

**Selected
Annual Proceeding
of the**



Annual Meeting

**February 28-March 1, 2008
Jacksonville, Florida**

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March 2009**

Editors of
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of the
Florida Conference of Historians*

Anthony D. Atwood, Editor

Joseph Patrouch, Associate Editor

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Florida Conference of Historians
<http://fch.fiu.edu>

Florida Conference of Historians

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Table of Contents

<i>From the Desk of the Editor</i>	5
<i>Letter from the President</i>	6
<i>Thomas M. Campbell Award Announcement</i>	7
<i>2008 Program</i>	8

2008 Selected Papers

Standing up the Standing Force: Transforming the American Military, 1941 to 1991 <i>Anthony D. Atwood</i>	22
Shoot to Kill: Flexible Gunnery Training at Buckingham AAF, 1942-1945 <i>Erik D. Carlson</i>	32
Fedor Evgenievich Konovalov's Eyewitness Memoirs of the Second Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-36 <i>J. Calvitt Clarke III</i>	37
No Independence without Sovereignty! The Resistance of Emperor Haile Selassie I to the British Occupation of Ethiopia (1941-1944) <i>Sterling Joseph Coleman, Jr.</i>	45
Rescue Russia! Even the Bolsheviks? American Railroad Men in the Russian Civil War <i>Clifford Foust</i>	53

Another Post-War Settlement: Eunice Hunton Carter and Mary McLeod Bethune <i>Christine Lutz</i>	60
Reexamining the Legacy of Lt. General James Longstreet, CSA <i>Jimi Thomas</i>	79
Appeasement in Russian, Chinese, and American Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 <i>Teddy J. Uldricks</i>	88
A Return to the Past: Teaching Russian and Soviet History from a Eurasian Perspective <i>Christopher J. Ward</i>	106
The Impact of American Political Thought on Historical Analysis: A Case Study of the Nicaraguan Revolution <i>John-Paul Wilson</i>	115

From the Desk of the Editor

This edition of the Proceedings underscores the diversity of the FCH and its commitment to reaching out. The strength of the FCH is that it does not focus entirely on historians of Florida and the South. Rather, it is a forum for historians *working* in the South. We continue to build our constituency on the interdisciplinary foundation, on our welcome to graduate and undergraduate scholars, niche historians, and the growth of the FCH as a destination conference.

Special note: printing deadlines prevented including the paper of Okete J.E. Shiroya, Valdosta State University, "Nationalism and Identity in East Africa: The Case of Burundi and Rwanda." The paper is posted on our website at: <http://fch.fiu.edu>.

From the Pen of the President

Dear Friends and Colleagues,

Welcome to Ft. Myers, Florida and the annual meeting of the Florida Conference of Historians.

The Florida Conference of Historians began in 1962 as the Florida College Teachers of History. Its founders imagined of an organization covering all fields of historical interest and that would give those teaching history in Florida's colleges and universities an opportunity to share their scholarship and develop a sense of collegiality. In 1992, the organization changed its name to the Florida Conference of Historians to encourage participation by historians outside the state's colleges and universities. In 1993, we published the first volume of our Selected Annual Proceedings.

I have been active in the FCH since 1992. In my personal experience, the FCH has seen good years and years more lean. But we have always met our goals of scholarship, diversity of interests and geography, and collegiality. The great news is that over the last several years, and thanks to the support of Florida International University, the quality and number of our conference presentations and published papers have reached higher. It means a lot to me to have been a passing part of this success.

I would like to congratulate Christine Lutz of Georgia State University. Her paper, "Another Post-War Settlement: Eunice Hunton Carter and Mary McLeod Bethune," won the Thomas M. Campbell Award for best paper submitted to the Proceedings published this year.

Thank you for joining us, and good luck to us all,

J. Calvitt Clarke III
President
Florida Conference of Historians
2008-2009

Thomas M. Campbell Award

Beginning with Volumes 6/7 in 1999, the Florida Conference of Historians has presented the Thomas M. Campbell Award for the best paper published in the Annual Proceedings of that year.

Thomas M. (Tom) Campbell was the driving force behind the creation of the Florida Conference of Historians, at that time called The Florida College Teachers of History, over 40 years ago. It was his personality and hard work that kept the conference moving forward. Simply put, in those early years he *was* the conference.

Tom was a professor of US Diplomatic History at Florida State University. The Thomas M. Campbell Award is in his name so that we may recognize and remember his efforts on behalf of the Florida Conference of Historians.

Recipients

Volume 16: Christine Lutz, Georgia State University
Volume 15: Vincent Intondi, American University
Volume 14: Steve MacIsaac, Jacksonville University
Volume 13: Dennis P. Halpin and Jared G. Toney, University of South Florida
Volume 12: David Michael, Chicago Theological Seminary
Volume 10/11: Robert L. Shearer, Florida Institute of Technology
Volume 7/8: J. Calvitt Clarke, III, Jacksonville University
Volume 6/7: J. Calvitt Clarke, III, Jacksonville University

PROGRAM
FEBRUARY 28, 2008, THURSDAY

REGISTRATION, 6:00-9:00 p.m.

INFORMAL RECEPTION, 6:00-9:00 p.m. Oasis and Falls Rooms

FEBRUARY 29, 2008, FRIDAY

FREE LIGHT BREAKFAST, 6:00-9:00 a.m. Oasis Room hotel registrants only

REGISTRATION, 7:30 a.m.-5:30 p.m.

SESSION F1, 8:00-9:00 A.M.

F1—VIETNAM AND IRAQ - Blue Heron Room

CHAIR: Tony Esposito, St. Leo University, St. Leo, FL

PAPERS:

Mao Lin, University of Georgia, Athens, GA

“China and the Escalation of the Vietnam War: The First Years of the Johnson Administration”

Marco Rimanelli, St. Leo University, St. Leo, FL

“The ‘Requiem’ on U.S. Foreign Policy in Iraq”

DISCUSSANT: Tony Esposito, St. Leo University, St. Leo, FL

F1—THE COLD WAR - Osprey Room

CHAIR: David Proctor, Tallahassee Community College, Tallahassee, FL

PAPERS:

John-Paul Wilson, St Johns University, Queens, NY

“The Impact of American Political Thought on Historical Analysis: A Case Study of the Nicaraguan Revolution”

Lynda Lamarre, Georgian Southern University, Statesboro, GA

“The Aldo Moro Affair”

DISCUSSANT: David Proctor, Tallahassee Community College, Tallahassee, FL

F1—LIFE IN AMERICA - Atlantic Room

CHAIR: Elena Thompson, University of Maryland University College, College Park, MD

PAPERS:

Jeffrey Wells, Georgia Military College, Atlanta Campus, Atlanta, GA

"Bush at Last: Paul Coverdell and the 1988 Presidential Campaign"

Heather Parker, St. Leo University, St. Leo, FL

"America at Large: Reflections on Obesity within America, 1850-1960, 1945"

DISCUSSANT: Elena Thompson, University of Maryland University College, College Park, MD

F1—RESISTANCE TO IMPERIALISM, NATIONALISM AND POLITICS IN EAST AFRICA - Courtyard Marriott, Courtyard Boardroom

CHAIR: Alison Meek, King's University College at the University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada

PAPERS:

Okete J. Shiroya, Valdosta State University, Valdosta GA
"Nationalism and Identity in East Africa"

Sterling Coleman, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL
"No Independence Without Sovereignty! The Resistance of Emperor Haile Selassie I to the British Occupation of Ethiopia (1941-1944)"

Altaye Alaro Alambo, Independent Scholar, Jacksonville, FL
"Notes of Diplomatic Experience in the London and Vienna Ethiopian Embassies, July 2001-July 2006"

DISCUSSANT: Bill Marina, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, FL; Research Fellow, the Independent Institution., Oakland, CA; Executive Director, the Marina-Huerta Educational Foundation, Asheville, NC

SESSION F2, 9:15 -10:45 A.M.

F2—PLENARY SESSION: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON APPEASEMENT Atlantic Room

CHAIR: Will Benedicks, Tallahassee Community College

PAPER:

Ted J. Uldricks, University of North Carolina, Asheville, NC
"The Soviet Union, the United States, and Republican China as Appeasers"

DISCUSSANTS: Steve MacIsaac, Jacksonville University, Jacksonville, FL; **Craig Buettinger**, Jacksonville University, Jacksonville, FL; **Alex Cummins**, Flagler College, St. Augustine, FL; editor, *Documents of Soviet History*

SESSION F3, 11:00 A.M.-12:30 NOON

F3—TALE OF TWO CITIES - Blue Heron Room

CHAIR: Gail Pat Parsons, Gordon College, Barnesville, GA

PAPERS:

Thomas E. Aiello, Gordon College, Barnesville, GA

“The Dallas Cotton Exchange and the Atlantic World”

Michael Epple, Florida Gulf Coast University, Fort Myers, FL

“Missiles on the Lake: Cold War Hysteria in Cleveland”

DISCUSSANT: Heather Parker, St. Leo University, St. Leo, FL

F3—NATION AND IMAGINATION IN THE 20TH CENTURY

AMERICAS - Osprey Room

CHAIR: Nicola Foote, Florida Gulf Coast University, Fort Myers, FL

PAPERS:

Ingrid Fernandez, Florida Gulf Coast University, Fort Meyers, FL

“Evita: A Female Icon of Nationalism”

Don Routh, University of Miami, Miami, FL

“How German-Americans Lost Their Hyphen: Ethnicity, Nationalism and World War One”

Ian Morris, Florida Gulf Coast University, Fort Meyers, FL

“The Women Axemaker’s Gift to Nationalism”

David Seurkamp, Florida Gulf Coast University, Fort Meyers, FL

“The American Space Race and Cold War Nationalism”

DISCUSSANT: Jesse Hingson, Georgia College and State University, Milledgeville, GA

F3—AMERICA’S ANTEBELLUM NORTH AND SOUTH - Atlantic Room

CHAIR: David Wagner, University of Southern Maine, Portland, ME

PAPERS:

Kevin Kokomoor, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL

“Indian Agent Gad Humphreys and the Politics of Slave Dealing in Territorial Florida”

Courtney A. Moore, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL

“‘Mind How Much Cotton You Pick’: Navigating the World of Work in the Antebellum South, 1800-1861”

Kimberly Sambol-Tosco, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA

“Relational Politics: Family Life and Kinship and African American Public Culture in the North before the Civil War”

Craig Buettinger, Jacksonville University, Jacksonville, FL
"Free Blacks, Citizenship, and the Constitution in the Florida
Courts, 1821-1846"

DISCUSSANT: David Wagner, University of Southern Maine, Portland,
ME

**F3—UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH PANEL - Courtyard Marriott,
Courtyard Boardroom**

CHAIR: Anthony Esposito, St. Leo University, St. Leo, FL

PAPERS:

Thomas J. Gillan, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL
"‘The Moment of Balance is Exquisite’: Henry Adams’s Middle
Way and the History of the Middle Ages"

Martin Persson, Jacksonville University, Jacksonville, FL
"Bureaucrats in Ancient Egypt: Their Life and Work"

Michael Murphy, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL
"Ethnicity, Race, and Disability in the New South"

DISCUSSANT: Anthony Esposito, St. Leo University, St. Leo, FL

LUNCH, 12:30-2:00 P.M.: Lunch on your own.

BUSINESS MEETING AND LUNCH, 12:30-2:00 P.M.

Oasis and Falls Rooms - Open to all registrants

SESSION F4, 2:00-3:30 P.M.

**F4—FLORIDA AND THE POPULAR MIND, 1: FILTERING
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY THROUGH THE FLORIDA
EXPERIENCE - Blue Heron Room**

CHAIR: Denise K. Cummings, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL

PAPERS:

Alison Meek, King’s University College at the University of Western
Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada

"Miami Vice and Florida Identity"

Leslie Kemp Poole, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL

"In Marjorie’s Wake"

Melanie Shell-Weiss, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD

"Good Neighbors? Florida as the Gateway to the Americas, 1940-
1960"

DISCUSSANT: Denise K. Cummings, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL

**F4—UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH PANEL—REBELS, ROGUES,
AND SCOUNDRELS: TROUBLEMAKERS AND EVERYDAY LIFE IN
LATIN AMERICA - Osprey Room**

CHAIR: Nicola Foote, Florida Gulf Coast University, Fort Meyers, FL

PAPERS:

Brian Chadwick, Georgia College and State University, Milledgeville,
GA

“Black Panther Party Activities and US-Mexican Relations during
the 1968 Mexico Olympics”

Ian Custar, Georgia College and State University, Milledgeville, GA

“Surviving Argentina’s Dirty War: The 1976 Detention of Gwenda
Mae Loken López and Its Impact on US-Argentine Relations”

Mitch Ogletree, Georgia College and State University, Milledgeville,
GA

“José Bueso Rosa and Honduras’s Narco-State during the 1980s”

Rick Ramos, Florida Gulf Coast University, Fort Meyers, FL

“The Slave Ships: Deadly to Slaves and Sailors Alike”

DISCUSSANT: Jesse Hingson, Georgia College and State University,
Milledgeville, GA

**F4—COMICS AND SOCIETY, 1. CRAFTING IDENTITY AND
CHANGING SOCIETY: COMIC BOOK SUPER-HEROES FROM THE
GOLDEN AGE TO THE PRESENT - Atlantic Room**

CHAIR: William Svitavsky, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL

PAPERS:

Dina Dahbany-Miraglia, Queensborough Community College and the
Middle East and Middle Eastern American Center, The City University
of New York, New York, NY

“Wonder Woman, a True “Woman of Valor”

Lance Eaton, Salem State College and North Shore Community
College, Salem, MA

“Superman’s True Enemy: Injustice and Oppression in the Late
1930’s”

William Svitavsky, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL

““Did You Know He Was Black?” The Tentative Identities of
Black Superheroes”

Thomas C. Donaldson, University at Albany, Albany, NY

“Ineffectual Girl Among the Legions of Superheroes: The
Marginalization and Domestication of Female Superheroes, 1955-
1970”

DISCUSSANT: William Svitavsky, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL

F4—RUSSIA AND ETHIOPIA - Courtyard Marriott, Courtyard Boardroom

CHAIR: Anthony Atwood, Florida International University, Miami, FL

PAPERS:

Clifford Foust, University of Maryland, College Park, MD

“Rescue Russia! The American Railway Mission to Russia, 1917-1922”

J. Calvitt Clarke III, Jacksonville University, Jacksonville, FL

“Different Versions of Fedor Evgenievich Kononov’s Eyewitness Memoirs of the Second Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-36”

DISCUSSANT: Anthony Atwood, Florida Internal University, Miami, FL

SESSION F5, 3:45-5:15

F5—ENCOUNTERS IN THE NEW WORLD - Blue Heron Room

CHAIR: Marco Rimanelli, St. Leo University, St. Leo, FL

PAPERS:

Steven R. Blankenship, Georgia Highlands College, Rome GA

“Rhetoric & Reality: Columbus, Las Casas, and Irony in the New World”

David Allen Harvey, New College of Florida, Sarasota, FL

“The Baron de La Hontan, Aristocratic Anarchism, and the Myth of the Noble Savage”

Bill Marina, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, FL; Research Fellow, the Independent Institution., Oakland, CA; Executive Director, the Marina-Huerta Educational Foundation, Asheville, NC

“Globalization vs. People’s Diplomacy: From Florida to the Caribbean and Beyond”

DISCUSSANT: Marco Rimanelli, St. Leo University, St. Leo, FL

F5—UNDERGRADUATE ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION: DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE ‘GREAT REPUBLICAN EXPERIMENT, 1790-1840” - Osprey Room

CHAIR: Gary Williams, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL

PARTICIPANTS

Andrew Ike, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL

Joe Kelly, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL

Angelica Garcia, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL

Gary Williams, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL

F5—TEACHING THE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR - Courtyard Marriott, Courtyard Boardroom

CHAIR: Michael Long, Pasco-Hernando Community College, New Port Richey, FL

PAPERS:

Alex Cummins, Flagler College, St. Augustine, FL; editor, *Documents of Soviet History*

“Teaching the Cold War to Undergraduates?”

Christopher J. Ward, Clayton State University, Morrow, GA

“A Return to the Past: Teaching Russian and Soviet History from a Eurasian Perspective”

DISCUSSANT: Lois Becker, Jacksonville University, Jacksonville, FL

RECEPTION, 5:30-6:30 P.M. Atlantic Room and Terrace (Weather Permitting)

Light Appetizers

Cash Bar

Free Half-Keg of Beer

Welcoming Remarks, 6:10-6:15

Lois Becker, Academic Vice-President, Jacksonville University

BANQUET, 6:45-8:15 P.M. Atlantic Room

Keynote Speaker

Dr. James Cobb, University of Georgia

“Southern Identity in Crisis”

MARCH 1, 2008, SATURDAY

FREE LIGHT BREAKFAST, 6:00-9:00 a.m. Oasis Room

For hotel registrants only

REGISTRATION, 7:30 a.m.-12:00 p.m.

SESSION S1, 8:00-9:30 A.M.

S1—UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH PANEL - Blue Heron Room

CHAIR: Jack McTague, St. Leo University, St. Leo, FL

PAPERS:

Eugene C. Fanning, Florida Southern College

“The Great October Strike and the Reaction of the American Press”

Brenden Kennedy, Stetson University, DeLand, FL

"The September Massacres: Crossing the Rubicon in Paris"

Steffan Plishka, University of Georgia, Athens, GA

"Blessed by the Forerunner: The Arm and Hand Relics of Saint John the Baptist"

DISCUSSANT: Jack McTague, St. Leo University, St. Leo, FL

S1—FLORIDA AND THE POPULAR MIND, 2: PROMOTING PARADISE, SACRIFICING LIFESTYLE? REFLECTING POSTWAR TRANSFORMATION THROUGH THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE -

Osprey Room

CHAIR: Julian C. Chambliss, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL

PAPERS:

Angela Starita, City College of New York, New York, NY

"A Question of Preservation or Housing: Paul Rudolph's Sarasota House"

Tiffany Baker, Tallahassee Trust for Historic Preservation, Tallahassee, FL

"'An Artist I am Not': Floridians' Depictions of Their State in the 1985 Florida License Plate Contest"

David Miller Parker, California State University, Northridge, CA

"Is South Florida the New Southern California? Carl Hiaasen's Dystopian Paradise"

John Martin, Jacksonville University, Jacksonville, FL

"Climate, Weather, and Baseball Stadiums in St. Petersburg, Florida"

DISCUSSANT: Julian C. Chambliss, Department of History, Rollins College

S1—THE ENLIGHTENMENT'S SCALAWAGS, DEISTS, AND WITCHES - Atlantic Room

CHAIR: David Proctor, Tallahassee Community College, Tallahassee, FL

PAPERS:

Roy Lechtreck, University of Montevallo, Montevallo, AL

"The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses: A Deist Concept"

Nick J. Sciallo, Independent Scholar, Alexandria, VA

"Pirate Codes and Constitutional History"

Daniel R. Vogel, Edinboro University of Pennsylvania, Edinboro, PA

"Peg-legs, Parrots, and Popularity: Perceptions of Piracy"

Shawne Keevan, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL,

“Providence v. Justice: Innocence and Confession in the Salem Witch Trials”

DISCUSSANT: David Proctor, Tallahassee Community College,
Tallahassee, FL

**S1—UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH PANEL - Courtyard Marriott,
Courtyard Boardroom**

CHAIR: Will Benedicks, Tallahassee Community College, Tallahassee,
FL

PAPERS:

John D. Money, Macon State College, Macon, GA

“Robert Owen Defends the Child”

Hendry Miller, Valdosta State University, Valdosta, GA

“The Crackers of Antebellum Georgia”

Jessica Auer, Stetson University, DeLand, FL

“Organized Inactivism, Retrenchment, and Conservatism in the
American Organized Labor Movement, 1955-1980”

DISCUSSANT: Will Benedicks, Tallahassee Community College,
Tallahassee, FL

SESSION S2, 9:45-11:15 A.M.

S2—ART AND MUSIC - Blue Heron Room

CHAIR: Francis Hodges, Florida Southern College, Lakeland, FL

PAPERS:

Christopher Lee, Zephyrhills High School, Zephyrhills, Florida

“Music, Movements, and Memory: Hardcore Punk, 1980-1986”

Hugo Miller (a.k.a. Huguéaux), National Conference of Artists, New
York, NY

“The History of Arte Mecco”

DISCUSSANT: Francis Hodges, Florida Southern College, Lakeland, FL

S2—FLORIDA’S INDIANS AND CRACKERS - Osprey Room

CHAIR: Denise K. Cummings, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL

PAPERS

Tamara Spike, North Georgia & State University, Dahlonega, GA

“Gender and Connectivity Between the Living, the Ancestors, and
the Gods Among the Timucua of Spanish Florida”

Michael S. Cole, Florida Gulf Coast University, Fort Myers, FL

"A Hypothesis on the Etymology of the Placename,
Withlacoochee"

James M. Denham, Director, Florida Center for Florida History,
Florida Southern College, Lakeland, FL

"The Black and White of Florida Cracker Lives: Shared Traditions
and Recalled Legacies"

DISCUSSANT: Denise K. Cummings, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL

**S2—COMICS AND SOCIETY, 2. SHAPING AMERICAN VALUES:
MARVEL COMICS, SUPER-HEROS, AND AMERICAN IDEALS -
Atlantic Room**

CHAIR: Julian C. Chambliss, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL

PAPERS:

Julian C. Chambliss, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL

"Heroes that Make Us Proud: The Black Superhero and Marvel
Comics Group, 1965-1980"

Michael Lecker, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA

"You Made Them Strong, We'll Make Them Army (Avengers)
Strong: How the Marvel Universe's Story Arc and Ad Usage are
Propaganda for Army Recruitment"

Shawn O'Rourke, California State University, Stanislaus, CA

"A New Era of Superheroes: Infinite Crisis, Civil War, and the
End of The Modern Age"

William M. Jones Jr., Independent Scholar, Laurel, MD

"The Evolution of Luke Cage and the Black Male Image"

DISCUSSANT: Julian C. Chambliss, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL

**S2—CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES OF TRAUMA IN CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE - Courtyard Marriott, Courtyard Boardroom**

CHAIR: William Greer, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL

PAPERS:

Samantha Barnsfather, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL

"Nineteenth Century Nationalism through the Eyes of Fryderyk
Chopin"

Lisa Booth, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL

"Atonement and Music about the Gulag"

William Greer, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL

"Memories from the Sky: German Representations of Allied
Bombing in World War II"

DISCUSSANT: Peter Bergmann, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL

**LUNCH, 11:15-12:30 P.M. - Outdoor Cookout, \$5.00 - Atlantic Room
Terrance**

SESSION S3, 12:30-2:00 P.M.

**S3—FLORIDA AND THE POPULAR MIND 3: THAT STATE IS MY
DESTINATION. TOURISM, ENVIRONMENT, AND FLORIDA APPEAL**

- Blue Heron Room

CHAIR: Joana Owens, Jacksonville University, Jacksonville, FL

PAPERS:

Tracy J. Revels, Wofford College, Spartanburg, SC

“State of Imagination: Florida’s Golden Age of Tourism and the
Creation of a National Image”

Wendy Adams King, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL

“From Romantic Paradise to Tourist Destination: Representation
of the Florida Indian”

DISCUSSANT: Joana Owens, Jacksonville University, Jacksonville, FL

S3—IDEAS WE LIVE BY - Osprey Room

CHAIR: Thomas E. Aiello, Gordon College, Barnesville, GA

PAPERS:

Alan Pratt, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, FL

“Nihilism in the 20th Century: Much Ado About
Nothing?”

Josh Abraham, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL

“Francis Schaeffer, *Brown v. the Board of Education*, and the
Creationist Rights Revolution”

Martha Reiner, Florida International University, Miami, FL

“Stowe in the News: Literary Circulations, Political Influence,
Contexts in Political Economy and Economic Geography”

DISCUSSANT: Thomas E. Aiello, Gordon College, Barnesville, GA

S3—AMERICA’S CIVIL WAR - Atlantic Room

**CHAIR: Michael Long, Pasco-Hernando Community College, New Port
Richey, FL**

PAPERS:

Angela Zombek, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL

“They Have Since Changed Their Minds and Obey: An
Examination of Power and Resistance at Camp Chase Prison,
1863”

Benjamin Miller, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL
"The Religiosity of the Union Soldier: An Examination of Sacred Space in the Army of the Potomac"

Jimi Thomas, Virginia Beach Public Schools, Virginia Beach, VA
"A Reexamination of the Military Legacy of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, CSA"

Boyd Murphree, State Archives of Florida, Tallahassee, FL
"States of War: Interstate Relations Between Florida and Georgia, 1861-1865"

DISCUSSANT: Michael Long, Pasco-Hernando Community College, New Port Richey, FL

S3—AMERICA'S GILDED AGE - Courtyard Marriott, Courtyard Boardroom

CHAIR: Sean McMahon, Lake City Community College, Lake City, FL

PAPERS:

Jesus Mendez, Barry University, Miami Shores, FL
"1892—Henry Flagler's Year of Decision in Florida"

David Wagner, University of Southern Maine, Portland, ME
"Bound Out? Children: The Ambiguous Origins of Foster Care in Gilded Age Massachusetts"

DISCUSSANT: Sean McMahon, Lake City Community College, Lake City, FL

SESSION S4, 2:15-3:15 P.M.

S4—DRAFT RESISTANCE AND ISOLATIONISM IN AMERICA - Blue Heron Room

CHAIR: James M. Denham, Director, Florida Center for Florida History, Florida Southern College, Lakeland, FL

PAPERS:

John Fuller, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA
"Please Stay Out of Our Mountains: A Story of Draft Resistance in WWII Southwest Virginia"

Bernard Lemelin, Laval University, Quebec, Canada
"An Isolationist Businessman in an Internationalist Era: Bruce Barton of New York City and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1945-1960"

DISCUSSANT: James M. Denham, Director, Florida Center for Florida History, Florida Southern College, Lakeland, FL

S4—TRAINING AND REFORMING THE AMERICAN MILITARY -

Osprey Room

CHAIR: Marco Rimanelli, St. Leo University, St. Leo, FL

PAPERS:

Anthony Atwood, Florida International University, Miami, FL
“Standing up the Standing Force: Transforming the American
Military 1941-1991”

Erik D. Carlson, Florida Gulf Coast University, Fort Meyers, FL
“Shoot to Kill: Flexible Gunnery Training at Buckingham AAF,
1942-1945”

DISCUSSANT: Marco Rimanelli, St. Leo University, St. Leo, FL

S4—WOMEN AND HISTORY - Atlantic Room

CHAIR: Gail Pat Parsons, Gordon College, Barnesville, GA

PAPERS:

Christine Lutz, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA
“Another Post-War Settlement: Eunice Hunton Carter and Mary
McLeod Bethune”

Katherina R. Brandt, University of Groningen, Groningen,
Netherlands

“Chauvinist or Feminist? Rudolf Steiner’s Attitude to the
Women’s Question”

DISCUSSANT: Sean McMahon, Lake City Community College, Lake
City, FL

S4—FLORIDA’S ECONOMY - Courtyard Marriott, Courtyard

Boardroom

CHAIR: Tamara Spike, North Georgia and State University, Dahlonega,
GA

PAPERS:

Connie Lester, University of Central Florida
“Protecting Small Farm Agriculture: The Florida Department of
Agriculture, 1920-1960”

Therese M. Aloia, Florida Atlantic University
“A Golden Opportunity”: Florida Atlantic University’s
Contributions to Industry”

DISCUSSANT: Tamara Spike, North Georgia and State University,
Dahlonega, GA

LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS

Local Arrangements Chair, 2009

Michael J. Epple
Florida Gulf Coast University

Local Arrangements Chair, 2008

Jay Clarke
Jacksonville University

Local Arrangements Chair, 2007

Julian C. Chambliss
Rollins College

Standing Up the Standing Force: Transforming the American Military, 1941 to 1991

Anthony D. Atwood
Florida International University

Growth and the transformation from its militia home guard origins into a professional standing force deployed overseas as the agent of U.S. foreign policy has been the pattern of modern American military history. In 1941, on the eve of its entry into World War II, the United States military, under the presidential condition of Unlimited National Emergency, initiated the following important actions fundamental to its future military history:

1. The Reserve component of the U.S. Military had been called to active duty, mobilized and deployed.
2. Conscription was implemented.
3. A rudimentary command structure of Joint Chiefs of Staff had begun operating. The ABC (American-British-Canadian) Talks starting in January 1941 began formation of a system of international alliances.
4. The stimulus of Lend-Lease was priming the U.S. manufacturing industries in retooling for war production on a massive scale.
5. The two-ocean global strategy of Rainbow Five was adopted.¹

World War II put 16 million Americans in uniform, of a population of 132 millions. The number approaches 1 in 8. By considering the family connections linking these humans, the number of directly involved persons was much larger. When the two parents of each uniformed participant are counted, the figure of direct human connection to the event involved was 48 millions. Adding other direct relations, such as wives, husbands, brothers, sisters, and children brings involvement in the event that much higher in terms of numbers. Many millions more participated in industrial, agricultural, health and scientific war work. Government support by law enforcement, merchant marine, para-military coast watchers, WASP (Women's Air Service Pilot) Corps, and draft boards, as well as a wide variety of voluntary support ranging from Red Cross to USO troupes further swell the number of people involved. It could be easily argued that more than half the population was directly involved in the event. This rare spike of

¹ Stewart, Richard W. American Military History, Vol. II. Center of Military History. United States Army. Washington, DC. 2005. 66-75.

military activity, approximated previously only by the American Revolution and the American Civil War in U.S. history, reshaped the country profoundly. The experience has not been replicated on any similar scale since.

The combat operations of the U.S. military in World War II amounted to the largest projection of force around the globe that the world has ever seen, or perhaps ever will see again. "The Arsenal of Democracy" operated from the comparative safety of North America. The U.S. produced over 34,000 bombers. A navy of 2,000 combatant ships and fleets of 3,300 Liberty and Victory supply ships went to sea.² Strategically, the United States concentrated on Germany first, shoring up the British on their home islands and subsidizing the Eastern Front, where the Soviet defense bled off much Axis combat activity.

The people of the U.S. worked overtime to assemble the forces for a counteroffensive in the West, while trading space for time in the Pacific, the Aleutians, and the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater of war. A victory at Midway, June 4-7, 1942, blunted the enemy offensive in the Pacific. Equally propitious to the Allies was the inability of the Axis powers to cooperate with each other. Unlike the close cooperation of the Anglo-Americans, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan seldom communicated closely, or operated jointly.

Of inestimable value to the Allies was the direction the enemy forces took halfway through the conflict. The German troops in the Caucasus, and the Imperial Japanese forces operating in the Bay of Bengal missed the opportunity to join forces. Had the Germans moved through the Middle East, while the Japanese overran the Indian sub-continent, they could have joined hands across the Indus. India neutralized, the Middle East occupied, China cut off, and the Axis' own lines linked and shortened might have made all the difference. Instead, the Germans turned back into the Russian steppe, while the Imperial Japanese about-faced to roam the Pacific.

In time the U.S. Military was fully mobilized and able to bring a vast army to bear in a series of invasions of North Africa, Sicily, the Italian peninsula, western and southern France, and finally Germany itself. Working in tandem with the Russian offensive from the East, the Allies crushed the Nazi state between them. In mainland Asia there was passive defense of the CBI periphery, while in the Pacific an amphibious campaign of island-hopping bypassed many enemy strong points. Those places selected for occupation were geographically complimentary towards the objective of projecting reach against the Japanese home islands. The objectives targeted were seized by naval and aerial bombardment and assault. In time the U.S. forces in the Pacific,

²American ship-building capacity has since been allowed to atrophy to nil. At that time the U.S. was a maritime nation.

beginning to be augmented by freed-up U.S. European forces, poised for a November 1945 invasion of Kyushu. The dropping of atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki prompted the Japanese emperor to command his forces to lay down their arms. The necessity to conquer the Japanese home islands was obviated by the surrender of September 1945.

U.S. military policy during the war was characterized by a practical and inspired approach. U.S. forces were encouraged to expend as much ordnance as possible, and wherever possible every machine and tool available was applied to solving the problem of destroying the enemy. American industry was pulled out of the Great Depression by the war. The identification of Nazi Germany as the primary threat was astute. The early abandonment of the Pacific in order to meet the primary threat first was necessary, despite its acceptance of a punishing defeat in the Philippines. The U.S. war policy of reliance on machinery and firepower first, rather than on manpower to overcome the enemy stoked U.S. industry to the point that production achieved a dynamo effect. This practical war policy was also inspired in that the human commitment of the nation and of its forces was such that whenever and wherever no other sacrifice but blood itself would tip the scale, which was often enough, the U.S. people showed themselves fully capable of making that sacrifice. Almost a half-million troops died in the war.

The U.S. armed forces of the time were essentially a citizen-soldier militia raised up for the expressed purpose of meeting and defeating the threat at hand. In this they followed the martial traditions of the frontier fort and the Continental Congress, of Mr. Lincoln in the 1860s, and of the Doughboys of the Great War, in responding to the call. Its large literate population allowed the U.S. to field overpowering numbers of fighters and workers. The protection lent by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans allowed for the time to assemble the host. The destructiveness of the war meanwhile reduced the other combatants, allied and enemy, to ruins or penury.

At the end of World War II, the United States possessed a gargantuan military establishment with the following components:

1. A full-service headquarters (the Pentagon "Puzzle Palace").
2. A smoothly running system of conscription to meet manpower needs, together with a cultural endorsement of military service validated by the victory of WWII, and endowed with a formidable laurel of social empowerment in the Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944 (GI Bill).
3. Military bases worldwide, including massive forward bases in occupied Western Europe and on the Pacific rim of Asia. NATO and a network of world-wide military alliances were implemented simultaneously.

4. 16 millions of veterans.
5. Nuclear weapons.
6. An industry sector that was devoted to research, development and manufacture of weaponry.
7. An emergent potential enemy in the Soviet Union and the worldwide Communist ideological movement.

The National Security Act and Defense Reorganization of 1947 codified the new organization.³ The most critical aspect to the transformation was the end of the War Department and the creation of the Department of Defense (DOD) in its place. The Romans of antiquity kept their Temple of Mars locked shut in peacetime. To a good extent the pre-WWII U.S. War Department had functioned similarly. In time of peace U.S. foreign policy was the arena and mission of the Department of State. The establishment of the new Defense Department, a world-wide, "24-7" establishment, was a watershed change for the U.S. military. The strategy of the DOD has since been that of homeland defense through overseas positioning. As originally envisioned under the Reorganization, the U.S. military was to be constituted so as to be able to fight (and win) two wars simultaneously. Among the most important changes to the armed forces realized over the next few years of reorganization were:

1. Designation of three executive Departments, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the new Department of the Air Force, drawn from the Army as a independent entity, with a specified command having cognizance over nuclear weapon systems, the Strategic Air Command (SAC).

2. The start of research and development in rocket jet propulsion leading to Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). The existing land-based bomber fleet, together with the deployment of the ICBM in 1958, and the parallel development of the nuclear ballistic submarine from within the Navy would lead to the Triad Nuclear Defense.⁴ Ultimately U.S. nuclear policy would solidify in the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction.

³ Yarmolinsky, Adam. The Military Establishment: Its Impact on American Society. Harper and Row. New York. 1971. 29.

⁴ Rockwell, Theodore. The Rickover Effect: How One Man Made a Difference. Naval Institute Press. Annapolis. 1992. 246-256.

3. The creation of the National Security Council, and the formalization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the military chiefs of the services, as principal advisors to the President.

4. The retention of the WWII Office of Strategic Services as the Central Intelligence Agency, folding itself together with the rest of the intelligence agencies under the Department of Defense.

5. The adoption of the helicopter by the Army, giving it air-mobile capability.

6. The standardization of all branches of military personnel matters, pay scales, rank structure, advancements, awards, recruitment, and discipline under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, unifying the whole as different shades of the same uniform, topped with the compelling reward of retirement (recallable) immediately payable upon 20 years of full-time active duty.

7. Allowance for a large formalized National Guard and Reserve, manned by personnel serving part-time in lieu of compulsory full-time service, and operating on active bases using Army/Navy surplus, as a second, "shadow" military force.

8. Organization of the Veterans Administration by Omar Bradley, especially as a backup health care system for casualties in the event of another Total War.⁵

9. The decision to permanently base the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and the Seventh Fleet in the Far East.

10. Retention of a peacetime draft to maintain manpower levels.

11. The incorporation of dependents (spouses, children and special-need relatives) of uniformed service members as a formal ID-carrying part of the DOD force structure with codified rights, responsibilities and entitlements, as with retirees.

11. Creation of a vast civilian component of DOD workers as disparate as benefit clerks, pipe fitters, police and mail service, including an overseas school system, to enable this establishment.

These changes enabled the U.S. to keep standing an armed force of vast proportions that is entire unto itself and hardwired to the national government's executive branch. Henceforth, the history of the U.S. military has been international. Many of these reorganizations were broached over hands of poker with the JCS at President Truman's card table at the Little White House in Naval

⁵ Gambone, Michael D. The Greatest Generation Comes Home: the Veteran in American Society. Texas A & M University Press. 2005. 45-46.

Station Key West. Within this new closed-circuit organization a series of internal transformation has since created the American warrior caste of today, a distinct class of American society.

The first and most important of the internal social changes was the desegregation of the armed forces by the fiat of the Commander-in-Chief. At the end of the Truman Administration practically all aspects of the military, from force structure to benefits was integrated racially.⁶ A great source of strength and success of the U.S. Military has been its straight-up integration. Today it is the most racially integrated institution in America.⁷ Service members of all races, together with their dependants, and DOD workers, form a separate, seamless, whole societal unit.

Between World War II and the end of the Cold War 1990-1991, while maintaining a capability to fight a Total War against the Soviet Union, the military has been committed by the presidency to three small wars, in Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm. Small wars being those waged without engaging the general population, mobilizing the nation, or committing the civilian government of the U.S. Korea and Vietnam were wars waged as occupational jobs of the DOD, rather than as national undertakings. The first of these, the Korean War, June 1950-July 1953, was fought in response to the North Korean invasion of the Republic of South Korea, a U.S. ally. The U.S. was at the zenith of its post-WWII might, and two advantageous pre-conditions obtained. First, this war was fought against a similarly constituted mirror-image military force. Second, the battlefield was a peninsula, the most favorable terrain for limited defensive wars of containment. The one tangible military objective was to retain half of the Korean peninsula, and in that the U.S. Military was successful by the means of building a wall (Demilitarized Zone) across the peninsula.

The introduction of U.S. military into South Vietnam ten years later was prompted by the less tangible ideological objective of preventing the spread of Communism. It was much less successful. The assassination of the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, John F. Kennedy, November 22, 1963, altered forever whatever direction the leadership of the Southeast Asian adventure may have initially envisioned. In the event, WWII-trained field commanders, William C. Westmoreland and later Creighton W. Abrams Jr., fought a conventional limited war against an asymmetric guerilla opponent.⁸ Limits on provoking the

⁶ Dalfiume, Richard M. Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-1953. University of Missouri Press. Columbia. 1969. 3-4, 220.

⁷ Rostker, Bernard. I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force. RAND. Santa Monica. 2006. 9.

⁸ Boot, Max. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. Basic Books. New York. 2002. 292-295.

sponsors of the enemy, the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China, allowed sanctuaries to the enemy for safety, rest, supply, and maneuver, ceding them the initiative. The enemy refusal to "stand and fight" conventionally undercut the U.S. advantages. This second small war was ambiguous and lacked victorious symbolism or public identification.

Home front public opinion was formed by watching the new medium of television. Protracted inconclusive war proved to be spectacularly untelegenic. While U.S. forces were clearly victorious in the field, and while the underlying policy *raison d'etat* that without U.S. armed intervention South Vietnam would be conquered by North Vietnam was later proven true in the aftermath, those considerations did not outweigh widespread domestic unpopularity with the war. The U.S. military was withdrawn in defeat by the end of 1972.

Without the external threat and obvious need for manpower that was widely recognized and accepted in WWII, the conscription system then in place fell apart. The times had changed, and the people had changed. The Vietnam War was waged by the unpopular conscription of either the children of the ruling G.I. Generation, or over-reliance on marginalized and minority sub-populations of the U.S. under a Selective Service System that had been tinkered with over the years into one of dubious fairness and impartiality. Compulsory military service was abolished in 1973.

The All-Volunteer Force was then created and into that mold the U.S. military reinvented itself. Manpower needs since 1973 have been met by substantial increases in pay to parity with civilian employment, and by the recruitment of females.⁹ Throughout the transformation female participation has grown steadily, from about 11 percent in 1991, to 15 percent today.¹⁰ Internally, the retention of personnel within the organization became a priority facilitated by the means of the emphatic DOD adoption of the military family.

In a radical departure from what was once the exclusive domain of single males, the U.S. Military transformed itself into an organization with extremely strong family ties that bind it to itself. Under the command of President Ronald Reagan the force was re-infused with esprit as a special organization, as well as rewarded with the wherewithal to make family life possible, and even comfortable.¹¹ Service members are now overwhelmingly married and parents. The strong official encouragement for and support of the military family unit has served to reinforce both the insularity and group cohesion of the armed forces as distinct from the mainstream population.

⁹ Stewart, Richard W. 373.

¹⁰ Rostker. 559-569.

¹¹ Weinberger, Caspar. Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon. Warner Books. New York. 1990. 51.

As a result of reconstituting itself as an All-Volunteer Force, the DOD initially eschewed foreign adventures. The U.S. Military concentrated on creating and retaining a professional force motivated by cultivating a warrior class ethos through programs such as Ombudsman, Project Warrior, Zero Tolerance, and Total Quality Leadership; by liberal subsidies, and by a preference for keeping the peace. Joint operations between the branches of service became widespread starting with prodding legislation of 1986.¹² The result has advanced the homogenization of the branches of service, leading to a closer knit and much more standardized military.¹³ The doctrine of Jointness is more deeply embedded than most casual observers realize, they being still attuned to the cosmetic visual differences of differing branch uniforms celebrated by WWII material culture. U.S. military incursions of the invasion of Grenada in 1983, and the 1989 invasion of Panama deposing strongman Manuel Noriega, renewed the confidence of the force.¹⁴

Militarily it should be noted that President James Earl "Jimmy" Carter Jr. reinstated draft registration for U.S. males between the ages of 18-27 in 1980 as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and protracted Iran hostage crisis, November 1979-January 1981. This registration has been a quiet success, with a steady rate of about 95% compliance. To be sure, registration is not a draft and it is unlikely that politicians would risk the possible unpopularity of reinstating conscription except under the most threatening circumstances. Nor has the well-paid and well-ordered All-Volunteer Force leadership been in any way keen to consider a return to compulsory service.¹⁵

However, should Total War conditions against similarly constituted state adversaries arise, the retooled Selective Service System has at present over 12 million registrants, giving the DOD the pool for a potentially large armed force. A non-traditional draft for part time "home guard" duties, or a national service draft to face unconventional challenges of a biological health care threat, or even situations of natural disaster are also measures that may be taken into account.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 left the U.S. then as the sole existing superpower. Some disingenuous scrambling by Federal, State and local entities to capitalize on this led to a Reduction-In-Force (RIF) labeled the "Peace Dividend." This RIF of the standing force was accompanied by a more injurious hollowing-out of the DOD real estate assets, under a program known as the Base Re-Alignment Commission (BRAC). While the manpower to fight may readily

¹² Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

¹³ Boot, Max. War Made New: Technology, Warfare and the Course of History, 1500 to Today. Gotham Books. New York. 2006. 400.

¹⁴ Stewart. 395-402.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 431.

present itself in the event of another Total War, depending upon the threat to the nation and how it is perceived, the availability of base assets at WWII prices can hardly be expected and presents a challenge to defense planning and logistics.

In the recovery from the Vietnam defeat, the military promulgated the Weinberger (later Powell) Doctrine of never engaging again in war without clear-cut objectives and the using of overwhelming force to attain those objectives.¹⁶ An adjunct to this called the Total Force Policy assigned to the Reserve Force missions essential to the waging of Total War. For example, every water-desalination unit in the Army was a reserve unit, all Navy construction battalions and cargo handlers (stevedores), and all Air Force Transport Wings became reserve units. The rationale for this was that since the military Reserve Force was in essence still a component of the general population, mobilizing the Reserve Force for war would require engaging the commitment of the general public, widely believed to be a requisite for achieving modern military victory.¹⁷ The practical result was that the Reserve Force was armed and integrated intrinsically into the total force structure as a ready force multiplier.

Following the law of unintended consequences, this use for the Reserve Force became the superseding doctrine after the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in August 1990. The U.S. Military then reasserted itself as an offensive force. In five months a half million U.S. military personnel were air-bridged to the Middle East (flexing the recumbent military asset of the U.S. civilian aviation fleet) to form Desert Shield in response to the takeover of Kuwait.¹⁸ Their equipment was sea lifted to meet them. Not only was this logistics feat accomplished by mobilized reservists, but about 1 in 5 of the American personnel deployed in theater was a mobilized reservist. Since that time the Reserve component has been incorporated as a full time part-time force-multiplier; contract warriors.

The All-Volunteer Force applied Total War measures to gain a quick crushing victory over the enemy forces in this third small war, Desert Storm, January 16-March 3, 1991. With the achievement of battle success and the attainment of the clearly articulated limited goal of freeing Kuwait, hostilities were suspended by armistice and victory was declared. The American military doctrine of waging Total War was validated in this conflict. The following tangible orientations of the U.S. military to the Middle East were the result:

¹⁶ Weinberger. 159-160.

¹⁷ Stewart. 375.

¹⁸ Ibid. 412-426.

1. The establishment of the Fifth Fleet based at Bahrain, having cognizance over the Indian Ocean.
2. Land base rights in Kuwait and Djibouti.
3. Virtual annexation of Diego Garcia as a permanent possession.
4. Pre-positioning of a USNS¹⁹ cargo fleet of arms and material about the region.

These measures gave the U.S. military the ability to project immediate force to this region in the same way it has retained such ability in the Far East and in Europe since World War II.²⁰ The close of 1991 left the U.S. military in a position of unquestioned global hegemony, completing its transformation.

Postscript

Changes within the global village since then have brought challenges to this hegemony of an economic, social and religious nature, as differentiated from nation-state challenge and opposition. Resurgent Islamic Radicalism, fueled by youthful vigor and belligerence, privations, and petrodollars, has shown the necessity for the U.S. military to adapt to asymmetric war fighting, while it retains the capacity to prosecute Total War. A step in this direction has been the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. This response to global conditions is a tacit recognition that the WWII defense model is no longer valid. It is an admission that threats to the U.S. today are less a challenge in the conventional military sense, than a matter of restless criminality and extremism.

The "Achilles Heel" of the U.S. military revealed by recent events since 9/11 is a shortage of manpower to face the increasing obligations of, and threats to the U.S. The present force, magnificent in its bravery, professionalism and élan, is nonetheless tiny stacked up against the missions and adversaries it faces and may well face. Arguments for democratization of the Force, for burden-sharing, and the apprehension at un-debated foreign adventures have renewed considerations over the size and composition of the U.S. military. Wisdom and the lesson of history teach us that there is strength in numbers.

For the world in general the times at hand are simply the predictable approach of the natural conclusion of the order of this world that was set in place by the G.I.s at the end of World War II. These considerations are current and beyond the scope of this paper.

¹⁹ USNS (United States Naval Ship) vessels are ships controlled by the DOD under the Military Sealift Command (MSC). They are owned or leased by the MSC. Either way, they are store ships, tankers, and hospital ships providing military support, but operated by civilian agencies.

²⁰ This capability is steadily decreasing, however. For example, U.S. force draw-downs have left only a token garrison of 60,000 remaining in Europe.

Shoot to Kill: Flexible Gunnery Training at Buckingham AAF, 1942-1945

Erik D. Carlson
Florida Gulf Coast University

On December 7, 1941 Japan launched a surprise attack on American military installations throughout the Hawaiian Islands. The early morning air raid on Pearl Harbor marked the start of a major Japanese offensive in the Pacific and a war with the United States. A day later, Japanese forces attacked American bases in the Philippines. Nothing could stop the Japanese tidal wave as it overwhelmed U.S. military and naval units throughout the Pacific. By the middle of December, America was involved a two-ocean world war with Japan, Germany, and Italy.¹

Japan's early military successes in the Pacific war were the result of weaving a modern vision of air power into its strategic planning. In particular, the Japanese air attacks on Pearl Harbor and Clark Field in the Philippines demonstrated the revolutionary impact of air power on mid-20th century military strategy. But in the final analysis it was the United States that perfected air power during the war, reshaping strategy and tactics and proving the airplane's decisive role in the defeat of the Axis powers.²

During World War II the American military aircraft inventory ranged from fast, maneuverable single-engine fighters to high altitude, multi-engine bombers. In 1942 the U.S. Army Air Corps (USAAC) used a variety of fast-attack bombers, medium bombers, and heavy bombers in tactical and strategic bombing missions. In combat all of these aircraft needed protection from enemy fighter aircraft. Unfortunately for the U.S. Army Air Corps, during the first three years of the war American fighter aircraft did not have the range to escort bombers over distant enemy targets. Because of this technological and strategic reality, the American bomber fleet flew unprotected during most long range missions. Individual aircraft relied on flexible gunnery crews in electric turrets and open windows to defend against attack from enemy fighters.³

Aerial gunner crews protecting bombers needed training in the "science of aerial gunnery" to survive the violence in enemy skies. For the U.S. Army Air Corps the need to protect bombers was crucial. During World War II six flexible

¹ Ronald Spector's *Eagle Against the Sun* is an excellent overview of the Pacific War.

² See Mark R. Peattie's *Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909-1941*.

³ For an excellent explanation of the evolution of American strategic bombing policy refer to Michael Sherry's *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon*.

gunnery schools provided instruction. In 1942 the U.S. Army built one of its new training schools on a vast coastal plain of palmettos, pine trees, and mangroves ten miles northeast of Fort Myers, Florida.

In January of 1942 U.S. Army Air Corps officers from Maxwell Field, Alabama arrived in Fort Myers to find a suitable place to build a flexible gunnery school. After several days of negotiations with Fort Myers and Lee County officials, U.S. government representatives signed a lease on a 7,000 acre parcel northeast of the small, sleepy southern city. After the war the government-improved land would revert back to Fort Myers and Lee County.⁴

United States Army advance teams arrived in Fort Myers in March to organize the construction of Buckingham Field. Generous city and county officials provided office space and supplies to help army officers coordinate the construction of Buckingham Field. Two months later workers arrived at a vast stretch of land covered with a thick growth of trees and plants, and home to a variety of Florida wildlife, to begin the four-month long construction project. More than 3,000 workers erected the buildings and poured the vast network of concrete taxiways and runways that made up Buckingham Field. In 1942 dollars the construction cost was enormous -- \$10,000,000.⁵

The United States Army Air Force* assigned the 37th and 38th Flexible Gunnery Groups, consisting of the 712th, 713th, 714th, 715th, 716th, 717th and 718th Flexible Training Squadrons, to Buckingham Field. Lt. Colonel Delmar T. Spivey was the first and best known commander of Buckingham Field. Throughout his tenure, Spivey demanded that all officers and enlisted men "live and think only of gunnery." Often Spivey was seen on the firing ranges and visiting students in classrooms to provide inspiration and leadership.⁶

While construction workers built the new air field, Col. Spivey assembled a team of instructors drawn from the aerial gunnery school cadre at Tyndall Field located near Panama City, Florida. Tyndall Field instructors trained the first aerial gunnery students before America's entry into the war. Spivey based the initial curricula and training exercises on the previous experience gleaned from the pre-war period. In addition, the extensive literature

⁴ Karl H. Grismer. *The Story of Fort Myers: The History of the Land of the Caloosahatchee and Southwest Florida* (Fort Myers: Southwest Historical Society, 1982), 248.

⁵ Prudy Taylor Board and Esther B. Colcord. *A History of Aviation in Lee County* (Fort Myers, Florida: Lee County Port Authority, 1993), 10-11; Karl H. Grismer. *The Story of Fort Myers: The History of the Land of the Caloosahatchee and Southwest Florida* (Fort Myers: Southwest Historical Society, 1982), 248.

* In 1942 the Army Air Corps changed to the United States Army Air Force.

⁶ "Units Assigned to Buckingham Air Field [During World War II Only]," Buckingham Field File, Archive Room, Southwest Florida Museum of History.

and field guides from the British Royal Air Force's aerial gunnery school influenced Spivey.⁷

The Army Air Force established strict physical requirements for aerial gunnery students. Electric gun turrets were small, so each student had to be 5'8" or smaller and weigh no more than 170 pounds. An age requirement was also imposed – all students ranged from 18 to 30 years old. Because aerial gunnery was very dangerous the Army Air Force accepted only volunteers. This factor forced gunnery schools to draw from a large pool of non-specialist volunteers and in some special cases aviation specialists, such as radio operators and airplane mechanics, for example.⁸

Reliance on non-specialists created an unqualified group of students for this deadly job. By the end of 1942 "washed out" flight cadets eliminated from flight training were allowed to volunteer for aerial gunnery school. In January 1943 the U.S. Army Air Force removed the volunteer requirement when the military forced all bomber crews to have flexible gunnery training.⁹

On September 7, 1942 the first flexible gunnery classes, 42-41 and 42-42, started at Buckingham Field. The school had a five week program. Students spent time in the classroom, in aircraft turrets, on firing ranges, and in the air conducting aerial target practice. Over the next four years flexible gunnery training at Buckingham Field evolved to reflect experiences gleaned in combat. Many times experienced aerial gunners returned to Buckingham Field as instructors bringing back indispensable lessons from air combat.¹⁰

In the first week of training students learned the basic principles of automatic weapons; for example, the operation of .30 and .50 caliber machine guns and how to dismantle and reassemble them in difficult situations. In addition, they spent time on the rifle range shooting .22 rifles and trap shooting with shot guns. During the second week, gunnery students learned sighting systems. In the third week of class students were taught aircraft recognition and how to operate, maintain, and repair Sperry and Martin turrets. In the fourth week they practiced firing from a jeep at moving targets on a circular track.¹¹

In the final week of training, students took to the skies above southwest Florida to conduct air to air target practice. Training flights were conducted with two AT-6 Texans. Both AT-6s took off from Buckingham Field, one towing a large aerial target, and the other aircraft with a flexible gunnery student in the back seat. During flights over the Gulf of Mexico students in the chase AT-6

⁷ "Buckingham Field History," AFHRA, Maxwell Air Force Base, Porter BAAF Collection.

⁸ *Ibid*, 25-26.

⁹ *Ibid*, 44-45.

¹⁰ "Buckingham Field History," 19-21, AFHRA, Maxwell Air Force Base, Porter BAAF Collection.

¹¹ "Gunnery Here Find School Plenty Tough," *Fort Myers New Press*, December 14, 1942.

would fire machine guns at the large, flapping target. After each flight, gunnery instructors evaluated students on their in performances by counting holes in the targets.¹²

During the first training classes at Buckingham Field students were taught the "estimate speed" sighting system to shoot down enemy aircraft. A student would attempt to estimate the speed of an incoming aircraft. Then subtracting the fighter's speed from his own bomber's rate of speed, the gunner fired his machine gun toward the fighter. This system was too cumbersome for the split second decisions made by gunners.¹³

Later the "apparent motion" sighting system was used as a teaching tool. With this method students guessed the flight path of the enemy aircraft, and then fired toward the projected path. By 1943 these two sighting systems gave way to more sophisticated simulators which created realistic training sessions, improving accuracy.¹⁴

Throughout 1942-1943 some aerial students "washed out" of the Flexible Gunnery School. For the most part the lack of qualified students (both from a physical and intellectual standpoint) created a high attrition rate. In some instances students failed the gunnery school due to psychological issues; for example, "fear of flying," and "fear of combat."¹⁵

In 1943 the United States Army Air Force established a Central Instructors' School at Buckingham Field. Lt. Colonel Daniel W. Jenkins arrived from Tyndall Field to head up the much needed post-graduate training. Jenkins was a graduate of the Royal Air Force's aerial gunnery course, and a pilot with vast flying experience. Jenkins' leadership transformed the Central Instructors' School into the last phase of the flexible gunnery education. The Central Instructors' School was a four-week course of field training and classroom instruction. All instructors for the United States Army's six flexible gunnery schools had to graduate from the Central Instructor's School before being assigned to another duty station.¹⁶

Near the end of the war the Army Air Force taught students on Waller Gunnery Trainers. Designed by the Vitarama Corporation and named for the president of the company, Fred Waller, the Waller Trainer was the most sophisticated aerial gunnery simulator in the world. The Waller Trainer used film footage to create, track, and score realistic target sequences. By 1944 the

¹² "Gunnery Here Find School Plenty Tough," *Fort Myers New Press*, December 14, 1942.

¹³ "Buckingham Field History," 18-19, AFHRA, Maxwell Air Force Base, Porter BAAF Collection.

¹⁴ "Buckingham Field History," 19-20, AFHRA, Maxwell Air Force Base, Porter BAAF Collection.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 43-44.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 74-75.

Waller Trainer created the most accurate combat simulations possible for gunnery students. During the last year of the war, the Waller Trainer improved students' overall accuracy and rate of fire.¹⁷

From 1942 to 1945 Buckingham Field provided the United States Army Air Force with a group of well-trained flexible gunners that helped to win the air war. Aerial gunnery training evolved rapidly from early 1942 to the end of the war. Flexible gunnery training had to overcome some tremendous obstacles in the early days: lack of qualified students, a dearth of realistic training equipment, and budgetary constraints. By 1943 flexible gunnery course curricula and training exercises reflected combat experience gleaned from action high above Europe and over the Pacific Ocean. At the same time American industry provided new and more sophisticated simulators to help train flexible gunners. Buckingham Field instructors trained more than 50,000 gunners during a four year period. Hundreds of these men became "unknown aces," but unfortunately many were injured or killed in combat.

With the defeat of Japan in September of 1945 Buckingham Field, like most of the wartime military bases built throughout the United States, closed its gates. For a brief time after the war Edison College used many of the buildings on the sprawling air field for classrooms. In 1947 the U.S. government auctioned off all of the buildings at Buckingham Field – barracks, hangars, warehouses, etc. – to the public.¹⁸

Today very little remains of the once thriving aerial gunnery school on the outskirts of Fort Myers. There is a small historical marker indicating the remote history of the area to an unaware public. Much of old Buckingham Field is now a residential development. The runways are covered and forgotten, but the taxiways are still there. They are used by a nearby residential airpark, and the old concrete network of taxiways serves as the headquarters of Lee County Mosquito Control (LCMC). On a lucky day a passerby will hear the throaty sounds of piston engines from a LCMC DC-3 (civilian configuration of the C-47) taking off; a fleeting and faint reminder of the crucial work conducted at Buckingham Field more than six decades ago.¹⁹

¹⁷ "Principles of the Waller Gunnery Trainer," March 9, 1943, Buckingham Field File, Archive Room, Southwest Florida Museum of History.

¹⁸ Karl H. Grismer. *The Story of Fort Myers: The History of the Land of the Caloosahatchee and Southwest Florida* (Fort Myers: Southwest Historical Society, 1982), 248; "Big Buckingham Sale On Today," June 27, 1947, Buckingham Field File, Archive Room, Southwest Florida Museum of History.

¹⁹ The author has visited the home of Mr. Jimmie Porter, a Buckingham Field historian, which is located near the Lee County Mosquito Control. Special thanks to Mr. Porter for sharing his Buckingham Field documents.

Fedor Evgenievich Konovalov's Eyewitness Memoirs of the Second Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-36

J. Calvitt Clarke III
Jacksonville University

Introduction

Brief Biography

In the fifty or so years before the First World War, many Russians—adventurers, scoundrels, and saints—explored Ethiopia and often formed close ties with the country's rulers. Steeled by this tradition, some anti-Communist, White Russians made their way to Ethiopia after the Bolsheviks had conquered their country between 1917 and 1922.¹

After Teferi Mekonnen—the future Emperor Haile Sellase—gained power as regent in 1916, one of his first steps was to recruit some of these White Russian officers to train his troops.² The most important of them was Fedor Evgenievich Konovalov.

Colonel Konovalov, a native of the Crimea, had been a military engineer. Before the First World War, he began a new career in aviation, and during the war he served with the Imperial Guards Squadron, eventually commanding an aerial division. Konovalov then served with Tsar Nicholas II's last military mission to Great Britain. As the Bolshevik Revolution swept through Russia, he fled to Constantinople, then to Egypt, and finally to Ethiopia in 1919.³

An electrical expert, Colonel Konovalov soon found employment in the Ethiopian office of Public Works, became an Ethiopian citizen, and loyally supported Ethiopian independence. In July 1935, Emperor Haile Sellase entrusted him to go to the North to inspect Ethiopia's main defenses along the likely route for invasion coming from Italy's Eritrean colony. He flew to Mekele and then continued

¹ Czeslaw Jesman, *The Russians in Ethiopia: An Essay in Futility* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 143-49.

² Teferi Mekonnen took Ethiopia's crown as Emperor Haile Sellase in 1930. See Chris Prouty and Eugene Rosenfeld, *Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1982), 91-93.

³ Th. Konovaloff, *Con le armate del negus (Un bianco fra i neri)* [With the Army of the Negus (A White among the Blacks)], trans. and ed. Comandate Stefano Micciche (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1938), v-x.

by automobile for Adowa,⁴ where he met Ras Seyoum Mengesha,⁵ governor of Tigrey,⁶ to offer him and other Ethiopian leaders technical-military advice.⁷

Without declaring war, Fascist Italy invaded Ethiopia on October 3, 1935. As a military adviser in January and February 1936, Konovalov witnessed the first and second battles of Tembien in Tigrey. He also observed the decisive Battle of Mychew in March.⁸ He then retreated with the sovereign back to the capital of Addis Ababa,⁹ and he watched as Italian troops entered the capital in May. Konovalov remained there for several months and witnessed Italy's early occupation of Ethiopia.¹⁰

George Steer Publishes Portions of Konovalov's Manuscript

Konovalov almost immediately drafted, likely in French, a semi-autobiographical account of the campaign. Of historical importance, Konovalov's work has led a troubled history as historian Richard Pankhurst impeccably documents.¹¹

⁴ Emperor Yohannes IV founded Mekele as his capital when he relocated his power base there in 1881. The city is important to Tigrey's economy. Adowa was once Tigrey's capital and site of Ethiopia's dramatic victory over Italian forces on March 1, 1896. Prouty and Rosenfeld, *Dictionary*, 5.

⁵ Ras Seyoum Mengesha served several times as governor of Tigrey. Prouty and Rosenfeld, *Dictionary*, 168. Similar to "Duke," Ras means "head," the highest traditional title next to *negus* [king], and is a title conferred on heads of important houses, provincial governors, ministers, and high officials. During the Italian occupation, the *rases* lost their privileges.

⁶ The province of Tigrey includes Aksum, the site of Ethiopia's earliest kingdom. Before 1935, the central government tried to impose its will over the recalcitrant Tigreys by dividing the governorship or by imposing a Shewan governor over them.

⁷ Fedor Eugenievich Konovalov, "The Konovaloff Manuscript," Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 307-09; Anthony Mockler, *Haile Selassie's War: The Italian-Ethiopian Campaign, 1935-1941* (New York: Random House, 1984), 51, 60; George Lowther Steer, *Caesar in Abyssinia* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1937), 298; Richard Pankhurst, "Le diverse versioni della testimonianza deH'colonnello Konovaloff sull'invasione fascista dell'Etiopia." [Different Versions of Colonel Konovalov's Testimony on the Fascist Invasion of Ethiopia] *Studi Piacentini: Rivista dell'Istituto storico della Resistenza e dell'eta contemporanea* 17 (1995): 157.

⁸ On Mychew, see Prouty and Rosenfeld, *Dictionary*, 123-24.

⁹ Founded by Empress Taytu in 1887 as Ethiopia's new capital, "Addis Ababa" means "New Flower" in Amharic. Located in the center of the country on a large plateau in Shewa Province, it is the center of Amhara life and culture and is Ethiopia's political, financial, and communications center. Prouty and Rosenfeld, *Dictionary*, 4.

¹⁰ Konovalov, "Manuscript," 310-46; Pankhurst, "Diversi versioni," 157; Mockler, *Haile Selassie's War*, 83.

¹¹ Pankhurst, "Diverse versioni," 157-59. I have not been able to find the French-language draft of the story, and, apparently, neither has Dr. Pankhurst. Born in 1927 in London into a progressive, left-wing family, Richard Pankhurst received his Ph.D. in Economic History. He moved to Ethiopia in 1956 and began teaching at the University College of Addis Ababa. One of Ethiopia's foremost historians, he has published nearly twenty books and over 400 articles on the country.

Konovalov gave a copy to George Lowther Steer, who was visiting Ethiopia. Steer had covered Italy's invasion of Ethiopia for *The Times* of London, and he knew Emperor Haile Sellase, who later stood as godfather to his son. Describing Konovalov as "a white Russian without a passport and without country,"¹² Steer added, "Colonel Konovaloff, who is still in Addis Ababa, has written for me the story of the Emperor's last battle. He was . . . the only European who saw it on the Ethiopian side."¹³ In his' popular book, *Caesar in Abyssinia*,¹⁴ Steer translated and published passages covering from March 19, 1936, after the Italians had defeated Ras Seyoum's army, to mid-April, before the Emperor's return to the capital. In this version, Konovalov sympathetically described Haile Sellase's courage. The Emperor had exposed himself on the battlefield while manning a machine gun, and he had shown great calm and dignity during the disastrous final rout of Ethiopia's army.¹⁵

Konovalov's Unpublished Italian Manuscript

After the Italo-Ethiopian War, Colonel Konovalov left the anti-Fascist cause and went to Spain, where he worked with the Fascist Falangists during the Spanish Civil War.¹⁶

Before then, someone revised and translated his work into Italian. Many years later, the Institute of Ethiopian Studies at Addis Ababa University got a typed copy which likely is this first Italian translation.¹⁷ It consists of seven chapters and ninety-one pages typed on a typewriter at the Fourth Court of Appeals in Turin. Pankhurst details some of the differences between this translation and the version found in Steer. In particular, this new version downplayed the author's friendly comments toward Ethiopia and added passages favorable to Italy, presumably to gratify the Fascist regime and to get by its censorship. Significantly, this manuscript said nothing about Italy's use of poison gas during the war.¹⁸

¹² Steer, *Caesar*, 284.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 298.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 299-338.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, e.g., see 307-08, and 316.

¹⁶ Angelo Del Boca, *Gli italiani in Africa orientate: La Conquista dell'Impero Roma*. (Bari: Laterza, 1979), 366, n. 56.

¹⁷ In 1963, Richard Pankhurst founded The Institute of Ethiopian Studies, the oldest of the five research institutes within the Addis Ababa University system.

¹⁸ Pankhurst, "Diversi version!", 159-60. This manuscript, I.E.S. No. 827, carries the title, *La guerra italo-etioptica vista da un testimone* ["The Italo-Ethiopian War As Seen by a Witness"]. Other foreign, contemporary observers referred to Italy's use of gas. John William Scott Macfie, *An Ethiopian Diary: A Record of the British Ambulance Service in Ethiopia* (London: University Press of Liverpool, 1936), e.g., 117; Kathleen Nelson and Alan Sullivan, *John Melly of Ethiopia* (London: Faber and Faber, 1937), e.g., 214; Marcel Junod, *Warrior Without Weapons* (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 42-45; John Hathaway Spencer, *Ethiopia At Bay: A Personal Account of the Haile Sellassie Years* (Algonac, MI:

What explains Konovalov's seeming change of heart found in the published version of this manuscript?

The American historian, Thomas Coffey has insinuated that Konovalov was playing a double game. He specifically charged that Konovalov could have deceived the Emperor, making him believe he faced only ten thousand Italians at Mychew, while the enemy's numbers were much greater. During his March 21 reconnaissance trip into the mountains north of the Ethiopian camp, he claimed to have passed through the Italian lines disguised as a Coptic priest.¹⁹ Doubting the story, Coffey concluded that, as a skilled military observer, if he had infiltrated the Italian lines, he must have discovered the Ethiopians faced more than twenty thousand men. In his memoirs, Konovalov did not detail what he told the Emperor on his return, although he admitted that, on March 29, he said he thought the Ethiopians faced "five-to-eight thousand" Italians at Mychew.²⁰

Writing on Italian Fascism and colonialism, Angelo Del Boca commented on Ethiopian fears of mercenaries fighting for Ethiopia but actually in Rome's pay. He called Konovalov's behavior "ambiguous."²¹ He wondered about "this survivor of the wreckage from Wrangel's army," who found a job in Ethiopia, enjoyed the Emperor's favor, and advised Ras Kasa Darge's army.²² Del Boca could not confirm rumors that Konovalov was sometimes in Italian pay and that he was playing a double game.²³ Even so, continued Del Boca, Konovalov's memoirs began with the puzzling dedication: "To the Italian soldier who showed to the world, at first skeptical and then amazed but always hostile, that glorifying in the new fascist climate, he has the ancient virtues of the Roman legionary."²⁴

Reference Publications, 1987), 47; Steer, *Caesar*, 8. For a few of the articles in the *New York Times* on Italy's use of gas, see Mar. 17, 31; Apr. 4, 10, 15, 26; and May 3, 1936.

¹⁹ St. Mark founded the Coptic Church about 42 AD. Composed of Egyptians who had converted to Christianity in the second and third centuries, the Church developed its own language, Coptic, a combination of Greek and Arabic, to translate the Bible. Its patriarch was one of early Christendom's most powerful figures. Holding the Monophysite doctrine, its followers left the Council of Chalcedon in 451. The Coptic Church belongs to the Eastern Orthodox family of churches. The patriarchate is in Alexandria, though the Patriarch usually lives in Cairo. He chose Ethiopia's first bishop in the fourth century. Despite interruptions, the See of St. Mark kept its privilege to name a Copt as abun [head] of Ethiopia's church for fifteen centuries. With an Ethiopian appointed as abun, the Ethiopian church became independent between 1948 and 1950.

²⁰ Thomas M. Coffey, *Lion by the Tail: The Story of the Italian-Ethiopian War* (New York: The Viking Press, 1974), 314-15; Mockler, Haile Selassie's War, 115.

²¹ Del Boca, *Gli italiani*, 366.

²² *Ibid.* Although the claim of Ras Kasa Darge, 1881-1956, to Ethiopia's throne was equal to Haile Sellase's, he remained loyal to his cousin, the Emperor. The Italians killed three of his four sons. Prouty and Rosenfeld, *Dictionary*, 112.

²³ Del Boca, *Gli italiani*, 366.

²⁴ *Ibid.*; Konovalov, *Con le armate*, xi.

The Published Italian Version: *Con le armate del Negus*

This first Italian draft, although closer to the Fascist point-of-view compared to Steer's excerpts, needed more manipulation before authorities would publish it. The work of revision fell to an Italian naval officer and a former "electro-technical adviser" to Addis Ababa, Commander Stefano Micciche, who had known Konovalov in Ethiopia before the war. The new text came with a new title, *Con le armate del Negus* [With the Army of the Negus] and with a new, and racist, subtitle, *Un bianco fr a Inert* [A White Among the Blacks]. The commander also wrote a twenty-six page, semi-autobiographical and political Preface in which he assured readers that "I have kept the original text unchanged, except for leaving out some episodes to avoid repetition."²⁵ A false promise, unfortunately, most know Konovalov only through Micciche's revised edition.

First published in Bologna at the end of 1936 and reprinted two years later, *Con le armate del Negus*, changed much, and Pankhurst again describes at some length these changes.²⁶ It consists of nine chapters versus Konovalov's seven in the first Italian draft. The book changed the order of the chapters to have Konovalov's audience with the Emperor taking place on July 17, 1935 instead of August 17, as in the original Italian draft. Micciche's edition almost invariably changed Konovalov's comments on Haile Sellase to the sovereign's disadvantage. The term "*negus*" [king] replaced "Emperor of Ethiopia," and the new edition omitted or weakened positive statements toward him.²⁷

As just one example of Pankhurst's discussion of these differences, he notes that Micciche added criticism along the lines fixed by Fascist propaganda, which described Ethiopia as weakened by ethnic differences. Konovalov's Italian draft noted such problems, but Micciche strengthened them. He now had Konovalov writing, "Ethiopia was a horde of races of peoples without order or national spirit... Ethiopia could not survive the first serious test with any hope of success."²⁸

Micciche further changed Konovalov's manuscript, again along the lines of Fascist propaganda, by adding a new chapter, "The Looting of Addis Ababa." One passage specifically accuses the Emperor of responsibility for the looting that took place after he had fled his capital in early May. "Sometime

²⁵ Konovalov, *Con le armate*, 26.

²⁶ Pankhurst, "Diversi versioni," 160-63.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 161..

²⁸ Konovalov, *Con le armate*, 187. Many philo-fascist works of this period emphasize this lack of ethnic unity, e.g., Edward William Poison Newman, *Ethiopian Realities* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1936) and Charles Fernand Rey, *The Real Abyssinia* (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969/1935). Compare Rey's earlier work, *Unconquered Abyssinia As It Is To-Day* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1924) for its more sympathetic view, e.g., 305-06 where he asserts that a powerful Ethiopia would benefit the surrounding colonies held by Italy, France, and Great Britain.

Friday night, provoked by anger, he violently tore the silk curtains that adorned the canopy for the throne and shouted to the bystanders, "Take all, ransack, but do not set fire to the *gebbi*, the royal palace compound. This will bring you misfortune. Do not leave anything for the Italians."²⁹ A photo of looting strengthened the impact of this final chapter, and Micciche's edition declared that when the Fascist army entered the Ethiopian capital immediately after these events, "the population went out of their houses and hailed the new arrivals. The Italians did not come as conquerors, but as liberators."³⁰

Contemporary writers and Haile Sellase himself contradict this version of events, as Del Boca shows.³¹

Konovalov's memoirs were one of only three meaningful works written by observers on the Ethiopian side—in addition to Steer's book there is also a book by a Cuban, Colonel Alejandro del Valle.³² Konovalov's book, however, became a tool of Fascist propaganda, and Pankhurst calls it "a brilliant political move."³³ The blustering bravado in Micciche's Preface and the extended effort to use Konovalov's words to rebut any denigration of the Italian people surely falls into the realm of defensive overcompensation. It comforted Italian public opinion—and international opinion as well. Writing, as the text underscored, as one of the Emperor's closest collaborators, it countered both Steer's writings and the opinions of most of the non-Italian residents in Addis Ababa before the occupation. These foreigners had vigorously condemned the Fascist invasion and occupation of Ethiopia.³⁴

The Duce himself enthusiastically supported Konovalov's book, and on December 31, 1937 in *Popolo d'Italia*, he recommended the book. The second edition of the work in 1938 reproduced this approval.³⁵

While many have uncritically quoted *Con le armate del Negus*, three writers have underlined the book's serious flaws. Czeslaw Jesman derisively dismissed

²⁹ Konovalov, *Con le armate*, 210; Pankhurst, "Diversi versioni, 162-63.

³⁰ Konovalov, *Con le armate*, 214.

³¹ Del Boca, *Gli italiani*, 694. See also James Dugan and Laurence Lafore, *Days of Emperor and Clown: The Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-1936* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1973), 283-84, 289-90 and Edward Ullendorff, *The Autobiography of Emperor Haile Selassie I. My Life and Ethiopia's Progress, 1892-1937* (London: Oxford University Press), 291-92.

³² Colonel Alejandro del Valle, *Un hombre blanco en el infierno negro por el Coronel Alejandro del Valle* [A White Man in a Black Hell by Colonel Alejandro del Valle], as told to Arturo Alfonso Rosello (Havana: Impreso en los Talleres Tipograficos, 1937). The book tells the story of a Cuban volunteer, Del Valle, who, like Konovalov, served at the northern Ethiopian front. Its anti-Ethiopian perspective is clear between the title and the photographs of mutilated Italian corpses at the end of the book.

³³ Pankhurst, "Diversi versioni," 163.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Popolo d'Italia*; Dec. 31, 1937; Konovaloff, *Con le armate*, v-x; Pankhurst, "Diversi versioni," 163.

Micciche's text as "a garbled and tendentious version of Konovalov's reminiscences."³⁶ Thomas Coffey more explicitly wrote that Konovalov "vividly and convincingly described many details, but was strangely silent, obscure, or baffling about others. His admiration for the Italians was greater than for their victims. He fulsomely praised Italian aviators but failed to mention the tons of mustard gas they sprayed on the Ethiopians."³⁷ Angelo del Boca underlined Micciche text's inherent distortions by noting its many inconsistencies compared to Steer's publication.³⁸

Konovalov's Manuscript at the Hoover Institution

Despite Micciche's edition, Emperor Haile Sellase evidently forgave Konovalov after Ethiopia's liberation. The Russian spent about ten more years in Ethiopia, where he lived until 1952, when he finally left the country.³⁹

During his stay at Addis Ababa after the liberation, Konovalov wrote the "History of Ethiopia," a long draft in English that no one has published in its entirety. The Hoover Institution in California and The Institute of Ethiopian Studies at Addis Ababa University hold copies of the manuscript. Typewritten, someone has begun editing part of it, and some sections clearly represent an early draft, full of mistakes, many of which are common for someone not comfortable with the English language.

Its most interesting and useful portions describe those events, which he witnessed or took part in. Clearly enthusiastic about Ethiopia's efforts to modernize, he favorably described Empress Zewditu Menilek,⁴⁰ and lavished praise on Teferi, the future Haile Sellase, for his education and reformist spirit, which many in the country opposed. As an eyewitness, he described many of the preparations for Teferi's coronation and the coronation itself as well as national improvements, such as road and church building, plus local administrative, postal, constitutional, and judicial reforms.⁴¹

In a chapter entitled "1935-1936," Konovalov describes his participation in the Italo-Ethiopian War without the changes Fascist politics had imposed. Although shorter than *Con le armate del Negus*, this interesting section begins with his first audience with the Emperor in July 1935.⁴² The chapter sympathizes with the

³⁶ Jesman, *Russians*, 148.

³⁷ Coffey, *Lion*, 314.

³⁸ Del Boca, *Gli italiani*, 619-39.

³⁹ Jesman, *Russians in Ethiopia*, 148.

⁴⁰ Zewditu Menilek ruled Ethiopia as empress from 1916 to 1930. Teferi Mekonnen, her second cousin, was her regent. Prouty and Rosenfeld, *Dictionary*, 191.

⁴¹ Konovalov, "Konovaloff Manuscript," 84-90.

⁴² For Pankhurst's discussion of the manuscript, see his "Diversi versioni," 164-66. Pankhurst complains that Konovalov still does not discuss Italy's use of poison gas. Pankhurst is wrong in detail;

Ethiopian people in their difficulties and celebrates their religion, culture, and patriotism. Konovalov now favorably evaluates the Ethiopian chiefs, comments not included in the published Italian text, and he praises the common Ethiopian soldier striving under impossible conditions. Konovalov sympathetically praises the Emperor and writes at some length about his personal conversations with him. Interestingly, Konovalov now glides over his underestimation of Italian forces at Mychew.

Konovalov's comments on Italy's occupation policy and the quick growth of guerrilla resistance provide a beguiling mix of Italian brutality and positive accomplishment, the latter especially in building a physical infrastructure and often forging close, personal relations with individual Ethiopians. Although Italy claimed victory on May 5, 1936 when its troops occupied the capital, in truth, Italy never pacified the country. Ethiopia's "Patriots" played an underappreciated role in liberating their own country, the first freed from Axis oppression in World War II.⁴³

The *World War II Quarterly* has published in February 2008 the first of a two-part article in which I took and severely edited material from Konovalov's manuscript at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Part of Konovalov's much larger, projected "History of Ethiopia," I excerpted from pages 307-77 material dealing with the eve of war and Italy's attack, victory, and occupation of Ethiopia. I closed with Konovalov's description of British victory and eye-witness commentary on Haile Sellase's entry into Addis Ababa in early World War II, after exactly five years of Italian occupation.⁴⁴

Konovalov mentions gas twice. But he is correct in wondering why Konovalov did not discuss this more. See 164.

⁴³ "Patriots" designates those who resisted the Italians between 1936 and 1941. These leaders were often provincial or local chiefs from important landowning families. Prouty and Rosenfeld, *Dictionary*, 144-46.

⁴⁴ Pankhurst, "Diversi versioni," 166-200, covers pages 307-67 in the manuscript. There appear to be fourteen pages missing from the manuscript copy, likely dealing with British military operations.

No Independence without Sovereignty! The Resistance of Emperor Haile Selassie I to the British Occupation of Ethiopia (1941-1944)

Sterling Joseph Coleman, Jr.
Florida State University

Introduction

On May 5th 1941 Emperor Haile Selassie I, recently restored to the throne of Ethiopia, delivered a stirring message of hope and triumph from the steps of his imperial palace in Addis Ababa. Within his speech, the Emperor declared his gratitude to the British Army and his Ethiopian patriots for restoring him to power and expressed his desire to maintain Ethiopia's independence and sovereignty.¹ However, from 1941 to 1944, the Emperor realized the price of British aid was far more costly than mere gratitude and his people's liberty and freedom from Italian rule would have to be regained from British rule. But why was he able to succeed in removing British rule from Ethiopia by the end of 1944? What strategy and tactics did the Emperor utilize to achieve this end? In an effort to answer these questions this study will argue that prior to his signing of the 1944 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement Emperor Haile Selassie I regained *de facto* control over Ethiopia by engaging in a strategy of resistance which employed the tactics of obstructionism, opportunism, brinksmanship, leverage and propaganda.² However, a brief overview of the Emperor's strategy of resistance is necessary prior to an analysis of these tactics.

Emperor Haile Selassie I's Strategy of Resistance

The Emperor's strategy was a pre-Cold War variant of the doctrine of flexible response. This doctrine was "based upon a measured and balanced range of appropriate responses...to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression."³ The Emperor's goal was to compel the British to end its rule over Ethiopia without provoking them into a disproportionate use of force which

¹ Emperor Haile Selassie I. *Selected Speeches of His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie First 1918 to 1967*. (Addis Ababa: The Imperial Ethiopian Ministry of Information, 1967), 338.

² The Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1944 is an arbitrary title the author of this text assigned to this agreement. The proper title of this agreement is *Agreement between His Majesty in Respect of the United Kingdom and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia Addis Ababa, 19th December 1944*. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1945.

³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Defense Planning Committee Final Communiqué," Brussels, 13-14 December 1967 in North Atlantic Treaty Organization. *NATO Final Communiques. Vol. 1, 1949-1974*. (Brussels: NATO Information Services, 1974), p.197.

could either destroy his resistance, cripple his attempts to regain control over his empire or harden British resolve to maintain the occupation. A crucial aspect of the emperor's strategy was not to attack the British government directly but the instruments of power they utilized to maintain its control. His probable rationale for utilizing such a strategy of resistance revolved around the fact that as much as he wanted an Ethiopia free of British rule, he still believed himself to be indebted to them for the sacrifices they made in his restoration to the throne. Also, the Emperor may have been reluctant to engage his people in another war of insurrection against a European power while they were still recovering from the Italian occupation.

Obstructionism & Administrative Control

And now I would like to address his first tactic to weaken British rule—obstructionism. In early 1941, the British military placed Ethiopia under the control of the Occupied Enemy Territorial Administration (OETA) led by General Sir Philip Mitchell. Believing his administration to be in control of Ethiopia, General Mitchell appointed British advisors to Ethiopia's bureaucracy without the Emperor's consent. In response, the Emperor quickly took steps to obstruct the actions of British advisors and neutralize their hold over his court. His first move occurred within a week of his return to the throne. In his autobiography, the Emperor wrote, "Since We had begun work on the New Ethiopia even before the conclusion of the war in Ethiopia, five days after We entered Addis Abeba [*sic*], on [May 10, 1941], We established a cabinet composed of seven ministers."⁴ These ministers and their subordinates obstructed the British in their attempt to administratively run the country by mishandling official documents produced by their occupier and by ignoring recommendations submitted by British advisors.

To further strengthen his hold over his empire and weaken British control, the Emperor quickly resurrected provincial and local governments and paid off debts incurred by patriot leaders during their struggle against the Italians.⁵ This tactic worked so efficiently that the British were compelled to work within the imperial administration the Emperor established rather than duplicate, undermine or dissolve it by force. Once the British began to work within his bureaucracy and accept his appointments to government positions, the Emperor achieved *de facto* administrative control over his empire.

⁴ Emperor Haile Selassie I. *My Life and Ethiopia's Progress: Volume Two Addis Ababa, 1966 E.C.* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1994), 167.

⁵ Harold G. Marcus. *A History of Ethiopia*. Updated Edition. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 152.

Opportunism & Territorial Control

Now I would like to address his second tactic to undue British control—opportunism. In the immediate aftermath of the ousting of the Italians from Ethiopia, the British occupied the country's population centers with elements of the 1st South African Division, the 11th and 12th African Divisions comprised of Kenyan, Nigerian and Ghanaian troops, and the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions. The Emperor knew that after five years of Italian occupation and insurrection by the Ethiopian patriots his people were too exhausted to directly challenge the full might of the British Army. In addition to this problem, from May 5th 1941 to January 31st 1942 World War II was turning against the Allies in North Africa. For example, on November 23rd 1941 the Afrika Korps defeated elements of the British 13th and 30th Corps at the Battle of Sidi Rezegh in Libya. And on January 21st 1942 Rommel launched a counteroffensive against the British 8th Army which ended eight days later with the German capture of the city of Benghazi in Libya.⁶

Realizing the dire nature of the Allied position, the Emperor joined official and unofficial international calls for the British to re-deploy their forces stationed in Ethiopia to other theaters of war. Though the British Empire complied with these requests, General Mitchell maintained a Military Mission to organize and train a new Ethiopian army and police force as well as to occupy the territory of the Ogaden and the Franco-Ethiopian Railway under Articles II, V and IX of the 1942 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement.

With the removal of British troops from the majority of Ethiopian territory and by opportunistically taking advantage of Nazi victories in North Africa, the Emperor established *de facto* territorial control over most of his empire by appointing Ethiopian patriot leaders to regional administrative positions.

Brinkmanship & Infrastructural Control

And now I would like to address the Emperor's third and riskier tactic—brinkmanship. During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, Fascist Italy established several factories, plants, breweries and mills in Addis Ababa along with improvements to the road and railways of Ethiopia.⁷

However, before the Ethiopian liberation was completed by the British Army and the Ethiopian patriots, General Mitchell implemented plans to seize,

⁶ JKW Bingham and W. Haupt. *North African Campaign 1940-1943*, London: MacDonald & Company, 1968, 70-72, 79-80.

⁷ Richard Pankhurst, "Post-World War II Ethiopia: British Military Policy and Action for the Dismantling and Acquisition of Italian Factories and Other Assets, 1941-1942." *Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 29, no. 1 (1996): 46.

dismantle and relocate Italian industrial assets to other British colonies where they could be utilized to produce war materiel for the Allied cause. From November 27th 1941 until February 28th 1942, the British Army by Ethiopian estimates stripped the empire of 80% of its Italian-created industrial infrastructure.⁸ Until he signed the 1942 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement, the Emperor lacked a legal and military recourse to halt these seizures. By the terms of the agreement, General Mitchell had to *request* the Emperor's permission to extract any future industrial assets before they could requisition them. On February 28th 1942 General Mitchell attempted to seize a sisal rope factory in the town of Jimma without his permission. In an armed confrontation between British African troops and Ethiopian patriots led by *Dejazmach* Gorasu Duki, the Emperor ordered the patriot leader to prevent the British African troops from dismantling the factory. Over a period of several tense days in which Sir Robert Howe and General Mitchell attempted to bully the Emperor into submission on this issue, he refused to yield and made his full displeasure over General Mitchell's industrial requisitions known to his occupier. The end result of the Emperor's brinkmanship was the cessation of all requisitions of Italian industrial assets in Ethiopia and the Emperor's *de facto* control over the infrastructure of his empire.

Leverage & Economic Control

Now I would like to address the Emperor's fourth tactic to restore Ethiopia's sovereignty—leverage. Under the terms of Article IV of the 1942 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement, the Emperor conceded:

that in all matters relating to currency in Ethiopia the Government of the United Kingdom would be consulted and that arrangements concerning it would be made only with the concurrence of that Government.⁹

In adherence with the terms of the agreement the Emperor consulted the British government about stabilizing the value of Ethiopia's official

⁸ R.G. Howe, "Mr. Howe to Mr. Eden" 17.6.1942 in Paul Preston and Michael Partridge (eds.), *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part III. From 1940 through 1945. Series G. Africa. Vol. 2 Africa, January 1942-March 1943.* (Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, 1989), 108.

⁹ "Appendix I: Agreement and Military Convention Between The United Kingdom and Ethiopia: Addis Ababa, January 31, 1942" in Lord Rennell of Rodd, *British Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa.* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948): 541.

currency, the Maria Theresa dollar against the Italian lira and the British East Africa shilling both introduced during the Italian and British occupations.

The British proposed to establish a Currency Board in London and replace the Maria Theresa dollar with a new Ethiopian currency linked to the British pound. The Emperor submitted a counter-proposal of an Ethiopian national bank which would limit his empire's economic dependency upon Great Britain. When the British refused to create a national bank, the Emperor created the bank by edict, capitalized it nominally with one million Maria Theresa dollars, yet rested its solvency upon the Maria Theresa dollar itself, the Italian lira, the East African pound, and the Indian pound. These fluctuating currencies kept the Emperor constantly under pressure to accept the British proposal. To resolve this problem, in May 1942 the Emperor instructed his Vice Minister of Finance, Yilma Deressa, to seek a loan of \$40 million as credit to be made available in the United States in cash balance, to purchase consumer goods from the United States, and to seek an additional loan of \$10 million under the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 to rebuild Ethiopia.¹⁰ The Americans responded by not only lend-leasing 5,430,000 ounces of silver for the purpose of coinage in Ethiopia and fulfilling the Emperor's request for credit but also dispatched in December 1943 an economic development mission to help the Ethiopians rebuild their country.

By leveraging the United States against the British Empire, the Emperor weakened the British hold over the Ethiopian economy long enough so that he could stabilize the Maria Theresa dollar, establish a national bank, and ensure his *de facto* economic control over his empire by the end of 1943.¹¹

Propaganda & Informational Control

And now I would like to address the Emperor's fifth tactic to secure Ethiopia's independence—propaganda. Immediately after the Emperor regained his throne, he confronted an active yet uncoordinated disinformation campaign designed to weaken and discredit his rule. As he recorded within his autobiography, "Among the British military officers in Ethiopia, there was a person called Brigadier [Maurice S.] Lush, who led a political group which had sinister intentions toward Our country... They spoke publicly that the purpose of

¹⁰ Yilma Deressa, "The Ethiopian Vice Minister of Finance (Yilma Deressa) to the Secretary of State" 12.7.1943 in United States. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1943 Vol. IV The Near East and Africa*. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), 101.

¹¹ Great Britain. Foreign Office. "Appendix I: Agreement and Military Convention Between The United Kingdom and Ethiopia: Addis Ababa, January 31, 1942" in Lord Rennell of Rodd, *British Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa*. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948): 540-541.

their coming was to rule Ethiopia.”¹² To counter this disinformation campaign, the Emperor found a champion in the most un-likeliest of people, Estelle Sylvia Pankhurst.

Sylvia Pankhurst, as she was popularly known, was a noted British suffragette who during the 1920s supported anti-imperialist and anti-fascist causes. What began as an alliance of convenience between the Emperor and the British anti-imperialist blossomed into a life-long friendship which reaped huge dividends for both parties during and after the Italian and British occupations.

In the person of the Emperor, Pankhurst gained something which she did not possess—legitimacy. Her interviews with the Emperor and other members of the imperial family allowed Pankhurst to eloquently address Ethiopia’s concerns before a British and international public which could have dismissed her as being an anti-imperialist malcontent who knew nothing about the cause she championed.

In the person of Sylvia Pankhurst, the Emperor gained a tireless crusader who within the pages of her newspaper, *New Times & Ethiopia News* fearlessly held the Italians, the British and the world responsible for the war-torn conditions of Ethiopia. Initially the goal of her newspaper was to defend the cause of Ethiopian independence, attack Italian Fascism, assault Nazi aggression and defend the cause of other nations victimized by the Axis. Once the Ethiopian patriots and the British Army liberated Ethiopia, Pankhurst redirected her attacks squarely against the British occupation in a bid to secure Ethiopia’s independence and sovereignty.

With a circulation that reached ten thousand copies weekly, Pankhurst and her newspaper permitted the Emperor to regain *de facto* informational control over his empire. While the Emperor never controlled the media or the means by which information about his empire was distributed to the world, he did control the debate over Ethiopia’s viability as an independent nation and sold his empire to the world as a sovereign member of the international community. The reward for his effort was international recognition for his empire’s sovereignty and independence by gaining a seat at the United Nations in 1942, while Sylvia Pankhurst was rewarded for her efforts with the Queen of Sheba medal and the Patriots medal awarded by the Emperor as well as the privilege of immigrating to Ethiopia.¹³

¹² Emperor Haile Selassie I. *My Life and Ethiopia's Progress: Volume Two Addis Ababa, 1966 E.C.* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1994), 172.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 215.

Why Was the Emperor's Strategy Successful?

So why was the Emperor's strategy successful? There are two reasons why it succeeded. The first reason is that his opposition, the British Empire, was neither united nor coordinated in its occupation of Ethiopia. The main entities of the British government which had a direct bearing upon the occupation—the Foreign Office, the War Office and Parliament—harbored opposing views which muddled their control over the African empire. For example, William Murray, the American Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs observed:

The War Office favored a virtual protectorate, saying that, given the chaotic condition of the country and the incapacity of the population, close British control would be advantageous to both parties. The Foreign Office, however felt that emphasis should be laid on independence, rather than control, and agreed that it would set a bad political precedent to deny independence to the first country to be freed from Axis rule.¹⁴

While the Labour and Tory wings of Parliament vacillated between granting full sovereignty and limited autonomy to Ethiopia.¹⁵ This policy confusion provided the Emperor with an opportunity to clarify his position, take advantage of British indecision, and relentlessly press for Ethiopia's sovereignty and independence.

The second reason the Emperor's strategy of resistance succeeded was because he wanted to remove the tendrils of British control over Ethiopia without entirely removing the British presence. The Emperor realized that it was not in his best interest to immediately call for the complete removal of all British troops in Ethiopia upon regaining his throne. He knew he needed the British Military Mission to help maintain order over his empire and train a new police force and army which would allow him to centralize his rule once the British departed. But the Emperor also acknowledged that he quickly needed to regain full control over his empire lest the British arrive at a consensus to govern Ethiopia as a military protectorate or crown colony. Finally, the Emperor's strategy allowed him to assess the threat he confronted, counter the British with a firm yet measured response equal to the level of threat he faced, and gradually

¹⁴ Wallace Murray, "Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)" in United States. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1942 (In Seven Volumes) Vol. IV The Near East and Africa*. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), 100.

¹⁵ *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. CXXI (1942), col. 646-680.

wear down his occupier's instruments of control until he achieved mastery over his empire by the signing of the 1944 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement which guaranteed Ethiopian independence and sovereignty. By employing such tactics as opportunism, obstructionism, propaganda, brinkmanship and leverage in a strategy of resistance to British rule, the Emperor secured his nation's future in the post-war world.

Rescue Russia! Even the Bolsheviks? American Railroad Men in the Russian Civil War

*Clifford Foust
University of Maryland*

On 14 December 1917 a group of 215 seasoned American railway men arrived in Vladivostok, Siberia, on 14 December 1917, having been recruited to help the Russian war effort by speeding up the transport of badly backlogged materiel from that city across the Trans-Siberian Railway. They were known as the Russian Railway Service Corps (RRSC). When they were organized, the hope was two fold: that the Eastern Front of World War I could be bolstered, and seizure of political power by radicals averted. But when their ship dropped anchor, the latter was already a done deed, and the former was being negotiated at Brest Litovsk. For most of the men, they never stepped foot ashore before their transport left for Nagasaki.

By late February 1918, the American railway leader on the scene - the aging but still vigorous John Frank Stevens, the erstwhile key engineer of the Panama Canal - together with State Department officials in Washington decided to risk the RRSC men working on a sector of the Trans-Siberian that seemed fairly safe: the Chinese-Eastern Railway that crossed Manchuria. Half of the men from Nagasaki arrived in Harbin in two echelons on the 2nd and 3rd of March.

Coincidentally on that latter day, far to the west, representatives of the Bolsheviks and the Central Powers signed the fateful Treaty of Brest Litovsk. Almost at once Lenin and Trotsky recognized their need for outside help, allied help, to meet the challenge of German forces racing into Ukraine, Russia's breadbasket and the route to Caucasian oil. But there was no Red Army, no Red Fleet, and feelers soon reached out to the allies to provide leadership in cobbling together some adequate forces, and refurbishing the main means of transport - rail.

It was in this setting that, shortly, a strange and little remarked event occurred. They had met a number of times earlier but this morning, Monday, 18 March, two days after the Soviet ratification of Brest Litovsk, Trotsky was joined in the Kremlin by one Raymond Robins. Robins, a well-to-do Chicago lawyer and social worker, had arrived in Russia the previous August as member of a medical mission. (I might mention here as an aside that Robins and his wife spend most of their later lives as their favorite earthly spot, Chinsegut Hill, at Brooksville, Florida, now the University of South Florida's Conference and

Retreat Center.) Robins now was head of the small Red Cross organization in Russia, hence his courtesy title of colonel and tidy uniform. Robins' daily diary, never expansive, notes only that on this day Trotsky:

Ask[s] for five [American] officers for inspection of Army Drill. Wants railroad men & supplies. Wants material later when canvass is complete (inventory).¹

Robins' longtime friend and biographer, William Hard, fleshed out Robins' late night notation on railway men, as follows:²

[Trotsky:] Haven't you Americans got a Russian Railway Mission, of Americans, somewhere?

[Robins:] Certainly.

[Trotsky:] Where is it?

[Robins:] Nagasaki.

[Trotsky:] Gone to Japan?

[Robins:] Yes.

[Trotsky:] What's it doing there?

[Robins:] Eating its head off.

[Trotsky:] Why don't you send it in here?

[Robins:] Why, Mr. Commissioner, you know there are many Americans —

¹ Robins diary, State Historical Society of Wisconsin/Robins papers/reel 1. There is considerable confusion in the secondary literature as to the date of this key meeting, in part, it would seem, because of Robins' persistent use in his diary of both Julian and Gregorian dates throughout the month of March. The old style had been abandoned on 1 February that was declared to be the 14th. Thus Robins was in Moscow, not Petrograd, from 10 March living in the Elite Hotel. Trotsky traveled to Moscow (with Lockhart and 700 Lettish warriors) on Saturday, 16 March. Two days after the Trotsky meeting Robins returned to Vologda, and left again for Moscow on the 24th, the same day Lenin moved there to take up quarters in the Kremlin. Cf. The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, vol. 1:1915-1938 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), 34.

²Hard, Raymond. Robins' Own Story, 97-100. The biographer's wording must of course be taken as only suggestive for he was not present at the meeting and Trotsky certainly never left a record. And as far as we know there were no hidden recorders or closeted stenographers, although it is more than likely that Hard spoke with Robins and perhaps Gumberg soon after the interview. A year later almost to the day Robins testified before a subcommittee of the Senate committee on the judiciary charged with investigating bolshevism, and repeated in variant language some of the conversation. Congress, Senate, Committee of the Judiciary, Bolshevik Propaganda, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary, 65th Cong., 3d sess., 6 March 1919, especially p. 788. Robins added to Hard's account only that Trotsky specifically promised allied control of the Siberian magistral ("You send in your mission. We will give you control of the Trans-Siberian at all points.") and agreed to allow the field pieces to be transported wherever the allies desired. Raymond Robins' Own Story, 122-23.

[Trotsky:] Yes, they think I'm a German agent. Well, now, suppose I am. Just assume, for argument, that I am. You admit I have never told you I would do a thing and then failed to do it. My motives may be bad, but my actions go with my promises. Is that right?

[Robins:] Yes.

[Trotsky:] Well, then, out of some motive, which you may assume to be bad, I am willing to share the railway system of Russia half-and-half with the United States; and if you will bring your Railway Mission into Russia I promise you that I will give its members complete authority over half the transportation of all the Russia of the Soviets.

[Robins:] What do you mean — half?

[Trotsky:] I mean this: I will accept anybody you Americans want to name as your railway chief and I will make him Assistant Superintendent of Russian Ways and Communications, and his orders will be orders. Then, as well as we can, we will divide all our available transportation facilities into two equal parts. You will use your half to evacuate war-supplies from the front and to carry them away into the interior, so that the Germans will not be able to get them. We will use our half, you helping us, to move our food-supplies from the places where we have a surplus to the places where we have a deficit. You see?

[Robins:] Clearly. You want us Americans to reform and restore your railway system for you, so that it can carry food successfully and so that you can feed your people and keep your government going.

[Trotsky:] Yes. But I propose to pay you in precisely the coin you most need and want. Colonel Robins, have you ever seen a gun-map of our front?

Trotsky unrolled it before him [William Hard writes]...

[Trotsky:] There it all lies... It's of no more use to us. Our army does not fight in any more foreign war just now. Lenin says the Germans will advance. If they do, they will take all that stuff. We cannot move it back. We can do small things on our railways now, but not big things. Most of our technical railway managers are against us. They are against the revolution. They are sabotaging the revolution. Our railways are headless. The whole point is: our railways need new heads. Will you supply them?

[Robins:] I'll inquire.

[Trotsky:] But be sure you make this clear: My motive, whether good or bad, is entirely selfish. I get a reorganized and effective railway system for Soviet Russia. And your motive, so far as I am concerned, is entirely selfish, too. You save a mass of munitions from all possibility of falling into the hands of the Germans. You get a benefit. I get a benefit. Mutual services, mutual benefits, and no pretenses! What do you say?

[Robbins:] I'll find out.

And so Robins did, through the American ambassador, David R. Francis, then in Vologda, east of Petrograd, for safety from possible capture by advancing German forces.

In less than three weeks the soviet government thus, had traveled far from its primitive origins - implacable revolutionary opposition to all things capitalistic - and now professed a desire for dozens of American railroad men to assist in restoration of Russia's lamentable railways. It was a case of either political pragmatism or supreme cynicism, using the capitalists against themselves.

Ambassador Francis telegraphed Secretary of State Robert Lansing the news of Trotsky's request and, apparently, he also tried to get a wire through to John Frank Stevens in Harbin. The telegram instructed Stevens to send the 100 RRSC men still languishing in Nagasaki to Vologda "if he has [the] authority."

After much backing and filling, the State Department on 23 April finally authorized Francis and Stevens to dispatch to Vologda, not the 100 men contemplated at first, but a small group to consult with Ambassador Francis and, presumably, through him Soviet authorities. Thereby the Department saved face, having vowed in December neither de facto nor de jure recognition of the Bolshevik government, and certainly no material aid. Stevens, for his part, thoroughly and outspokenly opposed the whole venture; he was implacably anti-Bolshevik. But he acceded to orders from back home, although he must have been aghast at the last sentence in one of the secretary's telegrams: "Why could not [the] men at Nagasaki be organized as [a] separate contingent in European Russia?" That would have meant of course working with the Soviets.

In a few days the uniformed head chief of the RRSC, Col. George H. Emerson, erstwhile 48-year-old general manager of the Great Northern, put together a small group to undertake this unprecedented adventure, five carefully selected men of various strengths: a mechanical superintendent, a senior traffic man, i.e. a dispatcher; a locomotive man; and a young telephone and telegraph man.³ To these he added one Maxwell Bunting, a Baldwin locomotive erection

³ For the entire Emerson excursion a few sources are used heavily: The principal official document is the final report, "Report of American Railway Engineers who were in Siberia with the Czecho-Slovacs from May 5th, to September 9th, 1918," 70 pp., dated 28 September 1918 and signed by Emerson and Major Slaughter. A copy may be found in National Archives/RG43/838A/6/DE3, another in Hoover Institution Archives/Emerson papers/1/18, and others elsewhere. Aide Ole A. Bjonerud drafted the report from his extensive notes and his diary: Bjonerud, "My Trip Abroad," 75 (these notes and diary are privately held). B. O. Johnson's log/diary (59 pp., also privately held) is essential for many details and opinions. Also Emerson's five-page letter to former colleague W. Kelly of the Great Northern, 7 March 1919, HIA/Emerson coll. /1 /18-26. The diplomatic documents are found in Stevens' files as president of the later Inter-Allied Technical Board, NA/RG43/838 A/especialy box 6, most of which are reproduced in FRUS, 1918, Russia, vol. 3. For a recent

engineer who had been at Harbin and now co-opted to the RRSC. Bunting, Russian born, both spoke Russian well and knew railroad mechanical engineering. With them traveled Major Homer Slaughter, a military attaché trying to get back to his embassy assignment. Also Emerson took along a young secretary/aide, Ole Bjonerud, who had been a superintendent's secretary on the GN.

They left Harbin in early May headed east because of stiff fighting reported further west and it took them considerable negotiating with Bolshevik representatives at Vladivostok and Khabarovsk to secure a train, but they did and finally rolled westward. On the way, oddly, their train met on the Amur line the train of Raymond Robins headed east out of the country, but Robins and Emerson somehow got crosswise of each other and both quickly pushed on. Emerson's adventure to the west went smoothly enough until their small train reached Krasnoiarisk on 27 May. There they found the town and rail yard in the hands of Bolsheviks who were in armed conflict with detachments of the famed Czech Legion further west on the line. The local Red leader persuaded the American railroad men to try to mediate between their forces and those of the Czechs. With no dependable contact with consular officials in Irkutsk or Stevens in Harbin, much less Washington, Emerson agreed. There transpired days of high excitement, considerable danger, little sleep, and much riding up and down the rails, until on 4 June at a rail station twenty miles west of Krasnoiarisk, an agreement known locally as the "Treaty of Mariinsk" accomplished, a truce between Czechs and Russians that allowed the Americans to continue westward.

A couple of thousand miles of the clickety-clack of rails not welded, and they arrived at a lovely resort town in the Ural Mountains, Miass, where they were warmly received by the local townspeople: an open carriage ride into town from the station, songs, huzzahs, tea, cakes, some very choice cherry jam, and the traditional Russian gift of welcome: bread and salt. Try as they did to negotiate their way further west and north to Vologda, they failed. Widespread fighting and disarray prevented them; they could not even communicate with the ambassador.

account that contributes much to the Czech context of subsequent negotiations, based heavily on the Emerson-Slaughter final report, see Victor M. Fie, *The Rise of the Constitutional Alternative to Soviet Rule in 1918, Provisional Governments of Siberia and All-Russia: Their Quest for Allied Intervention* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1998), 306-45. The best secondary account is still - in spite of the passage of a half-century - the magisterial work of George F. Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 279-91. Of course Kennan did not have available to him the Bjonerud and Johnson diaries and a variety of other sources.

Returning to the Siberian capital of Omsk they learned some detail of the allied military intervention, of the dedication of that intervention to aid the Czech Legion, and of the Czech successes against Bolshevik units. Their earlier stance of neutrality was totally abandoned. In spite of some sympathy for the Bolshevik cause on the part of Emerson and several others, they increasingly lent their railway skills to Czech needs and, indeed, the important Czech commander Rudolf Gajda even agreed to extend them (and their absent RRSC colleagues) complete operating control over the Trans-Siberian, now largely in the hands of the Czech Legion, an offer Emerson was in no position to accept.

Thus began the final dangerous, difficult, and exhausting trip back east. It took more than two months, largely because of many downed bridges and blown-in tunnels, the worst not far east of Irkutsk, a tunnel that even with the engineering expertise of Emerson and his mates took two weeks to clear. Finally, on the 5th of September, the group rolled into Harbin, worn-out but not worse for the-wear. Their RRSC mates gave them a heroes' welcome.

What was the meaning in the larger scene of this long, difficult and perilous excursion? Not a question so simple to answer. On the surface of it, of course, the entire jaunt failed in its mission. We can never know for certain what might have come from KRSC-Soviet cooperation in the crucial rail transport sector. In the light of the onset of the civil war, of the emergence of seemingly strong White forces in Siberia, the Russian south, and the northwest, it is simply not reasonable to suppose that the U.S. State Department would have sanctioned collaboration with Trotsky and Lenin against them. Nor can we, in spite of that earlier mediation at Mariinsk, expect that Emerson or any others could have diminished Czech-Bolshevik enmities.

But was the Great Adventure to the West a stupid, dangerous, and asinine blunder, as John Frank Stevens continued to think? It is at least mildly interesting, though, that he felt it necessary to swallow hard and to wire Lansing on 13 September the following in its entirety:

I have carefully examined [the] complete records [of the] Emerson acts on his western trip and consider that he used excellent judgment in every case under trying circumstances and I heartily approve all that he did.⁴

The passage of time did not mellow John Frank's private judgments. In his autobiography drafted in the late 1920s and early 1930s he wrote:

⁴ Telegram, Stevens to Lansing, 13 Sept, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, 3:248.

This was as stupid and dangerous a move that could possibly have been conceived, for the old Russian regime officials of the Chinese Eastern Railway would, and did jump at once at the conclusion that the purpose of our Government in sending these men to Vologda was to work with the Bolsheviki railway people, and I never had the slightest doubt but that was our Ambassador's intention. It was, in effect, an attempt, in a most delicate situation, to carry water on both shoulders, always a dangerous experiment.... But of all the utterly inexcusable, asinine, diplomatic blunders, the one the Ambassador made and which was approved by Washington, this was the worst that could have been imagined as affecting my work.... [It was a] wholly ill advised performance which was made without any reasonable excuse.⁵

From Stevens' wholly negative view of the Bolsheviks, the Armistice ending World War I in another two months, and the escalation of the Civil War in the months thereafter, we can only conclude that it was a vain hope and effort. But a tantalizing and colorful one.⁶

⁵ Stevens, autobiography, ch. 23, to be found in Georgetown University Archives/Stevens papers/boxes 3 & 4.

⁶ It is equally tantalizing to note here this was not the last Soviet effort to solicit American help on Russia's railways during the Civil War period. RRSC lieutenant colonel Frank R. Blunt, who together with a small group of RRSC and Red Cross men, was held by the Red Army about six weeks in January-March 1920, on his release carried back a Soviet proposal for railroad supplies and decapod locomotives unassembled in Vladivostok they presumed to be Russian property, duly paid for.

Another Post-War Settlement: Eunice Hunton Carter and Mary McLeod Bethune

Christine Lutz
Georgia State University

On 14 April 1944, 127 representatives of fifty-nine organizations – communist, liberal, Pan-Africanist, Democrats, and Rockefeller Republicans – joined several guests from Africa and Caribbean in New York City at the Council on African Affairs office. Paul Robeson, William Jay Schiefflin and Max Yergan, on behalf of the Council on African Affairs [CAA], had called for a summit meeting “to reach common agreement on basic principles and measures ... essential for the future welfare of the African people.” The conferees hoped to come to a “New Perspectives” agreement among anti-colonial leaders about how best to place Africa at the forefront of the hoped-for United Nations’ agenda. The CAA believed that Africa would be “the main testing ground of the determination and ability of the United Nations.”¹ Alphaeus Hunton, educational director of the CAA and secret Communist Party member, chaired the meeting’s Resolutions Committee, organized the discussions, and held to edit the meeting’s volume of Proceedings. His sister, Eunice Hunton Carter, attended, representing Mary McLeod Bethune and the National Council of Negro Women.

Eunice Hunton Carter was a prominent black attorney, lobbyist, and an influential Republican politician in the Rockefeller camp. Her mentor was Thomas Dewey, Republican governor of New York. Mary Bethune, the well known Floridian, had effected enormous practical and symbolic gains for African American women by 1944. She was a Special Advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and had been a New Deal administrator, the first African American woman to hold such a position in a presidential administration. Thanks to Mrs. Bethune’s work in the National Youth Administration, between twenty and twenty-five percent of the youth in New Deal jobs by 1941 were African American, even in the South.²

Mrs. Carter and Mrs. Bethune had worked in the National Association of Colored Women, at one time the largest secular organization of African

¹ Alphaeus Hunton *et al*, Proceedings of the Conference on Africa – New Perspectives (New York: Council on African Affairs, 1944), 36-37.

² R.B. Wright, The Idealistic Realist: Mary McLeod Bethune, the National Council of Negro Women, and the National Youth Administration (M.A., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1999), 120.

Americans in the country. From that Association had emerged the International Council of Women of the Darker Races, with which both women engaged. In 1935, Mrs. Bethune had established the National Council of Negro Women as an organization of leading race women who were young professionals that no longer fit into the outdated model of the NACW. In that endeavor, Mrs. Carter's help had been essential. Although for many years the National Council of Negro Women was penniless, under Mrs. Bethune's leadership, young African American professional women moved into influential positions to effect some changes in the race policies of the federal government.³ NCNW members represented roughly one million black women who had a significant voice in the New Deal and later, in the Democratic Party.⁴

The National Council of Negro Women and the National Youth Administration sponsored an important conference on "Negro Problems and the Problems of Negro Youth," and initiated a series of annual conferences sponsored by the federal government on "Participation of Negro Women and Children in Federal Welfare Programs." Sixty-five black women attended the first of these annual meetings, held in the East Room of the White House in April 1938, an unprecedented event. At that meeting, the African American women issued a paper of their goal for distribution to the President and other New Dealers: integration and equal treatment in the federal Bureaus of Women, Children, Education, and Public Health Service, and with the Social Security Bureau, the American Red Cross, and the Housing authorities.⁵

With other "united front" black-led organizations, Mrs. Bethune and the NCNW pushed the President to integrate defense industries and the army. In that effort, the Communist Party – notably Doxie Wilkerson and Mrs. Carter's brother, Alphaeus Hunton – and most famously, A. Philip Randolph, assisted Mrs. Bethune. For instance, women from forty-three organizations, including the NCNW, attended a June 1941 meeting of the Washington Committee for the Negro Woman in National Defense and as a result, three thousand post cards, telegrams, and telephone calls were directed to the President to protest discrimination in the U.S. Armed Forces.⁶

Changes in the positions and style of the National Council of Negro Women [NCNW] illustrate the collapse of unity among African American leaders

³ Black Women in America: An Historical Encyclopedia, ed. Darlene Clark Hine (Brooklyn, New York: Carlson, 1993), s.v. "Mary McLeod Bethune, by Elaine Smith; Organizing Black America, ed. Nina Mjagkij (New York: Garland Publishing, 2001), s.v. "National Council of Negro Women," by Karen Anderson. Also see:

⁴ Wright, 63-64.

⁵ Wright, 61-71.

⁶ Marjorie H. Parker, Alpha Kappa Alpha Through the Years, 1908-1988 (Chicago, Illinois: Mobium Press, 1990), 238.

toward African colonialism in the face of Truman's and Stalin's Cold War. Even among those who remained committed to anti-colonialism, the level of interest about Africa and the tenor changed after Roosevelt's death in 1945, when the House Committee on Un-American Affairs [HUAC] began its hearings.

At the conclusion of the 1944 "New Perspectives" conference, under Alphaeus Hunton's direction, the participants resolved, "This conference of Negro and white Americans, with representatives of the people of Africa and the British West Indies also in attendance, calls upon the government of the United States to take the leadership in promoting...a guarantee that the fruits of victory shall be shared by all people."⁷ The body also called for changes in colonial Africa, reforms including an end to peonage; fair and equal wages, working conditions, and employment opportunities; and fair trade practices. Mrs. Bethune pointed out that Africa was "a great responsibility [that] rests on us as American Negroes."⁸ A large number of influential African Americans apparently agreed with Mrs. Bethune and implicitly, Mrs. Carter, who Mrs. Bethune's go-to and go-fer woman in 1944. The National Council of Negro Women, the Harlem Young Men's Christian Association, the African Students' Association, and the First Episcopal District of the African Methodist Episcopal Church had endorsed the invitation to the meeting.⁹ Attendees at the "New Perspectives" meeting included moderates such as Lawrence Reddick; Africans such as Francis (Kwame) Nkrumah; liberals such as George Marshall, chairman of the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties; Amy Ashwood Garvey, the Pan-Africanist; W.E.B. DuBois, for the NAACP; and Benjamin Davis, Jr., a leading black Communist Party member. Others were delegates from Liberia, the Belgian Congo, the British Caribbean, Nigeria, India, Puerto Rico, and the USSR. Many representatives of churches and local unions were present, as was a hefty press contingent.

Speeches by conference participants indicated an almost blind faith in the Allies. The participants had been buoyed by news of battles successes for the "united nations," Roosevelt's phrase for the Allies, and they firmly believed that an institution of United Nations would be established following an imminent Allied victory. Amy Ashwood Garvey pointed out that "the times have changed; conditions have changed largely in the world today, and people are thinking more humanely."¹⁰ If the United States led the Allies to form a United Nations

⁷ Hunton, Proceedings, 11.

⁸ Hunton, Proceedings, 30.

⁹ Hunton, Proceedings, 4; Hollis Lynch, Black American Radicals & the Liberation of Africa: the Council on African Affairs, 1937-1955 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Africana Studies & Research Ctr, Cornell University, 1978), 26-27.

¹⁰ Hunton, Proceedings, 9.

organization after the war, they trusted, such an institution would "abolish imperialism and its evil consequences around the world."¹¹ Mrs. Bethune, and certainly Eunice Carter, knew that the principal mover and shaker of the CAA, Mrs. Carter's brother, was a communist. Mrs. Bethune was chairman of the Board of the Council on African Affairs, also. Such united front activity was commonplace. For instance, in October 1941, Doxey Wilkerson, an open Communist Party member, organized a meeting in Washington, DC at an Elks Lodge "to Mobilize Negro Citizens in Defeat of Hitler and Hitlerism." Among the meeting's sponsors were Dorothy Height of the National Council of Negro Women; Alain Locke, mentor to Alphaeus Hunton and Mrs. Carter alike; Judge William Hastie; and Alphaeus Hunton.

Five months after the 1944 "New Perspectives" summit meeting, the Council on African Affairs circulated a petition to the President and State Department. One hundred and fifty prominent signatories called upon the twenty-six Allies – the "united nations" – to bring democracy and self-determination to Africa. Eunice Carter and Mary Bethune signed, as did Channing Tobias of the Phelps-Stokes Fund; Arthur Spingarn of the NAACP; William J. Schieffelin; W.E.B. DuBois; Alain Locke, scholar and Pan-Africanist; Max Yergan; Earl Dickerson, Chicago politician and Supreme Court lawyer; the Rev. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.; Earl Browder of the Communist Party; Theodore Dreisser, Carey McWilliams, Rockwell Kent, and Paul Robeson.¹²

From the time of the mass protests led by the Communist Party urging that the United States intervene to end the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, to the many protests against discrimination in war production industries, African-American leaders – from Republican Eunice Carter to her communist brother to Democrat Mary Bethune - were more united in their demands and more cooperative with each other on the issue of Africa than they had been since the Amenia meeting of 1915.

Before the war, Eunice's mother and Mary Bethune's good friend, Addie Hunton had served on a delegation to Acting Secretary of State William Phillips to protest the State Department's collusion with Firestone Corporation in order to exploit Liberia. On this delegation, headed by W.E.B. DuBois, were Mordecai Johnson, Charles Wesley, Dorothy Detzer, Rayford Logan, and Addie Dickerson, again reflecting the wide united front among African Americans on

¹¹ Hunton, Proceedings, 30.

¹² People's Voice, 23 December 1944; "Africa and Post-War Security Plans," 15 December 1944, Hunton Papers, reel 2.

the issue of Africa.¹³ In 1941, the National Council of Negro Women showed its concern about Africa and the united front with a luncheon in Harlem, New York, about "The World Today," with guests from Free France, England, India, China, Ethiopia, Haiti, West Africa, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and the "Jewish Congress."¹⁴

The State Department paid attention. The Department established a separate Division of African Affairs under Henry Villard. The Villard family long had been supporters of civil rights for people in color. In 1943, Henry Villard made a statement in which he tied the welfare of the African people to the national security of the United States.¹⁵ In March 1944, State invited the Council on African Affairs to confer with the Division about lend lease, Ethiopia, Liberia, and the pass system in South Africa. The Division assured the Council on African Affairs – still a united front organization involving Mrs. Bethune – "that the United Nations' war aims apply to the people of Africa" and that an international agency overseeing the "advancement of the African people might be established."¹⁶

Throughout World War II, the U.S. Department of State consulted with the Council on African Affairs, and the relationship was a friendly one. As late as December 1944, the State Department responded courteously to a letter from the Council on African Affairs asking Roosevelt and the new Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, to remember Africa while they planned for the United Nations organization.¹⁷ Toward the end of the war, however, the Department of State turned away from the CAA and paid particular attention to drawing the National Council of Negro Women (NCNW) into its perimeter. For instance, in late 1944, representatives of over one hundred organizations, including the NCNW (but not the CAA), met with Undersecretary of State Edward Stettinius and most of the U.S. delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks conference of wartime allies. As the Department of State and the NCNW grew closer, not only did the

¹³ Twenty-fourth Annual Report of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People for 1933: A Summary of Work and an Accounting (New York: NAACP, Jan. 1934), 39-40.

¹⁴ African American Woman's Journal, Summer-Fall 1941.

¹⁵ W.E.B. DuBois, "A Chronicle of Race Relations," Phylon (1st Q 1944), 71.

¹⁶ Hunton, Proceedings; Council on African Affairs, Here Are the Facts -- You Be the Judge, New York: Council on African Affairs, 1953; UNESCO International Scientific Committee for the Drafting of a General History of Africa, General History of Africa, ed. Ali A. Mazrui (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993) s.v. "Africa & its Diaspora since 1935," by Joseph E. Harris with Slimane Zeghidour; "The Council in Action," flyer, 19 February 1947, Hunton Papers, reel 1.

¹⁷ Hollis Lynch, 27-28, 54; Council on African Affairs, Here Are the Facts; Black Women in America: An Historical Encyclopedia, ed. Darlene Clark Hine (Brooklyn, New York: Carlson, 1993), s.v. "Mary McLeod Bethune, by Elaine Smith.

NCNW make very constructive long-term gains for African American women in government service, but also, the NCNW became more conservative in general.

The National Council of Negro Women published Aframerican Woman's Journal, a magazine firmly under Mrs. Bethune's guidance, which carried articles urging African-American women to take up social tasks to benefit women internationally. The Aframerican Woman's Journal carried articles about discrimination against women of color in Cuba and Haiti, both of which were under the United States' hand. The magazine also provided a forum for Mrs. Carter and Mrs. Bethune to educate members how best to use law to reform society.¹⁸

The Rockefeller Republicans, the Republican faction to which Eunice Carter was loyal, began their courtship of African-American and white female liberals as early as April 1941, when Mrs. & Mrs. Nelson Rockefeller hinted to Bethune's circle at a quid pro quo around women's equality in exchange for their support of U.S. business interests in Central and South America.¹⁹ Rockefeller support and Eunice Carter's prominence in the NCNW were important to Mrs. Bethune, the principal black champion of the New Deal. Mrs. Carter already had been New York Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia's go-between Republicans and Democrats, obtaining "unity pledges" for him from African Americans in either party.²⁰

In May 1942, Muna Lee of the State Department spoke before the National Council of Negro Women's executive committee about what amounted to the Rockefeller Policy for Latin America. Her speech and an additional essay by Lee were published in the Aframerican Woman's Journal. Lee called upon the NCNW's leading body to unite with all of the people of the Americas, because all were tied together in common bond of "our Americanism, which is another word for democracy, which is another word for freedom."²¹ Rockefeller was interested in Latin America, and so, then was Mrs. Carter. In 1944, the National Council of Negro Women's annual meeting had the theme of international relations. However, the only guests from Africa were from Liberia; other guests were from the Pan-American Union, Guatemala, Mexico, Costa Rica, and others

¹⁸ See Aframerican Woman's Journal, Summer-Fall 1940 and January 1941.

¹⁹ Minutes, "Council of National Defense, Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics, Summary of Proceedings of Conference of Women's Organizations Interested in Inter-American Relations," 1 April 1941, Papers of the National Association of Colored Women, microfilm edition, reel 10.

²⁰ Linda Gordon, "Black and white visions of welfare: women's welfare activism, 1890-1945," Journal of American History (Sept 1991), 573.

²¹ Aframerican Woman's Journal, #1-2, 1942.

among the Allies. One of the three main speakers at the conference was Mrs. J. Borden Harriman.²²

In late 1943 and early 1944, the State Department invited the Non-Partisan Council, in which Mrs. Bethune was deeply engaged, to help determine foreign policy. The Non-Partisan Council suggested that the State Department establish an international exchange program that would include only integrated schools; and also, that State create "consciousness of world citizenship and individual responsibility for making a contribution to the new world order." The Non-Partisan Council was to claim credit for the State Department's "assignment of specialists" to Latin America and Scandinavia. Later in 1947, the State Department asked the Non-Partisan Council to recommend African Americans who would be good staff people in State's Office of International and Cultural Affairs. That year also, the State Department and the Non-Partisan Council (still dominated by Mrs. Bethune and the NCNW, as well as by the Alpha Kappa Alpha sorority) co-sponsored a program on Integration on International and Intercultural Affairs²³

Congress revived its red-hunting Dies Committee as the standing House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1945, with authority to investigate any person or organization that its members deemed subversive. The new CIA and the State Department perforce cooperated with Congress. Very quickly, the anticipated United Nations seemed to be the best hope for economic equity, fair trade, and protection from the West for sub-Saharan Africans to concerned African American leaders.

In April 1945, the National Council of Negro Women participated in regional meetings about the Dumbarton Oaks proposals for the United Nations. They steadily requested that the State Department integrate, but also, participated wholeheartedly in World Security Month (April) and a State Department representative participated in the event.²⁴

Never did the United States government need a united front around Africa more than during the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1946, a gold miners' strike could have allowed the United States to intervene quietly in South Africa, when the British Dominion government was succumbing to the Nationalist Party. The Council on African Affairs was the only United States organization to have close ties with the African National Congress, the principal opponents to apartheid in South Africa. In 1946, the Council on African Affairs almost single-handedly prevented South Africa's attempt to win United Nations approval for

²² African American Woman's Journal, Fall 1944.

²³ Parker, Alpha Kappa Alpha, 239-241.

²⁴ Robert L. Harris, Jr., "Racial Equality and the United Nations Charter," Race and U.S. Foreign Policy During the Cold War, ed. Michael Krenn (NY: Garland Publishing, 1998), 16.

its annexation of Southwest Africa.²⁵

In Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, an old acquaintance of Paul Robeson, was arrested in 1953 and kept in jail for several years by the British colonial government there. Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, was jailed because of his purported role in the Mau Mau rebellion. Jomo Kenyatta was not a Mau Mau, and had been falsely jailed because of his association with left-leaning Pan-Africanists.²⁶ An earlier release for Kenyatta might have clarified the divisions among the peoples of Kenya, but the U.S. government and the National Council of Colored Women were uninterested.

In Sudan – controlled by the French out of Djibouti during the Truman era – the American left stayed in close touch with Diallo Abdoulaye, leader of the Sudanese trades unions, where Sudanese of different regions and ethnicities rubbed shoulders and cooperated, albeit through gritted teeth. The potential for unity was present in Sudan; but in 1946 the State Department and more importantly, the U.S. Congress and Truman administration were suspicious of trade unionism and still more, of anti-colonial leaders of Sudanese trade unions.²⁷

Meanwhile, the National Council of Negro Women was struggling under Truman to maintain its prominence in the Democratic Party. The NCNW's militancy within racially broader women's groups faded. The U.S. delegation to the 1945 International Congress of Women – which included over five hundred female delegates from countries around the world – arrived late to the Paris meeting, and NCNW delegates were nonplussed to realize that no women were present from the West Indies, the Philippines, Central America, French Equatorial Africa, Liberia, Ethiopia, or the Belgian Congo. Members of the National Council of Negro Women, who once had stared down Deep South Southerners, simply said that they would get in touch with representatives from the excluded countries after the meeting.²⁸

In March of 1946, writers in the NCNW's Aframerican Woman's Journal were optimistic about the Cold War and expressed little doubt that women of the world could unite for good whatever their political views, for they maintained that the Cold War was just about economics. Marjorie McKenzie Lawson wrote

²⁵ Lynch, 35; Federal Bureau of Investigation, FOIPA No. 408377/190-1258937, 6 August 1998, 257.

²⁶ Lynch, 45.

²⁷ Lynch, 25; Council on African Affairs, Here Are The Facts; "Spotlight on Africa Action Appeal," Council on African Affairs, ca. 1952-53, Hunton Papers, reel 2; New Africa, September 1946, Hunton Papers, Reel 2; New Africa, October 1946, Hunton Papers, Reel 2; Alphaeus Hunton to Jessica Smith, 16 August 1967, Hunton Papers, reel 1; Dorothy K. Hunton, Alphaeus Hunton: the Unsung Valiant (New York: self, 1986), 89.

²⁸ Aframerican Woman's Journal, March 1946.

an article about African-American women's responsibility to women of color in the world.²⁹ Lawson's article recommended "government controls upon private interests when they attempt to stand in the way of public interest." Her principal point was to direct the attention of the NCNW away from internationalism, because the ordinary American woman would not be interested in Jamaica or Haiti, for example, if they would not work against the poll tax or vote in the United States.³⁰

That summer, 1943, Margaret McDonald of the State Department, who was based in Liberia, wrote an article for Aframerican Woman's Journal that praised the work of the Office of International and Cultural Relations was doing in South Africa and elsewhere on the continent.³¹ In that issue also, Pauline Redmon Coggs wrote, "Negro women must mend out community fences," for local political engagement was the "source of the 'good life.'"³²

Between 1945 and 1957, HUAC held about 230 public hearings, at which three thousand people testified around the country. When called to testify before the Committee, a witness had an alternative. She could invoke the Fifth Amendment, which would destroy her life or else, be cited for contempt; or the witness could name names. Only 135 witnesses were cited for contempt, but Eunice Carter's brother Alphaeus was one of them, and he would serve time in a federal penitentiary during the 1950s for refusing to name names.³³ In 1941, the National Council of Negro Women had supported a federal bill proposed by Congressman Marcantonio, a Communist Party member; had taken a public stand against the Couvert Committee's investigation of public colleges teachers for communist sympathies; and had pledged support for "progressive labor."³⁴ Mary Bethune had faced down the Ku Klux Klan and red-hunters, but she could not grapple calmly with the post-war whispers that she was a traitor.

She wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt, one of her "best friends," for assistance when a Congressman threatened to summon her to a HUAC hearing. Mrs. Roosevelt was cool, stating only that she had problems of her own, and Mrs. Bethune should ask someone else for help.³⁵ Mary McLeod Bethune stood to lose everything she had achieved for African American women and her own

²⁹ Aframerican Woman's Journal, March 1946.

³⁰ Aframerican Woman, March 1946.

³¹ Aframerican Woman's Journal, Summer 1946.

³² Aframerican Woman's Journal, Summer 1943.

³³ David Group, The Legal Repression of the Communist Party, 1946-1961: A Study in the Legitimization of Coercion (Ph.D., University of Massachusetts, 1979), 193, 203.

³⁴ Aframerican Woman's Journal, Summer-Fall 1941.

³⁵ Mary Bethune to Eleanor Roosevelt, 2-5-43, Eleanor Roosevelt to Mary Bethune, 2-13-43, The Papers of Mary McLeod Bethune, Part 2, The Bethune Foundation Collection, microfilm ed., reel 9 [Hereafter, Bethune Papers].

liberty. Eunice Carter was walking a thin line between betraying her brother or alienating Thomas Dewey and the Roosevelt Republicans.

In late 1946, President Truman replaced Secretary of State Edward Stettinius with Jimmy Byrnes, a segregationist from the Deep South. Truman Democrats had plummeted in the mid-term elections, and the Republican Party and Deep South Democrats dominated the U.S. Congress. Republicans had won on the issue of subversion, and the Truman Administration determined to fight on the same ground.³⁶ The Truman Administration realized that the race for the Presidency in 1948 would be a close contest. Mary McLeod Bethune could rally the African-American vote for the Democratic Party. Payment was due in advance. President Truman issued an executive order creating the President's Committee on Civil Rights in 1946 as in exchange for African-American political support. In 1946, Dean Acheson, the acting Secretary of State, wrote a letter to the chairman of the Federal Employment Practices Commission about the adverse effect that race discrimination in the United States had upon foreign policy.³⁷

George Kennan of the State Department would echo Acheson. In 1947, Dean Rusk warned that the United Nations Commission on Human Rights sub-commission on the prevention of discrimination against minorities was about to raise awkward questions for the United States. Rusk carefully did not blame segregationists for this problem, but rather, he blamed this upon the USSR, which he said had insisted on the establishment of the subcommittee within the United Nations.³⁸ Nevertheless, the State Department's message about segregation and the Cold War was clear. Truman demanded payment of African Americans, also: "an abandonment of militant action, especially in the arena of foreign policy," as Gerald Horne points out.³⁹ In 1949, President Harry Truman spoke at the annual meeting of the National Council of Negro Women. He carefully distinguished the United States from the "old colonialism." The intent of U.S. capital investment in other nations was to employ the hungry; still, he promised, when U.S. corporations invested in other countries, the countries first would be democratic nations.⁴⁰

³⁶ Florence Murray, ed., The Negro Handbook 1949 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1949), 222-223; Group, 68, 100.

³⁷ Mary Louise Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: The Relationship Between Civil Rights and Foreign Affairs in the Truman Administration (Ph.D., Yale University, 1992), 149.

³⁸ Dudziak, 85.

³⁹ Gerald Horne, Black and Red: W.E.B. DuBois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War, 1944-1963 (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986), 92.

⁴⁰ Women United, October 1949; New York Times, 16 November 1949. The date conflict (a report of Truman's speech a month early) may be understood by knowing that the NCNW was rather careless with dates for their periodicals.

The November 1946 annual conference of the National Council of Negro Women was glum. Channing Tobias and Estelle Massey Riddle, vice-president of the NCNW, spoke to the international situation by noting simply that if people of color in the world were not treated better, war might again break out. They urged support for the United Nations, which would fight for equality for all, internationally. The NCNW members were more concerned about recent outbreaks of racially motivated violence by fascists, the Ku Klux Klan, and the Talmadge dynasty's camp in Georgia.⁴¹ Accordingly, the last issue of African American Woman's Journal for 1946 reflected a concern for the disfranchised of the United States. Immediately after the NCNW convention, Eunice Carter, Edith Sampson, Dorothy Ferebee, Mary Church Terrell, and four other women of the NCNW called upon U.S. Representative Joseph Martin of Massachusetts and handed him a four-point program "for the immediate attention of the majority party." The National Council of Negro Women's demands of the Republicans were enactment of a federal law guaranteeing equal employment opportunities, a voting rights act, a federal law for equal education, and a federal law against lynching.⁴²

Eunice Carter spoke to the NCNW's customary internationalism in that issue. She wrote, "The United Nations at New York," in which she described the new organization's meetings at Hunter College in the Bronx.⁴³ In the article, she described Russia's interventions in Iran as a source of conflict in the Security Council of the new United Nations – which then was meeting at Hunter College in the Bronx – and she de-romanticized the United Nations for her readers. In the Bronx, she wrote, "There are no fabulously costumed men and women, there are no gaping crowds," but rather, "The eleven members of the Security Council with their advisors and secretariats" who were "working grimly day and night."⁴⁴ The subtext was that Third World delegates were sensational, but they had nothing to do with the real work of the United Nations and implicitly, that of the National Council of Negro Women.

The institution of a United Nations forum in which such issues could be resolved and world wars prevented was important to Mrs. Carter and Mrs. Bethune. Both women were determined to be part of the post-war resolution of democracy and civil rights for African Americans and for women generally. They and their colleagues had been disappointed earlier. Ralph Bunche was the only African American in the U.S. State Department's delegation at the

⁴¹ African American Woman's Journal, Summer 1946; Kathleen E. Gordon, "Edith S. Sampson," American Women's Legal History, 13 May 1997, www.stanford.edu/group/WLHP/papers/edith.html.

⁴² African American Woman's Journal, Summer 1946.

⁴³ African American Woman's Journal, Fall 1946.

⁴⁴ African American Woman's Journal, Summer 1946.

founding meeting of the UN in San Francisco in 1945. The only official observers who were African American at the San Francisco meeting were Mordecai Johnson, Walter White, W.E.B. DuBois, and Mary McLeod Bethune, who slipped in at the NAACP's insistence. Eunice Carter and Edith Sampson attended at least part of the two-month-long meeting, as advisors and assistants to Mrs. Bethune.⁴⁵

Another disappointment had occurred when the United States voted with England on the colonial question. This vote established that the United Nations would not be a vehicle to abolish colonialism and promote democracy in the world. About fifty African-American spokespeople, including representatives of the NCNW, attended a protest meeting three days before fifty nations signed the United Nations charter. All expressed anger at the shallowness of the commitment of the United Nations to de-colonizing Africa.⁴⁶

Otherwise, Mrs. Carter could be satisfied with the first days of the United Nations, for Mary Bethune, with her help, had established that African-American women had reason and right to be involved with the United Nations.⁴⁷ They believed that the more African American women who were nationally-recognized political figures, the better the status would be for the mass of black women. And Mrs. Carter and Mrs. Bethune believed that "improving the status of women was essential to advancing the community as a whole."⁴⁸

Truman launched his Cold War, and the National Security Council began. At the same time, the President's Committee on Civil Rights published its report and for the first time in U.S. history, the executive branch called for desegregation of the Armed Forces; an end to the poll tax and to lynching; voting rights laws; a civil rights division in the Justice Department; and a permanent Federal Employment Practices Division.

At the United Nations in 1947, however, the United States lost an important vote. The General Assembly bloc-voted with the USSR and censured South Africa. The noted Pan-Africanist from the Gold Coast, J.B. Danquah, wrote to

⁴⁵ Lynch, 29.

⁴⁶ Carol Anderson, "Symposium: African Americans and U.S. Foreign Relations," The African American Voice in U.S. Foreign Policy since World War II, ed Michael Krenn (New York: Garland Publishing, 1998), 185-187, 191-193; Brenda Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 201-202; Robert L. Harris, Jr., 20-21.

⁴⁷ Eunice Carter, "Following the U.N.," Women United Souvenir Yearbook (Washington, DC: National Council of Negro Women, 1951), 1-2; Chairman of the United States Delegation, the Secretary of State, Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference, Washington, DC: Department of State, 1945; Black Women in America, s.v. "Mary McLeod Bethune, by Elaine Smith.

⁴⁸ Linda Gordon, 587.

the Council of African Affairs to congratulate them for "the whacking you gave to General Smuts and for the proper end to the South African ambitions at the United Nations Assembly."⁴⁹

Still, the majority of African-American leaders had stopped speaking publicly about foreign policy by late 1947. Were one vocal about Africa, for instance, one might end up on Attorney General Tom Clark's list of subversives, like the Council on African Affairs, and lose one's influence and funding. HUAC members had not hesitated to declare that the NAACP and the American Civil Liberties Union were subversive.⁵⁰ The end result was, as DuBois wrote for the National Guardian in 1955, "One of the curious results of the current fear and hysteria is the breaking of ties between Africa and American Negroes."⁵¹ Mrs. Bethune cut off her connections to the left, including those to her friends Doxie Wilkerson and Paul Robeson and ended all critical comments on the West in Africa, although she did continue to speak of her African roots.⁵² Mrs. Carter and her brother had a furious fight and ceased to speak to each other for years.⁵³

When Franklin Roosevelt died, the Democratic Party had slumped into crisis and it remained so until 1948. Henry Wallace, Harry Truman, and Thomas Dewey had contended for the support of African Americans after Roosevelt died. Truman realized in 1946 that he must "out-red" Thomas Dewey, to paraphrase George Wallace's notorious comment. Black leaders to the left were unwelcome in the new Democratic coalition, but African American leaders like Mrs. Bethune were invaluable in an election that would be so hotly contested and, as it turned out, close.

Mary Bethune had established a National Non-Partisan Committee for the Re-election of Roosevelt. On this committee, she had worked closely with Doxie Wilkerson; Edith Sampson of the National Council of Negro Women; the venerable Bishop R. R. Wright; conservative journalist Roscoe Dunjee; Hugh Mulzac, a U.S. Navy officer; and radical publisher Charlotta Bass to line up

⁴⁹ "Appendix C: Extracts f/ letters to the educational director, 1947," ca. 1949, Hunton Papers; Dorothy Hunton, 63.

⁵⁰ James L. Roark, "American Black Leaders: The Response to Colonialism & the Cold War," African Historical Studies (#2, 1971): 262; Martin Duberman, Paul Robeson (New York: Knopf, 1988), 330; W.E.B. DuBois, The World and Africa (New York: Viking, 1947, repr. Millwood, NY: Kraus-Thomason Organization, Ltd., 1975), 265-266; Florence Murray, The Negro Handbook 1949 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1949), 221.

⁵¹ W.E.B. DuBois, The World and Africa, 265-266.

⁵² Mary Bethune to Max Yergan & Paul Robeson, n.d., in Alain Locke Papers, Box 164-38, Folder 25, Moorland-Spingarn Research Ctr, Howard University, Washington, D.C. (hereafter, Locke Papers); Doxie Wilkerson to Mary Bethune, 12 March 1947, Bethune Papers, reel 12; Thomas Buchanan to Mary Bethune, 27 December 1948, Mary Bethune to Thomas Buchanan, 3 January 1948, Bethune Papers, reel 2.

⁵³ Interview, Chris Lutz of Lisle Carter, Jr., 16 June 1999, Flint Hill, Virginia.

forces, and she re-organized her forces to vote for Truman.⁵⁴ Eunice Carter – a ferocious opponent of Roosevelt – had positioned herself as far away from Bethune as possible, for New York Governor Thomas Dewey was considering appointing Mrs. Carter to his Ives-Quinn Anti-Discrimination Commission.⁵⁵

The Republicans, Thomas Dewey and at his side, Eunice Carter, could point to the danger of the U.S.S.R. in an era of atomic weapons. Even the Rockefeller Republicans, no friends of Truman, implied that the Democratic Party, as reconstituted by Roosevelt, had encouraged communist infiltration of the U.S. government and in general, had been tainted by united front strategy during the war, which only had encouraged communists to try to take over the world. In fact, the USSR did overthrow the Hungarian government in 1947. In 1948, the USSR did establish a communist government through a coup in Czechoslovakia and apparently bore responsibility for Jan Msaryk's murder.

In 1948, Truman narrowly won the Presidential election against Thomas Dewey, and Republicans and Cold War liberals took over Congress. With his mandate, such as it was, the President felt confident enough to desegregate the Armed Forces. The mutuality between the Truman Administration and Mesdames Bethune and Carter might have palled in light of circumstances in South Africa and Liberia, but the President in 1948 again called for an end to the poll tax and segregations in interstate transportation, and he publicly requested Congress to pass a federal anti-lynching law. Truman also demanded integration of employment in the federal government and more federal attention to civil rights law and violations. However, in 1948, the Nationalist Party swept elections in South Africa and by 1949, legally had established apartheid, and in that case, the Russians were not involved, but the United States intended to be. The difficulty was Malan and the Nationalist Party, in winning the South African national elections in 1948, represented the first time since 1932 that fascists had won state power at the polls.⁵⁶

South Africa was the sticking point. The United States wanted friendly relations with the Malan government because South Africa had gold and industrial diamonds. Since Henry Ford's heyday, major U.S. corporations had been intensely interested in South Africa's resources, including its cheap labor, and in its potential for investment. Moreover the country offered strategic bases

⁵⁴ Doxey Wilkerson to Mary Bethune, 21 December 1944, Mary Bethune to Doxey Wilkerson, 29 December 1944, Bethune Papers, part 2, reel 12; Kathleen E. Gordon, "Edith S. Sampson," American Women's Legal History, 13 May 1997, www.stanford.edu/group/WLHP/papers/edith.html.

⁵⁵ New York Times, 7 March 1945.

⁵⁶ "Keep Your Eyes on South Africa," essay, 7 July 1948, Locke Papers, Box 164-38, Folder 25.

in a safely anti-communist nation.⁵⁷ The State Department knew that South Africa was volatile, but the United States' corporate interests in South Africa were political and economic, not sentimental.

Meanwhile, Liberia presented a particular problem for the State Department. Harvey Firestone had not been alone in seeing Liberia as a personal empire. Others companies and individuals deeply interested in exploiting Liberia included the Rockefellers; Lever Brothers; Sam Height of Mississippi, the U.S. Consul in South Africa; the Anglo-American Corporation, in a slightly westward move; American Transvaal; American Metal Company; DeBeers; the Villard interests; Edward Stettinius, who established Liberia Company for rogue companies to sail under Liberia's flag; and Jimmy Byrnes, with Newmont Mining Corporation. In early 1952, Mrs. Bethune would represent the United States at the presidential inauguration of William V.S. Tubman in Liberia. In his second inaugural speech, Tubman insisted upon a compulsory draft because, he said, "preparedness must become a reality within our borders in the shortest possible time."⁵⁸

As Mary Bethune turned her attention away from colonialism and its effect, she and Mrs. Carter became suspicious of each other. In February 1948, Mrs. Carter brought a message from the State Department to Mrs. Bethune. Chester Williams of the State Department brought her news of "a matter of most importance to us as Negroes." Mrs. Carter delivered the message in person, for she was afraid to commit it to writing.⁵⁹ Undoubtedly, Mrs. Carter told Mrs. Bethune that the National Council of Negro Women would be among those chosen to defend the USA on the matter of civil rights people of color around the world, through the Town Meeting Tour of the Air, sponsored by the State Department and the American Broadcasting Company. Probably it was at that moment of sharing the invitation that Mrs. Carter understood that she would be Bethune's choice as the NCNW's representative on the tour. Mary Bethune was unable to attend the 1948 annual meeting of the National Council of Negro Women. Edith Sampson, sometimes a chum and sometimes a rival of Eunice Carter, gossiped to Mrs. Bethune about Mrs. Carter's comment that the old people who could not be present could have learned much from the more efficient youth at the meeting. Mrs. Bethune had an asthma attack and blamed Mrs. Carter who, apart from political party choice, had been her loyal dogsbody

⁵⁷ Thomas Noer, "Truman, Eisenhower, and South Africa: The 'Middle Road' and Apartheid," Journal of Ethnic Studies (1983, #1), 154; New York Times, 29 November 1936.

⁵⁸ New York Times, 9 January 1952.

⁵⁹ Eunice Carter to Mary Bethune, 26 June 1949, Bethune Papers, reel 2.

for over a decade.⁶⁰ Mrs. Bethune chose Edith Sampson to accompany Max Yergan, Ralph Bunche, Channing Tobias and Walter White on the Town Meeting of the Air tour. They traveled through Asia and Oceania, defending the United States as a democracy and insisting that African Americans lived well in the United States. When Edith Sampson was chosen instead of she, Mrs. Carter called Mrs. Bethune a liar, and the older woman hit the roof.⁶¹ Other National Council of Negro Women members visited Haiti, British Guyana, Trinidad, France, Guatemala, Holland, Germany (which was Mrs. Carter's particular purview), Italy, Russia and Cuba for the Town Meeting. Mrs. Bethune had visited Haiti, and so she contributed an article to the new periodical, "Haiti Was Wonderful!"⁶² As a result of the Town Meetings on the Air, Mrs. Bethune wrote, the NCNW was then "able to open up opportunities for well-trained professional women in key government and industrial posts."⁶³

Mrs. Bethune had begun to slip. The periodical of the National Council of Negro Women drifted from its original tough-mindedness into a Cold War model of a commercial woman's magazine. The revamped periodical, Women United, was strikingly different from the original Aframerican Journal, in that it promoted fashions, home economics, and child rearing.⁶⁴ At Mary Bethune's last annual National Council of Negro Women meeting, the organization did condemn the South African Union and urged UN Trusteeship for Southwest Africa. At this meeting, the NCNW also staged a United Nations night featuring folk dance and "native music," for Mary Bethune had translated her concern for sub-Saharan Africa into cultural admiration.⁶⁵

Mrs. Bethune had not forgiven Mrs. Carter. She appointed Dorothy Ferebee to replace her as leader of the National Council of Negro Women. Mrs. Carter, who had been chair of the Board of Directors of the NCNW, was elected only to a member-at-large position.⁶⁶

Early in 1950, Mrs. Ferebee appointed Eunice Carter to represent the National Council of Negro Women before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Genocide Convention. The United Nations had voted unanimously in favor of the Genocide Convention in 1948,

⁶⁰ Eunice Carter to Mary Bethune, 20 April 1948, Eunice Carter to Edith Sampson, 20 April 1948, Bethune Papers, reel 2.

⁶¹ Eunice Carter to Mary Bethune, ca. April 1949, Mary Bethune to Eunice Carter, 14 April 1949, Bethune Papers, Part 2, reel 2.

⁶² Women United, October 1949.

⁶³ Aframerican Woman's Journal, Winter-Spring, 1947-1948.

⁶⁴ Women United, April 1949.

⁶⁵ Aframerican Woman's Journal, Winter-Spring 1948-1949.

⁶⁶ Aframerican Woman's Journal, Winter-Spring 1948-1949; Women United, October 1949; New York Times, 14 December 1943.

and representatives of forty-three governments, including the United States, had signed the Convention. The Convention represented a step forward in pursuing perpetrators of any more Holocausts, for its defined genocide as an international crime, more than simply an act of war. The convention would allow for the international legal prosecution of "denial of the right of existence of entire human groups" by "private individuals, public officials, or statesmen... whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, political, or any other grounds." However, twenty governments needed to ratify the Convention before it passed into international law. In January and February 1950, the U.S. Senate held public hearings to help them decide whether or not to ratify.⁶⁷

Public officials from the South such as Leander Perez, a district attorney, testified against ratification. Perez claimed that the Convention "would internationalize matters which are solely within our domestic jurisdiction," and it would allow federal courts to hear cases that claimed genocide in the U.S. South, and thereby, violate states rights. He added that "the overhanging threat" of the Convention was "that citizens of our states someday will have to face an international tribunal." The Convention, Perez insisted before the Senate, was a United Nations' "conspiracy to destroy our American institutions." The American Bar Association also opposed ratification, but two brave New York lawyers stood up to the powerful ABA: Dana Converse Backus and Eunice Carter.⁶⁸

Eunice Carter demonstrated that she had not forgotten about the world when she testified for the NCNW before the Senate on 24 January 1950:

Firstly, we come here because we are women who are working with women throughout America and the entire world to bring about peace and security everywhere. Women and children, weak and defenseless, are usually the first victims of genocide. They are the keepers of the future of any race of people. With all of them, wherever they are found, we stand united to work for their ultimate security in the homelands of their birth or their choice.

Secondly, we are members of a minority. The victims of genocide are minorities. There is no safety for any minority anywhere so long as their extinction goes unchecked and unpunished. The United States of America has an opportunity to give the minorities of the world new hope and new courage by

⁶⁷ U.S. Senate, The Genocide Convention: hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee of Foreign Relations. U.S. Senate, 81st Congress, 2nd Session on Executive O. the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, January 23, 24, 25 and February 9, 1950 (Washington, DC: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 23-24, 48.

⁶⁸ The Genocide Convention, 77-79, 221, 229-30.

ratifying this convention.

Our third interest is that we are Americans. We have pride in our great Nation and in its leadership in world affairs. We voted for this convention. More, we were prominent in its promulgation, but we have not ratified it. ...The United States takes leadership in military and economic affairs, but it cannot maintain the respect and trust of nations or of peoples unless it takes leadership in moral courage.⁶⁹

Mrs. Carter and the National Council of Negro Women were concerned that Southern Senators would not vote to ratify the UN's genocide convention if those Senators and their supporters would be subject to charges of genocide because of longtime racial violence in the U.S. South. To win Senatorial support for the proposed genocide treaty, Mrs. Carter provided an escape hatch for the U.S. South. She added to her statement, "Let me say that the National Council of Negro Women is under no impression as to the meaning of genocide or as to the implications of the Genocide Convention which is now before the Senate for ratification. The situation of the Negro people in this country is in no way involved. The lynching of an individual or of several individuals has no relation to the extinction of masses of peoples because of race, religion, or political belief."⁷⁰ The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Genocide Convention late in 1948. The U.S. Senate did not ratify the convention until 1988.

Shortly before her death, Mary McLeod Bethune sent Jeanetta Welch Brown to a meeting with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, to request integration of the U.S. Department of State. The African Americans who attended the meeting with Jeanetta Brown noted that State hired fewer African Americans, except in custodial and clerical positions, than any other federal department. The group asked Acheson to assist the applications of promising African Americans to universities that prepared youth for Foreign Service jobs.⁷¹ The elderly woman soon felt the hot breath of anti-communism on her shoulders. The Englewood, New Jersey, Anti-Communist League accused Mary Bethune of being a subversive in 1952, and the local school board excluded her from a meeting at Englewood Junior High School. At a quickly substituted site, a church, Mrs. Bethune was supported by Walter White of the NAACP who said at the talk, with no measure of irony, "Great resentment is stirring all the colored people of the world because of the myth of the generosity of the white man and

⁶⁹ The Genocide Convention, 131-132.

⁷⁰ The Genocide Convention, 48, 131-132, 275-80, 479, 545.

⁷¹ New York Times, 14 April 1951.

because they control the greatest supply of raw materials.”⁷²

The far right took advantage of Mrs. Bethune's age and fears. In 1954, Mrs. Bethune signed a petition circulated by a right wing group for a Christian Palestine.⁷³ Shortly after her death, a right wing religious group, Moral Re-Armament, produced a feature film about Mrs. Bethune's life. Moral Armament members believe that shallow, greedy Americans (which is to say, trade unionists) and imperialists of Britain had caused communism.⁷⁴ After a lifetime of fantastic achievement and selflessness for African Americans and for all women, she was repaid with a tawdry biograph. Mary McLeod Bethune died in 1955, and Mrs. Carter did not attend her funeral.

Eunice Carter went on to a golden career as an advocate for women's rights with the United Nations and working for the U.S. military in Germany. Alphaeus Hunton spent his final years in Africa and traveling. Alphaeus Hunton and Eunice Carter died of cancer in January 1970. During the last year of his life, Hunton was traveling in the People's Republic of China. By chance, he encountered Talitha Gerlack, a family friend. Ms. Gerlack gave him a secondhand message from Mrs. Carter. "Sometimes," Eunice had said, "I think he took the right path."⁷⁵

⁷² New York Times, 25 April 1952.

⁷³ New York Times, 14 December 1954.

⁷⁴ New York Times, 27 September 1954, 24 October 1960.

⁷⁵ Dorothy Hunton, 144-45.

Reexamining the Legacy of Lt. General James Longstreet, CSA

Jimi Thomas
Virginia Beach Schools

In the years after the American Civil War the reputation of Lt. General James Longstreet, one of the foremost military commanders of the Confederacy underwent a negative transformation in the popular public opinion of the South. The South at large came to blame General Longstreet not only for the loss at the Battle of Gettysburg; but, also held him responsible for the defeat of the South's struggle to become an independent nation. After the War, the South turned her back on Longstreet, to the point of refusing to recognize the significant military contributions he had made to the confederate cause. Later historical researchers are coming to believe the harsh judgment placed on his shoulders resulted from his actions following the war. His actions included advocating the South reconcile with the North; he criticized Robert E. Lee in print; he joined the Republican Party; accepted government jobs, and finally, he converted to the Catholic Church. It is the purpose of this paper to reexamine the systematic process by which James Longstreet became the scapegoat for the defeat of the battle of Gettysburg and strapped with the failure of the Confederate states to become an independent country.

James Longstreet played a crucial role in the Civil War. He was Robert E. Lee's hand picked senior Lt. General, commanding the 1st Corp of the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee held genuine affection and absolute trust in Longstreet whom he claimed to be "The staff in my right hand"¹ after the Peninsula Campaign, and "My Old War Horse"² after the battle of Sharpsburg. Jeffery Werts, a Longstreet biographer, claims that he was the best Corp commander in the Civil War on either side of the conflict. His ability to maneuver a corps of men in a tactical situation exceeded that of any corps commander in the war.³ As a professional soldier, army commanders Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard, Joseph Johnston, Robert E. Lee and John Bell Hood sought Longstreet as their second-in-command. Longstreet, not Stonewall Jackson, was

¹ Goree, Thomas Jewett. Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Major Thomas J. Goree. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1995, 98.

² Sorrell, G. Moxley. At The Right Hand of Longstreet: Recollections of a Confederate Staff Soldier. Nebraska: Bison Books Publishing, 1999. 116

³ Werts, Jeffery. General James Longstreet: the Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier. New York: Touchtone Publishing, 1993. 405.

Lee's most talented and most trusted subordinate.⁴ At the close of the war, James Longstreet, who was always referred to as "Old Pete," was a highly respected and accomplished general.

Longstreet's military reputation did not come under criticism until two years following the death of Robert E. Lee. With Lee unable to dispute the controversial allegations, the public accepted them as true. The controversy revolved around a supposed-order by Robert E. Lee for Longstreet to attack the federals' left flank of George Meade's army at sunrise on July 2, 1863 in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. His failure to do so cost the Confederacy their victory and; therefore, the chance to become a new nation.⁵ The allegations were brought by Jubal Early and William Pendleton; and, because of the nature of these inflammatory allegations, people in the South not only believed the charges but maintained their truth. The following is an attempt to untangle the web of charges which led to the lowering of his status in the South and even brought into question his loyalty to the Confederacy. It would be of benefit to note his background before and after the war.

Although born in Edgefield County, South Carolina, James Longstreet was reared several miles outside of Gainesville, Georgia. At the age of nine, he was sent to live with his uncle, Augustus Longstreet, in Augusta, Georgia. He lived and studied in Augusta until his entrance in West Point in 1837. His appointment was secured from Morgan County, Alabama where his mother resided.

He graduated from West Point in 1842. From graduation until the Mexican War, Longstreet engaged in infantry service from Jefferson Barrack in Missouri to Corpus Christi, Texas. During the Mexican War, he along with other Civil War Generals gained valuable combat experience in tactics and strategies under actual fighting conditions. During the War, he was seriously wounded carrying the 8th infantry's flag over the wall at Chapultepec and received two brevets for gallant and meritorious conduct at Churubusco and Molino De Rey.⁶ His military service following the war ranged from service at Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania to outpost duty in San Antonio, Texas; Chief of Commissary for the Dept of Texas, outpost duty at Fort Bliss, Texas; Paymaster General in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and finally a tour to the

⁴ Piston, William Garrett. Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant: James Longstreet and His Place in Southern History. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1987. 103, 22

⁵ Connelly, Thomas L. The Marble Man: Robert E. Lee and His Image in American Society. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977. 64, 83-89.

⁶ Robbins, James S. Last in Their Class: Custer, Pickett and the Goats of West Point. New York: Encounter Books, 2006. 114.

outpost in Albuquerque, New Mexico.⁷ When the War Between the States broke out, James Longstreet did not delay in offering his services to the Confederate States of America. As the title of his memoirs *From Manassas to Appomattox*, points out, he commanded the First Corps of Lee's Army from its creation in 1862 until Lee's surrender in April 9, 1865. He played a decisive battle role during the Seven Days Campaign, Second Manassas, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, and the Wilderness. Faithful to the Confederate cause to the end, his reply to General Pendleton's request to ask Lee to surrender was "If General Lee does not know when to surrender until I tell him, he will never know."⁸

Old Pete was acknowledged to be a superior battlefield commander with great tactical skills, even while enduring the personal tragedy of the deaths of three of his children, and an accidental wounding by his own men received at the Battle of Wilderness on May 6, 1864. The wound would plague him until his death. Following the war, Longstreet made his family residence in New Orleans. He joined the cotton brokerage firm, formed by Edward and William Owens. In addition, he became President of The Great Southern and Western Fire and Accident Insurance Company and President of the Southern Hospital Association in New Orleans.

In March of 1867, the Radical Republicans in control of congress passed the Reconstructive Acts that divided the former confederate states (except Tennessee) into five military districts. Each state was required to adopt a new constitution, which provided for black suffrage and citizenship. The reaction of southerners to these requirements was fueled with animosity. The New Orleans newspaper, *The Times*, solicited the views of prominent citizens' residing in the city to restore reason to the public. Longstreet was one of those citizens. In his response, published on March 18th, he strongly advocated reconciliation with the North in order to begin rebuilding the destroyed south and establishing unity for one nation.

After much thought, Longstreet decided the most efficient way to rebuild the south and control the black vote was to join the Republican Party. The Southern people genuinely believed that a man could not be a Republican and a true son of the south. Therefore, the public reacted with an ardent and harsh disapproval to his proposal. He was vilified and considered a traitor. Longstreet became an active Republican and secured a pardon from the United States government which restored his political rights. He actively continued his

⁷ Werts, General James Longstreet, pp. 46-51.

⁸ Longstreet, James. *From Manassas To Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America*. New York: Barnes and Nobles Publishing, Inc., 1896. 345.

affiliation with the republican party and in 1868 endorsed Ulysses S. Grant's campaign for the Presidency. He attended Grant's inauguration in March of 1869.⁹ A few weeks later; Longstreet accepted federal government jobs passed by congress. In 1870, Governor Henry Warmouth of Louisiana appointed him General of the State Militia. By 1872, Longstreet was considered a strong republican. When Williams Kellogg became governor of Louisiana, he appointed Longstreet, Major General of the State Militia. The dissatisfaction over the Republican government resulted in riots, protests, clashes in New Orleans. To regain order, in 1874, Longstreet led mostly black militia soldiers against a protesting group called Crescent City White Leaguers. The White Leaguers consisted largely of Confederate Veterans.

Following the clash, Longstreet was labeled a scalawag, publically berated and received numerous death threats. He had to leave the City for the safety of himself and his family. The final act that branded him a southern outcast was his conversion to the Roman Catholic religion. In a region where 99% of the population was Protestant, the acceptance of his Catholic affiliation was just too much.¹⁰

The following is an attempt to highlight the principal elements of the issue. In November a correspondent for the New York Times, William Swinton was writing a campaign history on the Army of the Potomac. He had been seeking information and opinions from ex confederate leaders who had participated in the Battle of Gettysburg. In this famous interview which became public knowledge, Longstreet criticized Lee's assault at Gettysburg on July 3rd. As far as we know, no one had publically criticized the leadership of Robert E. Lee. While Lee was alive, not one of his officers stepped forward to debate or deny Longstreet's criticism publically but after Lee's death the defamation of Longstreet's military leadership began.

The accusations against Longstreet began on January 19, 1872 at the birthday celebration of Robert E. Lee. Jubal Early was addressing the student body and guests of the now Washington and Lee University in Lexington, Virginia. A large part of his speech focused on exonerating himself of any blame for the Gettysburg's defeat and his failure as a Corp commander in independent command in Shenandoah Valley in 1864. His attention was then directed at excusing Lee of any fault in the Gettysburg defeat. It was not Lee that failed at Gettysburg but rather his senior subordinate who did not attack the union left flank in the early morning hours of July 2nd. Thus began Early's

⁹ Sanger, Donald Bridgeman and Thomas Hay. James Longstreet: I. The Soldier, II. The Politician. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952. 345, 49, 370, 371.

¹⁰ Gallagher, Gary. Robert E. Lee and His High Command. The Great Course; Teaching That Engages the Mind, Chantilly, Virginia: The Teaching Company, Part 1 of 2. 128.

campaign against Longstreet. The South would have won a great and decisive victory had Longstreet promptly obeyed Lee's order, which he delayed to execute until 4 o'clock that afternoon.¹¹

Jubal Early had his own agenda for placing the failure on Longstreet's shoulder. As a leading "Lost Cause" writer, he wanted to present Robert E. Lee as the supreme military leader who could not have erred on the battlefield. A scapegoat for the lost Gettysburg's battle had to be developed and Longstreet was the chosen one. Jubal Early became the most rebellious of all Rebels -- a crude, profane "Yankee-hating" individual. His desire to vindicate the South in the nation's eyes was tireless.¹²

The second charge against Longstreet came one year later on another R. E. Lee birthday celebration by William Pendleton. William Pendleton was a Lt. General in the Army of Northern Virginia who at one time commanded Lee's artillery division. Before the Civil War he was a protestant minister. Pendleton reassured the audience that Robert E Lee did not lose the battle of Gettysburg. It was Longstreet who failed to obey a direct order from Robert E. Lee to attack the union side at "sunrise" on July 2nd. Other assertions made by Pendleton were delays in attacking on July 3rd and direct insubordination to R. E. Lee that resulted in the defeat. The entire blame for the failure of Gettysburg was placed squarely on Longstreet's shoulders. Gen. Jeb Stuart's late arrival on the second day of battle and Gen. Ewell's decision to not capture Cemetery and Culp's Hill did not enter the debate as factors in the outcome on the famous defeat. According to William Piston, many confederate veterans came to believe that it was Longstreet's slowness at Gettysburg rather than the fleet of Yankees that captured New Orleans that best accounts for the union boundary to be pushed past the Ohio River.¹³

Longstreet himself proved that General Lee never ordered a sunrise attack by securing affidavits from Lee staff officers, Charles Marshall, Charles S. Venable, A.L. Long and Walter H. Taylor. Each officer submitted straightforward statements denying that Lee had planned a sunrise attack. Charles Venable referred to Pendleton as emotionally ill and stated it was a shame that the story was ever told.¹⁴

¹¹ Jones, J. William. "The Longstreet-Gettysburg Controversy." The Richmond Virginia Dispatch 16 Feb. 1896.

¹² Connelly, Thomas L. and Barbara L. Bellows. God and General Longstreet: The Lost Cause and Southern Mind. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1982. 10 and 7.

¹³ Piston, William Garrett, Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant. Pg. X, *ibid*.

¹⁴ Longstreet, Helen D. Longstreet. Lee and Longstreet at High Tide. Gettysburg in the Light of the Official Records. Wilmington, North Carolina; Broadfoot Publishing Company, 2000. 58-60.

While Longstreet demonstrated his innocence, the Southern people chose to believe the worst about his generalship because of his earlier transgressions. According to Piston, it was no coincidence that these allegations began after Lee's death. Early and Pendleton were acutely aware that Robert E. Lee did not share their opinion of Longstreet and only Lee could have set the record straight.

A third man to complete the major participants of the Anti-Longstreet faction was J. William Jones. Jones was a confederate chaplain who helped form the Chaplain's Association of the Army of Northern Virginia, and ministered to troops who served under Robert E. Lee. When Lee died, his family designated Jones to serve as his biographer and Jones produced his first book, Personal Reminiscences, Anecdotes and Letters of Robert E. Lee. Jones was an opportunist and discovered early after the war that a close association with Robert E. Lee resulted in fame and fortune. Jones echoed the allegations made Early and Pendleton, "Longstreet lost it at Gettysburg". Chaplain Jones portrayed Longstreet with a Judas Coat leading his men to the slaughter house. This about a man who told Robert E. Lee, "No fifteen thousand men ever arranged for battle could make a successful assault over that field."¹⁵ Charles Reagan Wilson calls Jones "the evangelist of the Lost Cause" and refers to him as "the single most important link between Southern religion and the Lost Cause".¹⁶

These three men were leaders attempting to place Robert E. Lee as the glorified saint of the Lost Cause. The Lost Cause was a justification for the south succeeding from the union. It was a way to provide an explanation for the military catastrophe. The southern catastrophe is best described in the words of James M. McPherson. "By the war's end much of the South was an economic desert. The war not only killed one-quarter of the Confederate's white men of military age; it also killed two-fifths of the southern livestock, wrecked half of the farm machinery, ruined thousands of miles of railroad, and destroyed the principal labor system on which the southern productivity had been based. Two-thirds of assessed southern wealth vanished in the war."¹⁷ In the presences of such an overwhelming loss, southerners needed an explanation that allowed them to retain a measure of pride. The Lost Cause served to fulfill that need.

Every cause demands a hero and Robert E. Lee was the perfect choice. Lee's military genius dominated the newspaper stories and the conversations of

¹⁵ Longstreet, James. From Manassas To Appomattox, pg. 345.

¹⁶ Wilson, Charles Reagan. Baptized in Blood: The Religion of the Lost Cause, 1865-1920. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980. 119-138.

¹⁷ McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom. The Civil War Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 818.

southerners and northerners alike. Lee exercised self-discipline, self-control, possessed a superior code of duty and a faith in God that would vie with that of Stonewall Jackson's devotion to God. These men, along with a select number of other officers, were so racial and fanatical in their affection for Lee that they became known as the Lee Cult. The problem with the Cult was their insistence that Lee's war record had no flaws. Therefore, he could not have lost the Battle of Gettysburg. Someone else must be made the scapegoat. James Longstreet was the ideal officer to blame for the defeat for reasons already discussed but highlighted below:

- 1) He had openly criticized Lee's battle plan at Gettysburg.
- 2) He advocated that the North and South reconcile as quickly as possible and move on toward rebuilding the south.
- 3) He joined the Republican Party and later became a Catholic.
- 4) His responses to criticism were often sarcastic and egotistical.¹⁸

James Longstreet could not have made a better target had he sat down and drawn a bull's eye on the back of his coat for the public to view.¹⁹ In part, their contempt for him may have been fueled by the close relationship between Lee and Longstreet. Author L. Fremantle, a captain in the Coldstream Guards and Lt. Colonel in the British army wrote in his book, *Three Months in the Confederate States*, "The relations between him (Lee) and Longstreet are quite touching -- they are almost always together."²⁰

Jubal Early was the most prominent member of the Lost Cause writers. Under his leadership began a well organized, concerted effort to discredit Longstreet's military record. Through the letters and papers of Jubal Early, William Jones and William Pendleton can be traced the method these men used to present Longstreet as guilty for the confederate defeat at Gettysburg. Their successful efforts were carried out through an overflow of hundreds of articles published in the *Southern Historical Society Papers* which fell under the control of the Lee Cult. Jubal Early used the papers as an instrument to espouse the Lost Cause tenants and anti-Longstreet myth. In an era when most information was secured through the printed word, the society's paper was crucial. The negative image of Longstreet in these articles was accompanied by speeches delivered at confederate reunions and larger southern city forums. The articles

¹⁸ Gallagher, Gary W. and Alan T. Nola., ed. *The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History*. Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana Press, 2000 pg. 128, 129, 132.

¹⁹ Gallagher, Gary W. Lecture: Higher Education Center, Virginia Beach, Virginia, 4 March, 2006.

²⁰ Fremantle, Arthur J.L. *Three Months in the Southern States: April-June 1863*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, reprint 1991. 249.

and speeches were reinforced by novels, poems and plays which presented Longstreet's evil fame in the public eye.²¹

William Piston argues "that as long as Southern history is lived and felt as much as it is read, James Longstreet will be remembered primarily as Lee's tarnished hero".²² Today, many books and articles about James Longstreet have received a positive appraisal from researcher and historians who are engaging in a fresh, objective examination of Longstreet's service. Public opinion demonstrates that James Longstreet's image in history has changed to a more accurate view. According to William Piston, this is largely due to the work of the following four individuals.²³ The first was Michael Shaara who authored the book The Killer Angels about the Battle of Gettysburg. Shaara's Longstreet was neither slow nor stubborn. He was instead competent, wise, Lee's friend and greatest source of strength. Second was Ted Turner who produced the movie Gettysburg based on Shaara's novel. The movie thrust James Longstreet into the forefront of the public so that the individual viewer could decide independently any blame that may have been assigned for the failure of the battle.

The third person acknowledged was Garland Reynolds who founded the Longstreet Society. The Longstreet Society is a group of more than 500 members formed to honor the life of Lt. General James Longstreet. The society is dedicated to the celebration and study of his history as a CSA Commander, his fervent dedication to the restoration of the American Union, his ideals for peace and his belief in the brotherhood of man.²⁴

Finally, credit is attributed to Robert Thomas who began the initiative to place a monument of James Longstreet on the battlefield of Gettysburg. The monument was unveiled in July 3rd, 1998.

As a frequent speaker on the Military Legacy of James Longstreet, I strive to obtain a measure of justice not only for his reputation but more pointedly for the military contributions that he made to the confederacy in the Civil War. In addition great emphasis is placed on his efforts to restore the union between the North and South following the war. The work of Jeffery Werths, William Piston, Thomas Connelly, Gary Gallagher, Alan Nolan, R.L. DiNardo, and Albert Nofi have all demonstrated a new even handedness in assessing the military record of Longstreet.

²¹ Connelly, Thomas L. The Marble Man: Robert E. Lee & His Image in American Society. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1978. 72-75.

²² Piston, William Garrett. Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant pg. 188.

²³ DiNardo, R. L. and Albert A. Nofi, ed. James Longstreet: The Man, the Soldier, the Controversary. Cambridge: DeCapo Press, 1998. 219.

²⁴ Politics from the Piedmont Porch. Gainesville: Lanier Center Best Western, 2007.

Perhaps Robert E. Lee himself would not have wanted the post-bellum charges to prevail against his old war horse. Longstreet himself said, "I do not fear the verdict at Gettysburg. Time will set all things right. Error lives for a day. Truth is eternal."²⁵ A validation of this observation is being realized by Civil War authorities at large. To conclude with the words of Albert Nofi: "The deliberate campaign to turn an authentic hero into a villain is a sobering reminder of what can happen to the historical record when it is manipulated for personal or political purposes."²⁶

²⁵ Longstreet, Helen Dortch. Lee and Longstreet at High Tide page 85.

²⁶ DiNardo, R. L. and Albert A. Nofi, ed. James Longstreet-The Man, the Soldier, the Controversy. Cambridge: De Capo Press, 199; 23.

Appeasement in Russian, Chinese, and American Foreign Policy, 1931-1941

Teddy J. Uldricks
University of North Carolina at Asheville

While the term appeasement is normally associated with Britain and France, a policy of appeasing aggressors prior to World War II was not limited to London and Paris, but was pursued at some time and in one form or another by all of the non-Axis powers, including the United States, Nationalist China and the Soviet Union.¹ Moreover, all five of them appeased the Axis aggressors for essentially similar motives. Those reasons include misunderstanding the character and/or degree of the Axis threat, the global extent of the threat (i.e., dealing with Japan as well as Germany and Italy), ideological hostility to other non-Axis potential alliance partners (anti-communism/anti-imperialism), bitter memories of past war devastation coupled with a strong desire to avoid a repetition of that havoc, and desperation to buy time in order to rectify inadequate military preparations. Of course, the timing, objects and specific manifestations of appeasement differed in each of the non-Axis states and none of the five powers practiced appeasement consistently and without contradiction as its sole response to Axis aggression. Instead, each pursued intertwined policies of appeasement and resistance to one or more of the aggressor states – with the proportion of each of these elements varying through time.

The United States

Appeasement was also practiced by the United States, but on this side of the Atlantic it was better known as isolationism, which sprang from a widespread disenchantment with American participation in the First World War and with the peace treaty which ended it. Many Americans came to believe that their country had been drawn under false pretenses into a European conflict which was none of their business. The unsavory picture of the victors at Paris squabbling over the spoils combined with Bolshevik revelations of secret Allied treaties to undermine the image of the war as a moral crusade for democracy and national self-determination. In 1934-1935 a Senate investigating committee, under the chairmanship of Gerald P. Nye, claimed to have unearthed evidence showing that the United States had been drawn into the Great War by greedy

1. The author thanks Yana Pitner, Grant Hardy, Jay Clarke, Craig Buettinger, Alex Cummins, Steve MacIsaac, Will Benedicks, and George Melton for their comments on earlier drafts of this study.

bankers and arms manufacturers. The general public lost interest in foreign affairs, reverting to an attitude of smug and disdainful superiority toward the outside world. Above all, the vast majority of Americans were determined not to let the nation be lured into the quagmire of European war again. In government, the isolationist impulse expressed itself as a firm refusal to enter into alliances or most types of binding commitments, whether a guarantee of French security or membership in the League of Nations. Ultimately, isolationism entailed refusal to assume responsibilities in world affairs which America's wealth and power thrust upon it – responsibilities Britain and France, severely weakened by the First World War, could no longer fully shoulder.

Menacing developments in the early 1930s – the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the rise of Hitler to power in Germany, and Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia – convinced Americans that another major war might soon break out in Europe or Asia. Congress was especially anxious that the sort of violations of American neutral rights which had led to the US declaration of war in 1917 not recur. For that reason it passed a series of Neutrality Acts between 1935 and 1937 which banned the sale of arms and ammunition or the granting of loans to belligerent powers, prohibited US ships from sailing into war zones, warned Americans that they could travel on vessels of warring states only at their own risk, and required any nation at war to pay cash for American goods and to transport those purchases in their own ships. This neutrality legislation was to be applied uniformly to all parties at war, aggressors and victims alike. The intent of these laws was merely to keep the United States out of war, but they sometimes worked to the advantage of the already well-armed predator nations by cutting off American supplies from any country which had been attacked.

Similarly, public opinion polling throughout the 1930s demonstrated that, while more and more Americans disapproved of the atrocious behavior of the Nazis, Italian Fascists and Japanese militarists, few wanted to risk American lives to stop it. After the fall of Poland in October of 1939 only 3.5% of Americans polled favored an American declaration of war with Germany, while 96.5% opposed that step. The following year, after the fall of France, 85% of Americans opposed going to war with Germany and Italy, with only 15% favoring the measure. By 1941 the spectacular Nazi victories in the Balkans, Russia, and North Africa had begun to alarm Americans. At this point 57% of respondents identified the defeat of Germany as a more important goal than keeping the US out war. In contrast, as late as August of 1941 76% of Americans still wanted to avoid hostilities with Japan.² Sentiment among

2. Polling between 1939 and 1941 by the American Institute of Public Opinion, results reprinted in Hadley Cantril (ed.), *Public Opinion, 1935-1946* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 966-978.

Senate Republicans and some Democrats was even more averse to war.

Franklin Roosevelt was considerably more realistic in his assessment of Hitler than was British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. But the president was constrained in foreign and defense policy by the need to focus on fighting the Great Depression and also by his personal aversion to war. Nevertheless, as early as 1935 FDR told some of his cabinet officers privately that the *Führer* was an international gangster, a bandit who would someday have to be stopped. The president was similarly outraged by Japanese and Italian aggression, but he was hindered from taking firm action against the aggressors by the pervasive anti-interventionist sentiment among the public and especially in Congress.³ Roosevelt had hoped, for example, that the neutrality statutes would be framed so as to give the president discretionary power to apply them against aggressor states but not against countries legitimately defending themselves. Congress refused. FDR could invoke the arms embargo in good conscience during the Italo-Ethiopian war because only the Italians had any possibility of buying significant amounts of American armaments. The situation was different in Asia. There China desperately needed war materiel from the United States to defend itself from the Japanese attack. Fortunately the legislation did grant the president authority to determine where and when a state of war existed. Roosevelt took advantage of the technicality that the "China incident" was an undeclared war to avoid invoking the Neutrality Acts and thus cutting off aid to China.

The isolationists argued that America could defend itself, secure between two broad oceans, and that the most dangerous threat to the United States was the Roosevelt administration's interventionist inclinations. This viewpoint was notably championed by Charles Lindbergh who, in his "Air Defense of America" speech, proclaimed that, "Our danger in America is an internal danger. We need not fear a foreign invasion unless the American peoples bring it on through their own quarreling and meddling with affairs abroad."⁴

The efforts of President Roosevelt to oppose aggression were severely hampered by isolationist sentiment, by the multifaceted threat of war in both Europe and Asia, and by American military weakness. The land forces, in particular, had been allowed to atrophy after 1918. The interwar US Army numbered only about 110,000 men and it was so poorly equipped that recruits sometimes had to drill with wooden rifles. Although the US Navy constituted a powerful force, American air power was as yet little developed. Moreover,

3. See Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), chaps. 6-11.

4. "Lindbergh Decries Fears of Invasion," *New York Times*, 20 May 1940.

Anglo-French appeasement gave the president little scope for effective American intervention against Nazi treaty violations and aggression. There was, in fact, a vicious dialectic at work here; Anglo-French appeasement and American isolationism reinforced each other. Chamberlain's assurances that a reasonable settlement with Hitler could be reached confirmed for many Americans the belief that US intervention on the Continent was neither necessary nor prudent. Similarly, the British belief that America could not be mobilized for effective action in Europe strengthened the conviction in London that appeasement was the only viable option. Chamberlain commented at the end of 1937 that, "the power that had the greatest strength was the United States of America, but he would be a rash man who based his considerations on help from that quarter."⁵

Beyond isolationism, anti-communism fostered appeasement. Like their counterparts in Britain and France, American conservatives at first saw Mussolini and then Hitler as powerful bastions against the spread of the revolutionary contagion. The Soviet Union's self-appointed leadership of the anti-fascist movement tainted that crusade in the eyes of many. Hatred of the New Deal, antipathy toward the American left, suspicion of the Republican cause in Spain, and deep distrust of the Soviet collective security campaign combined to reinforce the isolationist impulse. Before Hitler's victories in 1940 and 1941 threatened the global balance of power, any anti-fascist bloc between the western democracies and the USSR seemed premature at best and an invitation to communist subversion at worst.

Saddled with these handicaps, the president initially had no effective means of blocking the aggressors. His caution (in a few cases, timidity) has led some historians to conclude mistakenly that Roosevelt was, himself, an isolationist.⁶ Politics, it is said, is the art of the possible and FDR was the consummate political artist. He realized that he had neither the public support nor the military power to halt Nazi or Japanese expansionism. Given the strength of isolationism, to move too boldly would have diminished his own political popularity and undermined support for his anti-depression domestic reforms. Roosevelt was too smart a politician to take on a fight that could not be won. For the time being all he could do was struggle to strengthen the nation's defenses and begin the painfully slow process of remolding public opinion, alerting it to the serious danger which Nazi Germany posed for American security. Roosevelt had inherited the previous administration's non-recognition response to the Japanese take-over of Manchuria in 1931. Although Japanese

5. Quoted in Henry Pelling, *Britain and the Second World War* (Glasgow: Collins, 1970), p. 23.
6. E.g., Robert A. Divine, *Roosevelt and World War II* (New York: Penguin, 1970), chaps. 1-2.

aggression in China violated the long-standing American open door doctrine, FDR could do little but continue that ineffectual policy. In 1935 the president requested the nation's first peacetime billion dollar defense budget. Roosevelt justified expansion of the armed forces as a deterrent to would-be aggressors. "The American nation," he told Congress, "is committed to peace and the principal reason for the existence of our armed forces is to guarantee our peace." The administration also mutually reinforced its foreign and domestic policies by using Public Works Administration money to build the aircraft carriers Enterprise and Yorktown, four cruisers, more than a hundred planes for the army, and some fifty military airports.

Persuading the American public to support a more vigorous stance against aggressors proved to be no easy task. Congressional isolationists and such public pressure groups as the American First Committee and the No Foreign War committee rose in a storm of protest any time US policy veered too closely parallel to that of the League of Nations or of Britain and France. In support of League sanctions against Mussolini, in 1935 Roosevelt proclaimed a "moral embargo" to persuade Americans voluntarily not to supply the Italian war machine. The effort failed as American oil companies scrambled for lucrative Italian oil contracts. Similarly, after the Marco Polo bridge incident in China, American firms continued to provide the petroleum products and scrap metal on which the Japanese war effort depended. However, Roosevelt's deliberate failure to define Sino-Japanese conflict as a war, thus circumventing the Neutrality Acts, permitted the sale to China of 86 million dollars worth of American munitions between July and November 1937 while only one and a half million dollars worth of arms went to Japan. In contrast, FDR, willingly followed the Anglo-French policy of non-intervention in the Spanish civil war in the vain hope of preventing a wider European conflict.

The president made his boldest attempt yet to sway public opinion and influence foreign governments in his "quarantine speech" in Chicago on October 5, 1937, in which he decried a spreading "epidemic of world lawlessness." Roosevelt's words remained an empty gesture, however, because he could not back them with firm action. They certainly did not deter the aggressors. Hitler, in particular, despised the American president as the ineffectual, Jew-ridden head of a mongrelized nation. Nor did FDR's entirely verbal encouragements stiffen the resistance of Britain and France to Nazi encroachments. Japanese atrocities in China, Hitler's belligerence, and the anti-Jewish horrors of *Kristallnacht* deepened American hostility to the aggressors and bolstered support for increased defense spending, but did not alter the nation's resolve to avoid US participation in foreign wars. Moreover, in 1937 the economy deteriorated once more and the president's political opponents massed for an

attack on his domestic programs. Under these circumstances he could do little to hinder Hitler's plans. During the Munich crisis FDR could only make personal pleas to the dictators for a negotiated settlement. As Robert Dallek has suggested, "Hitler and Mussolini probably viewed Roosevelt's appeals as gestures by a powerless man."⁷

The president was able to take firmer action against the menace of Nazi subversion in the western hemisphere. Under US prodding the Pan-American Conference issued the Declaration of Lima in December 1938, pledging the American republics to take concerted action against the fascist threat to hemispheric security. Roosevelt also overcame considerable opposition to providing the French air force with new Douglas DB-7 bombers. However, even the German absorption of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, which convinced a majority of Americans that the US ought to provide arms for the western democracies, did not enable FDR to push a revision of the Neutrality Acts through Congress. His congressional opponents even accused him of seeking foreign adventures to buoy up the sagging New Deal at home. The president was once more thrown back on rhetoric in lieu of more substantive responses to aggression. In April he asked Hitler and Mussolini to promise publicly that they would not attack thirty-one specified nations for at least ten years. Predictably, the dictators treated this gambit with contempt. Since the president had been forced to reassure Congress that he would under no circumstances send American troops to Europe, Berlin and Rome dismissed the United States as an inconsequential factor in world politics. Roosevelt took this and similarly purely verbal initiatives primarily for their domestic effect in order, as he phrased it, to "put the bee on Germany." As long as Berlin and Rome regarded the USA so contemptuously, nothing the president said could deflect them from the path of conquest.

Not until the Axis victories threatened the global balance of power did the shift of American public opinion toward interventionism accelerate and the Roosevelt administration gain the congressional support (though just barely) for more effective measures against aggression. German conquests of France, the Balkans, western Russia, and North Africa together with Japanese occupation of the China coast and of Indo-China raised the horrifying possibilities that both Britain and the USSR would be defeated, the Axis gain hegemony over most of the earth, and America be left genuinely isolated in a fascist/militarist world. The lend-lease agreement, the sale of destroyers to Britain, the transfer of the Pacific fleet to Pearl Harbor, the freezing of Japanese assets in the US, the embargo on selling petroleum products to Japan, and Secretary of State Cordell

7. Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy*, p. 166.

Hull's refusal to agree to Japanese demands in the fall of 1941 (even though the American leadership knew that such a refusal meant war), all indicate a gradual turning away from isolationism and appeasement by the American people and their government. But even then, with London bombed nightly and Panzer spearheads approaching Moscow, the American people and Congress still opposed the entry of the United States into the war. It took a surprise attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor and a foolish declaration of war on America by Hitler to accomplish that necessary end.

The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union, like the western powers, at first had hoped that it could do business as usual with the Nazi regime, maintaining the Rapallo relationship of political, economic, and even limited military cooperation that it had enjoyed with Weimar Germany. As Deputy Foreign Commissar Nikolai Krestinskii wrote soon after Hitler's appointment as chancellor, "We want the present government to keep to a friendly position in relations with us. We are counting on this – that the Hitler government is dictated by the necessity of not breaking with us..."⁸ Berlin, however, rejected every Soviet overture and even signed a non-aggression pact with Moscow's long time antagonist, Poland. In response, the Politburo authorized a dramatic reversal of Soviet foreign policy in December of 1933.⁹

Under the new collective security doctrine, while the democracies attempted to avoid or at least postpone war through appeasement, the USSR pursued the opposite policy. Moscow labored to construct a new Triple Entente which would deter Hitler from the path of aggression by taking a strong stand against German advances. The Soviet Union attempted to reinvigorate the collective security procedures of the League of Nations, negotiate bilateral mutual defense pacts with the western powers, and gain broad support for this orientation through the Popular Front line in the Comintern.

Although collective security was pursued with vigor throughout the decade, the Kremlin continued to hope that Hitler would turn from his anti-Soviet course and normalize relations with Russia. Even Maksim Litvinov, that apostle of collective security, proclaimed that Russo-German relations could be rebuilt if the security interests of the USSR were respected by the Reich.¹⁰

8. Quoted in I.F. Maksimychev, *Diplomatia mira protiv diplomatii voiny: Ocherk sovetsko-germanskikh diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii v 1933-1939* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1981), p. 193.

9. V.Ia. Sipols, *Vneshniaia politika Sovetskogo Soiuza 1933-1935* (Moscow: Nauka, 1980), p. 150.

10. M.M. Litvinov, *Vneshniaia politika SSSR: Rechi i zaiavleniia, 1927-1935* (Moscow: Gos. Sotsial'no-econ. Izdvo., 1935), p. 70.

There were a few tentative Soviet attempts in the 1930s to suggest a *rapprochement* with Berlin, but they were rebuffed by the Germans.¹¹ Collective security remained both the doctrine which most closely approximated Soviet security interests in this decade and the only course apparently open to the Kremlin in the face of implacable Nazi hostility to Russia.

There was, of course, a faction in the Soviet leadership which clung to the Anglophobia that had prevailed among the Bolsheviks from 1917 to 1933. It had been an article of faith for most of them that Great Britain was the center of a global, anti-communist, anti-Russian campaign which might renew at any time the military intervention of 1918 to 1922 against Soviet Russia. Among top level Soviet leaders, Viacheslav Molotov and Andrei Vyshinskii seem to have advocated to this position.¹² Historian Silvio Pons has suggested that their concept of Soviet security was essentially "isolationist."¹³ Hitler's rise to power, the rearmament of Germany, and the anti-Soviet orientation of Berlin's foreign policy convinced Stalin, Litvinov, and the majority of the Politburo that Third Reich had replaced Britain as the most menacing threat to Soviet security. Nonetheless, the failure of Britain and France to respond positively to repeated, intensive Soviet initiatives for a new Triple Entente revived fears within the Kremlin that what the bourgeois democracies really wanted was a mutually destructive Russo-German war. Molotov would later praise Stalin for "...unmasking the intrigues of those Western European politicians who tried to throw Germany and the Soviet Union into conflict with each other."¹⁴

The Munich debacle, together with the continued unwillingness of Britain and France to commit themselves to a clearly defined alliance with the Soviet Union, finally caused Stalin to abandon the collective security campaign in favor of the Nazi-Soviet collaboration embodied in the Non-Aggression Pact of 24 August 1939, the Boundary and Friendship Treaty of 28 September 1939, and the secret protocols appended to both of those agreements.¹⁵ It is a tragic

11. N.A. Abramov and L.A. Bezymenskii, "Osobaia missiia Davida Kandelaki," *Voprosy istorii*, nos. 4-5 (1991), pp. 144-56; Geoffrey Roberts, "A Soviet Bid for Coexistence with Nazi Germany, 1935-1937: The Kandelaki Affair," *The International History Review*, vol. 16 (1994), pp. 94-101.

12. P.D. Raymond, "Conflict and Consensus in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1933-1939," Pennsylvania State University doctoral dissertation, 1979; and Vitaly Kulish, "U poroga voiny," *Komsomolskaia pravda*, 24 August 1988.

13. Silvio Pons, *Stalin and the Inevitable War, 1936-1941* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 180.

14. *God krizisa, 1938-39: Dokumenty i materialy v dvukh tomakh* (Moscow: Izdvo. Polit. Lit., 1990), vol. II, pp. 269-273.

15. See Teddy J. Uldricks, "A.J.P. Taylor and the Russians," in Martel, *The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered*, pp. 162-186; Uldricks, "Debating the Role of Russia in the Origins of the Second World War," in Martel (ed), *The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 135-154; and Uldricks, "Soviet Security Policy in the 1930s," in

irony that, precisely when Britain and France began to shift from appeasement to resistance, Soviet policy was moving in the opposite direction.

The Non-Aggression Treaty did not merely establish the USSR as a neutral state. It, together with its secret protocols and the Russo-German commercial agreement signed four days earlier, constituted a quasi-alliance between Stalin and Hitler. The pact lacked an escape clause, normally found in non-aggression treaties, invalidating it if either party were to commit aggression against a third power. The omission was deliberate, for Stalin certainly knew that the Wehrmacht was poised to invade Poland. Each side also pledged not to join any alliance directed against the other. In essence Stalin had given Hitler permission to attack Poland without fear of a significant two-front war. A month after the pact Stalin even reassured German foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, that, if the tide of war should turn against Germany, the USSR would come to its aid!¹⁶

The Soviet contribution to the Nazi war effort went far beyond this beneficial non-belligerence, however. Just as Hitler – and Stalin – had suspected, Britain and France did not follow their declaration of war on Germany with significant military operations. Their "guarantee" of Poland had never been more than a political gambit. Anglo-French military strategy was shaped by their vast overestimation of German military power and by their desperate desire to avoid another ghastly war of attrition *à la* 1914. The Allies had no desire for a decisive, frontal engagement with the Wehrmacht in 1939. Instead, they intended to fight a primarily economic war. Their strategy involved prolonging the war as a low-intensity conflict for more than two years during which time they, supported by their empires and the United States, would grow far stronger while Germany's resources would be depleted. As part of this strategy the Allies employed their overwhelming naval superiority to mount a blockade of the Reich. Allied strategists believed that two years of blockade would completely disrupt the German war economy and bring Hitler to his knees. In practice, however, the blockade was much less effective than Western planners had expected. In addition to trade with Axis partner Italy and neutral Sweden, the steady expansion of Russo-German trade enabled Berlin to obtain vitally needed stocks of food, fuel and raw materials from the USSR. From January 1940 to June 1941 the USSR shipped the following quantities of food and raw materials to the Reich: 1.5 million tons of grain, 100,000 tons of cotton, 2 million tons of petroleum products, 1.5 million tons of timber, 140,000

Gabriel Gorodetsky, ed., *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991: A Retrospective* (London: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 65-74.

16. *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, 1991, no. 7, pp. 126-138.

tons of manganese and 26,000 tons of chromium.¹⁷ The Soviets also procured for Germany on the world market many commodities the USSR did not produce, such as tin, rubber and soy beans. These goods were then transhipped across the USSR to the Reich. Moreover, the terms of the trade agreement gave Germany a substantial advantage by providing that Soviet deliveries of raw materials and agricultural products should start immediately. In contrast, German shipments of manufactured goods to the USSR were to be based on subsequently negotiated orders. This meant that the Soviets actually supplied great quantities of material to the Reich, while the Germans found many excuses to delay and thereby limit the shipment of orders to the USSR.

In addition to economic support for the Nazi war machine, immediately after signing the Non-Aggression Pact Stalin appeased Hitler by dramatically reversing the public, official Soviet view of the international situation. From 1934 to 1939 Moscow vigorously and continuously denounced the menace of Nazi aggression, while appealing to the Western democracies for mutual support against that threat. After the Pact, it was Britain and France which were denounced as warmongers, not Germany.¹⁸ This campaign to avoid giving offense to the Germans was carried to the extent of immediately removing anti-fascist movies from theaters and even replacing German communist periodicals with Nazi publications in some public libraries!¹⁹ At the same time the Soviet media denounced Britain and France with the animus of a lover spurned.

Soviet appeasement of Nazi Germany was also manifested in some limited military and political collaboration. Soviet military cooperation with the German war effort included the provision of a radio navigational beacon for German bombers attacking Poland, the use of Murmansk as a port of refuge by German ships, and the temporary establishment of a German submarine base in Zapadnaia Litza Bay near Murmansk.²⁰ The Soviet invasion of eastern Poland on September 17, 1939 had characteristics of both appeasement and resistance. On one hand, it responded to a request by Ribbentrop on September 3rd that the

17.. Geoffrey Roberts, *Unholy Alliance: Stalin's Pact with Hitler* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), p. 176. Also see G.M. Ivanitskii, "Sovetsko-germanskii torgovo-ekonomicheskie otnosheniia v 1939-1941 gg.," *Novaya i noveishaia istoriia*, 1989, no. 5, pp. 28-39.

18.. Molotov's speech to the Supreme Soviet on 31 October 1939 is typical of this change in line. Alexander Werth, *Russia at War, 1941-1945* (New York: Dutton, 1964), p. 84.

19.. Numerous examples of such actions can be found in Wolfgang Leonhard, *Betrayal: The Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939* (New York: St. Martin's, 1989), pp. 45-72.

20.. Gerhard Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941* (Leiden: Brill, 1954), pp. 78-85; Nicholas Bethell, *The War Hitler Won, September 1939* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973), pp. 303 and 328; and Nikolai Tolstoi, *Stalin's Secret War* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981), pp. 110-111.

Soviets secure the zone of Poland ascribed to them in the secret protocols,²¹ it concluded in a joint Russo-German appeal for peace with the Allies (a document couched in terms extremely critical of the Allies),²² and, most importantly, in the eyes of the Western powers it firmly identified Moscow and Berlin as comrades in arms. On the other hand, the Soviet move into Poland led to some fighting between Red Army and Wehrmacht forces and it did augment Soviet defenses against Germany by pushing the border farther away from the main military and political centers of administration in the USSR. There was also appeasement via political collaboration of a particularly disreputable sort, namely the exchange of prisoners by the NKVD and the Gestapo. The Soviet security service actually handed over German communist refugees to the Nazis.²³

Finally, there was considerable Soviet appeasement of Nazi Germany by diplomatic means. Moscow tried to avoid even the appearance of collusion with the Anglo-French camp so as not to offend Berlin. As the British ambassador in Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps, reported at one point, "not only Stalin, but even Molotov avoided me like grim death. Stalin...did not want to have anything to do with Churchill, so alarmed was he lest the Germans find out."²⁴ Similarly, American diplomats found the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Konstantin Umanski, hostile and evasive. He also appeared to be making frequent reports to the German embassy (presumably that his government was not conniving with the United States).²⁵ Two more examples from May of 1941— the USSR extended diplomatic recognition to the pro-Nazi Rashid Ali regime in Iraq and then subsequently expelled from Moscow the representatives of the Norwegian, Belgian and Yugoslav governments in exile. This campaign of diplomatic appeasement intensified so that by November of 1940 the Soviets were even willing to join the Axis.²⁶

Soviet policy toward Germany from 1939 to 1941 was, of course, not solely a policy of supine appeasement; there were some elements of resistance to Nazi aggression in it, too. The most important part of resistance was the crash campaign, already underway in 1939, to build Soviet military strength. The aspects of that program — pushing forward the borders of the Soviet Union, vastly expanding numerical strength of the Red Army, reequipping the Soviet

21.. *Documents on German Foreign Policy* (Washington: US Gov. Printing Office, 1949ff), series D, vol. VII, doc. 567.

22.. Raymond J. Sontag and James S. Beddie, eds., *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941* (Washington: Dept. of State, 1948), p. 108.

23.. Leonhard, *Betrayal*, pp. 69-72.

24.. Quoted in Werth, *Russia at War*, p. 270.

25. Waldo Heinrichs, *The Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt & the American Entry into World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). p. 54.

26. *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, p. 233.

forces with modern armaments, and developing new operational plans to meet a German attack – were certainly unwelcome in Berlin. In the period between the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact and Operation Barbarossa, the Soviet armed forces grew by almost three and a half million men. Its weapons inventory expanded by almost 10,000 tanks and 3,000 modern aircraft.²⁷ This substantial buildup of Soviet military power might have provoked the Germans, but the risk had to be taken, since the whole point of the appeasement policy was to buy time to enhance Soviet defenses.

Stalin was also capable of offering diplomatic resistance to German advances. This was especially true in the Balkans. The Soviet-Yugoslav Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression of 5 April 1941 was obviously an attempt to block the consolidation of German influence in Southeast Europe, despite Moscow's quick abandonment of Belgrade once the Wehrmacht attacked. Molotov's famous meeting in Berlin with Hitler and Ribbentrop is an even better example. The Soviet foreign commissar refused to be distracted by vague promises of imperial advances toward the Indian Ocean and, instead, repeatedly insisted on bringing up thorny issues in Russo-German relations – Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and the Straits. Similarly, the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of 13 April 1941 was another powerful diplomatic blow struck against Germany. Though, it was, at the same time, another measure of appeasement toward Japan in its campaign to conquer China.

Thus, Soviet behavior toward the Third Reich in the period from the Non-Aggression Pact to Operation Barbarossa was characterized by sustained attempts to forestall a German attack on the USSR through appeasement, combined with at least some measures of resistance. Stalin certainly never misunderstood the ultimate nature of the Nazi threat as Neville Chamberlain did. The Soviet dictator seems to have realized that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact only postponed an inevitable conflict with the Reich. As he said in October of 1939, "A German attack is also possible. For six years German fascists and the Communists cursed each other. Now an unexpected turn took place; that happens in the course of history. But one cannot rely upon it. We must be prepared in time. Others who were not paid the price."²⁸ Yet, Stalin did misunderstand the degree and imminence of the threat. He seems to have

27.. As Roger Reese has noted, this substantial rise in the size of the Soviet Army was not accompanied by a parallel growth of the officer corps. The decimation of 80% of the officers above the rank of captain during the Great Purges combined with this 280% increase in manpower produced a force which was inadequately trained and organized as well as poorly led. See Reese, "A Note on a Consequence of the Expansion of the Red Army on the Eve of World War II," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 41, no. 1 (1989), pp. 135-140.

28.. Quoted in Roberts, *Unholy Alliance*, p. 156.

counted on a substantial campaign in Poland and then a prolonged war of attrition on the Western front, similar to that of 1914-1918.²⁹ Such a war would materially weaken both Nazi Germany and the western Allies and also give the USSR until 1942 or even 1943 to perfect its defenses.

Ideological hostilities contributed to appeasement in Moscow just as they had in London and Paris. The conviction that the Western democracies had fostered the rise of Hitler and the rearmament of the German war machine and that the Western powers were intent on pushing the Wehrmacht against the USSR was held not only by Stalin, but widely shared within the Soviet political elite. Ideologically based mutual fear and hostility between Moscow on one side and London and Paris on the other had been one of the primary factors preventing the reestablishment of a Triple Entente against Nazi aggression in 1939. The lack of a common Soviet-German frontier before 1939 had also been a factor in western strategic calculations, but not necessarily an insoluble problem.³⁰ The assumption that Britain and France, as imperialist powers, were implacably hostile to the Soviet Union was the analog of the anti-communism which blighted Western diplomacy toward the USSR. Thus, for example, the flight of Rudolf Hess to England and the clumsy handling of the incident by the British government quite predictably set off alarms in the Kremlin. Soviet fears may have been unfounded in this case, but they were real. The imperialist states, even though nominally at war, seemed in Moscow's view to be up to their anti-Soviet plotting again.³¹ Even more alarming, of course, were the Allied plans to come to the aid of Finland with an expeditionary force and to bomb the Baku oil fields – plans which the Germans captured when they overran France and were only too glad to pass along to Moscow, though the Soviets already strongly suspected as much. Moreover, even after the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and even after the British and French declarations of war on Germany, the Kremlin continued to fear a "second Munich" – that is, a new agreement between Hitler and the Western democracies, this time at the expense of the USSR. This fear gave added impetus to the Soviet desire to placate Hitler.

Fear of the certain devastation brought by war was probably less of a motive for Stalin's appeasement of Hitler than it had been for Chamberlain or Daladier. After all, in the collectivization of the peasantry and in the Great

29. I. Lemin, "Novyi etap voyny v Evrope," *Mirovoe khoziastvo i mirovaia politika*, 1940, nos. 4-5, p. 28.

30. See the detailed analysis of the Red Army troop transit issue in Hugh Ragsdale, *The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

31. Gabriel Gorodetsky, *Stafford Cripps' Mission to Moscow, 1940-42* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 125-135, and Gorodetsky, "The Hess affair and Anglo-Soviet relations on the eve of 'Barbarossa,'" *The English Historical Review*, vol. CI, no. 399 (April 1986), pp. 405-420.

Purges Stalin had not shown himself much concerned over the human costs to the Soviet peoples of his policies. However, it is also probable that the awesome victories of the Luftwaffe and the Panzers in Poland and France may have changed his attitude, if not about human sacrifice, then at least about the likely widespread destruction of the Soviet industrial and communications infrastructures in a German attack.

Finally, military unpreparedness was an important motive for Soviet appeasement of Hitler. Kremlin propaganda trumpeted the strength of the supposedly unbeatable Red Army, but Stalin knew better than anyone to what degree the Great Purges had ravaged the officer corps as well as vital cadres of defense industry scientists, engineers and managers. The inept performance of the Red Army in the Winter War against Finland as well as its problems occupying the Baltic, eastern Poland, and Bessarabia demonstrated the reality of these concerns.³² Although Soviet forces fought very well in two major border incidents in 1938 and 1939 against the Japanese, the humiliation in Finland must have suggested to Stalin, as it did to the Germans, how unprepared the Soviet Army was. These fears were certainly reinforced by the results of the January 1941 war games. In those exercises the aggressor side (i.e., the side representing the Germans) overcame Soviet defenses and won the campaign.³³ Hence Stalin desperately needed to postpone as long as possible that awful day when his forces would have to face the Wehrmacht. Appeasement was thus designed to buy space and time – additional space in which to absorb the anticipated German blow and more time to build a modern army to meet it.

As is so often the case in human affairs, means subvert ends. The end goal of Stalin's appeasement policy was to prepare his forces adequately for the German attack that was sure to come. Yet, Stalin became so reliant on the strategy of appeasement that he was not prepared for the blow when it actually fell. He seems to have convinced himself that Hitler would not attack until after he had defeated England in the West. After all, Hitler had stated and written on many occasions that he would not repeat the Kaiser's error of trapping Germany in an unwinnable two-front war. With England still unbowed in June of 1941, it seemed that the policy of playing for time and space was still viable. Stalin was not unaware in the months leading up to Barbarossa of the growing evidence of German offensive deployments. Under the circumstances, however, he chose to interpret these moves as the prelude to new demands by Hitler for further Soviet

32. Mark von Hagen, "Soviet Soldiers and Officers on the Eve of the German Invasion," *Soviet Union/Union Soviétique*, vol. 18, nos. 1-3 (1991), pp. 79-101.

33. M.V. Zakharov, *General'nyi shtab v predvoennye gody*, (Moscow: Voen. Izdat., 1989), pp. 239-251. Also see Iu.A. Gorkov, "Gotovil li Stalin uprezhdaiushchii udar protiv Gitlera v 1941g.?" *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, 1993, no. 3, pp. 29-45.

concessions, or possibly even a provocation by conservative German generals unauthorized by Hitler. Further appeasement, he hoped, would postpone war until 1942 or 1943, that is, until his own military preparations were perfected. Stalin might even have gone as far as giving up Lithuania to the Germans in order to buy a bit more time. The growing weight of evidence from British Ultra sources and from his own intelligence service of a pending German attack was not enough to offset Stalin's desperate faith in the continuing efficacy of appeasement. After all, the full-scale alert and deployments which some of his generals were urging on him might, in themselves, provoke a German attack. Failure to take these measures until far too late (in fact, just hours before the attack) was Stalin's last – and nearly fatal – attempt at appeasement.³⁴

Nationalist China

The Nationalist Chinese regime of Chiang Kai-shek, though operating in a far different environment and facing different sorts of threats, followed a policy of appeasement toward Japanese aggression up to 1937 which paralleled the appeasement policy of the western powers. Manchuria and parts of coastal China had come under Japanese influence even before the creation of the Republic of China in 1912. In September of 1931 officers of Japan's Guandong (or Kwantung) Army precipitated a terrorist incident in Manchuria which they in turn blamed on the Chinese and used as a pretext to attack Manchurian and Chinese military garrisons and seize control of Manchuria.

Chiang Kai-shek did not want to expand the limited fighting in Manchuria into a full-scale Sino-Japanese war, although the Manchurian warlord Zhang Xueliang had formally accepted Chinese Nationalist sovereignty over his region in 1928 and certainly most Chinese regarded Manchuria as an integral part of their homeland. For Chiang, fear of massive casualties among his people probably played no more a role in his decision-making than it had for Stalin. Military weakness, however, was a prime consideration. Although the total forces available to Chiang exceeded two million troops, approximately three fifths of that total consisted of provincial soldiers whose discipline, equipment, training, and political loyalties left much to be desired. Later, American General Albert Wedemeyer would characterize the Nationalist army as merely a “loose coalition” of forces.³⁵ Even the central army, directly under

34. Gabriel Gorodetsky's aptly titled book details this bizarre episode, *Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). In fairness, Stalin was not the only one to misinterpret the German military buildup – so did many foreign diplomatic observers. Heinrichs, *Threshold of War*, p. 26.

35. Jui-te Chang, *K'ang-chan shih-chi ti kuo-chun jen-shin* [Anatomy of the Nationalist Army, 1937-1945] (Nankang, Taipei: Academica Sinica, 1993), p. 124.

Chiang's command, was no match for the tanks, heavy artillery and modern aircraft of the Japanese army. Chiang did not want a military confrontation with Japan before he had the opportunity to train and equip massive forces.³⁶

Anti-communism and underestimation of the Japanese threat also combined in Chiang's thinking to reinforce a policy of appeasement. Arguing the necessity of "unification before resistance," he was intent upon eliminating his communist rivals, Mao Zedong and the CCP, before dealing with the foreign enemy. His famous remark that the Japanese were a disease of the skin, while the Chinese communists were a disease of the heart, suggests that Chiang both miscalculated the menace of Japanese imperialism and also failed to understand that a weak Guomintang (or Kuomintang) response to Japanese aggression could discredit the KMT in its domestic struggle with communism.³⁷ Chiang, therefore, committed the best of his armies to five anti-communist extermination campaigns in south China between 1931 and 1934, rather than deploy them against the Japanese in Manchuria.³⁸

Judging the magnitude and immediacy of the Japanese threat to China was understandably difficult for Chiang. Whereas Hitler dissimulated about his firmly established aggressive intentions, Japanese "policy" in regard to China as constantly shifting and amorphous – as likely to be made by low-ranking officers in the field as by responsible leaders in Tokyo.³⁹ While Japanese diplomats spoke of conciliation and pursuing shared interests with China, Imperial officers in Manchuria and Tianjin talked of Chinese banditry and the need to teach their Chinese "little brother" a severe lesson. The Guomintang had declared its intention in 1928 to invalidate all of its unequal treaties with the imperialist powers. This was a threat to the special privileges in China which most Japanese considered both vital and inadequate in their current form. What was common in Japanese policy was that no one in Tokyo or in the field saw China as anything more than a junior partner in a Japanese dominated East Asia.

Moreover, the Republic of China lacked some of the core characteristics of a modern nation-state. The Guomintang "unification" of China in 1928 had been an incomplete victory. In actuality, Chiang and the

36. When Chiang finally confronted the Japanese in full scale combat, he lost nearly three fifths of his crack troops in the battle for Shanghai along. Chang, *K'ang-chan shih-chi ti kuo-chun jen-shin*, p. 20.

37. Lloyd E. Eastman, *The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 246.

38. See Akira Iriye, *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific* (London: Longman, 1987), chapt. 1; and James E. Sheridan, *China in Disintegration* (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 246-69.

39. James B. Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 172-180.

central government only reliably controlled five provinces around Nanjing . Outside that region, dissident factions within the Guomindang and local warlords (even though they wore KMT uniforms) exercised effective control. Zhang Xueliang's acceptance of unification had been more like an alliance than a submission to central authority. A rival Guomindang government established itself in Canton and sporadically fought battles with forces loyal to Nanjing. The Japanese take-over of Manchuria stimulated more cooperation among the Chinese (for example, uniting long time party rivals Chiang and Wang Jingwei), but the fragmentation of power faced by Chiang Kai-shek made Roosevelt's problems with the US Senate pale in comparison.⁴⁰

The western powers undertook no effective action to block Japanese expansion either. China appealed to the League of Nations for assistance and a League Commission of Inquiry condemned Japan's aggression. The League could not go beyond moral censure, however, unless the western powers were ready to impose effective sanctions on Tokyo. Hopes for collective security against aggression foundered on this point. France was too preoccupied with European affairs. Great Britain was unwilling to risk war in a region where Japan's military and naval forces were far stronger than its own, especially since London could not count on American support. The United States simply declared its non-recognition of any abridgment of American rights or Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria, but took no further action.

The Soviet Union, its rearmament program not yet completed and its forces locked in a bloody struggle to collectivize the peasantry, chose to acquiesce in the Japanese absorption of Manchuria. Far from resisting aggression, Moscow let the Japanese army use the Chinese Eastern Railway (which was then under its control) and hinted at the possibility of selling the railroad to Japan. The Soviet Union even proposed a non-aggression pact with Tokyo.

While the great powers gestured ineffectively, the Guandong army proceeded to extend its sway over more of China. Under pressure from Tokyo not to precipitate an open war in China, Japanese commanders adopted the tactic of piecemeal subversion in north China and Mongolia. They bribed and intimidated local officials and warlords, stirred up regional separatist movements, and sometimes resorted to naked violence, always justified as defensive reactions to Chinese provocations. Chronic, if low intensity, warfare spread south of the Great Wall. In spite of growing popular pressure to resist this renewed invasion, Chiang continued to appease the aggressors. He and his

40. Akira Iriye, "Chang Hsüeh-liang and the Japanese," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 20, no. 1 (1960), pp. 33-43; and So Wai-chor, "The Origins of the Wang-Chiang Cooperation in 1932," *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 25, no. 1 (1991), pp. 175-208.

foreign minister, Wang Jingwei, negotiated a series of truces with the Japanese from 1932 to 1935, each requiring Chinese concessions and each soon violated by the Guandong army.⁴¹ Chiang even went so far as to propose a Sino-Japanese treaty of friendship in 1935. But, as long as Nanjing was unwilling to recognize Manchukuo, relinquish north China, and become nothing more than a Japanese client state, no diplomatic solution was possible.

Continuing Japanese aggression pushed Chiang to consider an accommodation with the USSR and even with the Chinese communists. There was high level internal opposition to any such initiative. Wang Jingwei, for example, denounced it as "drinking poison to quench thirst."⁴² The Moscow-Nanjing negotiations foundered, however, on mutual suspicions and the intractable problem of the Chinese communists. The extraordinary Sian Incident in December of 1936 (Chiang's kidnaping by Zhang Xueliang) finally forced the KMT leader to establish a "united front" with Mao Zedong, but that shotgun marriage was soon annulled in practice. Only the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in the summer of 1937, which Chiang interpreted as a Japanese grab for all of north China, finally motivated him to confront Japan in full scale war.

Appeasement of aggression, motivated more by weakness than principle, had made its first, but certainly not its last, appearance in the Far East in the 1930s. If anything, the barrage of western denunciations followed by no effective action tended to stifle criticism of the Manchurian affair within Japan and to unite the nation in support of a more aggressive policy.

Conclusion

These few examples suggest that appeasement of Axis aggression was a policy common to all the non-Axis powers and was motivated by a common set of factors: namely, misperception of the character and extent of the Axis threat, ideologically based hostility to some potential alliance partners, a heightened fear of armed conflict stemming from painful experiences in the Great War, and military unpreparedness. Although the nature, extent and timing of appeasement differed among the five non-Axis powers, their common reaction to Axis aggression suggests that broader themes in global history were operating beneath the surface events of the diplomatic struggle.

41. So Wai Chor, "The Making of the Guomindang's Japan Policy, 1932-1945," *Modern China*, vol. 28, no. 2 (April 2002), pp. 213-252.

42. So, "Making of the Guomindang's Japan Policy," p. 244.

A Return to the Past: Teaching Russian and Soviet History from a Eurasian Perspective

*Christopher J. Ward
Clayton State University*

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, those who teach Russian history have faced a conundrum now that the convenient bipolarity of the Cold War is over ten years departed. I feel that I can use such a term as “convenient” comfortably at this time since for many scholars, including myself, the Cold War can now be thought of as a time of relative stability in comparison to today’s uncertain times. In this era of the eastward expansion of NATO and the European Union, nations and territories which were under Russian or Soviet influence for most of the twentieth century are now orienting themselves away from Eurasia. Soon, regions that were once part of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance or COMECON, will become a part of the decidedly Western institutions of NATO and the EU. We as educators in Slavic studies must approach the history of Russia in a manner that underscores its importance while at the same time emphasizing Russia’s relevance in a world which appears more interested in lands outside of the former Soviet Union. It is my view that a pedagogical approach that utilizes the rubric of Eurasianism, among other perspectives, can drive home for students, especially undergraduates, the notion of Russia’s continued viability and importance in a multipolar and insecure world.

In proposing a return to a Eurasian perspective in the teaching of Russian history, we must be cautious in our use of terminology. Among some of those in contemporary Russia who identify themselves as Eurasianists, the notion of Eurasianism entails a decidedly jingoistic, exclusionist philosophy in which Russia has a special mission to protect the Eurasian (read Slavic) people from the perils of encroaching Western ideas and religious traditions.¹ I prefer to identify this group of individuals as “neo-Eurasianists” in order to differentiate them from the Eurasianists, or what I call the “classic Eurasianists,” of the early twentieth century. This latter set of people possessed core beliefs which varied greatly from those of modern day proponents of neo-Eurasianism.

¹ I. G. Yakovenko, *Rossiiskoe gosudarstvo: natsional'nye interesy, granitsy, perspektivy* (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograf, 1999): 51-52.

Specifically, at a time when many Russians disagree about what form their nation should take and what it actually means to be Russian in the post-Soviet world, neo-Eurasianists see the Atlantic world as a primary root cause of the loss of Russian and, more generally, Slavic prestige around the globe. With NATO and the European Union growing in an ominous direction eastward toward the Russian heartland, some neo-Eurasianists seek to turn back the clock of recent history and return to a world where Russia, not the soulless West, will retake its rightful position as the dominant economic and geopolitical power in Eurasia.

Among others in contemporary Russia who choose the same moniker, Eurasianism includes a need to cooperate with other ethnic and religious groups that inhabit the Eurasian landmass. While this variant of neo-Eurasianism advocates inclusion of Muslims, Chinese, and other non-Slavic and non-Orthodox groups rather than their exclusion, recent events in Russia have weakened this permutation of neo-Eurasianism in favor of the first incarnation of neo-Eurasianism that I described. Specifically, the current conflict in Chechnya has thrown a number of obstacles in the way of those who support an integrationist approach to neo-Eurasianism. While the appeal of either form of neo-Eurasianism among the wider Russian public is difficult to gauge, it is quite plausible that those who follow the second type of neo-Eurasianism, continue to identify themselves as belonging within mainstream Russian Orthodoxy, and support any kind of meaningful and equitable cooperation with the Islamic peoples of Eurasia generally and the numerous Muslim populations of the Caucasus specifically will find it difficult to attract followers to their cause.²

In the West, the mention of Eurasianism among many who study Russia or the Commonwealth of Independent States evokes a pejorative connotation. I believe that it is appropriate to discuss first the more recent incarnations of Eurasianism, which I have already mentioned might be more appropriately termed neo-Eurasianism. Then, I will explore how the older, non-ultranationalistic and culturally inclusive concept of classic Eurasianism can be used effectively in the classroom. It is my aim in this paper to demonstrate that when properly employed, the traditional concept of Eurasianism can augment Western students' understanding of Russian history and, perhaps more relevantly, Russia's position in the contemporary world. Allow me to propose the integration of such a Eurasian perspective into our pedagogical strategy.

To begin with, a teacher of Russian history must promote his or her students' awareness of the existence of the dual manifestations of neo-Eurasianism which, for better or worse, have become synonymous with classic

² See Anatoly M. Khazanov, "Ethnic Nationalism in the Russian Federation," *Daedalus* 126, no. 3 (1997): 121-142.

Eurasianism. This replacement of a historical concept of Russia as a Eurasian entity that has a special and superlative global role with a relatively new or oppositional anti-Western variant of Eurasianism is, in my conception, a confusion of two mutually antithetical notions. I intend to reveal here that neo-Eurasianism understood collectively has many dissimilarities from classic Eurasianism. The currently more popular form of neo-Eurasian philosophy, which employs a decidedly anti-Western view and rhetoric, has found a voice in a number of media outlets and spokespeople. Among the most vehement expressions of neo-Eurasianism are the writings of publicist and philosopher Alexandr Panarin, numerous articles in what some observers have described as the reactionary and often pro-Stalinist newspaper *Zavtra* (Tomorrow) published by Alexandr Prokhanov³. In addition, the writings of Alexandr Dugin, particularly his 1997 book *Osnovy geopolitiki: geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii* (The Principles of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia), fall squarely within the camp of the more popular brand of neo-Eurasianism.⁴

Interestingly, the origins of neo-Eurasianism emerge not from the post-Soviet era, but from the work of the then Soviet historian Lev Gumilev.⁵ His 1970 book *Poiski vymyshlennogo tsarstva* (In Search of the Imaginary Kingdom) represented Gumilev's initial foray into neo-Eurasianism.⁶ Despite the Brezhnev era policy of not-so-subtle Russification, Gumilev's scholarship did not attract a large audience during the years before Mikhail Gorbachev's accession as Soviet General Secretary in 1985. The potential of a positive reception of Gumilev's philosophy had changed, however, by the late 1980s.

Gumilev's work from the Gorbachev years, in particular his 1989 effort entitled *Drevniaia Rus' i Velikaia Step'* (Ancient Rus and the Great Steppe), clearly reveals his nostalgia for the past great days of the already weakening Soviet empire. Also, the relative popularity of this second work illustrated to what degree the public's tolerance and even support of such unabashed Great Russocentrism had improved since the Brezhnev years.⁷ Gumilev's unequivocal

³ Gordon M. Hahn, "The Rebirth of Eurasianism," *The Russia Journal* 14 (July 12-18, 2002). Accessed at <http://www.cdi.org/russia/215-14-pr.cfm> and Olga Koulieri, "Russian 'Eurasianism' and the Geopolitics of the Black Sea," The Defence Academy of the United Kingdom Conflict Studies Research Centre, Special Studies document S43. Accessed at <http://da.mod.uk/CSRC/Home/pdfs/S43-chap4.pdf>.

⁴ Alexandr Dugin, *Osnovy geopolitiki. Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii* (Moscow: Arktogeia, 1997).

⁵ Anatoly M. Khazanov, "Contemporary Russian Nationalism between East and West," *Transit-Europäische Revue* 21, 2002. Accessed at <http://www.iwm.at/t-21.txt.htm>.

⁶ Lev Gumilev, *Poiski vymyshlennogo tsarstva* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo vostochnoi literatury, 1970).

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Drevniaia Rus' i Velikaia Step'* (Moscow: Mysl', 1989).

neo-Eurasianism would resonate with an even wider audience after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991.⁸

Those neo-Eurasianists who followed Gumilev also advocate a strident anti-American ethos and an extreme disdain for globalization. In the minds of this theory's adherents, those Western nations that promote the strengthening of global contacts eschew spirituality for a tactless and overt grab for the world's resources, including Russia's, and the souls of the world's population.⁹ Although many neo-Eurasianists have been labeled as ultranationalists in the West, the two philosophies are incompatible in the minds of at least one neo-Eurasianist, the aforementioned Alexandr Prokhanov. The founder in 2002 of a new political party named *Evraziia* (Eurasia), Prokhanov has emphatically argued on numerous occasions in his newspaper *Zavtra* that his brand of Eurasianism rejects Great Russian nationalism in favor of an inclusive conception in which Russia serves as a unifier of Eurasia in the face of a growing Western menace. Prokhanov identifies this threat in terms of conniving American-led capitalism and heretical Christianity in the guise of proselytizing waves of uninvited and unwanted Protestants of all persuasions. Even though some neo-Eurasianists see Russia's indigenous Muslim population as a potential ally in the struggle against Western (read American) hegemony, in reality many neo-Eurasianists gush the same anti-Islamic verbiage that some of Russia's other political groups do in this era of the Russian occupation or defense, depending on one's perspective, of Chechnya.

It is easy to assume that neo-Eurasianists in today's Russia, whether they advocate Eurasian unity or not, represent only a small group of voices in an increasingly pluralistic society. While it is true that hard-core Eurasianists constitute only a fraction of Russia's political milieu, in my opinion it would be a mistake to dismiss the neo-Eurasianists as simply a group of misguided xenophobes. The fact that such prominent political figures as Yevgenii Primakov, former Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, and Gennadii Zhuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (known by

⁸ Regarding the impact of Gumilev's scholarship, see Y. M. Budny, *Reinventing Russia: Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953-1991* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) and V. Shnirelman and S. Pananrin, "Lev Nikolaevich Gumilev: osnavatel' etnologii?" *Acta Eurasica* 3, no. 10 (2000): 5-37.

⁹ Charles Clover, "Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 2 (March-April 1999): 9. See also *Programma i ustav politicheskoi partii "Evraziia"* (Moscow: Arktogeia-Tsentr, 2002).

its Russian acronym KPRF), have both expressed neo-Eurasianist sympathies since the early 1990s.¹⁰

Primakov and particularly Zhuganov represent sizeable constituencies in Russia who may not support the ideals of neo-Eurasianism wholeheartedly, but whose potential support of neo-Eurasianism and undeniable political significance must be considered nonetheless. If for no other reason, we must be aware that neo-fascism is on the rise throughout much of provincial Russia, especially among young people. While the old Stalinist nostalgia employed by Zhuganov in courting Russia's dwindling senior population certainly fails to resonate with most Russian youth, I would argue that neo-Eurasianism's emphasis on Russia's leading role in the world, especially her special position as an alternative to American military and economic might, has already found an audience among some disenfranchised young people.

As the Western media has shown in its usual hyperbolic fashion, the modest prosperity enjoyed by some Russians has, by and large, remained strictly within the so-called "capitals" of Moscow and St. Petersburg. It is not here where Eurasianism may find its greatest following, but rather in vast non-metropolitan areas of the country where tangible benefits of Russia's current economic success are more difficult to find. For the Western student of Russia, an understanding of this urban-rural disconnect is crucial when engaging in a classroom discussion of neo-Eurasianism and its potential popular appeal.

Now we turn our attention to the original, or what I term classic Eurasianism and its potential utility in the classroom. The first concept of Eurasianism has a longer history and more distinguished pedigree than its more recent successor. Perhaps the first suggestion of a philosophy or worldview that we can identify as Eurasianist comes in the 1920s from the ethnographer and philologist Nikolai S. Trubetskoi.¹¹ According to Trubetskoi, the disparate traditions of Eurasia included those of the Russia as well as the Ugro-Finnish and Turkic lands. In Trubetskoi's determinist mind, Russian civilization not only contained Slavic elements, but also the best attributes of a number of myriad Eurasian traditions ranging from Eastern Europe to East Asia. Ultimately, he believed, Russia's homogeneous expression of a varied Eurasian

¹⁰ See G. A. Zhuganov, *Rossia—rodina moia. Ideologiia gosudarstvennogo patriotizma* (Moscow: Informpechat', 1996) and *Geografiia pobedy. Osnovy rossiskoi politiki* (Moscow: Informpechat', 1997).

¹¹ See N. S. Trubetskoi, *The Legacy of Ghengis Khan and Other Essays on Russia's Identity* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publication, 1991) and *Evropa i chevechestvo* (Sofia: Rossiisko-Bolgarskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1920). See also Mark Bassin, "Classical Eurasianism and the Geopolitics of Russian Identity," Collaborative Research Network Working Paper Archive. Accessed at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~cm/cm_papers/Bassin.pdf.

heritage would allow it to take its appointed place among the world's preeminent cultures.

When discussing classic Eurasianism with my students, I endeavor to stress its articulation of the preeminence of the Eurasian landmass and, by extension, the notion that Russia served as a unique nexus of numerous European and so-called "Asiatic" cultures. In class, I prefer to use the term "Asian" rather than "Asiatic" in order to avoid any potential misunderstanding that might arise if I were to employ this notion in its modern context. Historically, the descriptor "Asiatic" entails a identification with the ethnic typography of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that Edward Said and others have termed "Orientalism."¹² This Eurocentric philosophy, which found expression in North America as the so-called "Yellow Peril" of Asian immigration to the United States and Canada, stressed the inherent inferiority of Asia vis-à-vis the West. In an attempt to broach this linguistic and cultural phenomenon with my Russian history students, I ask a fundamental question. Did Trubetskoi support Orientalism as his contemporaries conceived of it? I find the range of answers often reveal that students are able to see that Trubetskoi's version of Eurasianism may have not completely dovetailed with the Eurocentrism of some of his Western colleagues.

One can also trace the beginnings of Eurasianism to the Russian émigré historian George Vernadsky, who in 1927 predicted the collapse of the then five year-old Soviet Union.¹³ Arguing that Eurasia had experienced concomitant cycles of unity and dissolution, Vernadsky stated that the Soviet Union would fall victim to the same decentralizing forces that had rent apart the old Russian Empire. He also postulated that from the ashes of the USSR might arise a phoenix of what we may term a "Eurasian Union." Within such a new environment, Russia, now free of the shackles of the inherently foreign philosophy of Marxism, would be free to extend its economic and geopolitical influence across a large area. Vernadsky clearly envisioned an increased Russian role in what the early twentieth century British author Sir Halford J. Mackinder, whom many consider to be the father of Western geopolitical thought, termed the "heartland" of Eurasia.¹⁴

¹² See Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995) and A. L. Macfie, *Orientalism* (London: Longman, 2002).

¹³ Elena Chinyaeva, "Russia in the CIS: The High Costs of Expansion," *Prism* 7, no. 3 (March 30, 2001). Accessed at http://russia.jamestown.org/pubs/view/pri_007_003_005.htm.

¹⁴ See Sir H. J. Mackinder, *Britain and the British Seas* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1902) and Milan Hauner, *What Is Asia to Us?: Russia's Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990).

How, then, to introduce both classic Eurasianism and the neo-Eurasianisms to the typical group of undergraduates who have had little or no exposure to Russia and its history? As one who has grappled with this exact question as he struggles to develop lesson plans during this and previous semesters, I have a few thoughts as how to segue a discussion of Russian history generally into an evaluation of Russia's significance as a legitimate Eurasian state.

In most semesters, I begin my discussion of Russia's Eurasian identity with a look at the Mongol contact with Russia which began in the thirteenth century. Here, I argue that the Mongol-Tatar impact on Russia was profound enough to create a series of cultural, social, and political links, albeit mostly forced ones, between Russia and the other Mongol-Tatar controlled lands to her east. One can argue, I say, that through violence and later with the collusion of the indigenous elites within its dominion, the Mongol-Tatar suzerains engendered a primitive Eurasian state that included all of the Mongol dominions from China to India to Mesopotamia.

After the Slavs' expulsion of the so-called "Mongol yoke" beginning in the fourteenth century, one might reasonably state that the loose Eurasian union that had included Russia was now a thing of the past. However, in discussing the rise of Muscovy with my students, I find it useful to stress that the Muscovite state evidenced many Mongol-Tatar characteristics, from its administration of the taxation system to conduct of diplomacy. I have discovered that the use of primary sources¹⁵, both from the Mongol and Muscovite periods, can be a useful expedient in allowing students to discern Eurasian tendencies in Russian history without my having to engage in the often over-utilized and rightly much-maligned professorial behavior of the "sage on the stage." I am convinced that such an approach benefits neither myself nor my students, especially in regard to such potentially complex and controversial philosophies as classic Eurasianism and neo-Eurasianism.

The expansion of Muscovy and later the Russian Empire eastward from the sixteenth century onward represents another area where a pedagogical approach that includes classic Eurasianism can prove beneficial. In regard to the emergence of classic Eurasianists and those who opposed them, I find that our discussions of Russia during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are augmented by a brief exposure to the writings of the aforementioned Nikolai

¹⁵ While there are a number of primary source collections on early Russian history to choose from, I have found Thomas Riha's two volume *Readings in Russian Civilization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd revised ed., 1969) to be helpful. While dated, Riha's editing is concise and mostly jargon-free, which in my opinion allows students to delve into primary sources with greater ease.

Trubetskoi and George Vernadsky, both of which are available in English. In addition, I feel that a discussion of the Westernizer-Slavophile debate that raged among Russia's intellectuals during the 1800s can be framed effectively by a consideration of classic Eurasianism. For example, I employ such primary sources as Nicholas Karamzin's *Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia*¹⁶, Peter Chaadaev's "The Philosophical Letters Addressed to a Lady" and "Apology of a Madman"¹⁷, Vissarion Belinsky's "Letter to Gogol"¹⁸, Alexander Herzen's "Young Moscow"¹⁹, and Ivan Aksakov's "A Slavophile Statement."²⁰ When engaging these texts with students, I try to suggest that the existence of a classic Eurasian perspective may have sparked the respective Westernism or Slavophilism of the aforementioned writers.

A salient question within the process of teaching Russian history from an Eurasian perspective revolves around the transformation, or to phrase it more accurately, replacement of classic Eurasianism with neo-Eurasianism in Russia over the last few decades. Here, I find that the Internet can play a vital role by allowing students to access contemporary documents from a variety of viewpoints including, but not limited to, the neo-Eurasianist perspectives. While Russian history websites abound, I have found the Russian history site of Bucknell University's History Department and the University of Pittsburgh's Russian and East European Studies Internet Resources Page to be the most comprehensive, frequently updated, and user-friendly online resources dealing with the *longue durée* of Russian history.²¹

One of the most difficult questions I find myself being asked by more than one thoughtful student during a typical Russian history seminar is, to paraphrase, "What is Russia? It is European, Asian, Eurasian, or something completely unique to itself?" Here, I attempt not to foist any personal preconceptions regarding the thorny dilemma of Russia's identity, but rather use the classic Eurasian perspective as well as modern neo-Eurasianism to illustrate the validity of each of these four proposed criteria for Russia's taxonomy.

¹⁶ See Richard Pipes, ed., *Karamzin's Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959).

¹⁷ See Raymond McNally and Richard Tempest, eds., *Philosophical Works of Peter Chaadaev* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991).

¹⁸ See Vissarion Belinsky, *Selected Philosophical Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956).

¹⁹ See Alexander Herzen, *Selected Philosophical Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956).

²⁰ See Olga Novikova, *Skobelev and the Slavonic Cause* (London: Longmans, Green & Company, 1883).

²¹ See <http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/history.html> and <http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/reesweb/> respectively.

In sum, educators often find that many a pedagogical theory that appears effective in the abstract often fails to achieve one's intended goal when put into practice. While I am by no means advocating that a focus on classic Eurasianism and the two variants of neo-Eurasianism should dominate an entire one- or two-semester sequence in Russian history, I do feel that such a paradigm has its merits if utilized judiciously. I am convinced that we as educators in Russian and Slavic studies can use a Eurasian perspective to help our students comprehend that Russia and other nations of the former Soviet Union are part of a region that is still viable politically, economically, and culturally. In addition, the former USSR is worthy of our attention due to its geopolitical significance, if for no other reason. The introduction of the various incarnations of Eurasianism can, in my mind, help to stimulate a revival of interest in the history of Russia and its neighbors.

**The Impact of American Political Thought
on Historical Analysis:
A Case Study of the Nicaraguan Revolution**

*John-Paul Wilson
St. John's University, Queens, NY*

One need not read many accounts of events related to the late twentieth century Nicaraguan revolution to realize that there are great differences in the analyses of those events. Upon further examination, however, one might suspect that these differences have more to do with the analysis process than some myopic view of actual occurrences. The North American historiography of the Sandinista Revolution is a wide assortment of texts composed from a variety of different standpoints and techniques. Thus, in order to arrive at a more objective historical account, one must first have a better understanding of the analysis process before he/she can begin to critique prior analysis. In the present paper, I first review the multiple factors of the historical analysis process with regard to personal and political bias followed by discussion of some analytical differences impacting the various accounts of the Nicaraguan revolution. I then discuss examples of divergence among thirty papers by twenty-seven authors distributed uniformly across three ideological schools and published in the decade beginning with the rise of the Sandinistas to power followed by their ultimate defeat at the end of the decade. Although personal bias resulting from extreme interest in the revolution seems to be in play among all the authors, it is ideologically driven bias that seems to play a dominant role in the analysis. Furthermore, frank bias is identified among conservative and liberal analysts who are mainly driven to support or detract from operative foreign policy decisions made early in the decade by the Carter administration and later decisions within the Reagan administration. Radicals were less affected by frank bias but, readily used world systems theory in their analysis leading to biased results contrived to further the aims of an anti-imperialist agenda. I will provide specific data to support these conclusions during the course of this paper.

Perspective and Historical Fact

In the act of transcribing events, historians work with what they believe to be a set of historical facts. Having been identified as fact, it is widely maintained that a particular piece of knowledge is true. Historical facts, however, are much more elusive than one would assume. According to Carl L.

Becker, the facts of history are not "concrete portions of reality but rather aspects of them."¹ Experience helps to supply images from the sources in which the historian is working, and it is the extent of the historian's experience that determines the quality of his testimony.² The historian can in no way account for all of the facts surrounding an event.³ The work of the historian is often limited by the quality and availability of relevant sources. In which case, historians have relied upon inference and imagination to help create a more complete record of the facts.⁴ As a result, the history of an event is never written by two individuals in precisely the same way. The mind will select and discriminate every detail of information that is put before it. As new facts become available, old concepts are "modified, distinguished and even destroyed," whereas new ideas often become "the new centers of attention."⁵ For this reason, only through a "scientific" detachment from his/her own passions and predilections can the historian hope to provide an objective treatment of the subject at hand.⁶

Despite attempts to reduce personal factors within the writing process, history is still affected by individual experiences and the "relative texture of time and place."⁷ Historians will always be influenced by what they know about human society as well as their own experiences as men (or women) themselves.⁸ As noted by Harvard philosopher, Donald C. Williams, historical propositions are assumptions established in collaboration with other approaches toward the same subject. Even in the historical analysis of primary sources, past approaches serve as a framework for outlining current research activity. Each historian, when examining a particular event, uses his or her own personal capabilities to imagine the circumstances surrounding that event.⁹ When embarking on research, the historian looks for what is personally important rather than that which he or she does not care about. The intentions, hypotheses, and facts that one selects to support them represent the *interest* that a historian

¹ P.L. Snyder, ed., *Detachment and the Writing of History: Essays and Letters of Carl L. Becker* (New York, Cornell University Press, 1958), 10-12 & 47.

² *Ibid.*, 12-13.

³ *Ibid.*, 15-18; Walter Rundell Jr., "Communication of Values in Teaching History," *Social Studies* 54, no. 7 (1963): 243.

⁴ C.V. Wedgwood, "The Historian and the World," *Time and Tide* (Nov. 14 & 21, 1942): 905 & 926.

⁵ Snyder, *Detachment and the Writing of History*, 25.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 8; E.K. Dortmund, "The Problem of Objectivity," *Social Studies* 61, no. 1 (Jan. 1970): 18.

⁷ Dortmund, "The Problem of Objectivity," 18-19; Richard J. Evans, *In Defense of History*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), 15.

⁸ Christopher Blake, "Can History Be Objective?" *Mind* 64, no. 253 (Jan. 1955): 61; Snyder, *Detachment and the Writing of History*, 21.

⁹ D.C. Williams, "More on the Ordinarity of History," *Journal of Philosophy* 52, no. 10 (1955): 269; Blake, "Can History Be Objective?" 62.

has toward a particular subject.¹⁰ This favoritism or *bias* is "an uncontrollable form of interest" that can prevent a historian from making a lasting contribution to the body of historical knowledge.¹¹ In this light, historiography becomes not so much a chronicle of the historical truths recorded by others but rather "a history of history subjectively understood."¹² As a result, a historian may have to consider a variety of viewpoints for any hope of achieving mastery of the truth.

Whereas it may be difficult to recognize certain preferences and motivations, frank bias can be easily detected by the seeming lack of pretense on the part of its practitioner. They may have leaned heavily upon their own hypotheses or, in some cases, simply refused to entertain any opposing viewpoints.¹³ Preferences need not blind the individual to the probable truth. In fact, preference can be an active incentive for accuracy. But once an author has allowed one's own convictions to supersede any reasonable interpretation of the facts, the author's writings become contrived in that they only serve to further his or her own beliefs.¹⁴

As the historical profession entered the modern age, historians gradually advanced from the mere chronicle or narrative to a more analytical form of writing. The creation and use of effective models have taken historians to the height of their craft. However, in their effort to find meaning within groups of otherwise disconnected facts, historians have run the risk of becoming systematic by attempting to find one meaning to *all* the facts.¹⁵ This type of speculation has lent itself to bias in that historians are prone to use their own ideology to find the single cause of world events. Systematic historians believe that one can discover universal truths through the application of certain social and scientific methods.¹⁶

Whereas politics was once a more concise and dispassionate pursuit, ideological preferences transformed it into a struggle between rivals for the

¹⁰ Dortmund, "The Problem of Objectivity," 19; Jacques Barzun and Henry F. Graf, *The Modern Researcher*, Third Edition (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 186.

¹¹ Barzun, *The Modern Researcher*, 186-187; John Langel Suloff, "Bias in History Writing," (MA Thesis, Teachers' College Municipal University of Akron, June 1925), 2.

¹² Snyder, *Detachment and the Writing of History*, 66 & 75; Williams, "The Ordinarity of History," 275.

¹³ Barzun, *The Modern Researcher*, 186-187.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 188; Williams, "The Ordinarity of History," 275.

¹⁵ R.W.K. Hinton, "Does Art Obscure the Truth?," *Listener* (Feb. 6, 1958): 233; Rundell, "Communication of Values," 247.

¹⁶ Barzun, *The Modern Researcher*, 193-195.

control of ideas.¹⁷ In a world where ideology has become a powerful tool that can shape the course of human events, one must have a solid historical framework of various ideologies before he or she can adequately determine how certain ideas have come to reach such a position of power. Historical context is essential to political understanding. For this reason, I have set up an abbreviated framework of principal North American ideologies so that the reader might be able to better understand the role that ideology plays in North American historical analysis.

Brief Overview of North American Ideologies

As is clear in the prior discussion, historical analysis tends to be dominated by the worldview and experiences of the analyst. Whether it involves the promotion of individual development and welfare, the protection of Western values, or the propagation of class struggle, the scholar's view of *how the world works and how it should work* can influence how he/she writes about world events. In the case of the Nicaraguan Revolution led by the *Frente Sandinista Liberación Nacional* (FSLN), the log of North American publications, mainly limited to the beginning of the Sandinista rule and ending soon after the ascendancy of the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) in the 1990 elections, reveal three distinct worldviews in relation to these historical events.¹⁸

Radicals had come to believe that the United States and other developed nations were growing wealthy at the expense of poorer, less developed countries. Such notions of economic exploitation were based on the larger assumption that developing nations were trapped in an unequal relationship with the Western world. Since the end of the colonial era, imperialist nations have relinquished direct political control over most of their colonies, yet they have retained many of their economic investments through their support of indigenous elites.¹⁹ By overthrowing the ruling classes, the workers would not only break free from the structure of oppression that had bound them, but also separate from the foreign capitalists that had created the

¹⁷ Ian Adams, *Political Ideology Today*, Second Edition (Manchester, NH: Manchester University Press, 2001), 3; Raymond E. Ries, "Social Science and Ideology," in *The End of Ideology Debate*. Ed. Chaim I. Waxman (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), 7-8.

¹⁸ John-Paul Wilson, "Political Bias in Historical Writing: A Case Study of Nicaragua's Sandinista Revolution and Its North American Historiography and Social Science; 1981-1990," (Doctoral Research Essay, St John's University, 2005), 6.

¹⁹ Terry Boswell, "Colonial Empires and the Capitalist World-Economy: A Time Series Analysis of Colonization, 1640-1960," *American Sociological Review* 54, no. 2 (April 1989): 183.

system in the first place.²⁰ To radicals, the Sandinistas represented a real challenge to the fulfillment of US hegemonic interests in Central America.²¹ Radicals criticized US counter-revolutionary programs attempting to isolate and overthrow the Sandinista regime.

As opposed to the egalitarian and socialist tendencies of the radical critique, the liberal and conservative worldviews have been shaped by their concern for authoritarian politics and their endorsement of democratic principles. North American liberals and conservatives both believe in the superiority of Western values, institutions, and ideas, but they differ in their approach to marketing these virtues to the rest of the world.²² Whereas conservatives sought to defeat communism as a way to secure capitalism and democracy for the rest of the world, liberals looked for ways to engage communists as a means of creating international peace and prosperity through free trade, developmental assistance, and arms control. Liberals believe in the power of international relations to convince wayward nations that their best interests lie with the majority. For this reason, North American liberals were largely opposed to the US covert war against the Nicaraguan Sandinistas. To the liberal community, the Sandinista vanguard were not so much a military force to be confronted as they were a political movement to be persuaded.

Unlike the political optimism of the liberals, North American conservatives did not share in their buoyant assessment of Sandinista capabilities. In their view, the Sandinistas represented Marxism, not some burgeoning movement for social justice. The Sandinista triumph in Nicaragua was seen as a Soviet victory in the "strategic rear" of the United States. To which extent, conservatives advocated the use of direct and indirect military pressure in the subsequent US effort to destabilize and ultimately overthrow the Sandinista regime.²³ The ensuing regional conflict seemed destined to become more than just a matter of national security as the US ability to effectively deal with Marxist liberation movements around the world was seemingly at stake. For this reason, conservatives reluctantly supported the involvement of certain

²⁰Ronan Van Rossem, "The World Systems Paradigm as General Theory of Development: A Cross-National Test," *American Sociological Review* 61, no. 3 (June 1996): 509; Mark T. Berger, *Under Northern Eyes: Latin American Studies and U.S. Hegemony in the Americas 1898-1990* (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), 194.

²¹Cole Blasler, *Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America 1910-1985*, (Pittsburg, University of Pittsburg Press, 1985), 297.

²²Berger, *Under Northern Eyes*, 198; Charles Bergquist, "Latin America: A Dissenting View of 'Latin American History in World Perspective,'" in *International Handbook of Historical Studies: Contemporary Research and Theories*, eds. Georg G. Iggers and Harold Talbot Parker (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), 378.

²³Berger, *Under Northern Eyes*, 163 & 171.

authoritarian forces, as they seemed to be in the best interest of a strong anti-communist defense. Such positions could be seen as a paradox to their democratic advocacy, but from a conservative macro global context they made perfect sense.

The Somoza dynasty of Nicaragua was allied to the US in the Second World War and the ensuing Cold War. But in recent times, liberals, conservatives, and radicals alike have all agreed that Somoza was a ruthless dictator that had completely lost legitimacy. Both the Cuban inspired Sandinistas (FSLN) through an armed insurrection and a Nicaraguan conservative/liberal coalition through strikes and protest were unable to dislodge the dictator. It was the Sandinista document entitled "General Political Military Platform of the Struggle of the FSLN" promising a future policy of "political pluralism, the 'mixed economy' of state and private enterprises, and international non-alignment" that received cautious support from the Church and allowed a broad-based coalition to form and overthrow the dictator.²⁴ Clearly, a successful Marxist-led revolution over this US supported dictatorship followed by the subsequent rise of a US supported democracy in the context of the Cold War was bound to make interesting history in that the central US ideological differences were all in play.

Historiography of Revolutionary Nicaragua

As seen from the prior discussion, bias can enter the analysis process at several levels, some resulting from the experience and interest of the analyst which are not under their control, other levels that result from strongly held views that the analyst can guard against. The historiographic analysis process used by the present author required content analysis over forty subject areas of thirty separate contributions by twenty-seven authors distributed over the three ideological schools discussed above.²⁵ The results of that content analysis are used herein to generate understanding of how bias has impacted the works of these ideological schools on understanding of various groups and actors. An interpretation of these results is given in a subsequent section.

In the case of the Marxist rhetoric that often permeated Sandinista speeches and writing, conservatives (Timothy Ashby, Margaret Daly Hayes, Joshua Muravchik, Roger W. Fontaine, and Nestor Sanchez) and radicals (Roger Burbach, Richard R. Fagen, Susanne Jonas, and Eldon Kenworthy) took such language literally as evidence of their true nature.²⁶ Burbach, Fagen, Jonas, and

²⁴ Shirley Christian, *Nicaragua: Revolution In The Family*, (New York: Random House, 1985): 37.

²⁵ Wilson, "Political Bias", 2005, 62-109.

²⁶ Timothy Ashby, *The Bear in the Backyard: Moscow's Caribbean Strategy*, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 103-4 & 109; Margaret Daly Hayes, "Not What I Say But What I Do: Latin

Nancy Stein (radicals) and Cole Blasier, John A. Booth, Thomas W. Walker, and Lars Schoultz (liberals) downplayed this rhetoric, which had a distinctly anti-American quality, and insisted they should be judged according to their moderate actions as a show of good faith.²⁷ Conservatives Ashby and Douglas W. Payne, however, thought that the Sandinistas were trying to cultivate an image of political pragmatism, and thus every attempt at moderation was greeted with a certain degree of skepticism.²⁸ Conservatives like Ashby, Payne and Leiken had come to believe that the Sandinistas were practicing a form of deception known as *El Manto*, meaning "a mask or disguise" or *egano* meaning "a hoax."²⁹ In the tradition of Fidel Castro and other Marxist revolutionaries before him, the perpetrator would make an audience think that a person is doing one thing, while he or she was actually working behind the scenes to accomplish something else.³⁰ In contrast, liberals rarely discussed the ideological roots of the Sandinistas or the notions of *El Manto* or *egano*. Radicals (Burbach, Fagen, Jonas, and Kenworthy), on the other hand, sometimes described the Sandinista

American Policy in the Reagan Administration," *United States Policy in Latin America: A Quarter Century of Crisis and Challenge 1961-1986*. Ed. John D. Martz, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), 114; Joshua Muravchik and Roger W. Fontaine, *Communism in Nicaragua: What Is To Be Done?* (Washington D.C: Dawn Publishing Company Ltd. 1983), 8-9; Nestor Sanchez, "Revolutionary Change and the Nicaraguan People," *Central America and the Reagan Doctrine*. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), 111-112; Roger Burbach, "Revolution and Reaction," *The Politics of Intervention: The United States and Central America*. Eds. Roger Burbach and Patricia Flynn, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984), 19; Richard R. Fagen, "Revolution and Crisis in Nicaragua," in *Trouble in Our Backyard: Central America and the U.S. in the Eighties*, ed. Martin Diskin (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 151; Susanne Jonas, "Central America as a Theater of U.S. Cold War Politics," *Latin American Perspectives*, 9 (3), 1982, 125; Eldon Kenworthy, "The U.S. and Latin America: Empire vs. Social Change," *Democracy* 1, no. 3 (1981): 90.

²⁷ Burbach, "Revolution and Reaction," 19; Fagen, "Revolution and Crisis in Nicaragua," 129 & 133; Susanne Jonas and Nancy Stein, "The Construction of Democracy in Nicaragua," *Latin American Perspectives*, 66, 17 (3), (1990): 11 & 14-15; Blasier, *Hovering Giant*, 288; John A. Booth, "The Revolution in Nicaragua: Through a Frontier in History," in *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean*, eds. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 324; John A. Booth and Thomas W. Walker, *Understanding Central America*, (Boulder: Westview Press, San Francisco and London, 1989), 69; Lars Schoultz, "Nicaragua: The United States Confronts a Revolution," *From Gunboats to Diplomacy: New U.S. Policies for Latin America*, ed. Richard Newfarmer (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 123.

²⁸ Ashby, *The Bear in the Backyard*, 106; Douglas W. Payne, "The 'Mantos' of the Sandinistas," *Central America and the Reagan Doctrine*. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), 55-57.

²⁹ Ashby, *The Bear in the Backyard*, 108; Payne, "The 'Mantos' of the Sandinistas," 61; Robert S. Leiken, "Sins of the Sandinistas: Nicaragua's Untold Stories," *New Republic*, (October 8, 1984): 17.

³⁰ Payne, "The 'Mantos' of the Sandinistas," 56-57.

regime in terms of a "revolutionary experiment" of democracy and socialism, often betraying its Marxist influence.³¹

Conservatives Muravchik, Fontaine, Radosh, Michael S. Radu, and Sanchez claimed that the Sandinistas attacked *La Prensa* and the Church hierarchy because they represented a real threat to their [FSLN] authority.³² Conservatives Radosh and Muravchik further charged that regular Sandinista harassment with organized mobs known as *turbas* and censorship of Catholic bishops and the opposition press was representative of the Sandinista attitude towards opposition groups in general.³³ Alternatively, the liberals (Booth and Walker) and radical Noam Chomsky accused *La Prensa* and members of the traditional clergy of being organs and operatives of the CIA and point to the Sandinista toleration of non-affiliated opponents.³⁴ The left (radical Walter LaFeber and liberal Blasier) pointed to the Sandinista crackdown on the Nicaraguan Communist Party as evidence of their moderate credentials.³⁵ But conservatives (Ashby, Muravchik, and Fontaine) saw this attempt as nothing more than a calculated effort on the part of the FSLN to appear less radical in the eyes of the world.³⁶ Clearly, conservatives thought that the Sandinistas had no interest in political freedom, whereas liberals believed that the Sandinistas were taking active steps to protect such freedoms. Radicals and liberals saw an active debate and criticism of FSLN policies among those opposed to them, while conservatives dismissed such allowances as efforts to further the appearance of plurality while serious opposition was thwarted. To conservatives, Sandinista moderation was all an act, whereas liberals and radicals saw it as genuine and to be taken at face value.

It was the Sandinistas' attempt to reorganize the culturally distinct Atlantic Coast peoples according to revolutionary principles that would play the largest role in the Sandinista loss of power. The arrest of the Atlantic Coast Indian leadership led to bloodshed, resulting in thousands of men joining

³¹ Burbach, "Revolution and Reaction," 19; Fagen, "Revolution and Crisis in Nicaragua," 139; Jonas, "Central America," 125; Kenworthy, "The U.S. and Latin America," 90.

³² Muravchik, *Communism in Nicaragua*, 12, 16 & 21; Ronald Radosh, "Darkening Nicaragua," *New Republic*, (Oct. 24, 1983), 8-10; Michael S. Radu, "The Nature of Insurgency," in *The Continuing Crisis: U.S. Policy in Central America: Thirty Essays by Statesmen, Scholars Religious Leaders and Journalists*. Eds. Mark Falcoff and Robert Royal, (Washington D.C: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1986), 418; Sanchez, "Revolutionary Change," 115-116.

³³ Radosh, "Darkening Nicaragua," 8-9; Muravchik, *Communism in Nicaragua*, 12.

³⁴ Booth, "Revolution in Nicaragua," 311; Booth, *Understanding Central America*, 69-70; Noam Chomsky, *Turning the Tide: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Struggle for Peace* (Boston: South End Press, 1985), 136.

³⁵ Walter LaFeber, "The Reagan Administration and Revolution in Central America," *Political Science Quarterly* 99, no. 1 (1984): 20; Blasier, *Hovering Giant*, 288.

³⁶ Ashby, *The Bear in the Backyard*, 106; Muravchik, *Communism in Nicaragua*, 11.

counter-revolutionary encampments in Honduras and Costa Rica. Under suspicion of aiding the counter-revolution, the Indian populations of the *Río Coco* were relocated under what conservatives (Muravchik, Radu, and Sanchez) described as forced marches to isolated and desolate wilderness regions, accompanied by rapes, murders, burning of their homes and villages, destruction of their crops and animals.³⁷ To radicals (Phillipe Bourgois, Jonas, and Stein) and liberals (Booth, Martin Diskin, and Schoultz), the Sandinistas did "error" but the US exploited the situation and made it worse.³⁸

It is clear from the above analysis that vast differences exist in understanding the nature of the primary groups of actors in revolutionary Nicaragua. While conservatives focus on FSLN misdeeds with underlying geopolitical concerns, radical and liberal interpretation would be to defuse those concerns with opposing responses placed within the context of what they saw as bad US policy.

Bias and US Policy: An Interpretation

Looking to the relation of publication rate to US foreign policy decisions and internal events in both Nicaragua and the US indicates, at a minimum, *extreme interest*, possibly leading to uncontrollable forms of bias in analysis results. Most notable is the peak publication rates after the establishment of the Reagan Doctrine (7), after the first attack of the Contras in the Red Christmas raids (12), again after the Iran-Contra scandal (19), and a rapid decline of interest after the 1990 electoral defeat of the Sandinistas (1). Whereas conservative and radical analysis results are readily understood within their specific ideologies, the liberal results are more subtly related. This is best understood by a typical liberal position with respect to the Carter and Reagan administrations: "Standing in the rubble, President Carter attempted to build a new, more mature relationship with the leaders of revolutionary Nicaragua... In stark contrast, during the Reagan administration relations with Nicaragua have deteriorated to the point of open hostility, with the United States conducting a much-publicized "secret war" that threatened to inflame the entire region."³⁹ To garner public and congressional support for these positions, the liberals had to argue that the Sandinistas were misunderstood as indicated in this apologetic liberal position:

³⁷ Muravchik, *Communism in Nicaragua*, 15 & 18; Radu, "Nature of Insurgency," 424.

³⁸ Phillipe Bourgois, "Ethnic Minorities," in *Nicaragua: The First Five Years*, ed. Thomas Walker (New York, London & Westport, CT: Praeger, 1985): 201-3 & 213; Jonas, "Construction of Democracy," 21-22; Booth, "Revolution in Nicaragua," 308 & 312; Booth, *Understanding Central America*, 69; Martin Diskin, "The Manipulation of Indigenous Struggles," *Reagan versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua*. Ed. Thomas W. Walker, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 81 & 86-7; Schoultz, "Nicaragua," 127.

³⁹ Schoultz, "Nicaragua," 116.

“One threat from Nicaragua consists of the “Marxist” Sandinistas who dominate the Nicaraguan government... in today’s Latin America the term “Marxist” often describes politicians who in Europe would be called “Socialists” - the evolutionary Socialists [i.e., democratic] who currently play leading roles in politics in most of Western Europe.”⁴⁰ However, the Kremlin and Fidel Castro believed the Sandinista had solid Marxist-Leninist credentials.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Ibid., 131.

⁴¹ Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky. *KGB, The Inside Story*. (Harper Perennial, New York, 1990), 562.