzing material that contains emotional as well as statistical information. Yes, I am asking: how were the people of Seville affected during the crises they experienced during the fifteenth century? How did they feel about the people, events, or circumstances that threatened them? About the individual human beings and formal institutions that came to the aid of the needy? And what materials enable us to investigate this topic and come to reasoned conclusions of some value? My sources include chronicles, letters, city council petitions, notarial records, fiscal accounts, and royal grants.

Keeping in mind Caroline Bynum’s comment at the opening of her Jefferson Lecture in Washington, D.C. in 1999: “Without change there is no story,” I examine three different episodes in the second half of the fifteenth century in Seville, contextualized within a frame of political crises, to illustrate the changes that took place in the city and its region in response to subsistence crises. The methods and institutions developed to respond to crises improved the quality of life for the city’s residents and served as models for subsequent crisis response. Two groups are highlighted in this study, because of their roles as crisis responders: the foreigner (especially the Italians, and particularly the Genoese) and the Church (in proximity, the friars at La Cartuja; by extension the Archdiocese of Seville, and ultimately Christian doctrine and practices regarding poverty).

The story begins during the troubled reign of Enrique IV, when frontier security was a major issue because of recurring warfare between the Kingdom of Castile and Granada (the last Muslim kingdom in the peninsula), and in the midst of a feud between the noble houses of Medina-Sidonia and Arcos. Persistent threats across the frontier created a climate of vulnerability for the people of Seville, especially because of the weakness of Castile’s central government. Both friend and foe had the same perception, for Alonso de Palencia tells us that in 1462, the king of Granada, “knowing the sloth and the bad government of the King Don Enrique (IV), and the lack of [military] preparedness in Andalucia, gathered a large army.”

Failure to pay the troops on the frontier exacerbated the situation, and those charged with defense of the Christian realm were unable to block a Muslim army’s strike through the town of Osuna. The counterattack led by Don Rodrigo Ponce

1 The first known use of affective, in this sense, dates from the 15th century (Oxford). For a useful review of how historians have treated the study of emotions, see Barbara H. Rosenwein, “Worrying about Emotions in History,” American Historical Review 107 (2002): 821-45.

2 Archivo Municipal de Sevilla [AMS]: Section X: Actas Capitulares, Section XV: Papeles de Mayordomazgo, Section XVI: Diversos; the Protocolos Notariales of Seville; several fifteenth-century chronicles from Seville and from Castille; El libro de los privilegios concedidos a los mercaderes genoveses establecidos en Sevilla located in the Archivo de Simancas; and the collection of documents in Cuartero y Huerta’s Historia de la Cartuja de Santa María de las Cuevas, de Sevilla, y de su filial de Cazalla de la Sierra.

3 “El Rey de Granada (dice Alonso de Palencia) conociendo la pereza, é mala gobernacion del Rey Don Enrique, é la poca guarda que en Andalucia se hacía, junto muy grandes gentes, . . .” Diego Ortiz de Zuñiga, Anales Eclesiásticos y Seculares de la Muy Noble y Muy Leal Ciudad de Sevilla, t. III (Madrid, 1796): 19.

4 Ortiz de Zuñiga, t. III: 20.
de León, son of the Count of Arcos, met with some success. But subsequent maneuvers effectively reignited the feud between the Count of Arcos and the Duke of Medina-Sidonia, which had lain dormant for a time, and the frontier army was divided between the two commanders. Although successful in capturing Gibraltar, the House of Arcos vs. the House of Medina-Sidonia would affect the kingdom, and especially Seville, at political, social, and economic levels for some time.\(^5\)

The enmity between these two noble houses seemed to encourage other lineages to nurse old wounds and create new rivalries. Powerful families raised several defense towers in Seville, what William I of England would have called adulterine castles. Factional strife engendered conflict and insecurity in the city as the battle for control of resources and authority continued. By the 1470s, we see an even greater conflict between noble houses in Seville (old nobility vs. new lineages), and the new monarchs, Fernando and Isabel (Los Reyes Católicos) are forced to take action.\(^6\) All of western Andalucía was affected by this tumult, between 1471 and 1474.

**Grain Crises and Terminology**

The subsistence crises of fifteenth-century Seville occurred along a spectrum of both natural and man-made circumstances: drought, flooding, earthquakes, snow, solar eclipse, epidemic disease, fire, heavy storms; and on one occasion the portentous moment when two wolves came running through the city in broad daylight, dashing first into the church of Santa Catalina (very close to the location of the expanding alhóndiga, a grain redistribution market) and then into the church of San Pedro before one escaped capture but the other was killed and his head delivered to the duke! Of that dramatic event, in early 1472 just following the second peace accord between the duke and the Marques of Cádiz, Alonso de Palencia remarks: “and of that sign, diverse declarations were made.”\(^7\) Was this an ill omen, or a precursor to miraculous intervention? It was not just one wolf, but two, and each met a very different fate. The threat represented by the wolf unleashed on peasants by a powerful, angry noble could not have been missed by witnesses to this unusual sighting. And the peace accord just reached would have been well known throughout the city of Seville and its hinterland. One cannot help

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\(^5\) The ongoing conflict cost both these nobles dearly: the duke lost his tenancy for the castle at Gibraltar; the count lost the fame and honor of having won the victory; but Alonso de Arcos found his place of rest in a chapel in the church of La Cartuja de Sevilla (Carmelite monastery) to which he left an endowment in his will. His epitaph: "Aquí yaze sepultado el hondrado cavallero Alonso de Arcos, Alcaide de Tarifa, que gano a Gibraltar de los enemigos de nuestra santa fe, fallecio en el año de 1477. Fue bienhechor de esta casa, rueguen a Dios por el." Ortiz de Zúñiga, t. III: 23.


\(^7\) Ortiz de Zúñiga, t. III: 57.
but be reminded of the “pet” wolf of Count Robert of Artois, encoded messages, and the assertion of power.\textsuperscript{8} Political factors, including the feuding noble houses, either deliberately or inadvertently cut off the city from its productive hinterland and compounded the crises.

The vocabulary of crisis is not limited to a simple assessment of inventory. Contemporaries were not just counting sacks of grain, recording a tally and leaving it at that. Instead, whether in the narrative text of account sheets or in their margins, they tell us how bad things may have been getting. \textit{Carestia} usually refers to serious need or dearth of grain, often accompanied by a rise in prices; grain thus becomes dear. Several terms and phrases emerge in petitions to the city, crown, or Church, representing combinations of crisis factors; this is when notations on pestilence often appear.\textsuperscript{9} \textit{Falta de trigo} can mean scarcity, privation, or shortage of grain, while \textit{hambre} denotes a great hunger, starvation or famine. It is worth noting that famine is a collective problem, while starvation is an individual fate.\textsuperscript{10} The intensity of the terms used in different contexts helps us to determine which is the foremost concern of the record keeper and gives us some idea of the emotional dimensions of the event.

The expression \textit{mengua de pan}, usually found in tax collection documents, refers to a lack or poverty of grain, a decrease or diminution, which affected collection of these tributes; specific, indirect taxes were then said to be \textit{quebrantados} (broken or suffering losses).\textsuperscript{11} In the account documents generally, we read about the need for \textit{pan}, or grain and grain products in general in Castile, including flour, baked bread, and even seed grain. Pan most often is used to refer to wheat specifically, and in crisis years that was the grain automatically assumed in dearth unless otherwise specified. Aside from the natural factors affecting the availability of grain and access to the stores, Seville had to maneuver around diverse claims on its grain from castle garrisons, armies summoned to battle, and others dependent on the monarchs for at least a portion of their maintenance.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{9}Pestilençia carries multiple meanings, with the association \textit{peste} directly referring to the plague. Pestilençia and peste are sometimes used interchangeably in the documents. Most often, however, pestilençia refers to a variety of contagious diseases or epidemics, which are as devastating to contemporaries suffering dearth of foodstuffs as plague itself. Recurring bouts of plague are well documented throughout this period, and into the seventeenth century. Those outbreaks, as well as more ordinary types of contagious diseases, constitute the category of pestilencia.
\item \textsuperscript{11}For statistical studies which underpin grain crises in Seville and its region during the fifteenth century, see: R. Hernández-Múzquiz, “Economy and Society in Medieval and Early Modern Seville (1391-1506): A Study of the Abastecimiento [Provisioning] of an Iberian Urban Center” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2005).
\end{itemize}
The First Episode

At La Cartuja, or Santa María de las Cuevas, a Carthusian monastery located, as the records of the Alhóndiga del Pan would later note, inside and outside of the city (dentro y fuera de la ciudad), we find a copy of a letter from 1461, which opens thus:

In the year 1461 there was great necessity in this city of grain, which we did not have in our lands; the city was surrounded by water, and the poor could not come here to eat at the house; and such was the dearth of bread, as of the abundance of waters, that the land was in overwhelming need.12

The then prior, Fernando de Torres, rallied all the priests of the house in response to the city’s desperate need, and they decided to limit the number of times per week they made bread, restricting the use of the flour they had and making it last longer.13

Moved to charity, these Carthusians not only made smaller loaves for themselves so that there would be more bread to give to the poor, but also delivered the loaves to a house in the city from where the bread would be distributed to the needy (who were unable to reach the monastery because of the standing flood waters).14 The friars thanked God for the grain stores lasting miraculously until “the good times returned” and the Virgin Mary for her intercession in response to their prayers.15

After the city recovered from this crisis, the prior and the priests at La Cartuja continued to deliver to the poor 250 loaves of bread weekly, and that amount was doubled by the time Fray Alvaro de Oviedo had copied the letter and added these details. So, by 1476, the Carthusian friars at La Cartuja supplemented the food supply for Seville’s pueblo menudo (the little people or common folk) with 500 loaves of bread a week as alms for the poor. In a personal note on the back of the document, Fray Alvaro tells us that he kept the letter as a memorial from the time the friars began to give bread to the underprivileged (or “helpless persons,” the menesterosos), both women and men, “just in case we wanted to know.”16

The mode of expression in the Cartuja letter is, naturally, religious, but we must recognize that fifteenth-century Iberian Peninsular society was predominantly

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12 En el año de [1461] años ovo mucha necesidad en esta ciudad de pan, que no lo avía en la tierra; e la ciudad estaba toda cercada de agua, e los pobres non podían venir a comer aquí a casa; e así de la carencia de pan, como por las muchas aguas, estaua la tierra en harta necesidad. B. Cuartero y Huerta, Historia de la Cartuja de Santa María de las Cuevas, de Sevilla, y de su filial de Cazalla de la Sierra, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1950) 1: 196.
13 They had about 60 fanegas of grain. Each fanega yielded 2 1/6 arrobas of ground flour or 54-1/6 pounds; while this is not an insignificant amount of flour, there were also not an insignificant number of mouths to feed, and no one could predict how long the dearth would last without some sort of intervention.
14 porque los pobres non podían venir con las muchas aguas; perhaps a double meaning of “los pobres.” The “casa” may have been the earlier Alhóndiga (before the 1478 Ordenancas), but this is not clear from the letter.
15 e todo lo amplió Dios milagrosamente, que non faltó el trigo en esta casa fasta que vinieron los buenos tiempos, a Dios gracias e a su gloriosa Madre, que se lo rogó.
16 e así que son todos 500 panes, los cuales se han embiado fasta oy e se embían agora, e así fué el príncipe de esta dicha limosna, como dicho es, de este pan que embian a la ciudad, e así como van creciendo las limosnas, así crece la casa en bienes, y en honras; [on the back of the document]: Memoria dende el tiempo que quedó en dar el pan cozido a los menesterosos, así mugeres como hombres; si lo quiseres saber, mira esta memoria. – Fray Alvaro de Oviedo.
Christian; so, the terms and phrases used in monastic documents, particularly in the vernacular, would have been intelligible to the general public as well as to consecrated religious. We learn from this document that the friars had, from earlier times (probably since the founding of the house in the first decade of the fifteenth century) fed the poor who came to them in need. But circumstances became so bad (floods, weather, crop failure) that in 1461 they could not do so, and they had to come up with a new way to help the poor.

This need for new ways to deal with crisis throughout the fifteenth century is seen in both sacred and secular facilities. A complex picture of need and innovation in fifteenth-century Seville begins to emerge, and we note a great dependence on the resources of the sacred. This was especially so when the secular authorities were focused on other things, such as succession crises and violent political factionalism.¹⁷

The different groups (sacred and secular) make their priorities visible through their actions. The friars meet the people where they are, literally and metaphorically: since the poor cannot come to them, they take sustenance to them in the city. The memorial of their actions uses the phrase “a los d[i]chos pobres” with no qualifiers; that is, simply because the people were poor, they were worthy of charity. This is a different perspective from what we see in secular documents, where worthiness or merit are prescribed. Thanksgiving for the grain miracle is offered to God and to the Virgin Mary, “who asked it of Him,” and this tells us that the Blessed Mother’s intercession is a given, from the friars’ point of view, because extraordinary rogations are not mentioned. The perspective of the monastery is that honor and blessings accrue because of the charity work they are doing;¹⁸ so, they are not complaining about the burden. They welcome the opportunity to serve and any spiritual or material benefits they may receive. And, as we will see ahead, Fray Alvaro de Oviedo will later be called upon to assist the officers of the Alhóndiga del Pan de Sevilla in the newly configured institution for grain supply and redistribution.

**The Second Episode**

The crisis of 1467-1469 began with a “great pestilence” in Seville, and a correspondingly steep increase in the price of wheat and barley; grain became very costly.¹⁹ Civic officials resolved to import grain to address the shortage. The ships began to arrive, but from December 1467 to March 1468, the grain price per fanega leaped from ninety *maravedí* to 400 *maravedí*, and flour cost 190

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¹⁷ This is not dissimilar to the condition of the late Roman Empire when outer frontiers such as Roman Britain were abandoned because of political crises in the center, and it was the early churchmen who saw to the subsistence needs (as well as defense) of their flocks.

¹⁸ así crece la casa en bienes, y en honras.

¹⁹ que valía a veinte *maravedí* y vino a valer a doscientos y ochenta *maravedí* la fanega. Anales de Garci Sánchez, ch. 284.
maravedís per fanega.\textsuperscript{20} The urgency revealed in the sources is the carestía, the “dearness” of grain that we discussed earlier. How did things get so bad that we see this leap? What changed?

There were distinct phases in the grain import process. First, a city-wide announcement informed the people that, owing to the scarcity of grain, the city council would reimburse merchants who could bring in grain by either land or sea. Next, the conègeo negotiated contracts with merchants, detailing when the bread would be brought, the amount to be paid for wheat, and the time and form of payment, as well as sanctions for breaking the agreement. The council compiled lists of merchants who promised to bring certain amounts of wheat to the city and imposed special taxes as subventions for wheat. Finally, the council gave orders to Juan Fernandes (the mayordomo of Seville during this three-year crisis) to pay those merchants who had fulfilled their contract.\textsuperscript{21}

By July 1467, still in the negotiation and contract phase of the process, we can see that this emergency system was not without its shortcomings. Despite the high prices secured in the contract to bring large amounts of grain,\textsuperscript{22} foreign merchants (including Genoese, Placentines, and Bretons) failed to deliver in time. These men had agreed to bring in 2,000 cahices to Seville by the end of October, for sale within the city, and be paid 2,000 doblas de oro for this service. The clerk of the city council, Alfonso García de Laredo, noted that the city was in great need, and that this accord was reached only after “many altercations” with the merchants.\textsuperscript{23}

The Genoese ignored the requirement to bring the grain directly to the alhóndiga, and they delivered it instead to their own facility, and the price increased again by November 1467. While the merchants had agreed to bring the grain as soon as possible and before the end of October, the first shipment of grain arrived on 2 November 1467. A Genoese merchant, Juan de Lugo, delivered 166 cahices, 5 fanegas of wheat to the city, depositing most of it not at the alhóndiga of Seville but at the lonja de los genoveses (Genoese commodities exchange).\textsuperscript{24} He received 39,540 maravedís for this shipment when sold in the city, which reveals a price increase to almost 240 maravedis per cahiz.\textsuperscript{25} By the end of the year, the merchants

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. The maravedi is a money of account. What matters for this study is not so much its value in silver as the ratio of one price to another in times of crisis.


\textsuperscript{22} One Castilian cahiz equals twelve fanegas.

\textsuperscript{23} Nota que en esta ciudad avya muy grand mengua de pan et las gentes non lo podian aver et la ciudad acordo que se mandase a los genoveses e otros mercadores que troxesen 2,000 cahices de trigo por la mar a esta ciudad para se vender en ella e despues de munchas altercaciones que con ellos se ovo la cibdad acuerdo e asento con ellos que ellos troxasen los 2,000 cahices de trigo e que lo vendiesen en esta ciudad a como pudiesen e que la cibdad les diese 2,000 doblas de oro castellanas [240 maravedis] muertas porque traxesen el dicho trigo los quales dichos mercadores repartieron entre sy la trayda del dicho trigo segund sus personas e cabdales e ellos se obligaron de lo traer cada uno en esta contia que aqui esta escrito. AMS, Sec. XV, Pap. May., 13 julio 1467. This is a marginal note to the account listing the merchants’ names and their obligations.

\textsuperscript{24} He deposited 103 cahices, 6 fanegas at the lonja de los genoveses, and the balance of his cargo (almost sixty-three cahices) at the alhóndiga. AMS, Sec. XV, Papeles de Mayordomazgo, 28 noviembre 1467.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., “Carta de pago.”
had not fulfilled their commitment, so they renegotiated their position. They would
bring what remained of the contracted 2,000 cahices of wheat, plus 2,000 additional
cahices without remuneration but with permission for them to sell it in Seville at
what price they could secure. Alfonso García noted that the said merchants brought
some of the grain and had yet to bring the rest. He also stated that, as the city was
composed of many and ruled by many (de muchos y por muchos regida) neither
the first nor the second obligations were fulfilled nor did the regidores execute the
contract sanctions for failure to comply.26

By 1468, wheat prices had increased to 280 maravedís per fanega, so the city
council changed the conditions of the contract and assured the merchants they
would pay one dobla castellana per cahiz in addition to the selling price in the city.
This became the convention in subsequent documents.27 Finally, by January 1468,
this assurance became one dobla castellana for each cahiz brought by sea and one
florin for each cahiz brought by land; the various taxes (imposiciones) to pay the
city’s share for these shipments had risen by 400 percent.28 Most of the documents
detailing the emergency grain shipments for this crisis date from 1468.

Conditions in Seville had become so desperate that civic officials could not
afford to punish anyone who could still bring relief from famine by imposing the
non-compliance sanctions of the contract. Instead, merchants would receive a set
amount of money on account,29 based on what they were to charge for the grain
(and this included shipping and handling). The merchants would receive their
money as they sold the grain, at the agreed set price; if the price had dropped and
the merchants could not make the amount they had anticipated, the city would
compensate them with the difference.30 So, the merchants were covered either way.
And that is how the price per fanega skyrocketed.

Of the various merchants who contracted to bring grain to Seville during the
crisis of 1467-1469, the Genoese predominated. The merchants from Burgos
complained, in a document dated 18 January 1469, seeking their pay when they
delivered the grain, and especially seeking permission to unload the grain wherever
they chose within the city and not to be obligated to unload in the alhóndiga.
They also wanted assurances that “those of the alhóndiga” not be able to claim
certain amounts of the grain and impose their additional taxes.31 The city granted
these merchants their requests. Of the total grain imported to resolve this crisis,
over 4,000 cahices came from Brittany and were unloaded predominantly at the
alhóndiga (2,644 cahices). At some point, all the grain which entered Seville

26 “y se quedó así todo.” Marchena Hidalgo, 192.
27 Marchena Hidalgo, 193.
28 Ibid., 194.
29 For the month of February, that came to 600,000 maravedís.
30 AMS, Sec. XV, Papeles de Mayordomazgo, anno 1467-68, “Los apuntamyentos que traxeron los cavalleros al
cabildo sobre el pan.”
31 The diputados, in this period periodically appointed by the city to staff the existing facility, especially during
crisis periods.
was to go through the alhóndiga, as the redistribution market where retail sale was assessed certain portions and taxes. For this reason, merchants (particularly foreign merchants) sought permission to unload where they would be free of such charges. The alhóndiga did remain the most important market for the grain from the sea (pan de la mar), processing over 24 percent of the total wheat imported for this crisis.\(^{32}\)

Regardless of which specific group of foreign merchants contracted to bring in grain and fulfilled their contractual obligations, civic efforts to respond to subsistence crises placed the people of Seville at the mercy of foreigners and strangers throughout their time of need. The wariness (at best) and deep suspicion (at worst) with which the permanent residents and members of the concejo viewed their rescuers increased their desperation and raised tensions on several levels: the negotiators, who were responsible for delivery success or failure; the officers of the grain redistribution market (alhóndiga) still in its developmental stages;\(^{33}\) nobles responsible for castle garrisons, which depended on specified grain maintenance for the city as part of the cost of defense for the region; and laborers (pueblo menudo), whose families ran the highest risks for suffering hunger and disease.

Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, in his studies on the various subgroups in medieval Castile and in Andalucía, notes that there were not as many Italians in the cities, statistically, as the chronicles and other narrative documents might have us believe.\(^{34}\) In the case of the Genoese, especially, their apparently ubiquitous presence is owed to their ability to use to good advantage the wide range of opportunities available to them. As part of the privileges they enjoyed because of the important role they played in international trade (expanding and increasing throughout the fifteenth century), exemption from taxes and customs duties enabled them to build considerable wealth in Seville city and its territories. However, there were not many Genoese families who chose to remain permanently in Seville, and still less who sought naturalized citizenship. The names of the prominent Italian families, and/or those most active in trade and shipping of bulk goods, appear in the documents relating to the crisis periods of the fifteenth century, and there are nineteen of them in 1467 and thirty-six in the crisis documents of 1473. The number increased again toward the end of the fifteenth century, but the Genoese seemed to choose not to assimilate entirely to the city where they made a rather comfortable living. Jacques Heers notes that the Genoese in Seville remained “anchored in a foreign land” and that they would return to Genoa to marry and become established rather than do so in the city where they made their fortunes. From the perspective of the vecinos

\(^{32}\) Marchena Hidalgo, 197. The rest of the wheat was unloaded in a variety of places, including Calle de la Mar, Calle de Castro, Horno del Bizcocho, and the Lonja de los Genoveses.

\(^{33}\) The Ordenanzas de la Alhóndiga del Pan de Sevilla would be promulgated in 1478, and the catalyst for specific components of that legislation was in large measure these fifteenth-century grain crises.

\(^{34}\) Los Mudéjares de Castilla y otros estudios de historia medieval andaluza (Granada, 1989).
(permanent residents) of Seville, the Italians, and especially the Genoese, were a protected enclave within the larger group of citizens. Although they did provide considerable amounts of emergency grain in time of need, the Genoese seemed just beyond the reach of accountability. This perception may be a causal factor in the outcry heard when crimes were committed, that the authorities should seek out the culprit amongst the many Genoese transient in the city.

Allowing for some sense of exaggeration in the interest of purpose, I suggest we dig deeper into how we as human beings perceive and interpret our circumstances. When we study fear responses, and perceptions of fear, one characteristic we discover is that the individual, as well as the collective, makes practical assumptions about the enemy, whatever or whomever that may be. Whether it is an assumption necessary in order to take protective action in the immediate sense, or whether we seek to improve our circumstances so we are not in an ongoing state of fear, we as human beings may perceive ourselves surrounded. Feeling surrounded by our enemy may lead to an exaggeration of number. And an enemy does not have to be a declared opponent, but rather some sort of threat, or perceived threat. The Italians in Seville had acquired specialized status owing to their participation in the efforts of Reconquista in the southern part of the peninsula in the thirteenth century, and special privileges had been granted to them by a succession of monarchs (compiled into a Libro de Privilegios de la Nación Genovesa) because of their role in the successful reconquest of the city and its liberation from Muslim rule.

The paradox presented by the Italians in the fifteenth century, particularly the Genoese, was that they were considered by fellow Sevillanos as both helpful and harmful. That is, there was an awareness of their coming to the aid of the city in times of crisis, especially as importers of grain during periods of scarcity (carestía). But there was also a resentment that the city accorded them special privileges as a result of that aid, and because of their historic role in the thirteenth-century Reconquest of Seville. Compounding the fear even further, the secrecy surrounding their economic practices and the negotiation and oath-taking of their contracts, made them suspicious to those not of their circle.

The Third Episode

We return to the tensions created by the ongoing noble feuds in Seville and its region that opened our study and contextualized the problems of subsistence crises. The residents (vecinos) of Seville approached the city council (cabildo) in September 1471 and, in plaintive language which reflected their outrage, frustration, and despair, demanded that guards be placed on the roads between Seville and Alcalá de Guadaira, where the troops of the Marques of Cádiz attack the merchants bringing provisions to Seville’s urban center. The list of “great evil and harm” presented by the aggrieved citizens included murders, robbery, and fires perpetrated on a daily basis, both by land and by sea, from the town of Alcalá
de Guadaira “as well as other places.” The petitioners remind the council that, as it already knows, the Marques and his troops have not complied with earlier sanctions imposed. In fact, they have escalated their attacks; and from the city of Cádiz (the power base of the Marques) they have intercepted shipments of grain coming from North Africa to help alleviate the current subsistence crisis suffered in Seville and its region. The vecinos suggest a temporary surcharge of 5 percent be placed on the region’s sales taxes to pay for the guards, in service to God, the king, and the republic; and they reveal their level of frustration when they tell the council members that, if they do not take this financial measure to provide security for the city’s food provisioning, the cost of hiring guards should come out of the pockets of the civic officers. The vecinos clearly are fed up with the current state of affairs, and emotions are running high.

The castle of Alcalá was in Seville region. The city was responsible for the castle, as was the castle for the city’s defense. Some of the people in Alcalá were legal residents of Seville city. So, one of the places that was supposed to help protect the city becomes instead a place from which harm came to the city, especially to its food supply in time of need. In times of war, the enemy is subdued by attacks on his food supply. But this is supposed to be a time of peace, and the enemy is supposed to be a friend. When our food supply is threatened by those close to us in some way, we feel especially betrayed.

In a period when the ability to count on a dependable food supply was precarious at best, man-made problems that imperiled the food supply contributed to a regular state of tension and anxiety, expecting or anticipating the worst even at the best of times. This partially explains the paradox of scarcity (carestía) during seasons when the crops were yielding a good harvest. The persistent state of insecurity because of human actions encouraged the people to express clearly, collectively, and passionately their dependence on God and His ability to provide for His people.

Our story comes to an end with the resolution of the central political issue which had marked the latter half of the fifteenth century in the Iberian kingdoms, the pacification of the realms following the Trastámara civil war and the accession of Isabel to the throne of Castile in joint rulership with her husband Fernando, King of Aragón. These monarchs would respond to the crises which presented themselves in due time, using a combination of methods, personnel, and new institutions linking secular and sacred ideals. But that story is part of another chapter.

**Conclusions: Perceptions and Interpretations of Crisis Responses**

Late medieval Iberian Peninsular society was unashamedly, unapologetically, and unreservedly Catholic Christian. E. Cabrera and others have pointed out that

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35 AMS, Sec. X, Act. Cap. c. 15, ca 61, 1471, agosto-octubre, fol. 57 (Sanz Simó, doc. 2119).
the late medieval Christian was not an expert in doctrine, and much of the faith practiced was based on popular devotions. However, we must also point out that the Gospels were well known from attending mass. Though the text of the Liturgy of the Eucharist may have been in Latin, the homily was in the vernacular; and the homily was and is specifically a reflection on the Gospels. The teachings of the Gospels were reinforced in popular devotions: processions, formal prayers memorized from childhood, the work of the confraternities. Additionally, Rosary prayer was well established by the fifteenth century (it had been in very popular use since the thirteenth century, particularly in Spain). The reflection on the mysteries that is part of Rosary prayer reinforced the teachings of the Beatitudes, including the teachings of Jesus Christ regarding poverty and humility. The words of Jesus in the Beatitudes would have been well known. And those words would have resonated with the people of that place and time. This perspective informs our interpretation of pious behavior, individual and collective, regarding crises and their resolution. Some of that behavior is echoed in personal wills and last testaments, revealing the mentalité of the believer, particularly the nobility and wealthy merchants, who left significant bequests for the care of the poor. Also, in late medieval Spanish society, the friars were active amongst the people. The Carthusian monastery in Seville region was particularly and regularly active in the provision for the poor and, as we have seen, even more substantially during times of crisis. Living the Beatitudes in some way, to a greater or lesser extent, would have been very real, very much part of the mentalité of the people we are studying. It informs our understanding of their sense of urgency and the question of those meritorious of assistance.

What is mirabile dictu, or wonderful to relate, is not that the people of Seville appealed to the Church to help solve the recurring grain crises that beset the city in the 1460s and 1470s, but rather that the Church was efficient and effective in

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37 If anything, Rosary prayer had grown by the fifteenth century; and in one of the best known miracles of the sixteenth century, the pope was able to call for collective Rosary prayer and count on its efficacy (1571 Battle of Lepanto).


The English text in the Revised Standard Version Catholic Edition (RSVCE): Blessings and Woes [inserted rubric, because Luke’s Gospel includes both the blessings and the curses] And he lifted up his eyes on his disciples, and said: Blessed are you poor, for yours is the kingdom of God. Blessed are you that hunger now, for you shall be satisfied. Blessed are you that weep now, for you shall laugh. Blessed are you when men hate you, and when they exclude you and revile you, and cast out your name as evil, on account of the Son of man! Rejoice in that day, and leap for joy, for behold, your reward is great in heaven; for so their fathers did to the prophets. But woe to you that are rich, for you have received your consolation. Woe to you that are full now, for you shall hunger. Woe to you that laugh now, for you shall mourn and weep. Woe to you, when all men speak well of you, for so their fathers did to the false prophets.
bringing about resolutions to the crises and collaborating with secular authorities in doing so. It was not alone in these efforts, as we have noted, but the Church helped create a bridge between factors which would take provisioning of subsistence goods into a reliable, institutionalized system that had some of the transparency and reliability the people of the city had hoped for. As part of the new system established by the *Ordenanças de la Alhóndiga* of 1478, the prior of the monastery of Santa María de las Cuevas would serve as one of three key holders (*llaveros*) who secured the funds used to purchase grain for redistribution in Seville. He also assisted in keeping accountable the officers of the new grain redistribution market, which would serve as a model for other markets throughout the Iberian Peninsula and in the Spanish overseas territories. The more visible and integrated interaction of the Church with secular, governmental agencies to secure provisioning for the city of Seville is among the changes we can point to in this story. Fray Alvaro de Oviedo, prior of La Cartuja, serves in an official capacity in connection with the Alhóndiga del Pan de Sevilla in the 1480s, and he is called upon to assist that newly configured grain redistribution market in a complicated subsistence crisis that lasted, effectively, for the entire decade.39 Los Reyes Católicos requested that Prior Alvaro take account of the Alhóndiga’s finances and inventory from November 1483 to August 1485, and several sets of document accounts, with marginal comments and descriptive text, survive as evidence of this successful assignment.40 The Rev. Prior Don Alvaro was becoming something of an expert in handling the crises that beset Seville’s residents, and he worked alongside both residents and foreign merchants to bring about solutions. The Italians continued to be involved in provisioning for the city, especially as *cambiadores* (both in currency exchange and as city accountants) and some of the families that were involved in earlier crises were well established in finance by the 1480s.

39 Troubles began in 1480-1481 with a serious epidemic (pestilencia) from which 15,000 died in Seville; floods in late 1481 affected the next harvest, and the shortage was exacerbated by royal demands for troop provisions (Bernáldez, *Memorias*; AMS, *El Tumbo de los Reyes Católicos del Concejo de Sevilla*). In 1482, Seville suffered bad harvests (*malas cosechas*) and scarcity of grain (*falta, mengua*), and again a shortage exacerbated by demands for troop provisions (AMS, Sec. XV, Papeles de Mayordomazgo, 1479-1500; AMS, Sec. X, Actas Capitulares, 1483-IV; AMS, *El Tumbo de los Reyes Católicos del Concejo de Sevilla*). In 1485 came flooding (*avenidas*) from the Guadalquivir River, plague (pestilencia) from April to October that was so severe that Seville was forced to pay a subsidy in lieu of sending their required troops for the Granada campaign, bad harvests (*malas cosechas*), and shortage exacerbated by demands for troop provisions (AMS, Sec. XV, Papeles de Mayordomazgo, 1479-1500: section: annos 1485-1486; AMS, *El Tumbo de los Reyes Católicos del Concejo de Sevilla*, IV-15; Bernáldez, *Memorias*, 166; Ortiz de Zúñiga, *Anales*, anno 1485). In 1486, again there was a bad harvest, low production, and scarcity (*mengua, carestia*), relieved to some extent by a substantial importation of 50,000 fanegas of grain from Mazagan (AMS, Sec. XV, *Papeles de Mayordomazgo*, 1479-1500: section: annos 1485-1486 and 1486-1487; AMS, *El Tumbo de los Reyes Católicos del Concejo de Sevilla*, carta real, 16 julio 1486). To wrap up the decade, 1489 brought another epidemic (pestilencia) in May, heavy rains from October 1488 to January 1489 that reduced the grain harvest critically (nearly 200,000 fanegas below normal production), and flooding of the Guadalquivir River (AMS, Sec. XV, *Papeles de Mayordomazgo*, 1479-1500: sections: annos 1488-1489 and annos 1489-1490; Bernáldez, *Memorias*, 204). See: R. Hernández-Múzquiz, “Economy and Society in Medieval and Early Modern Seville.”

Closing Thoughts

In the surviving documentation that allows us to attempt any study of the intersection of crises and fears in fifteenth-century Spain, particularly as related to subsistence crises and the threat of hunger and famine, I suggest that we learn as much, perhaps more, from the language of the documents recording the actions of the responders as we do from sources which report the cry for help. We can gauge the urgency of that cry, and substantiate it with quantitative material, when we work from the information revealed by those who took action to remedy catastrophes. The extent to which responders were willing to go, even to the point of taking heroic measures involving foreign agents and long-term investments, allows us to interpret with a certain degree of accuracy how they perceived the emergency, and in turn how those who required aid perceived their dire circumstances. Using sources from both ends of the spectrum allows us to discern more clearly a balanced picture; more so, that is, than interpreting literary sources (given either to hyperbole on the one hand, or to understatement on the other) on face value or applying the superstructures of literary theory. Actual, in-the-field reports of real emergencies, real people, and real heroes make for an interpretation of this history that may be more authentic than those who stray too far from their source. Having said that, we must also acknowledge that both crisis and response verbiage may sometimes be exaggerated, insufficient, heroized, and/or villainized; these are affective responses, emotional reactions to very real, frightening, circumstances. They may be romanticized or dramatized, and we can see the latter footprint literally in Golden Age drama, including picaresque interpretations of history and contemporary circumstances.

It is easy to point fingers and automatically read the past with negativity; it is the ultimate example of “us” and “them.” If we look at the past through the lens of presentism, we tend to see the flaws, how “they” fall short of “us” because we have made such “progress.” The skepticism to which I refer is not the skepticism of critical thinking that calls us to look closely at the sources and understand their context so that we may examine and comprehend, systematically and with some degree of precision, the evidence left to us by the past. The skepticism to which I refer is instead the judgement, veiled by the curtain of academic mechanisms, that demands we see ulterior motives and hidden agendas behind every decision made by established authority, particularly if that authority is ecclesiastical, and whether or not those motives and agendas truly are there. The automatic judgement, often phrased with scorn, has become so much a part of academic discourse, of the culture, that scholars do not question that bias. Yet it is as much a bias as the perspectives it sweepingly condemns and seeks to invalidate.

What is more difficult to do, what demands more time and effort, is to clean the windows through which we look at the past so that we can see more clearly what
was there and can interpret more validly, and with greater veracity, what the people of the past have left as evidence. We must clear away the grime of centuries of thought, just as the grime of the Sistine Chapel was removed, so that we can see the beauty, the intricacy, the amazing fresco of life in the late medieval period. And as was the case with that famous restoration, attempting to see things differently may cause consternation to some and even outrage to others. How dare we remove the constructs that have been so carefully erected? And if those constructs are new ones, literary theory and culture studies claiming to be the study of history, we will encounter even more resistance. If we truly seek understanding, if we strive to see clearly and think critically as scholars so we may teach future generations to do so, we must roll up our sleeves and pick up our tools. Let us see what we can see when we remove the filters, old or new.
In the early morning hours of 30 July 1916, a huge explosion ripped through the Allies’ loading terminal known as Black Tom Island. More than two million pounds of munitions went up, and a tremor estimated to be 5.5 on the Richter scale could be felt as far south as Baltimore, Maryland, where the German conspirators Paul Hilken and Friedrich Hinsch knew what had caused it.\(^1\) Other German secret agents, most notably Frederico Stallforth who awoke to rattling windows in his house in White Plains, New York, also felt more a sense of satisfaction than surprise. To the German agents in America, and there were hundreds, the Black Tom loading terminals signified death of German soldiers in France’s trenches. As New Yorkers woke to the latest proof that the European war had come home, the sheer magnitude of the explosion left them aghast. Most buildings in Brooklyn and Mid-Manhattan had broken windows, and shattered glass covered the walkways below. Ellis Island was in the process of a full-scale evacuation. Lady Liberty stood but suffered extensive damages under the continuing barrage of exploding shrapnel and artillery shells.\(^2\) It took days for land- and water-based fire brigades to put out the flames, the fire fighters themselves becoming victims of exploding munitions.

Not surprisingly, newspaper headlines the next day blamed German saboteurs for the explosion, a logical conclusion since German agents had set fire to American factories, logistics installations, and merchant ships for more than a year. Sabotage agents Werner Horn, Franz Rintelen alias Gaschê, Gates, and Hansen, Franz Wachendorf alias Horst von der Goltz, Lothar Witzke, and Carl “the dynamiter” Wunnenberg had made headlines when their plots fell apart. The German military and naval attachés Franz von Papen and Karl Boy-Ed had been disgraced and left the country in January 1916. Still, proof that the “Huns” were behind it remained elusive. An accident, so concluded American investigators, seemed more likely. A few night watchmen might have made a fire in a metal drum to ward off mosquitoes thereby setting the explosives off. An electrical short in one of the warehouses was another possibility. There were no witnesses. Nobody saw Germans near the site or had noticed a small boat that night. Police arrested a German suspect, Michael Kristoff, but had to let him go for lack of evidence. Insurance companies refused to

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\(^1\) “An Attack that Turned Out to Be German Terrorism Has a Modest Legacy 100 Years Later,” *New York Times*, 25 July 2016. The Richter scale was not used at that time. However, scientists have estimated the tremor and concluded that it was somewhere around 5.5.

\(^2\) Still today, access to the torch of the statue is prohibited because of structural damages the statue suffered in 1916.
pay, citing negligence of the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, the owners of the site. The real cause of the explosion was not revealed for many years.

German agents ordered, financed, planned, and executed the Black Tom attack. In 1939, the Mixed Claims Commission, set up in 1922 as part of the Treaty of Berlin to settle claims arising from German attacks on U.S. property between 1914 and 1917, researched and ultimately forced Germany to take responsibility for the brazen 1916 attack. The commission consisted of an American agent, under whom lawyers for the claimants, such as the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, researched and argued their cases. The German agent led the efforts of defending Germany against the claims. An umpire had the power to decide on the validity of the claims. In an amazing twist of historical irony, Frederico Stallforth, one of the leaders of the conspiracy, advised the U.S. attorneys charged with solving the case.

At stake was one of the largest claims, $21 million [approximately $440 million in today’s dollars] for damages, that the United States has ever filed with another country, plus interest which turned out to be another $29 million [$610 million in today’s dollars].

The story of Frederico Stallforth is one of those interludes in intelligence history that one would expect to be the brainchild of a novelist or screen writer. This would be a hard story to fabricate. Despite the access the American legal team had to World War I records and despite the clear suspicion if not proof that Stallforth was one of the conspirators and perpetrators of the German sabotage campaign, he gained access to the nuts and bolts of the American legal strategy. If he still worked for the German government at the time, he could have helped Germany counter the American efforts and ruin their case. There are many indications that Germany did just that: sabotage the American case. In the late 1920s German investigators bought off important witnesses like Fred Hermann and Kurt Jahnke. They possibly even faked the death of the American star witness Michael Kristoff in April 1928. The question thus begs an answer, whether the American government missed Stallforth’s background and allowed a German agent to infiltrate their negotiations, or if the government, fully aware of his history, used him. It took until 1935, before the Mixed Claims Commission papers demonstrated suspicion of Stallforth’s trustworthiness.

Born of a German father and a Mexican mother in Chihuahua, Mexico, Stallforth worked the family’s mining and banking business until 1913, when the chaos of the Mexican Revolution ruined the business and left the Stallforths in debt. He moved to New York where he dabbled in investment schemes on Wall Street without much success. When World War I started in Europe, the German government desperately sought to raise funds in the United States to corner strategic industries and prevent the Allies from supplying themselves; Stallforth saw his chance. The multi-lingual,

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3 Germany submitted the last payment in 1979, sixty-three years after the attack.
multi-cultural, suave networker quickly gained access to the head of the German
clandestine services in the United States, Heinrich F. Albert.

Initially, during the fall of 1914, Albert and his agents tried to interrupt British
and French arms purchases by simply buying up available materials and diverting
them to Mexico and India. This strategy failed to make a difference, mainly because
the German government refused to supply enough cash for the agents to effectively
buy up enough supplies on the market.4 Germany also had not anticipated the rapid
increase of production capacities in the United States. During this period, Stallforth
helped another agent, Felix Sommerfeld, conclude large munitions contracts
with American companies and divert the supplies to Mexico. He also worked
with Bernhard Dernburg, head of German propaganda in the United States, and
Heinrich Albert on fund-raising tasks, selling German war bonds and negotiating
loans with American banks for the German government. Clearly, Stallforth brought
ample experience with him. Within months the Mexican businessman became an
important asset for Albert’s organization, the Secret War Council. He had important
connections to both Wall Street and Mexican revolutionaries.

However, the losses on the battlefields of Europe in the fall of 1914 made
loans to Germany an ever-riskier endeavor for American banks. All bets were
on the Entente powers. In the spring of 1915, the German government decided
to commence a sabotage campaign against American factories and logistics
installations. At the same time, German submarines had orders to sink merchant
ships, including those with neutral flags. Frederico Stallforth now appeared as a
paymaster for German agents.

One of the key reasons for Stallforth’s ascent was an embarrassing scandal
that happened in the summer of 1915. Heinrich Albert, the head of the Secret
War Council, fell asleep on the elevated train in New York after a long day of
work. An American secret service agent who had shadowed the German spy
grabbed his briefcase and ran away with it. A few weeks later, the contents of
the briefcase appeared on the front pages of New York dailies. Albert’s role as a
spymaster, Germany’s efforts to corner specific industries, foment labor unrest,
and propaganda initiatives all became public with the briefcase affair.5 With his
phones tapped, and shadowed anywhere he went, Albert turned the responsibility
of distributing secret funds for German sabotage agents over to Stallforth.6 Daring,
slightly reckless, and with a charming naïveté, he played a key role in the financing
of the German sabotage campaign that culminated in the explosion of Black Tom
Island in July 1916.

4 See von Feilitzsch, Heribert, The Secret War Council: The German Fight Against the Entente in America in 1914
6 “Re: Frederico Stallforth,” undated document 129, file 9140-878, Military Intelligence Division, Record Group
(hereafter RG) 165, National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA).
One of the earliest sabotage efforts linked to Stallforth was the attempted
destruction of the Welland Canal that linked Lake Erie and Lake Ontario in Canada.
The November 1914 attempt failed, and the agents were arrested. U.S. authorities
identified Franz von Papen, the German military attaché, as the head of the plot
in 1915. The State Department revoked his passport and expelled him. When in
January 1916 English authorities confiscated von Papen’s personal papers on his
way back to Germany, an important check stub came into the hands of American
authorities. The document obtained from von Papen implicated the Mexican-
German agent. Stallforth testified in an interview with Counselor Frank L. Polk
of the State Department in March of 1916 that he recruited and paid the notorious
German sabotage agent, Franz Wachendorf, alias Horst von der Goltz in 1914.7

Stallforth had endorsed and cashed von Papen’s check paying von der Goltz for
the mission. He mentioned in the interview with Polk that he personally talked
about the validity of the check to von Papen. “I went down to Mr. von Papen’s
office . . . I met von Papen and asked him about it and he said the check was
all right.”8 An additional, curious entry exists in Stallforth’s company financial
records for 1921. Another member of the German sabotage team sent to blow up
the Welland Canal, Alfred Fritzen, owed Stallforth a whopping $5,150 [$108,000
in today’s dollars].9 When he borrowed the money is unclear; however, he was
arrested in March 1917, and spent the rest of the war in a penitentiary.10 This
sum, rather than the few hundred dollars documented in von Papen’s checkbook,
may have been the real cost of the Welland Canal sabotage mission. Stallforth’s
recollections clearly show that the Justice Department’s suspicions about Stallforth
were correct: He indeed worked on financial matters for the Secret War Council
and with von Papen in particular.

Stallforth’s activities as a German secret agent came into the open in August
1915. British authorities arrested Andrew Meloy, the business partner who shared
offices with Stallforth in New York. He was on his way to Berlin to arrange a loan
for a new Mexican faction he supported.11 He carried with him a satchel of papers
that belonged to a fellow traveler, Franz Rintelen. The German naval intelligence
agent had come to the United States in April 1915 as part of the German sabotage
campaign. He established his headquarters in Meloy and Stallforth’s offices and
plotted his moves from there. Stallforth introduced him to another businessman,
David Lamar, who was known in New York as the “Wolf of Wall Street.” Under
Lamar’s tutelage, Rintelen created an umbrella union that organized strikes all
over the American rust belt in the summer of 1915. The Great Bridgeport Strike

7 “Re: Frederico Stallforth,” 10 October 1936, Box 14, Mixed Claims Commission, RG 76, NARA.
8 Stallforth Papers, private collection, courtesy of Mary Prevo, Interview Frank L. Polk with Frederico Stallforth,
9 Ibid., Financials for Stallforth Inc., 1921.
10 “7 German Plotters are sent to Prison,” New York Times, 7 April 1917; Fritzen received an 18-month term.
11 “Re: Rintelen,” undated, file 8000-3089, Records of the FBI, FBI Case Files, RG 65, NARA.
literally brought munitions production at Remington Arms and other companies to a standstill. Against his orders Rintelen also inserted himself in Mexican politics, trying to help the exiled dictator Victoriano Huerta to return to power. When the German agent went rogue and already on the radar of American authorities, the German War Department recalled him after only four months. British naval intelligence intercepted him and Andrew Meloy on the way back to Germany in August 1915.

By then Rintelen, who traveled under an assumed name, had a warrant for his arrest pending in the United States. Meloy somehow convinced the U.S. ambassador to Great Britain, Walter Hines Page, to get him released and allow him to continue his travels.\(^\text{12}\) Rintelen, however, was not so lucky. After extensive debriefings in England, he was extradited to the United States in 1917. He received four years in the penitentiary in Atlanta. The court charged him for most of what U.S. authorities thought he was guilty of, namely fomenting labor unrest, planning and executing sabotage of American and British ships, and colluding with Mexican emigres to foment border unrest.\(^\text{13}\)

Stallforth’s name as an associate of both Meloy and Rintelen frequently appeared in the records. U.S. authorities knew he was an active German spy. In the fall of 1915, prosecutors of the Southern District Court of New York hauled him before a Grand Jury. Surprisingly, he escaped trial and conviction. The official record cites lack of evidence and personal hardship. Tragedy had struck Stallforth’s life, when his beloved wife Anita became sick in 1915 and died just two years later. In the midst of his legal troubles, he became a widower with the responsibility to care for his two small children.

He narrowly escaped the fate of Rintelen. Unlike the self-absorbed, hapless, and slightly megalomaniac German sabotage agent, Stallforth was flamboyant, smart, culturally aware, and diplomatic. He purposely cultivated the aura of a trustworthy, well-connected, and successful financier. Under investigation for being a German spy, Stallforth hired some of the best lawyers in New York. His network of friends reached deep into the Justice and State Departments, as well as Wall Street. He knew and used people like former Secretary of State Philander C. Knox for his defense.\(^\text{14}\) Most importantly, U.S. laws in 1915 did not require foreign agents to register. It was almost impossible to try spies unless they were caught in the act of a crime.

Brazenly, Stallforth continued his work for the German Secret War Council in New York. Virtually under the eyes of American and British agents, he took over one of the last projects Rintelen had organized. When Albert looked out of the

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\(^{12}\) “Re: Frederico Stallforth,” undated document 129, file 9140-878, Military Intelligence Division, RG 165, NARA.

\(^{13}\) Ibid. See also Franz von Rintelen-Kleist, *The Dark Invader* (London: Lovat Dickson Ltd., 1935).

\(^{14}\) “Statement of Frederico Stallforth,” 22 April 1917, file 8000-3089, Records of the FBI, FBI Case Files, RG 65, NARA.
windows of his offices in the Hamburg-America building on Broadway in lower Manhattan, he could see far in the distance the place where British and French freighters loaded arms and munitions. The loading docks of the Allies across the Hudson in New Jersey were situated on Black Tom Island, the terminal of the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company. Millions of rounds of artillery shells, dynamite, small arms ammunition, bombs, and grenades of all shapes and sizes filled the warehouses, purposely as far away from Manhattan as possible. German agents had long dreamt of blowing the whole thing up. But security was tight.

In the few months when Rintelen worked in the United States, he pushed the idea of sabotaging the Black Tom terminals. He met with the German representative of the North German Lloyd shipping line, Paul Hilken, in Baltimore, also a German naval intelligence agent, who had access to thousands of German sailors and their ships interned for the duration of the war. When Rintelen learned of the German chemist Walter Scheele in Hoboken, New Jersey, and his invention of timed pipe bombs, so-called cigars, the plan took shape. Rintelen wanted the glory of having blown up the New York harbor. After British authorities arrested and imprisoned him, Stallforth volunteered to take over the project. He became the link between Heinrich Albert, the German bomb maker Scheele, and the sabotage cell in Baltimore. When the Black Tom finally detonated, Rintelen was in prison. Under the probing eyes of U.S. authorities and British agents, Frederico Stallforth had written the checks for the sabotage agents and had brought the project to fruition.

In his role as Albert’s paymaster, Stallforth also associated with and supplied money to Anton Dilger in Front Royal, Virginia. Dilger prepared anthrax in a lab in Baltimore for German sabotage agents. These agents executed the first known biological warfare attacks by a foreign power on the United States in 1915 and 1916. They inoculated horses destined for Europe in several American ports. The number of animals infected remains unknown but Stallforth reported to the Imperial War Department in August 1915, “the whole United States is upset to-day because the horses are becoming sick. Here in Yonkers during the past few weeks over a thousand horses must have fallen to the ground.”

Stallforth certainly had reason to fear exposure. American authorities suspected him of being a German agent and had been collecting evidence against him since 1915. When Rintelen arrived from England in 1917 to be tried, Stallforth faced scrutiny as an unindicted co-conspirator. He hired and paid Rintelen’s defense lawyer (with money from Heinrich Albert) and even visited the German sabotage agent in prison in New York. American authorities arrested Stallforth in the spring

15 “Memorandum by H. H. Martin,” 2 April 1935, Mixed Claims Commission, RG 76, NARA.
17 “Report to Imperial War Department,” 13 August 1915, File 8000-3089, Records of the FBI, FBI Case Files, RG 65, NARA.
18 “Statement of Frederico Stallforth,” 22 April 1917, ibid.
of 1917. In an intense, multi-day interrogation agents of the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, Naval Intelligence, Justice Department, and Bureau of Investigations squeezed a tell-all statement from Stallforth. Stallforth admitted to his activities for Heinrich Albert in general. He even alluded to his role in the Black Tom explosion and the anthrax attacks by Dilger.

Seemingly caving to the immense pressure his interrogators put him under, Stallforth interpreted German code words for them, implicated Heinrich Albert, Franz von Papen, Karl Boy-Ed, Franz Rintelen, and David Lamar. Of course, all the people he informed on were either arrested or back in Germany at that time. American authorities now received a detailed inside view of the operations of Heinrich Albert’s organization from Stallforth. He testified on projects ranging from influencing politics, to creating shortages in American industries, engaging in propaganda, creating unrest along the Mexican border, massive labor unrest, and fire-bombing of American ships and factories.

Again, Stallforth received a pass. The German diplomatic corps, including Albert, who officially was the German commercial attaché, left for Germany after the U.S. declaration of war in April 1917 just when the interviews with Stallforth took place. The remaining German secret service personnel other than Felix Sommerfeld left to either Germany or Mexico. Rintelen and a handful of German agents that British and American authorities had arrested were tried and sentenced. Amazingly, considering how much evidence existed against Stallforth, he neither went to jail nor internment at this time. He was paroled on 28 April 1917 with a $500 bond. In June the court raised the initial bond to $5,000. The director of the Bureau of Investigations, A. Bruce Bielaski, wrote to his assistant, William M. Offley, on 30 August 1917, “any alien enemy who attempts to conduct business outside of this country in German interests should not be tolerated. I will authorize, therefore the revocation of Stallforth’s parole.”

Despite Bielaski’s efforts, Stallforth remained free, likely because of his cooperation with investigators. In a letter to the Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney Raymond H. Sarfaty reported, “I believe that he has truly and candidly answered the questions proposed to him, although he did not volunteer any information except where specifically asked.” Treading carefully, Stallforth worked on legal business ventures in New York during 1917. In January 1918, after more interrogations, he headed to Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, for internment.

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19 Ibid. Also “Re: Frederico Stallforth,” undated, file 9140-878, Military Intelligence Division, RG 165, NARA.
20 See for example “Mr. Stallforth’s answers to questions asked by Mr. Bielaski and Mr. Offley,” memorandum, undated, file 8000-3089, Records of the FBI, FBI Case Files, RG 65, NARA.
21 “Statement of Frederico Stallforth,” 22 April 1917, ibid. Information includes reports Stallforth filed with the Imperial War Department concerning his activities in the summer of 1915.
22 Ibid.
23 “Application for Parole of German Enemy Alien,” 9 June 1917, file 9-16-12-97, Department of Justice, RG 65, NARA.
24 Special Assistant to U.S. Attorney Raymond H. Sarfaty to Attorney General, 23 April 1917, ibid.
Felix Sommerfeld, who remained unidentified as a German agent, joined him in June. Both stayed there until the end of 1919.

As a German agent, Stallforth played a pivotal role in German clandestine operations first against the Allies and then against the United States. Arrested on multiple occasions, interrogated but never convicted of sabotage, treason, or espionage, Stallforth’s name appears repeatedly in U.S. Justice Department files. After the brief internment as an enemy alien, Stallforth worked as a translator for the Dawes Commission in 1923. In 1925, he started working for Harris, Forbes and Co., an investment bank in Boston with significant investments in Germany. Just before the crash of 1929, Stallforth maintained an office in Berlin and worked with his fellow World War I spy, Felix Sommerfeld, as a champion for unencumbered international trade with Germany. Stallforth received a commission to negotiate with the German government on behalf of the Mixed Claims Commission on 11 September 1935. Heinrich Albert, who had risen to Minister of Reconstruction and later Secretary of the Treasury in Germany in the early 1920s, now worked for a law firm which Stallforth retained.

Nowhere in the files of the Mixed Claims Commission is there an interview between the American team and Frederico Stallforth. One would expect that to be a logical move once the depth of Stallforth’s involvement in the German sabotage campaign became known. Lawyers for the Mixed Claims Commission collected statements from Paul Hilken, Friedrich Hinsch, Franz von Papen, Franz Rintelen, Heinrich Albert, and many more, all with the purpose of understanding the organizational structure of the 1916 attack. Why not Stallforth?

Amos J. Peaslee, the chief counsel for the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, knew Frederico Stallforth “since about 1912.” He hired him as a negotiator for the American team in 1935 after their strategy to win the sabotage claims had virtually collapsed. The main witness and only known perpetrator of the bombing, Michael Kristoff, had disappeared, and according to German authorities he died in April 1928. Edwin B. Parker, the umpire of the commission, died in 1929. His successor, Roland W. Boyd, stayed only for a year. He was eventually replaced in 1932 by Owen J. Roberts of the U.S. Supreme Court. By 1935, amidst the fervor of German nationalism, the Hitler government had all but ceased cooperation with the American legal team.

In September of that year, 1935, Stallforth received a commission from the American agent to contact Heinrich F. Albert, the former head of the World
War I era German Secret War Council in New York. This was not the first time Stallforth became involved on behalf of the American side. In 1926, he opened a line of communication for the American legal team to the chancellor of Germany, Gustav Stresemann, whose Secretary of Reconstruction was none other than Heinrich Albert. In the subsequent negotiations, Stresemann seemingly supported the American efforts to settle the sabotage claims but refused to enter into an agreement a few months later. The chaos of the 1929 stock market crash and a virtual collapse of the German economy followed. In 1933, the National Socialist German Worker Party (NSDAP) took power and Adolf Hitler became German chancellor and president a year later. The American lawyer for the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, Amos Peaslee, patiently waited for another run at it. In 1935, he saw that chance. The German economy was recovering, and Stallforth, in conversations with the lawyer, touted his connections to major players in the Hitler regime.

The commissioners turned all documents in their possession over to Stallforth. This might have been the first time Stallforth saw all the evidence the American lawyers had on him. He negotiated a fee of five percent for settling the claims within a year. The negotiations took more time, however, Stallforth’s efforts and his connections with major players in the German government including Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering, Foreign Secretary Joachim von Ribbentrop, Ambassador Ulrich von Hassell, Ambassador (and former Chancellor) Franz von Papen, President of the Reichsbank Hjalmar Schacht, and the colorful Airforce General Ernst Udet paid off. In October 1939 the umpire ruled that Germany was indeed responsible for the sabotage claims. However, Hitler opposed the judgement and no money flowed until 1953. Stallforth, who had tirelessly worked to help create this settlement, only received a pittance for his efforts. Instead of a percentage [over $1 million, approximately $18 million in today’s dollars], he received a payment of $38,000 from Peaslee and $2,500 from the other claimants.

The question of whether Stallforth was a German agent at this juncture, when the American team shared all they had with him, is critical. Considering the huge fee and potential financial reward Stallforth had negotiated for himself, his loyalties were likely materialistic and less nationalistic. The most compelling reason Stallforth ever started to work for Heinrich Albert and the German sabotage agents during World War I in the first place was his dire financial situation. His family business had collapsed in the chaos of the Mexican Revolution. In New York between 1913 and 1914 he dabbled in real estate and small-time schemes

28 Ibid.
30 “Stallforth v Commissioner,” 6 T.C. 140 (1946), Docket No. 5926, Records of the Internal Revenue Service, RG 58, NARA.
to make at least some money. Then the World War started and Stallforth saw the possibility of big rewards from people like Albert who had almost $1 billion of funds [in today’s value] to disburse at his discretion. Stallforth also benefited from Rintelen’s $21 million [in today’s value] credit, a good portion of which ended in Stallforth’s bank accounts. In 1915 he could afford to buy a new house in White Plains, New York and was known for his fast cars. After the war, in his work with the Boston investment firm Harris, Forbes and Co., Stallforth capitalized on his extensive networking skills to help promote German-American economic ties.

The Mixed Claims Commission posed another, potentially lucrative opportunity to monetize his German and American networks. By the mid-1920s the Federal Statute of Limitations eliminated any danger of legal jeopardy for him personally. With the compromising knowledge he had of the sabotage efforts and role of people like Heinrich Albert and Franz von Papen he had a recipe for making a lot of money. The American lawyers never interviewed Stallforth simply because there was no need. John McCloy, Amos Peasley, Harold H. Martin, and the other lawyers on the American legal team had purposely hired Stallforth because of his knowledge and background to press the German side into a settlement. The case did not break in 1939 because of new evidence. It was Stallforth as a member of the American team and with lots of “Kompromat” who forced a settlement.

The strongest evidence that that the American lawyers had Stallforth fully under control is contained in a few memoranda in the mid-1930s. Sir William Reginald “Blinker” Hall, Great Britain’s Director of Naval Intelligence during World War I, supported Stallforth to be hired and advised the American lawyers in 1935 on how to deal with him: “If I might venture to say so, the handling of Stallforth will have to be very carefully done but I rather feel that you will have in him a key to many things if you can get him to talk.”\(^{31}\) A memorandum dated 9 April 1936 from Harold H. Martin, acting U.S. agent before the Mixed Claims Commission, reported that Stallforth was negotiating on behalf of “certain parties close to high officials in the German Government and the attitude of those officials with respect to arrangements that might be effected for the settlement of the sabotage claims.”\(^{32}\) Stallforth continued to work on the U.S. government’s behalf. In 1941, he briefly hoped to negotiate a settlement between Germany and the United States that would prevent a U.S. entry into the war. He also informed American officials on the attitudes of important German players in the Hitler regime, and, most notably, members of the resistance. In 1942, he joined the O.S.S.\(^{33}\) After World War II he remained an agent for the C.I.A. until he died in 1960.

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31 “Re: Stallforth,” 7 August 1935, Memorandum by H. H. Martin, Mixed Claims Commission, RG 76, NARA.
33 Stallforth Papers, Private Collection, Courtesy Mary Prevo, Stallforth commission and code book.
In 1875, Georges Bizet produced his famous opera Carmen for the first time. It was set a half century earlier in Seville, in southern Spain. The opera opens in a mythic cigarette factory, where the climate was allegedly so hot in mid-summer that the young gypsy girls who worked there removed the tops of their dresses to cool themselves. As the opera begins, Carmen, a hot-blooded young woman, strides onto stage: beautiful, sexy, and self-confident. She embodies all the sexual appeal attributed to the item which she and the half-naked gypsy girls produce: the cigarette.\(^1\)

The European history of tobacco, a new world plant, goes back to 1492, when Christopher Columbus and his sailors, landing in the Caribbean, discovered that natives — whom they called Indians, thinking that they had reached India — were smoking a substance which they called tobacco. That encounter was the beginning of the European use of the tobacco plant. Over the next 300 years, tobacco was refined and used by Europeans in a variety of ways: by snuffing up the nose; by placing it in the mouth, where its juice could be absorbed through the cheek and into the bloodstream; by smoking it in a pipe; and by smoking it in a tube of rolled tobacco leaves, called a “cigar.” There were various official reactions to this imported luxury, ranging from outright condemnation and banning of tobacco to accepting and taxing it.\(^2\)

The origins of the cigarette, or “little cigar,” are obscure. The cigarette was not invented. It emerged from societies in which poor people wanted to smoke tobacco, but did not have the means to purchase it in more refined forms. Tobacco leavings were simply gathered up, bound inside of a covering, perhaps corn husks or anything else that could suffice, and smoked. Only later were there papelitos, which were pre-modern cigarettes, using paper as a binder.\(^3\)

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The cigarette was probably first produced in Latin America in the late eighteenth century and then in France or Spain, in the 1830s or 1840s. It was little used in Europe until the Crimean War (1854-56) during which England and France invaded Russia’s Crimean Peninsula. The war introduced the cigarette to soldiers on both sides.\textsuperscript{4} The French and British soldiers returned home and some brought the cigarette with them.\textsuperscript{5} The availability created a short-term use of the cigarette in Britain, as did the return of soldiers with cigarettes from the Civil War in America,\textsuperscript{6} but these cigarette crazes proved to be temporary.

After the Crimean and Civil wars, in Britain and in America tobacco users reverted to traditional forms of use, although snuff usage declined in both countries. In America, plug tobacco was used by men by placing a wad of tobacco in the side of the mouth and periodically expectorating into a nearby spittoon. Spittoons in bars and other places where men gathered became as omnipresent as ashpans would become in the 1950s. In Britain and in America, the predominant form in which tobacco was consumed was the cigar, and also the pipe.\textsuperscript{7} Out of this use grew a material culture devoted to the pipe and the cigar. Men’s clubs and occasionally private homes featured a smoking room where men dressed in smoking jackets and occasionally even hats, to keep their suit jackets and hair from smelling of tobacco. Pipes were fashioned of rare materials, such as briar or meerschaum, and treated almost as religious objects.\textsuperscript{8} Smoking on the street was regarded as uncouth, and women smoking anything, anywhere, were thought to have compromised their femininity.\textsuperscript{9}

By the 1880s, however, significant changes in the way cigarettes were produced and marketed dramatically expanded the market. To begin with, an accident during the process of curing produced a different kind of tobacco, Virginia Bright, which was milder and easier to inhale than the tobacco typically used in cigars and Turkish cigarettes.\textsuperscript{10} This “inhaleability” eventually produced smokers who became addicted to the nicotine in cigarettes.\textsuperscript{11} Also in the 1880s, the young American entrepreneur, James “Buck” Duke, scion of a small North Carolina tobacco firm, decided to make the cigarette, which commanded less than 1 percent of the total tobacco market, into his leading product. He adapted a machine roller called the Bonsack machine into his production line, dramatically increasing output and lowering cost. This technology spread almost immediately to Britain.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{5} Corti, \textit{A History of Smoking}, 264; Sobel, \textit{They Satisfy}, 11-12; Klein, \textit{Cigarettes are Sublime}, 41.
\textsuperscript{6} Goodman, \textit{Tobacco in History}, 98; Sobel, \textit{They Satisfy}, p 15.
\textsuperscript{7} Goodman, \textit{Tobacco in History}, 91-93.
\textsuperscript{9} Hilton, \textit{Smoking in British Popular Culture}, 139.
\textsuperscript{10} Gately, \textit{Tobacco: A Cultural History}, 184.
\textsuperscript{12} Hilton, \textit{Smoking in British Popular Culture}, 5, 83-86. Hilton makes the larger point about relative cigarette smoking in Britain and America, noting that their experiences were very similar, ibid., 9.
Duke also began spending enormous funds on various forms of advertising, including an idea he stole from a competitor to put stiffened picture cards into each packet of cigarettes. Most of these were series entitled “Actresses,” or “ Beauties,” and were the pornography of his day, showing young women in revealing outfits, at least by the current standards, and “come-hither” looks, designed to ignite the lust of the men who were his main customers. Duke himself commented on the importance of this form of marketing: “The cigarette was used almost exclusively by a masculine clientele. . . . Many sets of cards featured either photographs or lithographs of buxom young ladies in what have seemed very daring, if not shocking, costumes.”

Also contributing to the increased use of cigarettes was the development of cheap safety matches. A would-be smoker no longer had to search for a fire somewhere; he had the wherewithal to light his cigarette on his own person. Finally, Duke relentlessly and successfully drove most of his competitors out of business, or forced them into a consolidated business which he commanded. At the same time, a huge demographic wave hit America and, to a lesser extent, Britain. Between 1880 and 1914, there was a vast immigration of men and families, usually from southern and eastern Europe. Many of these men had already been exposed to cigarettes in their own countries and, as they settled in American and British cities, became some of Duke’s best customers. By 1900, cigarettes were much more commonly-used than they had been just two decades earlier.

One might have expected that the dramatic increase in the number of smokers of the cheaper, machine-made cigarettes would have brought a degree of cultural acceptance in both Britain and America. To the contrary. The cigarette was smoked by prostitutes and women of uncertain virtue. Indeed the New York Times noted in 1879 that “the practice of cigarette-smoking among ladies seems to be generally regarded as the usual accompaniment of, or prelude to, immorality.” Writing in 1899, Josephus Daniels, then the editor of a North Carolina newspaper, noted that if “any North Carolina lady would ever smoke what were popularly called ‘coffin nails’ it would have been regarded as slander of the good women of the state.” Other groups of smokers included “new women” of the 1890s, anxious to demonstrate their liberated status, college fraternity boys who continued to

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13 Tate, Cigarette Wars, 25. There is a complete set of one of these series in the Rochester, NY Public Library.
14 Quoted in Goodman, Tobacco in History, 102. British cigarette makers also appreciated the marketing possibilities of including picture cards of famous actresses in alluring costumes by the 1890s. Hilton, Smoking in British Popular Culture, 141.
15 A good account of the development of matches can be found in Sobel, They Satisfy, 67-71.
16 Ibid., 43-58.
17 The remarkable story of Mr. Duke is an oft-told tale. See Tate, Cigarette Wars, 11-37; Courtwright, Forces of Habit, 114-122; Gately, Tobacco: A Cultural History, 206-215; and Sobel, They Satisfy, 23-42.
18 Hilton, Smoking in British Popular Culture, 140.
19 Quoted in Tate, Cigarette Wars, 24.
20 Quoted in Ibid., 24.
order hand-made cigarettes embossed with their fraternity letters, Frenchmen (in England), immigrants from Italy, Russia, and the Balkans (in America), the urban poor and, most alarmingly, street boys in their young teens who could buy cigarettes for as little as two for a penny. Finally, according to one historian, gay men in London used cigarettes as a secret signal of their sexual orientation, along with several pieces of clothing, such as a green suit and/or a red tie. In England, Oscar Wilde smoked cigarettes publicly and incessantly.

As cigarettes gained more users among such fringe social groups, they garnered even more critics, who fumed about the “devil’s smoke,” and the miscreants who used them. Even Buck Duke, the king of cigarettes, a product that made him a millionaire many times over, never smoked them. Like most men of his social position, he smoked the manly cigar. This mounting criticism of the cigarette began in the 1880s, and reached a crescendo in the years just prior to the Great War.

The deeply-rooted Christianity in Britain, and especially in America, in the late nineteenth century provided a moral context and a vocabulary for the criticism of cigarettes. From time immemorial the Devil had been associated with a regime of fire and smoke. This image fit perfectly into anti-cigarette reformers’ needs. They denounced cigarettes as “an accursed weed,” and similar epithets that would resonate with their Christian audience. Surely such a morally demeaning habit of smoking cigarettes emanated from The Evil One himself, or his advisers and helpers. Cigarette smokers were condemned to a lifetime of torture in hell for their sinful habit but, somehow, smokers of pipes and cigars escaped eternal damnation. Could it have had anything to do with the fact that the latter were mostly upper- and middle-class gentlemen, while cigarette smokers were regarded as the riff-raff of society?

The late nineteenth century was a period during which reform movements of various kinds swept across both Britain and America. One sort of movement targeted the sinful and wasteful habits of working-class men, such as drinking alcohol, patronizing prostitutes, and smoking cigarettes. From the 1880s through the first two decades of the twentieth century, temperance movements in both countries made great strides in their efforts to discourage the drinking of alcohol, either by persuasion (mostly in Britain), or by legislation (mostly in America). Their efforts were often mirrored by anti-cigarette organizations. The Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) noted in 1885 that “smoking leads to drinking, and drinking leads to the devil.”

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22 Tate, Cigarette Wars, 8, 29; Gately, Tobacco: A Cultural History, 216-217; Sobel, They Satisfy, 7.
24 Hilton, Smoking in British Popular Culture, 1, 55-56.
25 Tate, Cigarette Wars, 30.
26 Quoted in ibid., 28.
Of course, we know that the WCTU and other like-minded groups achieved their legislative goal and, from 1920 through 1932, the consumption of alcohol in America was prohibited by law if not always in practice. However, it is less well-known that one movement, the Anti-Cigarette League of America, founded in 1899 and led by Lucy Page Gaston, along with other lesser-known organizations, succeeded in persuading legislatures in sixteen states, including Florida, to ban cigarettes between 1890 and 1930. Although none of these bans lasted very long, as enforcement was nearly impossible, Florida holds the record for the shortest ban — a few months in the year 1899. The members of the British Parliament, who were less bent than their American counterparts on reforming adult behavior, settled for passing a 1908 “Children’s Act,” that prohibited selling cigarettes to boys under the age of sixteen. After that, the organized anti-cigarette movement in Britain faded away.

Another line of attack on cigarettes was their alleged ill effects on the health of smokers. One of the most frequently used terms in this context was that smoking produced a disease called “cigarette heart,” which would lead to a state of general debilitation. This allegation of the health dangers of smoking cigarettes was ill-defined, and certainly lacked any scientific proof at this early date. Reports began to appear in the New York Times of the deadly effects of smoking tobacco, and especially cigarettes. One article ended with an analysis of the effects of cigarette smoking in America with the following warning: “The decadence of Spain began when the Spaniards adopted cigarettes, and if this pernicious habit obtains among adult Americans, the ruin of the Republic is close at hand.”

Still other health-related attacks focused on the way in which smoking cigarettes “took the wind” of athletes who smoked. This result was particularly evident in young men who participated in such sports as running, rowing, or soccer which required strong lungs. It is worth noting that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, lung cancer was virtually non-existent. Thus while observers noted correctly that cigarette smoking impeded lung function, they did not tie it to a specific disease. However, the New York Times published an article in 1888 which came very close to the truth: “We are informed that there has been latterly a great increase in malignant throat diseases, almost exclusively confined to males. . . . This set doctors on the track of tobacco and induced them to accept the theory that smoking was in most cases the cause of the ailment.” Finally, some sources claimed that cigarettes contributed to premature death of the smoker. One

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28 Hilton, Smoking in British Popular Culture, 61-65
of the earliest mentions of cigarettes in the *New York Times* was an article in 1882: “These conditions of the heart, liver and spleen, Dr. Mesemer said, would be accounted for the excessive use of tobacco,” of which the most harmful cause of this case of tobacco poisoning was likely cigarettes.\(^{32}\)

The American geneticist, Luther Burbank, wrote that cigarettes were “nothing more or less than a slow but sure form of lingering suicide.”\(^{33}\) Looking to popular culture, the term coffin nails, a reference to the deadly effects of cigarettes, became common in the 1880s, the very decade that cigarette usage first expanded in America.\(^{34}\) While these early health warnings about cigarettes were without a scientific foundation, it is interesting that the major lines of attack pre-figured some of the most important scientific claims about the health issues surrounding cigarettes in the period beginning in 1950: heart disease, lung malfunction, and shorter longevity for smokers.

Finally, there was an attack on cigarette users by some of the most prominent businessmen of the era, because cigarette smokers were allegedly persons of low character. This line was followed by Henry Ford, Thomas Edison, the breakfast cereal entrepreneur John Harvey Kellogg, and John Wanamaker, a leading retail merchant of the day.\(^{35}\) Henry Ford published a series of four pamphlets in 1914-1916 called *The Case Against the Little White Slaver*, featuring quotations from employers about their unwillingness to hire cigarette smokers.\(^{36}\) Ford drew on the term “white slavery,” which was a current euphemism for the social evil of prostitution, carrying the connotation that white women who were forced into prostitution were akin to slaves. Ford clearly meant to imply that cigarettes were a form of slavery, since those who began to use them found it nearly impossible to stop. Ford also noted that cigarettes were what a later generation would call a gateway drug: “Morphine is the legitimate consequence of alcohol, and alcohol is the legitimate consequence of tobacco.”\(^{37}\) Edison also joined Ford and Wanamaker in denouncing cigarettes and all three pledged that they would never hire men who smoked them.\(^{38}\) However, Edison smoked ten to twenty cigars a day, and believed that he had nothing to explain or apologize for.\(^{39}\) Kellogg wrote a book entitled *Tobaccoism or How Tobacco Kills* (1921). Kellogg took a wider view than Edison or Ford, and condemned all forms of tobacco use: “The ‘smoker’ is the enemy of good health, of good scholarship, of good morals.”\(^{40}\) He was focused on young men, especially college men, who used tobacco: “The use of tobacco

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\(^{33}\) Quoted in Gately, Tobacco: A Cultural History, 218.

\(^{34}\) Tate, Cigarette Wars, 19.

\(^{35}\) Gately, Tobacco: A Cultural History, 225.

\(^{36}\) Tate, Cigarette Wars, 55; Corti, A History of Smoking, 262.

\(^{37}\) Quoted in Gately, Tobacco: A Cultural History, 230.

\(^{38}\) Tate, Cigarette Wars, 55; Gately, Tobacco: A Cultural History, 225.

\(^{39}\) Tate, Cigarette Wars, 18.

by college students is closely associated with idleness, lack of ambition, and low scholarship.”

As indicated above, the history of tobacco is intertwined with differing modes of usage. Snuff, pipes, cigars, chewing tobacco, all had their day since tobacco’s discovery by Europeans in the late fifteenth century. Then the cigarette had an inauspicious introduction into America and Europe in the later nineteenth century. But the Great War gave the cigarette a more fulsome welcome, and the thirty-some years following, 1920-1950, saw the “golden age” of cigarettes in America and Europe. That era came to a long, slow death as scientists began to publish studies showing that smoking cigarettes caused lung cancer and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), accelerated heart disease, and did in fact shorten life, just as the nineteenth-century health critics of cigarettes had claimed. As Brits and Americans gradually responded to these results by quitting smoking — as I did — or by not taking it up, the rate of smoking in America fell from a high of 44 percent of the adult population to about 14 percent today. Interestingly, a habit which was once widespread across all demographics has recently been confined mostly to Americans of low income and low education. In gatherings of adult academics, for example, it is rare to find even a single cigarette smoker. Since the 1980s, smokers have been vilified and driven from most public spaces when they wish to smoke. As they were a hundred years earlier, the users of cigarettes are once again portrayed as social deviants in the thrall of a pernicious habit.

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41 Ibid., 87.
The Dishonorable Burial of Jesus of Nazareth by Joseph of Arimathea
J. D. Reiner
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Introduction: How Was Jesus Buried?

What happened to Jesus of Nazareth after his death by crucifixion around AD 30? While the Gospels agree on the general outline of what happened, historians have analyzed them critically in order to see how much historically reliable information they contain. Experts on the historical Jesus have developed several theories based on the evidence in Christian, Jewish, and Graeco-Roman sources. Most theories fall into one of three groups. On the one hand, conservative historians tend to think that a follower of Jesus named Joseph of Arimathea buried Jesus honorably in the latter’s rock-hewn tomb.¹ On the other hand, a few liberal historians believe the Romans followed their usual crucifixion practices and left Jesus’ body on the cross to decay, after which they may have tossed his body into a shallow grave to be dug up and eaten by dogs.² However, the most common view is that the Jewish leadership buried Jesus dishonorably in a criminal’s tomb.³

This article will support the third view. More specifically, it will argue that Joseph of Arimathea, a historical person, buried Jesus in a criminal’s tomb with the cooperation of the Sanhedrin and the Romans. Three reasons support this claim: first, Joseph of Arimathea, as well as the rest of the Sanhedrin, wanted to bury Jesus dishonorably to follow proper Jewish burial practices regarding executed criminals and to shame Jesus; second, Pontius Pilate wanted Jesus to be buried like a criminal because it conveniently satisfied both Roman and Jewish interests; and third, the Gospel burial accounts preserve apparent marks of dishonor. Before presenting the three reasons, though, the relevant primary sources will be analyzed and contextualized.

² For the non-burial view, see John Dominic Crossan, Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography (New York: HarperOne, 2009), 158; Bart D. Ehrman, How Jesus Became God: The Exaltation of a Jewish Preacher from Galilee (New York: HarperOne, 2014), 157. While Ehrman does not formally espouse the non-burial hypothesis, he says it is impossible to know what happened to Jesus’ body.
Analyzing the Primary Sources

Understanding the three arguments for a dishonorable burial requires some understanding of the primary sources. The sources that directly address Jesus’ entombment are 1 Corinthians, Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, and the non-canonical Gospel of Peter. 1 Corinthians 15:3-5 is the earliest document attesting Jesus’ burial, but it does not provide any details, so it is only useful for attesting that Jesus was buried in some manner. The earliest full burial story, though, comes from Mark, who composed his Gospel around AD 70. His passage is the most historically reliable and is quoted below.⁴

When evening had come, and since it was the day of Preparation, that is, the day before the sabbath, Joseph of Arimathea, a respected member of the council, who was also himself waiting expectantly for the kingdom of God, went boldly to Pilate and asked for the body of Jesus. Then Pilate wondered if he were already dead; and summoning the centurion, he asked him whether he had been dead for some time. When he learned from the centurion that he was dead, he granted the body to Joseph. Then Joseph brought a linen cloth, and taking down the body, wrapped it in the linen cloth, and laid it in a tomb that had been hewn out of the rock. He then rolled a stone against the door of the tomb. Mary Magdalene and Mary the mother of Joses saw where the body was laid.⁵

The Gospel of John, which is independent of Mark and was probably written after AD 90, corroborates Mark on important points and adds more details. Here, Joseph is a secret disciple of Jesus, he buries Jesus in a garden tomb in which no one had been buried before, and he anoints Jesus’ body with about one hundred pounds of myrrh and aloes in addition to wrapping him in a linen cloth. Unlike John, Matthew and Luke were both written in the 80s, and they borrowed the bulk of their literary material from Mark, but these two Gospels are important for showing how early Christians retold the burial story based on earlier stories and traditions. Lining up the Gospels in order of composition, along with the Gospel of Peter which dates to the early second century, shows a chain of elaborations to the story that beautify and dignify the burial. The table below illustrates the development of the details in the burial stories.⁶

Notice that in the earlier story of Mark, Joseph seems to be just a good councilmember who buries Jesus in a generic rock-cut tomb. However, as the burial story evolves, small details are added, such as Joseph’s being a disciple of Jesus, the fact that the tomb belongs to Joseph, and the additional spices with which Jesus is anointed. The important point here is that each successive Gospel

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⁴ Ehrman, *How Jesus Became God*, 90-95, 137.
⁵ Mark 15:42-47, NRSV.
preserves the basic version of Mark’s story, but these Gospels are also “shot through with theology,” as one expert describes it. While the Gospel writers were writing “biographies” of Jesus using the written and oral sources they had, they were also portraying Jesus theologically as the Messiah, and to the early Christians and ancient people in general, those two goals were not contradictory. Paying attention to these details is important when constructing a theory about how Jesus was buried, and now it is possible to explain the reasons that his entombment was a shameful one.

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7 McCane, 99.

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<td>Who Was Joseph of Arimathea?</td>
<td>Respected council member awaiting the Kingdom of God</td>
<td>Disciple of Jesus and rich man</td>
<td>Council member against killing Jesus and awaiting the Kingdom of God</td>
<td>Secret disciple of Jesus</td>
<td>Friend and witness of the many good things Jesus did</td>
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<td>Where Was Jesus Buried?</td>
<td>Rock-hewn tomb</td>
<td>Joseph’s new, rock-hewn tomb</td>
<td>Rock-hewn tomb in which no one had been laid</td>
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<td>How Was Jesus’ Body Treated?</td>
<td>Wrapped in linen cloth</td>
<td>Wrapped in clean linen cloth</td>
<td>Wrapped in linen cloth</td>
<td>Wrapped in linen cloths and 100 lbs. of myrrh and aloes</td>
<td>Washed and wrapped in linen cloth</td>
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Reason 1: Joseph (and the Sanhedrin) Had Motives to Bury Jesus Dishonorably

The first piece of evidence for dishonorable burial is that Joseph of Arimathea had multiple motives to bury Jesus dishonorably. But his existence must be established since not all historians agree that Joseph was a historical figure. Several reasons support his existence. First, he is independently attested. He is mentioned by name in two independent Gospels, Mark and John. Second, Joseph’s name bears no evidence of invention. The name “Joseph” means “to add,” and Arimathea was an obscure town with no connection to Jewish sacred history. If pre-Gospel tradition had invented Joseph and his name, then their choice was not very theologically sensible.\(^9\) Third, the criterion of embarrassment suggests that the Gospels did not invent Joseph. Instead of narrating a comforting story in which Jesus’ disciples heroically bury their master, the Gospels write that the disciples ran away and hid while a presumed enemy of Jesus piously buried him. The only explanation for this embarrassing story is that Joseph really did bury Jesus. As one historian writes, “that the burial was done by Joseph from Arimathea is very probable, since a Christian fictional creation from nothing of a Jewish Sanhedrist who does what is right is almost inexplicable.”\(^10\)

Even though one can be reasonably certain that Joseph existed, each Gospel depicts him a little differently. Joseph appears in Mark as “waiting expectantly for the kingdom of God.”\(^11\) In Matthew and John, he is described as a disciple of Jesus, and in the Gospel of Peter, he is “the friend of Pilate and of the Lord.”\(^12\) Many historians think that Joseph was Christianized more and more by each account, leading them to say that he must have been just a pious councilmember and not a disciple of Jesus. Regardless, whether he was or was not a follower of Jesus could not have changed the way he buried Jesus because an honorable burial would not have worked for the Roman authorities, as will be argued below.\(^13\)

Regarding the motives for burial, Joseph first wanted to follow biblical laws about burying executed criminals. All four Gospels agree that Joseph was a pious Jew, so he took seriously the need to bury Jesus before sunset to avoid ritually polluting the land. The law that applied to Jesus’ case is the following passage from Deuteronomy:

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\(^11\) Mark 15:42, NRSV.

\(^12\) Gospel of Peter 2:3; a translation of the Gospel of Peter is found in Brown, Death of the Messiah, 1318.

\(^13\) Brown, Death of the Messiah, 1214-1222; McCane, 101; for an effective critique of Crossan’s assertion that Joseph was invented, see Gerald O’Collins and Daniel Kendall, “Did Joseph of Arimathea Exist?” Biblica 75, no. 2 (1994): 235-41.
When someone is convicted of a crime punishable by death and is executed, and you hang him on a tree, his corpse must not remain all night upon the tree; you shall bury him that same day, for anyone hung on a tree is under God’s curse. You must not defile the land that the Lord your God is giving you for possession.\textsuperscript{14}

One can easily notice the similarities between this law and Jesus’ mode of execution. Most historians agree that many contemporary Jewish observers associated crucifixion with the curse Deuteronomy 21:22-23 because the executed criminal was hung up for display in a manner similar to the Old Testament period. Paul the Apostle, himself an observant Jew, seems to have agreed. He writes in one of his letters, “Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us—for it is written, ‘Cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree.’”\textsuperscript{15} Paul certainly has the Deuteronomy passage in mind here. Given that association, Joseph needed to bury Jesus by sunset to avoid defiling the land with a decaying corpse. The only way to do that was to ask Pilate for the body and bury it in accordance with the law.\textsuperscript{16}

The other motive is that Joseph and the Sanhedrin had an interest in shaming Jesus. While the Sanhedrin almost certainly did not play as large a role in Jesus’ execution as the Romans did, Jesus’ movement was not politically convenient because his preaching was easily interpreted as seditious; after all, his ministry was controversial enough to culminate in his execution for treason in the first place. Burying Jesus shamefully would show the Romans that the Sanhedrin was not supporting sedition. The Gospel of John dramatically portrays their situation, set in the context of Jesus’ raising of Lazarus from the dead:

So the chief priests and the Pharisees called a meeting of the council, and said, “What are we to do? This man is performing many signs. If we let him go on like this, everyone will believe in him, and the Romans will come and destroy both our holy place and our nation.” But one of them, Caiaphas, who was high priest that year, said to them, “You know nothing at all! You do not understand that it is better for you to have one man die for the people than to have the whole nation destroyed.”\textsuperscript{17}

Although John is most likely not narrating a literal meeting of the council, the idea of this passage is that the Sanhedrin had reason to be worried about the political ramifications of Jesus’ ministry. The Jewish authorities, including Joseph

\textsuperscript{14} Deuteronomy 21:22-23, NRSV.
\textsuperscript{15} Galatians 3:13, NRSV.
\textsuperscript{16} Magness, 142, believes that the same stigma attached to executions by the Sanhedrin was not applied to Roman crucifixion. In any case, it seems that enough Jews associated a hanging criminal in both cases as falling under Deuteronomy 21:22-23 for the characterization to make sense; Brown, Death of the Messiah, 1211-1212.
\textsuperscript{17} John 11:47-50, NRSV.
of Arimathea, wanted to protect themselves and their nation, so they had to secure a dishonorable burial.  

**Reason 2: Dishonorable Burial Met the Interests of Both Pilate and the Sanhedrin**

The second argument for dishonorable burial is that it was the best option for Pontius Pilate to prevent possible political perturbations. As the governor of Judea, Pilate’s main interest was to uphold Roman power. Thus, he would not have been friendly to any messianic movements. However, he often cooperated with the Jewish authorities like the Sanhedrin for practical reasons. For example, according to Josephus, Pilate once brought banners bearing Caesar’s image into Jerusalem. The Jews protested vehemently at Caesarea because they opposed such images on theological grounds. Pilate refused to remove the banners and threatened to kill the protestors. When the Jews showed they would rather die than accept the banners, Pilate relented and removed the images. Thus, while Pilate was not friendly to the Jews, he could be persuaded to appease them.

Also, it was quite conceivable for Roman governors like Pilate to let people bury crucified victims. While it is true that the Romans usually left bodies on their crosses to decay, in remote provinces like Judea where Pilate governed, practices often deviated from the norm. Only during times of open revolt did the Romans leave criminals on crosses. There is also positive evidence that the Jews were allowed to bury crucified criminals. In the archaeological record of ancient Palestine, the skeleton of one crucified victim named Yohanan has been discovered in a family tomb. However, archaeologists were only able identify him because of the tell-tale nail permanently lodged in his foot, which was usually removed before burial; undoubtedly, he was not the only criminal given a normal burial close to Jesus’ time. Additionally, such a proper burial was especially likely in three scenarios: first, if someone loyal to Rome asked for the criminal’s body; second, if the crucifixion happened during religious holidays; or third, if the execution was not part of a crackdown against a revolt. In short, Pilate had no reason to deny a reasonable request by Joseph to bury Jesus.

But the most significant point is that both Pilate’s interests and the Sanhedrin’s interests could be satisfied only by a dishonorable burial. Pilate needed to keep Jesus’ body from being venerated by his followers, and the Sanhedrin needed to

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18 For the historicity of Jesus’ controversial activities leading to his crucifixion, see Meier, 177. Meier believes that the apparent political and theological controversy Jesus caused is the only way to explain his execution for treason by Rome. Thus, his execution can be used as a secondary (but not primary) criterion for judging if a particular deed or saying is historical.


20 McCane, 91-93; Brown, “Burial of Jesus,” 235-236; Magness 144; Crossan, 124; for a more detailed explanation of the Yohanan ossuary and his burial, see Craig A. Evans, *Jesus and the Ossuaries: What Jewish Burial Practices Reveal About the Beginning of Christianity* (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2003), 98-103.
avoid defiling the land with an unburied corpse. Jesus was not the first potential messianic figure to arise in recent years. Several had come before him and failed, so the best policy was to extinguish every movement as completely as possible. If Pilate were to allow Jesus’ followers or family to bury him, then his disciples could preserve his resting place and venerate him, possibly causing more disturbances later. Contrariwise, leaving him on the cross in normal Roman fashion would anger the Jews unnecessarily because it violated their law. Since Pilate’s overarching concern was to keep the peace, his only workable option was to grant the body to Joseph.  

**Reason 3: The Gospels Include Visible Marks of Dishonor**

The third reason for thinking the burial was dishonorable is that the Gospels themselves preserve apparent aspects of shame when narrating Jesus’ entombment. Common criminals in most societies were – and still are – denied normal burial rites. The Jews were no exception. Much of historians’ current knowledge about Jewish dishonorable burial practices during Jesus’ time come from the Mishnah. Even though the Mishnah was largely composed after the first century, it is a useful source because burial practices in most societies are conservative and undergo few alterations over time. The common thread in the Mishnah and other primary sources is that honorable Jewish burials included both a family tomb and mourners. The Gospels, strikingly, include neither of those.

Regarding the first mark of dishonor, the tomb in which Joseph buried Jesus did not belong to Jesus’ family. An honorable burial would have included a family tomb of some type. Perhaps the reason that Matthew and the Gospel of Peter say the tomb belonged to Joseph was to fulfill that requirement in the most feasible way. But Joseph probably would not have placed the body in his tomb because it is not certain that he was a disciple of Jesus, and even if he were, Pilate most likely would not have allowed him to entomb Jesus buried honorably. It seems that the Jews kept burial sites near the places of execution outside Jerusalem in order to bury the criminals before sunset. In the Mishnah, there are descriptions of caves that Jewish authorities used for burying criminals. According to Mishnah Sanhedrin 6:5, “They used not to bury him in the burying-place of his fathers, but two burying-places were kept in readiness by the court, one for them that were beheaded or strangled, and one for them there were stoned or burnt.”

Many experts believe that was where Jesus was buried, even though he was slightly atypical because he underwent a Roman execution rather than a Jewish one.
Regarding the second mark, there is no record of mourners at Jesus’ burial. Honorable Jewish burials usually included mourners to weep over the deceased. The Gospels include mourners in other burial stories, such as the death of Lazarus in John 11:17-36, so the fact that they do not include them in the narrative of Jesus’ burial is significant. At the most, some women familiar with Jesus observed where the tomb was and planned to anoint the body after the Sabbath. If any mourning rituals took place for Jesus, then it would have been expedient for the Gospels to mention them, but they do not. Some may counter that there was no time to mourn because Jesus died around three o’clock in the afternoon, assuming Mark’s timeframe is correct. This left only a few hours to bury him before sunset, although some estimates say that it would have taken fewer than two hours to do the job. While the timing is important, it makes no difference for the presence of mourners: no one sympathetic to Jesus was in control of his body, and those who were in control of it would not have given it to any sympathizers to undergo honorable rites.

Conclusion: Jesus’ Dishonorable Burial and Why it Matters

To conclude, the most likely hypothesis about what happened to Jesus is that Joseph of Arimathea, the Sanhedrin, and the Romans cooperated to bury Jesus shamefully in a criminal’s tomb. That was the option that matched their disparate interests best. It worked for Joseph and the Sanhedrin because they needed to follow the rules for burying criminals found in Deuteronomy 21:22-23, and they had a political interest in shaming Jesus. It worked for Pilate because it would discredit Jesus’ movement while at the same time accommodating the Jewish laws about keeping the land pure. Any other type of burial could have easily caused issues either for the Jews or for the Romans — or for both. And of course, Jesus and his followers’ opinions did not matter, so entertaining their interests was of no interest.

But his followers’ interests were served in the end. Ironically, everything about Jesus’ burial was designed to make people forget about him and to discredit him as a messianic figure. Not only were the authorities burying Jesus; they were trying to bury his memory in the ground forever. Instead, exactly the opposite happened. Rather than fading into nothing, his movement has spread to become the largest religion in the world, with over two billion adherents who continue to bear fruit in his name.

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25 McCane, 102-103; Brown, Death of the Messiah, 1211.
Governmental Interference into Women’s Roles in British Society

The spy and Kay sit across from each other at the table. His hands are held up in the air; her hand grasps the gun she has pointed at his heart. With her free hand, she puts a cigarette to her lips. “Please,” he whispers.

She surveys him for a moment and then tosses the cigarette at him. As it falls short, her hands unconsciously move forward as if to pick it up. But that is all the distraction the German needs before he lunges for the gun. They grapple for it until he manages to wrest it from her. He savagely strikes her across the face and flees, leaving her stunned and dazed on the floor.¹

This is a scene from a short propaganda film produced by the British Ministry of Information in 1940 entitled Miss Grant Goes to the Door which was intended to educate those on the Homefront how to recognize enemy parachutists and how to handle it should they encounter one. The movie has a happy ending. Though Miss Grant is left unconscious on the floor, she soon awakes while her sister, at the police station, interrupts a class of Local Defense Volunteers (LDV) being taught how to recognize a German parachutist and how to handle one in case of invasion. As the German spy tries to escape, strapping young LDV members come to her rescue and capture him quickly and without trouble.

This film is an example of the British government using propaganda domestically during World War II to teach the public about how to cope with the dangerous and foreign situations that might be thrust upon them during war. This film is also an example of how the government was using propaganda to instruct women specifically how to behave and what their role was during war time.

With the onset of World War II, the British government did not want to repeat the same missteps they had made in World War I. They needed the assistance of women to win the new war, but they wanted women to know that the need for their assistance was only temporary — that when the war was over, life would go back to how it was, pre-war, and that women working actively in the public sphere was only for wartime emergencies.

In trying to convey this message, the British government pushed an idea of femininity and what being a woman meant, as well as what women were capable of. They used pop culture media like propaganda films, posters, pamphlets, magazines

¹ Rodney Ackland, Miss Grant Goes to the Door, directed by Brian Desmond Hurst (London: Ministry of Information/D&P Studios, 1940).
and more to showcase the kind of modern woman many male government officials believed that Britain needed at the time. Sir Kenneth Clark, a leader of the Ministry of Information, said in a BBC Broadcast in October 1940 that the point of the domestic propaganda, such as films like *Miss Grant Goes to the Door*, which was created by the government, was “to help people to remember government messages by putting them in a dramatic form.” However, their message was unwieldy and unclear. The modern woman that they showcased was full of contradictions.

The government had to fight against two issues: first, that their rhetoric of separate spheres during the Interwar Years had proven too effective and they now had to reverse their message to engage women to join the fights; and second, that the conservative party in power that had been less than supportive of women’s issues until that point now had to appeal directly to women and did not know how to effectively do so. Within a single ad, the government would contradict itself. For example, a governmental ad in a popular ladies’ magazine, published in the early 1940s, was a drawing of two men in uniform, relaxing with their feet up, talking with this text:

“Joan’s doing a **real** job,”/ “That’s what I like about her. She’s not playing at war work. Once she heard my story of what women **could** do for our chaps she was off like a flash to join the W.A.A.F. Gets her stripes soon . . . and **deserves** it.”/ The R.A.F. wants more women like Joan . . . and that means more women like you. You’ll wear a proud uniform. You’ll get a close up of the war. And **you’ll share responsibility with airmen who are making history**.3

The government was advertising positions open with a specific agency while denigrating other war work women were involved in — usually at the behest of the government. Governmental propaganda early in the War delivered conflicting messages, seemingly cognizant of what women could do and still unwilling to use them in a meaningful way. Both men and women were conscripted, though for different kinds of labor. Often, the jobs offered to women came across as useless, menial tasks that seemed like they would have no effect on changing the tides of war in the big picture. But these were the positions they were offered by the government. And such ads belittled them for doing what the government had pressed them to do.

Many women were already somewhat reticent to assist in the war effort after they had been rebuffed from working in the interwar years, and those who were eager to help had a hard time finding an appropriate outlet through which to offer their assistance. Often, the propaganda at the onset of World War II called for women to be active while not giving them outlets for this action and belittling any efforts they did make, showing how the best help a woman could provide was to do nothing.

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2 Reprinted in *Documentary Newsletter*, 1, November 1, 1940, reprint, 4-5.
The public mind to the trained propagandist is a pool into which phrases and thoughts are dropped like acids, with a foreknowledge of the reactions that will take place, just as [a biologist] . . . can make a thousand crustaceans stop swimming aimlessly about in the bowl and rush with one headlong impulse to the side where the light comes from, merely by introducing into the water a little drop of a chemical.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{5} “Cinema: War Shorts,”\textit{ Time}, Sept. 1940.
\textsuperscript{6} Aldgate,\textit{ Britain Can Take It}, 123.
\textsuperscript{7} “Propaganda and the Role of the State in Inter-War Britain,”\textit{ New York Tribune}, 12 July 1918.
By as early as War’s end in 1918, the public was aware of the importance of propaganda. And by the start of World War II, it had become common knowledge, as evidenced by noted English novelist Arthur Calder-Marshall, who said, “whatever of social importance is done to-day . . . must be done with the help of propaganda. Propaganda is the executive arm of the invisible government.”

Following World War I it was decided that the Ministry of Information, which was dedicated to propaganda, after its success in the War, should be retained, but its image rebranded and its purpose re-tooled. This rebranding led to reconstruction of the Ministry of Information. Before, it handled international propaganda. Now, as there was no war and no enemies to outwit, it would be devoted to domestic propaganda. However, the Ministry of Information was instead only operated during times of crisis, and the lack of public controversy, especially during the 1920s, meant that it was not very active. Many historians suggest that this was due to government’s distaste at using propaganda, and successful propaganda at that, during the War. No long-term policies regarding domestic propaganda were formed. In the 1930s, as tension grew stronger in Europe, the Ministry of Information, also sometimes referred to as the Ministry of Morale, and officials were cognizant of the importance that domestic propaganda played.

In conflicts in which whole populations were considered — and exhorted to think of themselves — as front-line troops, the role of civilian was crucial. . . . The citizen’s morale and his willingness to contribute on the war effort had therefore become of decisive military importance. . . . Defeat might not flow from the collapse of armies on a conventional battlefield but from the breakdown of morale at home.

As time went on, the invaluable nature of propaganda could not be ignored and indeed it had to be used to safeguard the British way of life. Government officials and politicians alike agreed that disseminating information and advertising or bringing it to the forefront of the public’s attention was imperative. The Ministry began to try to establish itself once more and put its best foot forward as World War II loomed closer on the horizon. It failed spectacularly.

Peter Cromwell wrote in “The Propaganda Problem” for the Horizon:

what propaganda efforts are being made by the government . . . are so helplessly amateurish that they have succeeded in achieving only one effect, that, fortunately, not quite useless, to convince people that their case must be better than it appears. There is, in fact, not only no plan and no policy, but

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9 Mariel Grant, Propaganda and the Role of the State in Inter-War Britain (New York: Oxford Press, 1994), 41.
10 Grant, Propaganda and the Role of the State, 34-35.
appalling technique. Worst of all, there is very little realization officially that a good job is not being done.\textsuperscript{12}

The Ministry was roasted by both the press and the public during the first half of the War. It was referred to as “the Ministry of Aggravation\textsuperscript{13}” and “Public Failure Number One,” described as “rather like a child’s home-made scooter, nailed together from bits of an old packing-case . . . the wheels tied on with string,”\textsuperscript{14} and that “complete unsuitability” has been the hiring standards for the Ministry.\textsuperscript{15} In the debate on whether or not to allow publishing the whereabouts of the Ministry of Information, one journalist made a joke, “God knows why [anyone would care about the Ministry’s location]? Hitler’d never bomb this place. It’s the only victory he’s won so far!”\textsuperscript{16} The irony of an entity responsible for keeping up morale having its name so besmirched and dragged through the dirt was inescapable.

Historians including Mariel Grant, Ian McLaine, Philip Taylor, and Temple Willcox have come to a consensus on the factors that led to the Ministry’s shoddy job. First and foremost, as highlighted by the quotations above, was the disparate hiring practices of the Ministry. Though perhaps at the time it can be argued that experts in the fields of morale and propaganda may have been sparse on the ground, related fields like journalism and psychology were not only ignored but outright rejected. The people working for the Ministry were male, educated, and upper class, used to cushy government jobs, and they often had no experience in the field that they had been thrust into working. Because of their lack of expertise in these areas, their understanding of the British public was flawed, and this is what poisoned their campaigns.

Another major factor was class differences. Instead of being able to look beyond their own class and understanding of British society, they were only able to embody and interact with their own. The propagandists could not separate themselves from their own biases. This caused the messages their campaigns churned out to be incongruent with how other classes making up British society viewed themselves.\textsuperscript{17} These class differences also created a divide between the public and the Ministry’s image as they came across as superior and patronizing, which only repelled the public more from the Ministry as an institution.

The Ministry was also set back by the lack of proper guidelines and standards from the previous pre-war administration. All information and records on the Ministry’s actions during World War I disappeared and the new administration had

\textsuperscript{13} “Propaganda.” \textit{Times}, December 1939.
\textsuperscript{14} John Hargrave, \textit{Words Win Wars -Propaganda, the Mightiest Weapon of All} (London: Wells Gardner, Darton & Co., 1940), 57.
\textsuperscript{15} Beverly Baxter, \textit{Men, Martyrs and Mountebanks: Beverly Baxter's Inner Story of Personalities and Events Behind the War} (London: Collins Publishers, 1940), 183-184.
\textsuperscript{16} Norman Riley, \textit{999 and All That} (London: V. Gollancz Ltd, 1940), 42.
\textsuperscript{17} McLaine, 11.
nothing from which to build. In 1938, one official told Sir Stephen Tallents, who had been the Director of the Ministry since it’s reboot in 1936, that “to produce anything coherent has in many cases been rather like completing a Chinese puzzle with the key pieces missing.”

**Ministry of Information Pamphlets**

One technique that the Ministry of Information continually applied throughout the war was the publication of pamphlets and booklets. Often the language used in these pamphlets was coded and worked to reinforce the gender roles that officials endorsed. Men were the fighters while women did the easy work and worried at home. However, in politicians’ attempts to appeal to as much of the Homefront as possible, their enforcement of these roles sometimes became distorted. Throughout the war, the Ministry of Information continually coded gender roles into the pamphlets they published. In 1944, they published a pamphlet where the outside cover page depicts a stylish yet practical woman walking and smiling, as though the war does not worry her in her self-sufficiency. Behind her is a silhouette of an obviously feminine and curvy munitions worker, tool in hand. Yet, the pamphlet is entitled “**Man power: The Story of the Mobilisation for War,**” with heavy emphasis placed on the word “man” on its cover. This constant discrepancy between what the Ministry called for women to do regarding the war effort, to stay home and do only the bare minimum to help the country or to give their true all for God and country, reiterates the question: What message were they trying to send to women of the nation? Women could take from it what they wanted. How women were to be regarded and what their roles were during war time were continually skewed by the Ministry of Information.

**The Most Popular Poster Campaigns**

In addition to the literature that the Ministry put out, they also tried to advertise different lessons they wanted to impart to their citizens. Many of their campaigns were ill-advised, but, their poster campaigns sent out some of the strongest mixed messages. One such mini campaign was the infamous "Up housewives and at ‘em" poster designed by cartoonist Yates-Wilson. Its title and theme were extracted from Herbert Morrison's speech made in August 1940. Three women, presumably housewives, one young, one middle aged, one old march militantly with a banner with "Up housewives and at ‘em." They are looking stoically forward, intent with their mission. This seems to go along with the equal cry for help of men and women made by politicians at the war’s start. However, the caption beneath them clarifies the government’s true intent: “Put out your paper, metal, bones! They make planes,

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18 Ibid., 14.

guns, tanks, ships, and ammunition.”20 This does not correlate with the previous calls for everyone, no matter who they were, to give their all, in aid of their country if all the government asks of the women is to contribute scraps in times of need as though they are incapable of providing anything more.

Despite many of the Ministry of Information’s failings, one of their most successful campaigns was that of “Careless Talk Costs Lives.” Its aim was to prevent valuable information from getting to the enemy rather than stopping the circulation of stories that could damage morale on the Homefront. “Careless Talk Costs Lives” was particularly long-lasting and had many iterations. At first, its success stemmed from its simple depictions and uncomplicated humor, which the people appreciated. Designed by popular cartoonist Fougasse (the pen name for Cyril Kenneth Bird), they showed everyday people having conversations, in their living rooms, on the bus, living the same lives as the viewers did.68 It was easier for people to understand the inherent danger of what they were doing by seeing it represented in their own lives without being condemned for it. Fougasse’s cartoons were egalitarian, depicting both men and women and not blaming one gender more for gossip.

However, a new iteration of the “Careless Talk Costs Lives” Campaign was revived in 1942. It had a more specific message: “Keep Mum, She’s Not So Dumb!” Many showed men talking to beautiful women. The images make it clear that the women are at fault for the spread of gossip; while it warns men not to tell women about sensitive information, it does so by insinuating that these women will gossip and share the information blindly. The women are the treacherous party in this campaign. These posters portrayed gossip as a wholly feminine activity— for the men to “gossip” and tell a woman any sensitive information, made him more feminine, and that women were the “true” gossips of society. The posters show a man talking to a beautiful woman, losing his head and confiding all in her.21

This campaign evolved too over time and shifted from portraying women as air heads, simply regurgitating information they had heard without thought, to showing women as predatory. The most famous poster of the entire campaign features a woman surrounded by an officer from each of the Armed Forces about her, underlined by the joint phrases “Keep Mum, She’s Not So Dumb! Careless Talk Costs Lives.” The woman is beautiful, generous amounts of blonde hair piled atop her head in an intricate bun, her manicured fingers sharpened into claws. She represents the epitome of femininity at this time, reclined across a chaise lounge, as the Air Force, Navy, and Army officers gaze wolfishly and longingly at her.22

Another poster shows a single woman, beautiful and ripe, seductively posing on a bar stool. It is captioned, “You forget - but she remembers.”\textsuperscript{23} It implies that the price to spend the evening with such a young lady is the information an officer could provide her. She is predatory, actively gathering information. What she will do with it is anyone’s guess.

While this campaign denigrates the women, it also shows them in positions of power. The campaign at least shows that the government had begun to recognize that women could take on more active roles, whether they were worried about German women posing as spies or feeling uneasy about their own use of women as spies out in foreign fields. As women did take on more active wartime roles their role in society was evolving into something the government had not wanted or expected, and into something that they feared.

\textbf{Women’s Magazines}

The Interwar Years brought a boom to the industry of Women’s Magazines in Britain. It truly began to flourish with the launch of the British version of the magazine, \textit{Good Housekeeping}, in 1922. It’s first issue sold out, selling more than 150,000 copies.\textsuperscript{24} Much of its success stemmed from its development of “the cause of the new independence for women and [how it] offered advice on how to enjoy the differing roles of wife and mother and working woman.”\textsuperscript{25} By 1946, there were some twenty-five to thirty weekly or monthly women’s magazines on the market.\textsuperscript{26}

The entire industry of women’s magazines came to reflect the major changes in women’s role in society after the war. Churchill and his team of officials were the first to so ruthlessly use women’s magazines as propaganda.\textsuperscript{27} They specifically enlisted women’s presses for “war time service.” Women editors, like most women in the nation, were eager to help. Mary Grieve, the longtime editor of the magazine \textit{Woman} gave a speech to the Ministry of Labour Advisory Committee in 1941, saying:

we feel that the women’s press is above all other media best fitted to translate to women the role they must fill in increasing numbers. . . . Although we speak in different voices we must, to reach the full peak of our propaganda value, be united to saying the things which are really relevant. . . . Tell us clearly, tell us often, what you want conveyed.\textsuperscript{28}

As magazines helped to form a woman’s view of herself and society’s view of her, they were one of the most influential means that could be utilized to mold

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 32.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 63.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
women into what the government wanted from them. These governmental ads became inherently embedded into the magazines of this time. The government recognized the utility of women’s magazines in regard to domestic propaganda.

What makes women’s magazines particularly interesting . . . is that . . . they tell women what to think and do about themselves, their lovers, husbands, parents, children, colleagues, neighbors or bosses. It is this, the scope of their normative direction, rather than the fact of its existence, which is truly remarkable. Add this to the power of the advertising which is directed at women through their pages and the conclusion follows: here is a very potent formula for steering female attitudes, behavior and buying along a particular path of femininity. And as Grieve demonstrates, the magazines and advertisements within them were influenced by the government’s requests. She asked them what they wanted conveyed regarding women’s roles in society and gave them free rein to dictate it, and again, the government still had trouble sending a clear message to their women readers. Instead, they clumsily shaped women’s roles, and not in the way that the government hoped or expected.

With paper rationing, magazines had very little advertisement space and any ads by the government were given priority. This is an excerpt from a tribute to the work women had done for the war effort that was published in Woman’s Magazine:

He who called the men of Britain
To become His living Sword
Sounds once more His royal challenge
Calls with no uncertain claim
To the women of Great Britain
To become His living flame. . . .
They are willing! They are willing! British women, here and now,
Drive with skill Britannia’s lorries,
Run to guide Britannia’s plough;
They will mind Britannia’s children,
Scrub, and shop, and wash, and mend,
Crochet, knit, and sew for Britain
Till her hour of need shall end. . . .
Toiling hard for Britain’s sake;
Nothing — Nothing — British women
Cannot — will not — undertake.

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29 Ibid., 1.
30 Ibid., 2.
31 Braithwaite, Women’s Magazines, 60.
32 Waller and Vaughan-Rees, Women in Wartime, 59.
In the beginning of this song, women were equated with men and at first the men were called to fight for Britain and then the women were as well. But then the tasks it offers to women seem almost useless, tasks that seem like they would have no effect on changing the tides of war in the big picture. It ends saying that the women are capable of and willing to do anything to help with the war effort, which was true. And yet their efforts were not being utilized to their fullest capacities.

Women’s magazines came to be used as tools of the government to help rein women in and to perpetuate the role in society they wanted women to fill. Women’s participation in the war effort was continually tempered to demonstrate that traditional gender distinctions were being upheld and that women could indeed serve without any loss of femininity. The government needed women’s participation in the war effort to be successful. However, the government denigrated women’s work and the scope of their assistance by strangling their contributions with engrained ideas of femininity.

**Propaganda Films**

Despite the advance of their agenda on women’s role in society through many kinds of media, the government and Ministry of Information knew that to truly reach the entire population, they would also need to include cinema. The government was aware to some degree of the effect that cinema had on the public; otherwise, after they closed all cinemas and theatres immediately on 9 September 1939 due to bombing threats, they would not have slowly reopened them with controlled media. The Ministry conducted The Wartime Social Survey of 1943, (less formally entitled *The Cinema Audience*), and one crucial point was reinforced: that the cinema reached more people than other media and visual communications, such as magazines, newspapers, or books. Additionally, although ticket prices to the cinema increased throughout the war, it had never been so well attended, reaching an all-time peak of 31.4 million attendees a week by 1946.87 And “while a large proportion of the population at large went to the cinema occasionally, the enthusiasts were young, working class, urban, and more often female than male.”

It was critical that the Ministry employ their propaganda tactics via film as well.

The government desperately sought to use film and the other media at their disposal to mobilize women. The government engaged in addressing gender differences most often in their shorter films.35 This heavy-handed approach to teach women how to assist the war effort while keeping them in their place as women is evident in the films produced and sponsored by the Ministry of Information.
The film *A Call to Arms*, produced by the Ministry of Information in 1940, depicts two “nudie” dancers working in wartime England — one of them feels that perhaps they could be more useful to the war effort if they worked in a profession besides dancing. By the end of the film, both Ireen and Joan quit their jobs as nudie dancers to go and work at the munitions factory. But the film’s message, that women could actively contribute to the war effort, is diminished by the patronizing attitude shown towards the women in the film, and thus the women it is trying to inspire.36

The first issue the film glosses over is class. Often, women who were employed as sex workers were not as readily accepted back into the fold to make “decent” contributions to society. Yet by the end of the film, all the women workers in the munitions factory rally around Ireen as she calls all the women to work again (after already working a ten-hour shift and a week of overtime) to create a million more bullets by morning. The other women are aware of the dancers’ backgrounds; just before “the call to arms” as it were, Joan was doing fancy and risqué moves in the locker room, titillating all the women.37

They also make a point of showing that women’s wartime contributions forced them to sacrifice their femininity, but also that it would restore itself once victory was achieved. When Ireen begins working, she sees her instructor’s hands, covered in gunpowder, then looks down at her own white, pale, smooth, well-manicured hands. With great resolve though, she sacrifices her soft hands for the good of her country. But the way it is presented reiterates the message: when the war was over, Ireen would go back to smooth and soft hands. This foray into the world of real work was just temporary.

By the end of the film, even though the women must now work another double shift, they frolic back into the factory, skipping, holding hands, and laughing like schoolgirls. By portraying grown women as little girls, the government was patronizing the work that women all over Britain were achieving. Annette Kuhn has done extensive research on the idea of femininity being de-matured by wartime cinema:

*The most striking finding to emerge from this study of the cinema going audiences in the 1930s relates to paradigms of femininity embodied in the personae of Britain’s favorite female stars, all of whom conspicuously lack attributes of overt, adult, sexuality. . . . British cinema-goers evidently preferred femininity to be youthful, innocent, asexual.*38

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36 *A Call to Arms*, directed by Brian Desmond Hurst (1940: London: Ministry of Information).
37 *A Call to Arms*.
This depiction of women as girls as in *A Call to Arms* is belittling, as though girls who are naïve, innocent, blindly following directions is what was necessary to be true women. The film ends with the forewoman watching the women working and whispering dramatically, “good girls.”

Furthermore, a majority of these short message films were addressed directly to women, teaching them how to do things correctly in war time, from baking a pie to domestic policy, always with a male voiceover telling women how to live their lives. There is a correlation in technique between the “how to” and the “inspirational” short message films produced by the Ministry. By beginning with how to films in the earlier 1940s, it suggests that the inspirational films that followed in the mid-1940s should be consumed in the same manner. These films, and thus the Ministry, further tried to inundate women with the idea that part of being feminine was to be childlike, to follow instructions, to obey authority, and not to question their directives.

This brings us back to *Miss Grant Goes to the Door*. A further analysis of the film shows all the discrepancies of the Ministry’s messages to women regarding citizenship and their relationship to it as women. Kay, the more outspoken and assertive of the sisters, is put in her place by the end of the film. Edith is the modern woman that the British government was endorsing. She dressed staidly in tweed and was cautious as the one who questioned her sister’s antics and ran to get help rather than getting involved directly with the action — she was really the woman that kept her head. On the other hand, Kay is the headstrong one that is very active, making fool-hardy decisions. She goes outside after seeing a man in the window. She is the one who insists on dragging his body into the house. She is the one who takes his gun. She is the one who lets in the spy. She is the one who confronts him and holds him hostage. She does everything she is not supposed to do, all while dressed in a dainty flowered silk dressing robe that typifies her female identity.

Her femininity is shown as a weakness. The spy thwarts her by balefully begging for a cigarette, and her delicate sensibilities cannot deny him. And because women are meant to serve, when the cigarette she tosses at him does not make it far enough, she unconsciously goes to pick it up for him, leaving herself defenseless. Her feminine weakness is her downfall and is what allows the German to escape. And for even attempting to stand up to the spy’s bold masculinity, he cold cocks her across the face. She was too assertive, too defiant, too capable, and while the Ministry wanted women to help and do their duty, they wanted to draw a clear line that getting overly involved was at women’s own peril.

Yet, the Ministry of Information weakened this message by even allowing Kay the agency and free will to pick up the gun in the first place. Many would not notice the micro details of the movie; they would focus on the actions they saw occurring. And this film, at its most basic state, seems to advocate action. “The sight of this
untrained hand wielding the weapon, however ineffectively, . . . was incidental propaganda for a ‘people’s war.’”  
These films contradict themselves, demanding women make every effort to help end the war, but of course, only enough of an effort that their existence as British citizens would not put the nation, and its gender paradigms, into jeopardy. These films “were unable to provide a consistent mode of address to its female audience, and instead produced mixed allusion for the male and national community. . . . [It] could not combine old and new images of femininity in a meaningful way.”

**Conclusion**

During the interwar years and World War II, women’s roles and the domain of the domestic sphere were constantly in flux, in a process of modernization. The government clearly wanted to cling to their ideas, to have the help of women during WWII and for them to quickly return into the fold of the domestic sphere once the war ended and victory on a grand scale was assured, their emergence into the world of war and men was for the duration only. When they did allow them to help, it was only in incredibly limited capacities.

Women are simultaneously presented with messages on two wavelengths. “Yes, get out there and show the world you are someone in your own right,” but also “Remember you must achieve as a wife and mother, too.” The psychological tension generated by these dualistic messages is largely ignored. . . . Yet these conflicting messages are overlaid with a seductive wrapping: every woman can choose the ‘kind’ of woman she wishes to be. They imply her choice is constrained only by her preferences from amongst the range of images offered to her.

Yet the propaganda of the Ministry of Information often allowed women to grasp onto the messages they wanted to see from the campaigns rather than what the Ministry’s text provided. Women were able to hold onto the uplifting and inspiring calls to action and disregard the more offensive parts. In *One Family’s War*, a British magazine, was published the following note by Lady Mayhew, the President of the Norwich Division of the Red Cross, in 1940:

I must confess I find “the present situation” quietly but deeply exhilarating, but it’s probably a female (and British female at that) sort of feeling which no male could begin to understand. When other people have always done your fighting for you it’s an incredible relief to feel you’ve come to a time when that blessed Ministry of Information poster has some meaning for you at last. . . . Here and now I wouldn’t trade places with anyone in history.

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41 Ferguson, 189.
42 Waller, 67.
The campaigns were successful in convincing women to join in the effort, even if it did not result in the creation of the modern woman they had been seeking. They created instead a modern woman who was strong, powerful, eager to help — and knew that she could.
With the election of 1876 on the horizon, Florida Democrats felt they had an excellent chance of regaining control of the state, once they united behind a candidate. Many felt the man to lead the party was William D. Bloxham, who had lost the 1872 Lieutenant Governor’s race in a controversial manner, and who some Democrats felt deserved the office after Ossian B. Hart’s death.¹ When the Democratic Party narrowed their focus to 1876, many felt Bloxham was the obvious choice as their gubernatorial candidate, and his supporters believed it was a job owed to him. Others however, decided on a decidedly different approach. To wrest power from the hands of the Republicans after close to a decade, they contended an outsider was needed, someone who would rally the former Whigs, entice enough African-American support, and convince some Republicans to cross party-lines. When the Democrats met in Quincy, they nominated New Hampshire born George Franklin Drew, much to the chagrin of some ardent party members, many who were Confederate veterans. Drew had a reputation as a Unionist, even though he had sold timber and salt to Confederates in Georgia. His Unionism, though viewed in a negative light by many in his party, was also a positive to some. His previous opposition to secession, the Klan, and violence might appeal to Republicans, and therefore encourage crossover voting, something alien in the South during Reconstruction. This was a potential large source of untapped votes the Democrats could extract under a candidate like Drew, as many Northern Union veterans had remained in Florida, or had relocated their families to the state after the cessation of hostilities.² Though he was a known Unionist, most were not aware of the extent of his wartime escapades, including his aid to draft dodgers, his imprisonment and the subsequent reward of $35,000 from the United States government for unwavering loyalty to the country. Some Democrats questioned whether he was a truly a Democrat, highlighting that when he first entered politics, he had been a Whig until that party imploded over the question of slavery.³ Drew had even supported Ulysses S. Grant for President in his first bid for the White House in 1868.

The Tallahassee Sentinel, one of the state’s leading Republican papers, exclaimed, “Mr. Drew was nominated for the Union flavor his record might give

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³ Tallahassee Weekly Floridian, 24 June 1877.
the Lost Cause. His nomination is a wicked fraud to catch Union men and Northern Republicans coming into the state. We would rather have the most bitter Bourbon.”

According to some, Drew only received the nomination when his soon to be nemesis, Bloxham, “in his most gracious manner” stepped aside, though there is debate as to whether or not Bloxham seriously considered a run at the Governorship in 1876. Drew’s considerable wealth also played a role in his selection, as he was able to finance his entire campaign, and he was a candidate whose reputation as a businessman was beyond repute, and who the Republicans could not label as corrupt or dishonest. Historian William Watson Davis proclaimed in 1876 Florida stood at a crossroads, and his “nomination at this crisis by Florida Democrats was expedient.”

While Drew favored immigration and Northern investment to help facilitate the transition of Florida to a “New South” state, others, ex-Confederates, adherents to the Lost Cause, and the former planter elite and “Cottonocracy,” looked on with a definite sense of anxiety, and possible disdain. Looking for any excuse to castigate the candidate, strict Bourbons grumbled that Drew spent much of his time in Ellaville looking after his mill, and other business ventures, rather than on the campaign trail. They questioned the wisdom of stumping for a man who did not seem to care enough to campaign for himself. Moreover, they were beginning to find fault with someone who was not one of their own. Not just a Northerner, but a moderate. Though little was mentioned publicly about these grievances until after the election, they were circulated internally amongst the more conservative elements within the Party. Generally, the Democrats rallied behind Drew, and the campaign was well organized in the black belt, and North Florida.

The campaign kicked off in Drew’s home county of Madison on 5 August with a rally attended by more than 2,000. Drew was the featured speaker, which the Weekly Floridian lauded, stating “never before was there such an interest” in politics in the state. The Democrats would continue to hold rallies and barbecues throughout the state for their white supporters as well their black supporters. Republicans jokingly claimed that African-Americans only attended the events because of the free food. There were “Drew” Clubs that sprung up around the state, made up of black and white supporters, though they were segregated, something the Republican press was eager to highlight.

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4 Tallahassee Sentinel, 10 June 1876.
9 Tallahassee Weekly Floridian, 7 Aug. 1876.
10 Ibid., 27 June 1876.
Both the state and national elections were heated and controversial, with the Presidential election garnering more attention, even within Florida, as both Democrats and Republicans in the state proclaimed victories for their respective candidates (as was the case in South Carolina and Louisiana). The national election would not be resolved until a Congressional commission declared Rutherford B. Hayes, the Republican, the winner in all three Southern states in question, victorious over the Democrat Samuel J. Tilden, in the so-called Compromise of 1877.

In Florida, Drew’s opponent was the current Governor, Maine born, one-armed Union Army veteran Marcellus Stearns, who was seeking reelection. Stearns had been elected Lieutenant Governor, and had subsequently assumed the office of Governor upon Ossian B. Hart’s death.\(^\text{11}\) The Republicans, who had dominated Florida since 1866, faced serious challenges in the upcoming election as the Democratic Party was finally able to mount a serious threat. Republican odds in Florida were further exacerbated by a divide within the party. Race also played a prevalent role in the election. In an effort to stem the Democratic tide, Republicans pushed their African-American candidates to the side, running only white candidates.\(^\text{12}\)

Neither party had any intention of making this a fair election, with rampant fraud and intimidation planned and subsequently executed.\(^\text{13}\) In 1876, while some violence was expected, they felt they could counter any violence with corruption. One canvassing board leader proclaimed, “it doesn’t matter how the people vote, as long as we count the ballots.”\(^\text{14}\)

While the Klan had been unmasked by Congress in 1871, violence remained, and nightriders still roamed the countryside in Jackson and Madison Counties, with Columbia County seeing some of its worst violence through 1875.\(^\text{15}\) A federal grand jury, convened in 1873, reported that there were no acts of political violence in Florida, and Democrats now maintained that there had never been a Klan operating within the state.\(^\text{16}\)

Though white supremacy and the curbing of African-American rights were absent from Democratic speeches as well as the party’s platform, it was not absent from the election. “Rifle clubs” carrying out the business of the Klan and the Party were present in numerous counties, some even going as far as to drill and practice with stuffed black target dummies. During the campaign and election, Democrats and their allies “bulldozed opponents at the end of a halter or the point of a gun into


\(^{12}\) Ibid., 13.


\(^{15}\) Tallahassee Weekly Floridian, 5 December 1871.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 14 January 1873.
voting with them or not voting at all,” in an effort to help produce “one of the most sinister . . . contests of modern times.”\textsuperscript{17} Outspoken African-American Republican politician Robert Meacham saw his home in Madison strafed by gunfire, which almost cost him his life. In an effort to place blame elsewhere, the local Democrats offered a $100 reward for those responsible.\textsuperscript{18}

It can be argued that the intimidation was successful, though not to the extent that Republicans maintained in the days and months after the election, and not to the extent many feared in the days and months leading up to the election. Stearns, for his part, maintained that a Drew victory at the polls would result in another civil war, with other Republicans resorting to scare tactics to rally the African-American base.\textsuperscript{19}

News also trickled out of Thomasville, Georgia, 35 miles north of Tallahassee, that the Thomasville Cornet Band, an armed Democratic club, would accompany prominent Georgians into Florida. They were traveling to their southern neighbor on a speaking tour to rally support for Drew and the Democratic ticket.\textsuperscript{20} While Democrats denied that they had solicited outside support, the Thomasville group was present at a joint Drew-Tilden rally in Monticello. According to the \textit{Thomasville Times}, over four hundred Georgians were present in the small Florida city.\textsuperscript{21}

One major fear, which was also ironically an advantage used by both sides, was the fact that Florida, like many states in the 1870s, did not have uniform election laws from county to county. Each party issued their own ballot, and it was left to whichever party controlled the county’s political machine to produce the final document. In several Democratic controlled counties with large African-American populations, the Democrats took advantage of the fact that many African-Americans were illiterate or under literate owing to their previous life of servitude. The Democrats printed ballots that included a new Democratic emblem, which happened to closely resemble the Republican emblem, in an effort to confuse or trick African-Americans into voting for Drew.\textsuperscript{22} The Florida Central Railroad Company, an ally of Drew, distributed ballots that were numbered and already filled out to its employees. Each numbered ballot was given to a specific employee, and a record was kept of which ballot was cast at the polls on election day. If an employee did not turn in the ballot, and thus vote for Drew, their job, or health, would be at stake.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{17} Newton, \textit{The Invisible Empire: The Ku Klux Klan} in Florida (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), 26.
\textsuperscript{18} Shofner, “Florida: A Failure of Moderate Republicanism,” 33-37.
\textsuperscript{19} Roy Morris, Jr., \textit{Fraud of the Century}, 147.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 146.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Thomasville Times}, 28 Oct. 1876.
\textsuperscript{22} Shofner, “Fraud and Intimidation in the Florida Election of 1876,” 327.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 324.
Republicans were not the only party who cried foul, as Democrats voiced their displeasure with Republican tactics on election day. Democrats in Jacksonville denounced the actions of local Republican officials who released African-Americans from prison on the day of the election to allow them to vote the Republican ticket, while in Jefferson County the charge was that black women had managed to prevent black men from voting for Drew.\textsuperscript{24} In Leon County, the Republican superintendent of public instruction succeeded in stuffing ballot boxes, by placing seventy-four extra ballots inside regular ballots, all of which had been pre-cast for Stearns, Rutherford B. Hayes, and other Republican candidates.\textsuperscript{25}

Every indication was that the governor’s race as well as the presidential contest would be extremely close. The original tally was made public only after a state canvassing board met and discarded over 2,000 votes from disputed counties. They subsequently handed the election, and most state offices to the Republicans.\textsuperscript{26} Drew, 924 votes behind Stearns, went to the courts seeking an injunction to stop the count. The courts complied, issuing the injunction to stop the certification of a Stearns victory. The canvassing board ignored the ruling, and on 8 December gave most state positions to Republicans.\textsuperscript{27} The attorney general refused to sign the certification, and protested to the circuit courts. Eventually, the case made its way to the Florida Supreme Court, which ordered a recount in several disputed counties. Though the Supreme Court was comprised of two Republicans and one Democrat, the Chief Justice, Republican E. M. Randall was a staunch enemy of Stearns, both personally and in the political arena.\textsuperscript{28} The Democrat though, James D. Westcott, Jr. had been appointed by a Republican governor, and had considerable Republican support, which threatened to swing the balance back to Stearns.\textsuperscript{29} Randall ordered the canvassing board, his inferior, to properly fulfill their duties, and also correct an abuse of power.\textsuperscript{30}

The Democratic plan was to force what was called a ministerial count, which would have effectively swung the election to Drew, since it would force the board to accept the returns from counties without hearing evidence or excluding votes.\textsuperscript{31} With these votes counted, Drew staked his claim to 24,613 votes, while maintaining that his opponent had garnered only 24,116.\textsuperscript{32} Instead of fighting, the Republicans initially claimed the court had no right to review the election, let alone make a

\textsuperscript{24} Jacksonville Daily Florida Union, 9, 11 Nov. 1876.
\textsuperscript{25} Shofner, “Fraud and Intimidation in the Florida Election of 1876,” 329.
\textsuperscript{27} New York Herald, 12 Dec. 1876.
\textsuperscript{28} Shofner, “Florida Courts and the Disputed Election of 1876,” 29.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Drw v. Samuel B. McLin, 12 Dec. 1876, law.fsu.edu/library/election.
\textsuperscript{31} Shofner, “Florida Courts and the Disputed Election of 1876,” 29.
decision. They therefore considered the work of the canvassing board complete.\textsuperscript{33} Even though they eventually made a case before the court, it ruled in favor of the Democrats. The ruling was labeled a “judicial crime” by the \textit{New York Times}, and other Northern newspapers.\textsuperscript{34} One California Senator commenting on the issue exclaimed, “the state is gone and forever,” while Stearns noted, “this beats us in the state, but we shall try to save Hayes.”\textsuperscript{35} Stearns further proclaimed the state election to be settled through the court ruling, and directed the canvassing board to comply.\textsuperscript{36}

The issue was seemingly settled until several national Republicans threatened to intervene, worried that this decision would set a precedent for a future ruling in the Hayes-Tilden decision in Florida, which had yet to be settled.\textsuperscript{37} Stearns was now ordered not to concede the decision, while other Republicans agreed to file a motion to set the decision aside.\textsuperscript{38} Meanwhile, the state’s attorney general ignored the national Republicans, and certified the election in favor of Drew (by a 497 vote margin) and Tilden (by ninety-one to ninety-four votes).\textsuperscript{39}

The ruling effectively awarded the Governor’s mansion to Drew, while handing most other state offices to Democrats. Upon hearing the decision, Stearns proclaimed that he would not yield the office, but when confronted by armed Drew supporters, many who were Confederate veterans, and some ex-Klansmen, the Governor complied.\textsuperscript{40} One account by Bloxham made note that Stearns had intended to keep his position by force, but acquiesced when faced with a committee of prominent Tallahassee citizens, one of whom proclaimed, “we have come sir, to put you on notice that if a single white man is killed in Leon County on election day, there are three hundred of us who have sworn that your life shall pay for it.” Allegedly, the men left Stearns “white as a sheet.”\textsuperscript{41}

In response, two Republicans on the board agreed to Drew as Florida’s next governor, but issued a result giving the national election to Hayes.\textsuperscript{42} The Florida Supreme Court refused to accept the board’s results, reverting back to the motion filed earlier, and Drew was announced as the state’s next governor. There was no mention of the national election.\textsuperscript{43} Democrats in Florida had seemingly made their choice, the governorship for the White House, or at least, they showed little desire to fight for Tilden once Drew was sworn in.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 138.
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{New York Times}, 29 Dec. 1876.
\textsuperscript{35} Shofner, “Florida Courts and the Disputed Election of 1876” 32.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Atlanta Daily Constitution}, 27 Dec. 1876.
\textsuperscript{37} Shofner, “Florida Courts and the Disputed Election of 1876” 33.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 34.
\textsuperscript{39} Tallahassee Weekly Floridian, 2 Jan. 1877.
\textsuperscript{40} Tebeau, \textit{A History of Florida}, 254.
\textsuperscript{42} Florida Reports, 1876-1878, 63.
\textsuperscript{43} Shofner, “Florida Courts and the Disputed Election of 1876,” 35.
Neither national party had shown much interest in Florida prior to the 7 November election, but “for a few weeks following, . . . Florida’s role in national affairs was greater than the state’s four electoral votes would normally warrant.” While both parties claimed victory for their respective candidate, recounts were ordered in Florida’s thirty-nine counties. After only ten had been reported, both parties declared victory through their presses. The ten counties that had reported their results were located in the black belt, and had better access to the state’s telegraph and communication systems, and were also home to Florida’s largest concentration of African-Americans. Official returns would not be known until 13 November when they were due to the secretary of state, though even unofficial reports were slow to materialize. In the meantime, twelve companies from the Army were dispatched to Tallahassee to join the already existing troops in Middle Florida, but when they arrived, they found no violence or disturbances, and spent most of their time hunting, fishing, relaxing and chasing women.

Along with the troops, no less than ten prominent Democratic and Republican politicians descended on Tallahassee. The future editor of the *Atlanta Constitution* exclaimed that Floridians were “inactive and inert” and Drew was nowhere to be seen, apparently remaining at home. Facing a proficient Republican team, with a seemingly endless supply of money, the Democrats faced a daunting task. Former Georgia Governor Joseph E. Brown, though, was as energized as he had been in years, and with a sudden influx of cash from the national party Democrats in Florida went to work, taking their case before the courts and the canvassing board. Both factions were also equipped with secret ciphering devices to send and receive encoded messages back to their party headquarters during the duration of the struggle.

The Republicans biggest fear was that they would not be able to overcome the Democratic stranglehold over South Florida. This was reinforced when they dispatched agents to the frontier, as Central and South Florida were considered at the time, and they were denied admittance to Polk County without a guide, which consisted of an armed Democratic escort. It was becoming painfully clear that the fair and transparent election Drew had promised Florida was not materializing, and on 18 November Republicans commenced a count of votes from available counties, and wired Hayes that Tilden had around a 150 vote lead. National newspapers only further added to the chaos by proclaiming that each candidate had at least a two or three thousand vote lead.

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47 *New York Herald*, 20 Nov. 1876.
49 Ibid.
With no end in sight, the *New York Herald* exclaimed, “both parties are at sea . . . neither knows exactly what to do, and yet is bewildered by the fear that the other will do it first,” while Lew Wallace, a prominent Northern lawyer stated, “money and intimidation can obtain the oath of white man as well as black to any required statement. A ton of affidavits could be carted in . . . and not a word of truth in them. . . . If we win our methods are subject to impeachment for possible fraud.”

Two weeks before the thirty-five day deadline the Democratic Executive Committee tried to force the canvassing board to recount the returns they had already received, but the board voted two to one, denying their request for a recount. The board assembled on 27 November and was overcrowded with the appearance of ten agents from each party. When the board began opening the returns, thirty-eight of the state’s thirty-nine counties had provided returns, with only Dade County failing to yet provide its votes. The Democrats protested ten counties, mostly large counties in North Florida, while the Republicans took issue with twenty-eight, mostly smaller, rural counties. Over a Democratic protest, they announced the initial count of 24,337 for Hayes and 24,294 for Tilden. If those results held, Hayes would control Florida’s four electoral votes by a miniscule forty-three vote margin.

Having already proclaimed a Hayes triumph, it would prove difficult to overturn the sentiment moving forward. As the count moved from county to county, the board approached the 6 December deadline. National politicians also focused on Baker County, with New York Congressman David Dudley Field, one of Tilden’s closest friends, insisting Tilden carried Florida, save for what he referred to as a “sort of jugglery” by canvassing boards that permitted what he called a “discredited” and defeated Governor Stearns to sign a falsified certificate.

As the state canvassing board met to discuss the last county, Monroe, on December 5, crowds poured into Tallahassee, and the city took on a carnival like atmosphere as they anticipated the results. They were joined by Federal troops who camped on the capitol grounds for the night in case of violence. A little past one in the morning, the secretary of state’s office announced that Hayes had carried the state by 924 votes.

Brown, upon hearing the news, proclaimed, “the dark deed of infamy is done by throwing out Democratic counties and precincts in the teeth of the evidence and

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52 Ibid., 130.
54 *New York Tribune*, 29 Nov. 1876.
in the shameless violation of the law.” Seriously ill when he left Florida, Brown was accosted by Republican agents asking him to assess Florida’s situation, to which he responded that he was “morally certain” the state had given Tilden a clear majority, and that any reports of a Hayes victory were the result of fraud. With Stearns and other Republicans still technically in control of the state government, the Democrats seemingly had no legal recourse, but two weeks after Drew’s inauguration, ironically on the exact day federal troops left Tallahassee, Drew signed a bill passed by the new Democratic leaning legislature, which declared Tilden the victor in Florida by 94 votes, and thereby ordered the electors to cast their votes for the New York Democrat. In a reversal from previous rulings, the judge hearing the case maintained the Republican electors had usurped power from the Democrats who had been legally elected. The electoral count was set to begin again on 1 February in Florida, despite the fact that there were already three certified election results in the nation’s capital. Drew, Stearns, and Attorney General Cocke had all certified results. Drew and Cocke for Tilden and Stearns for Hayes. When Congress reconvened their task was whether to accept the results signed by Stearns or the results signed by Drew.

On 9 February the commission, voting strictly along party lines (8-7), awarded the state’s four electoral votes to Hayes, claiming the finality of the certificate signed by Stearns, while also maintaining it was the only duly executed certificate. The same party-line votes occurred in Louisiana and South Carolina, though many at the time agreed that the decision in Florida set a precedent and settled the matter. According to the terms of what some have dubbed the Compromise of 1877, the Congressional Electoral Commission awarded Florida, South Carolina and Louisiana’s electoral votes to Hayes in return for an official end to Reconstruction, appointment of Democrats to governmental offices, and help building the Southern Pacific Railroad.

While Reconstruction came to an end with Drew’s election, and Florida, like her neighbors, joined the ranks of what became known as the Solid South for the next century, a decade of African-American involvement in politics and Republican rule in Tallahassee had brought diversity to the state in numerous ways. Advancements were made in education for white and black students, including the creation of the Florida Agricultural College in 1872 in Brevard County.

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57 Atlanta Constitution, 6 Dec. 1876.
58 Ibid, 9 Dec. 1876.
59 Tallahassee Weekly Floridian, 23 Jan. 1877; Florida Assembly Journal, 1877, 123.
60 Shofner, “Florida Courts and the Disputed Election of 1876.” Pp. 41
61 Ibid, 42.
64 New York Daily Tribune, 8 Feb. 1877.
Of No Safe Harbor:  
North American Maroons and Their Environment  
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Deep in the North American wilderness, far from the drudgery of the southern plantation, lies a particularly defiant and resourceful group of runaway slaves. Historians remember them as the maroons, escaped slaves who took to the wilds to construct their own freedom. Marronage occurred in every slave-society in the Western hemisphere. From the rainforests of the well-studied Latin America and South America, to the understudied North American woodlands, maroons lived by their own rules. Historians describe marronage as occurring in two types: petit, which lasted only a few days, and grand, which occurred from months to years, if not permanently, and with no intention of return. Whatever the circumstances of one’s flight, the success of a runaway’s marronage was linked directly to the person’s ability to conquer the various obstacles and circumstances inherent to life in the wilderness.

The American wilderness was an ever-present obstacle between runaway slaves and freedom, yet a safe-haven for those escaping the harsh life of bondage on plantations. Whether they were captured or not, maroons learned to master their environment to survive. They made homes in swamps, tree trunks, and caves, often creating invisible shelters with their bare hands if they had not made tools out of the resources available to them in the woods. Maroons built these shelters to blend into the landscape, so much so that modern archaeologists struggle to find remnants of their homes. While their shelters protected them from the elements, they were often located in risky places. Some lived on the borderlands of towns and plantations, often underneath their oppressors’ noses, validating their invisibility time and again. Others trekked into the swamps and forests of the hinterlands, towards the frontier. This article will look at two ways that maroons used their environment: for shelter and to evade capture.

1 Paper presented at the 59th Annual Meeting of the Florida Conference of Historians, originally entitled “No Safe Harbor: African Maroons and Their Environment.” Maroon, a term derived from the Spanish word cimarron, meant to describe runaway cattle and other farm animals, is the historical term for a slave who took flight with the intention of establishing permanently a life outside of white society. However, throughout this study I will sometimes use terms like runaway or fugitive interchangeably with maroon, as the environmental conditions for all three groups are comparable.
4 Some runaways who were skilled laborers may have brought tools of their trades.
This article utilizes slave narratives, newspapers, manuscripts, and various published sources to capture the individual perspective of maroons and their kin. Part of our understanding of maroon shelters comes from David Dodge’s “The Cave Dwellers of the Confederacy” (1891). Dodge offers insight to the construction of these bunkers, how they may have looked, and their effectiveness. The rest of our understanding of shelter construction comes from narratives, many compiled from interviews conducted by the Works Progress Administration in the 1930s, though some, like Solomon Northup’s Twelve Years a Slave, are autobiographical. These accounts, along with newspaper columns and other published sources, also shed light on life as a marooned fugitive, specifically the paramount anxiety of capture.

In noting the formidability of the American wilderness in the maroons’ journeys, I do not wish to take away from the other inherent dangers, fears, and forces that challenged maroon societies daily. Escape from slavery was the paramount goal of any slave and capture was an ever-present fear for maroons. Maroons, particularly those on the plantation communities’ borderlands, depended on the loyalty of their kin who remained on the plantation. If word of their whereabouts got out, as it did for a variety of reasons, slave owners employed slave catchers, also known as slave hunters, to track down the fugitives. Slave hunters succeeded due to their use of dogs, who depended on clues left in the environment to pick up fugitives’ scents. However, runaways were not helpless against their canine pursuers’ uncanny sense of smell. Hereeto, maroons utilized their environment to gain the upper hand on dogs, using a variety of methods to cover their tracks and hide their scents.

To maroons, and runaway slaves writ large, the environment was both a dangerous obstacle to master and an ally that offered shelter. This article does not deny nor discredit other conditions that contributed to their unimaginably demanding situation. Rather, it elevates and calls attention to the environment as a key factor in the reality of slaves on the run. More specifically, I argue that to be successful maroons had to display some mastery of the environment, with both their hands and minds. Maroons had to use their natural resources to form shelters and to evade capture. Indeed, for slaves on the run, flight through the trees was an everyday reality. Seeking shelter was the first and most important part.

Though all runaways faced the daunting task of building a camp, maroon societies faced it to a different degree, as their camp was a home-base; something they intended to be permanent. Maroons could have used tools or their hands to dig a shelter, or they could have commandeered a naturally occurring cavity, such as a cave or a large hollow tree trunk. Nevertheless, the utmost goal of a maroon’s
bunker was invisibility and secrecy. To achieve this, the maroons came up with ingenious ways to exploit their environment and maintain their cover.

Part of our understanding of maroon shelters comes from another group of fugitives who wished to remain invisible: deserters of the Confederate Army. These deserters took flight in the woods and many lived in the abandoned maroon hideouts. Dodge’s, “The Cave Dwellers of the Confederacy,” explores maroons’ bunkers as Confederate deserters adopted their methods and renovated the spaces. Dodge found that maroon caves were on average six feet deep and eight feet across. Smaller proportions existed, as time was always a sensitive matter and digging a cave of that size took much time, especially if done alone. In any case, it was important that there was room for at least one person; extra space for cooking, storage, and sleeping was a luxury. Maroons who were once skilled laborers may have brought tools with them, but others dug by hand or used their environment’s resources to craft makeshift trowels.

When digging their shelters, maroons had to think ahead and exercise great care, for a freshly moved mound of dirt would be indicative of their presence. For this reason, many caves were formed near hillsides and streams, as waterways were highly valuable in the digging process: “for the easiest and safest way of disposing of the earth thrown up in digging the pit was to dump it in running water.” If the location was not within a stream’s vicinity, maroons would have to work together to cart the dirt off to a water source or another part of the woods. However, they would have to exercise caution in their movements, for if they consistently took the same route back to their bunker, they would create a path or opening in the woods. If a pursuing hunter came across this, the environment would betray the maroons.

After they built their shelter, they could begin to furnish it and make it suitable for residence. They would often bring in pine needles and other brush as a carpet and for insulation. Additionally, some spaces had room for furniture: “a bed was constructed by driving forked stakes into the ground, and upon these were laid small poles topped with pine boughs.” What they were not able to craft, they would often take from the plantation; this included tables, dinnerware, and chairs. For storage, they often carved a cupboard into the dirt walls of their caves. Yet, “even under the best circumstances, in the fairest, warmest weather, and in the driest soil, a cave was a dismal abode.” No matter how miserable a maroon’s living conditions were, they preferred an independent life over a life enslaved.

Maintaining secrecy and invisibility was of utmost importance. It was paramount that maroons were careful in disposing sediment and dirt. Of equal importance

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8 Nathaniel Millet, The Maroons of Prospect Bluff and Their Quest for Freedom in the Atlantic World (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2013). The maroons of Florida’s Prospect Bluff are a notable exception to this. Their presence was explicit and known by many because they had the support of the British government.


10 Ibid.
was the discreetness of the door, or trap, to the apartment. Maroons utilized pine needles and other brush to camouflage the door with the forest ground. If available, they may have placed a felled tree, a branch, or a log across the top to give an extra candid appearance to the secret entryway. A pair of Confederate deserters who hunkered down in one of these hideouts once avoided detection by a hunting party of fugitive-seeking sentinels. For over an hour, the search party ate and talked only inches above their lookout, unbeknownst to them that their prey lay only inches beneath their feet. These methods helped maroons evade detection, some of whom hid only a stone’s throw away from white society. One maroon family, a mother and her children, hid so well “that one might walk over [their door] without guessing what was beneath. Here, mother and children lived in precarious freedom.” Within the realm of their invisibility, they lived by their own rules. Despite this, their fears were intertwined with the reality of a white-dominated slave society.

While maroons were invisible inside their shelters, exiting their bunker was another matter. When properly equipped, maroons could stay in their shelters for days, but eventually they would have to leave to forage for food. If a maroon had experience foraging and hunting, one could find food in the vicinity. If not, this meant an expedition to the plantation to steal food, though many maroons could rely on kin to provide. One ex-slave recalled, “runaways useto [sic] come to our house all de time to git somepin to eat. Dey stayed in de woods a long time an’ dere beards grewed so long dat no one could very well recergnize dem. Dey actually looked like wild men.” Maroons took a significant risk when leaving their shelters.

In a spectacular display of harmony with nature, one maroon found a way to know if someone was lurking outside his door. Uncle Louis, an elderly Alabaman slave whose ancestors came from the Guinea Coast, was in tune with his environment more than most. Thanks to his experience in the wilderness as a proud hunter, he gained a deep knowledge of his environment and was able to exploit that knowledge and skillset to survive in ways that other maroons would have struggled with. When asked why he ran away, “the old slave scratched his grizzled head, puffed at his clay pipe, and . . . replied: ‘I does cause de woods seem to call me.’” While in the woods, he developed a close relationship with the wildlife. To gain a sense of his bearings, he claimed to have learned the language of the wilderness’s highest residents: “A chickadee tole me you was comin’ long befo’ I seen you. Den

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15 Rawick, The American Slave, 6, 265.
a jay bird caught a sight of you an he tole me. Can’t nobody come along widout de birds tellin’ me. Dey pays no min’ to a horse or a dog but when dey spies a man dey speaks.”16 From his home in a hollow tree, Uncle Louis was able to discern any potential threats awaiting him outside his bunker. Other maroons used time as their ally, choosing to leave their abodes with the sun’s descent.

Maroons had to be cautious of their day-to-day activities if they were to maintain their invisibility. Fire was considered an “indispensable companion,” for the caves were dark and wet, cramped and muggy.17 While fireplaces were common in maroons’ dens, “not surprisingly, smoke was some maroons’ downfall.”18 To avoid revealing their positions, they needed to exploit their natural resources to trick the eye and minimize or reroute smoke.

One exceptionally industrious maroon built his runaway wife a cave-shelter in a Georgia swamp and came up with a brilliant way to reroute the smoke from their bunker. One enslaved bystander recalled, “he fixed dat cave up just lak a house for her, put a stove in dar and run de pipe out through de ground into a swamp.”19 Given that rising smoke would be a signpost for a fire below, this man’s idea of building log pipes to channel the smoke elsewhere ensured his wife’s (and eventually, his children’s) survival for at least seven years. This example is the exception instead of the rule, as most maroons lacked the time or the skill to create such an elaborate system while on the run.

Other maroons kept their cooking and fires for nightfall or dawn, when visibility was at a minimum. Even the couple who rerouted their smoke “didn’t cook on it ‘til night when nobody could see de smoke.”20 Others ran the risk in the morning: “if early in the morning you went out to the swampland and looked very carefully along the ground you might see a little line of smoke: that meant the woman was doing her cooking.”21 Some maroons used environmental phenomena to hide their activities. For instance, it was wise to dig a cave next to a dead, blackened tree. If no charred tree was in sight, one could place a blackened log or stump above the vent to give the appearance that the smoke had another source. Of course, it would be wise to dig the abode in an area known for frequent fire. For those maroons in a desperate situation, the best method was to use “the driest and most smokeless fuel,” such as hickory or oak bark.22

To make life in the wilderness more tolerable, anyone who sought life outside of society had to build a shelter. The maroons designed these shelters to be as durable and enduring as possible while blending into the wilderness floor. To do

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17 Diouf, Slavery’s Exiles, 104.
18 Rawick, The American Slave, 12:2, 14.
19 Ibid.
20 Blassingame, Slave Testimony, 537.
21 Dodge, “The Cave Dwellers,” 516; Diouf, Slavery’s Exiles, 104.
this, they had to adapt to their environment and manipulate their resources to trick the eye. However, one looming threat lurked over these fugitives’ shoulders, for some hunters relied on their scent rather than their sight.

Maroons feared capture more than death, because slave owners often terrorized returned slaves. Nevertheless, capture loomed around every corner. Most maroons had to leave their enclaves to obtain — often steal — food. Going to the plantation to steal a pig or cow was a remarkably risky enterprise, yet it was a reality for most maroons, especially those who lived on the borderlands. Besides endangering one’s kin, leaving the cave meant reestablishing their scent directly behind enemy walls, who often were on the lookout. In addition to having overseers on patrol, the slave master often employed slave hunters, so-called professionals at tracking and capturing maroons. Slave hunting could have been a full-time job for some, but “some traders, factors, and commission merchants were willing to purchase slaves on the run at reduced prices and then hunt them down themselves. . . . There were also self-appointed trackers who went after runaways for a possible reward or following a violent crime.”24 Whatever the circumstances of a slave hunter’s employment, the most formidable tool in a slave hunter’s arsenal was one universally feared by slaves; one that would help them navigate the woodlands and swamps of the American low-country: the so-called “nigger dogs.”24

Indeed, the American wilderness was incredibly formidable. Escaped slave Solomon Northup describes the bayous of Louisiana as

filled with immense trees — the sycamore, the gum, the cotton wood and cypress. . . . For thirty or forty miles it is without inhabitants, save wild beasts—the bear, the wild-cat, the tiger, and great slimy reptiles, that are crawling through it everywhere. Long before I reached the bayou, in fact, from the time I struck the water until I emerged from the swamp on my return, these reptiles surrounded me.25

Snakes were another prominent threat for those living in the southern wilderness. Northup encountered countless water moccasins (cottonmouth snakes) throughout his trek through the Louisiana swamp. “Every log and bog — every trunk of a fallen tree, over which I was compelled to step or climb, was alive with them. They are poisonous serpents — their bite more fatal than a rattlesnake’s.”26 Indeed, the water moccasin, a common snake in the swamps and waterways of the American South, is a force to be reckoned with. They are known for their white mouth, easily-agitatable temperament, and a tendency to chase their prey. Yet, despite these daunting beasts, it was not the snakes, alligators, bears, or bugs that runaways feared most, it was the dogs.

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24 “Dialogue on Slavery,” Non-Slaveholder, 1 July 1854, 61
25 Northup, Twelve Years a Slave, 110.
26 Ibid.
Slave hunters knew that their dogs were an asset that yielded profit. One man recounts in 1854: “one man . . . had five dogs. He charged $10 per day for himself and dogs, ‘catch or no catch,’ but would not go out on a hunt unless the owner of the runaway would give permission that the dogs should ‘take hold’ of the negro when caught. This was to keep them in ‘good heart.’”27 Ten dollars per day was a steep price tag for the time, one which attests to the perceived value of the slave hunters’ services and the amount of resources needed for the job. The hunter told the maroon that “if you strike one of them, I will shoot you.”28 Here, the value of the dog is evident in the hunter’s attempt to ensure its safety. Slave hunters were also reliant on the environment to be successful. People may have removed their four-legged companions from nature, but animals were still of nature.

Given the abolitionist newspapers’ political leanings, one must approach such testimonies skeptically. However, there are certainly truthful elements to the account. Indeed, while most slaves chose flight over fight, some had to force their way out of a hound’s jaws. Mary White Ovington, a former slave, recalls: “De dogs is terrible, Miss. When dey’s after yer ain’t nothin to do but climb a tree or dey tear yer all to pieces.”29 At the same time, that the master was prepared to administer 200 lashings speaks to the gravity of marronage and slave flight. Slave owners feared insurrection and disdained anything that inspired their slaves to act in their own interests. Surely that unfortunate slave who chose the 200 lashes was not the only martyr for marronage.

Of all the environmental challenges that slaves faced in their quest for freedom, slave-hunting hounds proved to be a massive feat to overcome. To do so, runaways had to demonstrate a mastery of their natural resources in often quick and desperate situations. It did not matter whether a slave was running away to secure freedom in the woods as a maroon, seeking refuge in the forest after a lashing, or evading purchasers. If an enslaved person took flight, he or she was potential prey for the slave hunters’ blood-thirsty hounds. Additionally, for those maroons who had successfully established societies in the wilderness, they grappled with the looming threat of capture by so-called “nigger dogs” when they went to the borderlands for food, or when they were minding their own in their enclaves. On a journey to the South, famed architect Frederick Olmstead described the upbringing of these savage hounds:

no particular breed of dogs is needed for hunting negroes: blood-hounds, fox-hounds, bull-dogs, and curs were used, and one white man told me how they were trained for it, as if it were a common or notorious practice. . . . I don't think they are employed in the ordinary driving in the swamp, but only to

27 “Dialogue on Slavery,” Non-Slaveholder, 1 July 1854, 61
28 Ibid.
29 Blassingame, Slave Testimony, 539.
overtake some particular slave, as soon as possible after it is discovered that he has fled from a plantation.\textsuperscript{30}

These hounds were fierce, loyal, and industrious. As Olmstead notes, their sole purpose since adolescence was the hunt. Trainers purposefully limited their dogs’ contact with blacks to moments of barbarity. In these instances, handlers trained their dogs’ sense of smell; they refined their ability to track and pursue; and—for the unfortunate slaves who were not able to make it up the tree—they instilled, encouraged, and fostered their aggressiveness towards blacks. In the aforementioned passage from \textit{Non-Slaveholder}, the owner of the runaway is required to “give permission that the dogs should ‘take hold’ of the negro when caught . . . to keep them in ‘good heart.’”\textsuperscript{31} Northup notes, “they will attack a negro, at their master’s bidding, and cling to him as the common bull-dog will cling to a four footed animal.”\textsuperscript{32} Implied in Northup’s account is the dogs’ barbarous purpose. In pursuit, the hounds treat runaways as nothing more than “human game.”\textsuperscript{33} As one freed slave recalled, “Dem dogs was trained to ketch a nigger same as rabbit dogs is trained to ketch a rabbit.”\textsuperscript{34} Such degradation reinforced the commodification, and zoomorphization, of human chattel.

Runaways had to be cunning and resourceful at a moment’s notice to outwit their canine pursuers. Octavia Victoria Rogers Albert (1853-1890)—author, religious leader, and liberated slave—explains how a maroon may have triumphed over the hunting dogs. Sam, a slave who experienced the wrath of an exceptionally cruel master, was a \textit{petit maroon}, a maroon who absconded for weeks or months, often with the intent of returning:

he would run off and stayed in the woods two and three months at a time. The white folks would set the dogs behind him, but Sam could not be caught by the dogs. The colored people said Sam greased his feet with rabbit-grease, and that kept the dogs from him. . . . It looked like Sam could go off and stay as long as he wanted when the white folks got after him.\textsuperscript{35}

In an expert display of proficiency of one’s environment, and perhaps some quick thinking, Sam deduced a way to trick the dogs. By using the scent of one animal to escape the jaws of another, Sam demonstrated the way in which the natural world was both friend and foe for maroons. Surely, those who worked with the grain of

\textsuperscript{30} Frederick Law Olmstead, \textit{Journey in the Seaboard Slave States; With Remarks on Their Economy} (New York: Dix and Edwards, 1856), 160-161.
\textsuperscript{32} Northup, \textit{Twelve Years a Slave}, 108.
\textsuperscript{33} “Dialogue on Slavery,” \textit{Non-Slaveholder}, 1 July 1854, 61.
\textsuperscript{35} Octavia Victoria Roberts Albert, \textit{The House of Bondage or Charlotte Brooks and Other Slaves} (New York: Hunt & Eaton, 1890); 23.
their environment could find success in their ventures. For those who left their success to chance, the American wilderness was no safe harbor.

In addition to animal grease, maroons resorted to plants and vegetables to sway their scent. Dodge states that maroons employed other tricks: “if he feared pursuit by dogs, he rubbed the soles of his feet with onions or odorous herbs to confuse the scent. If moderately wary or skillful, he found little difficulty in remaining ‘out’ till the crops were ‘laid by’ and all the heavy work was over, or till cold weather drove him back to a snugger berth in the quarters.” Clearly, maroons had to be pragmatic. If a rabbit was unavailable, onions and herbs worked as well, as, evidently, one could lie out successfully for a whole season. When asked how she outsmarted her canine pursuers, one slave recounted: “It’s a mighty hard matter ma’am, to run some folks. Hounds couldn’t run me. . . . I’d go ter de graveyard an’ open a grave where the people been buried about a week. When I put some o’ that dirt in my shoes there weren’t a hound could run me.” In a morbid display of quick wits, this Alabaman slave managed to find an alternative to animal grease, onions, and herbs in evading capture, instead exploiting the land to aid in her flight.

Slave hunters were formidable and merciless. They relied heavily on their animals to track and often debilitate fugitive slaves. However, their canine companions were not the only tools at their disposal. They were always armed and ready for conflict. In North Carolina’s Great Dismal Swamp, a famous refuge for maroon societies of the thousands, “a company of [maroons] were discovered, and made resistance, as they were armed with pistols; they fired, without effect, and then were fired on by these man-hunters, with their longer and heavier guns, and four of them shot, and others wounded so that they could not retreat. One of them in particular, was shot in the knee, which was badly shattered.”

During the hunt, dogs were most useful for tracking. After that, any damage they could do was a bonus, as the men carried greater destructive capacity than their hounds. Their violence served two purposes: it punished runaways and set an example for other fugitives. The shoot-out between hunter and hunted in the Great Dismal Swamp reduced the maroon societies’ numbers in more ways than casualty count: “so many of these poor wretched fugitives have been shot and wounded, that others have become so alarmed that they have come out and returned to their former masters.” While a mastery of the environment may have been indispensable on the run, it helped little once found and confronted.

Unless they were fortunate enough to buy or be granted their freedom, marooned slaves had to overcome their natural world if they hoped to seize their liberty. The environment was both a safe-haven and a formidable obstacle for runaway fugitives.

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37 Blassingame, Slave Testimony, 537.
38 “Slaves in the Dismal Swamp,” Non-Slaveholder, 1 May 1848, 115.
39 Ibid.
slaves. On one hand, the wilderness provided maroons with space to live out their idea of freedom, to escape the horrors of plantation bondage, or recuperate after a beating or humiliation. Indeed, for some slaves the wilderness was an accessory to rebellion. On the other hand, mastering one’s environment was no easy task. Slaves ran with little to no property (besides the clothes on their backs) and often with heavy emotional burdens. Runaways had to find ways to sustain themselves while overcoming the dangers inherent to life in the wilderness. Additionally, the vast wilderness was the physical barrier between southern slavery and northern freedom.

The maroons’ experiences varied from region to region, community to community. Maroons living in the borderlands near Louisiana plantations had a vastly distinct experience from those thousands of maroons living in the Great Dismal Swamp of Virginia. No matter what their conditions were, maroons had to be adaptable and pragmatic if they were to survive the wilderness’s dangers and avoid capture. In the grand scheme of slave flight, few maroons accomplished their goals, if they survived. Many were captured; others were forced to return to the dredges of slavery lest they starve to death. But for those who survived, those who became known as “wild men,” they developed a relationship with their environment that aided their success.
One of the most contentious presidential elections in American history came to an end as the polls closed the evening of 6 November 1860. While no candidate in the four-way race could claim a majority of the popular vote, as the ballots were counted it soon became clear that Republican Abraham Lincoln would easily win the Electoral College and become the sixteenth president. The result triggered a rapid series of events throughout the South, particularly in the cotton states. State after state passed legislation to call a constitutional convention. One by one, the states of the Deep South fulfilled the threat they had made during the presidential campaign: that the election of Abraham Lincoln would result in their secession. South Carolina led the way on 20 December, followed by Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana in January, and Texas on 1 February.

For the next two and a half months, a stalemate ensued as the remaining slave states awaited the outcome of several attempts at compromise. Ultimately there was no compromise and the attack on Fort Sumter in April would plunge the country into four years of bloody civil war. Attempts to compromise failed because they did not take into account the deep-seated fears of slave rebellion that were part of every slave society. These fears took on a greater urgency with the prospect of a presidential administration that many in the South believed would actively support slave uprisings as a means of achieving abolition. White southerners, particularly in the Deep South, chose secession because they believed that remaining in the Union would leave them vulnerable to a catastrophic slave revolution supported by the new “Black Republican” administration. This fear was based on their interpretation of the Haitian Revolution and exacerbated by the attack on Harper’s Ferry and a rumored slave plot in northern Texas in 1860.

In recent decades, the historiography on secession has shifted back toward a focus on slavery as the root cause of the Civil War. James McPherson highlights the correlation between the proportion of slaveholders in the population and support for secession or unionism. Additionally, he points to the problem this created for secessionists trying to build support for secession. He argues that white supremacy was the key to securing the support of non-slaveholding whites for secession. More recently, Charles Dew contends that the letters and speeches of secession commissioners representing the Deep South states reveal that racial fears played an important role in secession. What is missing from these and other

arguments is a detailed analysis of the role that anticipated violence, specifically slave insurrection, played in these fears.

White southerners lived in constant fear of slave revolts. According to both Herbert Aptheker and Eugene Genovese, the possibility of slave uprisings was so deeply a part of life in the American South that it did not take an actual insurrection to inspire fear; everyone, black and white, lived with the constant awareness that it could happen at any time. Even unsubstantiated rumor was enough to incite panic. While slave resistance has benefited from decades of research, it has only been in recent years that scholars have begun to recognize the role it played in white political culture in the antebellum South. William Link argues that slaveholder anxiety about potential revolts led to the political crisis over slavery in the 1850s. The secession crisis of 1860-1861 provides an excellent, although relatively unexplored, opportunity to analyze how southern white political thought responded to the threat of slave insurrection.

The effects of the Haitian Revolution have become an important part of the study of American history, especially since the bicentennial (1991-2004). The Haitian Revolution began only four years after the adoption of the U.S. constitution and so impacted the development of the United States from the very beginning. Fearing that successful revolution in Haiti would inspire slaves in the South, the United States quickly made Haiti’s diplomatic isolation a priority. African Americans also quickly recognized the potential implications of a free black republic founded by self-liberated slaves. African Americans in the Northern states held public celebrations commemorating the anniversary of Haiti’s independence and used the success of the Haitian Revolution in the development of black identity in the early republic. Like their free counterparts, enslaved African Americans also recognized the significance of the Haitian Revolution. Aptheker argues that it impacted slave resistance in the United States more than any other event.

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before the war ended with Haiti’s independence, it inspired Gabriel, a slave in Richmond, Virginia, to plan a massive uprising that was prevented only by weather and betrayal by an informer.\(^{10}\) A generation later, another group of slaves in Charleston, South Carolina, led by Denmark Vesey, a free black, plotted their own revolution inspired by Haiti, possibly with the intention of fleeing there.\(^{11}\) Haiti influenced not only slaves seeking their freedom, but also whites responding to these efforts. Writing about the Nat Turner revolt, Brian Gabrial argues that every slave disturbance in the United States brought up fears and memories of Haiti.\(^{12}\) According to Lacy Ford the Haitian Revolution led to increased anxiety among slaveholders throughout the South.\(^{13}\) While the sources above all recognize the impact that the Haitian Revolution had on the antebellum United States, they fail to acknowledge that it extended beyond the antislavery mail campaign of 1835.

There is however, a smaller body of research that recognizes Haiti’s influence on American politics up until the Civil War. In one of the earliest such works, Alfred Hunt contends that the Southern slave society can be better understood as a northern extension of the Caribbean plantation complex rather than as “an aberrant version of traditional American society.” Within this framework, Southerners believe peaceful emancipation to be impossible and their view of the Haitian Revolution as a warning against abolition influenced their defense of slavery and white supremacy from the time of the revolution until the Civil War.\(^{14}\) According to Matthew Clavin, Americans saw two different versions of the Haitian Revolution which he characterizes as the “horrific” narrative, which emphasized atrocities Haitian blacks committed against whites, and the “heroic” narrative, which focused on the efforts of the slaves to gain their freedom against almost impossible odds. While the heroic narrative was popular among free blacks and a few white abolitionists, the horrific narrative dominated American discourse on the Haitian Revolution, particularly in the South. Fears of a similar revolution united Southern slaveholders and non-slaveholders in defense of slavery, and that the path to the Civil War cannot be understood without taking into account the influence of the Haitian Revolution.\(^{15}\) Edward Rugemer, while focusing on the British Caribbean rather than Haiti, also insists that the conflict over slavery in the United States, and ultimately secession and Civil War, must be understood within a Caribbean

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\(^{13}\) Lacy Ford, *Deliver Us From Evil: The Slavery Question in the Old South* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 26, 85.


\(^{15}\) Clavin, *Toussaint Louverture and the American Civil War*, 4, 11-14, 69.
context. He describes the borders of the United States as permeable to people, goods, ideas, and information, including news from the Caribbean. According to Rugemer, the ideas of British writer Bryan Edwards who blamed the Haitian Revolution on French abolitionists were widely published in the United States and became the dominant narrative of the Haitian Revolution in the United States.16

In the case of South Carolina, where secession began, Bernard Powers argues that whites feared a “Black Republican” administration because they interpreted emancipation through the lens of the Haitian Revolution.17

Fear of slave insurrection played an important role in building a consensus for secession because it provided a motivation for non-slaveholders to support secession. The yeoman farmers, craftsmen, and hired laborers feared the prospect of widespread racial violence just as much as the aristocratic planter.18 Secessionists realized this and used this fear to reach out to potential supporters. Many news reports of slave unrest emphasized random violence that endangered all whites, including those who did not own slaves. In the fall of 1860, the Carolina Spartan warned that slaves planned to massacre the entire white population of Talladega, Alabama.19

A common threat against the general population was arson, with frequent reports of towns burned in Texas and plots to burn other towns throughout the South.20

Reports on the Texas plot also included allegations that the slaves would make use of another indiscriminate weapon by poisoning the wells.21 In his 27 December 1860 letter to Kentucky Governor Beriah Magoffin, Alabama commissioner to Kentucky Stephen Hale warned that “the slave-holder and non-slaveholder must ultimately share the same fate.”22 He later alluded to what that common fate would be, “it is a question of self-preservation. Our lives, our property, the safety of our homes and our hearthstones, all that men hold dear on earth” were at risk.23 While some Kentuckians chose to side with the Confederacy, Hale’s efforts were largely unsuccessful. When war broke out, four more states seceded, but Kentucky remained in the Union.

Appeals to fear had to be used carefully. Mid-nineteenth century ideas of masculinity did not permit men to show fear. Secessionists accommodated this by transferring these fears onto women and children and appealing to men’s roles as protector of home and family, warning that the insurrectionists would invade their

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18 Reynolds, Texas Terror, 176.
19 Carolina Spartan, 9 Sept. 1860.
23 Ibid., 99.
homes and asking if the South should wait for nighttime assaults on their homes “when our wives and children are slumbering.” Amid reports of a planned uprising near Talladega, Alabama, other Southern communities were advised to “see that no torches are preparing for the destruction of their homes.” When rumors of an alleged slave conspiracy spread during the summer of 1860, newspapers regularly claimed that the slaves intended to spare the lives of the young white women to be their wives. B. F. Barkley of Birdville, Texas in a letter to the Yorkville Enquirer, justified the resulting vigilante violence, writing that “when the lives of our families are at stake—when those that are most dear to us are in danger of being not only murdered in cold blood, but perhaps to meet a worse fate, then it is time to take the law into our own hands, and to protect our families.” A correspondent to the Shreveport South-Western, reported that “all is alarm and excitement with our women and children. Our men are in arms.”

In Georgia, Thomas Cobb reminded his audience of the dangers of slave rebellion. When he advised them to “take up your daily papers, and see reports of insurrections in every direction,” his listeners in Milledgeville were already alarmed by rumors of an uprising only a few miles away. He warned his listeners to “remember the trembling hand of a loved wife, as she whispered fears from the incendiary and the assassin. Recall the indefinable dread with which the little daughter inquired when your returning footsteps should be heard.” Having shifted the fears of his listeners onto their wives and daughters, he then appealed to their masculinity, asking them, “if there be manhood in you, tell me if this is the domestic tranquility which this ‘Glorious Union’ has achieved.” A week later, his fellow Georgian Henry Benning warned that during a slave revolution the women would “call upon the mountains to fall upon them,” suggesting that death would be better than the fate they faced. Stephen Hale was more explicit regarding the fate of women during slave revolutions, accusing those who incited them of “consigning her citizens to assassinations and her wives and daughters to pollution and violation to satisfy the lust of half-civilized Africans,” and predicting that “our wives and our little ones will be driven from their homes by the light of our dwellings.”

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27 Yorkville Enquirer, 16 Aug. 1860.
28 South-Western, 15 Aug. 1860.
30 “Henry L. Benning’s, Secessionist Speech, Monday Evening, November 19,” in Freehling and Simpson, Secession Debated, 120.
Secessionist speeches and writings on the dangers of slave rebellion built on a widespread public memory of the Haitian Revolution. This public memory provided a vivid example of what was possible if the slaves rose up. Rather than refer to Haiti by its official name adopted at independence, white Southerners still called it by its colonial name St. Domingo or San Domingo to delegitimize the idea of black revolution. When the Augusta Daily Constitutionalist told its readers shortly after Lincoln’s election that their choice was between secession or “the fate of . . . St. Domingo,” and the New Orleans Daily Delta warned the border states that they faced the “fate of St. Domingo,” if they remained in the Union as a substantially reduced minority after the secession of the cotton states, they offered no explanation of what they meant by referring to St. Domingo. They knew that their readers already understood what this meant and needed no explanation. For white southerners, the name St. Domingo represented black violence toward whites and conjured an image of the Haitian Revolution that was based more on sensationalized accounts of atrocities than on reality.

During the year leading up to the election, political leaders in the South used this common understanding of the Haitian Revolution to communicate to their constituents what they believed was at stake in the election. In a speech days after Harper’s Ferry, Congressman John McQueen of South Carolina claimed that emancipation would lead to a repetition of Haiti in the South. As the election approached, Joseph Clark, a candidate for the South Carolina legislature, wrote to the Lancaster Ledger that if the slaves were free, that the South should expect “the reenactment of the scenes of Hayti and St. Domingo in our midst.” Only days before the election, William Yancey told an audience in New Orleans that if they submitted to Republican rule, “the whole South would be reduced to the condition of another St. Domingo.” After Lincoln’s election, in a sermon reprinted in the Daily Crescent, Reverend B. M. Palmer of New Orleans’ First Presbyterian Church told his congregation that if Louisiana failed to respond, “within five and twenty years, the history of St. Domingo will be the record of Louisiana.”

The Louisville Daily Courier was slightly more descriptive, but still only meaningful to readers who already had a clear image of the results of the Haitian Revolution, predicting that the conflict over slavery would end in “a repetition of all the horrors of St. Domingo, at one fell swoop making the rich and prosperous States whose exports constitute the wealth of the nation an uninhabited and

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32 Reynolds, Texas Terror, 2.
34 Gabrial, “From Haiti to Nat Turner,” 336.
35 Lancaster Ledger, 26 Oct. 1859.
36 Ibid., 26 Sept. 1860.
37 Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel, 3 Nov. 1860.
habitless desert.” This warning reminded white southerners of the economic calamities they believed would inevitably occur when blacks were no longer forced to work.\textsuperscript{39} Whites saw colonial Saint Domingue not in terms of its brutal slave regime, but as an extremely wealthy plantation colony which had led the world in sugar production. The revolution which resulted in the liberation of the slaves and the colony’s independence also destroyed the plantations.

For white Southerners, Haiti was more than a reminder of the potential for slave revolution; it was also a source of support for such an uprising. This is particularly evident in their reports on the activities of James Redpath. Redpath was an abolitionist journalist, associate and biographer of John Brown, and a representative of the Haitian government, hired to recruit African Americans to emigrate to Haiti. In September of 1860, less than six weeks before the presidential election, rumors circulated that Redpath had gone to Haiti to solicit financial support to raise an army of 2,000 men that would start a slave revolt in the South. He predicted that their ranks would grow as slaves joined the rebellion and that within six months they would overthrow slavery in the South.\textsuperscript{41} Three weeks after the election, the \textit{Daily Crescent} claimed that he had been instructed to invite the widow of Lewis Leary to move to Haiti where she would be provided for by the government. The article reminded its readers that Leary had died fighting alongside John Brown at Harper’s Ferry.\textsuperscript{42} In January, the \textit{Yorkville Enquirer} reported that Redpath, along with John Brown, Jr. and thirteen black men, had chartered a boat from Boston to Port-au-Prince and may have planned a landing in South Carolina.\textsuperscript{43}

An important part of the white South’s collective memory of Haiti was that the slaves had been incited to revolt by abolitionist Jacobins.\textsuperscript{44} The widespread belief that slave revolts were incited by outsiders allowed Southern whites to reconcile their belief in slave loyalty with the reality of slave resistance.\textsuperscript{45} During the decades leading up to the Civil War, this suspicion of outsiders inciting slaves focused on northern abolitionists. After seceding, the conventions of South Carolina, Mississippi, and Texas all adopted formal statements identifying their reasons for their departure. South Carolina accused the North of having “permitted the open establishment among them of societies whose avowed object is to disturb the peace” and “encouraged and assisted thousands of our slaves to leave their homes; and those who remain, have been incited by emissaries, books and

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{40} Hunt, \textit{Haiti’s Influence on Antebellum America}, 89.
\bibitem{42} \textit{New Orleans Daily Crescent}, 21 Nov. 1860.
\bibitem{43} \textit{Yorkville Enquirer}, 24 Jan. 1861.
\bibitem{44} Clavin, \textit{Toussaint Louverture and the American Civil War}, 65; Hunt, \textit{Haiti’s Influence on Antebellum America}, 140.
\bibitem{45} Reynolds, \textit{Texas Terror}, 6.
\end{thebibliography}
pictures to servile insurrection.” Mississippi claimed that abolitionism “promotes insurrection and incendiaryism in our midst.” According to the Texas convention, northern abolitionists “have, through the mails and hired emissaries, sent seditious pamphlets and papers among us to stir up servile insurrection and bring blood and carnage to our firesides.” In each case, it was assumed that the purpose of abolitionism was to incite the slaves of the South to rise up against the whites. This belief can be traced, at least in part, to the 1835 mail campaign by the American Anti-Slavery Society. White southerners saw this as an attempt to encourage slaves to revolt. In response they censored the mail and restricted slave literacy.

While these restrictions dealt with the immediate perceived threat, the perception remained that abolitionists would go to any lengths to incite the slaves.

White Southerners were ready to believe that acts of resistance were incited by outsiders because of their belief in the myth of the contented and loyal slave as part of their justification for the institution. Newspapers frequently claimed that the slaves had been happy until abolitionists “tampered” with them. Shortly after Harper’s Ferry, the *Louisiana Democrat* described the slaves who joined Brown’s forces as having been “cajoled or forced into their service,” and the *Edgefield Advertiser* published a claim that the slaves on one nearby plantation had been armed by abolitionists and told to join Brown when he attacked, but out of loyalty to their mistress they stayed home. Similar claims that slaves who joined Brown had been coerced appeared in the *Mobile Register*, citing letters from Senator James Mason and an unnamed source. The *Independent Press* claimed that slaves in Charleston were “perfectly content” and would not consider rebelling or running away unless abolitionist incited them. To show the extent of the slaves’ alleged loyalty, the *Daily Crescent* reported that a slave in Mississippi was murdered by an abolitionist for refusing to join a planned uprising. This unnamed slave was presumed to have sacrificed his life rather than turn against his master.

Leading up to the election of 1860, rumors swept through the South of arson, poisonings, and rapes committed by slaves after visits from mysterious northerners. These incidents received the most coverage in newspapers that were sympathetic to secessionists. Alluding to these rumors, the *Charleston Mercury* wrote that “developments of the past year roused the people of the South to the dangers that

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46 Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union, and the Ordinance of Secession (Charleston: Evans & Cogswell, 1860), 9.
47 An Address: setting forth the declaration of the immediate causes which induce and justify the secession of Mississippi from the Federal Union and the ordinance of secession (Jackson: Mississippian Book and Job Printing Office, 1861), 4.
48 A declaration of the causes which impelled the State of Texas to secede from the federal union (Austin, 1861), 4.
50 *Louisiana Democrat*, 26 Oct. 1859; *Edgefield Advertiser*, 9 Nov. 1859.
51 *Mobile Register*, 21 Oct. 1859; 1 Nov. 1859.
menace them,” and the Daily South Carolinian warned that abolitionism “is at the bottom of every raid upon the South” and “incites to the murder of her citizens.”

In Texas this led to vigilance committees lynching or driving many northerners out of the state when they were suspected of inciting slaves. After the election, Robert Toombs claimed that abolitionists during the previous twenty years had “by publications made by them, by the public press, through the pulpit and their own legislative halls” encouraged slaves to revolt, and that there were “hired emissaries paid by brethren to glide through the domestic circle and intrigue insurrection.”

He did not need to explain in any detail how these emissaries operated because Thomas Cobb had done so the day before, telling the same audience to watch “when the travelling pedlar lingers too long in conversation at the door with the servant,” “when the slave tarries long with the wandering artist who professes merely to furnish him with a picture,” and “the Northern man conversing in private with the most faithful of your negroes.” Having warned his listeners that they cannot trust strangers, particularly those from the North, around their slaves, Cobb argued that these dangers required that Georgia secede, and do so immediately. “Delay is dangerous because it keeps our territory open to the emissaries of the North.”

The Montgomery Daily Post also used allegations of Northern incitement of the slaves to argue that secession must be immediate. Responding to proposals that secession can be averted through constitutional amendments to protect slavery, the editor argued that additional constitutional amendments would not work because existing laws were not enforced. As his first example to demonstrate the futility of laws to protect slavery, he wrote that “to incite servile insurrections is already recognized as a criminal offense . . . but they still continue to occur.” Regardless of any concessions that might be written into the Constitution, compromise was unacceptable because remaining in the Union would prevent the Southern states from protecting themselves from slave revolts incited by Northerners.

The Charleston Mercury explicitly linked alleged northern incitement of the slaves to the issue of secession. Two weeks after Harper’s Ferry, the paper claimed that Brown’s action “shows to the people of the South the destiny which awaits them in this Union,” that remaining in the Union was “a standing instigation of insurrection in the South,” and that similar raids would occur as long as Northerners

57 “Robert Toombs’s Secessionist Speech, Tuesday Evening, November 13,” in Freehling and Simpson, Secession Debated, 11.
59 Ibid. 27.
could travel freely in the South. The following March, the *Mercury* promised that once the South left the Union, they would be “freed from the hostile and incendiary actions of our now fellow citizens” and able to exclude Northern abolitionists as foreigners. As news arrived of the insurrection allegedly planned in Texas, the *Mercury* once again argued that remaining in the Union allowed abolitionists to travel through the South at will, but secession would allow the South to keep them and their subversive documents out.

In claiming that Northerners were planning to incite slave revolts throughout the South, secessionists had two recent examples that they used as evidence. The first was John Brown’s 1859 raid on Harper’s Ferry, Virginia. While Northerners had long been suspected of acting in the background to incite the slaves, at Harper’s Ferry white men for the first time took up arms to support a proposed insurrection. For many in the South, this provided clear proof of Northern intentions. The *New Orleans Daily Crescent*, in March when it was still assumed that William Seward would be the Republican nominee, called John Brown his “most illustrious disciple,” and on the day South Carolina seceded, wrote of the Harper’s Ferry raid “an attack upon the institution of slavery anywhere, was an attack upon it everywhere.” The *Mobile Register* reported that letters found in the farmhouse rented by Brown included letters implicating prominent northerners including Senator William Seward of New York and Governor Samuel Chase of Ohio.

Thomas Cobb used the raid in his argument for immediate secession. After posing the rhetorical question, “should I be told to wait for an overt act?” he responded “was not the John Brown raid, invading the territory of the South, overt?” Cobb was not suggesting that Brown himself, who had been dead for nearly a year, was still a threat, but rather that he was a representation of Northern ideas and intentions.

The Northern response to Brown’s hanging terrified white Southerners far more than his unsuccessful raid. The Mississippi Convention complained that the

61 *Charleston Mercury*, 1 Nov. 1859.
62 Ibid., 10 Mar. 1860.
63 Ibid., 30 July 1860.
North had “invested with the honors of martyrdom the wretch whose purpose was to apply flames to our dwellings, and the weapons of destruction to our lives.” Hale used the North’s response to Brown’s execution as evidence of widespread Northern support for slave insurrection. He told Governor Magoffin, “nor is this the mere ebullition of a few half-crazy fanatics, as is abundantly apparent from the sympathy manifested all over the North, where, in many places, the tragic death of John Brown, the leader of the raid upon Virginia, who died upon the gallows a condemned felon, is celebrated with public honors, and his name canonized as a martyr to liberty.” Despite the trial and execution of Brown and several of his followers, some members of his raiding party escaped to the North. The failure of Northern states, particularly Ohio and Iowa, to extradite these men back to Virginia to stand trial was also used by secessionists as evidence of Northern support for Brown. Among its list of grievances, South Carolina complained that “the States of Ohio and Iowa have refused to surrender to justice fugitives charged with murder, and with inciting servile insurrection in the State of Virginia.” According to the Texas Convention, Northerners “have invaded Southern soil and murdered unoffending citizens, and through their press, their leading men and a fanatical pulpit, have bestowed praise upon the actors and assassins in these crime – while the Governors of several of their States have refused to deliver parties implicated and indicted for participation” in the raid on Harper’s Ferry. Toombs claimed “that it was sympathy with the cause of John Brown which gave sanctuary to his confederates.”

The public commemorations of Brown in the North and the failure to extradite the escaped raiders convinced white Southerners that he had widespread Northern support. When Northerners raised money for Brown’s widow and surviving children, the Yorkville Enquirer claimed that the money would actually be used to fund the next invasion. The participation of organized groups of black men in commemorations of the anniversary of Harper’s Ferry was particularly alarming to white Southerners. This belief frightened them enough to ultimately make compromise with Republicans impossible and generate popular support for secession.

In addition to the actual invasion at Harper’s Ferry, secessionists also made use of the rumored conspiracy to incite a slave revolt in northern Texas during the

71 An Address: setting forth the declaration of the immediate causes which induce and justify the secession of Mississippi from the Federal Union and the ordinance of secession, 4.
73 Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union, 8.
74 A declaration of the causes which impelled the State of Texas to secede from the federal union, 3-4.
75 “Robert Toombs’s Secessionist Speech,” in Freehling and Simpson, Secession Debated, 43.
76 Yorkville Enquirer, 8 Dec. 1859.
summer of 1860. During an unusually hot summer, a series of fires led to rumors that they had been started intentionally as part of an abolitionist-organized plot to launch a slave revolution during the statewide elections on 6 August.\textsuperscript{79} According to the rumors, the abolitionists had recruited slaves into a plot to destroy all the provisions and weapons by burning the towns so the population would be helpless when the rebels began a general uprising while the men were at the polls. The abolitionists were reported to have supplied the slaves with guns and strychnine.\textsuperscript{80} Suspicions of Northern involvement led to the lynching of at least thirty Yankees, usually recent arrivals, often on largely circumstantial evidence.\textsuperscript{81}

News of the alleged conspiracy quickly spread throughout the South. Donald Reynolds has identified newspapers that printed stories of the rumored revolt in every state that would eventually secede.\textsuperscript{82} Coming only months after the Harper’s Ferry raid, the rumored conspiracy both reflected and intensified the fears that John Brown inspired. The \textit{Charleston Mercury}, almost as soon as reports of the plot began arriving, began linking the Texas fires to Harper’s Ferry as further evidence of Northern intentions toward the South.\textsuperscript{83} Unsurprisingly, Texas cited this episode in its Declaration of Causes, alleging that “they have sent hired emissaries among us to burn our towns.”\textsuperscript{84} Hale also claimed that “during the past summer the abolition incendiary has lit up the prairies of Texas, fired the dwellings of the inhabitants, burned down whole towns and laid poison for her citizens.”\textsuperscript{85} After the Texas Convention referred its ordinance of secession to the voters, Commissioner George Williamson of Louisiana warned in a speech that if the voters failed to ratify the ordinance, “the abolitionists would continue their work of incendiariism and murder” on Texas’ northern borders.\textsuperscript{86}

Southern fears of slave revolution led to secession following Lincoln’s election because they feared that under a Republican administration the danger would increase. While historians are careful to distinguish between Republicans and abolitionists, contemporary white Southerners did not.\textsuperscript{87} In a letter to the South Carolina Convention, Alabama Governor Andrew Moore wrote that the Republican Party, upon taking control of the executive branch, would “greatly endanger the peace, interests, and security” of the slave states.\textsuperscript{88} According to Hale, given the history of abolitionists, “the election of Mr. Lincoln cannot be regarded otherwise

\begin{itemize}
  \item Reynolds, \textit{Texas Terror}, 29-53.
  \item Reynolds, \textit{Texas Terror}, 83-86, 96.
  \item Ibid., 98-99.
  \item Charleston Mercury, 30 July 1860; 13 Aug. 1860; 24 Aug. 1860.
  \item A declaration of the causes which impelled the State of Texas to secede from the federal union, 4.
  \item South-Western, 27 February 1861.
  \item Reynolds, \textit{Texas Terror}, 22.
\end{itemize}
than a solemn declaration, on the part of a great majority of the Northern people, of hostility to the South, her property, and her institutions; nothing less than an open declaration of war.”

Secessionists clearly articulated how they believed Republicans would use their new political power to advance the cause of slave revolution. When John C. McGehee, President of the Florida Convention, said that the Republican Party was “sectional, irresponsible to us,” he was warning that the new administration would be free to act against the slave states. The presidential patronage power was an important part of Southern fears. Only weeks after Harper’s Ferry, Representative Otho Singleton of Mississippi warned that the South would never tolerate thousands of federal officials coming “as abolition emissaries, for the purpose of stealing our slaves and encouraging insurrection among them.”

On October 11, less than a month before the election, the Charleston Mercury highlighted the raid on Harper’s Ferry and fires in Texas and asked how much more danger they would face from abolitionists “with all the patronage of the Federal Government . . . to support it?” Later that month in a speech in New Orleans, William Yancey made a similar argument that if the Buchanan administration had not protected the South from “abolitionist outrages, plots, and incendiaryism,” then a Lincoln administration would be even less likely to do so. The week after the election, the New Orleans Daily Crescent warned that within six months of Lincoln’s inauguration, federal facilities in the South would “swarm with Abolition workmen and Abolition officials” who would build up a Republican abolitionist party in the South. Georgia Governor Joseph Brown likewise warned that Lincoln would use his patronage power to encourage the development of the Republican Party in the Southern states. One appointed position that white Southerners were particularly concerned about was the local postmaster. Hale warned of abolitionist postmasters throughout the South circulating abolitionist literature. This was particularly alarming because postmasters in the South had been preventing delivery of abolitionist publications since 1835, in violation of federal law but with the tacit acquiescence of nine consecutive presidents. The election of Lincoln meant the possibility that postmasters would begin delivering them. At the end of 1859,
the *Yazoo Democrat* reported that Postmaster General Joseph Holt had instructed postmasters to not deliver materials that violated state laws. The paper speculated that this protection against abolitionist literature could not be expected to continue under a Republican administration. The “hired emissaries” that secessionists had warned of would now have the support of the federal government.

In early February 1861, representatives from the seven seceded states gathered in Montgomery, Alabama to form the new Confederate States of America. They would later be joined by four more states after the firing on Fort Sumter. Haunted by the memories of the Haitian Revolution and reminded of its constant possibility by recent events in Harper’s Ferry and northern Texas, they had concluded that they could never be safe under a government that did not share their commitment to preserving the institution of slavery. The uncertainty of secession and possible civil war was preferable to what they believed was the certainty of slave revolution supported by an abolitionist Republican administration.

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“Feeling the Burn”: Camp Blanding, Florida and the U.S. Military’s Role in Forest Ecology, 1980s to 2010

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In 2018, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) awarded to Camp Blanding Joint Training Center its annual Military Conservation Award. The USFWS gives this award to the base that “has done outstanding work to promote conservation on military lands.”\(^1\) As the USFWS announcement notes, prescribed fire — the intentional burning of vegetation — has been vital to conservation practice at this 73,000 acre National Guard installation in Northeast Florida. Such fires have accomplished several goals, two of which are important for this discussion. First, from an environmental standpoint, they have helped restore the crucial longleaf pine ecosystem needed to support endangered or threatened animals like the red cockaded woodpecker and the gopher tortoise. Second, by burning away forest undergrowth, they have created suitable landscapes for infantry training, Camp Blanding’s overall mission.\(^2\) Camp Blanding is not alone in its support for progressive environmental policies. Today, several large military bases in the southern United States use prescribed fire for a variety of reasons, including the goal of improving the environment by enhancing fragile ecosystems.\(^3\)

Yet until relatively recently, this was not the case. At Camp Blanding, an emphasis on generating revenue from timber harvesting discouraged the use of prescribed fire to restore habitat for endangered species until the early 1990s.\(^4\)


\(^2\) Several definitions are needed for this discussion. In this context, “environment” refers to the totality of external, physical conditions that affect human life, or the lives and habitats of animals and plants existing in a relationship with human society. This definition has emerged since the late 1960s. As such, it frequently encompasses many features of the physical world including air, water, soil, noise, and living beings, and the relationship of those features to one another. It tends to be a holistic view, broader than a traditional emphasis on protecting trees or game animals so that they can be harvested in the future for human use. “Conservation” refers to the “wise and frugal use of natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations.” Today, “conservation” is often understood as a subset of environmental protection. In this context, an “ecosystem” refers to “A self-regulating and self-sustaining community of organisms that relate to each other and to the larger environment.” I have slightly modified or directly used definitions from those in Carolyn Merchant, *Environmental History: An Introduction* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), xiii-xxii, 225, 229, 231, 232. For evidence of policies at Camp Blanding, see United States Fish and Wildlife Service, “Base Recognized for Conservation Work: Home for Woodpeckers, Tortoises Awarded,” https://www.fws.gov/southeast/news/2018/05/base-recognized-for-conservation-work/.


\(^4\) Much of the inspiration — and a few key ideas — for this article come from a former graduate student of mine at the University of North Florida. In the fall of 2015, graduate student Zach Gray posed similar questions about Camp Blanding and its embrace of environmental protection. Zach concluded that pressure imposed by new laws, from U.S. Fish and Wildlife, and other organizations forced Camp Blanding to adopt an ecosystem approach. I reached the same conclusion. Zach clearly influenced my thinking on this issue. I also followed some of the
Likewise, natural resources staff at the Army’s enormous base at Fort Bragg, North Carolina also emphasized timber sales, to the exclusion of prescribed burns and other environmentally-progressive practices. A similar emphasis on timber sales existed at Fort Benning, Georgia well into the 1980s, although the installation has used prescribed burning for decades to control wildfires. As these examples indicate, the relationship between military bases (at least in the U.S. South) and the environment has changed, especially in the last forty years.

By focusing on the history of prescribed burning at Camp Blanding, it is possible to shed light on two important questions about this changed relationship. First, why did Camp Blanding adopt prescribed fire for environmental reasons? What factors encouraged the base to change direction in the early 1990s? Second, what does the example of Camp Blanding suggest about the evolving historical relationship between military operations and the environment?

As this analysis will show, Camp Blanding was little different from other large military bases in the U.S. South. Like Fort Bragg and Fort Benning, the installation was subject to pressure from various federal agencies to adopt more environmentally sensitive policies, pressure that coincided with the end of the Cold War. Only the timing was a little different, as Camp Blanding embraced prescribed burning somewhat later than these large bases. Yet once Camp Blanding’s staff decided to adopt prescribed burning and other policies to restore ecosystems, it did so wholeheartedly and successfully. Such enthusiastic support reflected the role of key personnel and their understanding that protecting the environment and carrying out their military mission could be compatible. Finally, the case of Camp Blanding suggests that military bases have become equally if not more attuned to environmental pressure than the private sector, especially in a pro-growth state like Florida. This article does not consider other environmental issues like toxic waste disposal, citizen protest, and other environmental concerns that might exist at military bases around the country.

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3 Zach Gray, “Camp Blanding’s Response.”

The historical relationship between fire and military bases in the South is complicated. With extensive forest acreage, large installations like Fort Bragg (150,000 total acres in 1992), Fort Benning (180,000 acres in 2015), and Camp Blanding (72,000 acres in 1998) relied for years upon timber revenues to finance conservation of natural resources and daily operations. At the same time, all three bases had experienced years of wildfires, not only those set by natural causes like lighting, but also those ignited by military operations like artillery and infantry training. Forestry staff at all three bases adopted a policy of fire suppression, that is, the practice of extinguishing wildfires as quickly as possible to preserve valuable timber and other assets. Yet at various times from the 1960s through the 1980s, limited intentional burning occurred at all three installations, sometimes to clear underbrush and prevent wildfires, but also to create suitable habitat for wildlife.

In this general approach to fire, the U.S. military has mirrored a general attitude among foresters across the southeastern United States. By the 1930s, most foresters in the region believed that fire was detrimental to growing timber, and especially the fast-growing slash and loblolly pines that dominated commercial pine plantations. This attitude prevailed until well into the 1980s. Longleaf pines, a fire dependent species that once existed from Virginia to Texas, had mostly been cut down and harvested by then. During this same era, however, foresters on federally-owned lands also engaged in prescribed burning, mainly to improve game but also to reduce fuel for wildfires.

Policies at Camp Blanding were similar, although with less emphasis on burning to reduce wildfires. Established in 1939 as a National Guard training post, Camp Blanding expanded from its original 30,000 acres (owned by the State of Florida), to 170,000 acres owned and leased by the U.S. Army during World War II. Camp Blanding became the training site for some 800,000 infantry troops destined for combat, making it one of the largest populated sites in the state of Florida at the time.

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The bustling installation also served as an infantry replacement training center, a prisoner of war compound, and an induction center, among other activities.\textsuperscript{13}

The end of World War II ushered in a period of relative dormancy at Camp Blanding, at least in terms of military activity. Immediately after the war, the War Department ceded 30,000 acres back to the state, and returned thousands of acres of leased land back to private landowners in Clay County, Florida. Retaining title to about 40,000 acres of land, the federal government also auctioned off or salvaged numerous buildings remaining on the installation, including parts of the base hospital. Camp Blanding would serve mainly as a logistical staging area for the Florida National Guard.\textsuperscript{14}

Like other large bases in the South, Camp Blanding also engaged in timber harvesting during the post-World War II years. In the early 1950s, the State Armory Board (which supervised the Florida National Guard) operated a forestry management program on 27,000 acres of state-owned training and bivouac land at Camp Blanding. This program involved “selective cutting, reforestation, and protection from fire and other hazards,” according to a U.S. Congressional hearing from 1954.\textsuperscript{15}

Camp Blanding’s timber program accelerated in 1955 when the base gained control of the remaining 40,000 acres of federal land. Under Public Law 83-493, which transferred this land to state ownership, Camp Blanding was required to maintain all of the acreage it controlled as a unified military training site, and also to operate a forestry management program on the former federal lands. This law also allowed Camp Blanding to collect royalties from the sale of timber and mineral rights on all of its land, much of it covered in pine forests. Army Corps of Engineers Chief Lawson Knott argued that reforestation, removal of dead trees, and the prevention of fire on former federal lands would allow Camp Blanding to earn an annual, “gross return” of between $70,000 and $85,000 per year, quite a sum in 1955. Other supporters of this legislation included Florida Senator Spessard Holland and National Guard Adjutant General Mark Lance.\textsuperscript{16}

That law also mandated that timber proceeds (along with revenues from the sale


\textsuperscript{14} Florida Department of Military Affairs, Camp Blanding, Florida, 1-11; Smith, Camp Blanding: Florida Star, 159-179.


\textsuperscript{16} Regarding the role of timber sales over the years, see Smith, Camp Blanding: Florida Star, 157-196. Regarding the support for this law, see Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, 1-26, especially 20; Zach Gray, “Camp Blanding’s Response.”
of mineral rights), were to be used “for the management of natural resources at Camp Blanding and its maintenance and preservation as a military installation.” Any residual earnings from the sale of timber or mineral rights on federal lands was to be shared equally between the state and federal governments.\textsuperscript{17}

This arrangement provided much of the funding Camp Blanding used to pay for daily operations and natural resource conservation programs. Between 1955 and 1958, for instance, Camp Blanding earned about $570,000 in royalties from the sale of mineral rights, timber, and pulpwood (much of the funding for salaries and equipment used for military training at Camp Blanding actually came from the federal government during this period).\textsuperscript{18} The timber program expanded in these early years as the installation and its small forestry staff built roads and fences in newly accessed timber acreage, made selective improvement cuts, and planted slash pines for seed propagation. Blanding’s own forester, a state employee, worked closely with the Florida State Board of Forestry and the U.S. Forest Service in the development of a forest management plan. The base forestry staff also encouraged timber cutting in a “random method” in order to allow military training in forested areas.\textsuperscript{19}

Pressure to earn revenue from timber increased over time. Since the 1950s, Camp Blanding had earned royalties from ilmenite mining operations conducted on state and federal lands by E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company. By the 1960s, deposits of ilmenite were mostly depleted on state lands, eventually forcing du Pont to move some operations to another site, off base. The result was a decline in mining income, although some royalties continued from du Pont’s mine on former federal lands. In any event, a well-organized timber harvesting operation continued on the installation.

The same basic pattern prevailed until at least 1980, even as military training at Camp Blanding waxed and waned according to the United States’ role in foreign affairs. In the 1960s and 1970s, the base natural resources staff continued to manage its forests for the sale of timber and pulpwood, a program that also entailed careful protection of forested lands, the replanting of pine trees, and the earning of substantial revenues from the sale of timber and mining rights.

Some prescribed burning did occur. Because Camp Blanding was open for public hunting, the base introduced the use of prescribed burning in the mid-1960s to improve habitat for deer, turkey, and other game on the installation. There is


\textsuperscript{18} Smith, Camp Blanding: Florida Star, 169-184.

little evidence that Camp Blanding used fire for any other purposes, at least not until the 1980s. Subsequent evidence also suggests that considerable wildfires occurred, not only from natural causes like lightning, but also because of military operations.

The modern environmental movement of the late 1960s and 1970s represented a sweeping change in the way that Americans viewed the environment and a potential change for operations at Camp Blanding. As historian Carolyn Merchant notes,

"during the latter half of the twentieth century, the resource conservation movement based on efficient use of natural resources changed to an environmental movement concerned with the quality of life, species preservation, population growth, and the effects of humanity on the natural world."

The rise of environmentalism also coincided with the passage of landmark legislation and greater willingness by the federal and state governments to regulate natural resources. Among other things, the U.S. Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969, a law which required federal agencies to consider the effect of human actions on the environment. Other key laws included the 1970 Clean Air Act, the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and the 1973 Endangered Species Act (ESA).

The ESA had the greatest potential to impact forestry practices at Camp Blanding. Passed by Congress in 1973, the ESA created a process to identify animals and plants near extinction or “likely to become endangered within the foreseeable future.” The law had two other provisions of major importance. Section Seven required federal agencies to determine if their actions might result in the destruction of endangered species and their habitats. If so, those agencies were also required to promote the conservation of a listed animal, in consultation with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service or other agencies. This section of the law could also require the active protection of wider habitats, such as forests, for endangered species, if deemed necessary. Section Nine prohibited the killing, capture, or other forms of destruction of any listed animal or plant, by any person or agency in the United States. It was unclear at the time of passage (and it remained unclear for decades) whether Section Nine also implied the protection of habitats in this provision. In any event, entities deemed to have violated the ESA could be subject to criminal and civil penalties.

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20 See section on Camp Blanding in various Reports of the Adjutant General (SFB) from 1961 through 1979.
21 Garrison interview.
23 Ibid., 283-284.
Historical evidence does not indicate how much the staff at Camp Blanding was concerned about environmental issues during the 1970s, much less the ESA. There is virtually no mention of this in the yearly Adjutant General Reports during this era. It is clear; however, that the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission (FWC) was aware that endangered red cockaded woodpeckers (RCWs) existed on the base. At times during the 1970s, the game warden hired by FWC actually took the trouble to mark trees (mostly longleaf pine) where RCWs nested in order to prevent these trees from being cut during timber harvesting operations. Attempting to protect the species, FWC biologist Jim Garrison, who worked at Blanding, continued this practice during the 1980s, marking trees with the understanding that no pines would be harvested within a three-hundred foot radius of a nesting site. Years later, Garrison admits to his frustration at this process since he knew that RCWs needed a much larger area around each nesting site in order to forage. Yet existing state laws and forestry practices at Blanding discouraged him from taking more active measures to protect the birds and their longleaf pine habitat.

Longleaf pines lay at the heart of those more active measures. Forests of longleaf pine are fragile and diverse ecosystems, habitats which support a range of endangered or threatened species, including not only RCWs, but also gopher tortoises and other animals. The longleaf pine habitat also depends upon fire, not only to clear away underbrush, but also so that seeds can fall upon and grow in soil that has been enriched by the burning of organic matter. Adult longleaf pines are protected from fire by their thick bark. Yet according to Garrison, practices that might have enhanced this habitat were frowned upon by the installation’s forestry staff, at least during the 1980s. Longstanding base practice was to plant fast growing slash pine once longleaf pines had been harvested. The base also attempted to suppress wildfires where possible, as growing and selling timber was the main emphasis. Prescribed fire was discouraged and rarely used.

In fairness to the forestry staff at Camp Blanding, their basic approach to forestry differed little from that of other large military installations in the U.S. South. As stated above, both Fort Benning and Fort Bragg prioritized timber sales and did not use prescribed fire to enhance fragile habitat, at least not in the 1970s and 1980s. It should also be noted that military bases like Camp Blanding have represented (and still represent) some of the last remaining habitat for a number of endangered species, including not only RCWs, but also snapping turtles, fish,
and frogs, among other species. Finally, the pressures of the Cold War meant that military preparedness was a priority at large bases across the country, at least until the late 1980s. Camp Blanding was no exception, as the installation constructed dozens of new buildings and several new training grounds in order to accommodate the training needs of National Guardsmen, regular Army troops, and military contingents from a number of other states. As W. Stanford Smith points out with respect to the 1980s, “training continued to expand at Camp Blanding, with more than 350,000 man-days utilized during several years of the decade.” Moreover, income from forestry and mining royalties reached over $3 million in 1989-1990, making it easy to understand why the base prioritized timber sales.

Yet while timber harvesting remained important for a few more years, the role of forestry, fire, and the environment at Camp Blanding would change in the early 1990s. Some of this change probably reflected the end of the Cold War and the sense of military officials that some bases needed to change with the times. With respect to environmental issues, historian Katherine Keirns states that the military “faced a rapidly changing world at the end of the Cold War, in which American citizens were no longer willing to accept that environmental destruction was an acceptable cost for national security.”

Camp Blanding clearly faced changing times. Like the rest of the Florida National Guard, Camp Blanding experienced cuts in federal funding during the 1990s, money which would have paid for salaries and capital investment on the base. Revenues from forest products were also way down by 1995, a result, at least in part, from overcutting in prior years with little thought for the future. One 1995 article in the *Ocala Star Banner* from 1995 suggested that such new economic realities would force Camp Blanding to more actively protect and manage its endangered and threatened species.

Related changes in federal policy probably impacted Camp Blanding as well. In the wake of a notorious incident during the late 1980s in which officials at Fort Bragg blatantly violated the ESA, the Department of Defense under Secretary Dick Cheney announced that the armed forces were to become leaders in complying with the ESA. Henceforth, environmental protection and military defense were not deemed to be incompatible. Rather, the military should strive to manage

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34 Smith, *Camp Blanding: Florida Star*, 187-188.
endangered species issues more effectively, while also guaranteeing flexibility to carry out its mission.\textsuperscript{36}

More dramatic changes occurred a year or two later. Under the Clinton administration, the Department of Defense announced that it was adopting an “ecosystem” approach to natural resource management issues. Rather than managing forests or habitats merely to protect an individual bird or frog, the military was now mandating that entire ecological relationships be enhanced. The new direction also required the development of partnerships between the military, scientific experts, outside agencies, and the public in order to implement this new direction in environmental policy. With its emphasis on ecosystems, partnerships, and public input on practices “inside the fence line,” the Clinton administration policy represented a radical shift in policy.\textsuperscript{37} Enhanced enforcement of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the passage of the 1993 Forest Resources Conservation and Shortage Relief Amendment Act probably encouraged a tougher, more pro-ecosystem approach as well.\textsuperscript{38}

Finally, previous events at large army bases probably influenced thinking at Camp Blanding as well. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, officials at Fort Bragg and Fort Benning had run afoul of officials with the USFWS over compliance with provisions of the ESA. At Fort Bragg, the USFWS charged officials at the base with jeopardizing populations of endangered RCWs on the installation. An outside environmental group, the Environmental Defense Fund, also stepped in and filed lawsuits against Fort Bragg for violating Sections Seven and Nine of the Act. Eventually, Fort Bragg was forced to accept USFWS recommendations, restrict military operations on a significant part of the base, and begin a systematic prescribed burn policy to improve pine ecosystems for the RCWS. At Fort Benning, three civilian employees of the base were indicted in 1992 for concealing the presence of RCWs on the installation in order to continue timber harvesting.\textsuperscript{39}

Officials at Camp Blanding were certainly aware of these events and the implications of the ESA. Post officials were initially afraid that compliance with the ESA would curtail timber harvesting and sharply reduce revenues for the base (as it did).\textsuperscript{40} At one point, the post commander pushed back on compliance with the ESA, arguing that since Camp Blanding was a state-owned military base, it was not required to comply with the act. In the midst of several heated arguments about the issue, the USFWS asserted that a significant portion of Camp Blanding’s

\textsuperscript{36} Keirns, “Wildlife Insurgency,” 255
\textsuperscript{38} Zach Gray, “Camp Blanding’s Response.”
\textsuperscript{39} Keirns, “Wildlife Insurgency,” 239-263.
\textsuperscript{40} Smith, Camp Blanding: Florida Star, 187-188; Garrison, interview.
funds came from federal sources. This seems to have been a critical moment, and one that encouraged Camp Blanding to adopt a more pro-ecosystem approach to the ESA.\(^{41}\)

In any event, by 1994 Camp Blanding had adopted a more pro-environmental stance, and one consistent with an ecosystem approach to endangered species. Under Installation Commander Frederic Raymond, Camp Blanding conducted a survey to identify endangered or threatened plants on the base, a process that was to take several years. The installation’s natural resources staff also began to coordinate a survey of threatened or endangered animals.\(^{42}\) The process continued in 1993, as Camp Blanding completed part of its floristic survey as well as its survey of endangered and threatened vertebrates on the base. Florida National Guard Adjutant General Harrison’s report also noted that Camp Blanding was in the process of completing an Integrated Training Area Management Plan, itself to become part of an Integrated Natural Resources Management Plan (INRMP). Such an INRMP, with involvement from federal and state agencies, in addition to other interests, was itself part of the Department of Defense’s new ecosystem approach to the environment. As Harrison noted in his 1993 report, such a plan would “include plant, animal, forestry and historic components at Camp Blanding,” while also assisting military personnel in conducting “environmentally sound training with minimal resource alterations or disturbances.”\(^{43}\)

While 1992 and 1993 clearly signaled a shift in direction at Camp Blanding, 1994 was the decisive year. Among other things, Camp Blanding completed animal and plant surveys of endangered species, in addition to a “Natural Communities Survey,” which identified critical ecosystems. Just as importantly, the base hired several new staff to monitor natural resources, including a Forestry Manager, Paul Catlett, who was experienced with prescribed burns.\(^{44}\) Part of the new forestry plan also called for a systematic prescribed burn policy, one that would be folded into the installation’s Integrated Natural Resources Management Plan.\(^{45}\)

In 1995, development of the INRMP was well under way. By then, natural resource managers at Camp Blanding were working closely with experts from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife, the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, the St. Johns River Water Management District, the Audubon Society, and other organizations to create a master plan for the protection of ecosystems and biodiversity on the installation. As Camp Blanding’s public affairs officer noted,
"fifteen years ago, we didn't manage military lands to look after endangered and threatened species. Now, we know we must."46

Since the early 1990s, Camp Blanding has continued to enhance ecosystems for endangered species like the red cockaded woodpecker. Prescribed burning, a policy rarely used in previous years, is now an integral feature of natural resource policies on the base. Under Forestry Manager Paul Catlett (now Installation Environmental Manager), Camp Blanding regularly burns the pine woodlands in order to enhance habitat, not only for RCWs, but also for threatened gopher tortoises. Such burning also improves areas for military training. By burning away underbrush, prescribed burns lessen the possibility of wildfires which may be hard to control. Camp Blanding has also been extraordinarily successful in its efforts to protect the environment, even exceeding what the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service considers to be a stable population of RCWs. Not surprisingly, Camp Blanding has also won several awards for its efforts, including an Army National Guard Environmental Security Award for Natural Resources Conservation, and the Secretary of Defense Natural Resources Conservation Award.47

In some respects, the example of Camp Blanding differs little from that of other military bases. Camp Blanding embraced an ecosystem approach to environmental issues at about the same time that large Army bases like Fort Bragg or Fort Benning also adopted such an approach. Pressure from the Department of Defense and its shift in direction likely played a role in this change in policy. Perhaps Camp Blanding adopted an ecosystem approach somewhat later than other bases, in part because as a National Guard base it was not immediately subject to the same pressures from the federal government. In any event, the example of Camp Blanding, its adoption of an ecosystem approach to natural resources, and its use of prescribed fire, demonstrates that the military is not immune to some of the same environmental pressures that affect other institutions.48 Camp Blanding has adapted to the changing times, protecting its natural resources while continuing to train members of the Florida National Guard and other armed forces.

45 "Military Base Home to Endangered Species."
The Working Women of Colchester:
The Economic Agency of Eighteenth-Century Virginian Women

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The winter of 1760 and the spring and summer of 1761 were active working seasons for some of the residents of Colchester, Virginia. Mrs. Elizabeth Fallen, recently a licensed operator of one of Colchester’s ordinaries, was mending and sewing clothing for the servants and slaves in the employ of Alexander Henderson, the owner of the general store. Mrs. Mary Rogers was trading half barrels of corn to the same store for credit, and perhaps this was the same corn which Henderson used to feed the horses he kept. Meanwhile, Mrs. Sybil West, the owner of considerable estates and the mother of similarly well-endowed planters, was collecting rent through the store from one Thomas Windsor. What did these women have in common? They were widowed, and surviving evidence of their marketplace activities can be found in the ledgers of Alexander Henderson’s general store. But they had something else in common that was not obvious to themselves but apparent to historians looking back: that they were each in their own way examples of the kind of economic agency eighteenth-century women could possess.

Women in the eighteenth-century British colonies had the ability to participate in the market in different ways. Through craft jobs and household based economic production women of the better, middling, and lower sorts were able to join working men in the pursuit of consumer goods according to their own needs and desires. The way women of the different social levels earned and participated in consumption varied and consequently is the subject of this study. Elizabeth Fallen, Mary Rogers, and Sybil West each serve as an example of how women could secure wages, occupations, and serve as productive members of the community outside of but sometimes connected to their domestic roles. Each woman appears in Alexander Henderson’s ledgers as a customer and credit earner. Their ability to sell products to the store and purchase items on personal accounts is a sign that they had a degree of economic independence. The purchases Fallen, Rogers, and West made at Henderson’s store reflect not only their everyday needs but their desires as consumers as well. While they each show their personal tastes through their consumption of goods at Henderson’s store, they also show their economic independence by acting as executors of estates, owning property outright, and maintaining significant employment in Colchester.

2 Henderson, et al., Ledger 1760-1761, fol. 5, credit, debit.
3 Ibid., fol. 96, credit, debit.
Fairfax County in the Colony of Virginia was a mostly rural landscape in the middle of the eighteenth century, dominated by the land holdings and plantations of wealthy tobacco growers. In this county the small town of Colchester, nestled on the northern bank of the Occoquan River, serves as a focus for this study as it was a nexus of activity for many of the county’s residents. The survival of Alexander Henderson’s store records sets Colchester apart as a community that can be analyzed and reconstructed.

This study builds from the work of the economic historians of the early modern period and of the Chesapeake region. The research of historians such as Lorena Walsh, Lorna Weatherill, Richard Bushman, Jan de Vries, Cary Carson, and Ann Smart Martin has been influential in this work as they have laid out many of the economic and consumer trends which this study relies on to properly analyze Fairfax County, Virginia, Alexander Henderson’s general store, and the three women as individuals. Therefore, I am adopting the understanding of the Consumer Revolution promoted first by McKendrick, Brewer, and Plumb in their research on early modern consumption.

The works of Kathleen Brown and Cynthia Kierner regarding women of the Chesapeake have also been influential, and due to the status of these women as widows, so has some of the scholarship on femme sole status in early modern English-speaking regions. However, while these works have illuminated many facets of women’s lives and domestic situations, their primary source focus has been based on legal records and personal correspondence. This research aims to extend the realm of feasible research by analyzing economic data and material goods alongside corresponding legal documents, and therefore, my methodology follows more closely the works of Weatherill and de Vries than it does Brown or Kierner.
To answer the question of who these women were, the identity of Alexander Henderson must be briefly reviewed. Henderson was young Scotsman who in 1758 settled in Colchester as a factor for the tobacco trader John Glassford of Dougalston. Based in Glasgow, Glassford’s trading firm offered transport of the Chesapeake Planter’s chief cash crop across the Atlantic in exchange for store credit to purchase items of necessity and luxury. It was Henderson’s job to see to the needs of his many customers who sought the variety of British goods offered in his store. Such traders were not rare by the 1760s, in fact, the previous decade had seen an explosion of Scottish traders setting up stores in the Chesapeake. In Colchester alone Henderson had to compete with two other traders. Henderson however has left a meticulous record of his store activity during the first half of the 1760s, and from this an image arises of not only the planters who used his services to become fabulously wealthy, but of a cross-section of Fairfax County’s residents who use the store for both necessities and luxuries and acquire store credit in diverse ways.

Mrs. Elizabeth Fallen: Seamstress and Tavern Keeper

Elizabeth Fallen was one of the regular customers of Henderson’s store, doing business with him over twenty times throughout 1760 and 1761. Her transactions are paid for entirely through store credit. Unlike others who paid in tobacco or in direct currency, Mrs. Fallen’s credit was a product of the work she was commissioned to complete by Henderson. This work consisted of creating and mending articles of clothing and furniture dressing for Henderson and his servants. This set of skills makes Mrs. Fallen appear to be a seamstress by profession.

Mrs. Fallen’s work was not limited to sewing and hemming, however. In 1759 she received a license to operate an ordinary with authorized security from Peter Wagener, the owner of the land which Colchester was built on. With this license Mrs. Fallen was kept occupied with the work a tavern would provide her. One wonders why she was granted the license. Women were known to be ordinary

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revolutions. The household economies of artisans and craftspeople modified their work schedules in response to heightened demand for greater productivity; Kierner, Beyond the Household; Weatherill, Consumer Behaviour.


12 Henderson et al., Ledger 1760-1761, fol. 5, credit, fol. 6, credit, debit, fol. 42, debit.

13 Ibid., fol. 42, credit.

14 Court of the County of Fairfax, held 17 Apr. 1759, in Court Order Book 1756, p. 334, Fairfax Circuit Court, Fairfax, Virginia.
keepers in Virginia in this period, but it was not common. Her work there may have been in exchange for Peter Wagener’s guardianship of her nieces since he was the owner of Colchester’s most prominent tavern. Wagener took up the guardianship of Agatha and Hannah when William Fallin, their father, failed to adequately provide for his children in the sight of the county court and the Church Parish of Truro. Elizabeth Fallen received her license for the ordinary in April of 1759, 9 months after the August court case against William. It is possible that Wagener gave Mrs. Fallen the license as a favor.

Mrs. Fallen therefore had two immediately apparent sources of income, tavern keeping and seamstress-work. Why did a woman, a widow in Fallen’s case, need to take up these jobs? It is possible that her social standing, being middling or lower, did not afford her or her late husband enough financial resources to allow her to subsist without jobs. It is likely also that Mrs. Fallen’s dependent daughter was old enough to shop at Henderson’s on her mother’s behalf but possibly not old enough to court a husband. Mrs. Fallen also may have had slaves which were both a financial liability and a source of revenue. The latter is hinted at in Henderson’s ledger, when a payment of credit for five days of Mrs. Fallen’s “Wench-Washing” is recorded. The term wench, though applied to loose women in the parlance of renaissance England, had come to denote enslaved women in the context of colonial Virginia. Therefore, as Mrs. Fallen was by no means a slave or a free woman of color herself, this wench who gave Mrs. Fallen income must have been an enslaved girl in Mrs. Fallen’s possession. Hiring out slaves was also a regular practice in colonial Virginia as Henderson himself received the work of a slave named Milford after hiring him from Catesby Cocke, another resident of Fairfax County. Unlike Milford, Mrs. Fallen’s slave was not recorded unless she is the girl Kate mentioned as buying rum on Mrs. Fallen’s behalf on the ninth of December. The lack of a clear indicator for the slave’s name hints that Henderson himself did not purchase the slave to work under him as with Milford, but hired Fallen to have her slave complete a task, and therefore the “wench’s” five days of laundry-work was likely overseen by Mrs. Fallen at her own home.

For Mrs. Fallen’s own labor of seaming, hemming, and mending she required and worked with a variety of fabrics and articles of clothing. She most often earned several shillings for her work. Making a set of six towels, making a pair of sheets and pillow cases, and making new stockings for Henderson’s slave Celia each

16 Henderson et al., Ledger 1760-1761, fol. 42, debit
17 Ibid., fol. 42, credit.
18 Brown, Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, 180-185, 208-211.
19 Henderson et al., Ledger 1760-1761, fol. 3, debit, credit, fol. 4, debit, credit.
20 Ibid., fol. 42, debit.
earned her three shillings. A shirt and one pair of stockings earned her five shillings, while two pairs of stockings earned her eight shillings. The wench-washing earned her six shillings and three pence.\textsuperscript{21} The prices seem to match for what Henderson was willing to pay for clothing work, as John McIntosh, Colchester’s resident tailor, was paid ten shillings for making a great coat and breeches, and eighteen shillings for a great coat, jacket, and breeches for the slave Milford.\textsuperscript{22}

While looking at Mrs. Fallen’s work and wages reveals her place in the world of production, her purchases say something about what she needed to do that work. Since it appears that Mrs. Fallen was not a large property owner like others in Colchester, she would require more utility goods from Henderson’s store than others. Among her orders were printed cotton, a remnant of striped linsey, and two and a half yards of fine linen. This indicates that some of her purchases may have been made with her commissions in mind. Other items she purchased likely went to feeding herself and her dependents, a daughter and a slave at least. She purchased several bushels of salt and 4-pound orders of sugar, and rum throughout the year and one order for ten pounds of beef in winter. These orders were likely used to supplement her supply of foodstuffs at home. Other orders for things like salt-peter were likely for similar necessity. However, two orders for shoes, one simply listed as “women’s shoes” and another as “one pair of Calamanco shoes” indicating their fine make, reveal that Mrs. Fallen was also sampling the refined goods which Henderson’s store offered.\textsuperscript{23}

Mrs. Fallen participated in the consumer culture of the eighteenth century both through purchasing fine fabrics and other goods she needed and desired. She was more than simply a consumer however, as also worked to produce in her local economy as a seamstress.

Mrs. Sybil West: Land Lady and Estate Manager

Mrs. Sybil West came from a different end of the social spectrum from Mrs. Fallen, those who were often referred to at the time as the better-sorts. Mrs. West was born Sybil Harrison into a wealthy family in the Virginia Colony and her husband Hugh West owned properties across the county of Fairfax. Mrs. West would outlive her husband by many years, and as a widow took on the role of matriarch to her family and an estate manager. She was afforded this position by being made the executor of his will and she used this power to oversee her children’s lands.\textsuperscript{24}

Mrs. West interacted with Henderson and his store only once during the ledger year of 1760-1761. The transaction involves the payment of rent from one Thomas...
Windsor. This payment was also initially collected by Mrs. West’s son Hugh jr. and it was transferred to Mrs. West’s account by him. Mrs. West is therefore recorded as the customer receiving the payment on her credit page even though she may not have entered the store at all for this transaction. Nonetheless, Henderson recorded it as Mrs. West’s rent and placed the money on her account for the store specifically.

Thomas Windsor’s own identity is somewhat easier to track down, as he appears both in Henderson’s ledgers and among the landowners of the county. He owned his own land outright, but also was a tenant on the land of William West, one of Mrs. West’s sons. In the partition of Hugh West’s estate, Mrs. West took her own plot of land, and her four sons and daughter had the rest of the properties spread between them. William West is listed as living outside of Fairfax County, while his mother and brother Hugh both live there. It must then be safe to conclude that if Mr. Windsor is paying rent to Mrs. West for property that belongs to her sons, she may have been acting in an oversight function.

This detail of Mrs. West’s life is important because it shows that a woman who owns or oversees properties, for herself and her family, can assume wealth from tenants. It also demonstrates that women could gain an income even within the bounds of domesticity. Mrs. West held a place of authority in the family as a matriarch, and this can be supported from the other wills and deeds which she signed and for which she served as a mediator. One clear example is her signature as a witness for the will and inventory of her son Hugh jr.’s property when he predeceased her in 1767. Her signature itself in addition to her felt presence in these legal documents shows that as a planter widow Mrs. West could exercise legal authority similar to that of her late husband while not compromising her role as a mother.

Mrs. West used the credit she received from Windsor’s rent to purchase two items: a pair of calamanco shoes and women’s worsted stockings. It is unclear who she purchased these items for, whether for herself or as a gift for a daughter or granddaughter. These granddaughters were well provided for by Mrs. West, as

25 Henderson et al., Ledger 1760-1761, fol. 156, credit, fol. 96, credit.
26 Ibid., fol. 156, credit.
27 Ibid., fol. 124, debit.
29 “Will of Hugh West” in Will Book B-1, pp. 74-75, Fairfax Circuit Court, Fairfax, Virginia, recorded 21 Nov. 1754.
30 Mitchell, “An Interpretive Historical Map of Fairfax County.
31 “Lease from Sibyl West to Benjamin Southard,” in Deed Book E-1, pp. 294-298, Fairfax Circuit Court, Fairfax, Virginia, recorded 19 July 1763; “Deed from Sibyl West to William Tripplett,” in Deed Book M-1, pp. 315-317, Fairfax Circuit Court, Fairfax, Virginia, recorded 1 July 1777; Deed from Sibyl West to George West,” in Deed Book D-1, pp. 403-405, Fairfax Circuit Court, Fairfax, Virginia, recorded 17 May 1757; “Deed from Sibyl West to Hugh West,” in Deed Book D-1, pp. 543-544, Fairfax Circuit Court, Fairfax, Virginia, recorded 20 Sept. 1758.
32 “Will of Hugh West,” in Will Book C-1, pp. 7-8, Fairfax Circuit Court, Fairfax, Virginia, recorded 19 May 1767.
in her own will she left an inheritance for all eight of them.33 A later document entrusts the care of two orphaned granddaughters to a trusted kinsman William Tripplettt, to whom Mrs. West had previously granted a portion of land.34 Thus, even after her passing, Mrs. West was able to be an influential figure in decisions concerning the family’s wellbeing.

These records show that Mrs. West participated in the consumer culture of the era, she purchases a set of fine women’s shoes for a personal desire. And she used the money she earned as a manager of an estate to do so. That managerial role did not compromise her high place in the social order. Indeed, her place as a family matriarch was clearly accepted and if the wills are to be believed, deferred to.

Mrs. Mary Rogers: Corn Farmer

Mrs. Rogers was a landowner, but unlike Mrs. West and Mrs. Fallen she was not a slave owner according to both the property and tax records.35 Her place in the colonial hierarchy is roughly what might be called the middling sort. Her purchases at Henderson’s store were varied, and mirror Mrs. Fallen’s in both necessity and consuming interest.36 What sets Mrs. Rogers apart was her use of corn to acquire store credit. Specifically, Mrs. Rogers delivered a half-barrel of corn to Henderson successively over the period of half a year.37 What might this transaction tell historians about farmers of this social class in Fairfax County?

According to a deed by Richard Rogers granting a plot of land to his son William, Richard’s wife Mary Rogers was provided for in the use of Williams property however she saw fit, and to be protected from harm.38 This legal language means that, according to the rules of coverture in this period, William owned the land outright and his mother did not have a claim on land ownership herself. She was, however, permitted to use the property within her son’s legal protection for her own purposes.39

It is likely that Mrs. Rogers grew corn as both a subsistence crop and a convenient cash crop. Because the plot of land was not as substantial as others in the county, and the Rogers family owned no slaves, it is likely that they were not participating in the tobacco trade.40 They instead may have been farming mostly for subsistence, and the corn may have been a sellable surplus.

35 Mitchell, “An Interpretive Historical Map of Fairfax County; Patricia Duncan, Fairfax County, Virginia Personal Property Tax Lists, 1782-1850 (Heritage Books, 2012,), 72, 84, 107.
36 Henderson et al., Ledger 1760-1761, fol. 107, debit.
37 Ibid., fol. 107, credit.
38 “Deed from Richard Rogers to William Rogers,” in Deed Book D-1, pp. 888-890, Fairfax Circuit Court, Fairfax, Virginia, recorded Sept. 15, 1761.
40 Mitchell, “An Interpretive Historical Map of Fairfax County; Duncan, Fairfax County, Virginia Personal Property Tax Lists, 72, 84, 107.
However, trends among the plantations and farmers of Virginia generally were moving toward a diversified crop and they were no longer as dependent on the cash crop of tobacco as they had been in previous years. Such changes were in part due to crop failures which crashed the market and made many merchants unwilling to trade in tobacco unless assured good credit. The Glasgow merchants like John Glassford were a notable exception to this trend, buying large quantities of tobacco from the backcountry. While Mary Rogers’ own use of corn as produce may have come from necessity, she would not have been alone among many of her neighbors in growing it for market.

Mrs. Rogers’ sale of corn reflects both her social status as well as larger trends in the Chesapeake towards more varied forms of crop growth. But Rogers was a smaller landholder, and the tax records for Fairfax list no slaves for most of her life and the lives of her husband and children. Mrs. Rogers did not own the land on which she grew the corn, but she was able to use her son’s land to provide for herself as she wished. Her ability to use the land, and her freedom to sell the corn as she wished for her own financial gain, reflects her ability to access the market independently. Rogers selling corn to Henderson also shows that those women who were part of smaller landowning families had a degree of economic agency and were able to access the consumer market of the Atlantic.

Mary Rogers earned three shillings for each half-barrel she brought to Henderson. What Henderson did with the corn after Mary Rogers delivered it to him is unclear. It is possible that some was consumed by Henderson and his servants, while some may have gone to the taverns to provide for corn whiskey. However, things consumed by Henderson personally were not part of his records. One hint for use is that Mrs. Rogers’ corn is listed as household expenses under the section titled “Horses Expenses.” Thus, at least some of what Mrs. Rogers produced was being used as feed for the horses lodging at the store.

Mrs. Rogers bought rum, sugar, shot, and gunpowder from the store in March, April, and July of 1761. The items she bought served clear home utility purposes and were not merely for a fashionable function. This would seem to indicate that at least in 1761 Mary Rogers was not in the market for new items of clothing at Henderson’s store. These purchases indicate, however, that Mrs. Rogers as a landowner had responsibilities to her household. On 1 December 1760, Mrs. Rogers’ daughter bought rum on her mother’s behalf. Thanks to this a clearer

42 Devine, The Tobacco Lords.
43 Duncan, Fairfax County, Virginia Personal Property Tax Lists, 72, 84, 107.
45 Henderson et al., Ledger 1760-1761, fol. 6, credit.
46 Ibid., fol. 107, debit.
picture of Mrs. Rogers’ family can be drawn. She had a son who was old enough to own the land, and a likely unmarried daughter who lived with them. As a recently widowed family who did not have tobacco wealth, the surplus corn at three shillings per half barrel monthly or bi-monthly would seem to be a necessary financial move.\textsuperscript{47}

Overall, Mrs. Rogers’ decisions seem motivated by economic necessity. These decisions as an extension reveal the ways a woman could engage in the consumer market for needed goods under the legal restrictions of coverture and as a person with less financial means than the planter elite who have dominated the discourse around refinement and consumption.\textsuperscript{48}

In conclusion, Elizabeth Fallen, Sybil West, and Mary Rogers each represent a different way that eighteenth-century women of the Chesapeake could engage both the working world and the consumer economy of the eighteenth century. Like in the realm of growing domesticity that also marks this period, in which political authority for Chesapeake women was being modified through education and etiquette, the economic side of Chesapeake life had avenues by which women could earn wages and participate in the market as consumers and producers.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{47} “Deed from Richard Rogers to William Rogers,” in Deed Book D-1, p. 890, Fairfax Circuit Court, Fairfax, Virginia, recorded September 15, 1761.

\textsuperscript{48} Bushman, The Refinement of America, 26-29; Carson, Face Value, 10-17.

\textsuperscript{49} Cynthia Kierner, Beyond the household, 5-8.