


**Selected
Annual Proceedings
of the**



**Florida
Conference
of
Historians**

40th & 41st Annual Meetings

**April 4-6, 2002
Ft. Lauderdale
Beach, FL**

**Feb. 27-March 1, 2003
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**Selected
Annual Proceedings
of the**

***Florida
Conference
of
Historians***

Editors of:

*Selected Annual Proceedings
of the
Florida Conference of Historians*

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Letter From the Editors

We're back for one last editorial performance. Accomplishment and Astonishment. It is with a combination of these emotions that we present the Florida Conference of Historians Selected Annual Proceedings for 2002-2003. A sense of accomplishment for helping to continue the excellent tradition of the Florida Conference of Historians. A feeling of astonishment for how quickly time passes. This is our sixth and absolute final year as the editors of the Annual Proceedings. We have edited four volumes, three of them combined: Volumes 3/4, 1995-1996; Volume 5, 1997; Volumes 6/7, 1998-1999 and Volumes 10/11, 2003-2004. The fine tradition of quality for which the FCH is known allowed us to fill the Annual Proceedings with well-written papers. This made our job the more easier and enjoyable and to you all we extend a well-deserved thank you.

We have enjoyed our time as editors and sincerely believe that we have developed a closer relationship with the FCH membership. Again, for that we thank you. We hope the membership continues to support the Annual Proceedings by submitting their papers for publication and following the submission guidelines of the new editor.

As is usual we are responsible for all editing errors contained within and will gladly blame each other for any you may encounter.

Will Benedicks
Kyle Eidahl

Tallahassee, Florida
February, 2004

Thomas M. Campbell Award

Beginning with volumes 6/7 in 1999, the Florida Conference of Historians announced the inauguration of the Thomas M. Campbell Award for the best paper presented in the Annual Proceedings.

Thomas Campbell, (Tom) was the driving force behind the creation of the Florida Conference of Historians, at that time called The Florida College Teachers of History, over 30 years ago. It was his personality and hard work that kept the conference moving forward. Simply put, in the early years he *was* the conference.

Tom was a professor of U.S. Diplomatic History at Florida State University. The Thomas M. Campbell Award is in his name so that we may recognize and remember his efforts on behalf of the Florida Conference of Historians.

Past Recipients

Vols 6/7	J. Calvitt Clarke III, Jacksonville University
Vols 8/9	J. Calvitt Clarke III, Jacksonville University
Vols 10/11	Robert L. Shearer, Florida Institute of Technology

Florida Conference of Historians

2002 Annual Program

Hosted by
Blaine T. Browne

Broward Community College
Ft. Lauderdale Beach Florida

Thursday, April 4

7:00-10:00 P.M.

Registration and Reception: Penthouse

Reception Refreshments provided by McGraw-Hill Companies and FCH

Friday, April 5

Continuing Registration - Penthouse Foyer

Refreshments Courtesy of Prentice Hall and FCH

8:30 -10 A.M.

Session I: Issues in Modern American History

Chair: Noel Jacoby, Lake City Community College

“Academic Freedom Then and Now”

Sean McMahon, Lake City Community College

“I Pledge Allegiance to the American Way; Florida's Americanism versus Communism Curriculum”

Andrea Howard, Florida State University

“Urban Violence, ‘Riotous Behavior’ and Self-Defense: Watts Revisited”

Chris Strain, Florida Atlantic University (Jupiter Campus)

10:15 -11:15 A.M.-

Session II: The United States and International Affairs

Chair, **Sean McMahon**, Lake City Community College

“Pulp Paper Magazines and the Myth of the Anglo-American Cooperation”

David Richards, Lake City Community College

“On Their Own Terms: US Response to Operation ‘Peter Pan’”

Melissa Soldani-Lemon, Tallahassee Community College

11:30 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.

Session III: Hitler's Germany

Chair: **David Marshall**, University of California

“The Failure of Operation ‘Sea Lion’”

Amy Carney, Jacksonville University

“To Leave or Stay: German Scientists under Hitler”

Colleen Harris, Jacksonville University

12:30 - 1:30 P.M.

Riverside Lunch: - You're on Your Own!

1:30 - 2:00 P.M.

Business Meeting: Officers and Members Invited

2:00 - 3:00 P.M.

Session IV: Europe: Early Russia and Elizabethan England

Chair: **Jay Clarke**, Jacksonville University

“The Cultural and Political Impacts of the Mongol Invasion of Russia”

Adam Harpstreit, University of Tampa

“Flushing Chalk: The Elizabethan Privy Council and the Repair of Dover Harbor”

David Mock, Tallahassee Community College

3:15 - 4:15 P.M.

Session V: Germany: Perspectives from within and Without

Chair: **David Mock**, Tallahassee Community College

“The East German Museum of History”

David Marshall, University of California, Riverside

“News of the Persecution of German Jewry in 1935”

Robert Drake, Sienna College

4:30 - 5:30 P.M.

Session VI: Africa and Asia

Chair: **Owen Farley**, Pensacola Junior College

“Slavery as a Comparative Unit of Analysis of European and Islamic Civilizations in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean Basins”

Michael Auterson, Eastern Kentucky University

“Seeking a Model for Modernization: The Japanizers of Ethiopia”

Jay Clarke, Jacksonville University

7:00 - 8:00 P.M.

Banquet

Keynote Address: “Trouble in Mind: African Americans and Race Relations in the 20th Century”

Leon Litwack, University of California, Berkeley

Professor Litwack's appearance was arranged through the Organization of American Historians' Lectureship Program and was made possible by funding provided by the Broward Community College Foundation.

Saturday, April 6

Late Registration

Refreshments provided by Allyn & Bacon / Longman

9:00 - 10:00 A.M.

Session VII: Teaching World History

Chair: **Blaine T. Browne**, Broward Community College

“Using Personal Narratives to teach a Global Perspective”

Jennifer Trost, St. Leo University

“World History and the World Wide Web: A Student Satisfaction Survey and a Blinding Flash of the Obvious”

James Longhurst, Carnegie - Mellon University

10:15 - 11:15 A.M.

Session VIII: Native Americans and the Revolutionary Era

Chair: **Ima J. Stephens**, Appalachian State University

“The Spaniards' Secret Weapon: Illinois Indians and the Weakening of the Chickasaw's Loyalist Party”

Wendy St. Jean, Tufts University

“The Pursuit of Freedom: Cherokee Identity”

Dixie Haggart, University of Kansas

11:30 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.

Session IX: The Modern Middle East

Chair: **Will Benedicks**, Tallahassee Community College

“The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and Camp David: What went Wrong?”

Jack McTague, St. Leo University

“Iraq: Current Issues”

Marco Rimanelli, St. Leo College

Conference Conclusion - Final Remarks - **Blaine T. Brown**

Florida Conference of Historians

2003 Annual Program

Hosted by
Jay Clarke

Jacksonville University
Jacksonville FL

Thursday, February 27, 2003

6:00-9:00 P.M.

Registration, Prefunction Area

6:00-9:00 P.M.

Informal, Drop-In, Reception, Plantains Lounge, Sea Turtle

Friday, February 28, 2003

7:30-9:00 A.M.

Continental Breakfast, Prefunction Area

Publishers' Displays, Prefunction Area

8:30-10:00 A.M. Panel Session F1

The War Between the States

Chair: **Jim Baugess**

Discussant: **Craig Buettinger**

“The Gloomy Bitterness that Filled My Breast’: The Effects of Sherman’s March on Confederate Soldiers”

Lisa Tendrich

“The Affair at the Passes: An Early Fiasco for the Union Navy Blockaders in the Gulf of Mexico”

Frank Robert M. Oxley

Imperialism in Africa

Chair: **James Christian**

Discussant: **Steven D. MacIsaac**

“Ethiopia’s Dashed Hopes for Support: Daba Birrou’s and Shoji Yunosuke’s Trip to Japan”

J. Calvitt Clarke III

“When Is a Man a Man?” Masculinity and German Colonialism in Southwest Africa, 1894-1914”

Daniel J. Walther

Literary Heroines in History (UG)

Chair: **Dick Gibson**

Discussant: **Dick Gibson**

“Without a Blemish: Helen of Troy”

Amy Beth Carney

“Fictional Heroines of Girls’ Series Literature: Role Models of the Twentieth Century”

Jean Louise Lammie

10:15-11:45 A.M. Panel Session F2

East Asia: Korea and the Philippines

Chair & Discussant: **Blaine Browne**

“The 1871 Battle of Kang Hwa Do”

Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.

“Birth of Two Nations: Rival Representations of the March First Movement in North and South Korean History Textbooks.”

Dennis Hart

“The Huk Rebellion in the Philippines and the Failed Amnesty of 1948”

Steven D. MacIsaac

The Indian Wars

Chair & Discussant: Sean McMahon

“Andrew Jackson and American Military Operations in the Mississippi”

Joseph L Meeler

“Englishmen in Disguise: Southeastern Indians and the Imposition of Racial Identities”

Andrew Frank

The Second Reconstruction: Politics and Violence in South Carolina and Florida

Chair & Discussant: David Courtwright

“Civil Rights Leadership Models: John Culmer and Theodore Gibson”

Clarence Taylor

“The Orangeburg Massacre: Sources, Names, and Context”

James Christian

“The Integration of Stetson University: The Development and Failure of Stetson’s Public Sphere” (UG)

Jake Blake

Innovative Teaching

Chair & Discussant: Will Benedicks

“Apples and Oranges: On the Compatibility of High School and College History Courses in a Team Teaching Program”

Thomas Dunn and Daniel Robison

“Building Biltmore”

Fred McCaleb

“Quarterstaff, Halfstag Fisticuffs, and Wrestling: the Medieval Yeoman’s Martial Arts” Discussant: Will Benedicks

Dick Gibson, Justin Lang, Jess H. Jacobs

11:45 A.M.-1:30 P.M.

Lunch on your own

11:45 A.M-1:20 P.M.

Business Lunch, Plantains-open to all registrants

1:30 3:00 P.M. Panel Session F3

Florida and the Cold War

Chair: Nick Wynne

Discussant: Eric Thomas

“Congressman Dante Fascell and the Cold War”

Bill Marina

“The Fair Play for Cuba Committee”

Frank DeBenedictus

**“A Former Communist Reflects on His Involvement in the Cold War After Writing
“Red Star Over Cuba”**

Nathan Weyl

Revolution in the Western Hemisphere

Chair: Jeanine Clark

Discussant: Philip Blood

**“Brothers in Arms / Brothers in Ideology? The Influence of American Revolutionary
Veterans in the Haitian Revolution”**

John Garrigus

**“The Search for Santucho’s Grave: Argentina’s Dirty Warriors Reluctance to Provide
Information on the Disappeared”**

Steven Scheuler

Reimagining Traditions: Cultivation of Early 20th Century National Identities

Chair & Discussant: Joe Perry, Georgia State University

**“Constructing a Museum, a Memory, and a Nation: The Role of *Skansen* in Creating
a Historical National Narrative in Sweden”**

Kevin Goldberg, Georgia State University

“Reinventing a National Heritage: Remembering World War I in Rural Georgia-A Case Study of Morgan County”

Brian Miller, Georgia State University

“Imagining Autonomy: Preservation of National Culture through Narrative Representation”

Leslie DeLassus, Georgia State University

War in the Twentieth Century (UG)

Chair & Discussant: David Mock

“NAZI Policy in the Third Reich, 1933-1941: Emigration First”

James Green

“1918: The United States and the Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire”

Colleen R. Harris

3:15-4:45 P.M. Panel Session F4

America and the Cold War (UG)

Chair: Steve Piscitelli

Discussant: Tony de la Cova

“Operation Pedro Pan: Cold War Foreign Policy in Neverland”

Christi McCullars

“Ambivalent Culture: Film and McCarthyism”

Clara Sherley-Appel

Evaluating War: Morality, Economics, and Race

Chair: Blaine Browne

Discussant: Bruce E. Bechtol

“What, If Anything, Can Economics Tell Us About the Conduct of War? The Civil War and the Principle of Information”

Jurgen Brauer and Hubert van Tuyll

“The Origins of Just War Theory and its Contemporary Relevance”

Eric Freiberger

“Perceptions of Performance Assessing Combat Effectiveness in the Civil War”

Richard M. Reid

Florida and Environmental History

Chair & Discussant: Ken Hoover

“Sanctuary, Play Land or Profit Maker: John Pennekamp: Coral Reef State Park”

Jeanine Clark

“One Woman, One Book: How Marjory Stoneman Douglas Changed the Ecological History of Florida”

Rebecca Johnson

Odds and Ends

Chair & Discussant: Noel Jacoby, Lake City Community College

“The Formation of Timor’s State”

Akmal Ahmedov

“The Debate About Minimum Wage Policy During the Early Jimmy Carter Administration”

John Farris

5:00-5:45

Information Session

Joseph F. Patrouch, Directory of Graduate Studies, Graduate Program in History at Florida International University, Miami, FL

6:30-7:30 P.M.

Reception and Entertainment

7:30-9:00 P.M.

Banquet

8:30-9:00 p.m.

Keynote Speaker

“Icebreaker’ Stalin, Hitler and the Origins of the War on the Eastern Front.”
Teddy Uldricks, University of North Carolina at Asheville

Saturday, March 1, 2003

7:30-9:00 A.M.

Continental Breakfast, Prefunction Area
Publishers’ Displays, Prefunction Area

8:00-9:30 A.M. Panel Session S1

Politics in Florida and Elsewhere

Chair & Discussant: **Joan Carver**

“Turn Your Radio On: Brailey Odham’s 1952 “Talkathon” Campaign for Florida Governor”
Michael Hoover

“The People vs. The Railroad-Civil Disobedience and Waterfront Rights in Early Miami”
Gregg Lightfoot

“Democratizing the Businessman’s Government: Proportional Representation and the City Manager Plan”
Robert Burnham

Cuba and the USA, 1898 and 1959

Chair & Discussant: **Jack McTague**

“Heritage and Homeland: N.G. Gonzales, His State Newspaper, and His Call for South Carolina’s Re-Emergence During the Spanish-American-Cuban War of 1898”
Timothy F. Brown

**"The Distant Strain of Triumph: Women's Behind the Scenes Fight Against Spain
1898"**

Jacqueline E. Clancy

"Comandante William Morgan: Cuban Rebel With a Cause"

Antonio de la Cova

Creating Modern Europe

Chair & Discussant: John Garrigus

**"Pearls in a Portrait: Francois Clouet's 1571 Depiction of the Archduchess Elizabeth
of Habsburg"**

Joseph F. Patrouch

**"The Sixteenth Century Debate about Resistance to Political Authority and the Issue
of Female Regiment"**

David Mock

**"Mathematics and the Mind of God: The New Cosmology of the Seventeenth Cen-
tury"**

Robert L. Shearer

9:45-11:15 A.M. Panel Session S2

The Second Reconstruction: Desegregation and Civil Rights in Florida

Chair & Discussant: Jennifer Trost

**"The Best Education Provided': A History of School Integration in Polk County,
Florida, 1963-1994"**

James V. Holton

**"I'm Against the Way It Is Being Done': School Desegregation and Civility in Pinel-
las Country, Florida"**

Gordon K. Mantler

Children in Russia

Chair: Paul Edson

Discussant: Theo Prousis

"Student Attitudes in Nizhni, Russia Toward the Second World War"

John Calhoun

"Homeless Children in Southern Russia in the 1920s"

Hugh Phillips

Public Spaces

Chair & Discussant: Brian Keaney

"An Historiographical Look at Bethel Cemetery, Columbia County, Florida, 1855-2003"

Louis Zelenka Jr.

"Moral Authority and Public Space: Club Women and the Construction of Municipal Space"

Julian C. Chambliss

"Cemetery of Père Lachaise in Paris"

Jeannie Theriault

Early American Collective Memory and Identity (UG)

Chair: Andrew Frank

"The American Mind in the Early 19th Century"

Kristi Hall

"Spain's Forgotten Role in the American Revolution" Discussant: Andrew Frank

Allison Coble

11:30-1:00 P.M. Panel Session S3

The Politics, Economics, and Culture of Race in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century (UG)

Chair & Discussant: Jim Holton

"Historic Preservation and the Politics of Race: Restoring the Douglass Theater of Macon, Georgia, 1978-1996"

Anna Faulkner

“Compromised Civil Rights in Florida”

Jennifer Williams

“African American Courtship in the 1950s”

Amber Davis

Hot Spots in 2002 and 2003

Chair & Discussant: **Hugh Phillips**

“Kashmir and Palestine: Comparative Crises”

Jack McTague

“Saddam’s Totalitarian State: Iraq’s Policies of Domestic Repression & Impact of War”

Marco Rimaneli

“US Strategy For Dealing With Hot Spots: Different Blows For Different Joes”

Sam Hart

World War II, and After

Chair: **John Calhoun**

Discussant: **David Proctor**

“Bandenbekämpfung: Nazi Occupation Security in Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia 1942-45”

Philip W. Blood

“The Sachsenhausen Trials: War Crimes Prosecution in the Soviet Union and East and West Germany, 1945-1970”

Jonathan Friedman

“Hans Morgenthau: The Life of a Realist”

Brian Keaney

The Elizabethan Privy Council and the Repair of Dover Harbor

David B. Mock
Tallahassee Community College

The prolonged concern of the Elizabethan Privy Council with the repair of Dover Harbor provides an excellent example of the collaboration of local and crown officials in late Tudor England. Dover Harbor is one of the most important ports on the southeastern coast of England. Located at the narrowest point of the English Channel it is some fourteen miles from the Continent. Tides, storms, and regular currents regularly erode the chalk banks and present on-going obstacles to both constructing and maintaining a harbor at this location.¹

The history of Dover Harbor began around 1500. Unfortunately, conflicting reports as to the initial construction of this harbor may mean that the history of the original harbor may never be fully understood. What is certain, however, is that Henry VIII and his children were almost continuously involved, often intimately, in supervising and occasionally even financing various construction and repair efforts. The Tudors' interest in what we today call "public works" was not limited to harbors. Roads, lighthouses, and bridges; safe harbors, waterfronts and docking facilities; navigable rivers and the reclamation of marginal lands all gained royal and parliamentary moral and financial support during the sixteenth century. Government officials clearly recognized the economic, military, and political importance of these projects. Despite the interest of Tudor monarchs in these projects, historians have unfortunately shown more interest in the public works activities of Elizabeth's con-

¹ Henry Clifford Darby, *The Draining of the Fens*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956); Frederick G. Emmison, "The 'Very Naughty Ways' of Elizabethan Essex," *Essex Review* 64 (April 1955): 85-91; Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, *English Local Government: The History of the King's Highway* (Hamden, CN: Archon Books, Shoestring Press, 1963), pp. 1-26; H. M. Colvin, *The King's Works*, vol. 4 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1982); Frederick G. Emmison, "1555 and All That: A Milestone in the History of the English Road," *Essex Review* 64 (January 1955): 15-25; Frederick G. Emmison, "Was the Highways Act of 1555 a Success?" *Essex Review* 64 (October 1955): 221-34.

temporaries than they have in activities in England.²

During the reigns of Edward VI and Mary I repair efforts centered on building piers south and west of the harbor in order to shelter ships from foul weather. As the piers extended into the channel silt built up and created a beach and sand bar. Storms would gradually knock the newly constructed pier into the sea and erode the beach. Erosion of the chalk cliffs created another perennial problem. Tides and currents which wore away the cliffs carried pebbles along the coast until they reached the harbor mouth, where they were deposited, gradually filling up the harbor. Nature was thus not only destructive; it was also expensive, as an inquiry into the efforts of the Elizabethan Privy Council will demonstrate.³

As early as 1559 Dover officials advised Elizabeth's Privy Councilors about the decay of the harbor. Nevertheless, the queen's council did nothing for five years. Finally, in 1564 William Brooke Lord Cobham, Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, forwarded concrete proposals of a plan to repair the harbor to the Council. His elaborate plan admitted, however, that the town could not afford to pay for the necessary repairs. This is, perhaps, the major reason that another twelve years would pass before the Council would act. Finally, in 1576 Sir Francis Walsingham, one of the Privy Councilors, hired one William Borough, a well-respected navigator, to investigate the perpetual problems the harbor faced and to develop a plan to resolve the difficulties. By this time a sand bar had spanned the harbor, creating a shallow lagoon. Moreover, part of an older pier had collapsed during a storm earlier that year. In the resulting discussions the Council considered plans to construct additional jetties or groins, in order to protect the shore from erosion. It also reviewed the surveys of Matthew Richworth, a master Dutch sluice maker. After a lengthy debate the Councilors accepted Borough's plans to stabilize the bank and to use the River Dour to help clear the harbor of pebbles. Essentially the plan was to erect a dam to hold back the river and to build a sluice, which would channel the river toward the compilation of pebbles. Periodically the sluice gates would be opened. This would release the

² Elizabeth I issued proclamations in 1571, 1575-75, 1578, 1580-81, 1584-85, 1590, 1595 and 1598. Paul L. Hughes and James F. Larkin, eds., *Tudor Royal Proclamations*, vols. 2-3 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 2: 426-30, 510-11; 3: 51-52, 57-58, 151-53, (hereafter cited as *Proclamations*); William Dunkel, *William Lambarde, Elizabethan Jurist, 1536-1601* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965), pp. 73-74; *The Acts of the Privy Council*, John R. Dassent, ed., n.s. 42 vols. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1892-1907), 7: 91; 12:121; 13:34; 21:77-78; 30:359-60, (hereafter cited as *APC*); Michael B. Pulman, *The Elizabethan Privy Council in the Fifteen Seventies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 137-39.

³ British Library, Lansdowne Manuscripts, MSS 107 no. 54 f. 217; British Government, Public Records Office. State Papers Domestic, Series 12/108 (hereafter cited as PRO SP, series and document; 2& 3 Philip and Mary c. 8 (1555), *The Statutes of the Realm*, 4 vols., reprint (London: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1963); 4 (1): 284-85, (hereafter cited as SR); 5 Elizabeth I c. 13 (1563), SR 4 (1): 441-43; 18 Elizabeth I c. 10 (1575-76), SR 4 (1): 620-21; *Journal of the House of Commons, 1547-1714*, 17 vols., reprint (Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1967), 1: 45-46, 67, 112-13; APC 9: 117, 120-21, 131, 135, 150; T. E. Hartley, ed., *Proceedings in the Parliaments of Elizabeth I. Volume I 1555-1581* (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1981), 1: 389, 395, 483-84, 486-90.

water and essentially flush the pebbles into the channel and thus clear the harbor of debris.⁴

As the cost of construction exceeded the financial ability of the people of Dover, and since the Councilors recognized the national importance of this harbor, they convinced Elizabeth to grant the city a license to export rye grain. The income generated by this license would help to defray construction costs. The economic value of this license increased once the Council imposed an embargo on neighboring ports. The city would earn even more money when the Council added other commodities, including beer, malt, wheat, and barley, to the rye export license. As these funds were still inadequate to fund the project the Councilors sold the lands of Dover's St. Peter's church and allocated the £118 17s. to the repair work. Although this was a modest amount, it was nevertheless appreciated by Dover's populace.⁵

In early 1580 the Council examined eight new proposals concerning the construction of additional jetties. Although it determined that most of the proposals were too expensive, it believed that existing taxes and other assessments would be able to finance a second groin. The Council then endorsed John Trew's plan to build a large masonry wall to shield the harbor and directed Cobham to discuss Trew's plan with Dover's mayor. As the plan required close supervision the Council identified local gentlemen it believed capable of serving as commissioners. In July 1580 the Council ordered Cobham to employ another surveyor to examine the work that had been completed to that point and to evaluate the success of future efforts. Two months later it authorized Trew to levy masons and other workers to complete the work. In January 1581 the Council received yet another evaluation of the project from Elizabeth's naval officers when Sir William Winter, Sir Francis Drake, and John Hawkins critiqued the plans. The next year found the Councilors objecting to the projected expenses of new proposals of the Dover commissioners, and ordering Trew fired. Essentially the problem at this time was that the riverbank would not support the weight of a masonry wall. Consequently, its foundation kept collapsing. Commissioners developed several new plans over the following months. The Council's approval of these proposals was postponed until its agents—Winter, Borough, and Thomas Digges—met with the Dover commissioners. Finally, in April 1582 the Council agreed on a new course of action and appointed Digges to oversee the work.

⁴ Huntingdon Library, Ellesmere Manuscripts, MSS 2531, 2532, 2535; Darby, *Draining of the Fens*, pp. 15–21; Harry Godwin, *Fenland: Its Ancient and Uncertain Future* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 135–46; APC 10: 223–24. For developments under the Stuarts see Mark E. Kennedy, "Charles I and Local Government: The Draining of the East and West Fens," *Albion* 15 (Spring 1983): 19–31; and Margaret Albright, "The Entrepreneurs of James I and Charles I: An Illustration of the Uses of Influence," *Explorations in Entrepreneurial History* 8 (1955).

⁵ British Library, Lansdowne Manuscripts, MSS 104: 40; 106: 54; PRO SP 12/19, 77, 108, 283; APC 5: 166; 7: 248; 8: 19, 25, 289–90; 9: 17, 19, 134–35; 10: 321; 11: 85, 287–88; 12: 108, 114, 164; 13: 85; 18 Elizabeth I c. 17 (1575–76), SR 4 (1): 627; 27 Elizabeth I c. 25 (1584–85), SR 4 (1): 735; P. W. Hasler, ed., *The House of Commons, 1558–1603* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1981), 1: 672–75; *Proceedings* 1: 483–84; Proclamations 2: 426–30.

In addition, it made several technical decisions about the enterprise as well, choosing between several plans concerning the location of a wall; the placement of additional groins, a sluice, and a crosswalk; and the relocation of the harbor mouth. Work resumed, but progress was slow.⁶

In late 1582 and 1583 the Council resolved a bitter dispute between officials overseeing the Dover works. Richard Barrie, lieutenant of Dover Castle, complained in December 1582 that a recent opening in the harbor that Fernando Poyntz, the chief overseer, had made, would not allow the harbor to withstand the force of the high seas. Borough, the Council's agent, supported Barrie, who claimed that the harbor was worse than it had been in 1576. Dover commissioners, on the other hand, reported that Poyntz had, in fact, made only one slender groin and it had been beneficial to the project. Other town officials, including the mayor, even praised Poyntz's efforts. A subsequent investigation by the Privy Council, however, criticized Poyntz and ordered him fired. In November 1583 the Council investigated a new problem of additional decay between two parallel sluices. Poyntz received the blame for this as well.⁷

Throughout the 1570s and 1580s the Council, and presumably the Queen, remained closely involved in the myriad details of the project. Through extensive correspondence with Dover officials and the dispatch of agents to supervise the work, the Council remained well informed about developments on the coast. In 1584 engineers created a new harbor in a shallow lagoon that the River Dour fed. The next year work progressed on new groins, a sea wall, and a sluice. Unfortunately, in the fall of 1585 severe storms destroyed some of that year's work. Despite frequent setbacks the project was finally completed at a cost of less than £12,000.⁸

The repair of Dover harbor perhaps best illustrates the collaboration that occurred between Crown, Council and local officials. Although the Councilors and other royal officials preferred to rely upon local authorities to supervise the construction, the Councilors remained closely involved with major projects of the age—particularly the repair of Dover Harbor and the reclamation of the East Anglian fens. Once the Council became interested in a project, it authorized several different schemes to raise money to finance the work. It also dispatched agents to monitor the expenditure of funds and to investigate the progress of construction. Furthermore, it carefully examined and discussed plans and hired engineers and workers to pursue the work. Yet, despite this very high level of involvement in some projects, the Coun-

⁶ British Library, Lansdowne MSS 67: 35, 38; PRO SP 12/75, 99, 106, 120, 125, 127, 141, 144, 148, 219, 241, 244, 264; Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Honorable the Marquis of Salisbury, Series 9* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1883–1930), 2: 267; APC 7: 310; 8: 99; 10: 321; 11: 54, 190–91, 414; 18: 314; 29:329–30; King's Works 4 (2): 755–56.

⁷ PRO SP 12/130, 140, 142, 152, 153, 154, 155, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163, 164, 155, 167; APC 7: 70; 12: 161, 192, 195, 197; 13: 80, 392; King's Works 4 (2): 754–62.

⁸ PRO SP 12/156, 158, 159.

cil worked *through* local officials, especially local commissioners and mayors. Though it was concerned with the success of a project, it usually did not seek to circumvent local authorities. The Council acted differently towards Dover Harbor, however.⁹

Dover Harbor was unique in both the difficulty of the project and its national importance. It is thus understandable that the Privy Council would take such a personal and long-standing interest in the work there. Such interest was highly unusual. Not only was this the only public works project to receive such close conciliar supervision, it was only one of two subjects, the other being the plague, where royal officials regularly countermanded decisions of local officials and received on-going status reports. Moreover, while communities were traditionally responsible for paying for the maintenance of local roads, bridges, and harbors, this was not the case with Dover. Parliament might occasionally authorize a temporary assessment on a neighboring region, but assessments for Dover's repairs included not only grants, monopolies, and taxes that extended over decades, but also levies of workers and wagons similar to the French *route corvée*. The attention and the involvement of the Council was obviously necessary and timely. In May 1588 Sir William Winter reported to William Cecil Lord Burghley and the Privy Council that few repairs remained to be completed. Winter was thus able to recommend that the English fleet, then awaiting the Spanish Armada, be resupplied through Dover.¹⁰ The intervention of the Privy Council thus paid off—and just in time.

⁹ After 1585 the major additions were the construction of a seawall in 1592–93 and the repair of the sluice after 1599. PRO SP 12/162, 163, 181, 184, 210, 210; British Library, Lansdowne Manuscript 67: 27, 29.

¹⁰ King's Works 4 (2): 762–64.



Seeking a Model for Modernization: Ethiopia's Japanizers

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Rise of a Progressive Educated Elite and the Japanizers

Origins of the Japanizer Movement

From the second half of the nineteenth century, mainly through European missionary activities, a smattering of young Ethiopians began receiving the rudiments of a modern education. Europe impressed these youths, even if many had never been there. Several, however, did have contacts with the colonial territories bordering on Ethiopia, and most studied foreign languages and other new subjects in mission schools or the new state schools. In the early twentieth century, these foreign-educated Ethiopians generally sought positions at court, and many of them refused to share the complacency of their countrymen after Ethiopia's military victory over Italy at Adwa in 1896.

Called "Progressive Intellectuals," "Young Ethiopians," and "Japanizers," their influence peaked in the 1920s and early 1930s. Each name emphasized something different about them. The first label simply expressed Ethiopia's need to reform. The other two implied Ethiopia's need to find an appropriate model for reform. European and American observers generally used the term, "Young Ethiopians," which evoked parallels with reforming groups such as the Young Turks and Young Egypt. The third term highlighted the impact of Japan's Meiji transformation on Ethiopia's intellectuals. Japan's dramatic metamorphosis by the end of the nineteenth century from a feudal society—like Ethiopia's—into an industrial power attracted them. For these young, educated Ethiopians, Japanization was a means to an end—to solve the problem of underdevelopment. Japan's rapid modernization, after all, had guaranteed its peace, prosperity, and independence, while Ethiopia's continued backward-

ness threatened its very survival.¹

Modern education was their mantra, as exemplified by one of the earliest and most important of Ethiopia's new intellectuals was Gebre Heywet Baykedagn. He compared Ethiopian and Japanese attitudes toward education:

As for Japan, not only does the government not hunt someone who comes to serve it after having made his studies, but it helps that person financially who finds himself ready to leave to study in Europe. As for the Europeans who come to open a school there, not only does no one prevent him; but attracts him by contracts. The eyes of the Japanese people are thus opened up; Japan became richer, it became powerful, and it is respected. Asia and China begin to follow with perseverance the path of Japan.

Emperor Menilek should have done the same thing; but he did not do it.²

While passionately denouncing archaic feudalism, it was not bourgeois capitalism they sought as the alternative mode of production. Ethiopia's backward commercial bourgeoisie could not accumulate the necessary capital, and the imperialist colonizers would not allow it to develop to such size and weight that it could eventually win the home market for itself. Given the threat from Western, capitalist imperialism, Ethiopia did not have the luxury of time for "natural" capitalist development. Rather, the capitalism the Japanizers envisaged would be developed with the resources available only through state power and "revolution from above." The state had to undertake capital accumulation while giving the commercial bourgeoisie its active support to create conditions favorable for its development. With its poorly developed division of labor, only recently had Ethiopia emerged from a protracted period of feudal anarchy with the feudal barons still entrenched in the provinces. Japanization in Ethiopia therefore implied more drastic and more vigorous mea-

¹ Bahru Zewde, "The Concept of Japanization in the Intellectual History of Modern Ethiopia," in Bahru Zewde, et al., eds., *Proceedings of Fifth Seminar of the Department of History* (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University, 1990): 1.

² Guebrè-Heywèt Baykedagne [Gabrahiwot Baykadagn], *L'empereur Ménélik et l'Éthiopie*, trans. Beletou Kebede and Jacques Bureau, intro. Jacques Bureau (Addis Ababa: Maison des études éthiopiennes; Paris: Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales, 1993), 39. Also see Gabrahiwot Baykadagn [Gebre Heywet Baykedagn], *State & Economy of Early 20th Century Ethiopia: Prefiguring Political Economy c. 1910*, trans. and intro. Tenkir Bongor (London: Kamak House, 1995). Where possible, transliteration spellings will be used as found in Chris Prouty and Eugene Rosenfeld, *Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia and Eritrea*, 2nd ed. (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1994).

tures than had been needed in Japan itself.³

Further, Japan's victory over Russia in 1905—a victory of “peoples of color” over “white” oppression—dramatized that European techniques and institutions could be learned and turned against European colonizers. Italy's successful invasion of Libya in 1911 and 1912, in contrast, showed the failure of the Ottoman Empire to meet the new challenge.

Ironically, Europeans often reinforced the idea of a Japanese model for Ethiopia. In 1907, for example, a French plenipotentiary minister in Addis Ababa wrote about an interview he had had with Empress Taytu regarding Ethiopia's progress. To her question, “What can we do?” he replied,

See the Japanese. I know them. In hardly fifteen years, from the beginning of their evolution did they not become, in a short time, as strong as their teachers? It is necessary to go to the front in progress and not to escape it. Send some young people to Europe, as well in England, or to France, perhaps to Germany or to Italy, and they will come back here to tell their countrymen what they have seen and learned.⁴

Blattengeta Heruy Welde Sellase (1878–1939)

Perhaps the most influential of the Japanizers in Ethiopia was Heruy Welde Sell-

³ Addis Hiwet, *Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution* (London: Review of African Political Economy, 1975), 68–70. This is an analysis by an Ethiopian Marxist soon after a Communist revolution had dethroned Haile Sellase in 1974. Also see Bahru Zewde, “Concept of Japanization,” 8.

For another perspective on the problems of development and the need for state direction see J. Calvitt Clarke, *Russia and Italy Against Hitler: the Bolshevik-Fascist Rapprochement of the 1930s* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991), Chapter 4. Here are reproduced the arguments of Anthony James Gregor as well as the former Sorelian syndicalists who joined Benito Mussolini's Fascist Party and wrote for *Critica Fascista*. In essence, they claimed that Benito Mussolini's Fascist Italy and Joseph Stalin's Communist Russia faced similar problems and found similar solutions—all be it with different vocabularies. Gregor puts the point plainly:

Fascism was the heir of a long intellectual tradition that found its origins in the ambiguous legacy left to revolutionaries in the work of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Fascism was, in a clear and significant sense, a Marxist heresy. It was a Marxism creatively developed to respond to the particular and specific needs of an economically retarded national community condemned, as a proletarian nation, to compete with the more advanced plutocracies of its time for space, resources, and international stature.

See his *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 123. In other words, necessity under conditions of chronic underdevelopment forms a nexus uniting Bolshevik—including Addis Hiwet's—and fascist thought.

⁴ Hidéko Faërber-Ishihara, “Heruy, le Japon et les “japonisants,” in Alain Rouaud, ed. *Les orientalistes sont des aventuriers. Guirlande offerte à Joseph Tubiana par ses élèves et ses amis* (Paris: Sépia, 1999), 146. Taytu Betul (empress 1889–1913) was born about 1850. Well-educated and energetic, she married Menilek in 1883 and strongly influenced him. After an increase of her personal power, in 1910 she was forced to confine herself to nursing Menilek. After his death in 1913, she retired to a semi-monastic life and died in 1918. Prouty and Rosenfeld, *Historical Dictionary*, 166–67. See Chris Prouty, *Empress Taytu and Menilek II: Ethiopia, 1883–1910*. Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1986.

assie.⁵ He hailed from Merhabete district and went to Emperor Menilek II's court at Entotto, where he served at Raguel Church and as secretary to the emperor. He authored and published in Amharic some twenty-eight of his own works, including stories, histories, and social philosophy. A linguist and after 1930 foreign minister, he also served in diplomatic missions to Paris, Geneva, Japan, and the United States. Additionally, Heruy edited Ethiopia's civil and ecclesiastical codes.⁶

In 1932 after an official visit to Japan, he published *Mahidere Birhan: Hagre Japan* [The Document of Japan] in which he testified:

Ethiopia was not knowledgeable of the situation in the East until the [Russo-Japanese] war. Because of the war, we learned tremendous amount about Japan from Russians living in Ethiopia, and our Ethiopian people started to admire courageous Japan."⁷

Of the Japanizers, he most elaborately compared Ethiopia and Japan. Both had been ruled by long and uninterrupted founding dynasties: Hirohito was the 124th monarch of the Jimu dynasty while Hayle Sellase was the 126th ruler of the Solomonic dynasty. He compared Emperor Menilek to the Meiji. In the entire world, only Ethiopia and Japan had preserved that long the title of "emperor" to designate the chief of state. Both countries had experienced roving capitals in their histories. He compared the Tokugawa Shogunate to the *Zamana Masafent*: the only difference was that while the overlordship of the Yajju lords had been confined to Bagemder, the Tokugawa exercised authority over all of Japan. The manners of the two peoples were similar. Heruy went on to conclude that, despite these similarities, the two countries had long lived in mutual ignorance of one another—much as do the two eyes of one person. Just as a mirror helps one eye to see the other, so too his visit to

⁵ Richard Bradshaw, "Japan and European Colonialism in Africa 1800–1937" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio University, 1992), 300; Aoki Sumio and Kurimoto Eisei, "Japanese Interest in Ethiopia (1868–1940): Chronology and Bibliography," in *Ethiopia in Broader Perspective: Papers of the XIIIth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*, K. E. Fukui and M. Shigeta, eds., 3 vols. (Kyoto: Shokado Book Sellers, 1997): 1: 714; Adrien Zervos, *L'Empire d'Ethiopie: Le Miroir de L'Ethiopie Moderne 1906–1935* (Alexandria, Egypt: Impr. de l'Ecole professionnelle des freres, 1936), 482; and Alain Rouaud, *Le negus contre l'esclavage: Les édits abolitionnistes du ras Tafari* (Paris: Aresae, 1997), 124.

⁶ Prouty, *Historical Dictionary*, 82.

⁷ Heruy Welde Sellase, *Dai Nihon* [Light of Japan] trans. Oreste Vaccari, Foreword by Baron Shidehara Kijuro (Tokyo: Eibunpo-Tsuron Shoji, 1933), 3–4 of Preface. Originally published in Amharic as *Mahidere Birhan: Hagre Japan* [The Document of Japan] (Addis Ababa: Gohi Tsiba, 1932). Also see Taura Masanori, "Nihon-Ethiopia kankei ni miru 1930 nen tsusho gaiko no iso" [A Phase of the 1930 Commercial Diplomacy in the Japanese-Ethiopian Relations], *Seifu to Minkan* [Government and Civilians], *Nenpo Kindai Nihon Kenkyu* [Annual Report, Study of Modern Japan] 17 (1995): 148; Okakura Takashi and Kitagawa Katsuhiko, *Nihon-Afurika Koryu-shi: Meiji-ki kara Dainiji Sekai Taisen-ki made* [History of Japanese-African Relations: From the Meiji Period to the Second World War Period] (Tokyo: Dobun-kan, 1993), 31.

Japan had brought mutual awareness between the two countries.⁸

Given these similarities, if Japan had succeeded in modernizing itself in so short a time, Ethiopia could do as much. Both Heruy and Emperor Haile Selassie sought the Japanese developmental model, and both understood that Japan's rapid evolution had been due to European technicians who had acted as Japan's educators. Speaking with the French chargé d'affaires in Ethiopia, Heruy praised Japan's transformation and asserted, "You will see even more extraordinary things here than in Japan."⁹

Ethiopia's policy was to confide important business to those countries that did not have immediate interests in Ethiopia, for example, the United States, Germany, a few small countries of Europe, and Japan.¹⁰ In the international political game, Heruy understood that Japan's geographical position meant that the Japanese could not threaten Ethiopia's sovereignty, and economic interests in Ethiopia might induce them to assist Ethiopia in case of an European invasion. A Japanese presence could weaken in Ethiopia the rights of England, France, and Italy, who held neighboring colonies.¹¹

French diplomats thought well of Heruy, at least early in his career. In 1919, when he went to Europe, they saw him as leading Ethiopia's intellectual party. At the request of the Quai d'Orsay, he received an insignia as an officer of public instruction. When he was named in 1922 as president of the Special Court in Addis Ababa, a special court designed to deal with foreigners, foreign diplomats were satisfied. The French minister in Ethiopia from 1917 to 1923, reported that Heruy was honest, intelligent, and educated and that all Europeans were counting on him to guarantee the smooth functioning of this court. Another French minister wrote on the occasion of Ras Teferi's trip to Europe in 1924:

⁸ Heruy, *Dai Nihon*, 6 of Preface, 21-23, 58-60, 114-16, 119; Faërber-Ishihara, "Heruy," 145. For more on the similarities and differences, presumed and real, between Ethiopia and Japan, see the articles in *Ethiopia in Broader Perspective: Papers of the XIIIth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*, 3 vols., K. E. Fukui and M. Shigeta, eds. (Kyoto: Shokado Book Sellers, 1997): Messay Kebede, "Japan and Ethiopia: An Appraisal of Similarities and Divergent Courses," 1: 639-51; Donald N. Levine, "Ethiopia and Japan in Comparative Civilization Perspective," 1: 652-75; and Merid W. Aregay, "Japanese and Ethiopian Reactions to Jesuit Missionary Activities in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," 676-98.

⁹ Faërber-Ishihara, "Heruy," 145.

¹⁰ As a small example of Italian fears of being displaced in Ethiopia, particularly by Japan and the United States, see Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Commissione per la Pubblicazione dei Documenti Diplomatici [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commission for the Publication of Diplomatic Documents, *I documenti diplomatici italiani* [Italian Diplomatic Documents], 7th Series: 1922-1935 (Rome: La Libreria dello Stato, 1952), vol. 11: nos. 42, 148, 177, and 204.

¹¹ Faërber-Ishihara, "Heruy," 145.

a man of great worth, completely devoted to Ras Teferi for whom he will probably become one of the principal ministers if the prince arrives to the throne. Full of common sense and open-minded. Understands well modern ideas and understands the necessity that his country come to know them. One of the government's best heads although currently without official status.¹²

Little-by-little, however, this positive opinion changed. In a letter of July 25, 1931 to the foreign minister, the French chargé d'affaires wrote that Heruy was not an intelligent man and that he took only superficial care of his job. The government, none-the-less, took no decision without consulting him. His influence on the sovereign remained so important that one French representative called him the "Rasputin" of Ethiopia, and another editorialized, "Blattengeta Heruy was consecrated emperor under the name of Hayle Sellase." One wag called him "the wizard."¹³

Why had Heruy's reputation among French diplomats slipped so badly? Many Europeans blamed Heruy for Japan's advances in Ethiopia. Not a Francophile, he did not trust Europeans in general, although he did wish to draw closer to the English and the Swedes. While the international press denounced the Japanese, the French criticized Heruy's aggressive policies that, in their view, had isolated Ethiopia. In other words, the Japanizers played a role in isolating Ethiopia from Europe before the Italo-Ethiopian War.¹⁴

Always Hayle Sellase's trusted adviser, he went into exile with the emperor in 1936 and died in England in 1939.

Bajerond Takle-Hawaryat Takla-Maryam and the Constitution of 1931

Ethiopia's Constitution of 1931, modeled on Japan's Meiji Constitution of 1889, best illustrates Ethiopia's desire to follow in Japan's progressive footsteps. As the emperor himself put it in a speech at its signing on July 16, 1931:

Everyone knows that laws bring the greatest benefits to mankind and that the honour and interest of everyone depend on the wisdom of the laws, while humiliation, shame, iniquity, and loss of rights arise from their absence or insufficiency.¹⁵

The constitution paid homage to the traditionally absolute, imperial power. The emperor held executive power over the central and provincial governments—the nobility and provincial governors receiving no independent authority. The newly instituted parliament, which had only powers of discussion, provided no check on the emperor, who could disregard the human rights provisions of the constitution in

¹² *Ibid.*, 147–48.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 148.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*.

¹⁵ Haile Sellassie I [Hayle Sellase], "The Constitution of 1931," *Ethiopia Observer* 5 (1962): 362.

emergencies. For the most part, the constitution merely confirmed powers to the emperor, which he would have exercised in any case. In short, the constitution was an instrument of centralization under the emperor—such centralization was necessary for national unity and effective modernization. The constitution, however, merely echoed modernizing developments and did little to further them. Its only direct result was the founding of the parliament, but in no other field was there legal or administrative machinery available to implement it. The constitution was subject to no judicial interpretation, and the provisions on rights had little relevance to a people to whose traditions they were largely alien.¹⁶

The emperor had ordered the Russian-educated intellectual and “Japanizer,” *Bejirond* Tekle-Hawaryat to draft the constitution.¹⁷ Tekle-Hawaryat examined copies of the English, German, Italian, and Japanese constitutions for their usefulness to Ethiopia. He also read works on Japanese history, politics, and economy. His guiding principles were to maintain the monarchy as the basis of Ethiopia's unity and to protect the public from arbitrary rule. He and his advisers, Heruy and Ras Kasa Darge, wrote a draft, which the emperor modified.¹⁸ Then the leading nobility and rulers of each region approved it.¹⁹ In his capacity as finance minister, he introduced the constitution to Ethiopia's Parliament.

With only a couple of exceptions, when comparing the 1889 Japanese constitution and the 1931 Ethiopian constitution, even the chapter divisions were identical, and in both cases, nullifiers such as “within the limits provided for by the law” or “except in cases provided for in the law” constrained the guarantees of civil liberties.²⁰

¹⁶ Paul and Clapham, *Ethiopian Constitutional Development*, 340–41.

¹⁷ Richard Pankhurst, “History of Education, Printing and Literacy in Ethiopia. 8: Education Abroad—and at Home—in Menilek's Day,” *Addis Tribune*, Sept. 25, 1993, <http://archives.geez.org/AddisTribune/Archives/1998/09/25-09-98/Hist-312.htm>. In 1896, Menilek had sent to Russia six young men, including Takle-Hawaryat, who, between 1896 and 1902, studied military science in Russia, specializing in engineering and agriculture. The young Ethiopian attended the Mikailovskaia Artillery School in St. Petersburg, and received the rank of colonel in the Russian army. He stayed seventeen years in Russia. Upon his return to Ethiopia, he was employed by Ras Mekonnen in Harar and Jijjiga. He participated in the coup that deposed Lej Iyasu in September 1916. He became finance minister in 1930. Later he was minister to France and a delegate to the League of Nations. He left for work in Djibouti with Ethiopian refugees during the occupation and did not return until 1955. Prouty, *Historical Dictionary*, 169.

¹⁸ Hideo Faëber-Ishihara, *Les premiers contacts entre l'Éthiopie et le Japon* (Paris: Aresae, 1998), 11–12. As the son of Darge Sahle Sellase, Ras Kasa Darge's (1881–1956) claim to the throne was equal to Hayle Sellase's, but he was loyal to his cousin. A devout churchman, he also participated in designed the constitution of 1955. Three of his sons were killed by the Italians, only one escaped that fate. Prouty, *Historical Dictionary*, 169.

¹⁹ Interestingly, Hayle Sellase brought the nobility into the process but did not allow it to change those parts that limited their power. The emperor found it difficult to actually enforce the document on the recalcitrant nobility. James C. N. Paul and Christopher Clapham, *Ethiopian Constitutional Development: A Sourcebook*, vol. 1 (Addis Ababa: Haile Sellassie I University, 1967), 340.

²⁰ Bahru Zewde, “Concept of Japanization,” 9.

The two constitutions were similar not only in content, but also somewhat in origins. Both were "granted" from above; both were intended as a foundation for strong monarchical government rather than for popular representation—that is, sovereignty represented in the emperor; both consciously borrowed from outside sources; and both were preceded by a period of deliberation to choose the type of constitution best suited to the two countries' needs.²¹

In Japan, the period of deliberation was quite extensive. An Imperial edict in 1876 mandated the preparation of drafts of a national constitution, and the revision of drafts continued into 1887. The Meiji Constitution was finally promulgated on February 2, 1889.²² Deliberation took much less time in Ethiopia. Hayle Sellase revealed in his memoirs that, although the idea of a constitution had first occurred to him while heir to the throne, he had had to abandon the idea in face of opposition from Empress Zawditu instigated by some of the nobility. Serious work in formulating the constitution could begin only after April 1930 when the empress died and Teferi had ascended to the throne. Thus, the constitutional writing process in Ethiopia lasted only slightly over a year.²³

The two tables below point out some of the important similarities and differences between the 1889 Meiji and 1931 Ethiopian Constitutions²⁴

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Yoshimitsu Khan, "Inoue Kowashi and the Dual Images of the Emperor of Japan," *Pacific Affairs* 71 (Sum. 1998): 215–30; George M. Beckmann, *The Making of the Meiji Constitution: The Oligarchs and the Constitutional Development of Japan, 1868–1991*, Foreword by Harold S. Quigley (Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas Publications, 1957), 39–83.

²³ Bahru Zewde, "Concept of Japanization," 9. For Hayle Selasse's own extended commentary on the constitution and its origins, see Haile Selassie I [Hayle Sellase], *Emperor of Ethiopia, 1892–1975, My Life and Ethiopia's Progress, 1892–1937*, trans. and annotated by Edward Ullendorff (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), 178–201. For more on his relationship with Zawditu, see 62–64.

²⁴ Beckman, *Meiji Constitution*, 151–56; Bahru Zewde, "Concept of Japanization," 15–17; Paul and Clapham, *Ethiopian Constitutional Development*, 326–38; Haile Selassie [Hayle Sellase], "The Constitution of 1931," 363–65.

Table 1: Similarities

Japan	Ethiopia
Chapter I, Article 3. The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.	Chapter I, Article 5. By virtue of His Imperial Blood as well as by the anointing which He has received, the person of the Emperor is sacred, His dignity is inviolable and His power indisputable. Consequently, He is entitled to all the honours due to Him in accordance with tradition and the present Constitution. The Law decrees that anyone so bold as to injure the Majesty of the Emperor will be punished.
Chapter I, Article 4. The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them according to the provisions of the present Constitutions.	Chapter II, Article 6. In the Ethiopian Empire supreme power rests in the hands of the Emperor. He ensures the exercise thereof in conformity with the established law.
Chapter I, Article 7. The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes and prorogues it, and dissolves the House of Representatives.	Chapter II, Article 8. It is the Emperor's right to convene the deliberative Chambers and to declare the opening and the close [sic] of their sessions. He may also order their convocation before or after the usual time. He may dissolve the Chamber of Deputies.
Chapter I, Article 12. The Emperor determines the organization and peace standing of the Army and Navy.	Chapter II, Article 13. It is the Emperor's right to determine the armed forces necessary to the Empire, both in time of peace and in time of war.
Chapter II, Article 25. Except in the cases provided for in the law, the house of no Japanese subject shall be entered or searched without his consent.	Chapter III, Article 25. Except in the cases provided by law, no domiciliary searches may be made.
Chapter II, Article 26. Except in the cases mentioned in the law, the secrecy of the letters of every Japanese subject shall remain inviolate.	Chapter III, Article 26. Except in the cases provided by law, no one shall have the right to violate the secrecy of the correspondence of Ethiopian subjects.
Chapter II, Article 27. The right of property of every Japanese subject shall remain inviolate. Measures necessary to be taken for the public benefit shall be provided for by law.	Chapter III, Article 27. Except in cases of public utility determined by law, no one shall be entitled to deprive an Ethiopian subject of the movable or landed property which he holds.
Chapter III, Article 40. Both Houses [of the Imperial Diet] can make representations to the Government, as to laws or upon any other subject. When, however, such representations are not accepted, they cannot be made a second time during the same session.	Chapter IV, Article 36. Each of the two Chambers shall have the right to express separately to His Majesty the Emperor its opinion on a legislative question or any other matter whatsoever. If the Emperor does not accept its opinion, it may not, however, revert to the question during the same parliamentary session.
Article 57. The Judicature shall be exercised by the Courts of Law, according to law, in the name of the Emperor. The organization of the Courts of Law shall be determined by law.	Chapter VI, Article 50. Judges, sitting regularly, shall administer justice in conformity with the laws, in the name of His Majesty the Emperor. The organization of the Courts shall be regulated by law.

Table 2: Differences

Japan	Ethiopia
Chapter I, Article 5. The Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet	No such provision.
Chapter II, Article 28. Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief.	No such provision.
Chapter II, Article 29. Japanese subjects shall, within the limits of law, enjoy the liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meetings and associations.	No such provision.
Chapter III, Article 35. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members elected by the people, according to the provisions of the Law of Election.	Chapter IV, Article 32. Temporarily, and until the people are in a position to elect them themselves, the members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be chosen by the Nobility [<i>Mekuanent</i>] and the local chiefs [<i>Shumoch</i>].
Chapter III, Article 37. Every law requires the consent of the Imperial Diet.	Chapter IV, Article 34. No law may be put into force without having been discussed by [the] Chambers and having obtained the confirmation of the Emperor.
Chapter III, Article 38. Both Houses shall vote upon projects of law submitted to it by the Government, and may respectively initiate projects of law.	Chapter IV, Article 35. The members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be legally bound to receive and deliberate on the proposals transmitted to them by the Ministers of the respective Departments. However, when the Deputies have an idea which could be useful to the Empire or to the nation, the law reserves to them the right to communicate it to the Emperor through their President, and the Chamber shall deliberate on the subject if the Emperor consents thereto.
Chapter III, Article 51. Both Houses may enact, besides what is provided for in the present Constitution and in the Law of the Houses, rules necessary for the management of their internal affairs.	Chapter IV, Article 44. The Emperor shall draw up, in the form of a law, the standing orders of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies.
Chapter III, Article 54. The Ministers of State and the Delegates of the Government may, at any time, take seats and speak in either House.	Chapter IV, Article 47. The Chambers may not summon Ministers to their meetings even if they feel the need therefor, without having first obtained the consent of the Emperor. Ministers, on their part, may not attend meetings of the Chambers and take part in their deliberations without having obtained the consent of His Majesty.

There are a few other significant differences. Even the similar chapters differ in nuances and emphases. Particularly on the question of civil liberties and the power of the emperor *vis-à-vis* the legislative body, the two constitutions diverge with greater civil liberties and legislative power in the Japanese case. This, perhaps, suggests the political strength of the bourgeoisie in Japan compared to its virtual absence in Ethiopia. Ethiopia's constitution had only one clause of vague value on the budget while the Meiji model had ten relatively elaborate provisions—again indicating differing levels of fiscal development.²⁵

Araya Abeba

A figure of underestimated importance in the Japanizer movement was Araya Abeba, a member of Hayle Sellase's family. If he is remembered at all today, it is for his proposed marriage with a Japanese, Kuroda Masako, a subject of great mirth and greater fear among many European observers. A handsome young man in the 1930s, in truth he played an important part in Ethiopia's relations with Japan, and he gives every appearance of being groomed for greater things until the Italo-Ethiopian War intervened.

Araya saw the Japanizers as "visionaries," and he admired Japanese courtesy, development, and modernization. Even before his trip to Japan in 1931 with Foreign Minister Heruy, his friend and patron, Araya had already expressed his desire to marry a Japanese woman. This reflected the Japanizer in him as well as, by his own admission, his desire for a traditionally submissive woman. Heruy was aware of Araya's interest, but restrained him for fear that any such marriage would cause adverse diplomatic consequences and might interfere with his mission to Japan.

The visit to Japan impressed Araya and other members of the party. The month-long sea voyage to Japan included stops in India, Singapore, Indo-China, and Shanghai. Everywhere along the way, the Ethiopians saw Asiatics under white, colonial rule. This made a profound impression. In contrast, Japan was modern, vibrant, strong—and independent. Araya and the others were particularly impressed at the opportunity to be wined and dined with Japan's emperor—at a time when he lived in god-like seclusion with few having the opportunity to meet with him.²⁶

By the first half of the 1930s, Japan and Ethiopia were drawing closer together to the acute concern of all of Africa's colonial powers, most especially Italy. To states-

²⁵ Bahru Zewde, "Concept of Japanization," 9–10; Prouty, *Historical Dictionary*, 38; Taura, "Nihon-Ethiopia kankei," 148; Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1974* (London: J. Currey, 1991), 92, 110; Furukawa Tetsushi, "Japan's Political Relations with Ethiopia, 1920s–1960s: A Historical Overview," unpublished paper presented to the 35th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Seattle, WA, Nov. 20–23, 1992, 5–6; Furukawa Tetsushi, "Japanese-Ethiopian Relations in the 1920–30s: The Rise and Fall of 'Sentimental' Relations," unpublished paper presented at the 34th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, St. Louis, MO, Nov. 1991, 5–6.

²⁶ Interview with Amde Araya (son of Araya Abeba) and Araya Abeba, Fairfax Lakes Park, VA, and apartment of Araya Abeba, Alexandria, VA, July 7, 2001, 1:45–6:30 p.m. Araya took the notes that Heruy dictated that later formed the book, *Mahidere Birhan: Hagre Japan*.

men in London, Paris, Moscow, and elsewhere, the threat of Japanese political, commercial, and military intrusions into Ethiopia seemed sufficient to justify Italy's military preparations against Ethiopia from 1934 on. In 1933 and 1934, Araya's proposed marriage vexingly personified these intrusions. Mistakenly believing that this was to be a royal wedding, Europeans saw the genesis of the proposed marriage as lying in Ethiopia's desire to model its modernization after Japan and in Japan's romantic vision of Ethiopia.

While this sufficiently explains the motives of Araya and Kuroda for joining in an arranged marriage, other individuals were also involved. Most important were several Pan-Asian, nationalist Japanese who were promoting the marriage to leverage a prominent role for themselves in commercial exchanges between Japan and Ethiopia. Interestingly, neither government in Tokyo or Addis Ababa promoted the marriage idea; neither lamented when the proposal died sometime in 1934; and both suffered international complications because of it.²⁷

The proposed marriage continued to rankle Italians long after the quasi-betrothal had been broken off.²⁸ Other enemies of either Ethiopia or Japan also continued to write about the implicit threat of the proposed union long after they had had every cause to know that it never carried the policy implications feared and had not come to pass in any case. One Communist book published in 1936, for example, echoed the thoughts and fears of many, when it thundered against Japanese imperialism and asserted: "Through the marriage of an Abyssinian prince to the daughter of a Japanese noble, the Japanese were enabled to equip airdromes in Ethiopian and to receive a cotton concession there."²⁹ Clearly, for Moscow as for many others, the falseness of such statements was less important than was the need to draw upon any potential anti-Japanese and anti-Ethiopian arguments. One particularly hyperventilated account by Roman Procházka maintained that,

[P]lans have been made for effecting mixed marriages between the eligible Japanese settlers (estimated at about 2000 in number) and native Abyssinian women. This declared policy which is intended to produce a new race of leaders in the united revolt of the coloured peoples against the white races, was to have been inaugurated by the marriage

²⁷ J. Calvitt Clarke III, "Marriage Alliance: The Union of Two Imperiums: Japan and Ethiopia?" *Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians* 7 (Dec. 1999): 105-16.

²⁸ Japan (Greene), 1/17/34: United States, National Archives (College Park, MD), Record Group 59, Decimal File [hereafter cited as NA (College Park)] 784.94/6.

²⁹ O. Tanin and E. Yohan, *When Japan Goes to War* (New York: International Publishers, 1936), 14. For the Soviet Union's policies *vis-à-vis* Italy, Japan, and Ethiopia before the Italo-Ethiopian War, see J. Calvitt Clarke III, "Periphery and Crossroads: Ethiopia and World Diplomacy, 1934-36," in *Ethiopia in Broader Perspective: Papers of the XIIIth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*, 3 vols., K. E. Fukui and M. Shigeta, eds. (Kyoto: Shokado Book Sellers, 1997), 1: 699-712.

of Princess Masako, a daughter of the Japanese prince Kurado [Kuroda], to the Ethiopian prince Lij Ayalé [Araya].³⁰

Teferi Makonnen (Haile Sellase) (1892–1975)

The crucial force behind Ethiopia's desire to use Japan as a model was the emperor himself. His father, *Ras Makonnen*, had studied foreign military literature, and Russia's defeat by the Japanese Navy at Tsushima in 1905—following as it did in Ethiopia's footsteps by defeating a European power—surely electrified him. By 1906 when *Ras Makonnen* died, the thirteen year-old Teferi apparently had already developed a mental blueprint for his goal. An essential part of it was to draw upon the Japanese model, that other empire, which had proved that a non-European nation could embrace modern civilization and stand culturally and technically on par with European countries.³¹

Once Teferi became emperor, with Heruy as his closest adviser, he imitated the "attitude of exclusiveness" of the Japanese emperor, because he thought it would help create "an imperial dignity lacking in Ethiopia."³²

On the eve of Heruy's visit to Japan in 1931, America's head of Legation in Addis Ababa, Addison Southard, mused on the emperor's attitudes toward Japan. From his conversations over many years, Southard knew that he greatly admired Japan and believed that the country had brought about its influential world position by using foreign advisers. He toyed with the idea that Ethiopia might reasonably expect to accomplish similarly marvelous results the same way. Haile Sellase was "unaware, of course," said Southard, "of the vast differences between the two countries and peoples, and their qualifications and resources which place Japan far ahead of what Ethiopia is or ever could hope to be." Southard had spent many years in the Far East before entering the foreign service and felt he knew Japan and the Japanese well. He, however, never thought it "discreet to attempt the probably impossible, and genuinely delicate, task of convincing His Imperial Majesty of the great difference between the two countries and their peoples." Southard, however, did "informally and tactfully" suggest to Heruy some ways in which he could make practical comparisons during his visit to Japan.³³

Tied in with Ethiopian admiration for the Japanese, were changing racial attitudes. Southard acknowledged that they and Haile Sellase himself held complicated

³⁰ Roman Procházka, *Abyssinia: The Powder Barrel* (London: British International News Agency, 1936), 60. Translated from the German edition of 1935, this book was printed in Austria. Procházka had lived in Ethiopia—and had not much liked it there.

³¹ Hans Wilhelm Lockot, *The Mission: The Life, Reign and Character of Haile Sellassie I* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1989), 31–32, quote, 32; Furukawa, "Japan's Political Relations with Ethiopia," 4–5; Furukawa, "Japanese-Ethiopian Relations," 5; Furukawa Tetsushi, "Japanese Political and Economic Interests In Africa: The Prewar Period," *Network Africa* 7 (1991): 7.

³² Harold Marcus, *Haile Sellassie I: The Formative Years, 1892–1936* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987), 125–26; Bradshaw, "Japan and European Colonialism," 300.

³³ Ethiopia (Southard), 10/5/31; NA (College Park) 033.8411/81.

racial attitudes. By mid-1930, Southard had begun noting new views developing toward foreigners. Southard explained that the late empress and her immediate followers before then had regarded with some contempt those foreigners with other than white skins. They were, in fact, as contemptuous of foreign blacks as they were of their own black subjects. Attempts by foreign blacks to fraternize with Ethiopians as brother Africans always aroused resentment. The empress and many of her ruling class were proud of their Semitic blood, which in their opinion made them the equal to any white and distinctly superior to any black.³⁴

Emperor Hayle Sellase had, in Southard's opinion, perhaps even more Semitic blood than had some of his royal relatives. Yet, the emperor after 1930 became convinced that Ethiopia's future was bound up with peoples "with at least dark skins." Hence, he was "temporarily" losing existing prejudices—at least against those foreign blacks possessing western education and ability. Southard further commented that the emperor was encouraging advisers, teachers, and such "of the darker-skinned divisions of the human race" to work in Ethiopia.³⁵

While Hayle Sellase wanted to avoid foreign influences from dominating in Ethiopia, he also understood that his country's modernization required foreign advisers and teachers. The isolated attempts to introduce whites into these tasks had led to the white arrogance that so greatly restricted their usefulness. Additionally, white advisers retained their foreign nationality and their foreign prejudices. Hayle Sellase had discovered that advisers and teachers with dark skins could often be persuaded to opt for Ethiopian nationality and would not display the superior arrogance so typical of white advisers.³⁶

The new emphasis on peoples of color encouraged many Ethiopians to want to model themselves after the Japanese. It also assisted the opening of Ethiopia to Japanese penetration to the detriment of the traditional, white, colonial powers. Reinforcing this Japanization, many Japanese were themselves seductively speaking of leading an alliance of the colored peoples of the world against white imperialism.³⁷

Later, as the Italo-Ethiopian war was brewing, one British minister to Ethiopia echoed Southard's observations:

³⁴ Ethiopia (Southard), 7/30/30: NA (College Park) 884.01 A/8.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.* See additional documents in 884.01A, 884.4016, and 784.94.

³⁷ J. Calvitt Clarke III, "Japan and Italy Squabble Over Ethiopia: The Sugimura Affair of July 1935," *Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians* 6 (Dec. 1999): 9-20; J. Calvitt Clarke III, "The Politics of Arms Not Given: Japan and Ethiopia in the 1930s," Paper presented to the annual meeting of the Florida Conference of Historians, Tallahassee, FL, Mar. 2001, <http://users.ju.edu/~jclarke/wizzat3.html>. A longer version, with citations, of this article is forthcoming in *Girding for Battle: Arms Sales in a Global Perspective, 1800-1950*, to be published by Greenwood Press.

the Emperor has always been interested in the achievements of Japan and his imagination sees similarities between the two countries which—however incredible it may seem to foreign observers—lead him to dream of Ethiopia as the Japan of Africa.³⁸

Ultimate Failure of the Japanizer Movement

How successful were these and other Japanizers? Just before the war with Italy, Welde Giyorgis Welde-Yohannes, the emperor's private secretary, told Ladislav Farago, the peripatetic journalist, that,

At last we have reached the point when we have officials who have the ability to govern the country in the European method, instead of oligarchies. I am convinced that we shall now develop more rapidly, but, we must be left alone, for all our efforts would be wasted if we fell back on the old ways, even if it were in defence of our very life and independence. On that day our evolution would stop, and a bloody revolution would take place. And the men who take it upon themselves to make a European country out of this backward African Empire, will be the first martyrs in the revolution, for the Conservatives rule the country, and conservative here means backward and pitiless. We of the younger generation are the friends of progress and humanism, while they are its enemies! And we do not want to work in vain!³⁹

Ladislav Farago concluded that this statement referred to the Japanizers and helped explain Ethiopia's determination to resist Italy—to protect the work begun less than ten years earlier through its own strength and initiative.⁴⁰ The Marxist Addis Hiwet has added that it also demonstrated that the ideas advanced by the Japanizers were too radical for the other educated elements in Ethiopia.⁴¹

After the Second World War and Ethiopia's liberation, Kabbada Mikael in his book, *Japan Endamen Salatanach* [How Japan Modernized], confidently and enthusiastically continued to prescribe the Japanese model. He wrote that Japan had charted its own course and had maintained its independence through education. As had the Japanizers before the Italian invasion, he hoped that Ethiopia would learn this lesson. He noted some similarities between Ethiopia and Japan: the Portuguese, for example, had visited both countries at about the same time and both had driven them out to preserve their religions; and both countries were subsequently isolated from the world for about 250 years. More significantly, Kabbada also pointed out the differences separating the two countries. Japan was relatively more developed than was Ethiopia even before its contact with the West, especially in shipbuilding and

³⁸ Bahru Zewde, "The Concept of Japanization," 7.

³⁹ Ladislav Farago, *Abyssinia on the Eve* (New York G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935), 70–71. Welde Giyorgis Welde-Yohannes was born about 1902 in Bulga to a leather worker and church-educated. He shared Hayle Sellase's exile and returned to become the most powerful man in the government from 1941–55.

⁴⁰ Farago, *Abyssinia*, 71.

⁴¹ Hiwet, *Ethiopia*, 70.

arms manufacture. Whereas Japan had adopted European ways with remarkable speed, Ethiopia was much slower. Further, what Ethiopia's intellectuals had most feared—the loss of independence if Ethiopia failed to modernize—had already occurred, for five years, anyway.

The only country that has succeeded in safeguarding her independence and in charting her own path of educational progress is Japan. If we examine her history and follow her example, we can achieve a lot in a short period of time.⁴²

Kabbada Mikael's yearnings dramatize the point made by the historian, Bahru Zewde, that, ultimately, the Japanizer movement in Ethiopia failed. He argues that comparing the Adwa victory of 1896 with the Japanese victory of Russia in 1905 is not particularly useful. It would be better to compare Japan's victory with Ethiopia's defeat in 1935 and 1936. The former was the logical outcome of three decades of fundamental transformation of Japanese society, whereas the latter "was the penalty for the failure to modernize."⁴³ Even before the Meiji reformation, Japan had attained a higher state of social development than had Ethiopia in the twentieth century. Japan's agriculture before the Meiji period had already begun to undergo the process of commercialization with the emergence of sugar, cotton, tea, and tobacco plantations. The cash nexus had gone further in Japan than in Ethiopia, thereby entailing a higher degree of differentiation among the peasantry. Urbanization and the attendant emergence of a strong mercantile class in Japan had proceeded much further than in Ethiopia. Literacy in pre-reform Japan greatly exceeded that in Ethiopia.

In sum, the foreign threat to Japan, first made apparent by the visits of the American, Commodore Matthew Perry, in 1853 and 1854, had "acted as a sort of mid-wife in the delivery of capitalism from the womb of feudalism." Ethiopia, on the other hand, was unable to muster the same energetic reaction to its foreign threat. To the contrary, Ethiopia's victory of 1896 had instilled in Ethiopians "a false sense of self-sufficiency and [had] ill-prepared them for the greater danger of the 1930s." And with fewer resources available to Ethiopia than Japan had at its command, the urgent and "impassioned pleas of the Japanizers remained only a 'subjective urge unsupported by the objective reality.'"⁴⁴

⁴² Bahru Zewde, "Concept of Japanization," 2.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

The Rejection of Modern Science: the Nazi Dismissal Policy of 1933

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In 1933, the Nazi regime in Germany passed the Civil Service Law, which dismissed non-Aryans and the “politically unreliable” from state employment.¹ Exemptions existed, such as those for World War I veterans, but many of these civil servants were forced to accept transfers to other positions.² Two currents had flowed together to create the Civil Service Law, the first law of the Dismissal Policy. Long before the rise of the Nazis, many Germans had rejected elements of the modern world of which science is a crucial component. On top of this, Nazi Germans associated Jews with modern science because of the high number of Jews working in science. These dismissals included scientists from teaching and other governmental positions. Of those dismissed from their positions, some left their homeland and some remained in Germany. In either case, the dismissal of professors from their appointments adversely affected German science.³

Respect for higher academic learning had traditionally played a large role in German life and culture. Academics stressed more than merely building upon a student’s primary and secondary education. Guided by the concepts of *Bildung*, German professors taught their pupils character development and loyalty to Germany. They imparted the wisdom of “personality formation within a cultural environment which stressed duty, adherence to principle, and a lofty concern for the ‘inner’ or ‘spiritual’ values of life.”⁴ Through *Bildung*, professors sought to develop an entire individual and imbue him with the right character, generally with a “Chris-

¹ Alan D. Beyerchen, *Scientists under Hitler* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1978), 13–14.

² Hentschel, Klaus. Ed. *Physics and National Socialism: An Anthology of Primary Sources*. Basel: Birkhauser Verlag. “Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service,” April 7, 1933. 21–24.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

tian-ethical tone".⁵ *Bildung* led to the concept of *Kultur*—an ideology that led to "an air of moral superiority" among Germans and promoted esteem for professors.⁶ *Kultur* connoted everything society had accomplished. Continuing the Romantic tradition of the nineteenth century, Germans contrasted the values of *Kultur* with the impositions of *Zivilisation*, crass Western materialism. "Materialism" later came to describe any of Germany's social problems, in particular, any movement away from tradition. These ideas led Germany's intelligentsia and traditionalists to reject much of the modern world and all its attendant evils to prevent Germany's suffering greater problems.

These attitudes shaped the Nazi's approach toward modern, specifically, theoretical science. Scientific traditionalists hesitated to endorse the scientific advances of the early twentieth century. Germans enthusiastically embraced learning as a part of *Kultur*; they did not, however, include science as part of this learning. The Germans considered *Wissenschaft*, general learning or study, to be acutely different from *Naturwissenschaft*, or science. German intellectuals dismissed science as "less worthy than pure learning."⁷

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, German laboratories and industrial institutions had been the best, most innovative, in the world. In fact, between 1901 and 1932, one third of all Nobel Prize winners hailed from Germany. Only 18 percent were British and a meager 6 percent were American.⁸ Germany retained its dramatic lead over the rest of the scientific world until the early 1930s, when the United States took its place.⁹ Certainly, the Nazi regime's Dismissal Policy, especially toward theoretical scientists, spurred the decline in the quality of German science and enriched the scientific establishments of its enemies. By 1939, for example, the level of chemistry in the United States, a country frequently adopted by the German refugees, had risen dramatically.¹⁰ After a European tour in that same year, a University of California professor asserted that, while the pace of research under the Nazi regime had not diminished, theoretical science was not being encouraged because it conflicted with the government's ideology.¹¹ By 1942, even some Germans were themselves admitting that the United States had pulled ahead in physics.¹²

⁵ Fritz Stern, *Einstein's German World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 68.

⁶ Beyerchen, *Scientists under Hitler*, 2.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁸ Jean Medawar and David Pyke, *Hitler's Gift: the True Story of the Scientists Expelled by the Nazi Regime* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2001), 3. In 1937, Hitler forbade Germans to accept the Nobel Prize, which he replaced with a German national prize. Hentschel, *Physics and National Socialism*, "Germany and the Nobel Prizes." February 12, 1937. 142.

⁹ *New York Times*, January 15, 1934.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, August 13, 1939.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, February 12, 1939.

¹² Hentschel, *Physics and National Socialism*, "Carl Ramsauer: American Physics Outdoes German Physics," January 20, 1942. 281.

Persecution of scientists and their flights to safety and freedom had long been a German tradition. Many German scientists, for example, had fled their homeland during the revolutionary disturbances of 1848. The pace picked up after Adolph Hitler's ascent to power in January 1933. Between 1933 and 1939, over 1,700 scientists rejected Nazi-imposed restrictions on science and left Germany to seek sanctuary in other lands.¹³

Many of the scientists who left objected to Nazi-enforced methods of science. The Nazis' "new science" was not objective; it was certainly not the "common property of mankind,"¹⁴ and the party used it to serve its own purposes.¹⁵ In June 1936, Dr. Bernhard Rust, German Minister of Science, Education, and People's Education and loyal Nazi, declared that Nazism and official ideology were more important than was empirical, objective science. Turning the notion of empirical truth on its head, he argued that "Science which is not in accord with it [German ideology] is not objective." For Rust, the changes made in German science were only to "enrich itself."¹⁶ The Nazis maintained that they were basing science on observing nature and its reactions. Non-Aryan, theoretical science, on the other hand, did not expect one clear, definitive answer and considered each partially proven assumption to be a milestone.¹⁷ In Germany, as the *New York Times* reported, not even "a laboratory worker [could] decide for himself what the philosophy of science [should] be," implying that science was a merely a tool of the dictatorship to be manipulated by the Führer and his party.¹⁸ Prominent scientists willingly gave themselves and their study to the regime.¹⁹

Philipp Lenard and Johannes Stark, who included Adolph Hitler as a great scientist, wrote as early as 1924 that "incarnations of this spirit [that of the great scientists] are only of Aryan-Germanic blood."²⁰ Lenard also claimed that the basis for the misguided belief that science was international could be traced to the amount of Nordic blood in the country's population. Other societies could produce science only because they shared a common ancestor with the Germans.²¹ Professor Lenard, a Nobel Prize winner and famous for his work with cathode rays, was fiercely anti-

¹³ *New York Times*, August 13, 1939.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, February 23, 1936.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, July 8, 1936.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, June 30, 1936.

¹⁷ Hentschel, *Physics and National Socialism*, "Willi Menzel: German Physics and Jewish Physics," 119-120.

¹⁸ *New York Times*, July 2, 1936.

¹⁹ Hentschel, *Physics and National Socialism*, "The Scientific Situation in Germany," June 2, 1933. 60; Hentschel, *Physics and National Socialism*, "Contract between the Army Ordnance Officer and the Kaiser Wilhelm Society for the Advancement of the Sciences," March 6, 1940. 236.

²⁰ Hentschel, *Physics and National Socialism*, "The Hitler Spirit and Science," May 8, 1924. 7.

²¹ Hentschel, *Physics and National Socialism*, "Philipp Lenard: Foreword to 'German Physics,'" August 1935. 100.

Semitic and enthusiastically supported Hitler and Nazism. The dismissal of Jewish scientists did not disturb him.

Nazi science naturally contained a racial element to it: theoretical science was "Jewish" and non-theoretical was "Aryan."²² The Nazis dismissed the validity of Jewish science, especially physics, a field where Jews were particularly prominent. Philipp Lenard later wrote, "With the massive introduction of Jews into influential positions . . . the basis of all scientific knowledge, the observation of nature itself, was forgotten and was no longer considered valid."²³ Dr. Otto Wacker of the Ministry of Education clearly stated the party's view at a renaming ceremony of the Physikallsches Institut [Physics Institute] in 1936: "The problems of science do not present themselves the same way to all men. The Negro and the Jew will view the same world differently from the Germans." He also claimed that true science resulted from the "superior qualities of 'Nordic' research."²⁴ The Institute was itself renamed the Philipp Lenard Institute.²⁵

There were more racist scientists in Germany. In early 1936, for example, Willi Menzel, a student of physics, claimed that theoretical science came from either Jews or the Jewish spirit; this meant non-Jewish scientists who insisted upon practicing theoretical science were practicing a Jewish craft.²⁶ He and like-minded Germany scientists thought Jews were contaminating science by attempting to make science mathematical, "in a characteristically Jewish manner."²⁷ These Aryans who espoused the "Jewish spirit" were called White Jews. Many contended that to eliminate Jewish influences, especially in science, White Jews also had to be cleansed.

Ignoring the contributions of others, these Germans also said that only Aryans could add to science.²⁸ Implying that Jews could not devise a worthy science of their own, Germans accused Jews of attempting to "pass off the products of 'Aryan' brains as their own."²⁹ In one particularly ignoble effort, Johannes Stark, a Nobel-Prize winner in physics, claimed that Albert Einstein had not discovered the famous formula $E=mc^2$. Because Stark could not disprove the formula, he maintained that an Aryan had discovered the formula before Einstein had.³⁰

The Nazis coerced Jews, including Jewish scientists, for many years, even before

²² *New York Times*, December 11, 1938.

²³ Hentschel, *Physics and National Socialism*, "Philipp Lenard: A Big Day for Science. Johannes Stark Appointed President of the Reich Physical and Technical Institute." 50.

²⁴ *New York Times*, February 23, 1936.

²⁵ Medawar and Pyke, *Hitler's Gift*, 35-36.

²⁶ *New York Times*, March 9, 1936.

²⁷ Hentschel, *Physics and National Socialism*, "White Jews in Science," July 15, 1937. 153-154; *New York Times*, March 9, 1936.

²⁸ *New York Times*, March 12, 1936.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, November 22, 1936.

³⁰ Medawar and Pyke, *Hitler's Gift*, 36.

the Nazis made such persecution the official policy with the Nuremberg Laws of 1936. In 1933, James Franck, director of the Second Physical Institute of the University of Göttingen, voluntarily resigned his position because he was Jewish. Although his service during the Great War exempted him from dismissal according to the Civil Service Law of 1933, he decided it would be better if he continued his work elsewhere in Germany. In his resignation letter, Franck claimed that German Jews were "being treated as foreigners and as enemies of the fatherland." The University of Göttingen lecturers protested his resignation, stating he was attempting "sabotage."³¹ Early on, Nazi policies did not always meet with success—some German scientists were not yet covered by Nazi physical and ideological thuggery. The Jewish secretary of *Astronomische Gesellschaft*, for example, assumed he would be re-elected in 1935 based on his scientific qualifications. The Nazis wished to deny him the position because he was Jewish, but a secret ballot thwarted them.³²

After many scientists had emigrated, those left behind generally refused to correspond with their former friends and colleagues. Paul Harteck and Karl-Friedrich Bonhoeffer were exceptions. The two young chemists opposed Nazi ideology and maintained contact with the émigrés. Even so, they refused to support their dismissed colleagues beyond correspondence and generally remained indifferent to their fellow scientists' plight.³³

Many have wondered how the Aryan scientists could be so blasé about the dismissal of their colleagues. The allure of promotions partly contributed. When the Germans began dismissing Jews from academe, many vacancies opened. Many Aryans who would not have normally arrived to high positions filled these holes. With the exception of Otto Kraye, Assistant Professor of Pharmacology in Berlin, no Germans refused the positions offered them. Immediately following his refusal to assume the spot left by his departed Jewish colleague, university officials dismissed him. Kraye's career did not end, though. Harvard University later appointed him to a position of full professor.³⁴

There was also a quiet anti-Semitism within German academia. Although obvious discrimination did not take place before 1933, Jews found it difficult to rise in their chosen fields. Jews who converted to Christianity had an easier time rising to high positions, but their Jewish heritage was not forgotten.³⁵ Many Germans

³¹ Hentschel, *Physics and National Socialism*, "Voluntary Resignation of Prof. James Franck" April 17, 1933. 26–28; Hentschel, *Physics and National Socialism*, "Göttingen University Lecturers: Professor Franck's Resignation" April 24, 1933. 32–33.

³² *New York Times*, December 29, 1935.

³³ *Ibid.*, 250.

³⁴ Medawar and Pyke, *Hitler's Gift*, 131 Ute Deichman, "German-Jewish Chemists and Biochemists in Exile," *Science in the Third Reich*, ed. Margit Szollosi-Janze (Oxford: Berg, 2001) 253.

³⁵ Stern, *Einstein's German World*, 75.

regarded the discharge of non-Aryans as a 'cleansing' of their homeland. As one example, Karl Freudenberg, a renowned organic chemist, wrote that the Nazi policy of dismissing Jewish scientists was "a cure of the body of the German people."³⁶

Another popular sentiment of the time was that of obedience, an essential component of *Bildung*. Their education in *Bildung* meant that scientists had to follow the government's orders. In a letter responding to British colleague George Barger's criticism of the dismissals, Karl Freudenberg wrote in July 1933:

There are orders which you simply have to comply with. It is my firm conviction that a cure of the German people was necessary, something which probably only very few will deny. The way it has been carried out cannot be subject to lengthy considerations in this country, simply because there are orders, and it does not matter at all, what the viewpoint of an individual is.³⁷

Freudenberg added that Hitler was "simplifying the [governmental] administration with great energy."³⁸ Expelling the Jews was the answer to Germany's problems.³⁹

This represented common thought, and cleansing was a large part of the Nazi doctrine. Hitler called the Jews "evil" and described them as "parasites" who have caused all of humanity to suffer.⁴⁰ He declared that Jews were the leaders of the "unintellectual human material" of the Marxist party.⁴¹ Hitler felt such strong antipathy toward Jews that he declared, "If the dismissal of Jewish scientists means the annihilation of contemporary German science, then we shall do without science for a few years."⁴² Later, cleansing would lead to the development of the Final Solution, the Nazis' means of ridding the world of the Jewish people.

Albert Einstein, perhaps the best-known German scientist, was one of many forced to leave Germany as Hitler's power grew. Although he was initially accepted into the scientific community, Germans came to dislike him even before the imposition of the Nazi regime. He was a pacifist who rebelled against the rigidity of German academia. He also subscribed to what many loathed most about science: theory. Einstein was Jewish, another strike against him. He received many threats, such that he fled to Leiden in the Netherlands in November 1923. He returned to Germany later that year to accept a professorship at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute. Einstein was in

³⁶ Ute Deichman, "German-Jewish," 247, 253; Medawar and Pyke, *Hitler's Gift*, 131.

Ute Deichman, "German-Jewish," 250.

Ibid., 250.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 247.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 250.

⁴⁰ Adolph Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943), 59, 150.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 457.

⁴² Medawar and Pyke, *Hitler's Gift*, inside cover.

California when Hitler came to power, and he refused to return to his homeland.⁴³

Even those with the expectation of immunity were not always spared. Fritz Haber, a converted Christian, was a German nationalist, firmly devoted to the country of his birth.⁴⁴ He had saved Germany during the first year of World War I with his discovery of making ammonia by using compressed and heated nitrogen and hydrogen.⁴⁵ This enabled Germany to make explosives, which had been in short supply because of the Allied Blockade. His discovery also facilitated a large increase in world soil fertility thereby preventing global starvation. More ironically, given the Holocaust, he also developed poison gas. His work led to the deployment of chlorine gas at Ypres in 1915 and the Battle of Caporetto in 1917.⁴⁶ Fritz Haber was a Jew, and that outweighed any potential help he could give to the Nazi Regime.

It is easily understood why many Jewish scientists left Germany. Jews, however, were not the only émigrés. The Nazis also dismissed many Aryan scientists for political reasons. These scientists had refused to swear an oath to Hitler or opposed the party for various reasons. The Nazis dismissed Communists for their political views and others for reasons that remain unclear.⁴⁷

Not all scientists left, of course—many stayed. One of the most controversial of these German scientists was Werner Heisenberg. He believed that politics and science did not mix, and he rejected extremist views, including Nazi violence and anti-Semitism. He, nonetheless, praised the regime for its support of national revival. Heisenberg also became the most prominent spokesperson for theoretical physics in Germany. As theoretical physics drew increasing disapproval, he became more focused on defending theory.⁴⁸ Heisenberg came under attack in 1937, because of the controversy over his impending appointment as Arnold Sommerfeld's successor at the University of Munich. Johannes Stark led the attack against Heisenberg's appointment, claiming he was a "white Jew." Heisenberg was investigated by the *Schutz-Staffel* [Defense Squadron]—the SS—after a scathing diatribe against him appeared in *Das Schwarze Korps*, a newspaper edited by Gunter d'Alquen of the SS. The SS recommended he be transferred to the Theoretical Physics Chair in Vienna where he could be influenced by his colleagues.⁴⁹ Despite this disaffection among his colleagues, Heisenberg remained loyal to Germany. He rejected an offer of an American job in 1939. He explained that he felt obligated to share his country's fortune

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 34–35, 36.

⁴⁴ Stern, *Einstein's German World*, 73–75.

⁴⁵ Medawar and Pyke, *Hitler's Gift*. 88.

⁴⁶ Medawar and Pyke, *Hitler's Gift*. 88.

⁴⁷ Hentschel, *Physics and National Socialism*, "The Spirit at Universities," April 28, 1933. 42.

⁴⁸ The above paragraph is based on Brennan, *Heisenberg Probably Slept Here*, 159, 173.

⁴⁹ David C. Cassidy, *Uncertainty: The Life and Science of Werner Heisenberg* (New York: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1992), 379–380; Hentschel, *Physics and National Socialism*, "SS Head of the Central Office of Public Safety: Letter to Rudolf Mentzel enclosing Report on Heisenberg," May 26, 1939. 195–197.

and help rebuild its science after the war.⁵⁰

In September 1939, Heisenberg joined the uranium fission research team, paving the way for the controversy that surrounds him. Heisenberg's presence led many Americans to fear that Germany might develop an atomic bomb before the Allies.⁵¹ Germany did not, and controversy over Heisenberg's involvement rages on in historical circles. Recent developments may answer many questions. In early February 2002, papers concerning the historic meeting between Heisenberg and the Danish physicist, Niels Bohr, were released by the Bohr family. These evidence that Heisenberg was not secretly sabotaging Germany's atomic program but was diligently working on the bomb and was probing Bohr's ideas during the meeting.⁵²

After the Second World War ended, an American team under Samuel Goudsmit investigated Germany's failure to develop an atomic weapon. When questioned by an American reporter, Heisenberg claimed that the Germans had known how to produce a bomb and had merely not wished to do so. Although the scientists working on the bomb project could have been faced with a moral dilemma, whether to develop an atomic weapon, Heisenberg insisted the sheer size of the impending project relieved them of that burden. Goudsmit was furious that Heisenberg had claimed knowledge the Germans could not have had. The only evidence of a bomb project was a primitive reactor vessel in southern Germany which could not sustain a reaction.⁵³

The Nazi failure to develop an atomic weapon symbolized the disfunctionality of Nazi science wherein *a priori* ideology trumped scientific accomplishment. The Third Reich promoted a subjective view of science that rejected theoretical ideas. Because of the disproportionate number of Jews in science, the Nazis associated modern science with the Jewish people. The Nazis dismissed hundreds of Jewish and Aryan scientists who practiced theoretical science. Many also left their institutions and Germany on their own volition. The Nazi Civil Service Law of 1933 had set in motion events that led to the downfall of German science and contributed significantly to Germany's eventual destruction in 1945.

⁵⁰ Thomas Powers, *Heisenberg's War: The Secret History of the German Bomb* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1993), vii–viii.

⁵¹ Richard P. Brennan, *Heisenberg Probably Slept Here: The Lives, Times, Ideas of the Great Physicists of the Twentieth Century* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1997), 174; Cassidy, *Uncertainty*, 549; Powers, *Heisenberg's War*, vii.

⁵² *New York Times*, February 7, 2002.; *New York Times*, January 7, 2002.

⁵³ Powers, *Heisenberg's War*, vii–ix.

Mission Impossible: Operation Sea Lion

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By the summer of 1940, German Führer Adolf Hitler had conquered most of his adversaries in Europe except for Great Britain. Hitler eventually decided to invade the island nation. Unaware that his military forces had already considered an invasion, Hitler ordered his Army, Navy, and Air Force to prepare for an operation he called Sea Lion. The invasion was doomed to fail from the start. Hitler's inability to invade and to conquer Britain served a devastating blow from which Nazi Germany never recovered.

After Poland fell in September 1939, Hitler organized his plans to occupy Belgium, Holland, and northern France. On October 9, he issued his sixth directive to Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht (OKW; High Command), outlining the specific roles of the Heers (OKH; Army), Kriegsmarine (OKM; Navy), and Luftwaffe (OKL; Air Force) in the upcoming invasion. The directive also mentions actions against Great Britain: "If it should become apparent in the near future that England... [is] not willing to make an end of the war, I am determined to act vigorously and aggressively." By taking Belgium, Holland, and northern France, Hitler sought territory to use as a base to launch "a promising air and sea war" against Britain.¹

From those few words, it might appear as if Hitler were seriously contemplating an invasion of Britain. To the contrary, Hitler directed his thoughts elsewhere. On the other hand, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of the OKM, felt he should "give some initial thought to" an invasion so that he would be prepared if Hitler ever came to such a decision. On November 15, Raeder created a secret team to study "the military, naval, and transportation aspects of a possible invasion."² The

¹ Directive No. 6 for the Conduct of the War, *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 Series D, vol. 8: The War Years 1939-40* [hereafter cited as *DGFP, D*], ed. Paul R. Sweet (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1954-64), no. 224.

² Egbert Kieser, *Hitler on the Doorstep: Operation 'Sea Lion': The German Plan to Invade Britain, 1940* (Annapolis, MD: Arms and Armour Press, 1997), 82.

officers delegated to this task had never planned an invasion before and knew Germany would be facing an enemy navy at least ten times its strength. Nevertheless, on November 20, Raeder received a document entitled "Study Red." This report stated that a landing operation launched from German ports might force the British to sue for peace if several conditions were met: enemy naval forces were destroyed or kept at least 100 kilometers from the landing site; enemy air forces were eliminated; enemy coastal defenses were destroyed; and enemy submarines were kept occupied during the crossing.

Raeder promptly passed this report to General Alfred Jodl, Chief of Operations for the OKW, and Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the OKH. Whereas Jodl simply filed the report, Brauchitsch had his men begin a counter study, "Study Northwest," and sent a copy to the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe. From the Heers' point-of-view, the Kriegsmarine had to close the Straits of Dover; prevent enemy naval interference; clear any sea mines; transport the troops across the Channel; provide the necessary landing equipment; provide fire support against British defenses; and impede the return of British troops from France. "Study Northwest" required the Luftwaffe to command the air; support the Kriegsmarine against enemy naval forces; deploy airborne landings in Great Yarmouth, Lowestoft, and Cambridge; support final operations in Britain; and impede the return of any British troops from France.³

Jodl filed the Heers' report,⁴ but the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe examined "Study Northwest" and then shot it down. The former asserted that it could not protect the German supply line from the British fleet and pointed out that it would be difficult to land in the locations the Army desired. The Kriegsmarine also berated the Luftwaffe: "Support...by the Luftwaffe cannot be counted on with any degree of assurance. The weather, the time of day, and other circumstances could totally preclude the participation of air forces over the sea."⁵ For its part, the Luftwaffe commented that it would not be possible to have the air superiority the Heers demanded.

While the Kriegsmarine, Heers, and Luftwaffe spent late 1939 and early 1940 dallying over possible invasion plans, Hitler dealt with Norway in April 1940 and then with his Western offensive, which Germany launched on May 10, 1940. By mid-May, however, Raeder feared that if he did not bring up the invasion idea to Hitler, someone else would. Raeder met with Hitler on May 21, and explained the dangers of crossing the English Channel. Hitler replied that no preparations were being made for an invasion. Raeder felt relieved.⁶

Nonetheless, Rear Admiral Kurt Fricke, the Chief of Operations for the OKM, pulled out "Study Red." He revised this plan based on Germany's conquest of ports

³ *Ibid.*, 82-4.

⁴ Walter Ansel, *Hitler Confronts England* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1960), 50.

⁵ Keiser, *Hitler on the Doorstep*, 86.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 87-88.

in Belgium, Holland, and France. Fricke's inquiry, "Study England," made Raeder all the more adamantly opposed to an invasion. At the time, Raeder had no one to convince against a landing because an invasion of Britain remained the last thing on Hitler's mind. On June 17, Jodl sent Major-General Walter Warlimont, Chief of the OKW Operations, to inform Fricke that Hitler was astonished his branches were making invasion plans while he was trying to arrange peace terms with the British. Although this visit should have reassured the Kriegsmarine that there was not going to be an invasion, it caused alarm. The Kriegsmarine still feared that if one of the other branches came up with an acceptable plan, Hitler would force the Kriegsmarine to carry out a mission it could not handle.⁷

In fact, Colonel-General Franz Halder, the Chief of the OKH General Staff, saw many available German ships and troops in France. He began planning for an August 15 invasion. Having dealt with the Navy's complaints before, Brauchitsch put his people to work to solve any transportation issues the Kriegsmarine could possibly raise. Brauchitsch also desired to create his own private navy because he felt that the Kriegsmarine would let him down. Raeder's plan of mentioning an invasion to Hitler to preempt serious planning for one had backfired; the various staffs spoke of little else.⁸

Only Hitler remained silent on the invasion issue. He thought the British would sue for peace after the fall of France, despite British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's bellicose speeches of June 4 and 18. In the latter, Churchill pledged that Britain "shall fight on unconquerable until the curse of Hitler is lifted from the brows of men."⁹ Hitler did not want to invade Britain because, as he had written in *Mein Kampf*, Britain was one of Germany's few potential allies in Europe. Knowing the island nation relied heavily on imports, Hitler wanted to force Britain to capitulate by cutting her supply lines.¹⁰ Only gradually did Hitler expand the war against Britain. In his first directive on August 31, 1939, Hitler had ordered the Navy and Air Force to "carry on a warfare against merchant shipping." When the British opened hostilities against Germany on September 3, 1939, Hitler released his second directive and ordered his submarines to aid the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe against the British merchant fleet. In successive directives, Hitler gave the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe permission to act more assertively by conducting offensive missions in the North Sea and raiding British naval harbors.¹¹

⁷ *Ibid.*, 88–89.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 137.

⁹ *London Times*, June 18, 1940.

¹⁰ Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, in *The Sword and the Pen*, eds. Basil and Adrian Liddell Hart (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1976), 249.

¹¹ Directive No. 1 for the Conduct of the War, *DGFP, D, 7*: no. 493; Directive No. 2 for the Conduct of the War, *DGFP, D, 7*: no. 576; Directive No. 5 for the Conduct of the War, *DGFP, D, 8*: no. 170; Directive No. 7 for the Conduct of the War, *DGFP, D, 8*: no. 276.

On November 29, 1939, Hitler released his ninth directive. He wanted the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe to paralyze the British economy. This document also states, "In [our] war against the Western Powers, England sparks the determination to fight and is the leading power of our enemies. To throw down England is the prerequisite for final victory."¹² When combined with the sixth directive, the Kriegsmarine had good reason to believe Hitler planned to invade Britain. Through June 1940, however, Hitler considered only an economic war to starve the British into submission.

Even if Hitler had wanted to invade, the fact that he had developed no plans was not out of character for him. He had a grand design of aggressive expansion, but no overall strategy for how to achieve his goal. He simply exploited the situations in which he found himself. On November 5, 1937, the only intended victims of Hitler's plans were Austria and Czechoslovakia. He created plans in April 1939 for the September invasion of Poland. He began to think about Norway in December 1939 and defeated the Norwegians in April 1940. Finally, his Western Campaign, which ended with the fall of France in June 1940, had its roots in September 1939.¹³

Prospects of peace with Britain diminished by July 1940. Raeder met with Hitler on July 11 and again convinced him that an invasion was not plausible, especially if the Luftwaffe did not control the air. Hitler agreed, and the Admiral once again left believing an invasion would be a last resort to get the British to sue for peace.¹⁴ Yet, as the first half of July unfolded, Hitler reviewed an invasion plan created by Jodl, who defined an invasion merely as a "Mighty River Crossing." Jodl listed five prerequisites: defeat of the Royal Air Force (RAF); destruction of the British naval forces off the south coast of Britain; mine-free crossing lanes for the Kriegsmarine; protection of the German flanks from mines; and operations to hold the rest of the British fleet in the North Sea. Jodl recognized three major problems for the Germans: Britain's command of the sea; Britain's movement of troops to the landing sites; and Germany's inability to launch a surprise attack. He suggested landing on the south coast where aerial superiority made up for naval inferiority; landing on a river with the Luftwaffe bombing ahead of the first wave of troops; and landing with a powerful force. Jodl named this plan Operation Lion.¹⁵

Jodl left the staff within the Heers to determine how to deal with the British Army once the Germans had landed. On July 13, Brauchitsch and Halder presented to Hitler the invasion plan Halder had been preparing since mid-June. Hitler did not ask for any details, did not recommend any improvements, did not consider any alternatives, and did not talk about the cost. He simply and uncharacteristically accepted

¹² Directive No. 9 for the Conduct of the War, DGFP, D, 8: no. 399.

¹³ Ronald Wheatley, *Operation Sea Lion: German Plans for the Invasion of England* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 27-28.

¹⁴ B. H. Liddell Hart, *The German Generals Talk* (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1948), 146.

¹⁵ Ansel, *Hitler Confronts England*, 132-33; Wheatley, *Operation Sea Lion*, 34-35.

the plan.¹⁶

Three days later, Hitler combined the two plans and issued his sixteenth directive. The purpose of the plan was to eliminate Britain's ability to wage war against Germany and to occupy the isles if necessary. The directive set the landing as "a surprise crossing on a broad front." All preparations had to be completed by mid-August. Hitler listed five prerequisites: defeat of the Royal Air Force; mine-free crossing lanes for the Kriegsmarine; operations to hold the British fleet in the North and Mediterranean Seas; mines to seal off the Straits of Dover and the western entrance of the Channel; and control of the coast by strong coastal artillery. Hitler renamed the project Sea Lion. He wrote orders for each of the branches. The OKH would determine the transportation for the first wave of soldiers; take over anti-aircraft artillery; and establish the embarkation and debarkation points with the Navy. The OKM would provide the means of transportation across the Channel to the Army; escort the flanks of the ships carrying the soldiers; and regulate the coastal artillery against any sea targets. The OKL would "hinder interference from the enemy air force"; overcome any British coastal defenses; break the resistance of enemy ground troops and troop reserves; destroy any routes for bringing in enemy reinforcements; and have parachute and glider troops ready in reserve.¹⁷

Raeder's worst nightmare had come true. He called the OKW twice to verify the directive. The seemingly impossible August 15 deadline horrified Raeder because he knew there was a critical shortage of both ships and landing craft. He believed that the Luftwaffe could not gain absolute control of the air and doubted the effectiveness of the mine barriers to protect the flanks of his ships. Furthermore, the harbors and waterways on the continent had been damaged in recent campaigns. The Navy was at the mercy of the weather, fog, currents, and tides. Most disconcerting was the presence of the British fleet, which could lay mines at the last minute and eliminate any safety margin for the German Navy. Raeder flatly stated that the Heers did not realize the hazards of this mission. In response, the Army gibed that the Navy had started all of this invasion talk with its November 1939 study and was now getting "cold feet."¹⁸

While these problems tormented Raeder, Hitler made his last appeal to the British in a July 19 speech. Hitler professed that he had never wanted a war, but instead wanted to create a new European state "with a new social order and the finest possible standard of culture." He declared that "a great empire will be destroyed—an empire which it was never my intention to destroy or even harm." He claimed that Britain needed to come to her senses and realize she was beaten.¹⁹ The speech left the

¹⁶ Kieser, *Hitler on the Doorstep*, 95.

¹⁷ Directive No. 16 for the Conduct of the War, *DGFP, D, 10*: no. 177.

¹⁸ Ansel, *Hitler Confronts England*, 144–46, 161–61; Wheatley, *Operation Sea Lion*, 41.

¹⁹ *London Times*, July 20, 1940.

British unmoved; they defiantly replied, "We have heard all this before."²⁰ Their disdain for Hitler compounded when leaflets of this speech were dropped into Britain. The British sold the leaflets in auctions to raise money for charity or used them as toilet paper.²¹

His speech ineffective, Hitler focused on the invasion plans and set a new September 1 deadline. When Hitler met with Brauchitsch and Raeder on July 31, Raeder described the problems with the Army's plans. Because the OKH wanted a dawn landing, the Kriegsmarine would be able to provide night transports only between September 19 and 26 due to the tides. The Channel, however, experiences bad weather at the end of September, which could stall additional troop and supply transports. Therefore, Raeder recommended May 1941 as the best time for an operation against Britain. Hitler countered that nothing could be done about the weather, and by postponing, the ill-prepared British Army would have time to improve. Raeder further believed that the 235-mile front the Heers wanted would spread the German lines too thin. After Raeder left this meeting, however, Hitler ordered preparations to commence for a September 15 operation using a wide front.²²

Despite the bickering between the Heers and Kriegsmarine, all plans hinged on the ability of the Luftwaffe to gain air supremacy over the Channel. Hitler declared in his seventeenth war directive that "the German air arm is to overcome the English Air Force with all means at its disposal and in the shortest possible time."²³ Reich Marshal Hermann Göring, Commander-in-Chief of the OKL, believed his pilots could take out the RAF in two to four weeks. He felt that his successful air war, Operation Eagle, would eliminate the need for Sea Lion. Due to adverse weather conditions, however, the Luftwaffe could not start its mission until August 13. This delay prompted a nasty remark from the Navy: "The Luftwaffe has missed opportunities afforded by the recent favorable weather."²⁴

Göring had his pilots feint attacks on London to draw the rival RAF pilots out to fight.²⁵ He instructed his pilots to drop parachutes, wireless transmitters, explosives, maps, photographs, addresses of prominent people, and instructions for imaginary agents throughout Britain. These items were all part of a psychological warfare to let the British know the Germans were coming.²⁶ Göring additionally sent bombers to attack British airfields and factories vital to the British war effort. He wanted the Luftwaffe to deliver a knockout blow, and he hurled wave after wave of planes against

²⁰ *New York Times*, July 20, 1940.

²¹ Kieser, *Hitler on the Doorstep*, 145.

²² Wheatley, *Operation Sea Lion*, 47-49; Ansel, *Hitler Confronts England*, 205-06.

²³ Directive No. 17 for the Conduct of the War, DGFP, D, 10: no. 270.

²⁴ Wheatley, *Operation Sea Lion*, 63.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 62-64.

²⁶ Peter Fleming, *Operation Sea Lion: The projected invasion of England in 1940—An account of the German preparations and British countermeasures* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), 116-17.

the beleaguered RAF. Britain sustained heavy damage, and the Germans began to believe that the war would be over by the end of the year...until a fatal mistake occurred.

On the night of August 24/25, German bombers flew thirty kilometers too far west of their targets and accidentally bombed London. Hitler had given express orders to leave London alone. In response to this mistake, the British attacked Berlin on August 28, 30, and 31. Hitler learned of the raids against London and Berlin on August 30, and the Germans struck back on September 7. Hysteria momentarily overtook the British people, but this frenzy died down by the next morning. Throughout the month of September, London suffered 22 attacks aimed at destroying the civilian morale and forcing a rapid collapse of any resistance.²⁷

While the Luftwaffe bombed away, the Heers and Kriegsmarine still bitterly argued over how many troops and supplies the Army wanted to send with how many the Navy could feasibly carry. Hitler finally settled the argument on August 16. He nonchalantly switched from supporting the Army to the Navy. He told the Heers that it must conform to the services that the Kriegsmarine could provide. He removed some of the landing points from the invasion plan, determined how many troops would be in the first wave, decided how long it would take for the first wave to cross the Channel, and resolved how often reinforcements would land. The invasion would take place on September 21, and the final orders would be delivered on D-10, September 11. Unfortunately, these sudden changes satisfied neither the Army nor the Navy.²⁸

On September 10, Hitler postponed his final orders to the fourteenth. At this point, the invasion still hinged on the one fact that had existed since the November 1939 "Study Red"—the destruction of the Royal Air Force. Despite the almost daily battles with the RAF, the Luftwaffe had not achieved aerial superiority.²⁹

On September 13, despite Jodl's impression that Hitler had given up the invasion, Hitler issued plans for the landing. The plan called for thirty-nine divisions of troops to land on British soil within four weeks. Two hundred and fifty amphibious tanks and parachute troopers would assist the initial landing. Bombers would neutralize the coastal defenses and protect the flanks of the Kriegsmarine. Ten destroyers and twenty torpedo boats would secure the western flank and thirty motor boats would defend the eastern flank. Twenty U-boats would operate out of the Western Channel and North Sea and another six would be off the coast of Northumberland and Pentland Firth. Finally, to distract the Royal Navy, a phony operation would simulate a landing in Scotland.³⁰

²⁷ Kieser, *Hitler on the Doorstep*, 209-13; Wheatley, *Operation Sea Lion*, 77-78.

²⁸ Wheatley, *Operation Sea Lion*, 70-71; Ansel, *Hitler Confronts England*, 233; Fleming, *Operation Sea Lion*, 252-55; Liddell Hart, *The German Generals Talk*, 148-49.

²⁹ Wheatley, *Operation Sea Lion*, 73.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 80-83.

As D-day approached, the Luftwaffe continued to bomb Britain. The Germans suffered heavy losses, and the RAF remained undefeated. When his pilots complained, Göring issued the standard alibi, "I can't do anything about it, the *Führer* himself has ordered it."³¹ The Luftwaffe was not the only air force busy pounding at the enemy. On the night of September 17/18, British bombers successfully raided the German fleet harbored at Dunkirk, Cherbourg, Boulogne, Calais, and Den Helder. The RAF sunk twenty-six barges and damaged another fifty-eight. The Germans had to stop shipping supplies to the invasion ports. According to Raeder, this attack would push the invasion back by at least five days.³² At best, the Germans would be ready to attack on September 26, the very last day, because of the tides, that the Kriegsmarine could sail across the Channel at night.

The Naval Staff issued orders to disperse the ships so they could not fall prey to another British attack. Hitler confirmed these orders; he no longer talked about invading Britain and worried about a long, drawn-out war. On October 12, Hitler issued a directive renouncing an invasion in 1940. He sullenly accepted his first major failure of World War II, although he clung to his belief that he would eventually win the war.³³ In a letter to Italian Duce Benito Mussolini dated January 20, 1941, Hitler justified his inability to invade Britain:

We could never attempt a second landing since failure would mean the loss of so much equipment. England would then not have to bother further about a landing and could employ the bulk of her forces where she wanted on the periphery. So long as the attack has not taken place however, the British must always take into account the possibility of it.³⁴

After December 5, Hitler concentrated his efforts on Russia, the last possible European ally for the British. On February 6, 1941, he wrote his twenty-third war directive, which states that "the object of further military operations against" Britain was to reduce imports and decrease the "production of airplane material." He wanted "to inflict the greatest possible damage" and to make the British fear that "an attack on the British Isles" was imminent.³⁵ Finally, on February 13, 1942, Raeder persuaded Hitler to cancel any remaining Sea Lion preparations. Hitler consented, and on March 2, Jodl issued the order that at least one year's notice would be given if plans to invade Britain were resumed. After a slow, agonizing death, Operation Sea Lion was buried at last.³⁶

³¹ Kieser, *Hitler on the Doorstep*, 242.

³² Wheatley, *Operation Sea Lion*, 89.

³³ *Ibid.*, 99-97.

³⁴ Walter Warlimont, *Inside Hitler's Headquarters 1939-45* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 116-17.

³⁵ Directive No. 23 for the Conduct of the War, *DGFP, D, 12*: no. 23.

³⁶ Wheatley, *Operation Sea Lion*, 98.

In hindsight, *Sea Lion* was appropriately named. The real animals “pride themselves on a loud roar...In fact, all seem to try to make noise continuously.”³⁷ Once Hitler had decided to invade, he threatened the British over and over with inflammatory statements: “Our victory will teach them a lesson which will go down in history” and “As our enemies still reject peace, they shall have a war of total annihilation.”³⁸ Yet, when it came time to follow through, he could not back up his threats with deeds.

Consequently, the question remains: why did the Germans fail to invade Great Britain?

Three reasons stand out above the rest: problems among the Wehrmacht, Heers, Kriegsmarine, and Luftwaffe; failure of the Luftwaffe to accomplish its mission due to the continual presence of the RAF; and failure of Hitler to organize his forces in an appropriate and timely fashion.

The basic problem was that the requirements for a successful invasion exceeded the abilities of the Kriegsmarine. The thought of an invasion constantly plagued Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, who, although not the strongest personality among Hitler’s military commanders, was the soundest strategist. He consistently laid out the difficulties of an invasion before Hitler. He repeatedly stated that the Army clearly did not realize the hazards of the mission. The plans issued with Directive 16 were out of proportion to the power of the Navy. Even when Hitler narrowed the invasion front, the Navy could not meet the increasing demands placed on it. Harbors had been damaged; fog, currents, and tides presented navigation difficulties; there was uncertainty about how to land the troops on the beaches; limited numbers of craft existed to transport troops and supplies; an adequate margin of safety from sea mines did not exist; there was no protection from the RAF; and the British Navy could block communication and prevent subsequent waves of troops and supplies from landing.

Raeder’s objections fell on deaf ears. During the operations in Norway, the Luftwaffe bombing made up for the lack of German naval power, and the Germans easily conquered Norway. Therefore, plans went forward because of the belief that the Luftwaffe could successfully bomb the British into submission. The Nazis mistakenly thought they could do to Britain what they had done to Norway; they thought that they could win a war by the strength of their air force alone.

Sea Lion should have forced the Heers, Kriegsmarine, and Luftwaffe to work together: the soldiers had to get to Britain; the sailors had to transport the soldiers; and the pilots had to protect the sailors. Each branch raised important problems with the various invasion plans, but none of them was interested in solving those problems. They could only criticize one another. Jealousy and mistrust reigned among

³⁷ Ansel, *Hitler Confronts England*, 143.

³⁸ *London Times*, June 6, 1940.

the commanders-in-chief.³⁹

The Heers believed that prior land warfare had fine-tuned the German Army into a proficient weapon⁴⁰ and complained, "We are in the peculiar situation where the Navy has only obstacles to offer, the Luftwaffe is unwilling to start on a task which is theirs alone at the outset, and the OKW... simply plays possum. The only driving force in the whole situation comes from us."⁴¹ The German naval officers possessed a holier-than-thou attitude toward their Army and Air Force brethren. The Kriegsmarine concluded that each section of the armed forces had its own private war, and the OKM had its conflict with the British Navy. The Navy had little regard for the land objectives. Finally, the Luftwaffe squabbled with the Navy and ignored the Army.⁴²

Each commander-in-chief always found something to dislike about the other two. Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch and Raeder argued non-stop over the wide versus narrow front. Raeder could have pointed out that both the Romans and Normans had landed on narrow fronts and still managed to conquer Britain. Ultimately, Raeder's views were confirmed on June 6, 1944, when the Allied forces landed in Normandy on a narrow front seventy kilometers wide.⁴³ Severe friction had existed between Raeder and Reich Marshal Hermann Göring since the Norway invasion. Raeder had proposed that strong air units be kept around the naval base in Norway, but Göring responded with a rude, mind-your-own-business telegram. He had even suggested that he would do the Navy's job if the Kriegsmarine could not handle it.⁴⁴ Göring also kept a close eye on the reactionary Army to make sure it did not receive too much glory in the eyes of the German people.⁴⁵

It was the responsibility of the Wehrmacht, the High Command of the German Armed Forces, to reconcile the sparring commanders, but in reality Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel and General Alfred Jodl were nothing more than Hitler's "mouth-pieces."⁴⁶ Keitel and Jodl spent their time trying to gain authority over the three branches. Raeder and Göring each kept a measure of independence. A unified command would have had little effect on the Kriegsmarine. Göring relied on his high position in the Nazi party and his close relationship with Hitler. The Army was not so lucky, and the Heers resented the Wehrmacht meddling in its affairs.⁴⁷

In the midst of this conflict, where was the Supreme Commander himself? The

³⁹ Ansel, *Hitler Confronts England*, 326-331.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 333.

⁴¹ Wheatley, *Operation Sea Lion*, 148.

⁴² Fleming, *Operation Sea Lion*, 222.

⁴³ Kieser, *Hitler on the Doorstep*, 130.

⁴⁴ Ansel, *Hitler Confronts England*, 65, 102.

⁴⁵ Warlimont, *Inside Hitler's Headquarters*, 91.

⁴⁶ Kieser, *Hitler on the Doorstep*, 260.

⁴⁷ Warlimont, *Inside Hitler's Headquarters*, 8, 56.

fact of the matter—Hitler trusted no one. He did nothing to stop the bickering because that would impair his ability to control them effectively.⁴⁸ Hitler “preferred to talk to one commander-in-chief at a time and play them off against each other.” Aside from the fact that Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Brauchitsch, and Göring could not stand each other, if the five of them met together, they might put aside their differences and combine to oppose Hitler.⁴⁹

In every plan created by the Germans, one factor kept reappearing as a prerequisite for a successful invasion—the defeat or destruction of the Royal Air Force. Here lies the second explanation for Germany’s failure to invade. The Germans continually overestimated the Luftwaffe’s strength and capacities. The OKW, OKH, and OKM made exacting demands that the OKL could not meet. Coupled with the ability of the British to withstand continual saturation bombing, an invasion of Britain became impossible.

The Luftwaffe had two roles according to Göring: first, to shoot down as many enemies as possible; and second, to perform strategic bombing that would “decide the war and relegate the army and the navy to the role of mere bit players.”⁵⁰ Nothing could ever come of Sea Lion, however, because the Luftwaffe failed to take out the RAF. As long as the RAF could menace the sailing German fleet and the landing German troops, an invasion could not happen. Because of the presence of the RAF, the Luftwaffe could not protect the troop transports from the British Navy. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe bombers were not well defended, did not release enough bombs, and did not follow up on targets to make sure the targets were completely destroyed.

The RAF had two distinct advantages over its German counterpart: fighting near home and radar. When a British pilot was shot down, he bailed out over the British mainland or in the Channel. Either way, he could be picked up by British forces, sent to an airbase, and put into another airplane to continue fighting the Germans. The Luftwaffe pilots were not so lucky. When a German pilot went down near Britain and got picked up by the British, he was out of the war for good. Radar was a bitter surprise for the German pilots. The British made extensive use of the technology that had been developed in 1935. They had advanced notice when the Luftwaffe planned to strike, could accurately plot the enemy’s course, and could plan the best time and place for the RAF to intercept the Luftwaffe.⁵¹ The Luftwaffe continually underestimated the effectiveness of the British radar, and in all of their bombings in Britain, the Luftwaffe put forth no serious effort to jam or destroy radar stations.⁵²

Finally, Hitler himself proved to be his own formidable obstacle to his invasion

⁴⁸ Fleming, *Operation Sea Lion*, 35.

⁴⁹ Warlimont, *Inside Hitler’s Headquarters*, 118.

⁵⁰ Kieser, *Hitler on the Doorstep*, 155–57.

⁵¹ William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), 776.

⁵² B. H. Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1971), 95.

plans. Hitler's ego demanded success over Britain. "He had swallowed Austria and Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, and Norway, the Low Countries and France in successive gulps. Italy was his jackal, Russia (the next victim) his dupe, Japan a thunderbolt up his sleeve, Spain at the worst a toady."⁵³ He assumed he could waltz into Britain and easily take over...once he decided to invade. Up through mid-July 1940, Hitler proclaimed that he wanted nothing more than peace with Britain. Even when he ordered Sea Lion, he continually thought of an invasion as a last ditch effort to get the British to sue for peace.

Hitler did not understand Britain or her people's tenacious will to resist. First, Hitler chose to starve the British into submission. Then, he thought the British would capitulate once France fell. However, as Churchill later wrote, "Hitler could not conceive that Britain would not accept a peace offer...he misjudged our will-power."⁵⁴ Only after this refusal did Hitler decide to change from strategies of annihilation to exhaustion. Had he been planning ahead for a possible invasion or had he been privy to the studies of the Kriegsmarine and Heers in late 1939, perhaps he would have been better prepared to deal with the British. This advanced preparation would have given his commanders more time to solve the problems that arose during the summer of 1940. Instead, Hitler seemed content to play his commanders off one another to see who could best curry favor with him. If Hitler had been ready to strike immediately after the fall of France, he would have been far more successful. In fact, if Hitler had destroyed the fleeing forces at Dunkirk, Britain could have been left "so defenseless that he might have conquered her even by hastily improvised invasion."⁵⁵

Hitler's golden opportunity slipped past him before he had serious thoughts about an invasion. If he had created a strategy beforehand, Britain could have fallen. If the invasion had succeeded, the only remaining British forces would have been in Egypt, and those few forces probably could not have held off the Italian's invasion from Libya. Hitler would never have had to deploy troops marked for Russia to Greece due to British intervention. Hitler presumably would not have had to postpone his operations in Russia, and with his extra troops, he might have taken Moscow before the bitter Russian winter set in. Capturing the Russian capital would have significantly strengthened the German position.⁵⁶ All of this could have happened if Hitler had created a master strategy or at least made plans more than a few weeks in advance.

Operation Sea Lion was a symbolic and pivotal event in World War II. The Germans had crushed the French, but they became stuck on the French side of the Channel in a stalemate. German Führer Adolf Hitler demanded his forces invade Britain,

⁵³ Fleming, *Operation Sea Lion*, 133.

⁵⁴ Winston Churchill, *Their Finest Hour* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1949), 320-21.

⁵⁵ B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1967), 251-52.

⁵⁶ Fleming, *Operation Sea Lion*, 300-02.

but they failed miserably after having spent the summer of 1940 laboriously laying the groundwork. The Germans fell short of their desired goal for many reasons, among which was the inability of the high-ranking officers to cooperate with one another; failure of the Luftwaffe to gain aerial superiority due to the continual menace of the Royal Air Force; and lack of foresight and planning on Hitler's part. Operation Sea Lion delivered Hitler his first defeat in World War II, and with this loss, Nazi Germany suffered a devastating blow from which it never recovered.



Hitler, Stalin and the Origins of War on the Eastern Front

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At 3:30 on the morning of 22 June 1941 the spearheads of 146 German divisions (comprising 3.2 million troops and supported by 3,350 tanks and over 2,000 aircraft) smashed across the Soviet border. Massed in three powerful strike groups, Hitler's legions enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority at the three points of attack. They also achieved virtually complete strategic surprise. The largest battle in history, Operation Barbarossa, had begun.

The results of that operation are well known. The Red Army, stunned and inadequately prepared, was routed all along the Soviet frontier. On the first day of the war, the Luftwaffe destroyed much of the Soviet air force before it ever left the ground. German Army Group North quickly overran the Baltic States and, by September, had surrounded Leningrad. Army Group South plunged through the Ukraine and stormed Kiev in September. Army Group Center roared toward Moscow. By early December its lead elements could see the spires of the Kremlin through their field glasses. Between June and the end of the year, the USSR had lost 2.7 million troops killed, another 3.3 million captured, and over half of its industrial capacity destroyed or in enemy hands. Some historians believe that only a combination of bad weather, bad roads, troop exhaustion, equipment fatigue, and command arrogance prevented a complete Nazi victory before Operation Barbarossa ground to a halt in the suburbs of Moscow.¹

Historians have had difficulty explaining how so paranoid a leader as Joseph Stalin, supported by the world's largest intelligence network, could have been so completely surprised by the German assault. After all, it was not possible for Hitler to conceal the

¹ For detailed accounts of the Barbarossa campaign, see John Erickson, *The Road to Stalingrad* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975), chs. 1-7; David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, *When Titans Clashed* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), chs. 3-5; and Richard Overy, *Russia's War* (New York: Penguin, 1997), chs. 2-4.

marshaling along the borders of the USSR of over three million troops, with all their armor and other heavy equipment. Moreover, Soviet intelligence, including the now famous Red Orchestra in Berlin and Richard Sorge in Tokyo, supplied literally hundreds of reports suggesting the likelihood of a Nazi attack. Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt and other foreign sources provided additional warnings.²

Most explanations of the Barbarossa debacle have emphasized such factors as Stalin's misunderstanding of Hitler's intentions or the deficiencies of Soviet military doctrine or the disastrously incomplete renovation of the Red Army and its equipment or the tendency of such sycophantic intelligence chiefs as General Filip Golikov (GRU) and Lavrenti Beria (KGB) to shape incoming intelligence data to fit Stalin's mistaken assumptions. Such explanations, though probably accurate, leave the reader uneasy. The human and material cost of being unprepared for the Barbarossa onslaught was so enormous that any national leader, not just a man so hyper-suspicious as Stalin, should have been on guard against such a disaster.

Not surprisingly, then, an alternative explanation of the Barbarossa debacle, which purported to reveal a previously hidden factor, might find ready acceptance among many readers. If the new interpretation also appealed to long-standing, deeply held western anti-communist and anti-Soviet prejudices, it would seem even more plausible. Just such an explanation was put forward in 1985 and subsequently by a writer calling himself Viktor Suvarov.³ This author is actually Vladimir Razun, a former Soviet military officer who had defected to Great Britain in 1978.

Suvarov argues that Soviet forces were caught so unprepared and were routed because the German assault found them concentrated in vulnerable forward deployments for their own attack on the Third Reich. This invasion, Suvarov contends, was intended by Stalin not only to conquer Germany, but also to carry communist revolution throughout central and western Europe. Thus, Suvarov titled his first book on this topic, *The Icebreaker*, because this alleged Soviet attack was supposed to break the ice which had prevented the spread of revolution since the Bolshevik victory in Russia during the First World War. He even suggests that Stalin had sought to instigate a new world war since 1922 in order to rekindle the fires of revolution. Suvarov also pictures the Soviet armed forces as a virtually invincible Juggernaut in 1941. He imagines hordes of crack paratroops, ready to darken the skies over Germany; he fantasizes squadrons of winged tanks able to jettison their avionics as they move into

² Barton Whaley, *Codeword BARBAROSSA* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1973) and John Erickson, "Threat Identification and Strategic Appraisal by the Soviet Union, 1930-1941," in Ernest R. May, ed., *Knowing One's Enemies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 375-423.

³ Viktor Suvarov, "Eshche rtaz o soobshchenii TASS," *Russkaia mys'*, 16 and 23 May 1985; Suvarov, "Who Was Planning to Attack Whom in June 1941, Hitler or Stalin?" *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, vol. 130, no. 2 (1985), pp. 50-55; and Suvarov, *Ledokol: Kto nachal vtoruiu voynu?* (Paris: Olivier Orban, 1988). His later books on the same theme include: *Den'+M: Kogda nachalas' vtoraiia mirovaia voina?* (Moscow: Vse dlia Vas, 1994; and *Posledniaia respublika* (Moscow: AST, 1996).

battle, as well as additional Panzer formations equipped with rubber wheels rather than tank tracks to let them race down the Autobahn. So, in this view, Barbarossa is not an act of aggression, but a preemptive strike launched by the Germans after they discovered Stalin's supposed plan to attack them.

Suvorov deploys an array of purported evidence to support the novel thesis that it was Stalin, not Hitler, who was (or at least was planning to be) the aggressor in 1941. The logic of his argument is based on his own estimation of what would have been the most effective defensive strategies and deployments for the Red Army before the war broke out. Since Soviet forces did not follow his plan, he judges that they could not possibly have been preparing to defend the USSR from an attack. If their dispositions were not defensive, they must, he thinks, betray offensive intentions. Thus, because the Soviet general staff did not prepare to meet a German attack the way he would have, this somehow proves that Stalin was planning a treacherous attack on Hitler. Throughout this analysis, Suvorov must distort or ignore prewar Soviet military doctrine, which expected to deliver a crushing counterattack within ten to fifteen days of an enemy invasion, thus carrying the fight onto the aggressor's own territory. When he finds references in essays on strategy, in war games, and in military orders to attacking German-occupied Poland and Germany itself, he ignores the fact that all such attacks by the Red Army were projected in a context in which the Wehrmacht has already invaded the Soviet Union.⁴

To say that *Icebreaker* and Suvorov's subsequent books are not works of scholarship is an understatement. The author introduces statements of purported fact, previously unknown to specialists on World War II or the Soviet military, as well as controversial, sweeping interpretive judgments without reference to any supporting documentation. Most of the evidence, he suggests, has been destroyed by the Soviets in order to cover their misdeeds after the fact. When he does cite specific details, they are often wrong. For example, Suvorov tells his readers that the underlying decision to attack Germany was made at a Politburo meeting on 19 August 1939, but evidence now available indicates that there was no such meeting on that date, nor is there evidence of such a discussion taking place at any other Politburo session.⁵ His fantasies about bizarre weapons systems, the mere existence of which supposedly prove an intention to conquer Germany (the winged tanks and rubber-wheeled Panzers, etc.) seems to confuse designers' brainstorming or, in few cases, limited prototypes, with actually operational, mass-produced weaponry. Similarly, his judgments about Stalin's political and military plans in the 1940s are not supported by contemporary documents, but, if documented at all, are based on vague statements, taken out of

⁴ Cynthia A. Roberts, "Planning for War: The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 47, no. 8 (1995), pp. 1293-1326; Andrei A. Kokoshin, *Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917-1991* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 86-111; and M. Il Mel'tiukov, "Sovetskaia razvedka i problema vnezapnogo napadeniia," *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, 1998, no. 3, pp. 3-20.

⁵ Derek Watson, "To the Editor," *Slavic Review*, vol. 59, no. 1 (2000), pp. 492-3.

context, made 15 to 20 years earlier. Stalin's 1925 remark, for instance, that the Soviet Union would be the last, and therefore decisive participant in any future European war is taken to mean that he consistently sought another world war in order to advance his supposed revolutionary and/or imperial aims.⁶ However, the connection between this statement and the decision-making process in 1941 is tenuous, at best.

It should also be noted that Suvorov's thesis is not original. It was Hitler, himself, who first claimed that his attack on the USSR was merely a preemptive strike meant to foil an imminent Soviet attack. That is what German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop told Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Dekanozov when he handed him the German declaration of war, some hours after Barbarossa had commenced.⁷ By 1941 Hitler had already established a pattern of blaming his victims for the "need" to attack them. No objective observer believed Hitler's claim in 1941, but in recent years Suvorov has found credulous followers, both among the reading public in some countries and even among a segment of the scholarly community.

In Germany, Suvorov's preventive war thesis became part of the *Historikerstreit* (or historians' debate) which erupted in the late 1980s. Walter Post, for example, claims that Lenin and, subsequently, Stalin had conspired all along to launch a revolutionary-military crusade against Germany. Hitler prevented just such an attack by launching Operation Barbarossa.⁸ Similarly, Joachim Hoffmann contends that Stalin saw the stalemated Anglo-German conflict in the West as the perfect opportunity to stab Germany in the back with a revolutionary thrust.⁹ More radical still, Ernst Topisch, an Austrian scholar, argues that the Second World War, in its entirety, was manufactured by the USSR as "a Soviet attack on the capitalist world."¹⁰

Some Russian scholars, too, have been drawn to the Suvorov thesis. Mikhail Mel'tiukov contends that Suvorov's "conclusions, drawn on a solid base of historical facts, have not only not been overturned by his opponents + on the contrary, they have been confirmed by new evidence."¹¹ He also uses propaganda planning docu-

⁶ J.V. Stalin, *Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), vol. VII, pp. 13-14.

⁷ Raymond J. Sontag and James S. Beddie, eds., *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: Documents* (New York: Didier, 1948), pp. 356-57. Cf. the similar announcement by German ambassador Friedrich von der Schulenburg in Moscow, who omitted any attempt to justify the attack as preemptive. *Dokumenty vnesheinei politiki, 1940-22 iuniiiia 1941* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1998), vol. 23, bk. 2, pt. 2, pp. 753-54.

⁸ Walter Post, *Unternehmen Barbarossa: Die Deutsche und sowjetische Angriffspäne 1940/41* (Hamburg: E.S. Mittler, 1996).

⁹ Joachim Hoffmann, "The Soviet Union's Offensive Preparations in 1941," in Wegner (ed.), *From Peace to War* (Providence: Berghan, 1997), pp. 361-80; and "Die Sowjetunion bis zum Vorabend des deutschen Angriffs," and "Die Kriegführung aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion," in *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1987), vol. 4, pp. 713-809.

¹⁰ Ernst Topisch, *Stalin's War: A Radical New Theory of the Origins of the Second World War* (London: Fourth Estate, 1987), p. 133.

¹¹ M.I. Mel'tiukov, "Spory vokrug 1941 goda: Opyt kriticheskogo osmyleniia odnoi diskussii," *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, 1994, no. 3, p. 22.

ments in an attempt to show that Stalin sought to stir up a war fever among the Russian people against Germany.¹² Another Russian scholar, Vladimir Nevezhin argues that Stalin's speech to military cadet graduates on 5 May 1941 betrayed an intention to strike aggressively against Germany.¹³

Even in the United States, Suvorov's position has found some support, particularly in the work of Richard Raack. He attempts to buttress the preventive war hypothesis with the insider reminiscences of Lithuanian politician Vincas Kreve-Mickievicius, NKVD defector Grigorii Tokaev, and various Comintern functionaries. In Raack's version of the facts, Viacheslav Molotov, then head of the Soviet government, and Dekanozov disclosed their secret plans for war on the West to a foreign (and bourgeois!) politician, Kreve-Mickievicius. Raack also interprets a swirling discussion of possible international scenarios at a February 1941 Comintern meeting chaired by Walter Ulbricht as sure evidence of the Kremlin's intent to launch a revolutionary-military crusade.¹⁴

The controversy over the icebreaker thesis has left the bounds of academic debate and captured the imagination of the general public in some counties. Particularly in Russia, Germany and Israel Suvorov's books have become best sellers and have created something of a sensation in the mass circulation press. Although *Icebreaker* was originally published in 1988 by a Russian language emigré press in Paris, four years later it was reprinted in Moscow with a press run exceeding half a million copies! Suvorov's subsequent books have also sold extremely well in Russia and have been the subject of a lively, ongoing discussion in popular magazines and newspapers there. In Germany, too, the preventive war thesis has found a significant audience. Many Germans are eager to grasp any reinterpretation of their national past, which will allow them to salvage something positive from the sacrifices of World War II. Certainly Hitler and the Holocaust were undoubted evils, but, if Suvorov is to be believed, then the German war effort (or at least the 75% of it directed at the eastern front) was a justifiable defensive war, or even a heroic struggle to save civilization itself from the horrors of Stalinist Bolshevism. Different domestic political factors + the importance of anti-communism in internal politics and the presence of so many immigrants from Russia + have made *Icebreaker* widely popular in Israel, as well. Finally, beyond traditional conservative circles, the preventive war thesis has been taken up by the radical right in the United States and elsewhere. The Institute

¹² M.I. Mel'tiukov, "Ideologicheskie dokumenty maia-i iunია 1941 goda o sobytiakh vtoroi mirovoi voiny," *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, 1995, no. 1, p. 70-85.

¹³ V.A. Nevezhin, "Rech' Stalina 5 maia 1941 goda i apologiia nastupatel'noi voiny," *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, 1995, no. 2, pp. 53-69.

¹⁴ R.C. Raack, *Stalin's Drive to the West, 1939-1945* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 24 and Raack, "Stalin's Plans for World War Two Told by A High Comintern Source," *The Historical Journal*, vol. 38, no. 4 (1995), pp. 1031-36.

for Historical Review, based in southern California and specializing in Holocaust denial, has published positive reviews of Suvorov's works in its journal.¹⁵ His writings have also been lauded on the neo-Nazi For Folk and Fatherland website, which announces its mission to combat all aspects of the "Master Conspiracy" (i.e., the supposed Jewish world conspiracy).

Yet, in spite of the adherence to it by a few researchers and its popularity among the general public in at least three countries, the icebreaker thesis has been rejected by the great majority of scholars.¹⁶ Upon close examination, its trumpeted certitudes begin to fall apart. To begin with, Suvorov's central argument welds together two very different propositions: first, that Stalin was planning an unprovoked offensive against Germany and its allies in an effort to conquer all of Europe for communism, and second, that Hitler only decided to attack the USSR preemptively after discovering Stalin's nefarious plans. This second supposition concerning Hitler's motivation can be easily discredited.

Destroying the Soviet experiment was not a last minute decision taken to fend off a perceived imminent attack; it was the centerpiece of the National Socialist project. For Hitler the USSR was a breeding ground for the dreaded Marxist contagion, the key weapon in what he alleged to be the Jewish conspiracy to destroy Aryan civilization. Crushing Bolshevism always had been at the heart of his ideology, a goal developed more than a decade before his rise to power in Germany.¹⁷ Moreover, all the available evidence demonstrates that the Germans did not fear a Soviet attack in 1941. Just the opposite, their racist perception of Slavic inferiority and Russian inefficiency led them badly to underestimate Soviet military capability. Propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels' diaries show that neither Hitler or his generals feared a Soviet strike, but rather assumed that the USSR would attempt to maintain its neutrality for as long as possible.¹⁸

Suvorov's other central proposition (that Stalin was preparing a revolutionary crusade against Germany and western Europe) also dissolves upon detailed examination. First, the image of countless hordes of crack Soviet troops scarcely corresponds to the reality of the Red Army in 1941. That army was large (on paper, the

¹⁵ *The Journal of Historical Review*, vol. 16, no. 6 (November/December, 1996-97), p. 22 (review of Icebreaker by Joseph Bishop) and p. 28 (review of *Den'+M* by Daniel W. Michaels), and vol. 17, no. 4 (July/August, 1998), p. 30 (review of *Posledniaia respublika* by Daniel W. Michaels).

¹⁶ Suvorov's most devastating critic has been Gabriel Gorodetsky. See *Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). Another recent study concludes that, far from planning to attack the Third Reich, in the months leading up to June 22nd, the Soviet leaders' "conduct grew out of the priority of dividing spheres of influence between the USSR and Germany." Silvio Pons, *Stalin and the Inevitable War, 1936-1941* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 211.

¹⁷ Norman Rich, *Hitler's War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion* (New York: Norton, 1973), ch. 18; and Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,), pp. 193 and 198.

¹⁸ Willi A. Boelcke, ed., *The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels, October 1939-March 1943* (London: Weidenfelt & Nicolson, 1970), pp. 176-7.

largest army in the world), but as careful students of the RKKA have noted, it was in a precarious state of transition in 1941.¹⁹ Stalin certainly understood that the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 has only a temporary truce, so the already existing military expansion program was further accelerated. The induction of a huge number of raw recruits brought with it enormous problems of training, equipping and integrating the new troops which had not been solved before Hitler's attack. Also, the huge holes in the senior and mid-level command staff, caused by the Great Purges of the late 1930s, had not yet been filled adequately. Far too many recently promoted front, army and division commanders had not yet mastered the complexities of fielding such large units.²⁰ Demonstrating this point, Mark von Hagen highlights the poor performance of the Red Army in the Winter War with Finland and also in the occupation of the Baltic States, eastern Poland, and Bessarabia.²¹ Similarly, procurement programs were in operation, which would eventually produce great quantities of superior T-34 tanks, Katusha rockets and serviceable interceptor aircraft, but in 1941 those programs were far from complete. In addition, the Red Army had lost its prepared defensive fortifications. The pre-1939 borders had been heavily fortified with steel-reinforced concrete bunkers and gun positions with pre-sited fields of fire. After the Nazi-Soviet Pact Soviet forces had moved forward to incorporate parts of Finland, the Baltic States, eastern Poland and parts of Rumania into the USSR. The old fortified line was not only left far behind, it was largely dismantled in order to recycle building materials, and the new line was far from complete. Similarly, the Red Army's accelerated arms modernization program meant that in the summer of 1941 many units had turned in their old weapons and either not yet received new ones, or had not had time to train with the replacement weapons. Thus, the Soviet armed forces were at this time not quite the awesome Juggernaut that Suvorov pictures.

A second problem with Suvorov's argument is the timing it attributes to Stalin. He claims that the Soviet dictator intended to launch a revolutionary crusade in May of 1941. The difficulty here is that, far from being ravaged by war at this point, Germany was at the pinnacle of its strength, having established its hegemony from the Bay of Biscane to the Soviet border and from Norway to the sands of North Africa. Moreover, there is also no evidence that the proletariat of Nazi-occupied, bourgeois Europe were ripe for revolution at this point.²² If Stalin had decided to attempt a pan-European revolutionary uprising in the summer of 1941, it is hard to imagine

¹⁹ Yuri Y. Kirshin, "The Soviet Armed Forces on the Eve of the Great Patriotic War," in Wegner (ed.), *From Peace to War*, pp. 381-394.

²⁰ Gorodetsky, *Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia*, pp. 115 and 319; and Bernd Bonwetsch, "The Purge of the Military and the Red Army's Operational Capability during the 'Great Patriotic War,'" in Wegner (ed.), *From Peace to War*, pp. 395-414.

²¹ Mark von Hagen, "Soviet Soldiers and Officers on the Eve of the German Invasion," *Soviet Union/Union Sovietique*, vol. 18, nos. 1-3 (1991), pp. 79-101,

²² On the sorry state of the Comintern and most of its constituent parties in this period, see Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, *The Comintern* (New York: St. Martin's, 1997), pp. 191-205.

him having chosen a less opportune moment.

A third glaring error in Surovov's analysis is his failure to see that what he takes to be evidence of the Kremlin's aggressive intent was, in actuality, the fruits of a foolishly inappropriate defensive doctrine on the part of the Soviet general staff. For many years Red Army doctrine had held that any attack on the western frontier of the USSR would commence with two weeks of more of limited, probing attacks before the enemy could concentrate his full might for a decisive strike. Under this assumption, Soviet generals believed that their fairly light screening forces could hold off the enemy near the border while the RKKK's main forces prepared to launch a devastating counter-attack. The fight would thus be carried quickly back onto the aggressor's own territory. It is for this reason, rather than any aggressive intent, that so much of the Red Army was deployed in forward positions in the summer of 1941 rather than more sensibly arrayed farther in the rear for a defense in depth.²³ The Soviet generals had obviously missed the significance of the Polish defeat in 1939 and the French disaster in 1940 + namely, that the Blitzkrieg could strike with its full, devastating force on day one of the war. Suvorov misses this key point entirely.

Finally, the disaster of 1941 rests above all on Stalin's shoulders, not because he was caught in an attempt to double-cross Hitler, but because of his astounding self-delusion. Although he certainly knew that war with the Third Reich was ultimately unavoidable, he realized better than anyone else that the propaganda picturing an invulnerable Soviet Union was a hollow lie. He knew better than anyone else how badly the Purges had hurt the Soviet armed forces, how inadequately Soviet industry was responding to the need for a crash-paced arms buildup, and how much in disarray the Red Army was in 1941. For that reason he convinced himself that the growing German troop concentrations along the Soviet border were a gambit to gain leverage for a possible renegotiation of the Nazi-Soviet Pact more in Germany's favor.²⁴ Alternatively, he considered the possibility that renegade, militantly anti-communist German generals might launch an attack on the USSR without Hitler's knowledge as a way to provoke war. For these reasons he prevented proper defensive preparations in order, he felt, not to provoke the Germans. It was a self-delusion that was nearly fatal for his country.

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²³ Roberts, "Planning for War," pp. 1293-1326.

²⁴ Valentin M. Berezhev, *At Stalin's Side* (New York: Birch Lane, 1994), p. 53.

Heritage and Homeland: N.G. Gonzales, His State Newspaper, and His Call for South Carolina's Re-Emergence During the Spanish- American-Cuban War of 1898.

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Introduction

Narciso Gener Gonzales was in a rare, if not unique, position during the Cuban Crisis of 1898.¹ His father, born in Cuba, fought for Cuban independence in the late 1840s; his mother came from one of South Carolina's most prominent families. During the Cuban conflict of 1898, N.G., as he signed his name, was editor of *The State* newspaper in Columbia, fast becoming a leading voice in South Carolina. Gonzales was well-known for his "unreserved candor and the unrivalled vigor of his editorial expression."² It was a style that served both him and his paper well, as the paper continued to grow in both prominence and circulation during the late 1890s.³ He was always ready to stand up for what he believed in and wasn't afraid to put his feelings into print. But what about the needs of Gonzales' readers? Should they have been put aside for the personal feelings and causes of the editor? In his biography of Gonzales, Professor Lewis Pinckney Jones points out that:

¹ Newspapers, such as *The State*, often used the term "Cuban Question" or "Cuban conflict" to describe what eventually became the first part of the Spanish-American War. For the purposes of this paper, "Cuban conflict," "Cuban crisis," and "Spanish-American War" will be interchangeable in referring to the same war over Cuba.

² Rev. Samuel M. Smith, in *The State*, January 19, 1904.

³ For a more complete examination of the history of *The State*, see S.L. Latimer, *The Story of The State and the Gonzales Brothers*, Columbia, S.C.: The State Printing Company, 1970.

in the first four months of 1898, *The State* rivaled the Hearst and Pulitzer papers in its partisanship....Interested though the population probably was, it is difficult to believe that South Carolina wanted to have its attention riveted on Cuba and Cuba alone, but *The State* seems to have made that assumption.⁴

How would Gonzales' Cuban and Southern heritages play into his editorial policy during a conflict that has been called "a newspaper War," rife with sensationalism and the birth of "yellow journalism"? This paper examines the editorials of N.G. Gonzales during the year leading up to his eventual voluntary service in the Cuban conflict in May of 1898. Examining N.G. Gonzales' editorials may provide a clearer picture of Gonzales' love for his State, both the paper and South Carolina.

Historical Significance

Several studies have been conducted on the impact that newspapers had over public opinion during the Cuban conflict. Most of them have centered on the New York press, specifically the *New York World* of Joseph Pulitzer, and the *New York Journal*, published by William Randolph Hearst. These papers have long been vilified for the sensational way they not only portrayed events that actually happened, but also for some that may not have happened at all.⁵ Interestingly, these studies address least the press coverage from the region of the United States closest to Cuba – the South.

This study begins to fill that gap in historical research about the Cuban conflict. It also begins to fill the gap in research about N.G. Gonzales. While books and research papers have been written about the founding of *The State* and others have been written about the Gonzales brothers,⁶ little has been done to examine N.G. Gonzales' work connected with the newspaper's coverage of the events leading up to the Cuban conflict. Professor Lewis P. Jones touches on the topic in his biography of N.G. Gonzales, *Stormy Petrel*, but he merely hits the highlights. S.L. Latimer also touches on N.G. (and his brothers) and his passion for a Free Cuba in his history, *The Story of The State*, but like Jones, he merely touches; there is no in-depth analysis or discussion of what Gonzales was writing and how often he wrote it.⁷ Philip S. Foner quotes Gonzales extensively in his books on the "Spanish-Cuban-American" war, but his is of a national scope, not one devoted to the study of a South Carolinian. Foner doesn't offer the depth and focus of the present research, which bridges that gap between the study of the Cuban conflict and the State's editorial coverage of that

⁴ Lewis Pinckney Jones, *Stormy Petrel: N.G. Gonzales and His State*, Columbia, S.C., University of South Carolina Press; 1973; p. 273.

⁵ See Wilkerson, *Public Opinion and the Spanish American War*, and Wisan, *The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press*.

⁶ See Latimer, *The Story of The State*; Todd, *The Editorial Policy of The State, 1903-1913*; Pierce, *Palmettos and Oaks*

⁷ Both works contain less than ten pages each on the topic – Jones, pp. 273-280; Latimer, pp. 45-48.

conflict.

Many of the studies that have looked at the newspapers in other states and how they covered the Cuban crisis were conducted to examine the notion that all newspapers practiced "yellow" journalism in their coverage and called for war with Spain at any cost. Morton Rosenberg and Thomas Ruff analyzed Indiana newspapers over a four-year period, from 1895 to 1898. By and large, they found that Hoosier newspapers were not "yellow," and indeed were cautious about what they said, even though they professed to be fiercely patriotic. In one case, the authors cited the *Lafayette Journal*:

If there was the slightest ground for action by the United States in the maintenance of national honor, we would be the foremost to advocate it... But thus far there is no justification for war.⁸

Some Hoosier papers were in favor of going to war, and one even pointed to the unifying benefits of another battle:

Greensburg Review—If ever Yankee Doodle and Dixie are heard in Cuba, Butcher Weyler and his army might as well take to their boats. No power on earth could stand before the music that would mean so much.⁹

Rosenberg and Ruff concluded that Indiana papers were certainly not as "jingoistic" about going to war as were their New York counterparts, although the Hoosier papers did seem to have a grasp of what was going on.

North Carolina papers seemed to mirror their neighbors to the South a little more closely in many respects. Like South Carolina, the Tar Heel state fought for the Confederacy and lost. Families were left without fathers and brothers. The state was struggling through Reconstruction. In 1866, many newspapers were agreed that a war so soon after the Civil War was not in the best interests of the South. Just 30 years later, however, attitudes changed.

George Gibson concluded in his study of Tar Heel papers that in 1895 "North Carolina showed no lack of sympathy for the rebels. The (Raleigh) *North Carolinian* declared: 'We think the time was come for this country to show an active sympathy for those neighbors of ours who are making such a bold stand for their independence.'"¹⁰ But as with Indiana, North Carolina papers deduced, in 1898, that war might be coming, whether they wanted it or not.

⁸ Morton Rosenberg and Thomas Ruff; *Indiana and the Coming of the Spanish American War*; Ball State University Press, Muncie, In; 1976; p. 20. Both editorials and newspapers articles were part of this study.

⁹ *Greensburg Review*, Dec. 25, 1896, as cited in Rosenberg and Ruff, p. 19

¹⁰ George Gibson; "Attitudes in North Carolina regarding the Independence of Cuba, 1868-1898;" *North Carolina Historical Review*, vol. 43, p. 54.

The South prays that there will not be necessity of war to preserve the National Honor, but if war is declared it will not be wanting in patriotic devotion to the flag.¹¹

Georgia newspapers were little different, according to journalism historians Louis Griffith and John Talmadge. They noted that the papers urged caution, and were concerned that a war with Spain would only make Southern ports more vulnerable. But with the sinking of the *Maine* came a change in attitudes. "News of the disaster reached he (Atlanta) *Constitution* too late for its issue of Feb. 16th to carry more than a hurried announcement. The next day the paper proclaimed in a huge headline that 'T'WAS THE DEED OF A DASTARD,' yet an editorial in the same issue advised that public judgment be held up until an investigation could be made."¹²

An examination of *The State's* editorials should indicate whether the ancestry of the newspaper's Cuban-Southern editor affected his views. Since many other papers in the country were cautious, and since papers in both Georgia and North Carolina were careful with their words and their opinions, a more aggressive editorial policy by *The State* in support of war in Cuba would indicate that N.G. Gonzales was swayed by both sides of his heritage: he hoped for freedom for his Cuban brethren, and for renewed glory for his Southern comrades.

Methodology

This study will be conducted in two parts. The first will be a quantitative content analysis of editorials, both full and "survey" (short passages listed under the heading, "*The State's* Survey") in *The State* newspaper from May 1, 1897, through N.G. Gonzales' departure for Cuba on May 9, 1898. It will be a census survey, examining all the editorials in all the editions of the newspaper. This research will determine how many editorials Gonzales wrote during that time. Lewis P. Jones has pointed out that Gonzales wrote nearly every editorial for every edition of *The State* up until about 1900, and only then did he relinquish Sundays. It is reasonable to assume that an editorial written during the time period under study would have been written by Gonzales.

The qualitative portion will examine the editorial bias. N.G. Gonzales was a man of strong convictions. What did he tell the readers of *The State* about the Cuban conflict through his editorials? How often did he comment on the conflict? Did he run an editorial every week merely to keep up interest? But the most important variable will be what Gonzales said in his editorials. Was he trying to stir up more sentiment for the Cuban conflict through his editorial writing? By examining the language and

¹¹ Raleigh (N.C.) News and Observer, March 5, 1898, as cited in Gibson, p. 60

¹² Lewis Griffith and John Talmadge; *Georgia Journalism, 1763-1950*; University of Georgia Press, Athens, GA; 1951; p. 123.

style of his writing and by looking at the timing of his editorials, this paper hopes to reach a better understanding of the type of influence Gonzales was trying to wield.

It could be argued that this research should include an analysis of the stories that appeared in *The State* during the time in question. That was considered, and a coding sheet was developed for just such a purpose. However Gonzales had recently acquired the rights to use the Associated Press wire and he used it quite extensively to fill his eight-page newspaper.¹³ In fact, his paper often carried the claim as the "only newspaper in Columbia with a full use of the Associated Press wires." Gonzales was very liberal with his use of national and international stories, so it would not seem unusual that he would run several stories of the Cuban conflict in his newspaper; he also ran several stories of the war between Greece and Turkey as well as troubles in Russia and other parts of Europe. This research focuses specifically on the editorials of N.G. Gonzales and it questions whether his heritage led him to write editorials that were out of the mainstream of his neighbors in other states.

For the coding sheet and the definition of the variables, please see Appendix C.

NANNO

On August 5, 1858, Narciso Gener Gonzales "sniffed the air of the Edisto" for the first time.¹⁴ His father was Ambrosio Jose Gonzales, a former Cuban Freedom fighter; his mother was Harriett Rutledge Elliott, daughter of a prominent family from Beaufort. It would be a nice fairy tale to say that N.G. grew up in the lap of fortune and luxury, a child of the South. But the Civil War destroyed the family home, and fever took Harriett during a trip to Cuba when "Nanno," as his family called him, was 12 years old. Nanno eventually found himself in private school in Fairfax, Virginia, and he was thrilled at the chance to grow. But while he excelled in studies, he returned home to South Carolina eight months later, penniless.¹⁵ He later found work as a telegraph operator, thanks to his older brother, but it wasn't long before he ended up working for a newspaper, *The (Charleston) News and Courier*.

He worked first as a correspondent in Columbia. A transfer to Washington, D.C., helped him sharpen his before he returned to Charleston in 1883, considering himself the heir apparent as editor of the *News and Courier*. When that didn't happen, he returned to Columbia to as the Capital correspondent. When "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman won the Governor's Mansion in 1890, Gonzales was out of a job (he had left his *Courier* job to campaign for Tillman's opponent). It was then that his life was to change again, as he and his brother Ambrose were approached by a group of conser-

¹³ Gonzales had lost his rights in 1896, but had been getting the wire reports anyway; he had to fight hard to get the official rights back. See Jones.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 10.

¹⁵ Jones, p. 41.

vatives who wanted to start a new newspaper in Columbia. That paper, called *The State*, published its first edition on February 18, 1891.¹⁶ N.G. Gonzales was editor, his brother Ambrose the "general agent," or publisher/manager. Issue number 1 contained the promise that the paper would be "Democratic, independent, fair, statewide, and progressive."¹⁷ N.G. Gonzales was now able to fire off his opinions and deliver the news the way he wanted.

The Coming War

The Buildup

While Spain had controlled Cuba since before the American Revolution, the newly formed United States had long wanted the island for its own. President James Buchanan once wrote, "The acquisition of Cuba would greatly strengthen our Bond of Union...(and) insure the perpetuity of our Union."¹⁸ Several years later, before Theodore Roosevelt became President, he would be quoted as saying:

I wish to Heaven we were more jingo about Cuba and Hawaii. The trouble with our nation is that we incline to fall into mere animal sloth and ease, and then to venture too little instead of too much... There seems to be a gradual feature of vitality in these qualities... that make men fight well and write well.¹⁹

Indeed, there were several offers made by the United States to Spain to purchase the island outright, including one of \$100 million in 1848.²⁰ But Spain wasn't interested.

Tensions grew on the island between the Spanish occupiers and the Cuban inhabitants. Several times, the United States tried to intervene and either take control of Cuba on its own, or broker a deal to keep the peace; nothing worked. On February 16th the USS *Maine*, which had been sent to Havana harbor ostensibly to "monitor" the situation, sank from an explosion. Rumor was rampant that the Spanish were responsible, though evidence at the time was at best, inconclusive. The United States, so consumed with the idea of annexing Cuba for its own purposes as well as with the obvious struggles of the Cuban people, decided it was time for war. When President McKinley asked Congress for a declaration of war on April 11, 1898,

¹⁶ See Latimer and Jones for more complete histories of *The State*.

¹⁷ Jones, p. 140, citing *The State*, Feb. 18, 1891.

¹⁸ Louis A. Perez, *The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography*, Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1998, p. 4.

¹⁹ Susan Moeller, *Shooting War: Photography and the American Experience of Combat*; Basic Books, Inc., New York; 1989; in all sections of text, the researcher has attempted to condense some of the text. The omitted sections do not change the meaning of the quoted sections, or the context in which they are used.

²⁰ Perez, p. 4.

it was for "the termination of hostilities between the government of Spain and the people of Cuba."²¹

It took a week for Congress to decide on the final declaration, and when it was formally announced on April 25 (retroactive to April 22), it was far from President McKinley's true intent. Congress didn't want to fight the Spanish AND the Cubans. Thus in the Teller Amendment to the declaration of war, Congress emphasized "neutral intervention," meaning that the United States recognized Cuba as an independent nation, and that it:

...disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts that when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people.²²

Semantics and opinion would become factors with these words—just what is pacification, and when will it be accomplished? Those were questions over which United States leaders, and N.G. Gonzales, would debate.

Attitude in South Carolina

One might think that South Carolina would want nothing to do with war again, being only a generation removed from the ravages of the Civil War. But evidence of the passion for the cause of "Cuba Libre," or at least the desire to make a good showing in battle for the rest of the Union, is as close as the State House in Columbia where there are two monuments to the Cuban Crisis on the grounds.²³ The Palmetto State was one of frequent change in fortune, but little change in ideology. South Carolinians took pride in their stand in the "War of Northern Aggression" (Civil War).²⁴ Among the white population, the belief in the glory of the Confederacy and the love of those who fought for it was still very strong.²⁵ But that didn't mean it wouldn't carry over to a new loyalty to the "Re-United States." There was the belief among whites that the South was a unit within a larger unit—the Union. The hatred toward the northern aggressors did not take away from the loyalty to the reunited country, and the "new" flag of the United States. Southerners could love the South and the memory of the Confederacy, but also pledge their allegiance and loyalty to the United States. In fact, that love of the Confederacy and belief in patriotism made southerners more suited to join up and fight in the Cuban crisis. Songs of the day started showing the push for more cooperation between the North and South. The

²¹ Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 10, pp. 63–64, as cited in Perez, p. 19.

²² Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 2nd session, vol. 31, p3988, as cited in Perez, p. 21.

²³ For pictures of the soldiers' monument, please look to Appendix B.

²⁴ Southerners often view the Civil War more as the North invading the South, rather than a war over slavery, state's rights, freedom, etc.

²⁵ In fact, it has yet to die; witness to battle over the Confederate flag that continues to fly near the entrance to the South Carolina State House.

second verse of "Remember the *Maine*" is clear: "With Yankee Doodle, Dixie swells/ with no discordant notes; And Northern cheers and Southern yells/Come from ten million throats."²⁶ In one advertisement, the Prudential Insurance Company pledged to honor life insurance policies, even "in the event of war."²⁷ And in what can only be described as a strange set of circumstances, John Phillip Sousa made his contribution to the cause of reconciliation as well. On April 17, 1898, mere days before the United States was to officially declare war with Spain, the *Charleston News and Courier* carried a story from New York City about a Sousa concert. Sousa was in his second encore, trying to follow his stirring rendition of the Star Spangled Banner:

At last Sousa raised his hand for silence, and when he could be heard, said, 'Ladies and Gentlemen, it seems as though the only appropriate encore that I can give in these days is 'Johnny get your gun,' but there's another air we all will cheer to-night,' and turning to his band he led off 'Dixie.' The previous applause was as a Sunday quiet compared to the bedlam that broke loose as the strains of this beloved southern air arose. Cheer after cheer was given from all parts of the house, and through and over all, in startlingly increased volume rose the genuine, old time 'Rebel yell.'...a man in the orchestra, who jumped into the aisle and called for three cheers for 'One flag and one country, the North and the South—we're all ready,' and the cheers, given with a will, were accented by the now familiar yell.²⁸

The South was ready to fight, and the North appeared ready to have it.

FINDINGS

In all, 398 editorials, both full and "survey" met the criteria for this study. Of those, 117, or 29 percent, were considered "full" editorials (ones with titles, containing several paragraphs); 281, or 71 percent, were considered "survey" editorials (no titles, ranging from 3 lines to 33, and listed under the heading "*The State's Survey*"). And while the number suggests that there was an average of 1.1 editorials (of either kind) per day, the breakdown of the numbers tells a much different story.

South Carolina Pride through Patriotism

N.G. Gonzales, of course, had two sides to his heritage: the Cuban side, and that of his late mother, Harriett Elliott Gonzales. The Elliott side of the family exerted great influence over N.G. and his siblings, and they all had a deep love for South Carolina. When Gonzales began to write about the pending war and the impact that it would have on the state, he appeared to have two primary objectives: 1) to encourage South Carolinians to help in any way possible and 2) to remind them that theirs

²⁶ *Remembering the Maine: The United States, 1898, and Sectional Reconciliation; The Crisis of 1898*; Angel Smith and Emma Davila-Cox, ed; St. Martin's Press, New York City; 1999, p. 49.

²⁷ See Appendix B.

²⁸ *News and Courier*, April 19, 1898, p. 5.

is a state full of honor and glory and should be treated as such.

Gonzales wrote about the South and its place in the Union should war break out. He had written many times about the chances that South Carolina troops would have the opportunities for glory and for honor in a Cuban campaign; but he also understood the dangers that war presented. Responding to criticism from other editors around the city and the state, Gonzales wrote that he wasn't advocating war, merely the independence of Cuba; and if the South benefited from that, all the better:

...We think that as many southern men as have a taste for army service should volunteer; we would like to see the larger part of the army made up of southerners; see them do the best fighting and win the greatest honors of the war. This is their country and their cause. Nothing could have a worse effect in perpetuating sectional feeling than their remaining at home and sulking; nothing would have a happier effect in obliterating northern prejudice and restoring the south to full and esteemed comradeship with the other sections than prompt volunteering and such fine service in arms as southern men can give to the country. When the men of the south and north shall have fought together against a common enemy the war of 1861-1865 can be said, at last with real truth, to be over....²⁹

Gonzales knew that many in the South continued to harbor both ill feelings toward the North and a sense of inferiority toward themselves. He took every chance he could to change that attitude. When the *Maine* was sent to Havana, Gonzales made sure to point out that it was a "Son of the South," Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, who had made the call, "in all his coolness."³⁰ His love affair with the myth that would surround Lee continued throughout the conflict, even as Lee came home from Havana and reported to Congress and McKinley what was happening to Americans in Cuba. In April, as Lee made his way to Washington, D.C., Gonzales was among the first to cheer him, and made it clear that others were cheering him as well:

On the 9th of April, 1865, Robert E. Lee surrendered the army of Northern Virginia to Gen. Grant. On the 9th of April 1898, Fitzhugh Lee "evacuated" Habana. But he did so as a high officer of the United States, and bore with him a letter from General Grant's grandson, seeking the honor of serving on his staff in case he should command an army of the United States against Spain. And he left Habana to begin an 'Ode to Washington,' which was throughout an ovation and which ended in one of the most remarkable demonstrations in the history of the national capital, extending even to the war department and the White House. The war is pretty nearly over.³¹

Gonzales used the excitement over Lee's return to introduce the notion to many Southerners that the North was beginning to look to the South for leadership and

²⁹ Ibid, Feb. 28, 1898.

³⁰ Ibid, Jan. 25, 1898.

³¹ Ibid. p.4.

patriotism. While it was unlikely that any old Southern officers would be given ultimate command over troops, Gonzales was pushing for the recognition that Southerners should *expect* commands:

“Fitzhugh Lee returns from his long and difficult experience at Habana to find that the whole nation honors and loves him. Few public servants have been more promptly rewarded for distinguished services. Not long ago, he was the favorite son of Old Virginia. Now he is a favorite son of Old Glory.” -New York Sun. It really seems so, and Old Glory can prove it by letting him lead an army into Cuba. His good right arm has been tingling these two years under the bonds of diplomacy—it is time that it should be allowed some exercise.³²

While he is engaging in hyperbole here Gonzales also recognizes how valuable the growing legend of Fitzhugh Lee can be for his readers. Gonzales is reminding Southerners of their heritage of loyalty and determination. And he also admonishes those who would suggest that the North should do all the fighting because the “Union government” is pushing this war. After the article over the John Philip Sousa concert³³ Gonzales saw an opportunity to, in essence, say “the time has come to heal.”

The theory that thousands of auditors in theatres should go wild over “Dixie,” that the New York naval reserves should march to their war-time monitor keeping step to it, that the air should awaken enthusiasm whenever in the north it was played, that these spontaneous popular manifestation were due to a scheme to induce the south to the north’s fighting is absurd. Why not honestly admit the obvious meaning of them, a desire to show fellowship with the south and to wipe out sectionalism in a common cause?³⁴

Gonzales was afraid that an American war without the South would set unification back generations. He wasn’t afraid to go after Southern heroes, either. When Gen. Wade Hampton was quoted (he would later say ‘mis’-quoted) as saying he would prefer the North to send all the troops to the front, Gonzales jumped right in:

No! The south is knitted to the Union now by closer bonds than have held it there for 75 years; there is less sectionalism, less of misunderstanding, less prejudice, less conflict than there has been since the time of the younger Adams. We are Americans and once more we feel that we are. We share in the greatness of our country and we recognize our duties toward it. We feel as keenly as the people of any other section our responsibility for the guarding of its interests and the maintenance of its honor. The state which shall volunteer quicker than South Carolina in the national cause must step fast to the telegraph office.

³² Ibid, Apr. 13, 1898.

³³ See previous section, The Setting - Attitude in the United States,

³⁴ Ibid, Apr. 21, 1898.

From Gen. Hampton's past record we are induced to think that he expressed himself the other day without due consideration. We believe that if war should be declared his good right hand would burn for the saber-hilt.³⁵

As it was, Hampton later "explained" himself, and Gonzales took him at his word. But this still gave Gonzales a chance to extol South Carolinians to think of themselves as Americans as well as Southerners, something he feels they hadn't done for a long time. He saw these opportunities and worked to make the most of them, because he felt that a strong Southern showing, including a strong showing from South Carolina, would shape the future of relations in the Union for generations.

On April 22, 1898, when the declaration of war against Spain was finally announced, Gonzales acted as if he alone predicted that it would happen and congratulated himself because the "result has been a vindication of logic and honest dealing."³⁶ The next day, he started trying to stir up people of the South Carolina to march off to what he thought would be glorious battle:

The War Spectacle

These are stirring times—times worth living in, and, if need be, dying in.

It may be very barbaric and all that, but it is a pleasure to feel the blood tingle and the pulses throb as the great kaleidoscope of war presents its quick-changing pictures; to know that on the land there are armies marching and on the sea squadrons steaming to execute the American will; to have a vivid, virile interest in the day's news, to know that every hour is an hour of history, that heroes are in the making and that deeds are doing or to be done which will mark the time down the centuries.

...The war may bring suffering and death to many of us, but at least it makes life, while it lasts, worth the living. Whether in body or in spirit we fight with the fighters there is an intoxication in the time, and exaltation which is grateful to the old Adam that is in us. At close quarters we grant you it may not be so entrancing a prospect, but, while the panorama unrolls itself afar in a world's theatre you are privileged to enjoy the excitement it affords; to feel, to throb, to breathe, to LIVE!³⁷

And again, he comes under fire for advocating South Carolinians to engage in their "patriotic duty." Again, he responds by not only with what he considers learned discourse, but a promise that he will be there, too:

Unable to answer The State and to demonstrate that war is always without excuse and those who engage in it malicious murderers, the Greenville News evades that subject and pleases itself by insinuating that The State has been urging others during the last three

³⁵ Ibid, Mar. 3, 1898.

³⁶ Ibid, Apr. 22, 1898.

³⁷ Ibid, Apr. 23, 1898.

years to go to the aid of the Cubans, but has not sent any volunteers to them out of its own office. What this, if true, would have to do with the matter we don't know, but we may as well say that the services of the editor of *The State* were offered to the Junta years ago, and declined on the ground first that thousands of men were then waiting in Cuba for arms and ammunition that could not be furnished, and second, that he could do more for the cause as an editor, promoting recognition of the Cuban government by the United States. It was obvious, besides, that the Cuban policy was to avoid pitched battles and simply to wear Spain out, and that policy, while effective, was not dependent on numbers. Hence, he not only did not urge any reader of *The State* to go over but dissuaded those who expressed to him a desire to do so. He will go over now for various reasons – one of which is that he wants to go, and another that he has advised others to go. We have not urged the editor of the *Greenville News* to volunteer. With his views on war we would sooner advise an Episcopal bishop to take the field.³⁸

Conclusion

N.G. Gonzales, characterized as a fiery champion of Democratic causes in South Carolina, saw the Spanish-American-Cuban War as a way to bring South Carolina back into prominence in the Union. At the time this research was started Cuba, South Carolina, and heritage were central points of discussion in America. Cuba and the United States were fighting over a 6-year-old Cuban boy found floating in the ocean on Thanksgiving Day, 1999; South Carolinians of all colors were fighting over the heritage of a Confederate flag that still flew over the State House in Columbia; and people began to question whether their view of history was the “right” view. While not every event in 1897–1898 had direct bearing on the perception of the modern events above, there is a sense of irony that more than a hundred years after the end of the Cuban conflict, people are still arguing over the same core issues.

N.G. Gonzales was a fiery, passionate man who fought hard for what he believed. His battles with the Tillman family are legendary³⁹ and his editorials leading up to his service in Cuba during the Cuban conflict are certainly worth note. His Cuban-Southern heritage afforded him a unique perspective during the conflict. On one side he pushed hard for the independence of his father's homeland; on another side he lobbied for South Carolinians to realize their future was in the Union, not hating it; and yet he never tired of slashing an opponent for his beliefs.

Gonzales held a nostalgic love for Cuba, and as the conflict of 1898 loomed closer, he continued to hold out hope that Cuba would be free. The Cuban side of his heritage deeply influenced how he wrote about the conflict. He often romanticized about the life of the Cuban insurgent, yet when it suited his needs he was ever-ready to comment on the hardships the Cuban faced. His editorials show that while he had indeed thought long and hard about the issue he allowed his emotions to get the bet-

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Apr. 27, 1898.

³⁹ For Gonzales, those battles ultimately proved deadly. Ben Tillman's nephew, Jim, who was Lieutenant Governor at the time, shot Gonzales in the head while the editor was walking by the State House on January 15, 1903. Gonzales died four days later.

ter of him, sometimes.

The South Carolina side of his heritage allowed Gonzales the chance to push for a better place for the state within the Union. Gonzales remembered the destruction of his home in the Lowcountry, and, with his brothers' help, he long supported his sisters as they struggled to bring the home back to its original glory.⁴⁰ He believed that South Carolina deserved a place of respect within the Union and he reasoned that the war, as savage as it could be, was a way to give the state the glory that he thought it should have.

But were his views that much different than those of his contemporaries in other states? The views of the New York City dailies have been well documented, and it is reasonable to assume that while Gonzales, Hearst, and Pulitzer eventually all agreed upon war, they reached their respective positions in different ways. Newspapers in the Midwest covered the Cuban conflict, but not with the fervor that was shown in the New York dailies or in Gonzales' *State*.⁴¹ But Gonzales' contemporaries in Georgia and North Carolina were closer to him in their editorials.

Georgia newspapers were loyal to the history of the South as much as Gonzales was, but they were slow to pick up the drumbeat of war. Griffith and Talmadge conclude that the two Atlanta dailies, the *Constitution* and the *Journal*, were following the practice of the New York papers, in which they would lure the readers in with page spanning headlines, then "preach" to them through their editorials.⁴² And the conservative newspapers in Georgia were having trouble determining their direction; on one hand desiring to remain loyal Southerners and rally around Fitzhugh Lee while on the other hand reminding their readers of the horrors of war, and what waging war meant.⁴³ Even up to early February, the press in Georgia urged the United States government "not to take on the war-like and predatory ways of the European nations."⁴⁴ In the end Georgia papers as a whole, like Gonzales, recognized that war could restore the integrity and standing of the South, and declared that a united America could withstand any nation.

The overall mood in the North Carolina press was closer to Gonzales' in that most Tar Heel papers were able to see through much of the sensationalism. Gibson notes that most papers were not likely to push for war, but as the conflict escalated, they grew warmer to the idea.⁴⁵ While many papers hoped that war could be averted,

⁴⁰ Jones, Stormy Petrel.

⁴¹ See Mark Welter's work on Minnesota newspapers and B. Karl Zobrist's work on Chicago newspapers. Welter points out that the Minnesota press "was either disinterested in the rebellion, or it turned to more objective sources to cover the struggle," and Zobrist notes that the Chicago Record and Daily News "were among those papers which were not guilty of sensationalist journalism."

⁴² Griffith and Talmadge, p. 124

⁴³ Ibid, p. 122

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 123

⁴⁵ See George Gibson, "Attitudes in North Carolina regarding the Independence of Cuba, 1868-1898."

like Gonzales they were ready to accept it if it proved the only option for the freedom and relief of the Cubans. Gibson also points out that the *Raleigh News and Observer* called for not only recognition of the Cuban belligerency, but also the full independence of the Cuban government and people.⁴⁶ There, Gonzales and his North Carolina contemporaries are in unison. A possible connection could be that both newspapers were centered in state capitals, and therefore more accustomed to “seeing through” the politicking to the real issue. The *News and Observer’s* view on the De Lôme letter was very similar to that of Gonzales, citing that De Lôme “told the truth... The only crime was in a foreigner... presuming to write as Americans write.”⁴⁷ But the *News and Observer* and its neighbors were slow to call for war. Gonzales had been calling for war shortly after the explosion of the *Maine*; Gibson notes that many Tar Heel papers didn’t start until early March.⁴⁸ Perhaps Gonzales was out in front because he knew the desire of the Cuban people to be free more than his contemporaries possibly could and perhaps also because his devout love for Cuba was mixing with a devout love of South Carolina’s need for respectability again.

N.G. Gonzales’ heritage was the driving force behind his views; yet he was also a newspaperman of his times, and he would often use hyperbole in order to convey his message to his readers. His screaming headlines during the Cuban conflict were new to the people of Columbia, but Gonzales knew he had to get their attention.⁴⁹ By combining his heritage and the hyperbole of his profession, Gonzales continued to work towards what he felt was a better South Carolina—a state that was moving ahead, and putting the ravages of the Civil War behind it.

Gonzales knew he had a commanding position as editor of *The State*, and he was determined to use it. That he did so and yet was prepared to back up his words with his actions by going to Cuba and fighting on the front lines is testament enough to the man.⁵⁰ This research offers another glimpse into Gonzales’ words as they played out during what has been called the “Newspaper War.” It allows us to see the efforts of Gonzales as he and South Carolina moved closer and closer to not only starting a war in Cuba but also ending the war at home.

⁴⁶ Gibson, p. 57, citing the *News and Observer*, Dec. 8, 1896

⁴⁷ Gibson, pp. 58–59, citing *News and Observer*, Feb. 11, 1898

⁴⁸ Gibson, p. 60

⁴⁹ Jones, *Stormy Petrel* p. 273.

⁵⁰ For more on Gonzales’ time fighting in Cuba, see the collection of his writings from the island while in service, entitled *In Darkest Cuba*.

Appendix A
Totals of Coded Editorials
May 1, 1897–May 9, 1898

	Full	Survey	Total
May-97	5	9	14
Jun-97	2	2	4
Jul-97	0	2	2
Aug-97	0	4	2
Sep-97	3	4	4
Oct-97	6	17	23
Nov-97	5	9	14
Dec-97	4	14	18
Jan-98	2	14	16
Up to 2/16	3	4	7
After 2/16	10	9	19
Mar-98	32	61	93
Apr-98	39	112	151
Up to 5/9	6	20	26
Totals	117 (29%)	281 (71%)	398

Editorial from February 17, 1898*The Loss of the Maine.*

The destruction of the Maine shocks and awes the country. The moment is one of tense anxiety, of infinite eagerness to know the truth.

If the explosion which caused the loss of this splendid battleship and 250 lives was the result of accident or of negligence within the vessel there will be great pity but—no more. If, on the other hand, it were the product of foul play, if it can be shown that the Spanish had ought to do with it, then war between the United States and Spain need no declaration. The strongest administration could not stand against the wrathful rising of this mighty people. Pending knowledge we must be calm and wait.

The mystery thus far is absolute. It cannot be solved, even in fact, until divers can examine the hull of the sunken warship. We cannot venture to build a theory on so grave a subject upon some basis of accurate information, so we shall offer no pinion. But it is harder to understand how the destruction of the vessel could have come from within than from without its armoured sides. It was night. Most of the officers and crew were in their bunks. Little work could have been doing at that hour. The magazines would naturally have been closed. Their steel casing ought to have been strong enough to withstand the explosion of any small engine in operation near them.

Of all the outer causes the first to suggest itself—and indeed the only plausible one—is the explosion of a torpedo or submarine mine under the ship. The concussion might have produced explosions of detonating material in one of the magazines.

Who could have had an interest in committing so great a crime? The Cubans, some say—by this act hoping to embroil Spain and the United States in War. But in Habana Cuban sympathizers with the insurrection have no means for torpedo operations—no access to the torpedo stations and no skill in the use of the destructive engines.

The Spanish Tory businessmen are beginning to favor annexation in order that they and their property interests may be protected against the revenges which they fear would follow the success of the insurrection. But an easier and less cruel method of provoking a war which would end in annexation would be to mob the American consulate or American citizens.

The Spanish volunteers are at the moment most likely to commit such an outrage. They hate the Cubans and hate the Americans doubly because of their sympathy for Cuba. They have never scrupled at bloodshed to promote their ends. They have resented bitterly the presence of an American warship in their harbor. They constitute the "home guard" of the city and man the forts in rotation. They have access to the torpedo stores. They are young, and being young, are reckless. A fantastic and perverted notion of resenting American intervention may have caused some of them to carry out a torpedo attack on the intrusive warship.

We do not think that Spanish regulars, whether of the army or navy, could have done such a deed.

Last Monday we said: The storm centre has changed. It is no longer in Washington, no longer in Madrid. These (autonomists) proposals have brought it to Habana. Watch Habana.

Appendix B

The Monument to the South Carolina Soldiers of the Spanish-American War.



A closer look at the cross on the base of the monument.



The State's headline from the sinking of the Maine, February 17, 1898.

FOUNDED FEB. 18, 1891. Feb. 17, 1898 COLUMBIA, S.

STEEL COFFIN FOR 206 BRAVES.

So Proves the Great Battleship Maine,
the Pride of the New American Navy.

THE WHOLE WORLD IS HORROR-STRICKEN

Most Appalling Catastrophe in the
History of Navy in Peace
or in War.

WHETHER ACCIDENT OR THE WORK OF TREACHEROUS ENEMIES IS UNSOLVED.


Investigation by Divers Ordered--Spanish Papers, While Expressing
Sympathy, Display Hatred--Many Naval Officers Believe
Ship Was Sunk by Torpedo--Messages From Lee and Sigbee
Sea Dog Suspends of Popular Judgment for Present.

Washington, Feb. 16.--After a day of intense excitement at the navy depart-

neighborhood of the hole which sunk her, whether they are buried out, as

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Secrets
Capt. A
relative
journey

An ad in *The State* newspaper from the Prudential Insurance Company



Newark, N. J., April 9, 1898

Mr. J. E. Withers, General Agent, Columbia, S. C.

DEAR SIR: After careful consideration we have decided as follows:

As to all Policies, whether Industrial, Intermediate or Ordinary, which may be in force at the time of declaration of war, permission is hereby given for the insured under such Policies, in the Army or Navy of the United States, or Militia of any of the United States, in time of War, and no written permission for such service need be obtained from the company, nor will an extra premium be charged. It will not be necessary to submit Policies for endorsement.

This permission applies to those who may be insured at the time when war is declared as well as to present policy holders.

Very truly yours,

JOHN F. DRYDEN, President

Appendix C

Coding Booklet

Column	Variable Name	Variable Label	Value Labels	Text/Value
1-4	Item	Item Number	0001-9999	
5-10	Date	Date of Publication	Mm/dd/yy	
11	Day	Day of Publication	1=Sunday 2=Monday 3=Tuesday 4=Wednesday 5=Thursday 6=Friday 7=Saturday	
12	Place	Placement of Story	1= Front page 2= Inside Newspaper 3= Editorial page	
13	Type	Type of story	1= News 2=Editorial	
14	Zone	Story zone in paper	1= upper right 2= upper left 3= lower left 4= lower right	
15	Scope	Scope of news story	0= can't tell 1= local 2= national	
16	Origin	Origin of the story	0= can't tell 1=local 2= national/ap wire	
17	Headline	Headline of story	0= no 1=yes	
18	Headline Length	Number of lines in the Headline	01-99	
19	Headline Text	Text of Headline	0= no 1= yes	
20-21	Headline length	Length of headline in columns	01-99	

22-24	Length of Story	Length of story in lines	001-999	
25	Jump	Does the story jump to the next page	0= no 1= yes	
26	Editorial Type	Type of Editorial	1= Full 2= Survey	
27	Title	Editorial Title	0= no 1= yes	
28	Bias	Is there a bias to the editorial	0= no 1= yes	
29	Slant	What is the slant of the editorial	1=strongly for war 2=for war 3= neutral 4= against war 5=strongly against war 6= can't tell	
30	Author	Is the Editorial Local or National?	1= local 2= national	
31	Editorial Length	How many lines is the editorial?	001-999	

Coding Definitions

It is assumed that coders are either in college or graduate school (or have completed either) with a working knowledge of print journalism. The definitions are listed below for assistance.

As for determining whether a story fits the criteria in the first place:

- Should it contain, in the headline or the body, any or all of the following terms: Cuba, Cuban, insurgent, freedom fighters, Spain, Captain-General, McKinley, Sagasta, Canovas, Weyler, Blanco, Fitzhugh Lee, filibustering, Cuban question, reconcentrados, Havana (or Habana, in this case).

1) Place

- a) *Front* – Either on the front page or in the area generally considered the news section of the newspaper.
- b) *Editorial* – in the editorial section of the newspaper, generally the next to last even page of the front section; either an editorial by the editors/publishers of the paper (or of same by another paper, reprinted in the State), or a letter from a reader, generally referred to as a “letter to the editor.”

2) Type – type of story/record/unit studied.

- a) *News* – news story written by a reporter/wire service that offers the record of an event.
- b) *Editorial* – a commentary written by the editors/publishers of a paper.
- c) *Letter to the editor* – letter written, generally by a reader, for the purpose of publication in the editorial section of the newspaper.

3) Zone – area of the page in which the story appears; the page is generally divided into quadrants, with the “fold” of the paper (where it is horizontally folded for delivery) being the horizontal axis, and a line from through the center of the paper from the top to the bottom being the vertical axis.

- a) *Upper right* – the right side of the paper above the fold
- b) *Upper left* – the left side of the paper above the fold.
- c) *Lower left*—the left side of the paper below the fold.
- d) *Lower right*—the right side of the paper below the fold.

4) Scope – What is the field of the story? Does it concern only local interests in Cuba? Or does it refer to national discussion/facts/interest in the conflict; i.e., in the report, is the main topic about the discussion on Washington, or is it the discussion in Columbia?

- a) *Local* – the main focus of the story is of events/discussion/people pertaining to Columbia and South Carolina
- b) *National* – the main focus of the story is of events/discussion/people pertaining to the nation, and for that matter, the world (since we’re talking about Spain).

5) Origin – who wrote the story? To determine this, look to the dateline of the story (i.e., Washington, Havana, Paris, Madrid, etc = national; Columbia, anywhere in South Carolina = local)

- a) *Local* – a reporter from the State (or from another South Carolina publication) wrote the story, ostensibly using facts that the reporter himself gathered.
- b) *Wire service/national reporter* – a reporter from a wire service (Associated Press/ United Press International) or from another, out of state newspaper (*New York World, New York Journal*, etc.) wrote the story, and the State picked it up and ran it.
- 6) **Headline** – the title section of the story, typically the synopsis of the story content.
- 7) **Survey**—a portion of the editorial section of *The State* where various one liners or small paragraphs are offered as editorials. These rarely have titles, other than under the main heading of “*The State’s Survey.*”
- 8) **Headline length** – Measure each line in standard number of columns. The State newspaper during this time generally used eight columns for its page.
- 9) **Length of story** – write in the number of lines using three digits. If the story is an odd measure, say one and half columns wide, take that into account; therefore, the number of lines in a story laid out one and one half columns would have to be multiplied by 1.5 to get an actual count of lines. Count all other partial lines as a whole line each (i.e., even if a line only has one word, that counts as a full line)
- 10) **Jump**—does the story jump from the page where it starts to another page?
- 11) **Bias** – Is there a bias on the part of the author in favor of one position on Cuban policy over another? In other words, does the author weave the story in a way that tries to persuade the reader to believe one set of facts over another? Does the author present the facts in a way that would cause the reader to believe the facts the way they are presented?
- 12) **Slant** – does the bias, if it is present, appear to be:
- a) *Unrelated to involvement in Cuba;*
 - b) *Strongly for involvement in Cuba;*
 - c) *For involvement in Cuba;*
 - d) *Neutral*
 - e) *Against involvement in Cuba;*
 - f) *Strongly against involvement in Cuba;*
 - g) *Can’t Tell.*
 - h) *How to determine slant of editorials*
 - i) *Words and phrases* such as “the time for action is now,” “war is coming, and we must fight,” or “intervention” would suggest involvement by the United States in Cuba. Look for those terms that encourage action on the part of the United States, especially to encourage freedom of the Cubans from Spain.
- 13) **Local Editorial** – is the author of the editorial local, that is, from *The State* or from another newspaper within South Carolina. Typically, editorials from the local newspaper don’t have a byline, but appear right under or close to the masthead. National editorials usually have a notice that mentions that the editorial is from another newspaper or city.



Mathematics and the Mind of God: Implications of the New Cosmology of the 17th Century

Robert L. Shearer
Florida Institute of Technology

The Inverse Square Law of Newton, the law of gravitation, has been called “the most stupendous single achievement of the human mind”¹ in all of intellectual history. Even Alexander Pope, despite the worries about science he expressed in his “Essay on Man,” composed a very significant couplet:

Nature and nature’s laws lay hid in night;
God said, “Let Newton be,” and all was light.²

That is, whatever *purely* religious sense—what Hegel was to refer to as the “pictorial” account of truth—had prevailed in accounting for the world, from the ancient Hebrews onward through its Christian addition and throughout history, had now shifted to what essentially was the Hellenic notion of Being: a cosmos intelligible, rational, and knowable through mathematics.

Of course, Newton’s work did not take place in a vacuum; in a rare moment of humility he acknowledged that his having seen farther than anyone into the workings of the universe was owed to his having “stood on the shoulders of giants”—Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo. And indeed, these giants had themselves inhabited the universe of mathematics; but it was Newton, breathing its rarified air at that altitude, who turned it to greatest account.

The results for the West were revolutionary. As Greer and Lewis put it, in linking

¹Quoted in Lerner, Meacham, Burns, *Western Civilizations*, Thirteenth Edition, vol. 2 (New York, W.W. Norton & Co, New York, 1998), p. 640

²Quoted in Chambers, Grew, Herlihy, Rabb, Woloch, *The Western Experience*, Fourth Edition (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1987), p. 632.

Galileo to Kepler, Newton “eliminated the barrier between forces acting in space and those on earth, and established by *empirical and mathematical proof* the existence of *universal laws*.”³ It is these universal laws that replace the presence of God. The Enlightenment of the 18th century owes its beginnings in very large part to the mathematical science that had overturned Aristotle’s account of the physical cosmos.

As well, in addition to the rising validity of mathematical thinking, there are other events that seem to have conspired to bring in the acceptance of universal mathematical laws, events unrelated to mathematics as such.

It may seem odd that the Protestant Revolution of 1520 would have any connection to science, but William Barrett has made the case that even though Martin Luther considered reason “the whore,” his, and in general Protestantism’s, view of nature is opposite that of the Catholic Church: whereas in the medieval universe of a Dante all of nature is religiously symbolic, Protestantism empties nature of all of its symbolic connections to Christianity; faith must be so pure as not to have the “props” of symbols.⁴ For that matter, Luther wanted even to rid the religious service of the Eucharist, and would have, had his followers not protested. This is to suggest that nature simply becomes neutral—or, if anything, as Barrett points out, hostile to human purposes—and it is this same neutrality, this drained and chastened view, that science must assume toward nature in accordance with “scientific method.”

The second event affecting the ground of the new science is the rejection of the Church by Henry the Eighth. This will not seem obvious until we recall that, owing to his desire for a male heir, Henry wanted a divorce from Catherine of Aragon the Church never got around to granting; Henry then kicked the Church out of England and set up, not a Protestant ceremony, but what mimicked to a very large extent the Catholic service—yet the result was that the Church had no lasting influence after 1534, despite the attempts of Henry’s daughter, Mary, to reestablish it, and could not get to Isaac Newton in the later 1600’s as it had Galileo earlier. Interesting to reflect that if not for the monomania of the eighth Henry, Newton might have been silenced and the true battle for the future would have taken place in the theater of religious warfare. As it turned out, science triumphs especially in the eighteenth century, making (as it did for Voltaire) religious wars objects of ridicule and disgust to scientific minds.

Of course, science and the scientific method were around as early as the twelfth century with Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon, and the later Bacon of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. But in these cases science is more empirical than mathematical.

Because mathematics completes the methodology of science, let us look espe-

³Greer and Lewis, *A Brief History of the Western World*, Sixth Edition (New York, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1992), p. 417.

⁴William Barrett, *Irrational Man* (New York, Anchor Doubleday, 1990). This thesis is defended in his Chapter Two. See also Merton’s “Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England” in *Osiris* 4.

cially at the mathematical as the abstract chronicle of the shift into the eighteenth century. We need only notice its prevalence in times long before that of Newton to appreciate its gathering force. And if we allow that "the mathematical" need not necessarily refer to numbers, but is best understood as a rigorous abstract conception (perhaps bearing the marks of Kant's *a priori*, necessity and universality), then Copernicus is thinking mathematically when he rejects the data of his senses—not to mention the views of Aristotle, Ptolemy and the Church—in favor of a simplifying conception for the solar system. But the *Ethics* alone of Baruch Spinoza, an application of Euclid to the relations obtaining between human and human, and human and God, bear out this thinking; surely Hobbes' love of geometry, so that even human thought was composed of "bodies in motion," is relevant here. In art, the mathematics of foreshortening and perspective, worked out by Brunelleschi in the early Renaissance, bear testimony here as well. One might also cite the growing mathematical methodology for musical composition, observable as early as the late medieval period and the beginning of the Renaissance—canons, fugues, imitative counterpoint, even a palindromic composition entitled "My End Is My Beginning," in which the second half of the piece is literally the backwards version of its first half—by way of suggesting that mathematical spores were carried on the cultural currents of Western Europe and England long before the advent of Kepler, Galileo and Newton.

The Mathematical

It is with this shift to something like an unquestionable basis—for how could mathematics possibly present a false picture?—that the foundation for the Age of Reason is laid. That this period would come to be called "The Enlightenment" shows to what extent the mathematical had replaced what heretofore could only be called, by comparison, "the mythical"; of course, this latter term includes for the most part revealed religion. Not that the eighteenth century was irreligious; rather, *deism* reinterpreted God in less pictorial ways, more like a principle of exact creation. Terms like "the Great Mathematician," and "the Great Engineer" came, in deism, to replace the God of the Hebrews and Christianity. Most significantly, deism held that once God had put his mathematically coherent creation in place he retired, leaving it to run on its own perfection; with this, God becomes something of a creative principle, whose method is mathematical. One way to appreciate this new notion of God is in the orderliness of Kepler's second and third laws, and the universality Newton proclaims for gravitation. With regard to the former, Kepler states that the planets, traveling in elliptical orbits (rather than the perfect circles of Aristotle and the Church) and at varying speeds, yet sweep out equal areas in equal times, and that "the *square* of the time a planet takes to complete its orbit is proportional to the *cube* of its mean distance from the sun."⁵ That this should be so was surely proof of divine order.

⁵Greer and Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 413.

Perhaps one can conclude that the divine mysteries which the doctors of the Church interpreted—so that truth had been *doctrina*—were stood open by the mathematical; indeed, perhaps now the mind of God could be read in the mathematical order of revealed astrophysics.

But what, then, is *truth* in the Newtonian and enlightened era? Descartes supplies something of an answer in his *Meditationes de prima philosophia*. I can doubt everything, he notes, except that I am doubting: the “I” here, in its indubitability, is so clear and distinct that this very clarity and distinctness ought to be the marks of any true proposition, according to Descartes. What sort of propositions have this indubitable clarity and distinctness? That two times two is four, that a triangle has three sides, are examples; truth then becomes something like mathematical certainty. If Descartes is the “father of modern philosophy” it is not because he refutes Aristotle—indeed, he uses Aristotle’s term (translated as) “substance” to characterize thought, while a separate “substance” characterizes matter—but because he is in step with an age in which mathematical certainty is well on the way to replacing traditional theology.

But what is the essence of “the mathematical,” then? And why does it go so well with Descartes’ self-founding proposition, *cogito ergo sum*?

Martin Heidegger addresses just this question in an essay entitled “Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics.”⁶ According to the Greek origins of the term *mathesis*, as Heidegger explicates them, the mathematical is something we already have with us, and comes to knowledge only because it was already there. Plato tries to show this in the *Meno* dialogue by having Socrates question a slave boy about the areas of various squares—a boy who has had no training in mathematics or geometry. Plato considered true knowledge to be memory of the Forms which the soul beheld before falling into the body, and takes the boy’s answers as proof of the prior existence of the soul in a realm of truth.

Of course, Heidegger is no Platonist, but he recognizes that mathematical thinking is something that precedes the accounting of phenomena; it is a prearranged way of accepting data. An illustration of this is in the experiment of Galileo in which he dropped objects of different weights from the tower in Pisa in an attempt to refute the Aristotelian notion that the heavier object should fall faster than the lighter one. Usually, the outcome of this experiment is reported to have been that the objects landed at exactly the same time, as his observers supposedly confirmed. Heidegger writes that there was a slight difference in the arrival times, and that arguments between Galileo and his observers broke out when the former insisted that the times were close enough. The witnesses to the experiment “persisted the more obstinately in their former view. By reason of this experiment the opposition toward Galileo increased to such an extent that he had to give up his professorship and leave Pisa.”⁷

⁶Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings* (New York, Harper and Row, 1977).

⁷Heidegger, *Ibid.*, p. 266.

In other words, a mathematical mind-set had prearranged what was to be significant and what would not. But more than this is what the mathematical needs in order to be a pre-set standard for the calculation and interpretation of phenomena: its absolute self-foundation. According to Heidegger, this foundation is not some elaborate derivation from a higher standard; rather, the mathematical is *self-founded only in its self-positing*. "The positing, the proposition, has only itself as that which can be posited. Only where thinking thinks itself is it absolutely mathematical, i.e., a taking cognizance of that which we already have."⁸ This is never more clearly given than in the "I think, therefore I am" of Descartes. With him, the mathematical arrives as a criterion for truth.

Heidegger comments on the famous *cogito ergo sum*, pointing out that there is no question here of any deduction from thinking to being. He writes:

Descartes himself emphasizes that no inference is present. The *sum* is not a consequence of the thinking, but vice versa; it is the ground of thinking, the *fundamentum*. In the essence of positing lies the proposition: I posit. That is a proposition which does not depend upon something beforehand, but only gives to itself what lies within it.⁹

With the arrival of the mathematical as self-founded in its self-positing, "There is not only a liberation in the mathematical project, but also a new experience and formation of freedom itself, i.e., a binding with obligations which are self-imposed."¹⁰ That is, the mathematical is a "detachment from revelation as the first source for truth and the rejection of tradition as the authoritative means of knowledge."¹¹

Historical Implications

With this way of looking at the mathematical, we can perhaps see the overriding significance of the Renaissance for intellectual history. That period was certainly a break with the medieval world, although not an abrupt one. This is to suggest that the roots of the mathematical, in its self-positing, lie in not taking the Church as the ultimate authority on "the good life," and in the acceptance of the "here and now"; to the extent humankind could come into the egoism of the Renaissance (where, we are reminded by various historians, humility and self-abnegation were reserved only for saints) the emergence of the mathematical was being prepared: the "I think" accompanying any new account of phenomena. When Galileo can write that he conceives "in my mind" of a body not affected by forces, he has engaged the mathematical, for nowhere in actual existence is there such a body; likewise, for Galileo to have con-

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 278.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 279.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 272

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 272

ceived ("in my mind") a frictionless plane on which a ball would roll on to infinity is to have posited the mathematical over the physical: not even the Smithsonian contains such a plane, perfectly frictionless and infinitely extended, nor could it.

Whence this "I think in my mind" long before Descartes? The question is unnecessary if we appreciate the rise of humanity as such in its break with the all-encompassing theological interpretation of the world that was the medieval period. The Renaissance, a break with ancient authority and the concomitant appreciation of the human individual—though obviously not on the scale of the individualism of the nineteenth century—was the gestation period for the mathematical; by the end of the Renaissance it is borne forth as the ground of the new principle: science. Surely, for any period to serve authentically as a transition—as the Renaissance was—it must carry within it the seed that will bloom into a new era. That seed was the egoism of humanity—humanism in its starkest outline—which accepts this world as the worthy arena for human striving and development of talents; by the end of the Renaissance this egoism had refined itself into the "I posit," or the self-grounding of the mathematical mind-set, by which the new principle of truth, mathematical science—the truth of *this world*—is informed.

Let us look to some of the ways the arrival of mathematical thinking affects history. Certainly, as mentioned above, Copernicus is thinking mathematically when he embraces an abstraction over the physical appearance of the heavens in relation to earth. And by the time of Galileo, what is left of the medieval Church is under attack, both on the ground of religion, with Protestantism, and that of science. With Newton, the argument is ended about whether Copernicus or the Church is correct about the positions of earth and sun, although it took the latter centuries to admit that Galileo was right about Copernicus, who had had the good sense to die before he might have been burned at either the Catholic or the Protestant stake. But it is not a case where there is the sudden abandonment of the theological in favor of mathematical astronomy.

Rather, as hinted at above, the move to the mathematical is a radical *theological* change. When we consider how closely allied Platonic philosophy was with theology, and that Plato placed mathematics in his Analogy of the Line near the eternal realm, just below the highest section—the Forms united under The Idea of The Good—the move to the mathematical over the absolute truths of the Church is not a change outside the theological; rather, it is a reinterpretation of it. It really is not surprising that Newton sought the density of angelic matter, or that he dabbled in Biblical chronology. Least of all was he an atheist.

Here then is the unity of the shift from Church *doctrina* to the mathematical: "God's mind" became accessible in the orderliness and rigor mathematics embraces. The Church lost out to Protestantism in the same way it lost out to mathematical science: *the Church became unnecessary to religious truth*, as Luther believed, and, if mathematics is itself a divine revelation, then doubly unnecessary. In this way Prot-

estantism indeed goes “hand in hand” with the new science. For that matter, Luther embraces something of the “I posit” of the mathematical when he arrives at the notion that the individual cannot compromise on what each believes to be true, and frees worshippers effectually to be their own priests in a direct relation to God. And before Luther, these notions had their intuitive beginnings as early as the early 1400s with John Wyclif.

The human consequences of this shift out of medieval faith into rigorous science are too staggering to calculate in one article. Suffice it to say, when the earth lost its status as the center of the cosmos—thereby diminishing by an infinite power the significance of humankind—the very seeds of postmodernism were sown. It would take centuries for a sense of desolation and despair—groundlessness—to become the theme of an era in the West, and in the meantime a profound optimism would arise and decline: the eighteenth century’s Enlightenment that came to fail by the nineteenth century.

An intuition of the sense of groundlessness that is the subtlest implications of mathematical science—for the mere self-positing of mathematics fails, as Kurt Gödel’s two Incompleteness Theorems showed in 1931—was had by Blaise Pascal, who died about the same time Newton was writing his *Principia Mathematica*:

When I consider the brief span of my life, swallowed up in the eternity before and after, the little space which I fill, and even can see, engulfed in the infinite immensity of spaces of which I am ignorant, and which knows me not, I am frightened, and am astonished at being here rather than there; for there is no reason why here rather than there, now rather than then.¹²

It is in Newton’s work that *place* becomes the same throughout the cosmos, as opposed to the medieval/Aristotelian understanding that place is a category of being to which objects are uniquely related; “place is no longer where the body belongs according to its inner nature, but only a position in relation to other positions,” Heidegger observes.¹³ Pascal is frightened at the silence of this homogenized, uncharged space. Jorge Luis Borges has pointed out that instead of a remark Pascal made as it remains today—“Nature is an infinite sphere, whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere”—the proto-postmodernist had first used the word “fearful” (*effroyable*) instead of “infinite” in reference to the sphere of nature circumscribed by the new science.¹⁴

On the other hand, the grand optimism for the advancement of man—the “heaven on earth” of utopian society, rather than the heaven of traditional theol-

¹²Blaise Pascal, *Pensees*, No. 205. Quoted in Diane Barsoum Raymond’s *Existentialism and the Philosophical Tradition* (New Jersey, Prentiss Hall, 1991).

¹³Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

¹⁴Jorge Luis Borges, *Labyrinths* (New York, New Directions Books, 1990), p. 192.

ogy—comes logically out of the new science. To the extent this science was the new cosmology of the here and now, it seemed to promise transcendence for humankind to the Enlightenment thinkers. Of course, by the nineteenth century and writers like Dostoevsky, especially in his *Notes from Underground*, the whole business had only provided humanity with a ghastly distortion of itself.

Reason is at the core of the Enlightenment, and just as the essence of the mathematical is its self-positing as ground, Reason becomes its own ground. It is this that informs the Age of Reason in its rejection of the tenets of traditional religion and, as well, in its finalization of the rejection of a monarchy that had originally arisen as God's lieutenants on earth; it is the latter to which the two great revolutions of the eighteenth century testify.

Weakened in the twentieth century by the revelations of a new physics in which Einstein makes Newton's absolute space/time relative to the speed of the observer, and Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle shatters the hope of Laplace for a perfectly calculable universe; relegated to a secondary and derived status in an existential philosophy that follows Heidegger's reopening of the question of Being; put into grave question with the irrationality of World War I, Reason, borne into modernity on the current of mathematics, becomes in postmodernity the legacy of a demystified God.

Avenging The General Sherman: The 1871 Battle of Kang Hwa Do

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In the Hall of Heroes at the Pentagon sits a small monument to 15 men who won the Medal of Honor in what is labeled the Korean Campaign of 1871. The names of six Marines and nine Navy personnel who fought in a short 18-hour war serve as one of the few reminders of an incident not even known to most American servicemen stationed in Korea. And yet, this battle was a pivotal moment in the historical relationship of the United States and what was then the Kingdom of Korea.

Before describing the battle that occurred on 10 and 11 June 1871, it is important to understand the reasons Koreans and Americans found themselves in conflict in the first place. Thus, it is key to understand the national security policy that motivated the United States into getting involved on the Korean peninsula, and the goals the Americans had once they decided to use force as a tool for enforcing foreign policy on the Korean peninsula.

Korea: Opening up to the West

Korea had been an isolated civilization for most of its 4,000-year history going into the 19th century. Much of this was self-imposed, as the Koreans were constantly invaded by foreigners throughout their history. In fact, China and Japan often fought and settled wars with each other on the Korean peninsula – at the expense of the Korean people. Because Koreans were geographically caught between two Asian powers, they were able to maintain their identity only by keeping their country (and their culture) closed to almost all outsiders – particularly westerners.

Things began to change in the 1860s. First, Korea's principal ally (and often overlord) China, was being opened up to the west a piece at a time, often against its will. The government of China was too weak to stop the inroads made on its landmass by the western powers. Another key element of change was the introduction of Christianity. By the early 1860s, several thousand Koreans had converted to Catholicism.

Most of the missionaries entering Korea had to do so in secret. When discovered, they were often put to death, or detained in prison. The majority of these missionaries were French. Despite strong discouragement from the Korean government, by 1866 there were several thousand converts in Korea.¹

The year 1866 was pivotal in Korean history. First, the Russians unsuccessfully attempted an expedition into Korea. This was particularly disconcerting to the government because Russia had recently gained land holdings in China and now had a border with Korea. The Koreans feared conquest was on the minds of the Russians.² Secondly, the government in Korea, dominated by the Taewun-gun (Regent), began to become extremely displeased with the behavior of Catholic missionaries and their converts. Early in 1866, he decreed that they be punished or executed. The resulting anti-western demonstrations (exacerbated by the recent visit from the Russians) resulted in several thousand Korean Catholics being killed or driven from their homes. All of the priests were killed except for three who escaped to China and reported the fate of their comrades in Korea. The event caused great anger in the French government.³

The Ill-Fated *General Sherman*

Meanwhile, some enterprising Americans decided that Korea would be an interesting place to attempt setting up trade. Their timing could not have been worse. The U.S. flagged merchant ship *General Sherman* visited Korea in July of 1866. She had previously been named the *Princess Royal*, and had been a Confederate blockade-runner during the Civil War. Following its capture before wars end, the ship was converted to a Union vessel, then after the war was converted to a merchant vessel. The small ship had a crew of approximately 21 men and was heavily armed. Upon entering the mouth of the Taedong River (which runs into Pyongyang), the ship's captain, Mr. Page, met with officials who told him he was not welcome. Despite being warned off, Page decided to sail up the river. The trip came to a sudden and violent end when the ship sailed too far up river, becoming caught in low water levels. Seeing a chance to put the mission to a complete and final ending, the Koreans lit several rafts on fire and floated them against the sides of the ship. The crew, attempting to escape, was massacred. There were no survivors. Most were hacked to death.⁴

¹ William Elliot Griffis, *Corea: The Hermit Kingdom* (New York: Charles Scribners and Sons, 1902) 369-376.

² Dr. Suh In-han , Research Historian at the Institute for Military History Compilation, Seoul Korea. Interview conducted by the author, 23 December, 2000, in Seoul Korea.

³ Griffis, 377-378.

⁴ Kojong Silrok, National History Compilation of the Republic of Korea, available at URL: www.2nhcc.go.kr/cgi-bin/xlogin?dbid=/kchong/web/kchong

The French Expedition

Later that year, the French decided to take action on what they considered to be an unlawful slaughter of missionaries. A three-ship expedition sent by Admiral Roze made a brief survey of the situation and returned to China where they reported the rumored fate of the Americans. The small expedition also made important surveys of the islands near the west coast of Korea, drawing maps of the area that would prove to be surprisingly accurate for later French and American expeditions. On 15 October 1866, a second French armada arrived in the waters just off the west coast of Korea.⁵

The French expedition consisted of seven combat navy ships and a landing force of 600 men, 400 of which were French Marines from the base at Yokohama. The announced object of the French expedition was a blockade of the Han river leading into Seoul.⁶ Admiral Roze decided that the best way to do this would be to attack the small city of Kang Hwa, the largest city on the island of Kang Hwa (Kang Hwa Do means "River Flower Island" in Hangul, the written Korean language). The French took the small city with little difficulty, but did not anticipate the uproar it would cause among the populace of the island. Bands of irregulars harassed the French forces and kept them constantly on the defensive. Admiral Roze made his big mistake when he ordered forces to attack the fortification of Cho Dung-sa, approximately 10 miles south of the city of Kang Hwa. His forces ran into 800 elite Hwa-rang (warriors) there and were beaten back with heavy casualties. The remaining forces fell back to Kang Hwa City in disarray, with the Korean warriors in hot pursuit.⁷

On the verge of complete defeat, and seeing his landing force in danger of being annihilated, Admiral Roze ordered them to re-embark the next day. First however, he ordered the city of Kang Hwa to be set ablaze and ravaged. The French decided to take the largest bell in the city, a huge bronze bell, as a trophy of war (Koreans are famous for their intricately designed bells, which have been a cultural tradition for over a thousand years). Unfortunately for the French, the Korean warriors again attacked, this time forcing the landing force to retreat so quickly back to their ships that they abandoned the large bell and left it rolling down a hill after them. The French were completely routed in the confrontation and the bell was later hung in the center of the city as a reminder of the failed invasion by the French foreigners. Thus ended the French chapter in the attempted pacification of the Korean Kingdom.⁸

The French attack on Kang Hwa Do would have important ramifications for the American expedition that followed in 1871. Because several western powers had

⁵ A. Wigfall Green, *The Epic of Korea*, (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1950) 25-28.

⁶ Griffis, 381.

⁷ R. McM. Thompkins, "Glory of the River," *Leatherneck*, November 1955, 42.

⁸ Thompkins, 42.

attempted attacking the peninsula on the west coast, and particularly Kang Hwa Do, it was determined that the forts defending the island needed to be beefed up and armed more heavily. In addition, the troop strength of both the ground and naval garrisons was increased significantly in anticipation of another attack by foreigners.⁹ Finally, knowing that their firepower was significantly inferior to that of western powers, great care was taken in calculating fire zones, powder charges and placement of weaponry, in anticipation of further attacks on island defenses.¹⁰ In the aftermath of the 1866 engagements, monuments were erected throughout the kingdom decreeing all citizens must fight attacks by foreigners.

The Bizarre Expedition of Ernest Oppert

Small-scale and rather blundering attempts to open up Korea to western trade continued in 1868 when the German merchant Ernest Oppert devised a bizarre plan to force the Koreans into opening up to westerners. With a crew made up primarily of Malays and Chinese, he chartered the merchant ship *China*. His plan was to secretly enter Korea, dig up the tomb of the Taewon-gun's (Regent) father, and then demand that Korea open up to western trade before the relics from the tomb would be returned.¹¹

Along with a few Korean Catholics as guides, Oppert and his small raiding party entered Asan Bay and sailed up the nearby river to Kaya Dong, where the Taewon-gun's father was buried. Burial mounds for Korean royalty are huge, and this particular burial mound proved to be far too large for a few crewmen to lay waste to in a short amount of time (time was of the essence, as being discovered would mean almost certain death). The project was abandoned when it proved to be simply too big for the small number of people undertaking it. This is when the island of Kang Hwa once again became the focal point for attempted interference by foreigners. After leaving Asan Bay, Oppert sailed north to Kang Hwa Do. Upon arrival, he informed Korean authorities that he had profaned the grave of the Taewon-gun's father in retaliation for the murder of the French missionaries (mentioned earlier). He then demanded that Korea open up to western trade. The Koreans of course reacted angrily, as he was sent on his way by an angry mob in a clash that resulted in the wounding of two of the Malays in Oppert's crew.¹² Oppert was later reprimanded by German authorities in Shanghai, but by then it was too late and the damage was done. Once again, westerners had offended the Koreans not only politically and vio-

⁹ Dr. Suh interview.

¹⁰ Mr. Robert Collins, Special Assistant to United States Forces Korea J5. Interview conducted in Seoul Korea, 26 December 2000, by the author.

¹¹ Han Woo-keun, *The History of Korea*, (Seoul Korea: Eul-Yoo Publishing Co., 1970), 366.

¹² Kwak No-jung, City official, the city of Kang Hwa, Korea. Interview conducted at Kang Hwa Do, Republic of Korea, by the author, 26 December 2000.

lently, but culturally as well. Once again, Kang Hwa Do had been the site where much of the action had occurred. By this time, the obvious inference is that, based on events, the Taewon-gun, who was the leading power broker in the royal family at the time, had developed a strong bias against outside influence from the west. It is also likely that, given the actions occurring during the 1860s time frame, he also had developed a strong distrust for westerners.

U.S. Attempts to Determine the Fate of the *General Sherman*

By 1867, the United States still had received no official word on the fate of the *General Sherman*. Rumors from Chinese officials in Peking were that the ship had been wrecked on the Korean coast (a very reasonable assumption given the shallow, rocky waters and the extreme tides in the region), while the report from the failed French expedition was that the ship had been sunk near Pyongyang – though it remains unclear definitively where the French heard this.

In 1867, the U.S. Navy dispatched Commander Robert W. Shufeldt to investigate what had happened to the *General Sherman*. He was ordered to Korean waters, once again the west coast, to determine the fate of the lost merchant ship. Commander Shufeldt ran into bad weather on his expedition and was forced to turn back early, but what little contact he had with Korean authorities proved to be extremely unproductive. The Koreans were uncooperative and did not confirm anything he did not already know. Unable to accomplish his mission and fearing the bad weather, Commander Shufeldt turned his ship, the *Wachusett*, back to China.¹³ Shufeldt would later successfully negotiate the first treaty between Korea and a western power, but that was many years later and will be described in detail near the end of this essay.

The second attempt to determine the fate of the *General Sherman* occurred in April 1868, when Commander John C. Feiberger was dispatched with his ship, the *Shenandoah*. This time, Commander Feiberger was able to get beyond the bad tides and the weather, but again ran into a stone wall when dealing with the Koreans. In Korean culture, as in most East Asian cultures, face and protocol are considered extremely important. Apparently, the Koreans did not consider an individual of Feiberger's rank and status (the Captain of one Navy ship) important enough to deal with in any substantive way. Feiberger was told by the mid-level officials he met that, "Koreans did not deal with anybody who did not come under direct instructions from the Sovereign of the United States."¹⁴

¹³Jack Bauer, "The Korean Expedition of 1871," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 74 no. 540 (February 1948): 197.

¹⁴Bauer, 197.

Forming the Expedition of 1871

As events related above prove, the United States had been unable to successfully obtain an answer from the Koreans relating to the fate of the *General Sherman*. This was particularly disconcerting to the United States government given the fate of other western excursions in Korea that the Americans knew of. By 1871, the State Department had determined that a "large-scale" expedition should set sail, under a State Department official, for Korea.¹⁵

What the United States hoped for was to secure a treaty with Korea similar to the one negotiated with Japan by Commodore Perry in 1853. Also of key concern was the safety of merchant seaman who would be traveling in Korean waters. Finally, a definitive account of what happened to the *General Sherman* was to be sought. These were truly lofty goals given the history of Korean dealings with westerners during the 1860s. The American State Department was well aware of this. Minister Frederick Low described Korea as "More of a sealed book than Japan was before Commodore Perry's visit."¹⁶

Frederick Low, the Minister to China, was put in charge of a five-ship naval expedition in China in May of 1871. The combatant command of the expedition was to be under Admiral John Rodgers, but all decisions regarding dealings with the Koreans, up to and including those involving violence, were to be made by Minister Low. Frederick Low was an accomplished politician who had formerly been governor of California. Both he and Admiral Rodgers felt that securing the safety of merchant seamen traveling in Korean waters was paramount. They both also believed a treaty similar to the one secured with Japan was unlikely. Because of events that had occurred throughout the 1860s, violence was not ruled out as a method to be used in dealing with the Koreans. Nevertheless, it was not to be the first option.¹⁷

The expedition was formed from five ships, the *Colorado* (flagship), *Alaska*, *Benicia*, *Monocacy*, and *Palos*. The *Monocacy* and *Palos* were both paddle-wheel steamers capable of navigating the tricky tides and rocky waters of the river Han and the tributaries into it near Kang Hwa Do. All five ships were heavily armed. Also onboard the ships was a contingent of Marines, numbering 109 officers and men. The ships in the expedition were designated the "Asiatic Squadron," and Frederick Low reported aboard the flagship *Colorado* on 13 May 1871.¹⁸

The five-ship expedition sailed from Nagasaki, Japan on 16 May and first anchored off of the Korean coast on 17 May, moving slowly around the Korean pen-

¹⁵Official State Department Dispatch, No. 69, Onboard the USS *Colorado*, 13 May 1871. Mr Low to Mr. Fish, US State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1871*.

¹⁶Official State Department Dispatch, No. 69.

¹⁷Glenn Howell, "Our Brief Clash with Korea," *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 61, No. 393 (November 1935): 1628.

¹⁸Official State Department Dispatch, No. 69.

insula toward the island of Kang Hwa. Fog kept the small task force from moving too quickly, but by 23 May the five ships had anchored near Inchon, close to Wolmi Island.¹⁹

It was determined that soundings would be taken of the waters in and around "Roze Roads" (the French name for the area now widely known as Kang Hwa Do and surrounding islands, near the coastal industrial city of Inchon). The exploration and soundings were conducted because of the reputation for treacherous waters that the west coast of Korea had. In case of future operations or merchant ship visits, these operations would prove to be very important for the safety of American merchant seamen.

Initial Contact with the Koreans

The main exploration of the small islands around Inchon and south of Kang Hwa Do was conducted by Commander Blake (commanding the *Palos*). Most of the islands were very small and sparsely populated. On Wolmi Do, an apparent armed band of approximately 200 citizens under a battle banner appeared in a threatening manner (probably led by local Yong-ban, Korean nobles), brandishing sharpened wooden lances. When it became obvious that the Navy ship meant no harm to the Koreans, they became much more friendly. The day following the brandishing of what must have appeared to be very primitive weaponry, the natives on Wolmi Do actually welcomed the sailors ashore on the island, with the Village Chief allowing himself to be photographed.²⁰ The attitude of the Koreans at Wolmi Do must have been extremely misleading to the Americans. They took the initial attitude of violent defense to be early shyness toward westerners, and reported back to Minister Low that the situation would likely be the same when encountering military forces and government officials farther to the north on Kang Hwa Do.

On the afternoon of 29 May, the expedition moved its ships still farther north but was again forced to anchor before desired because of thick fog. On the 30th, with the fog having cleared, the small fleet moved north again, anchoring just south of Kang Hwa Do. It was here that the *Colorado* was approached by a junk with individuals onboard indicating they desired communications with the expedition. The Koreans carried with them a letter that stated the Korean government had learned the small fleet was American (from an earlier letter handed out to villagers by crewmen of the *Palos*), and announced that three envoys appointed by the Sovereign had been appointed to confer with them. The individuals who carried the letter were of inferior government grade and were merely messengers for the envoys who would follow later. The messengers were assured that the Americans had only peaceful intentions

¹⁹ Report of Rear Admiral John Rodgers, No. 38, onboard the *USS Colorado*, Boissee Anchorage, Salee River, Corea, June 3, 1871.

²⁰ Report of Mr. John P. Cowles Jr., accompanying Commander Blake aboard the *USS Palos*, Roze Roads Corea, May 29 1871, US State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1871*.

and that they had no intention of attacking unless first attacked. The envoys took this message back to the Korean government officials after exchanging formalities with the Americans.²¹

On May 31st, the three Korean officials acting as envoys who had been announced by the messengers the previous day appeared in a junk next to the *Colorado* and were allowed onboard. These three individuals announced that they were officials of the third rank and failed to exhibit any real authority from the Korean government or the governor of Kang Hwa Do. Understanding the East Asian proclivity for protocol, Minister Low declined to see them (because of their rank), instead referring them to his assistants from the State Department, Mr. Drew and Mr. Cowles. They were informed that the expedition would be sending surveying vessels the next day up the river that ran between Kang Hwa and the mainland and eventually fed into the Han river that ran through Seoul. They were also informed that Minister Low had important business with the Korean government and desired to meet with officials of the first rank, and also desired to make treaties – a treaty in their estimation meaning trade. The Korean officials were cordial, and explained that they had no authority to grant any wishes because of their rank. They also stated that while the King desired friendly relations, he did not desire to make treaties. They did not make a statement regarding the surveying mission that was to take place the next day. The envoys were given a short tour of the *Colorado*, and left the ship on cordial terms with the State Department officials and ships crew. Minister Low did not have a good feeling about this meeting with the Korean envoys, remarking in his official dispatch that he placed “little confidence in oriental professions of friendliness,” and that he would make “every effort to avoid trouble unless forced on him in a way that cannot be escaped without dishonor.”²² Based on his analysis of events that had occurred, Minister Low decided to go ahead with the surveying expedition scheduled to take place the next day.

The Korean Attack on the United States Surveying Party

On June 1st, the surveying expedition sailed north, bound for the Yam Ha river, which the Americans called the Salee River, a name given to it by the French because of its brackish waters. Their instructions from Admiral Rodgers, as approved by Minister Low, were “To proceed cautiously, avoiding all menace, through the passage before referred to, taking careful soundings, and making such scientific observations as would enable a correct chart of the channel to be made.”²³ Commander Blake, the leader of the surveying expedition was further instructed, “in case a hostile

²¹ Report of Rear Admiral Rodgers, No. 38.

²² Official State Department Dispatch, No. 70, Onboard the *USS Colorado*, 31 May, 1871, Mr. Low to Mr. Fish, US State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1871*.

²³ Official State Department Dispatch, No. 71, Onboard the *USS Colorado*, 2 June, 1871, Mr. Low to Mr. Fish, US State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1871*.

attack were made, either upon his men or vessels, to reply by force, and destroy if possible, the places and the people from whom the attack came."²⁴ Blake was also further instructed to proceed quietly in his mission and go as far north along Kang Hwa Do as possible, turning east and heading up the Han river towards Seoul if possible, but not to enter Seoul. Once these orders were carried out, Blake was to return with his surveying expedition back to the main anchorage of the Asiatic Squadron just south of Kang Hwa Do, and to report his findings.²⁵

As discussed earlier, Commander H.C. Blake was in charge of the expedition sent up the Yam Ha river. The force dispatched consisted of the *Monocacy*, Commander E.P. McCrea; *Palos*, Lieutenant C.H. Rockwell; *Alaska's* steam launch, Lieutenant C.M. Chester; *Colorado's* steam cutter, Lieutenant G.M. Totten; and *Benicia's* steam launch, Master Schroeder. Blake was onboard the *Palos*. The *Monocacy* and the *Palos* were the only ships able to navigate the shallow and rocky waters on the Yam Ha river, thus the other three ships from the Asiatic Squadron stayed behind, anchored just south of Kang Hwa Do awaiting the findings of the small surveying expedition sent upriver.²⁶

The ships and steam launches weighed anchor at noon on 1 June, and proceeded up the river with the four steam launches ahead in line abreast, followed by the *Palos*, with the *Monocacy* bring up the rear. The ships ran into problems almost immediately. Because the *Monocacy* and the *Palos* had the tide with them, they could not go slow enough to allow the launches time for accurate angles or soundings. For this reason, it was almost impossible for the surveying parties to construct truly accurate charts of the river.²⁷

The expedition went quite peacefully for the initial part of the mission. Koreans could be seen on the shore near fishing villages and small hamlets as the ships and launches made their way cautiously up the river. Blake's party soon reached a point in the river (still at the lower end of Kang Hwa Do), where several forts appeared. These forts were manned, and Korean troops could be seen darting in and out of positions. From a parapet high above the connected forts flew a huge banner, which in Hangul (Korean Characters) carried the symbol of the Commanding General. As the party reached a sharp bend in the river, another small fort could be seen on the east bank (all of the other forts were on the west bank of the river). Some of the artillery noted was of the 32 pounder variety, though the majority was of much smaller caliber. From what the Americans onboard the ships and launches could see, most of the weaponry arrayed in and near the forts consisted of gingals, a small, 16th century vintage piece smaller than an actual cannon, but too big for one man to carry. Normally, the gingal would be mounted on a stick and held up by two men. A third man

²⁴ Official State Department Dispatch, No. 71.

²⁵ Official State Department Dispatch, No. 71.

²⁶ Report of Rear Admiral Rodgers, No. 38.

²⁷ Report of Commander H.C. Blake, onboard the *USS Alaska*, Boissee Anchorage, 2 June, 1871.

would then light the end of the ginal, igniting the powder, and the weapon would fire. These weapons were clearly inferior to the weaponry being used at the time by United States forces.²⁸

As the Americans approached the pronounced bend in the river, a single shot was fired, apparently from a pistol or musket near the large standard of the Korean Commanding General. This was probably a signal, planned for in advance that the Koreans were to fire on the Americans. Instantly, from the forts and from masked batteries that had been concealed all along the river, heavy fire was rained down upon the ships and boats of the Americans. The ships and launches immediately returned the fire. The damage inflicted on the forts and firing positions of the Koreans was apparent immediately. Many of the Koreans deserted their positions and took refuge in the ravines that were prevalent along the hillsides. Because the current of the river was so powerful, it was impossible to stop the vessels in the positions from which they were first fired upon. With the ships going at full speed, they soon sailed out of sight of the guns and around the bend. Once rounding the bend, Blake turned his party around and once again faced the forts. From there, a steady fire was maintained on the forts and smaller positions until it became obvious that most of the Koreans had been driven out.²⁹

By this time the *Monocacy* had struck rocks and was leaking badly. In addition, the launches were running dangerously low on ammunition. One of the launches, the *Benicia's* steam launch, commanded by Master Seaton Schroeder, had a particularly harrowing experience. Shortly after nearing the forts, the launch became disabled by the landline, fouling the propeller. During this time, the expedition swept on far ahead. After clearing the line and starting ahead, one of the crew remarked that the artillery batteries on shore seemed to "be saluting." As the launch rejoined the other vessels, it too came under heavy fire from the Korean positions. When the launch got closer to the shore, Schroeder sighted a Korean dressed in the obvious garb of one of the commanders. The young naval officer coolly picked off the officer with his carbine and the troops around the Korean leader dashed for the ravines. He then swung the launch around again and fired the launch's 12 pounder on the main fort, getting a direct hit near the Commanding General's position. The problems with the landline fixed, and having sufficiently contributed to the combat mission of the other ships and boats in the expedition, the launch was able to rejoin the expedition as it sailed back to the main anchorage of the Asiatic Squadron.³⁰

With one ship leaking badly and ammunition running low, Blake decided it was time to rejoin the rest of the Asiatic Squadron to the south. He maintained a steady fire on the Korean positions for a few more minutes and then withdrew his surveying

²⁸ Report of Commander Blake, 2 June 1871.

²⁹ Report of Commander Blake, 2 June 1871.

³⁰ Seaton Schroeder, *A Half Century of Naval Service*, (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1922), 28-31.

party and headed back down the river. The only casualties of the mission were John Somerdyke, an ordinary seaman, who received a gunshot wound in the left shoulder (not serious), and James Cochran, also an ordinary seaman, who lost two fingers from the recoil of the howitzer he was firing. Both men were on the *Alaska* steam launch. None of the vessels or launches received any damage from the fire of the forts. The damage from the rocks to the *Monocacy* was insufficient to keep her from limping back along with the rest of the surveying party to rejoin the Asiatic Squadron to the south.³¹ The surveying party probably was not badly damaged in the engagement because of the superiority in firepower that the Americans had over the Korean positions. A bit of luck probably also prevailed, as many of the sailors reported seeing the “plop-plop” of shells all around their launches during the engagement. The Americans would find out later that the guns the Koreans had were very limited in their targeting capability. The largest artillery could not be moved, so was fired from fixed positions, which made adjusting fires next to impossible. The same was true for the smaller pieces, which were often simply lashed to logs by rope or attached to earthwork positions where they too had difficulty adjusting fires.³² The bottom line was that the Koreans probably got much worse than they gave on the afternoon of 1 June. Nevertheless, the nature of the positions they had occupied and the number of men they had in their garrisons made it a relatively easy process to rebuild positions and to strengthen the walls of the forts in anticipation of the next attack that was likely to come from the Americans.

The Aftermath of the June 1st Engagement

When the ships from the surveying expedition returned to the Asiatic Squadron anchorage with word of the “unprovoked” attack they had received from the Koreans, both Minister Low and Admiral Rodgers felt that further action needed to be taken. It was obvious that the Koreans had planned for and laid an ambush for the Americans as they sailed up the river. In his dispatch of 2 June, Minister Low stated that, “The events of yesterday convince me that the government of Corea is determined to resist all innovations and intercourse with all the power at its command, without regard to nationality...” He further stated that, “If the squadron retires now, the effect upon the minds of the Coreans, and, I fear, upon the Chinese also, will be injurious, if not disastrous to our future prospects in both countries.”³³ Clearly, Low felt that this should not be the end of the issue. The fact that two previous smaller expeditions had been unsuccessful in generating a treaty or gaining any knowledge on what happened to the *General Sherman* was also likely disconcerting and added to the frustration felt by both Minister Low and Admiral Rodgers.

³¹ Report of Commander Blake, 2 June 1871.

³² McLane Tilton, Personal Letter No. 14, Onboard *USS Colorado*, 21 June 1871.

³³ Official State Department Dispatch, No. 71.

For their part, the Koreans were completely unapologetic, and questioned United States motives. In a note that was left for the Americans and brought onboard the *Colorado*, the Koreans claimed that the destruction of the *General Sherman* was brought on itself because of hostile action taken, and as for the wreck near Kang Hwa, "who is to be blamed?"³⁴ The note further inquired, "Will you wish to take possession of our land and people, or will you wish to consult upon and carry out friendly relations?"³⁵ The Koreans still did not see of a need for a treaty. They had been living 4,000 years they said, without a treaty with the Americans, and of course they couldn't see why they should not just continue to live as they always had.³⁶

In reply to the note, Edward Drew, Frederick Low's assistant, sent through a messenger another note. In it he assured the Koreans that, "We desire peace and friendly feelings exist between our country and all others."³⁷ On 6 June, a note from the governor of Kang Hwa was brought onboard the *Colorado*. In it, the governor stated that "...it was the ascent [of the river] to the sea-gate of your vessels the other day that brought on the engagement between us." The note further stated, "I send some worthless articles as a trifling assistance to your table..." [Note - With the foregoing were brought three bullocks, fifty chickens, and one thousand eggs, which were declined].³⁸ Clearly, Minister Low and Admiral Rodgers felt that the "offering" sent to the Asiatic Fleet by the governor of Kang Hwa along with an explanation was not enough of an apology to warrant not striking back at the Koreans for what they felt was an unwarranted attack on the surveying expedition sent forward under Commander Blake. From the notes sent to them by the Koreans, it seemed clear that the governor of Kang Hwa Do felt the attack was justified - as was the attack on the *General Sherman* five years earlier that continued to weigh heavily on the minds of the Americans.

Minister Low and Admiral Rodgers agreed that punishment should be rendered against the Koreans. Because of the small size of the American force, Admiral Rodgers felt the most practical form of attack would be against the forts that had fired on the surveying expedition, along with any surrounding forts, which also may have been protecting the positions near the river that had fired upon United States naval ships.

Admiral Rodgers had many concerns regarding the sending back of a combat force to punish the Koreans for actions taken against the Americans. First of all, the

³⁴ Translation of paper found attached to a pole on Guerriere Island, 3 June 1871, and brought onboard the *Colorado*, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1871*.

³⁵ Translation of paper found attached to a pole on Guerriere Island, 3 June 1871.

³⁶ McLane Tilton, Personal Letter No. 10, Onboard USS *Colorado*, 4 June 1871.

³⁷ No. 2, Reply to a communication found on Guerriere Island, on Saturday morning, June 3, 1871 written by Edward B. Drew, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1871*.

³⁸ Translation of dispatch brought onboard *Colorado* from Kang-Hoa high official, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1871*.

Koreans of course needed to be given time to render an apology to the Americans. It was felt that if a proper apology and explanation for actions taken was rendered by high-level Korean authorities, no violent actions needed to be taken.³⁹ Secondly, the prevalent spring tides which were active in and around Kang Hwa Do were a great concern. During the spring-summer tide season, the water rises from 30 to 35 feet with each flood tide. Because of this, the velocity of the stream at the point which the attack would need to be made would render the management of vessels extremely difficult⁴⁰ (Ironically, this would be a key concern for the U.S. Navy again some 79 years later, when a specific time period had to be chosen to land at nearby Inchon, because of extremely treacherous tides). The tides would not be favorable to offensive operations until 10 June. Finally, a ten-day delay would be important because it would give time for training of the landing force, a task which would be a challenge because, with the exception of the Marines, most of the sailors had little experience in the weaponry and tactics of landing operations.⁴¹

The landing force was particularly fortunate in that the ships had been given a large store of the new Navy version of the 1867 Remington Rifle. Captain McLane Tilton, who would lead the Marine battalion in the landing force, had served as the Marine Corps member of a Navy Board, which made exhaustive studies towards adoption of a new breech-loader for Navy use. As such, he was literally one of the most qualified individuals in the Naval service to train the Navy seamen of the landing force in the manual of arms, loading, unloading and firing of what would prove to be one of the most effective infantry weapons of the 19th century.⁴²

The expeditionary force sent up the river to attack the Korean forts would consist of the *Monocacy*, commanded by Commander E.P. McCrea, the *Palos*, commanded by Lieutenant C. Rockwell, four steam launches under Lieutenant Commander H.F. Pickering, and a number of smaller boats which would be towed behind the ships. The landing force would be embarked on the boats being towed behind the ships. Lieutenant Commander Silas Casey commanded the infantry battalion, Lieutenant Commander D.R. Cassel commanded the artillery, and Captain McLane Tilton, USMC, commanded the Marine battalion. Commander Blake, who had commanded the earlier surveying expedition, would command the expeditionary force. He was to remain afloat, embarked aboard the *Palos*.⁴³ In typical 19th century U.S. Navy fashion, in full dress uniform, the Admiral ordered all of the companies of

³⁹ Report of Rear Admiral John Rodgers, No. 43, onboard the *USS Colorado*, Chefoo China, 5 July, 1871.

⁴⁰ Report of Rear Admiral John Rodgers, No. 38.

⁴¹ Report of Rear Admiral John Rodgers, No. 38.

⁴² C.F. Runyan, "Capt. McLane Tilton and the Korean Incident of 1871," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (March 1958): 43.

⁴³ General Order, written by LCDR W. Scott Schley, Adjutant General, aboard the *USS Benicia*, 8 June, 1871.

infantry, the field batteries of artillery, and the pioneers, sappers and miners and hospital corps to be assembled and pass in review.⁴⁴

Facing the Americans upriver, the Koreans had assembled a formidable force. Because Kang Hwa Do had been the focus of so much interference from foreigners in the 1860s, the garrisons were heavily fortified. In addition, the ground troops, under the command of General Oh Choe-yon, were well trained, many having experienced combat against the French. Korea was a country with a very disjointed chain of command within the government going down to the military. Though the warriors on Kang Hwa were probably among the best in Korea, in western terms they were roughly the equivalent of state militia, with the ground and naval commanders both answering directly to the governor of Kang Hwa, who in turn took his orders from the Taewon-gun (Regent). While Korean records are not exact, the Korean force on Kang Hwa is estimated to have numbered roughly around 2,000 men, approximately 1,500 ground forces and about 500 naval personnel.⁴⁵

The Landing Force Moves In

At 1000 on June 10th, the *Monocacy* weighed anchor and, accompanied by two steam launches, began steaming up the river. At 1030, with all the boats having taken their proper places for towing, the *Palos* weighed anchor and proceeded up the river with the boats in tow. Two steam launches followed to the *Palos'* rear in case of accident.⁴⁶ Commander Blake's orders were to approach the forts that had fired on them previously, shelling them and driving out all inhabitants if possible. Once this was accomplished, the landing force was to disembark, with the armed launches supporting and covering the force for debarkation. Difficulties were anticipated from the natural obstacles in the river such as rocks, shoal water and furious currents. Thus, Commander Blake was to use his own discretion regarding the exact details of where to disembark the landing force. The object of the mission was to hold and destroy the forts that had previously fired on U.S. vessels, but only long enough to demonstrate the American ability to punish the Koreans for actions taken against U.S. forces. The force was to return within 24 hours (tides permitting), or such reasonable time as the Commander saw fit. The slim chance of a treaty was still seen, and if one was offered, Blake was to accept it as long as it fell within the terms described by Admiral Rodgers—under the direction of Minister Low.⁴⁷

As the small expeditionary force approached Kang Hwa Do, a Korean junk appeared, waving a white flag. Blake ordered one of the steam launches to approach the vessel and meet with the individuals onboard. The Korean junk carried on it a

⁴⁴ C.F. Runyan, 43.

⁴⁵ Dr. Suh interview.

⁴⁶ Report of Commander H.C. Blake, Onboard the *USS Alaska*, Isle Boisee, 17 June 1871.

⁴⁷ Orders to Commander Blake, Given by Rear Admiral John Rodgers onboard the *USS Colorado*, Isle Boisee anchorage, Corea, 9 June 1871.

message from a high level Korean official which was translated by Mr. Drew, the State Department representative accompanying the expedition. The letter was similar to the others received by the Americans, and because it still contained no apology, Blake made the decision to continue up the river.⁴⁸

At approximately 1200, Commander McRea, commanding the *Monocacy*, approached the first fort, called Choji Fortress by the Koreans, and later renamed the Marine Redoubt by the Americans. Passing the Marine Redoubt, which was also close to a smaller set of positions, the *Monocacy* was fired on by the artillery from the shoreline. None of the enemy shells did any damage, many becoming caught in the hammock settings of the ship or cutting some of the standing rigging far above the heads of the sailors. The *Monocacy* was brought to anchor about 550 yards from the forts and commenced firing. Much of the wall face on the forts was destroyed and the guns of the Koreans were silenced.⁴⁹

At 1330, the *Palos*, with 19 boats in tow carrying the landing force, approached the first positions. The landing party departed for the beach at 1343. They approached in two lines of boats. The launches and boats made up one line (two boat lengths apart), while another line to its immediate right composed the second line.⁵⁰ Upon landing, the artillery, consisting of seven pieces, ran into trouble almost immediately. It was landed with only the greatest of difficulty, because as soon as the pieces were loaded off the boats, they sank up to their axle trees in thick mud, and only could be moved very slowly, with extreme difficulty. It took about 80 men nearly the whole afternoon to get the artillery out of the mud.⁵¹ It was decided that the Marine battalion under Captain McLane Tilton would go forward as skirmishers in advance of the bogged down artillery, as the rest of the landing force remained near the artillery on the beach for force protection. Tilton's Marines were chosen for this job "on account of their steadiness and discipline," and were also the best trained troops for the job at hand.⁵²

After disembarking, the Marine battalion formed a reinforced line of skirmishers across the muddy beach (79 years later at Inchon, similar mud flats would be encountered by the Marines who landed - such mud flats are common to the central west coast of Korea). The line moved along a tongue of land jutting out into the river, through small fields of grain, towards the first fort. As the Marines approached the fort, they came under some small arms fire. After the Marines returned the fire, the occupants of the fort, who had already come under heavy fire from the *Monocacy*

⁴⁸ Report of Commander Blake, 17 June 1871.

⁴⁹ Report of Commander E.P. McRea, Onboard the *USS Monocacy*, Boisee Island anchorage, 14 June, 1871.

⁵⁰ Report of Commander Blake, 17 June 1871.

⁵¹ Report of Lieutenant Commander Douglass Cassel, onboard the *USS Alaska*, Off Isle Boisee, 13 June 1871.

⁵² Report of Commander L.A. Kimberly, Onboard *USS Benicia*, Boisee anchorage, 15 June, 1871.

earlier, fled through the brush and fields, firing a few shots back at the Marines as they ran. The fort was secured, and all of the weapons, food supply and ammunition was destroyed or dumped into the river. The Marines then advanced through the area, sweeping through more grain fields and a small village, but encountering no opposition.⁵³ By then, the artillery batteries had been successfully pulled from the mud flats and the main body of the landing force rejoined the Marines. Tilton was ordered to again push forward with his battalion, and to conduct a reconnaissance-in-force for engagements that would be conducted the next day.

As the main body of the landing force waited northwest of where the Marines had taken and destroyed the first fortification, Tilton's battalion moved forward as skirmishers-in-force once again. The second fort in the line of forts that sat along the shoreline was then approached. This fort, known as Dokjin Fortress by the Koreans, would later be renamed Fort Monocacy by the Americans. By this time, the Marines were about half a mile ahead of the main body. Captain Tilton described the fort as "a square work of hewn granite foundation, with a split rock, mud, and mortar rampart, crenulated on each on each face, with a front of about 30 paces."⁵⁴ A messenger was dispatched to headquarters to tell them that the road was clear and passable for artillery. Tilton then posted pickets on the flanks of his position, which was just behind a rice field, and a Dahlgren 12-pounder was also positioned (the only such piece the Marine battalion had), so they were able to command the junction of the only two approaches. The Marine position now commanded the road to their position and the approaches to the fort. Because the main body planned to rejoin them in the morning, the Marines bivouacked in their advance position below the second fort for the night.⁵⁵

That night, sometime around midnight, the Marines were suddenly awakened by screams and howls of Koreans, intermixed with some small arms fire. Marines on the scene noted that the Koreans looked like "white ghosts in the night."⁵⁶ This is likely a reference to the traditional Korean garb the warriors were wearing. The garb consisted of several layers of white cloth used as body armor to protect against arrows and minor sword wounds. Throughout the centuries, Koreans have traditionally crept near the camps of their enemies at night and made great pains to scare them before whatever battle was to occur the next morning. The Marines were neither frightened nor amused by having their sleep interrupted. A few artillery shells were lobbed in the direction of the Koreans attempting to harass the Marines, and they quickly dispersed.⁵⁷

⁵³ Report of Captain McLane Tilton, Commanding United States Marines, onboard *USS Colorado*, at anchor off Isle Boisee, Corea, 16 June 1871.


⁵⁴ Report of Captain Tilton, 16 June 1871.

⁵⁵ Report of Captain Tilton, 16 June 1871.

⁵⁶ Report of Captain Tilton, 16 June 1871.

⁵⁷ Report of Commander Cassel, 15 June 1871.

KOREA
FORTS AND BATTERIES
Engaged by the
Land and Water Forces
Of The
U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.
JUNE 1871



Map 3: The line of march for the landing force. The area identified on this map as "Forts Du Conde" was later renamed Fort Monocacy by the landing force. The map also depicts the route traveled by the ships providing naval gunfire support.

At 0400 the next morning, the Navy and Marine encampments sounded reveille. As the Americans began to move about in both encampments, uniforms were once again donned, blanket rolls rolled up, and small fires lit to heat their portable tea and coffee. The Marines stood their ground as individuals from one of the Navy companies returned to the first fort and completed destruction of all remaining ammunition and supplies. The fort was burned to the ground.⁵⁸

At 0700, the artillery was ordered to advance in order to support the Marine attack into the second fortification, Fort Monocacy (Dokjin Fortress).

The artillery was formed up with two pieces in front, three in the center and two to the rear. Kang Hwa Do is an extremely hilly island, and the roads at the time were very narrow. In addition, the sailors had nothing to pull the large artillery pieces except manpower. The weather was also extremely hot and humid. Because of these factors, progress was slow but steady. Sailors from the infantry companies assisted in helping to tow the heavy but very important artillery pieces. The Marines were then once again ordered to advance, this time on the second fort, and with the now land-based artillery support provided by the Navy.⁵⁹

As the main body reached the Marines, they once again threw out a line of skirmishers-in-force. The Marines stretched out in a line across the hills behind the fort and attacked it from the rear face. They were able to enter the fortification without opposition, its inhabitants apparently having abandoned it during the night. The artillery that had been called forward thus did not yet need to be used. After entering the fort, the Marines dismantled the battlements by throwing into the river the 60 or so breech loading brass cannon – all of which had been abandoned loaded. They then tore down the ramparts on the front and much of the right face of the fortification. Captain Tilton described the ramparts as consisting of "... a pierced wall of chipped granite, with a filling of earth in the interstices and coated over with mortar, giving it the appearance of being more solid than it really was."⁶⁰

After leaving the second set of fortifications captured, the Marines progressed about another half mile through steep hills and deep ravines. At this point they once again encountered opposition from the Korean warriors. From the left, the Marines began to receive small arms fire. Tilton cautiously wheeled his skirmishers and upon reaching a summit, saw the enemy on a parallel ridge. There they could be seen blazing away at the Americans with their gingals and matchlocks, (as described by Captain Tilton) "their black heads popping up and down the while from the grass, but only one bullet spent struck us, without injury."⁶¹ Lieutenant Commander Cassel's artillery was called in for support, successfully firing rounds that scattered the force attempting to attack the Marines. In addition, two companies of sailors were brought

⁵⁸ Report of Commander Cassel, 15 June 1871.

⁵⁹ Report of Commander Cassel, 15 June 1871.

⁶⁰ Report of Captain Tilton, 16 June 1871.

⁶¹ Report of Captain Tilton, 16 June 1871.

forward under Lieutenant McKee to support the Marine left flank.⁶²

The Marine skirmishers, supported by artillery and two companies of sailors, now advanced to the next set of hills. It was on this set of hills that the Koreans once more chose to attack the landing force. This time they attacked with great fury, attempting to charge the high positions the landing force now tenuously occupied, and firing hundreds of small arms, again using as weapons the gingals and flintlocks which had imposed so little damage since the landing had occurred. Though the number of warriors attacking was estimated by the Americans at the time to be several thousand, it was probably closer to several hundred warriors who attacked, being repulsed by the Marine skirmishers and

Navy infantry companies again and again. With the aid of artillery and maintaining a steady stream of small arms fire with their Remington Rifles, the Americans were able to successfully defend all of their positions. Seeing that their attacks would not loose the Americans from their positions, the Koreans fell back, retreating to the third set of fortifications along the river (later named Fort McKee by the Americans and Kwangsung fortress by the Koreans) and other positions to await the attack by the landing force.⁶³

The Main Engagement

At a point approximately a third of a mile from the third fortification (which the Americans initially called "The Citadel" because of its great height), the Marines and accompanying forces halted for a rest. Many of the men were close to heat exhaustion because of the terrain and weather conditions. Following a short rest, the Marines, continuing to act as skirmishers, cautiously began taking up positions along a crest approximately 150 yards from the west walls of the fortification. The main body then came up and formed close behind the Marines. With the entire landing force now nearly into position, the Americans decided it was time to test the firing capability of the Koreans inside the fort. Along a path running immediately before the fort ran a long set of banners, obviously planted there by the Koreans. Much to the dismay of the occupants of the fort, several Marines bravely ran through a tremendous hail of fire, pulling down approximately 15 of the banners and greatly angering the Koreans.⁶⁴

The entire infantry force that would attack the main fort, numbering about 350 men in all, was now on a ridge approximately 150 yards from the wall of the fortification. The force pushed forward to the next ridge, and were now about 120 yards from the fortification. From there, a furious fire commenced from both sides. The firing

⁶² Report of Lieutenant Commander W. Scott Schley, Acting Adjutant General of Expedition, onboard *USS Benicia*, Isle Boisee, Corea, 14 June 1871.

⁶³ Report of Lieutenant Commander Silas Casey, onboard *USS Colorado*, off Boisee Island, Corea, 16 June 1871.

⁶⁴ Report of Captain Tilton, 16 June 1871.

continued for a few minutes, and from inside the fortifications, the Koreans could be heard singing their war songs defiantly as the Americans prepared to charge the walls.⁶⁵

Having massed on a ravine directly facing the rear defenses of the fort, the landing force prepared to charge. They were supported by artillery fire from a nearby hillside from Douglass Cassel's batteries.⁶⁶ In addition, immediately before the charge was made, the fortifications had once again been bombarded by the guns of the *Monocacy*, which had sailed up the river in anticipation of the naval gunfire support it would need to provide.⁶⁷ The signal given to stop the naval gunfire bombardments, the force was now ready to charge. The Marines were on the extreme right of the line and the Naval infantry companies on the left. When the order was given, the whole line rose up from the ravine amid a terrible fire of gingals and with a yell, rushed for the fortress.

The first man over the top was Lieutenant McKee, who gallantly led his company into the fort. He was killed by both spear and bullet as he fought at the head of his men. By this time, the rest of the two battalions were charging into the main defenses. As the Koreans ran out of ammunition, they continued fighting with swords and rocks, even throwing dust up into the faces of the Marines and Sailors. The battle waged fiercely until a Marine sniper picked off the Commanding General of the Kang Hwa garrison, Oh Choe-yon. With that, the Koreans began to fall into disorder and retreat. As the Koreans ran for the river, Cassel's artillery caught them in the flank with cannister. Many warriors could be heard screaming as their cloth body armor caught on fire. The smell of burning flesh prevailed over the battlefield as the Americans continued to fight the faltering forces of the fortress. Captain Tilton passed to the right of the fort with several of his men, and caught the Koreans retreating along the crest of a hill, which joined the main fortification to a smaller fortified position. Using their Remington Rifles, the Marines cut down the retreating Koreans before they could escape. A few Koreans actually made it to the river, but were there captured. By 1245, the entire fort was taken. The Marines quickly cleared out two smaller fortifications nearby that they named Elbow Fort and Hydrogapher Fort. This brought the final total of forts being destroyed to five.⁶⁸

The total number of Korean dead estimated by the Americans on the scene was 243.⁶⁹ The number of dead estimated by Korean historians is somewhere around 350.⁷⁰ While the battle had raged, Corporal Brown and Private Purvis, USMC, had

⁶⁵ Report of Captain Tilton, 16 June 1871.

⁶⁶ Report of Lieutenant Commander Casey, 16 June 1871.

⁶⁷ Report of Commander E.P. McCrea, 14 June 1871.

⁶⁸ Report of Commander Kimberly, 15 June 1871.

⁶⁹ Report of Commander Kimberly, 15 June 1871.

⁷⁰ Suh In-han, *History of the French and American Invasions*, (Seoul Korea: The Institute for Military History Compilation, 1989), 69-78.

pulled down the huge yellow cotton standard of the Korean Commanding General. The flag was later to be brought back to the Asiatic Squadron and now sits in the Naval Museum at the United States Naval Academy.⁷¹

The Results of the Battle

The victorious Americans brought the Korean prisoners with them as they re-embarked onboard the ships to sail back to the Asiatic Squadron. The Marines, who had been the first in the fight, were given the honor of being last ashore. They remained to cover the landing force as it departed the battle areas for the ships, and to destroy what equipment was left in the last forts they had occupied. The entire landing force remained ashore for a second night, camping out within the confines of the main fortress. In all, the landing force captured and spiked 481 cannon, hundreds of flintlocks and gingals, and 50 flags. The flags were taken back to the ships as was the custom during the 19th century for a unit, which is victorious in battle. The entire force was re-embarked onboard the *Palos* and *Monocacy* within an hour of sunrise on the 12th. The total casualties for the Americans were, three killed and nine wounded.⁷² Fifteen members of the force, nine sailors and six Marines, would later receive the Congressional Medal of Honor for the role they played in the 16 hour campaign.⁷³

During the campaign, the *Palos* struck rocks in the river and started to keel over. It was only with the aforementioned highly rising tide that she was able to get off, after considerable pumping from the ships crew. Both the *Monocacy* and *Palos* received damage from the shoals and rocks in the river that would later have to be repaired at dockside in Shanghai. There was no other major damage to the ships, launches or boats in the expedition. On the way back to the Asiatic Squadron, it was determined that the final fortress where an engagement was fought (Kwang Sung Fortress) would be named Fort McKee after the brave comrade who had perished there.⁷⁴

Waiting for a Reply from the Koreans

Following the end of the battle, the Americans continued to attempt contact with high level Korean officials. Mr. Drew sent a dispatch through messenger to the governor of Kang Hwa Do, telling him that they had taken Korean prisoners, and that the men were being given medical treatment and food, offering to return them to the government of Korea as long as they agreed to not fight against the Americans

⁷¹ The author visited the United States Naval Academy, where the standard remains on display.

⁷² Report of Commander Kimberly, 15 June 1871.

⁷³ The names of those who won the Medal of Honor can be found at the "Hall of Heroes" in the Pentagon.

⁷⁴ Report of Rear Admiral Rodger, No. 43, 5 July 1871.

again.⁷⁵ He received the reply that, "If you shall come to join battle, then with battle we will meet you, and there's an end (of the discussion)."⁷⁶ On the 20th of June, nine days after the battle's conclusion, the governor of Kang Hwa Do sent another long dispatch to Mr. Drew in which he told him there would be no visits to the King, no correspondence from the King, and no welcoming committee on Kang Hwa or any other part of Korea. In addition, no treaty was to be concluded with the Americans. Finally, the prisoners when received back at Kang Hwa, were to be "punished accordingly."⁷⁷ The prisoners, upon their return, were probably put to death. On June 22nd, Frederick Low sent the following short telegram to the State Department; "Recent demonstrations produced no effect upon negotiations. Nothing can be effected short of the capital. Force insufficient to go there without great risk. If peaceful means fail, shall withdraw and wait instructions."⁷⁸

On July 2nd, one final dispatch was sent to the governor of Kang Hwa in which it was made clear the United States would not tolerate violent action taken against its merchant seamen or Navy ships, but was a peaceful nation and desired eventual peaceful relations with the government of Korea.⁷⁹ Having seen that neither peaceful nor violent means would push the Koreans into signing a treaty with Minister Low or even allow him to meet with high-level officials, the Squadron withdrew, and sailed back to China.

Conclusions

From a tactical standpoint, the battle of Kang Hwa Do was very successful. Fighting an enemy that outnumbered them considerably, the American landing force was able to successfully accomplish all of the combat goals for the operation. The attack was a well-staged landing and infantry assault, supported by Naval gunfire and artillery that had been brought ashore. It was a textbook 19th century small-scale amphibious assault.

The superior firepower of the American landing force was undoubtedly the deciding factor in all of the engagements fought during the 16-hour campaign. The flintlocks and gingals of the Koreans were no match for the Remington Rifles carried by the Marines and others in the landing force. Always the meticulous Marine Officer, McLane Tilton afterward noted in his report to the Secretary of the Navy that

⁷⁵ Mr. Drew to Cheng, Guardian of Kang Hoa prefecture, ex-officio general and governor, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1871*.

⁷⁶ Translation of a dispatch received 15th June, 1871, on Guerrre Island, by hand of two messengers from the magistrate of Fu-Ping Prefecture, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1871*.

⁷⁷ Translation of a dispatch from the prefect of Foo Ping to Mr. Drew; received June 20th, 1871, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1871*.

⁷⁸ Telegram to Secretary of State, Washington, Corea, June 22, 1871, Frederick Low. *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1871*.

⁷⁹ Edward B. Drew, acting Secretary to legation, to Li, guardian general of Foo-Ping prefecture, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1871*.

the ammunition for the new rifles that was packed in paper boxes misfired at least 25% of the time, while the cartridges in wooden boxes was nearly perfect.⁸⁰ Tilton of course was looking out for the safety of those infantrymen who would carry the rifle into battle on future expeditions. The artillery used by the Koreans also proved to be no match for the guns on the ships, or the field artillery batteries brought ashore. The Americans could maneuver their artillery much easier, and the shots fired by the ships often were able to clear out positions on the shoreline, while the shots fired by the forts on the ships inflicted almost no damage.

The fact that the Koreans had at least 240 killed, numerous others wounded, and still more captured, just in one of the three engagements, while the Americans suffered only three killed and seven wounded during the entire campaign, is also a tribute to the superior firepower and tactics of the American landing force. Nevertheless, the bravery of the Korean warriors was quite notable. Captain Tilton stated in his report that, "Their bearing was courageous in the extreme."⁸¹ Minister Low reported to the Secretary of State that, "Giving no quarter, and expecting none, the Koreans fought until the last defender had fallen."⁸²

The overall strategic goals of the expedition were not accomplished. The attack on the *General Sherman* (Which the Koreans had finally admitted to in one of their dispatches noted earlier in this work) was certainly avenged in the eyes of the Americans, as was the attack on the surveying expedition of June 1st. This was sounded off briefly in the American press of the time, but received little attention, as the United States was testing its Naval might in Asian locations throughout the later part of the 19th century.⁸³ The Koreans refused to deal with the Americans at the time, and no treaty was concluded. In fact, no substantive talks of any kind were concluded between Minister Low and Korean officials.

The United States did not give up on trying to establish relations with the government of Korea. In 1879, Commodore Shufeldt (who had earlier tried to negotiate with the Koreans as a Commander), dispatched aboard the *Ticonderoga*, once again tried to negotiate with the Koreans, this time through the Japanese, who had recently pushed the Koreans into opening up some of their ports to trade with Tokyo. This mission failed as well, but Commodore Shufeldt was not a man to give up easily. In 1882, Shufeldt again returned to Korea, this time onboard the corvette *Swatara*. A treaty was formally concluded between the United States and the government of Korea. Thus, in 1882, the United States became the first western nation to conclude

⁸⁰ Report of Captain Tilton, 16 June 1871.

⁸¹ Report of Captain Tilton, 16 June 1871.

⁸² Official State Department Dispatch, No. 71.

⁸³ For a good example of U.S. press reports on the battle, see: William Elliot Grifis, "Our Navy in Asiatic Waters," *Harpers Monthly*, (New York: August 1898) 738-769. Available online at "Making of America," from Cornell University: <http://library5.library.cornell.edu/moa/>

a treaty and establish formal diplomatic relations with Korea.⁸⁴

Did the campaign of 1871 have any effect on the United States being the first western nation to establish formal ties with Korea? It is not clear. At the time (1871), the Korean government saw no need to deal with the United States and was not intimidated by the U.S. armed forces, despite the fact that the landing force won such a clear victory. To the Koreans, it was an overall strategic victory for their side. In fact, at the restored battle site of Kwang Sung fortress (Fort McKee), the placard at the site states that the "Korean warriors fought bravely to the death before driving the Americans out."⁸⁵ While it is not clear how the Koreans see the complete destruction of five of their forts and the slaughter of several hundred of their warriors as "driving out the Americans," it is true that the landing force was too small to win any kind of large-scale victories over Korean forces on the mainland, and the ships of the expedition too few to forcefully open up any Korean ports. Thus it appears that the intimidation that the United States used in attempting to force Korea to open up in 1871 was unsuccessful. Nevertheless, it may have been a factor in helping the Koreans to make a decision to deal first with the United States (among western powers). The power exhibited by Naval forces in 1871 may have been enough to influence the Koreans in wanting a powerful western partner now that the Japanese were busy trying to forcefully make many inroads into the Hermit Kingdom. Historians disagree and we shall never know for sure.

The battle of 1871 can legitimately be called the "First Korean War." Marines landing on the beaches at Kang Hwa Do had no idea that 79 years later, their great-grandsons would make a much larger landing just a few miles south, at Inchon. This time, the Americans came as an ally, fighting against communist aggression, most of them having no idea that many years before, their brothers-in-arms had fought a short, 16 hour campaign that was to be the first combat American servicemen would see on the Korean Peninsula.

⁸⁴ Griffis, *Korea: The Hermit Kingdom*, 427-435.

⁸⁵ The author visited Kwang Sung fortress during December of 2000, when the words on the placard were noted.

*All reports filed by Navy and Marine Corps officers found in the endnotes may be found in "Report of the Secretary of the Navy," a compilation of all reports filed to the Secretary of the Navy during the year 1871, found at the Navy Historical Center, Washington DC.

Pearls in a Portrait: François Clouet's 1571 Depiction of the Archduchess Elizabeth of Habsburg

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My presentation this morning will be based on an analysis of a painting by the painter François Clouet (circa 1515–1572), one of the court painters of the Queen Dowager of France, Catherine de Medici (1519–1589). Catherine was fascinated by the genre of portraiture.¹ By her death in 1589 she had assembled a collection of hundreds of such works, and the one which I will discuss this morning was painted in oil on wood around 1571. It is approximately 43.5 by 30 cm and is known from the original in the Louvre as well as numerous copies, including one at the Trianon, another at the Musée Condé, and a third at the French embassy in DC.

This portrait depicts Queen Elizabeth of France at the age of approximately 17 years. She reigned from 1571–1574 and was a Habsburg archduchess who was born in Vienna in 1554 and would die there in 1592. Her uncle and brother-in-law was King Phillip II of Spain. (Her sister was Phillip's wife Anna and Anna and Elizabeth's mother was the Holy Roman Empress María, Phillip's sister.)² Elizabeth's father was a

¹ For more on the new-found interest in Catherine de Medici's portrait collection, see the description of the recently-closed exhibition at the Musée de Condé, "Les Clouets de Catherine de Médicis." (25. Sept. 2002–6. Jan. 2003.) A catalog has been published: Alexandra Zvereva, *Les Clouet de la reine Catherine de Médicis au musée Condé de Chantilly* (Paris, 2002). Ian Wardropper has pointed out the role portraits such as those collected by Catherine de Medici play in the research on Renaissance jewelry: "Between Art and Nature: Jewelry in the Renaissance," *Museum Studies* 25 (2000) 7–15, here 8.

² Archduchess Elizabeth is the subject of a long-term research project by this author. For some background, see: Joseph F. Patrouch, "Elisabeth of Habsburg," Volume V, 129–133. Anne Commire and Deborah Klezmer, editors, *Women in World History*. (Waterford, CT: Yorkin Publications, 2000); Joseph F. Patrouch, "Ysabell/Elizabeth/Alzbeta: Erzherzogin. Königin. Forschungsgegenwurf." *Frühneuzeit-Info* 10 (1999) 257–265; Joseph F. Patrouch, "The Archduchess Elisabeth (1554–1592): Where Spain and Austria Met," Cameron M.K. Hewitt, Conrad Kent and Thomas Wolber, editors, *The Lion and the Eagle: Interdisciplinary Essays on German-Spanish Relations Over the Centuries*. (NY: Berghahn Books, 2000) 77–90.

Habsburg archduke who became Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian II (1527–1576) (He also ruled as King of Bohemia and King of Hungary, among many other titles.)

This morning I would like to concentrate not so much on the person being portrayed, Elizabeth of Habsburg, but on the dress and jewelry in which she is shown and what these can show about the mental worlds of early modern Europe as well as the international scene of the early 1570s, particularly in relation to the Atlantic, and even Florida, and (to some extent) the Jacksonville area.

In his analysis of this portrait, Etienne Jollet has pointed out how a theme of Clouet's work, the conflict between animate and inanimate, is resolved in this piece in favor of the inanimate: the dress and jewelry overwhelm the teenage queen. Jollet goes so far as to parallel the handling of the face in this and in his chalk sketch version with Clouet's depictions of the pearls on Queen Elizabeth's dress.³

Jollet's insight provides my jumping-off point to a discussion of the pearls so prevalent in this portrait, as well as the puffy material cutouts in her dress. Here we see the material of the second layer billowing out in exotic shapes like clouds or, as I will suggest, seashells, an object of fascination among some European elites in this period.

On Columbus' third voyage of 1498 he came into contact with the Venezuelan coast and its native inhabitants. The Paria, the name of the people who lived on this coast, wore pearl necklaces and spoke of great pearlbeds in the area.⁴ This news excited Europeans, who established some of the first European settlements on continental South America as bases from which to extract pearls. By the early 1500s, the pearl islands which the Europeans knew as Cubagua, Coche, and Margarita were being exploited. Some settlers set up a town they called Neuva Cádiz on Cabagua Island and began shipping massive quantities of pearls to Europe, pearls harvested with coerced native labor at tremendous human cost.

Often, the influx of gold and its effects on the European economy of this period is discussed. I believe that one also needs to recall the effects of the pearls on the representational economy, the pearls' effects on the amount of symbolic capital available.

Spanish jewelry designers, inspired apparently by Mexican animal pendants, incorporated pearls into their designs, and, as revealed in this portrait, the French (and later the English) were attracted to this lucrative trade.⁵ As Elizabeth Rodini wrote in reference to pearls in Baroque jewelry, "In the sixteenth century ... an influx of pearls prompted by European access to rich sources off the American coasts stim-

³ Etienne Jollet, *Jean et François Clouet* (Paris, 1997), 249.

⁴ This brief discussion of the Europeans' initial contacts with the peoples and pearls of what is now Venezuela is drawn largely from William D. and Mary L. Marsland, *Venezuela Through Its History* (NY: 1954). See 24, 30, 35–37, 61–62. See also Paul E. Hoffman, *The Spanish Crown and the Defense of the Caribbean 1535–1585: Precedent, Patrimonialism, and Royal Parsimony* (Baton Rouge, 1980). See 115 and 131 where he discusses the affects of the pearlbeds on French corsairs, the economies of the Main, and the Habsburg defensive strategies.

⁵ Elizabeth Rodini, "Baroque Pearls," *Museum Studies* 25 (2000) 68–71.

ulated a new interest in this material."⁶ The English, too, were affected by this new source of representational capital. No longer was the European supply limited to the expensive eastern pearls from the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, from the famous pearlbeds off Sri Lanka, Bahrain or Ormuz.⁷

At the time of the Clouet portrait, 1571, French trade with the Caribbean was skyrocketing. Since the 1560s, Rouennais merchants had been gaining a foothold in the Caribbean and Venezuelan trade, supplying the locals with fancy cloth in exchange for American products.⁸

The French had tried to establish a foothold here in Florida during that decade and, I submit, this portrait of the French queen Elizabeth with its pearls and seashells from the Americas, reflects claims and assertions over power in the Americas, power which the French crown under Queen Elizabeth's husband King Charles IX and his trusted naval advisor Admiral Coligny wished to pursue aggressively.

Of course, reading this portrait and its pearls with the Venezuelan pearldivers and Caribbean colonial rivalries in mind is only one way to give the portrait meaning.

The pearls could also be read, for example, as markers of gendered status: the wearing of pearls was often restricted to married women, and these jewelry pieces seem possibly to have belonged to Queen Elizabeth's mother-in-law Catherine de Medici. This alludes to the relationship between the Italian queen dowager and her Austrian successor on the queen's throne of France, Elizabeth.

If we move briefly away from the pearls to the seashells, we can read this portrait another way: as the reflection of broader attitudes toward the sea, and the Spanish Atlantic generally.

Queen Elizabeth's mother-in-law Catherine de Medici (1519–1589. Queen of France 1547–1559) had a room full of natural curiosities in her city palace in Paris: one of the so-called "Wunderkammer" of this period in the early modern German world. A large part of these collections of curiosities was devoted to nautical oddities. The ocean was considered full of the debris from the Flood and a constant reminder of God's wrath. Alain Corbin calls the ocean therefore a "permanent appeal to repent" for the people of pre-modern Europe.⁹

The contemplation of the irregular, the transforming, the pearl, the billowing cloth, the seashell's myriad but related forms, the animate's relation to the inanimate

⁶ Ibid., 68.

⁷ Diana Scarisbrick, *Tudor and Jacobean Jewelry* (London, 1995), 19, 39. Scarisbrick details how Elizabeth I of England received Mary Stuart's elaborate pearl collection after Mary had fled to England, and how some of these pearls had been a wedding present to Mary from her mother-in-law Catherine de Medici. Ibid., 17.

⁸ In addition to the work by Hoffman mentioned above, see also Kenneth R.C. Andrews, *The Spanish Caribbean: Trade and Plunder, 1530–1630* (New Haven, 1978) 181–182.

⁹ Alain Corbin, *The Lure of the Sea. The Discovery of the Seaside in the Western World, 1750–1840*. (Berkeley, 1994.) Jocelyn Phelps, translator. (Original title: "Territoire du vide," 1988). Page 3.

(as Clouet discussed in his paintings) was to lead to a similar contemplation of the self.

I hope that my brief comments about Queen Elizabeth of Habsburg's 1571 portrait dress will lead to a similar contemplation of pearls and seashells and their relationship to the early modern Spanish Atlantic and Florida.

Without a Blemish: Helen of Troy

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The Most Notorious Woman in Western Literature

Forever remembered as the ravishing beauty whose face launched a thousand warships, Helen of Troy remains one of the most recognizable names in literature and mythology. According to Homer and other classical authors, Helen's irresponsible actions ignite the Trojan War. These poor decisions allow readers to misplace guilt for the entire war on the shoulders of one woman. Yet many others, including the Trojan elders in the *Iliad*, exonerate Helen of guilt because of her beauty and crystallize the erroneous belief that physical beauty equals inner goodness. This binary insistence on Helen's immortal looks has marginalized her as an individual. As long as others treat her as an object and not as a person, Helen cannot accept responsibility for the poor decisions she makes. This impasse calls for an examination of the politics of power and an inquiry into why Helen of Troy is held unaccountable for the reckless choices she makes in following her passions.

"The story of Helen is the story of a woman, loved and hated beyond human recognition."¹ It provides the background necessary to understand why people blame or exonerate her for the Trojan War. Her infamy originated when her mother Leda conceived Helen and her brother Pollux after an unusual sexual encounter with Zeus. As a young girl, Helen was abducted by Theseus, the King of Athens, and his friend, Peirithous, the King of Lapithae.² She returned home after her brothers Pollux and Castor rescued her. Suitors from all over the Greek world visited Sparta "to pay court to the Wonder Girl."³ Her father, Tyndareus, found it impossible to select Helen's husband for fear that his choice would result in retribution against himself,

¹ Robert Emmet Meagher, *Helen: Myth, Legend, and the Culture of Misogyny* (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1995), ix.

² J. E. Zimmerman, ed., "Helen of Troy," in *Dictionary of Classical Mythology* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), 118.

³ Albert Payson Terhune, *Superwomen* (New Jersey: Moffat Yard and Company, 1916), 64.

his daughter, and her husband by a scorned suitor. The clever Odysseus, famed hero of Homer's *Odyssey*, devised a solution. All of the suitors would bind themselves to Tyndareus' choice. If someone should violate Helen's marriage, then the remaining suitors were obligated to punish the rogue. The suitors agreed, and Tyndareus selected Menelaus to wed Helen. They married and produced one child, a daughter named Hermione.

The arrival of a foreign prince, however, shattered Menelaus and Helen's life. For proclaiming her the most fair goddess, Aphrodite rewarded Paris, son of the Trojan king Priam, with Helen, the most beautiful woman in the world. He then set sail for Sparta. Menelaus welcomed Paris to his home under the conventions of *xenia*, "guest friendship."⁴ During this visit, Menelaus was called away to a funeral in Crete. Helen abandoned her lawful husband and nine-year-old daughter when she gathered up the palace treasure and eloped with Paris.⁵ This flight bears a striking resemblance to Helen's kidnapping by Theseus because both of these events connect Helen and her abductors with the theme of an "earth-bride who is carried off and mated by a chthonic deity" as personified in the rape of Persephone by Hades.⁶

Helen's former suitors banded together after learning about the betrayal of Menelaus' hospitality. They sent a delegation to Troy demanding the return of both Helen and the money, but the Trojans refused. Rebuffed, the Greeks, known as the Argives or Achaians, prepared for war. With the eventual arrival of the Argive forces and the subsequent landing of the Trojan allies, the Trojan War broke out and raged for ten years. From the walls of Troy, Helen watched the men fight and mourned as heroes on both sides perished, Paris among them. Helen immediately married his younger brother Deiphobus.⁷

By pretending to give up the war and having their forces sail away, the Argives ultimately gained admittance to Troy hidden in the Trojan horse. Once the celebrating Trojans had sufficiently inebriated themselves, the Argives broke out of the horse, opened the gates of the famed city, let their own soldiers inside, and slaughtered the Trojans. Menelaus found Helen in her bedroom with Deiphobus. Enraged, he slaughtered Deiphobus and was about to execute Helen when she bared her breasts and pleaded for her life. Menelaus hesitated and declared that he would kill her later.⁸ By the time Odysseus' son Telemachus visits Sparta ten years later in the *Odyssey*, Menelaus has forgotten about this declaration and lives with Helen once again.

Helen's personal history provides details as to why many people view the Trojan

⁴ Barry B. Powell, *Classical Myth* (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001), 520.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Jack Lindsay, *Helen of Troy: Woman and Goddess* (London: The Anchor Press, Ltd., 1974), 257.

⁷ Terhune, *Superwomen*, 81.

⁸ Powell, *Classical Myth*, 554.

War as simply a contest for possession of her.⁹ Branded as the most notorious woman in Western culture, Helen is the original *femme fatale*.¹⁰ Her provocative beauty becomes the commonly accepted cause of the war.¹¹ The root of her name, *hele*, means destroy. Within a few months after the initiation of the war, many men curse Helen as the source of war and destruction; she embodies the fatality pursuing Troy.¹² By the time of the *Iliad*, twenty years have passed since she fled Sparta with Paris, and she still remains the motive for the war and is “the reward the winner will carry off.”¹³ She watches from the walls of Troy as the men fight “first and forever, for Helen.”¹⁴

These soldiers fight on a daily basis for the sake of Helen, a woman the common soldier does not even know. The nameless, faceless masses eventually scorn Helen for their losses. People more intimate with Helen join them in censuring her, as shown in Euripides’ *Iphigenia at Aulis*, Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon*, and Homer’s *Odyssey*.

Euripides’ play relates the story of how Agamemnon, brother of Menelaus and supreme commander of the Argive forces, must sacrifice his young daughter Iphigenia to appease Artemis and to allow the Argives to continue their voyage to Troy. When Clytaemnestra learns about the intended sacrifice of her daughter, she demands her husband explain why their daughter must die. When he does not respond, Clytaemnestra answers with a bitter slander toward her sister: “It is that Menelaus may recover Helen.’ An honourable exchange, indeed, to pay a wicked woman’s price in children’s lives! ‘Tis buying what we most detest with what we hold most dear.”¹⁵ Before submitting to her lethal fate, Iphigenia chastises her aunt for “causing wars and bloodshed by her beauty.”¹⁶ Even the Greek chorus, which represents the common people, degrades Helen and blames her for the tragedy at Aulis.

Similarly, Clytaemnestra and the chorus both rave against Helen in Aeschylus’ tragedy *Agamemnon*. Clytaemnestra again slanders her sister as “the scourge of men, the one alone / who destroyed a myriad of Greek lives.”¹⁷ The chorus declares that

⁹ Linda Lee Clader, *Helen: The Evolution from Divine to Heroic in Greek Epic Tradition* (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1976), 10.

¹⁰ Meagher, *Helen: Myth, Legend, and the Culture of Misogyny*, 1, 10.

¹¹ Mihoko Suzuki, *Metamorphoses of Helen: Authority, Difference, and the Epic* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), 1.

¹² Terhune, *Superwomen*, 76; Rachel Bespaloff, “On the *Iliad*,” in *Classical and Medieval Literature Criticism, Volume 1*, eds. Dennis Poupard and Jelena O. Krstovic (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1988), 343.

¹³ Bespaloff, “On the *Iliad*,” 344.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Euripides, *Iphigenia at Aulis*, *The Internet Classics Archive*, ed. Daniel C. Stevenson; <http://classics.mit.edu/Euripides/iphi_au_i.pl.txt>; accessed November 30, 2002.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Aeschylus, *Agamemnon*, trans. Robert Fagles, in *The Norton Anthology of World Masterpieces*, ed. Maynard Mack (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), 383.

Helen went to Troy with a simple dowry: death. She symbolizes war and drives men to their deaths; she is "hell at the prows, hell at the gates / hell on the men-of-war."¹⁸

Finally, Odysseus discloses his feelings about the wicked actions of Helen in Homer's *Odyssey*. While speaking with Agamemnon in the Underworld, Odysseus claims that "Myriads / died by Helen's fault."¹⁹ When one of the most cunning and revered heroes in Western literature assails Helen for her actions, the path for blaming Helen has clearly been paved for lesser people to follow with their own disapprobation. Helen became an object of blame. For many people, she caused the Trojan War. Bashing Helen became an accepted poetic pastime.²⁰ Helen is the prototype for blaming women for dire situations. Other similar victims include Eve, Dido, and Guinevere.

Eve falls susceptible to the serpent and takes an apple from the forbidden tree of knowledge in books two and three of *Genesis*. After sampling the fruit, she hands it to her husband. Her actions spoil the tranquil life in the Garden and force God to banish the husband and wife as punishment. It does not matter that anyone—even Adam—could have fallen susceptible to the serpent or that Eve does not force Adam to eat from the fruit. Eve is blamed for all of the woes of mankind for making one mistake. By extension then, women can be held responsible for the ills of the world because of Eve's weakness, thus placing an eternal and terrible burden on the women of the world.

In Virgil's *Aeneid*, Dido pledges her love and her city to the famed Trojan hero Aeneas. She does not understand Aeneas' devotion to his mission to found Rome, and she cannot accept his reasons for abandoning her. This misunderstanding leads to an eternal and bitter hatred not between the lovers, but between their nations. After Aeneas and his men leave Carthage, Dido implores the gods that "no love, / No pact must be between" the Romans and Carthaginians.²¹ She wants the two cities to live forever in conflict. "May they contend in war, / Themselves and all the children of their children!"²² These curses come true many generations later. Between the years of 264–146 BCE, Rome and Carthage fought three wars known as the Punic Wars. The wars ended once the Romans wiped out the Carthaginians and razed the city of Carthage to the ground. Over one hundred years of death and destruction were explained away as the curses of one forlorn woman.

In the tales of Camelot, Guinevere is classified as the beautiful but unfaithful wife of King Arthur. Her similarities to Helen do not end with her beauty and infidelity.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 354, 362, 382.

¹⁹ Homer, *Odyssey*, trans. Robert Fitzgerald, in *The Norton Anthology of World Masterpieces*, ed. Maynard Mack (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), 175.

²⁰ Meagher, *Helen: Myth, Legend, and the Culture of Misogyny*, 49.

²¹ Virgil, *The Aeneid*, trans. Robert Fitzgerald, in *The Norton Anthology of World Masterpieces*, ed. Maynard Mack (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), 665.

²² *Ibid.*

Guinevere is abducted from her husband twice—once by Melwas, the king of Aestiva Regio, and the second time by Mordred, Arthur's nephew. Sir Lancelot rescues her from Melwas, and from this liberation, their infamous love affair began. This scandalous liaison, along with the death of Arthur during her second abduction, leads to the fall of the illustrious Round Table.²³ Once again, behind all of the destruction lie the reckless actions of one woman; Guinevere, like Helen, becomes a scapegoat for ruin.

Disarmingly beautiful, Helen's physical appearance drives men to war. On the other hand, her story also shows that her persuasive beauty disarms men. For as many detractors as Helen has, she always has supporters who attempt to exonerate her of guilt for the Trojan War. Neither her Spartan nor Trojan husband faults Helen. Menelaus values her no more than the treasure that had been stolen with her.²⁴ She is simply an eminent possession that he must recover. Paris has no greater respect for Helen than Menelaus does. As stubbornly as Menelaus fights to get Helen back, Paris refuses just as vigorously to give her up.²⁵ In essence, one man desires her simply because another man does as well, but at the same time neither holds her responsible for this conflict.²⁶

The distinguished Trojan king Priam bears Helen no ill will. As one of her most ardent supporters, he absolves her of guilt by placing it on the gods. Following Helen's first appearance in the *Iliad*, Priam gently tells her that the gods contrived the war against the Argives. Once he declares this sentiment, he drops the matter and asks Helen to name the notable Argive warriors fighting below.²⁷

Helen's other resolute supporter is her Trojan brother-in-law Hector. He staunchly protects Helen from both the physical onslaught of the Argives and the verbal abuse heaped on her from inside the city walls. Like his father, Hector treats Helen tenderly and defends her from the hatred she inspires.²⁸ She has brought war to his home, but he harbors no ill will and constantly remains courteous.²⁹ If anyone,

²³ "Guinevere," *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*; <<http://www.eb.com/article?eu=350244&query=lancelot>>; accessed November 12, 2002.

²⁴ Donald M. Foerster, *Homer in English Criticism* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1947), 78.

²⁵ Bowra, C. M., "An excerpt from *Tradition and Design in The Iliad*," *Literature Resource Center*; <<http://www.galenet.com/servlet/LitRC?c=3&stab=512&ai=149783&ste=16&docNum=H1420014748&bConts=16047&tab=2&vrsn=3&ca=21&tbst=arp&ST=Homer&srchtp=athr&n=10&locID=jack11383&OP=contains>>; accessed October 1, 2002.

²⁶ Meagher, *Helen: Myth, Legend, and the Culture of Misogyny*, 37–38.

²⁷ Homer, *Iliad*, trans. Richmond Lattimore (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), 104–07.

²⁸ Rachel Bernaloff, "Helen," in *Homer: A Collection of Critical Essays*, eds. George Steiner and Robert Eagles (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), 102.

²⁹ Edwin Arnold, "Homer," in *Classical and Medieval Literature Criticism, Volume 1*, eds. Dennis Poupard and Jelena O. Krstovic (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1988), 309.

Hector blames Paris for the hostilities; upon finding Paris at his house with Helen, Hector declares, "It is for you that this war with its clamour / has flared up about our city."³⁰ Helen returns Hector's kind treatment with a tearful lament over his grave.³¹

Finally, there are the Trojan elders. Too old to fight, they still voice their mixed opinions. They wish Helen would leave and not bring further grief to them and their children. Nevertheless, they conversely state that "surely there is no blame on Trojans and strong-greaved Achaians / if for long time they suffer hardship for a women like this one. / Terrible is the likeness of her face to immortal goddesses."³² Her indescribable beauty moves these men to forget the resentment provoked by the battle below. No other woman in literature, save perhaps the New Testament's Virgin Mary, has such majestic command over the hearts and souls of men.

Helen's True Culpability

These diametric views paint Helen in two very different lights. She is found either totally responsible or totally innocent of blame. In reality, there is no clear dividing line when it comes to guilt. Helen is not the sole scourge of men, as Clytaemnestra asserts. Nor is she an innocent victim of the whims of the gods, as Priam claims. The truth lies in the middle of full liability and absolute vindication. No one can deny Helen's significance in the Trojan War, but she is not the sole originator of the war nor the only motivating force that spurs the war on for ten years.

The Argive chieftains were bound by their oath to Tyndareus to rescue Helen and to salvage Menelaus' pride. Each prince rounded up soldiers quite willing to battle the Trojans because new markets, raw materials, rich lands, and treasures were also in store for the victorious army.³³ Helen just provides the perfect justification for the violence. She is as good a cause as any to initiate the war.

But after ten years, the war has still not been won, and the end is nowhere in sight. Despair begins to loom over the Argive soldiers. In their estimation, too many lives have been lost in the name of saving fair Helen. This original goal cannot sustain the bloodshed. The men have lost the burning passion they once held and do not want to fight. Agamemnon tests the troops' resolve in book two of the *Iliad*. He tells his men that even though the Argives outnumber the Trojans, they cannot win the war. He suggests that they return home.³⁴

Agamemnon's words have the opposite effect than he intends. Instead of renewing their vigor for the war, the men trample over one another as they race for the boats. They would have succeeded had Athena not inspired Odysseus to interpose

³⁰ Homer, *Iliad*, 162.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 495.

³² *Ibid.*, 104.

³³ Bespaloff, "Helen," 104.

³⁴ Homer, *Iliad*, 79-80.

himself among them. Odysseus and the wise king Nestor persuade the men to remain until the city of Troy falls. The authoritative words renew the vigor of the men, and they head back toward Troy. They do not march this time with thoughts of beautiful Helen in the back of their mind, but of remaining to sustain their honor, to pay homage to their dead comrades, and to decimate Troy.³⁵

An integral plot in the *Iliad* supports the idea that the fighting is founded on more than Helen. Achilles never fought for the sake of Helen. Too young to have been one of her suitors, he is not bound by the oath. The Argives sought him out because it had been foretold that Troy would not fall without his assistance. After a dispute with Agamemnon over the possession of a slave woman, Achilles withdraws from the front. When the tides turn against the Argives, Achilles' beloved friend Patroklos implores him to be allowed to wear his armor on the battlefield to deceive the Trojans. Achilles consents, and in the course of the fighting, Hector slays Patroklos. Enraged by the loss of his friend, Achilles vows vengeance and returns to the battle to avenge his friend.

Although once brought to the battlefield by Helen, the soldiers find a greater reason to fight after ten bloody, brutal years. The Argives redefine the war in their own terms to make the loss of life justifiable in their minds, a phenomenon that would pervade warfare as the centuries passed. While this reshaping of the context of the war relieves Helen of complete blame, she still makes poor decisions that adversely affect others. It is these errors in judgment and not an entire war for which she must be held accountable. Her culpability falls into three offenses: following her passions, endangering the lives of the others, and jeopardizing her family.

"The songs of Homer and later ancient poets are not about historical events, but about difficult choices and tragic consequences that face all human beings as they attempt to answer the demands of society and their own desires."³⁶ The constraining demands placed on Helen revolve around her sex and her beauty. As an ancient Greek woman, she is locked into the values of modesty, obedience, restraint, and submission. Her marriage is based on political expedience, not love, and her primary purpose is to provide her husband with a proper family.³⁷ Her iconic beauty captures any man who beholds her. It creates an entrapping power that ensnares even Helen herself; she cannot escape the image fashioned by her immortal looks.

To Helen, the arrival of Paris and the subsequent departure of Menelaus provide her with an opportunity to escape the life into which she has been trapped. Like Tolstoy's Anna Karenina, Helen thought that fleeing from home would abolish her confined past life and usher her into a new life filled with love.³⁸ Helen finds this promise of a free life quickly shattered. She cannot escape her past. By attempting to flee, her

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 80–88.

³⁶ Powell, *Classical Myth*, 509.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 33, 37.

³⁸ Bespaloff, "On the *Iliad*," 343.

famed beauty delivers death to the gates of Troy. She becomes a catalyst for war by following her heart and not her head.

Helen's passion leads her down the road of adultery not once, but twice. After Paris dies, Helen compounds the mistake of her first affair by engaging in a second one with Deiphobus. She receives no reproach for either affair, and this lack of criticism creates an exception to the rule of castigating women who engage in extramarital affairs. Clytaemnestra certainly never finds approval for her affair with Aegisthus. Although readers now view the love affair between Lancelot and Guinevere as a model of courtly love, Guinevere unquestionably receives blame for betraying her worthy husband. In William Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, the title character condemns his mother Gertrude for her hasty marriage to Claudius and suspects that their relationship originated before the death of his father. Edna Pontellier, the main character of Kate Chopin's *The Awakening*, breaks all traditional conventions when she falls in love with another man, engages in an affair with a third man, and then commits suicide, all prohibited behavior for a woman in the late Victorian era. Nathaniel Hawthorne's *Scarlet Letter* illustrates the pinnacle of guilty passion. Not only does Hester Prynne have an affair with Reverend Arthur Dimmesdale that she does not regret, but she also has a daughter from this liaison. Among these six women, Hester suffers the most injurious scorn for committing a passionate crime no different from some committed by the "faultless" Helen.

Helen's first reckless decision, following her passions, directly ties in with her second mistake, endangering the lives of others. Whereas the entire catastrophic death toll cannot be blamed exclusively on Helen, she must share responsibility for the loss of life. Her former suitors, having lost Helen to Menelaus, settle into other marriages and raise their own families. Not one of them thinks about Helen anymore, unless it is to compare her with his own wife. Now these same men have to inform their wives that they must risk their lives for the sake of another woman.³⁹ The absence of a husband is grievous enough, but a permanent loss imposes suffering for both a wife and her children.

No wife suffers greater than does Penelope. Odysseus does not die, but his absence for twenty years creates ample opportunity for trouble to brew in Ithaca for Penelope and their son Telemachus. Suitors besiege her and demand she choose a new husband. These men disrespect her home, defile her slaves, and attempt to kill her son. Instead of protecting his family and estate, Odysseus spends twenty years of his life—ten at war and ten at sea—away from home because of Helen. Indirectly, she is responsible for the suffering of many such wives and children as Penelope and Telemachus.

A specific example of the jeopardy Helen directly places the soldiers in comes at the end of the war. Although Helen knew that the Argive soldiers were tucked away

³⁹ Terhune, *Superwomen*, 74.

in the hollow belly of the Trojan horse, she did not warn the Trojans, a decision that would have allowed the Trojans to kill the Argive leaders and would have left the Argive fleet hidden at sea without any guidance. In lieu of directly selling the Argives out, Helen simply walks around the horse, and, assuming the identities of the men inside, imitates the voices of their wives. If any of the Trojans had realized what she was doing or if any of the men inside of the horse had responded, the lives of the latter soldiers would have been forfeit. This act on the part of Helen represents one of her greatest betrayals.

This dastardly exploit undertaken by Helen pales in comparison with her final error in judgment—jeopardizing her family. When Helen abandons her home, the ensuing actions negatively impact her forsaken daughter Hermione. Helen's flight and Menelaus' subsequent pursuit leaves the couple's daughter in the shrewd hands of Clytaemnestra. The house of Atreus in Argos under the care of her treacherous aunt is certainly not a safe place for the young girl. Furthermore, Menelaus promises the hand of his daughter to Neoptolemus, the son of Achilles, in exchange for his help at the end of the war. This arrangement causes a problem when Orestes, son of Agamemnon and Clytaemnestra, murders Neoptolemus after the war because Orestes feels that he himself should marry Hermione. Hence, another death is indirectly caused by Helen's poor decisions.

Hermione is not the only child wronged by Helen. As mentioned earlier, Iphigenia suffers a cruel fate when her father lures her to Aulis. Helen's departure results in the sacrifice of her innocent niece. The story, however, takes a brutal turn for the worse. Later poets, including Euphorion of Chalkis, Alexandros of Pleuron, and Stesichorous of Himera, assert that Iphigenia is the daughter of Helen.⁴⁰ They believe that Helen became pregnant with Iphigenia by Theseus during her abduction. Clytaemnestra, already married, adopted the child so as not to compromise Helen.⁴¹ It is tragic enough that Helen's poor decisions endanger the safety of one daughter. To think that her improvident actions result in the death of another daughter generates a heavy burden that Helen must bear. She cannot receive exoneration for the crime of endangering her own children.

The Politics of Power: Helen's Loss of Agency

Although Helen clearly needs to claim responsibility for her reckless decisions, because of her beauty, she habitually escapes scathing criticism. Therefore, if she should answer for her faulty judgment, then why is Helen generally held unaccountable? Why does no one see past this physical facade of "the face that launched a thousand ships"? Five explanations clarify these questions: the scapegoat archetype, lack

⁴⁰ Lindsay, *Helen of Troy: Woman and Goddess*, 103.

⁴¹ Eugene Oswald, *The Legend of Fair Helen As told By Homer, Goethe, and Others* (London: John Murry, 1905), 28.

of power, negation of guilt, lack of dissenting female voices, and the power of stereotypes.

Archetypes are universal symbols. Red roses represent love, the Ying-Yang stands for harmony, and Helen of Troy exemplifies female beauty. One of the more powerful archetypes in literature is the scapegoat archetype. This motif revolves around the belief that "by transferring the corruptions of the tribe to a sacred animal or person, [and] then by killing (and in some instances eating) this scapegoat, the tribe could achieve the cleansing and atonement thought necessary for natural and spiritual rebirth."⁴² While Helen is certainly not physically killed or eaten, she has no life of her own. She is not an individual, but a valued object for which men will fight. She erroneously represents the sole reason for the war. By using Helen as a scapegoat, the Argive and Trojan warriors can easily pass the blame on to Helen and thus escape responsibility for their own actions and objectives in pursuing the war.

Interestingly, Helen accepts this role of scapegoat. She blames herself and openly refers to herself as a slut. While speaking with Priam in book three of the *Iliad*, Helen retrospectively desires that she had wished for death instead of following Paris to Troy.⁴³ When speaking with Hector in book six, she refers to herself as "a nasty bitch"; she again wishes for death, lamenting that she had not died at the moment of her birth.⁴⁴ Full of self-reproach, Helen never forgives herself; she remains ashamed of her actions.⁴⁵

The soldiers, however, are not the only ones who use Helen as a scapegoat. Aphrodite unquestionably exploits Helen and uses her as a pawn. Aphrodite rewards Paris with Helen knowing full well of Helen's marriage and the oath sworn by her former suitors. Helen understands the power the goddess holds over her and even tries to escape this authority. After Aphrodite rescues Paris from his duel with Menelaus, she commands Helen to visit Paris. Helen responds by upbraiding Aphrodite, telling the latter to spend eternity caring for Paris until he marries or enslaves her. As this response does not settle well with Aphrodite, she irately warns Helen not to cross her or she will cause Helen to be reviled by everyone. Fearful of Aphrodite's wrath, Helen submissively obeys the goddess' orders.⁴⁶

Therefore, Helen remains transfixed in the guilt with which she has surrounded herself. Regardless of whether other people trap her into this state of guilt or if she is nothing more than a plaything of the gods, she cannot escape the role of the scapegoat. As nothing more than a pawn, she loses her individuality and the ability to take responsibility. Freedom does not exist for her; she has nothing to hope for short of

⁴² Wilfred L. Guerin, Earle Labor, Lee Morgan, Jeanne C. Reeseman, and John Willingham, eds., *A Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 158.

⁴³ Homer, *Iliad*, 104.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 162.

⁴⁵ Arnold, "Homer," 309-10.

⁴⁶ Homer, *Iliad*, 110-11.

death. "She is a prisoner of the passions her beauty excited."⁴⁷

Helen has no power to avoid her role as a scapegoat, ergo correlating the first explanation for her unaccountability with the second: lack of power. Critic Judith Fetterley describes the politics of power in literature as disguised powerlessness.⁴⁸ Within the story of Helen a social myth has been fashioned to promote the concept of female power and male powerlessness, a myth which inverts reality.⁴⁹ Whereas Helen may appear to have power over men, she truly has no ability to affect the war. Rather, her beauty moves men to war. It has become an entity in itself, a vibrant force so dynamic that its description is limited to a few lines in the *Iliad*.⁵⁰ Men revere her beauty, and her looks have great influence over their actions and words. Yet, this influence cannot be mistaken for power. She understands the influence her beauty has over other people, but she does not have any control over it. Real power would require Helen to have both the knowledge of her influence and to have direct control over the decisions made in the name of her beauty. Rather, the soldiers who fight over her and the authors who have written about her valorize Helen's beauty as if she had some sort of immediate control over it. Valorizing this influence serves "to sustain unequal power relations between" women and men.⁵¹

This cleverly disguised uneven relationship pervades the entire myth of Helen and supports the most fundamental concept of power in literature: male dominance.⁵² The dominators view domination as equality while it appears as oppression to those dominated.⁵³ Helen's placement in a supposed dominant position forces her into the role of the scapegoat and compels her to accept the guilt of the warriors as described above. Her elevation furthermore separates her from the rest of society, and this isolation is another form of domination.⁵⁴ Because Helen finds herself in a position of presumably superior power to her kin, her supposed power can be examined only from the bottom up. This method of investigation reinforces the idea of blaming Helen, the actual victim of dominance, for all of the problems.⁵⁵ The real

⁴⁷ Bespaloff, "Helen," 100.

⁴⁸ Judith Fetterley, "Introduction on the politics of literature," in *Feminisms: An anthology of literary theory and criticism*, eds. Robyn R. Warhol and Diane Price Herndl (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1993), 493.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 500.

⁵⁰ Gilbert Murray, "The *Iliad* as a Great Poem," in *Classical and Medieval Literature Criticism, Volume 1*, eds. Dennis Poupard and Jelena O. Krstovic (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1988), 313.

⁵¹ Judith Lowder Newton, "Power and the Ideology of 'Woman's Sphere,'" in *Feminisms: An anthology of literary theory and criticism*, eds. Robyn R. Warhol and Diane Price Herndl (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1993), 767.

⁵² Guerin, *A Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature*, 187.

⁵³ Nancy Hartsock, "Foucault on Power: A Theory for Woman," in *Feminisms: An anthology of literary theory and criticism*, eds. Robyn R. Warhol and Diane Price Herndl (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1993), 168.

⁵⁴ Paul Rabinow, ed., *The Foucault Reader* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 8, 11.

⁵⁵ Hartsock, "Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women," 169.

power lies in the hands of the men who fight for Helen. Whoever owns Helen has the greatest power.⁵⁶

Because she possesses knowledge of her own faults, Helen grievously acknowledges her responsibility for her actions and openly blames herself in the *Iliad*. She assumes the burden of her guilt and does not allow herself the comfort of self-defense.⁵⁷ Despite her own views, others negate her assumption of responsibility, and this negation is the third reason why Helen is held unaccountable. The Trojan elders fall silent as soon as she comes near them. They find her an object worth fighting for and release her from guilt. Menelaus sees Helen as a victim. Priam blames the gods. Hector bares Helen no ill will and would fight another ten years for her if necessary.⁵⁸ All of these defenders are men; they have the power to accept their share of the responsibility for the war, but they do not. After using Helen as a scapegoat, they again employ their superiority in their unequal power relationship to exonerate her.

The men speak in favor of Helen, but what about the women? Few female voices exist in the myth as it stands, let alone any who strongly oppose wrongs to themselves, much less wrongs to or by Helen. This lack of feminine protest is the fourth explanation for Helen's unaccountability. Hecuba, Andromache, and Penelope stand foremost among the silent women. Hecuba can do nothing but weep as her sons die in the war. Afterwards, she helplessly watches as the Argive chieftains enslave both her and her daughters. Few, if any, harsh words fall from Hecuba's lips maligning Helen. Andromache firmly stands as the antithesis of Helen. Staunchly loyal to her husband Hector, her only scenes in the *Iliad* present a tender respite from the violence. She finds herself a widow at the end of the war, loses a child when her infant is thrown from the walls of Troy, and eventually becomes a slave. Again, any slander toward Helen is conspicuously absent. Penelope suffers day after day in the *Odyssey* as the barbarous suitors plague her home. She patiently bides her time and wisely forestalls those who press her to remarry. In the midst of all of this woe, she never blames anyone for her misfortunes. These women, along with many others, speak few acrimonious words against Helen. They each fulfill the role of the suffering woman. Caught within the same patriarchal structure as Helen, they might understand her entrapment. However, they must also want to lash out at the woman who is partly responsible for the deaths and absences of their husbands and sons. The main exception to this rule is Cassandra, the doomed prophetess who foretells the destruction Paris will bring to Troy and foresees the enslavement of the Trojan women after the war.

As mentioned above, the name Helen of Troy stands for an archetype of beauty. This archetype gives credence to the stereotype that "what you see is what you get"

⁵⁶ Fetterley, "Introduction on the politics of literature," 495.

⁵⁷ Besseloff, "On the *Iliad*," 343.

⁵⁸ Arnold, "Homer," 309.

and is the final explanation as to why Helen is held unaccountable for her actions. Since the time of the Trojan War, a mistaken belief has arisen that if Helen is physically beautiful, then she must also be morally virtuous as well. While Helen does not epitomize evil, she has committed heinous acts, including adultery, abandonment, and endangerment. These facts, notwithstanding, even if Helen were morally corrupt, most people would still gloss over her flaws due to her appearance.

Beauty does not necessarily equate with virtue. Mass murderer Ted Bundy aptly illustrates this concept. Even during his trials for the rape and murder of several young women, his looks, charm, and intelligence captivated the public. By the same token, ugliness does not necessarily equate with immorality. Quasimodo, the bell-ringing hunchback in Victor Hugo's novel *The Hunchback of Notre Dame*, often suffers from this stereotype. Others heap misery on him because of his deformities. Both cases reinforce the misguided notion that behavior and physical looks coincide with one another, the very same notion that troubles Helen. The insistence on her physical looks marginalizes her as an individual. In the end, as long as she remains nothing more than an icon of beauty, she cannot accept responsibility for the poor decisions she makes.

Helen of Troy has gone down in literature and mythology as the face that launched a thousand warships. She did bring the Argives and Trojans together, but she was not a strong enough motivation to sustain the melee. Her poor decisions allow readers to lay blame for the entire war inappropriately at her feet. Others use her beauty as an excuse to absolve Helen of guilt. Until a person looks past her physical appearance, examines her decisions, and investigates the politics of power holding Helen back from accepting responsibility, she cannot escape the trap in which her beauty and passions place her.



The Sixteenth-Century Debate about Resistance to Political Authority and the Issue of Female Regiment

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The Protestant Reformation not only changed the religious landscape of Europe, but influenced discussions about political obedience as well. Today we will be looking very briefly at changing notions about political obedience and resistance and how these views influenced men's attitudes toward female regiment. What we will see is that there was a dramatic change in the positions that men held concerning political obedience and female regiment that was in large part due to the actions of some of the women who had risen to prominence during the sixteenth century.¹

The Reformation's emphasis on religious individualism led Protestant religious leaders to argue that the people should obey God and resist monarchs who led the people away from Him. The individual conscience became the ultimate arbiter in deciding matters of obedience and resistance. Personal biblical study led to conflicts of conscience that ultimately raised popular expectations for religious toleration. The new emphasis on religious individualism saw increasing concerns about political individuality that could threaten the power of the state and its ruler. Martin Luther is generally seen as an advocate of political obedience to legitimate authority.

¹ See Paula Scalingi for a good discussion of the gynocracy debate in the sixteenth century. Paula Louise Scalingi, "The Scepter or the Distaff: The Question of Female Sovereignty, 1516-1607," *The Historian* 41 (November 1978): 59-75. See also Sharon L. Jansen, *The Monstrous Regiment of Women: Female Rulers in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Palgrave, MacMillan, 2002); Richard L. Greaves, *Theology and Religion in the Scottish Reformation: Studies in the Thought of John Knox* (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian University Press, 1980), pp. 157-68; Robert M., Kingdon, "Calvinism and Resistance Theory, 1550-1580," *The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700*, eds. J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 193-214; James E. Phillips, Jr., "The Background of Spenser's Attitude toward Women Rulers," *Huntington Library Quarterly* 5 (October 1941): 5-32.

His criticism of the Peasants' Revolt is also well known. But, Luther's statement "It is lawful for an inferior magistrate to resist a superior that would constrain their subject to forsake the truth" was also used to justify his followers' fight for religious freedom in the War of the Schmalkaldic League. The second generation reformer John Calvin clearly saw princes as God's lieutenants who received their power directly from Him. Calvin preferred tyranny to anarchy. Nevertheless, he too encouraged passive resistance in 1555, 1557, 1559, and six times in 1561, if "princes of the blood' resist and if the Courts of Parliament join in their resistance."²

But, before the fires of Smithfield and the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre political theorists and religious leaders proposed moderate, orderly means to resist tyrants. Those who were dissatisfied with an unfavorable king or queen should turn first to a prince of the blood and secondly to magistrates to deal with a ruler who was guilty of tyrannical actions. The Calvinist Theodore Beza claimed in *Du Droit des Magistrats sur leurs Sujets* that people owed complete obedience to God and that divine and natural laws limited the power of monarchs. Beza believed that magistrates were appointed for the good of the people and were thus subservient to the people's representatives. If the ruler were tyrannical, the magistrates and estates could resist his authority, even to the point of tyrannicide. Francis Hotman, a Huguenot, favored popular sovereignty whereby the people transferred authority to a ruler although he too believed that Franco-Gallic law justified resistance. Meanwhile Bartolus of Saxoferto recognized two types of tyrants: the one who had seized a throne by force and the one who had received his crown by succession or election but later oppressed the people. Bartolus believed that the people could resist the first tyrant, but not the second, whose opposition would have to come from the nobles, popular representatives, and lesser magistrates. Popular resistance is thus possible, but not the resistance of individuals as this would lead to anarchy. Should the aristocrats and lesser magistrates fail to fulfill their responsibilities in resisting tyranny, Bartolus argued, the only alternative is flight. Challenging the issue of unquestioning obedience to lawful authority, Duplessis-Mornay recognized the existence of a triple contract between God and king, God and people, and people and king. The violation of one of these contracts, e.g., a king breaking his contract with God, voided the other two agreements. Zanchius also justified resisting an ungodly superior magistrate since someone who advocates evil is not a power that God established. Johannes Alstedius contended that the people could oppose tyrants who broke their oaths of office. People, after all, he maintained obey the laws, not the dictates of kings. Althusius on the other hand recognized the existence of two contracts—one of govern-

² Martin Luther, *Luther's Works*, ed. J. Pelikan et al. 54 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia, 1955-76); Jean Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. J. T. McNeill, (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960), pp. 1058, 1486, 1490, 1494-95, 1511-17; Jean Calvin, *Praelections in librum prophetiarum Danielis English* (Grand Rapids: William B. Erdmans, 1993), Lecture 30; H. C. Porter, *Reformation and Reaction in Tudor Cambridge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 47; Kingdon, "Calvinism," pp. 200-206; Jansen, *Monstrous Regiment*, pp. 1-6.

ment and one of society. If the ruler breaks the law the people can rise up against him because once he has broken the contract he has lost his authority to govern. George Buchanan, noted that kings exist for the will and good of the people and thus can be brought to account if they fail in their duties for breaking their contract.³ (Note: In 1567 the Scottish legislature enacted a statute that recognized the duty of the subject to rebel against a sovereign.) Arguments justifying political resistance to tyrants were thus not uncommon.

The fiery deaths of some 287 martyrs during the reign of Mary I and of some 10,000 Huguenots as a result of the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre, during the regency of Catherine de Medici, will change both the tone and the nature of political resistance theory. Jean Boucher, for example, claimed that the church could depose a heretic if he were a tyrant as the people would be released from their required obedience. Boucher went on to condone tyrannicide. Guillaume Roze, Francisco Suarez and Juan de Marianna also encouraged popular revolution and tyrannicide, though Roze only approved the assassination of usurpers. For his part Marianna argued that if a godly king becomes tyrannical and loses popular support the people could kill him, but only if they first warned him to change his evil ways. Justification of tyrannicide, while less common than the call for lesser magistrates to control tyranny, extended to the highest levels. Even Pope Gregory XIII pardoned beforehand any assassin of England's Elizabeth I.⁴

In the sixteenth century there was a surprisingly close link between political resistance and resistance to female sovereignty. Opposition to the rule of women increased dramatically in the last half of the sixteenth century. The French political theorist Jean Bodin for example, opposed female regiment, arguing: "Women ought to be removed as far as possible from the majesty of government; for the rule of a woman is contrary to the laws of nature, which has given men prudence, strength, greatness of soul, and force of mind to govern, but to women has denied these gifts."⁵

The Scottish reformer John Knox was a vociferous and arguably the best-known opponent of female sovereigns. He cautioned: "[L]et us comfort ourselves with the

³ Theodore Beza, *Du Droit des Magistrats sur leur Sujets*, ed. Robert Kingdon (Geneva: Droz: Les Classiques de la Pensee Politique, 1971); Johannes Althusius, *Politica Methodice Digesta*, ed. C. J. Frederick (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932); Francis Hotman, *Le Tigre de 1560*, ed. Conyers Read (Geneva: Slatkine Reprints; facsimile reprint of 1875 edition); John Ponet, *A Shorte Treatise of Politike Power* (1556); Bartolus of Saxoferto; Philippe de Duplessis-Mornay, *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos* (1577); George Buchanan, *History of the Reformation in Scotland* (1564), p. 1521. J. H. Franklin, ed., *Constitutionalism and Resistance in the Sixteenth Century: Three Treatises by Hotman, Beza and Mornay* (New York: Pegasus, 1969). In 1567 the Scottish legislature enacted a statute that recognized the duty of the subject to rebel against a sovereign.

⁴ Jean Boucher, *Histoire Tragique et Memorable de Gaverston Gentilhomme Gascos Iadis Mignon d'Edouard II Rio d'Angleterre* (1588); Guillaume Roze, *Opera Omnia*, ed. D. M. Andre, vol III (Paris: Vives, 1856) Francisco Suarez, *Juan de Marianna, De Rege et Regis Institutione Libri Tres* (1599).

⁵ Jean Bodin, *The Six Books of a Commonweale*, trans. R. Knolles, ed. K. D. McRae (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 1154.

thought that we are rendering that obedience which the Lord requires when we suffer anything rather than turn aside from piety". Knox suggested that female regiment is not so significant as to cause men to lose their lives in resisting it. Nevertheless, he also theorized that ministers were duty-bound to speak out against female rulers because such women usurped God's authority and thus were "abominable, odious, and detestable". Moreover, he claimed that it was unnatural for women to govern as they were made to obey men and were prohibited from speaking in public or from judging cases of law because of their natural imperfections of vanity, weakness, and impatience. They thus held office against God's will, although Knox did admit that God had exempted some women and raised them to the throne. Knox's particular dislike of England's Mary I and her religious policies enhanced his opposition to female regiment, a sentiment reinforced by the actions of Mary Queen of Scots. He criticized the English and Scottish nobles for being "schlaues of Satan, and seruantes of iniquitie" for accepting the governments of Mary Tudor and Mary Stuart, respectively. Moreover, while Knox proposed that God can put aside the law and appoint women to political office, man does not have the same authority. Given Knox's opposition to female regiment, it is not surprising that he favored deposing female sovereigns who unjustly usurped their thrones or that he called upon his fellow Scotsmen to overthrow the immoral Mary Stuart.⁶

Christopher Goodman, another enemy of female regiment, argued that man should obey his political leader, even if a woman, as to do so meant not only the obedience but also the glorification of God. Goodman maintained that obedience was, however, expected only as long as rulers were engaged in lawful activities. He explained that people who fail to follow the dictates of their leaders call down upon themselves the wrath of God. He noted how recently English magistrates had encouraged Englishmen to disobey God's laws and follow Mary Tudor's "ungodly" policies. In this instance he felt that England's aristocrats, so-called "ministers of injustice", were neglecting their responsibilities to follow the law and the teachings of true religion. Disobedience of authorities who led men from God is therefore necessary, Goodman suggested, because it would cause people to "fal into the handes of his mightie reuenger". He additionally warned people about accepting a female monarch, particularly that "wicked woman" Mary Tudor. Resistance was thus expected of those who led the people away from God, for "to disobey God is playing rebellion in his judgement". Goodman invited the English people to rebel against their queen because she was a bastard, a hypocrite, an idolatress, an agent of Satan—and a woman. Magistrates were, for Goodman, primarily responsible for leading a rebellion against a tyrant. If they failed to do so they should be considered negligent in the performance of their duties. This incompetence would then release the people

⁶ John Knox, *First Blast of the Trumpet Against the Monstrous Regiment of Women* (1559), ff. 6, 9-10, D7v, E1r, E8v-F2r; Greaves, *Theology and Religion*, 126-68.

from their bonds of obedience. The English theorist empowered the lesser magistrates to resist tyrants if the greater officials, busy ingratiating themselves with their prince, failed to act. In the event the magistrates and the public refused to rise against an idolater, the people should pray and ask for divine intervention. Goodman, however, also justified the assassination of idolaters and added that any ruler who was known to be an idolater "must dye the death". He asked, had not God told Moses to hang the captains and the popular leaders "agaynst the sunne without mercy" because they were heretics?⁷

David Lyndsay (or Lindesay) argued that man should accept the male magistrates placed above them because "Paul bids us to be obedient/To kings as the most excellent". But, he opposed female sovereigns who were disqualified from holding office by Eve's responsibility for man's fall from grace. Lyndsey argued that after Eve, all women were subject to men's rule. Nevertheless, women, despite their disqualification, have erroneously desired sovereignty.⁸

Yet, not all men opposed female regiment. In *An Harborowe for Faithfull and Trewe Svbiectes* John Aylmer offered one of the first rebuttals of Knox's *First Blast*. Aylmer explained that he was speaking out lest people think his silence meant that he had accepted Knox's views. He freely admitted the cruelty and inhumanity of Mary Tudor, but claimed that her reign was "though the faulte of the persone, and note of the Sexe." He further argued that God appointed magistrates and it was therefore not man's responsibility to overthrow political authorities. Instead, he continued, it was the people's duty "to honour [H]is choise, rather the[n] to prefer our own". Aylmer then suggested that God may have "some secret purpose" that women should reign. He even credited Anne Boleyn for causing the English Reformation, and recognized that there had been numerous female rulers who possessed the same virtues as their male counterparts. Aylmer further suggested that England's mixed government of king, aristocracy, and Parliament reduced his fear of female sovereigns. Moreover, people should trust God for establishing female rulers and for helping them govern. Clearly, people should obey their magistrates. "Nowe therefore, it is all our duties, to be in euery wise be obedient to gods lieutenants our souereign in forwardness, and helping her both without goods longs and bodies, when nede is, euerye man in hys calling". Aylmer concluded by encouraging his readers to be good subjects if they wished to have good kings. Obedience leads to the reception of God's blessings and prosperity. "Blusterynge blastes to blowe you, fyrst from youre dutie to God, whiche commaundeth you to obeye youre Rulars, next from your faith which you owe to

⁷ Christopher Goodman, *How Superior Powers Oght to Be Obeyd of their subjects*, (1558) pp. 47, 60, 144-45, 179-85. See also Anthony Gilby, *An Admonition to England and Scotland, to Call Them to Repentance* (1558).

⁸ David Lyndsay, *The Monarchie* (1552), ff. B2v, D6v.

your prince, for that care and love whiche she beareth toward you".⁹

John Ponet also defended women's political rights, claiming that magistrates possessed their God-given power to execute laws by having control over the bodies of their citizens. Man's fall from grace demonstrated that he needed to be supervised so that he would behave himself. Rulers do not, however, possess absolute power, "but that the ende of their authorities is determined and certain to maintene justice, to defende the innocent, [and] to punish the evil". God's laws thus bound and subjected them to His judgment. Citizens must, Ponet claimed, obey their prince, who possesses "fulnesse of power," unless he erred against God or attempted to harm his subjects. Ponet saw resistance to be the same as opposing God, though he admitted that one should not have to act against one's conscience. "He [man] mustt seke what God will haue him doo, and not what the subtiltie and viole[n]ce of man will force him to doo". Ponet added that Christian law justified killing "malefactours," even if they were magistrates; and noted that revolution and assassination "doo most certainly confirme it to be most true, just and consonaunt to Goddes judgement". But, private citizens cannot act unless they have a "special inwarde comaundement or surely proved mocion of God". Poynet also noted that the Greeks and Romans celebrated those heroes who assassinated tyrants, even making brass busts of and dedicating songs to them. "[I]t is naturall to cutte awaie tn incurable membre which (bei[n]g suffred) wolde destroie the hole body". Resistance to tyranny is not always violent, however, as people also have the options of penance and prayer.¹⁰

Sir Thomas Elyot's *The Defence of Good Women* examined the issue of female sovereignty with a debate between two fictional characters (Caninus and Candidus) and Zenobia, a famous female warrior and queen who had unsuccessfully led her armies against the soldiers of ancient Rome. His characters "proved" that women possessed the requisite martial and political skills along with the moral integrity necessary to govern.¹¹

The political events of the sixteenth century clearly influenced development of political thought in the century. How could this be otherwise when one considers the relatively large number of female sovereigns, regents, and governors in that century? A brief listing of some of the female rulers, regents, and governors includes Isabella and Juana of Spain, Mary Tudor, Mary Stuart, Elizabeth I, Catherine de Medici, Margaret of Parma, Mary of Guise, and Jeanne de Navarre. By the late 1580s, when Henry Howard completed what is arguably the most scholarly defense of female regiment, the issue of female regiment was essentially a non-issue. Political theorists in the following century will continue to address the nature of the legitimacy of political

⁹ John Aylmer, *An Harborowe for Faithfull and Trewe Subiectes against the Late Blown Blast Concerning the Government of Women* (1559), ff. B2r-v, B3r, Q3r-v, Q4v-R1r, R2v.

¹⁰ John Ponet, *A Shorte Treatise of Politike Power and of the true obedience*, (1556) ff. A4v, B6r, C1v, D1r-D4v, G3r, G6r-7r, G8r-v, H6r-7v.

¹¹ Sir Thomas Elyot, *The Defence of Good Women*

authority and justify resistance to that authority, but the gynecocracy controversy is largely over. Seventeenth century thinkers would focus on natural rights, political liberties, and especially practical political abuses. Sex, it appears, no longer matters.¹²

¹² Lisa Hopkins, *Women Who Would Be King: Female Rulers of the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Viking, 1991); Jansen, *Monstrous Regiment*, pp. 67-228.



Dashed Hopes For Support: Daba Birrou's and Shoji Yunosuke's Trip to Japan, 1935

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Ethio-Japanese Relations In The Early 1930s—The American Legation Reports

In August 1935 as Italy was preparing for war against Ethiopia, the American legation in Addis Ababa surveyed the economic and political rapprochement surfacing between Ethiopia and Japan in the early 1930s. The report suggested that Italy wanted to use its uneasiness at Japanese aims, real and imagined, to justify its aggressive policy.¹ This long report briefly noted the 1930 Ethio-Japanese Treaty of Friendship and Commerce² that gave Japan most-favored-nation status and then quickly

¹ Ethiopia (Engert), 8/24/35: National Archives (College Park, MD), Record Group 59, Decimal File [hereafter cited as NA] 784.94/23. See Ethiopia (Engert), 8/24/35: NA 884.24/73. Also see J. Calvitt Clarke III, "Mutual Interests? Japan and Ethiopia before the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-36," *Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians*, 9 (Feb. 2002): 83-97 and "The Japanizers of Ethiopia," *Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians*, forthcoming.

² See Okakura Takashi and Kitagawa Katsuhiko, *Nihon-Afjrika Koryu-shi: Meiji-ki kara Dainiji Sekai Taisen-ki made* [History of Japanese-African Relations: From the Meiji Period to the Second World War Period] (Tokyo: Dobun-kan, 1993), 32; Heruy Welde Sellase, *Dai Nihon* [Light of Japan] trans. Oreste Vaccari, Foreword by Baron Shidehara Kijuro (Tokyo, Eibunpo-Tsuron Shoji, 1933); Hidéko Faërber-Ishihara, "Heruy, le Japon et les "japonisants," Alain Rouaud, ed., *Les orientalistes sont des aventuriers. Guirlande offerte à Joseph Tubiana par ses élèves et ses amis* (Paris: Sépia, 1999), 143-49; Taura Masanori, "Nihon-Echiopia Kankei ni miru 1930 nen Tsusho Gaiko no Iso" [A Phase of the 1930 Commercial Diplomacy in the Japanese-Ethiopian Relations], *Seifu to Minkan* [Government and Civilians], *Nenpo Kindai Nihon Kenkyu* [Annual Report, Study of Modern Japan] 17 (1995): 142, 149; Umino Yoshiro, "Dainiji Italia-Ethiopia Senso to Nippon" [The Second Italo-Ethiopian War and Japan] *Niigata Dai Hosei Riron* [Theory of Law and Politics, Université de Niigata], 16 (1983): 189-90; Chris Prouty and Eugene Rosenfeld, *Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia* (Metuchen: NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1981), 94; J. Calvitt Clarke III, "Marriage Alliance: The Union of Two Imperiums: Japan and Ethiopia?" *Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians* 7 (Dec. 1999): 105-16; Yamada Kazuhiro, *Masukaru no Hanayome: Maboroshi no Echiopia Ojiji* [Bride of Mascar: Phantom of an Ethiopian Consort] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun-sha, 1998); and Ethiopia (Southard), 12/17/32: NA 784.94/1. I would like to thank Mariko Clarke for translating the Japanese materials used in this paper.

turned to Foreign Minister Blattengeta Heruy Welde Sellase's successful visit to Japan in 1931 and Lij Araya Abeba's less successful attempt to marry a Japanese, Kuroda Masako. When Heruy returned to Ethiopia in 1932, he brought with him five Japanese businessmen with sample goods as well as rumors of cotton plantation concessions in return for a Japanese loan, and in February 1934, a representative of the Kanegafuchi Spinning Company inquired about increasing Japan's exports to Ethiopia of cotton textiles.³ In June 1934, an Ethiopian delegation met two Japanese naval vessels visiting Djibouti and brought presents from the emperor for the ships' commanding officers.⁴ This visit roughly coincided with the arrival in Addis Ababa of the First Secretary and Consul attached to the Japanese Consulate General in Geneva. He remained in Ethiopia for about one month discussing the possibility of establishing regular diplomatic relations between the two countries. He also received inquiries about purchasing Japanese arms and ammunition.⁵

These activities alarmed the Italians, the American report continued. They accused the Japanese of posing as the champions of the colored races in their struggle against whites and of seeking hegemony over Africa and Asia. To salve this response, in July 1935, Japan's ambassador to Rome, Sugimura Yotaro, assured Italy's Duce, Benito Mussolini, that Japan did not have political interests in Ethiopia or intend to interfere in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. The American report noted Italy's satisfaction at these statements and Italy's shock when Japan's foreign ministry disavowed its ambassador in Rome. Tokyo insisted that Japan could not ignore Italian aims in Ethiopia and was watching developments. Japan's press and nationalist groups vigorously expanded these themes. Ethiopians responded and felt particularly indebted to sympathetic writers such as Dr. Ashida Hitoshi and to organizations such as the Japan Production Party [Dai Nippon Seisanto],⁶ which had recently passed a resolu-

³ See Tokyo to Heruy, 9/4/33; Note to Kitagawa, 9/28/33; Japan, Gaimusho Gaiko Shiryo-kan [Record Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo), hereafter cited as Gaiko Shiryo-kan] E424 1-3-1; Ethiopia (Southard), 2/14/34: NA 784.94/7; and Okakura and Kitagawa, *Nihon-Afurika Koryu-shi*, 37.

⁴ See William M. Steen, "Ethiopia In Danger as Mussolini Begins Expansion Program," Sept. 1934, *Papers of the NAACP*, Part II: *Special Subject Files, 1912-1939*, Series A: *Africa through Garvey, Marcus, August Meier and John H. Bruce, Jr.* eds. (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1990), microfilm frames 634-43; Shoji Yunosuke, *Ethiopia Kekkō Mondai wa Donaru, Kaisho ka? Ina!!!: Kekkō Mondai o Shudai toshite Echiopia no Shinso o Katari Kokumin no Saikakunin o Yobosu* [What Will Happen to the Ethiopian Marriage Issue, Cancellation? or Not!!!: I Request the Re-recognition of the Japanese Nation by Narrating the Truth of Ethiopia with the Marriage Issue as the Central Theme] (Tokyo: Seikyō-sha, 1934), 6; Ethiopia (Southard), 6/21/34: NA 784.94/10; and Italy, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Direzione Generale degli Affari Politici, Ethiopia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Office of Political Affairs, Ethiopia, 1930-45] (Rome) [hereafter cited as AP Ethiopia—Guerra], Ethiopia (Vinci), 6/23/34, 8/29/34: b(usta) 24 f(ascio) 3.

⁵ See J. Calvitt Clarke III, "The Politics of Arms Not Given: Japan and Ethiopia in the 1930s," in *Girding for Battle: Arms Sales in a Global Perspective, 1800-1950*, eds., Donald Stoker and Jonathan Grant (Greenwood Press, forthcoming), and Taura, "Nihon-Echiopia Kankei," 154-58.

⁶ Ethiopia (Engert), 8/24/35: NA 784.94/23. See *New York Times*, July 13, 1935; J. Calvitt Clarke III, "Japan and Italy Squabble Over Ethiopia: The Sugimura Affair of July 1935," *Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians* 6 (Dec. 1999): 9-20.

tion denouncing Italy's coming military expedition.

Acting on a letter from Emperor Hayle Sellase, on August 2, Afewerq Gebre Iyesus, Ethiopia's representative in Rome, visited Sugimura for an hour and spoke about Italy's military strength, Ethiopia's military disorder, the League of Nation's powerlessness, and British duplicity. After this sad litany, he asked for assistance, although he conceded the difficulty of importing weapons from Japan. Revealing his desperation, Afewerq suggested that Japan send submarines to sink Italian ships supporting Mussolini's military buildup in East Africa. He tearfully pleaded that if this aid was not feasible, Japan should officially support Ethiopia in the name of justice. Sugimura responded that for the moment he could not give any assurances on such important and delicate matters. Putting an exclamation point to Sugimura's judicious response to Afewerq, a high Japanese official publicly asserted on August 6, that Japan's own army program made it unthinkable that Tokyo would divert munitions stocks to Ethiopia.⁷

That same day, Ethiopia's foreign ministry formally denied rumors that a Japanese military mission would visit Addis Ababa and that Japan was furnishing arms to Ethiopia. Hayle Sellase himself publicly declared that Ethiopia had not received any assurances of Japanese support. To quell the increasing cascade of rumors, on August 7, the Ethiopian government again denied that it was seeking arms from Japan—but could if it so desired. These denials notwithstanding, Hayle Sellase was desperately combing the world, especially Japan, for credits and equipment.⁸

On August 8, Japanese officials again denied reports of Japanese assistance to Ethiopia. The foreign ministry's press department stated that Japan had heard nothing of the reported Ethiopian arms-purchasing mission coming to Japan and added that no visas had been asked for or issued. That same day, Japan's chargé d'affaires told Ethiopia's minister in London that reports that Japan had sent weapons to Ethiopia were false.⁹

On August 10, the Amharic newspaper Aymero ridiculed Italian assertions of Japanese interference in Ethiopian affairs. The paper acknowledged that Japan was

⁷ Italy (Sugimura), 8/3-4/35: Gaiko Shiryo-kan A461 ET/11-7 vol. 1; *New York Times*, Aug. 7, 1935; Prouty and Rosenfeld, *Historical Dictionary*, 6-7, 91-93.

⁸ Ethiopia (Engert), 8/24/35: NA 784.94/23; Japan (Neville), 9/18/35: NA 894.00/93; Ethiopia (Leone), 8/7/35; Italy, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Direzione Generale degli Affari Politici, Etiopia—Fondo di Guerra (1935-40) (Rome) [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Office of Political Affairs, Ethiopia, 1930-45] b(usta) 62 f(ascio) 3, hereafter cited as AP Etiopia—Guerra b62 f3; Ethiopia (Vinci), 8/9/35, AP Etiopia—Guerra b72 f3; *OM&TNN*, Aug. 10, 17, 1935; *Japan Advertiser*, Aug. 10, 1935; *New York Times*, Aug. 9, 13, 1935; *Times* (London), Aug. 7, 9, 10, 1935; *Japan Times*, Aug. 8, 9, 10, 11, 1935; Furukawa Tetsuschi, "Japan's Political Relations with Ethiopia, 1920s-1960s: A Historical Overview," unpublished paper presented to the 35th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Seattle, WA, Nov. 20-23, 1992, 11-12.

⁹ Great Britain (Fujii), 8/8-9/35: Gaiko Shiryo-kan A461 ET/11-7 vol. 1; Italy (Kirk), 8/8/35: NA765.84/897; Italy (Kirk), 8/7/35: NA 765.84/755; *New York Times*, Aug. 9, 13, 1935; *Times* (London), Aug. 9, 10, 1935; *Japan Times*, Aug. 10, 11, 1935.

too involved with its "great Manchurian enterprise" to intervene forcefully in East Africa and continued:

Japan desires to sell her products to Ethiopia and to see its independence preserved and its civilization advance in order to sell more goods. The Japanese consider that Ethiopia could follow their example if it remained independent. Japanese nationalists sympathize with all governments that are intent upon freedom from the tutelage of Western powers.

Japanese nationalists desire to prevent the subjugation of Ethiopia by Italy. They have not forgotten that in the past Italy sided with China during the Manchurian campaign.¹⁰

As war approached, Ethiopia's lack of supplies was becoming ever-more evident as troops daily were pouring into the Addis Ababa to get equipment only to find none available—all having been doled out before August. Although Ethiopia, this long American report concluded, harbored no illusions regarding the practical value of Japanese sympathy, the Hayle Sellase had shrewdly decided to strike while "the iron was hot" by appointing an Ethiopian emissary to go to Japan with a message of good will. He selected Ato Daba Birrou. Ostensibly, he was to be the first secretary to Yukawa Chuzaburo, Ethiopia's honorary consul in Osaka, but his position in Ethiopia was not one of those from which consular clerks were ordinarily drawn.¹¹

Daba Birrou

Daba, who came from Gara, had studied at the Swedish Mission School in Addis Ababa. He had acted as an interpreter for the British Consulate in Southern Ethiopia and had served with a British officer stationed at Moyale on the Kenyan frontier. He later accompanied Dr. W. H. Osgood on the Field Museum Abyssinian Expedition of 1926 and 1927. He had served as Heruy's official interpreter on the mission to Japan in 1931. Upon his return, he had become a clerk and interpreter for the foreign ministry as well as Heruy's protégée. He later became Inspector General at Wallega, and in 1934 he obtained the post of Director of the Wollota Military School. Highly regarded by foreign diplomats in Addis Ababa, Daba was "a notorious Anglophile," young, modernized, well-known, and close to Hayle Sellase.¹²

As secretly as possible, Daba left Addis Ababa on August 9. Even so, many pro-Japanese governmental officials went to the station to see the party off, as did three

¹⁰ Ethiopia (Engert), 8/24/35: NA 784.94/23.

¹¹ *Ibid.*; *New York Times*, Aug. 9, 1935; Sept. 19, 20, 1935; *The Times* (London), Sept. 20, 1931; Faëber-Ishihara, *Les premiers contacts entre l'Éthiopie et le Japon* (Paris: Aresae., 1998), 20; Furukawa, "Japan's Political Relations with Ethiopia," 11. The honorary counsel resided at Koraihashi, Higashi-ku, Osaka.

¹² Ethiopia (Vinci), 8/11/35, 8/13/35; Japan (Auriti), 8/15/35: AP Etiopia—Guerra b101 f4; Japan (Auriti), 8/10/35: AP Etiopia—Guerra b62 f3; Adrien Zervos, *L'Empire d'Éthiopie: Le Miroir de L'Éthiopie Moderne 1906–1935* (Alexandria, Egypt: Impr. de l'École professionnelle des freres, 1936), 120.

Japanese "merchant-journalists," the only Japanese then in Addis Ababa. He took with him an autographed photo of Hayle Sellase that he was to give to the Osaka Mainichi and to Toyama Mitsuru, a founder of the Dark Ocean Society [Genyou sha] and the Black Dragons/Amur River Society [Kokuryu-kai]. He also carried treasured sound movies of Ethiopia's imperial household, which he was to give to Japan's imperial family. Accompanied by "an unidentified Japanese," Daba left amid rumors that he was to establish Ethiopia's first consulate in Japan and that he was to negotiate arms purchases with credits of at least 50 per cent of the value of the orders as well as "vast" concessions of territory for planting cotton and permission to construct a factory. Some thought he would seek a military alliance with Japan.¹³

Shoji Yunosuke and the Osaka Mainichi

At the request of foreign minister Heruy and to further mutual friendship, Shoji Yunosuke, a special correspondent of the Osaka Mainichi, accompanied Daba to Japan. He was the "unidentified Japanese" early reports had referred to. His newspaper sponsored and diligently publicized the trip.¹⁴

A pro-Ethiopian, right-wing, Pan-Asian activist who objected to white domination of the "colored" world, Shoji finished his studies at the Shanghai Asian School [Toa Dobun Shoin] during the Shanghai Incident of 1932. In August 1932, he went to Ethiopia to investigate its economy and stayed in Addis Ababa for three months. He then traveled to the southwest from the capital and spent seven more months in the deepest parts of Ethiopia where no Japanese had been before. During his stay, Shoji developed "a close friendship" with Araya Abeba, who soon became famous as a principal in the "marriage issue." Before Shoji left Ethiopia, Hayle Sellase, met with him and gave him a picture, rhino's horn, musk, and other items. The emperor also entrusted to him a recent portrait as a gift to Sumioka Tomoyoshi, another Pan-Asian nationalist. When Shoji returned to Japan in September 1933, he handed it to Sumioka—Shoji's first meeting with him. Deeply impressed with "his excellent understanding and right belief concerning racial issues and world statecraft," Shoji consulted Sumioka about Araya's proposed marriage to a Japanese woman.¹⁵

To describe his experiences in Ethiopia, Shoji wrote Report on the Economic Situation in Ethiopia: An African Country Friendly to Japan. The author's new patron, Sumioka, wrote the Preface and perfectly mirrored Shoji's opinions. Both powerfully justified Japan's role in liberating the colonial peoples of the world from white, west-

¹³ *Japan Advertiser*, Aug. 11, 1935; *OM&TNN*, Aug. 13, 1935; *New York Times*, Aug. 9, 13, 1935; *Moscow Daily News*, Aug. 11, 1935.

¹⁴ *Japan Times*, Aug. 11, 1935; *Japan Advertiser*, Aug. 11, 1935; *OM&TNN*, Sept. 20, 1935.

¹⁵ Shoji, *Echiopia Kekkō Mondai wa Donaru*, Introduction.

ern imperialism.¹⁶ In a more popular work describing Ethiopia, Shoji continued this theme by decrying pragmatism in Japan's foreign policy for fear of offending the great powers. He continued:

Since the Manchurian Incident, Japan has closely led the small countries of Asia and has reached the stage of being able to boldly take the initiative in its foreign policy just as the Great Powers in the West do.

Hitherto, Caucasian peoples have not regarded White and Colored peoples as equal....Colored peoples in Asia and Africa...have been suffering for a long time under White oppression. In the Sino-Japanese War, Japan's counterattack on European powers lying behind China awakened the concept of independence among all Colored peoples. As we now see the declining path of Western civilization, a strong wave of nationalistic movements is sweeping throughout the world including Asia, Africa, and South America....

The security and dangers facing Eastern peoples and the various peoples of Asia and North Africa are as the security and dangers for Japan itself. This concept is called Pan-Asianism, Colored Peoples' Leveling movement, or Turanins....

These oppressed peoples all view Japan as Asia's leader and show their friendly attitude with great reverence toward Japan....¹⁷

Shoji praised ethnologists interested in the possibility that Ethiopia's ruling class and Japan's ancient Yamato tribe shared the same racial roots. He mentioned a legend that Ethiopia's ancestors shared the same origins as did the Japanese people. And Shoji favorably quoted Togami Komanosuke of Kyushu Imperial University, who wrote in 1931 that:

It is obvious that some superior races moved from West Asia to the Nile basin a long time ago....I believe that our race started in the basin of Tigris-Euphrates in West Asia by surveying studies of the Asian continent's ancient history, languages, and anthropology. I believe that the ancient Hyksos tribe had a racial connection with our ancestors. Noting the names of places around the basin of the Nile today, I cannot help but judge that they were named by the tribe which was our ancestor....I think that [many of] our place names...and personal names...are derived from the same etymological origin.

¹⁶ Shoji Yunosuke, *Ethiopia Teikoku Keizai Jijo* [Report on the Economic Situation in Ethiopia: An African Country Friendly to Japan]. Preface Sumioka Tomoyoshi (Tokyo: Daido-sha, 1933); Aoki Sumio and Kurimoto Eisei, "Japanese Interest in Ethiopia (1868-1940): Chronology and Bibliography," in *Ethiopia in Broader Perspective: Papers of the XIIIth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*, K. E. Fukui and M. Shigeta, eds., 3 vols., (Kyoto: Shokado Book Sellers, 1997): 1: 724.

¹⁷ Shoji, *Ethiopia Kekkō Mondai wa Donaru*, 36-37.

Therefore, it is uncontroversial that the Ethiopian people very long time ago had racial connections to some extent with the Japanese people.¹⁸

Emphasizing both ancient and modern, Shoji affectionately described Ethiopia to his Japanese readers. It was no coincidence, Shoji added, that Ethiopia's customs were similar to Japan's and that as the only black empire on the African continent Ethiopia, had quickly expressed its friendship to the Japanese people.¹⁹

Shoji, with Sumioka, played a crucial role in the proposal that Araya marry Kuroda—a proposal that for many personified the dangerous drawing together of Ethiopia and Japan. Neither government in Tokyo nor Addis Ababa thought particularly well of the idea,²⁰ and both suffered diplomatically as the Western world grew alarmed at the presumed implications of the marriage. In 1934, Shoji somewhat unctuously explained the idea and its failure:

This marriage idea was originally suggested...by Ethiopia....Of course, an issue of marriage is in fact a delicate matter as our old saying expresses, "Strange and sweet is how the knot of love is tied."...the issue sprouted as an expression of mutual warm feelings as the result of the developing friendship between intimate peoples. The marriage issue is not the basis of our attempt to deepen friendship between our two countries—the marriage resulted from friendship between the two countries. In other words, the friendship was the cause, and the marriage was merely one fruit of the friendship. Therefore, friendly relations between the two countries shall increase more and more regardless of the success or failure of the marriage issue.²¹

Returning to Ethiopia in the spring of 1935 for four months, Shoji wrote sympathetically about Ethiopia from its capital as a special correspondent of the *Osaka Mainichi* and was well-received by Heruy and Hayle Sellase.²² In Addis Ababa on August 1, the *Osaka Mainichi* sponsored a roundtable discussion at the Majestic Hotel, "Ethiopia in Emergency." Beginning at 7:30 p.m., Araya, Heruy, and thirteen

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 5. Dr. Togami, a graduate of the Tokyo Imperial University, studied medicine at Berlin University. He wrote a few books on the origins of the Japanese, including *Nippon no Minzoku* [Ethnology of the Japanese] (Tokyo: Oka Shobou, 1930). In it, he promoted his hypothesis that the Japanese and ancient West Asians have the same origins, and that West Asians moved east and settled in South Korea and Japan. He insisted that the Koreans, Ainu, and Yamato are all related. These ancient West Asians also moved westward and one of their western descendants are the Ethiopians. I would like to thank Sato Renya of Kyushu University for this information. Personal e-mail communication, Oct. 18, 2002. Professor Sato adds that Togami is little remembered today, except by a few "maniacs" with crazy ideas about the nature of ancient Japan. See, e.g., <http://www2odn.ne.jp/~caj52560/yondaikisyu.htm>.

¹⁹ Shoji, *Echiopia Kekkon Mondai wa Donaru*, 5–6.

²⁰ Amde Araya says that eventually Heruy and Hayle Sellase came to support the idea. Interview with Amde Araya (son of Araya Abeba) and Araya Abeba, Fairfax Lakes Park, VA, and apartment of Araya Abeba, Alexandria, VA, July 7, 2001, 1:45–6:30 p.m. Araya took the notes Heruy dictated, which Heruy later used to write his book, *Mahidere Birhan: Hagne Japan*.

²¹ Shoji, *Echiopia Kekkon Mondai wa Donaru*, 36.

²² Rome (Guarnaschelli), 4/25/35: AP Etiopia—Guerra b62 f3; Rome (Guarnaschelli), 4/26/35: Etiopia—Guerra b 101 F4. Also see *Japan Advertiser*, July 28, 1935.

other prominent Ethiopian officials gathered. Three represented the Japanese side: Shoji, Iwabuchi Yoshikazu, and Yamauchi Masao. Yamauchi had been in Ethiopia for about three years representing some Japanese firms and writing for the *Nichi Nichi*. Iwabuchi planned to accompany Ethiopian troops in Harrar as a correspondent. The American legation believed that Shoji also reported to the Japanese Consulate General at Alexandria and received funds from that office. Both Yamauchi and Shoji frequently communicated with Sumioka. Well-versed in the Amhar language, Yamauchi acted as the chair. Iwabuchi took charge of the reception and Shoji recorded the proceedings. Although the roundtable gathering had been arranged in secret, British, American, and German correspondents came to the hotel seeking information on the gathering.²³

Daba Birrou and Shoji Tour Japan

Ethiopia's failing effort to obtain arms formed the backdrop as Daba and Shoji set sail from Djibouti on August 13 on board the French liner, *Atos II*. Only on August 11, did Ethiopia officially explain that Daba was not to establish a consulate in Tokyo but was to be secretary to Ethiopia's honorary consul. Many doubted this story, especially because Shoji was accompanying him and because Japanese nationalists had organized the Ethiopian Rescue Society [*Echiopia Kyuen Doshikai*] in early August to welcome Daba.²⁴

Japanese expressed their excitement at the coming visit in many ways. The Nagoya branch of *Osaka Mainichi*, for example, sponsored exhibits on Ethiopia. As a further promotion, the *Osaka Mainichi* & *Tokyo Nichi Nichi* published a multi-part story by Shoji, describing Ethiopia's history, culture, and socio-political-economic system. The government proved more ambivalent. On August 29, a foreign office spokesman forcefully denied rumors that Tokyo had become more sympathetic toward Italy's Ethiopian adventure in order to enlist Rome's support for its demands for naval parity at the London Naval Conference. At the same time, he again denied that Japan was sending arms and munitions to Ethiopia.²⁵

While the Italians remained unclear as to the meaning of his trip,²⁶ Daba arrived in Shanghai on September 10. He told those gathered that the League would avert war in Ethiopia and that, in case of war, Britain would check the Italians. Daba expected increased trade turnover between Ethiopia and Japan. He agreed that Ethi-

²³ Japan (Neville), 10/3/35: NA 784.94/24; Japan (Neville) 10/3/35: NA 764.84/2018; Japan (Auriti) 8/8/35: AP Ethiopia—Guerra b117 f7; *OM&TNN*, Aug. 4, 1935.

²⁴ Sbrana (Djibouti), 8/13/35, AP Ethiopia—Guerra b62 f3; Japan (Auriti), 8/15/35: AP Ethiopia—Guerra b101 f4; *OM&TNN*, Aug. 13, 1935; *Japan Times*, Aug. 13, 1935; Umino, "Dainiji Italia-Echiopia Senso," 206-07.

²⁵ *OM&TNN*, Aug. 16, 1935. See Shoji's illuminating articles of Aug. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 1935; *Japan Advertiser*, Aug. 30, 1935.

²⁶ To Rome (Minister of War), 8/27/35; To Japan (Auriti), 8/27/35: AP Ethiopia—Guerra b72 f3; Ethiopia (Vinci), 8/30/35: AP Ethiopia—Guerra b101 f4; *New York Times*, Aug. 30, 1935.

opians resembled the Japanese in temperament, deeply respected them, and that relations between them would become increasingly friendly. Shoji organized a meeting of about fifty members of Japan's political, commercial, and cultural institute in Shanghai [Tung Pe]. After speaking, Shoji introduced Daba who spoke in English. Daba thanked those present for Japanese sympathy for Ethiopia. He left Shanghai on September 12 on board the Nagasaki Maru.²⁷

Daba and Shoji arrived in Nagasaki on September 13. The delegation greeting them included staff from the Osaka Mainichi, Yukawa, the chairman of Nagasaki's Chamber of Commerce, Toyama, and about 40 others. Daba assured them: "The present Italo-Abyssinian issue has much in common with the Russo-Japanese conflict and if a peaceful settlement should prove in vain and war result, Italy may perhaps meet the same humiliation that Russia received at the hands of Japan." Daba and Shoji visited the Suwa Shrine. Later in the afternoon, they were hosted at the Geiyotei restaurant by the Osaka Mainichi. He emphatically denied that he had come to negotiate in Japan for war materials or a loan to buy them. He added that he might remain in Japan for more than a year. At 5:00 p.m., Daba and Shoji left on the Nagasaki Maru for Kobe.²⁸

Inauspiciously for Ethiopian hopes, Japanese newspapers reported that the foreign ministry officially knew nothing of the visit and maintained that Japan's attitude remained "that of a spectator watching a fight from a high window;"²⁹ that is, watchful waiting and protection of Japan's rather small commercial interests in Ethiopia.

The American embassy disparaged rumors that Daba was to buy munitions or to secure a loan for Ethiopia. In fact, the Americans thought the visit was largely a newspaper stunt by the Osaka Mainichi and that Daba was probably trying to find out how far Japan would go to champion the colored races against whites. They did not believe that Tokyo intended to alter its policy of non-interference in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. Foreign ministry officials, in fact, on September 22 again declared that Japan did not want to be affected by or commit itself in the dispute. On the other hand, newspaper reports and editorials showed that an excited Japanese public had sided with Ethiopia. The embassy directly attributed Japanese enthusiasm to the Osaka Mainichi's and the Tokyo Nichi Nichi's propaganda, their ability to organize demonstrations, and, according to rumors, to their having paid for Daba's trip. Ambassador Giacinto Auriti agreed with these assessments.³⁰

The Osaka Mainichi trumpeted the numerous contributions, letters of encour-

²⁷ *Japan Times*, Sept. 12, 14, 1935; *Japan Advertiser*, Sept. 11, 1935; Shanghai (Neyrone), 9/19/35: AP Ethiopia—Guerra b101 f4; China, 9/19/35: AP Ethiopia b24 f3.

²⁸ Japan (Neville) 10/3/35: NA 765.84/2012; *OM&TNN*, Sept. 14, 15, 1935; *Japan Advertiser*, Sept. 12, 14, 1935.

²⁹ *New York Times*, Sept. 14, 19, 1935; Japan (Auriti), 9/12/35: AP Ethiopia—Guerra b62 f3; *OM&TNN*, Sept. 18, 1935.

³⁰ Japan (Neville), 10/18/35: NA 894.00/94; Japan (Auriti), 9/11/35; 10/2/35: AP Ethiopia—Guerra b101 f4.

agement, applications from volunteers, and other expressions of sympathy pouring daily to Ethiopia's honorary consul. At the same time, Heruy told the Japanese correspondent in Addis Ababa that his office too had been flooded with applications—some written in blood—of Japanese wanting to join Ethiopia's army.³¹

Daba arrived in Kansai on September 14. The next day after a courtesy visit to the commander of the Fourth Division, he paid homage at the Momoyama mausoleums at Fushimi-Momoyama between Osaka and Kyoto. Daba then attended a welcoming tea given by the Ethiopian Rescue Society at the Miyako Hotel in Kyoto. Accompanied the whole time by Shoji and Yukawa, the party returned to Osaka at 1:30 p.m. and their rooms at the Osaka Hotel. Daba reported to Heruy on the enthusiastic welcome he had received.³²

Hosted by the Ethiopian Rescue Society, Daba received many invitations to meetings held to "express the sympathy of the Japanese people for Ethiopia."³³ And the Japanese flocked to hear Daba and Shoji. On the sixteenth, an audience of 6,000 packed Central Public Hall in Osaka to hear a lecture sponsored by the Osaka Mainichi. Yukawa introduced Daba, who spoke briefly in English and told the audience that he was to promote friendship and trade with Japan. He added that two great problems confronted East Africa: class struggle and racial conflict. He then drew a parallel with the foreign threat faced by Japan in the preceding century.

Abyssinia...is now menaced by foreign foes as Japan was some 60 years ago when she was about to open her doors to the outside world. Because the country is small, because the country is non-Caucasian, because it is weak, it must meet the foreign challenge. These things we non-white people are forced to endure.³⁴

After Daba, Shoji stepped on the platform to "thunderous applause." In his two-hour speech, he dwelt on Ethiopia and its relations with Japan and Italy. He assured his listeners that as the only independent nation of the black race, Ethiopians were proud and confident of their ultimate victory. A film describing Ethiopia finished the long evening. The next night, despite inclement weather, a mammoth crowd packed the auditorium of the Kobe First Middle School for a similar performance, again sponsored by the Osaka Mainichi. After the latter meeting, Daba was a guest at a sukiyaki dinner.³⁵

³¹ *OM&TNN*, Sept. 14, 1935; Bahru Zewde, "The Concept of Japanization in the Intellectual History of Modern Ethiopia," in Bahru Zewde, et al., ed. *Proceedings of Fifth Seminar of the Department of History* (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University, 1990), 5-6.

³² *OM&TNN*, Sept. 17, 1935.

³³ *New York Times*, Sept. 19, 1935.

³⁴ *OM&TNN*, Sept. 20, 1935; Bahru Zewde, "The Concept of Japanization," 5.

³⁵ *OM&TNN*, Sept. 17, 18, 1935. For Shoji's entire speech, see *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 1935. For newsreels showing Italian and Ethiopian military preparations, taken by Paramount Pictures and released by the *Osaka Mainichi & Tokyo Nichi Nichi* on September 19 to Japanese theaters, see *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1935. These newsreels differed from those shown at the lectures sponsored by the *Osaka Mainichi*.

Daba, Yukawa, and Shoji arrived at the Tokyo train station at 8:30 a.m. on September 19 to be hailed by about 2,000 members of the Black Dragons, the Patriotic Students Federation [Aikoku Seinen Renmei], Nationalist Volunteer People's Party [Kokusui Taishu-to Teishin-tai], the Ethiopia Support Society, and kindred organizations. They carried banners that screamed "Down With Italy!" and "Rescue Ethiopia!" Shinryu and Showa Boy Scouts addressed the gathering. Daba told the gathering that he intended to develop trade between the two countries. After shaking hands with editors from the Osaka Mainichi, the visitors, led by Ethiopia's tricolor flag, proceeded to the plaza in front of the Chiyoda Palace, where they bowed low. They then paid homage at the Meiji and Yasukuni shrines. Daba next visited the Tokyo Nichi Nichi headquarters and thanked officials there for the courtesies extended him. Daba was later a guest at a luncheon given by the Osaka Mainichi at the Tokyo Kaikan. He, Yukawa, and Shoji later addressed a gathering at the Nippon Young Men's Hall at 6:30 p.m.³⁶

Although Daba's movements in Japan enjoyed all the publicity the Osaka Mainichi and the Tokyo Nichi Nichi could command, and, despite the popular hullabaloo, influential Japanese were not involved. This had become painfully clear earlier that afternoon when he called at the foreign ministry, where he was received by Yoshida Tanichiro, Chief of the Second European Section. Daba presented his government's letter of appointment along with a letter from Heruy to Foreign Minister Hirota Koki. Daba thereby had officially revealed for the first time the purpose of his visit—his appointment as consular secretary. Yoshida soon divined, however, that Daba also sought aid, especially arms, ammunition, and advisors. As for the best way to ship munitions to Ethiopia, Daba pointed out that by treaty Ethiopia's colonial neighbors were obligated to allow their passage. He quickly acknowledged, however, that arms transfer through French and Italian territories would be impossible. Daba therefore suggested that Berbera in British Somaliland was the only port through which to send such goods. The journey from there to Ethiopia took two days. Turning the conversation to his traveling companion, Daba confessed that Shoji had discovered his special, secret mission and had imposed himself on the venture with some support in Ethiopia. Daba expressed his displeasure at being involved in the stunts that Japanese newspapers had cooked up.³⁷

On September 21, Daba again visited Yoshida and detailed the aid he wanted: a couple of surgeons; a major, captain, and lieutenant as military instructors; a couple of fortifications engineers; four telecommunications engineers; two artillery instructors; one airplane sound locator instructor; and general educators to train young

³⁶ *OM&TNN*, Sept. 20, 1935; *New York Times*, Sept. 20, 1935; *The Times* (London), Sept. 20, 1935; *Moscow Daily News*, Sept. 20, 1935; Furukawa, "Japan's Political Relations with Ethiopia," 10; Okakura Takashi, "1930 Nendai no Nihon-Ethiopia Kankei," [Japanese-Ethiopian Relations in the 1930s], *Afuri-rika Kenkyu*, 37 (Dec. 1990): 40-43. For more on trade promotion, see *Japan Times*, Oct. 31, 1935.

³⁷ Umino, "Dainiji Italia-Ethiopia Senso," 207.

Ethiopians. He also hoped to send Ethiopian students to Japan. Daba additionally sought medical supplies for 10,000 people as well as tents for a field hospital and surgeons. Daba requested weapons: modern artillery, anti-aircraft guns, sub-machine-guns, small airplane sound locators, automatic rifles, light tanks, and munitions. Daba further wanted military telephones, small tents for soldiers, trench telescopes and other tools for trenches, and soldier's rations. In return, Daba offered cash for weapons and ammunition as well as Ethiopian products such as coffee, hides, bees-wax, and honey for medicines and other items. For a facility to produce ammunition, credit was to be arranged. The two foreign ministries were to negotiate the salaries for the instructors.³⁸

Later that same day, the Oyama Ujiro of the Ethiopian Problems Society [Echiopia Mondai Kondan-kai] held a welcoming party for Daba and 251 patriotic guests at the Seiyoken restaurant at Ueno, Tokyo. Among the evening's sponsors were four lieutenant generals, two major generals, and two vice admirals, all retired, plus seven representatives, two peers, and various reactionary leaders, such as Toyama. Shoji described Ethiopia, and Daba relayed his emperor's appreciation for Japanese sympathy. Daba also delivered two personal letters to Toyama. In the first, Emperor Hayle Sellase wrote, "It is very regretful that Ethiopia, a country with a long history, should be destroyed by the imperialists." He added that as "a Christian country and a proud people, we do not wish to fight a war [but the] Ethiopian people are determined to defend our country at any cost." In the second letter, Heruy likewise thanked the Japanese people for their friendship. Daba also gave Toyama a photograph of Hayle Sellase. Toyama then took the lead in cheering for Ethiopia's ruler and Daba led cheers for Japan's emperor. The roundtable guests unanimously passed a resolution asking Daba to tell Hayle Sellase that, though the meeting could say nothing about the government's attitude, the Japanese people wished to assist Ethiopia. Western newspapers snidely pointed out that Daba, "young," "coal-black," and English-speaking, appeared dazed by the amount of handshaking by elderly patriots, and he did not realize that no Japanese of importance was present. The meeting broke up about 9:30 p.m. after dinner.³⁹

On instructions from Addis Ababa, on September 28, Daba visited Yoshida for the third time and even more urgently and no more successfully asked for help.⁴⁰

Hearing the news of Italy's attack on Ethiopia, on October 3, Daba hurried back to Tokyo and was solicited to attend various lectures and meetings hosted by various right-wing organizations. With great bravado, Daba told the Osaka Mainichi: "We will crush them out! That's all that awaits the Italian invaders."⁴¹

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 208.

³⁹ *OM&TNN*, Sept. 24, 1935; *New York Times*, Sept. 22, 1935; *The Times* (London), Sept. 21, 23, 1935; Oguri (Tokyo Police), 9/23/35, Gaiko Shiryo-kan: A461 ET/11-2 vol. 1.

⁴⁰ Umino, "Dainiji Italia-Echiopia Senso," 208.

⁴¹ *OM&TNN*, Oct. 5, 1935.

About thirty members of the Ethiopian Problems Society met at the Aeronautical Hall on the night of October 5. They sent Heruy a rather pretentious cablegram signed by Toyama: "The Japanese nation indignantly condemns Italian aggression. God bless righteous Ethiopia. In a war air raids are not the deciding factor. Never lose courage. Transmit this message to your commanders."⁴²

Although Daba was to remain in Japan until the spring, this was the last of the intense coverage of Ethiopia's envoy in Japan's press. Even the Osaka Mainichi, which had played such a crucial role in promoting Daba's visit and which now began devoting extraordinary resources to covering the war's fighting and diplomacy,⁴³ no longer followed his activities.

Collapse of Ethio-Japanese Friendship...And of Ethiopia

Apparently at the suggestion of ultra-nationalist groups, Daba visited the general staff office in Miyakezaka and met with several officers, although he did not visit the War Ministry itself.⁴⁴ The army that Daba had so courted, however, had already decided to maintain neutral, watchful waiting—or even lean toward Italy. As early as September 9, Lieutenant Colonel Numata Takazo, the military attaché in Rome had urged the chief of staff that Japan push Italy to war and not compromise with the League. He added, "we need to manipulate Italy, which seems soft at this moment."⁴⁵

A month later, on October 10, Major Seizo Arisue of the War Ministry's Adjutant General's Department handed Yoshida a policy paper. It described the government's policy as maintaining friendly relations with both Italy and Ethiopia and hoping for an early and peaceful solution to their conflict. The military, on the other hand, hoped to prolong the conflict. Arisue's report suggested that the government should "restrain public opinion and popular demonstrations" and added, "If England and others solicit Japan to support sanctions against Italy, Japan should reject the advance and show our favorable attitude toward Italy." At the same time, Japan should send a minister who would secretly support Ethiopia. Japan should also send officers to observe the conflict but supply neither side with weapons. Clearly, important elements within Japan's army wished to observe the war and to see it prolonged, presumably hoping to learn from parallels between Italy's struggle in Ethiopia and Japan's own fighting in China. Military authorities on October 5 dispatched Navy Lieutenant Commander Yamamoto Yoshio, stationed in England, to Port Said and in November, Captain Hattori Takushiro, a military attaché in France, to observe the

⁴² Rome circular, 12/4/35: AP Ethiopia—Guerra b117 f4; Umino, "Dainiji Italia-Echiopia Senso," 208; *Japan Advertiser*, Oct. 6, 1935.

⁴³ *OM&TNN*, Oct. 5, 1935.

⁴⁴ Umino, "Dainiji Italia-Echiopia Senso," 208.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 210.

battlefront.⁴⁶

Japanese officials at Geneva complained that many in Japan were anti-Italian and sympathized with Ethiopia. They further grumbled that Tokyo faced the dilemma of acting and arousing accusations of supporting the same League that had opposed Japan in Manchuria or of not acting and thereby helping Italy. The government, these Japanese officials continued, had considered action similar to that taken by the United States, that is, an arms embargo against both belligerents, and Tokyo regretted not having had the foresight to place itself in a similar position.⁴⁷

The Japanese readily assured Rome that they wanted to increase mutual trade and that they were ready to obstruct the application of sanctions against Italy. Sugimura even volunteered the Japanese firm of Mitsui as a source for vital petroleum products, and Mussolini happily accepted. Driving home this tilt toward Italy, in December, Sugimura informed Aloisi that Daba wished to obtain nurses and physicians, military advisers, and arms and munitions. Tokyo, the ambassador promised, had refused his supplications from the beginning.⁴⁸

Ambassador Auriti was sufficiently impressed with Japan's attitude that he asked that the Italian news agency, Stefani, be told not to speak of the yellow peril, Japanese exploitation of workers and women, Japanese dumping, the need for a white crusade, Japanese intentions to monopolize Ethiopia's market, or China except a little on Italy's trade interests there. Above all, Italy's press should be prudent in its comments on Manchukuo and recognize Japan's need for expansion. Despite insufficient economic resources and a growing population, Japan had rapidly progressed because of its patriotism, industriousness, and discipline. Japan, he added, was useful in guarding the Far East against communism. Auriti promised that Japan's press agency, Rengo, would immediately respond with articles favorable to Italy.⁴⁹

In sum, Japan's foreign ministry and army had agreed that public passions would not affect policy. Tokyo announced that it would observe strict neutrality, calmly watch the East African situation, and ignore League policy.⁵⁰ The Japanese told the Italians but not Daba that they would not send loans, arms, munitions, volunteers, or a military mission to an Ethiopia unable to pay in any case. Perhaps the government resented Daba's being dragged around the country by the various right-wing organizations. Tokyo, in fact, replied to Daba's requests only through its instructions of December 4 preparing for the appointment of Secretary Suzuki Kuma in France as minister ad interim to Ethiopia. He would open Japan's new legation in January

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 209-10.

⁴⁷ Geneva (Gilbert), 10/14/35: NA 765.84/1794.

⁴⁸ Rome (Suvich), 11/22/35; Geneva (Aloisi), 11/21/35; Rome (Mussolini), 11/22/35; Rome circular, 12/16/35: AP Ethiopia—Guerra b117 f7.

⁴⁹ Japan (Auriti), 11/22/35: Etiopia—Guerra b117 f7.

⁵⁰ Japan (Scalise), 10/14/35: AP Etiopia—Guerra b72 f3; Rome circular, 10/9/35: AP Etiopia—Guerra b117 f4; *Japan Advertiser*, Oct. 5, 1935.

1936.⁵¹ Japan also had to consider international relations and had few resources in any case to offer East Africa.⁵²

On January 23, 1936, Heruy visited the newly opened Japanese legation at Addis Ababa to order small quantities of light arms from Japan, but did no better than had Daba.⁵³

In the end, the Japanese limited their aid to sending the Ethiopian Red Cross enough plasters for 10,000 people, 138 boxes of medical supplies, and some tents in November 1935 and February 1936. Along with most of the rest of the world, Japan protested Italy's use of poison gas and its bombing of Red Cross units. Japanese sent 1,200 swords, relics of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese war, to Ethiopia. A patriotic society presented an old Japanese sword to Emperor Hayle Sellase. One firm refused to deliver 100,000 pairs of boots to Italian Somaliland, because they would be used against Ethiopia. The Osaka Chamber of Commerce planned to provide straw sandals to Ethiopians to protect their feet against poison gas. The "Bar Ethiopia" in Tokyo posted a notice barring Italians from entering.⁵⁴

At the end of March, Emperor Hayle Sellase through Daba awarded Sumioka the Commander Class of the Order of Menelik II. In a letter to Ethiopia's emperor, Sumioka expressed thanks for the decoration and for the gifts of a gold bracelet and ring for his wife, he predicted that Ethiopia's brave army under the "direct command of its courageous "King of Kings" would defeat his enemies. The letter went on to commend Daba's activities:

During his six months' sojourn in Japan...Daba has at all times conducted himself with credit, and at no time has the prestige of Abyssinia suffered at his hands...Hirota...has received him twice in private conference and has seen him to the door in person when...[he] took leave....

Despite the difficulties of his task...Daba has been able to push negotiations with the Japanese authorities to a point where agreement on principles has been reached, although on particulars there still seems room for further discussion.

The goodwill of the Japanese people toward Abyssinia has been evinced in the warm welcome which...Daba received when he landed at Kobe and when he arrived at Tokyo station and in the intense activities of...[Toyama's Ethiopian Problems Society],...the

⁵¹ Taura Masanori has written on the issue of Japan's establishing and maintaining a legation in Addis Ababa. See his "Nihon-Ethiopia Kankei," 141-170 and "Nichii Kankei (1935-36) to sono Yotai' Ethiopia Senso wo meguru Nihon gawa Taio kara" [Italo-Japanese Relations (1935-36) And Their Conditions: From the Japanese Response to the Ethiopian War] in Ito Takashi, ed., *Nihon Kindai-shi no Saikochiku* [Reexamination of Japanese History] (Yamakawa Shuppan-sha, 1993), 302-28.

⁵² Umino, "Dainiji Italia-Ethiopia Senso," 209.

⁵³ Faerber-Ishihara, *Les premiers contacts*, 20.

⁵⁴ See the documents in Gaiko Shiryo-kan ET/11-6. For private offers of medical assistance, see Oguri to Goto and Hirota, 7/20/35; Gaiko Shiryo-kan A461 ET/11-2-1. Also see A461 ET/11-7-6 and *Japan Advertiser*, Jan. 21, Feb. 7, 1936.

Japanese Red Cross Society, the Patriotic Women's Society and other organizations and individuals in sending medical supplies, money and other articles for the aid of the Abyssinian people.⁵⁵

Sumioka's statement certainly—even if inadvertently—emphasized the quasi-official nature of Daba's visit. And Sumioka's list of accomplishments—Daba had seen Hirota twice and been escorted to the door; he had negotiated "agreement in principles" even if without particulars; he had been enthusiastically welcomed by many Japanese; some few groups had sent some few medical supplies; and Daba had not embarrassed himself—merely emphasizes how little his visit had achieved or even could have achieved.

Auriti agreed. He had only casually followed Daba's exploits. In his report to Rome describing Daba's departure from Tokyo at the end of March, he mentioned the couple of hundred members of "reactionary nationalistic associations," especially the Black Dragons, who saw him off at the station. He noted the money as well as the military and medical supplies given to Daba. Auriti quickly added the assurances from the war ministry that these supplies had been few, in the nature of samples, of poor quality, and that Daba had not been given "even one of the rifles that he had been insistently requesting."⁵⁶

Daba, whom Grew disparaged as "the self-styled diplomatic negotiator for Ethiopia,"⁵⁷ after seven months in Japan sailed for his homeland on April 2. Although he had declined to attend a farewell party held by right-wing organizations, Daba did put on a brave face in interviews with the Osaka Mainichi just before his departure.⁵⁸ Misplaced bravado. At a press conference on April 17, a foreign ministry spokesman stated that in the event of Italy's subjugation of Ethiopia, Japan would act independently to protect its rights and interests in that region. He pointed out that Japan had a friendship and commercial agreement with Ethiopia and that commerce between the two countries had been increasing.⁵⁹

Ethiopia's army was neither sufficiently armed, trained, nor led to effectively resist for long Italy's invasion. Italian troops entered Addis Ababa in May 1936.

The Italians only with great confusion followed Daba's trail once he returned to Africa. He arrived in Egypt on September 16, and briefly stayed at Port Said and Ismailia. By mid-October, with Ethiopia's ex-consul at Port Said he established him-

⁵⁵ *Japan Advertiser*, Mar. 28, 1936; Japan (Grew), 4/16/36: NA 894.00 P.R./100. In addition, the Japanese attorney addressed another letter to Ethiopia's foreign minister urging him to establish a Legation in Tokyo as soon as possible.

⁵⁶ Japan (Auriti), 3/31/36, 3/6/36: AP Ethiopia—Guerra b117 f7.

⁵⁷ Japan (Grew), 4/16/36: NA 894.00 P.R./100.

⁵⁸ *OM & TNN*, Mar. 31, Apr. 1, 1936.

⁵⁹ Japan (Grew), 5/13/36: NA 894.00/unclear; Umino, "Dainiji Italia-Echiopia Senso," 208-09.

self in Cairo.⁶⁰

Daba soon accommodated himself to Italy's conquest. On December 12 in the presence of the officials of Italy's legation in Cairo, he subjected himself to Italian authority and received a passport. The Italians withheld news of Daba's subjugation to allow him to withdraw his baggage deposited with Ethiopia's ex-consul in Djibouti. Daba had additionally deposited in Aden and near the Ethiopian consulate at Djibouti some fifty boxes of medicines and surgical tools he had acquired in Japan and once destined for Ethiopia's Red Cross. They would now go to the Italians. The Royal Legation in Cairo predicted that Daba's subjugation would help break up the nucleus of Ethiopian refugees residing in Cairo.⁶¹

In February 1936 at the crucial moment during the Italo-Ethiopian War, young Imperial Way Faction [Kodo-ha] army officers attempted a coup by occupying the Diet Building and the War Ministry in Tokyo and by assassinating "traitorous" high officials. The coup's failure strengthened the Control Faction [Tosei-ha], which clamped down on these ultra-nationalist groups, which had also tended most vociferously to support Ethiopia. One consequence of the victory of the pragmatic Control Faction's victory was that Tokyo ultimately accommodated itself to Italy's conquest of the Ethiopian Empire. The exchange of recognitions on December 2, 1936—Japan's conquest of Manchukuo for Italy's conquest of Ethiopia—paved the way for the reconciliation between Tokyo and Rome.⁶²

Surely, this volte-face in Rome and Tokyo could not have been accomplished so quickly if the Italians had not been brought to believe Japanese protestations of innocence regarding the arms transfers and training that Ethiopia had so desperately sought through Daba's mission to Japan. Perhaps they never truly had. But whether they had or not, throughout 1935 and most of 1936, they had effectively used the rumors of significant Japanese inroads into Ethiopia to successfully disarm potential international opposition to Italy's coming adventure, especially in London, Paris, and Moscow. In truth, Daba's visit never had any real chance to succeed other than as a publicity stunt orchestrated by Shoji and the Osaka Mainichi.

⁶⁰ Rome circular, 6/13/36; Port Said (Corti), 8/18/36; Rome (Minister of War), 9/29/36; Aden (Fabiani), 4/30/36, 9/8/36; Cairo (Legation), 10/3/36; 10/23/36: AP Ethiopia—Guerra b117 f7.

⁶¹ Legation (Cairo), 12/18/36; Alexandria (Ghigi), 12/5/36: AP Ethiopia—Guerra b117 f7.

⁶² Richard Albert Bradshaw, "Japan and European Colonialism in Africa, 1800–1937," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio University, 1992), 320–22, 358–62; Italy (Sugimura), 10/29/36: Gaiko Shiryo-kan A461 ET/11 Vol. 8; Italy (Sugimura), 5/12–13/36, 5/25–26/36; Germany (Mushanokoji), 5/15–16/36: Gaiko Shiryo-kan A461 ET/11–7 vol. 7; Okakura and Kitagawa, *Nihon-Afurika Koryu-shi*, 45. America's representatives followed these events closely. See the many documents in NA 765.94.

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